G.R. No.
196049 June 26, 2013 Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and
to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province
or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least
six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply
with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
1
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family
Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only
to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the
party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of
the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family
Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows
a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate
Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court
should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack
of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued
by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x
x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x
x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for
further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse
of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:
2
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage
void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter
is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz
v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal
capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven
as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity
in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
3
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow
its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15
of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment
or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if
they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life
which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
4
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition
under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest
in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband
and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither
the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse
is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and
5
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under
R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which
is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does
not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because
it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do
not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino
spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between
a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy.
A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but
this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines;
and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
6
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that
the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of
the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011

and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

7
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant
in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father
with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's
death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time
and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection
to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why
the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
8
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The
law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
9
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot
be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court,
which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never
to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation
to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished
the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage
bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights
or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is
as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
10
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8,
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were
both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the
instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal
Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on
12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
for being designed merely to harass him.
ordered After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
2001
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for
the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He
therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his
staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages
had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must
be present at the time of marriage;
11
 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he
had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to
note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn
to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is
simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed
upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous

marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known
that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge
of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was
clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family
Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when
the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of
time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other
is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as
a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he

solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law
excuses no one" has special application to judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,

12

G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the
legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar,
the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with
the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner
and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together
as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia
A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court. 3 In her complaint,
respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
"reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their
marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit;
and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage
contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get
parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that
they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen
nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural
father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it
ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could
not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has
been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove
the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last
time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners
"forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it
was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to
it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family
Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to
show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can
be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited
to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of
the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
13
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October
2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital
Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as
the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2)
declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and
the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his
marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and
admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage
license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage
license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit
should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for
the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an
ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support.
Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the
same evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous
expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of
the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the
childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring
the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on
the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere
dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the
legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her
candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive
in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds
that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it
was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v.
Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their
affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of
the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus
entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the
daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent.
The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Nial
v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 20
14
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed
with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the
main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that
the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. 23 In the instant
case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together
for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of
at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. 26 In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate
daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children. 27 Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of
respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque,
Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein
he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they
were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or
clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of
their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately
led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal
otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1"
and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1"
and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners
finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent
is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City
in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
15

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared
the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna,
Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of
the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of
them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper
lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part
of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account
of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful
and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from
service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. 9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
16
valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall
to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces
of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that
could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa]
told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet
it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper
that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not
seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a
ride" by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife,
he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified
that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further
testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson
was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his
sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the
action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party
within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained
by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose
and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not
exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses
appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on
Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.
Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987
then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed
the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 16 of the Civil Code as one
of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and
wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took
17
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member
of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court
of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 18 of
the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar.
In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this
Court in Nial v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for
at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such
and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify
their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception.
It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from
the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license. 21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas
motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No.
175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of
the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
18
 II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Nial.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of
the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does
not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose
only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy
and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would
exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To
reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise
to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For
her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that
the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said
affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under
a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that
the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties
and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage.
To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents:
(1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988,
indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the
effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the
prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on
24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly,
the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark contrast to
the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war,
(2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3) ratification of
19
marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article
76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of
marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule
on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under
the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or
add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the
age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be
had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall
state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited
Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises
when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on
this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by
Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license,
is beyond question.
20
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since
all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of
a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds
that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage
to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that
Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of
law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties
marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The
marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage
license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license
a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the
place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be
wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity
of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested
to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a
lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the
fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law. 54 There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he
sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose
and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-
year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year
period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to
a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. 57 It
covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken. 58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
21
SO ORDERED. OR FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS OR FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS and TEOFILO CARLOS II, Respondent.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

These consolidated petitions emanated from a civil case filed by Juan de

Dios Carlos ("Carlos") against respondents Felicidad Sandoval ("Sandoval")
and Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II) docketed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Muntinlupa City as Civil Case No. 95-135.

In his Complaint before the RTC, Carlos asserted that he was the sole
surviving compulsory heir of his parents, Felix B. Carlos and Felipa
Elemia,1 who had acquired during their marriage, six parcels of land (subject
G.R. No. 135830 September 30, 2005 properties). His brother, Teofilo ("Teofilo"), died intestate in 1992. At the time
of his death, Teofilo was apparently married to Sandoval, and cohabiting with
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, Petitioners, her and their child, respondent Teofilo II. Nonetheless, Carlos alleged in
vs. his Complaint that Teofilo and Sandoval were not validly married as they had
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE not obtained any marriage license.2Furthermore, Carlos also asserted that
CARLOS or FELICIDAD S. CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL DE Teofilo II could not be considered as Teofilos child. As a result, Carlos
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, Respondent. concluded that he was also the sole heir of his brother Teofilo, since the latter
had died without leaving any heirs.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
Carlos also claimed that Teofilo, prior to their father Felixs death in 1963,
G.R. No. 136035 developed a scheme to save the elder Carloss estate from inheritance taxes.
Under the scheme, the properties of the father would be transferred to Teofilo
SIDDCOR (now MEGA PACIFIC) INSURANCE who would, in turn, see to it that the shares of the legal heirs are protected
CORPORATION, Petitioners, and delivered to them. Felix assented to the plan, and the subject properties
vs. were transferred in the name of Teofilo. After Teofilos death, Carlos entered
FELICIAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS and TEOFILO CARLOS into certain agreements with Sandoval in connection with the subject
II, Respondent. properties. Carlos did so, believing that the latter was the lawful wife of his
brother Teofilo. Subsequently though, Carlos discovered that Sandoval and
his brother were never validly married, as their marriage was contracted
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
without a marriage license.3
G.R. No. 137743
Carlos now sought to nullify these agreements with Sandoval for want of
consideration, the premise for these contracts being non-existent. Thus,
SIDDCOR (now MEGA PACIFIC) INSURANCE Carlos prayed of the RTC to declare the alleged marriage between Teofilo
CORPORATION, Petitioners, and Sandoval void ab initio, provided that Teofilo died without issue, order
vs. that new titles covering the subject properties be issued in the name of
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION), Carlos, and require Sandoval to restitute Carlos in the amount
HON. ALBERTO L. LERMA and/or the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE ofP18,924,800.00.4
CITY OF MUNTINLUPA, BRANCH 256, FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS OR FELICIDAD S. CARLOS

22
Carlos likewise prayed for the issuance of the provisional relief of preliminary
attachment. The RTC issued anOrder dated 7 September 1995 granting the
prayer for preliminary attachment, and on 15 September 1995, a writ of
preliminary attachment. Carlos posted a bond for P20,000,000.00 issued by
herein petitioner
SIDDCOR Insurance Corporation (SIDDCOR). 5 Shortly thereafter, a Notice
of Garnishment was served upon the Philippine National Bank (PNB) over
the deposit accounts maintained by respondents.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment,
which was opposed by Carlos. On 4 December 1995, the RTC rendered an
order denying the motion. This caused respondents to file a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the RTC order
granting the writ of preliminary attachment denying the motion for the
discharge of the writ. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39267. 6
On 27 February 1996, the Court of Appeals Second Division promulgated
its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39267,wherein it granted the Petition for
Certiorari and ordered the discharge and dissolution of the Writ of
Attachment and Notice of Garnishment.7 The Court of Appeals found that
there was no sufficient cause of action to warrant the preliminary attachment,
since Carlos had merely alleged general averments in order to support his
prayer.8Carlos elevated the said Decision to this Court by way of Petition for
Review on Certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-125717. In
a Resolution dated 21 October 1996, the Court denied Carloss Petition, and
thus the Court of Appeals Decision ordering the dissolution of the Writ of
Attachment and Notice of Garnishment became final.
In the meantime, the hearing on Carloss Complaint ensued before the RTC.
Respondents duly filed their Answerand thereafter filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Carlos opposed the motion and countered with his
ownMotion for Summary Judgment. On 8 April 1996, the RTC rendered a
summary judgment in favor of Carlos. Carloss victory was wholesale, with
the RTC making the following pronouncements:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite, on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the
Marriage Contract submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land,
less the portion adjudicated to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered
by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering
said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of the Complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to
issue another title in the sole name of the plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the Complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff
herein.
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein. 9
Upon promulgation of the Summary Judgment, Carlos moved before the
RTC for execution pending appeal. The RTC granted the motion for
execution pending appeal upon the filing of a bond. 10 On 27 May 1996, the
RTC issued a Writ of Execution.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary
Judgment, which was denied in anOrder dated 20 May 1996. Respondents
then appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, wherein such
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53229. The case was raffled to the
appellate courts Fourteenth Division for completion of records. Sandoval and
Carlos also filed a Petition for Certiorari with Temporary Restraining
Orderdated 2 June 1996. This special civil action primarily attacked the
allowance of execution pending appeal, and prayed for the annulment of
the Order granting execution pending appeal, and of the Writ of Execution
On 10 December 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53229, respondents filed
a Motion for Judgment On the Attachment Bond. They noted that the Court of
Appeals had already ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by
23
the RTC was improperly granted and that its Decision, as affirmed by the
Supreme Court, had attained finality. Accordingly, they were entitled to
damages under Section 20, Rule 57 of the then Rules of Civil Procedure,
which governed claims for damages on account of unlawful attachment. In
support of their allegation of damages, they cite the Notice of Garnishment
served on PNB Malolos Branch, where Felicidad Carlos maintained
deposits amounting to P15,546,121.98.11 Also presented in support of the
motion was a Notice of Delivery/Payment by the RTC Sheriff, directing the
PNB Malolos Branch to deliver the amounts previously garnished by virtue of
the Writ of Execution dated 27 May 1996;12 a Manifestation filed by PNB
dated 19 July 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40819, stating that PNB had already
delivered to the RTC Sheriff on 27 June 1996 the amount of P15,384,509.98
drawn against the accounts of Carlos; and a Certification to the same effect
issued by the PNB Malolos Branch. In an Addendum to Motion for Judgment
on the Attachment Bond, respondents additionally prayed for moral and
exemplary damages.13
After various pleadings were duly filed by the parties, the Court of Appeals
Special Fourth Division issued aResolution dated 23 March 1998, certifying
that all the necessary pleadings have been filed, and that the case may
already be referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to a ponente for
study and report. The sameResolution likewise denied without elaboration
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping filed earlier by Carlos. 14
On such denial, Carlos filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents
likewise filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 17 April 1998,
arguing that under the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA), the case may be re-raffled for assignment for study and report only
after there is a resolution that the case is deemed submitted for
decision.15 They pointed out that re-raffle could not yet be effected, as there
were still pending incidents, particularly the motions for reconsideration of
Carlos and themselves, as well as the Motion for Judgment on Attachment
Bond.
On 26 June 1998, the Court of Appeals Former Special Fourth Division
promulgated two resolutions.16 The first, in response to Carloss Motion for
Reconsideration, again denied Carloss Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
andMotion for Suspension, but explained the reasons for such denial.
The second resolution is at the center of the present petitions. The
assailed Resolution agreed with respondents that it was first necessary to
resolve the pending incidents before the case could be re-raffled for study
and report. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
proceeded to rule on these pending incidents. While the first resolution dwelt
on the pending motions filed by Carlos, this Resolution tackled the other
matter left unresolved, the Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond.The
Court of Appeals found the claim for damages meritorious, citing the earlier
decisions ruling that Carlos was not entitled to the preliminary attachment.
Invoking Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, as well as
jurisprudence,17 the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary for the
determination of damages on the injunction bond to await the decision on
appeal.
The Court of Appeals then proceeded to determine to what damages
respondents were entitled to. In ruling that the award of actual damages was
warranted, the court noted:
It is also not disputed that the PNB, on June 27, 1996, issued two managers
checks: MC No. 938541 forP4,932,621.09 and MC 938542
for P10,451,888.89 payable to the order of "Luis C. Bucayon II, Sheriff IV,
RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa", duly received by the latter in the total amount
of PESOS FIFTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINE & 98/100 (P15,384,509.98), drawn
against the accounts of Ms. Felicidad Sandoval Vda. de Carlos which were
earlier garnished for the satisfaction of the above-mentioned writ of
attachment (Annex "E", Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond, pp. 7-
8)18
....
The contention of [Carlos] that the writ of attachment was not implemented
falls flat on the face of the manifestation of PNB that the delivery of the
garnished P15,384,509.98 to him was effected through the sheriff. 19
The Court of Appeals found that moral and exemplary damages were not
warranted, there being no malice in pursuing the attachment. The appellate
court also found the claim of P2,000,000.00 for attorneys fees as excessive,
and reduced the sum by half. Correspondingly, the dispositive portion of the
assailed Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against
the attachment bond, ordering SIDDCOR INSURANCE CORPORATION and
plaintiff-appellee to pay defendants-appellants, jointly and severally, the sum
of P15,384,509.98 and 12% interest per annum from June 27, 1996 when
the unlawful garnishment was effected until fully paid and P1,000,000.00 as
attorneys fees with 6% interest thereon from the trial courts decision on April
8, 1986 until fully paid.
24
SO ORDERED.20
Both Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their respective motions for reconsideration
of the Resolution. For their part, respondents filed a Motion for Immediate
Execution dated 7 August 1998 in regard to the Resolution of 26 June 1998
awarding them damages.
In the Resolution dated 10 October 1998,21 the Court of Appeals denied the
motions for reconsideration and granted the Motion for Immediate Execution.
In granting the Motion for Immediate Execution, the Court of Appeals cited
the reasons that the appeal to be undertaken from the 26 June
1998 Resolution was patently dilatory; that there were no material and
substantial defenses against the motion for judgment on the attachment
bond, rendering the appeal pro-forma and dilatory; that Sandoval was of
advanced age and might not enjoy the fruits of the judgment on the
attachment bond; and that immediate execution would end her suffering due
to the arbitrary garnishment of her account pursuant to an improper
attachment.22
In its Motion for Reconsideration, SIDDCOR explicitly assailed the allowance
of the Motion for Immediate Execution.23 This was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 22 December 1998.24
From these antecedents, the following petitions were filed before this Court:
G.R. No. 135830
This Appeal by Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction dated 26 October 1998 filed by Carlos assailed
the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals both dated 26 June 1998, as well
as theResolution of 10 October 1998, which denied Carloss motion for
reconsideration. Carlos argues that the Court of Appeals, through the Former
Special Fourth Division, could not have resolved the Motion for Judgment on
the Attachment Bond since the case had not yet been re-raffled under the
two-raffle system for study and report; that the Court of Appeals erred in
resolving the motion without conducting any hearing; that the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction over the motion as the docketing fees had not yet
been filed; that the motion for judgment, which did not contain any
certification against forum-shopping, was an application subject to the
requirements of certification against forum-shopping; that there was no
supporting evidence to support the award of damages; and that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration without adverting to specific reasons mentioned for the
denial of each issue.25
Carlos likewise ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the Court of Appeals in
its other Resolution dated 26 June 1998 for its refusal to dismiss CA-G.R. CV
No. 53229 on the ground of forum-shopping, adding that the appellate court
should have deferred resolution of the Motion for Judgment on the
Attachment Bond considering the prejudicial question raised in Carloss
motion to dismiss the main case on the ground of forum-shopping.
G.R. No. 136035
This concerns a Petition for Review filed by SIDDCOR, likewise challenging
the Resolution of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals and the 10 October
1998 Resolution wherein Siddcors Motion for Reconsideration, among
others, was denied. Siddcor argues therein that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling on the motion for damages without awaiting judgment in the main
case; granting that damages may be awarded, these should encompass only
such damages incurred during the pendency of the appeal; and that a
hearing was necessary to prove the claim for damages and the appellate
court erred in granting the award for damages despite lack of hearing.
G.R. No. 137743
The third petition for adjudication, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, was also
filed by SIDDCOR. This petition, dated 8 March 1999, specifically assails the
allowance by the Court of Appeals of the immediate execution of the award
of damages, made through the resolutions dated 10 October 1998 and 22
December 1998.
SIDDCOR hereunder argues that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that execution of a judgment or final order pending
appeal may be made only on motion of the prevailing party and may be
made "even before the expiration of the period to appeal." 26 Respondents
had argued in their Motion for Immediate Execution that the judgment sought
to be executed (that on the attachment bond) was interlocutory and not
appealable, yet cited rulings on execution pending appeal under Section 2,
Rule 39 in support of their position. SIDDCOR cites this inconsistency as
proof of a change of theory on the part of respondents which could not be
done for the theories are incompatible. Such being the case, SIDDCOR
argues, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in granting
immediate execution since respondents had filed its motion on the premise
that the award on the judgment bond was interlocutory and not appealable.
SIDDCOR also claims that the judgment on the attachment bond is not
interlocutory, citing Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals27 wherein it was ruled that such indeed constitutes a final and
appealable order.
25
SIDDCOR points out that no hearing was conducted on the Motion for
Immediate Execution despite the requirement in Section 2, Rule 39 that
"discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing." SIDDCOR likewise notes that the motion
granting immediate execution was granted in the very same resolution which
had denied the motion for reconsideration of the resolution sought to be
immediately executed. For SIDDCOR, such constituted a denial of
procedural due process insofar as its statutory right to appeal was
concerned, as the resolution that it intended to appeal from was already the
subject of immediate execution.
Finally, SIDDCOR contests the special reasons cited by the Court of Appeals
in granting the Motion for Immediate Execution.
Facts Arising Subsequent to the Filing of Instant Petitions
On 7 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Execution directing the
enforcement of the judgment on the attachment bond. 28 However, in
a Resolution dated 9 June 1999, this Court through the First Division issued
aTemporary Restraining Order, enjoining the enforcement of the said Writ of
Execution.
On 15 October 2002, the Court of Appeals First Division rendered
a Decision29 on the merits of CA-G.R. CV No. 53229, setting aside
the Summary Judgment and ordering the remand of the case for further
proceedings.30 Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.31 In addition, Carlos filed a motion to inhibit the author of the
assailed decision, Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, 32 who thereafter
agreed to inhibit herself. 33 Then on 7 August 2003, the Court of Appeals
Former First Division issued a Resolution deferring action on the motions for
reconsideration in light of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
until the resolution of the present petitions.
The factual background may be complicated, but the court need only concern
itself with the propriety of the judgment on the attachment bond and the
subsequent moves to secure immediate execution of such judgment. Should
this Court be called upon to tackle the merits of the original action, Carloss
complaint, it shall be in the review of the final resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53229.
Consolidation of Issues in
G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035 are concerned with the award
of damages on the attachment bond. They may be treated separately from
the petition in G.R. No. 137743, which relates to the immediate execution of
the said award.
We consolidate the main issues in G.R. Nos. 135830 and 136035, as follows:
(1) whether the assailed judgment on the attachment bond could have been
rendered, as it was, prior to the adjudication of the main case; (2) whether
the Court of Appeals properly complied with the hearing requirement under
Section 20, Rule 57 prior to its judgment on the attachment bond; and (3)
whether the Court of Appeals properly ascertained the amount of damages it
awarded in the judgment on the attachment bond.
Resolving these issues requires the determination of the proper scope and
import of Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
provision governs the disposal of claims for damages on account of
improper, irregular or excessive attachment.
SECTION 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or
excessive attachment.An application for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before
appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due
notice to the attaching obligee or his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts
showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may
be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the
judgment on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom
the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the
pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court with
notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or
sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The
appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial
court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the
attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the damages
awarded to him from any property of the attaching obligee not exempt from
execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail
to fully satisfy the award. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 20 essentially allows the application to be filed at any time before the
judgment becomes executory. It should be filed in the same case that is the
main action, and cannot be instituted separately. 34 It should be filed with the
court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application. 35 The
26
remedy provided by law is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the
determination of the damages on time and while the judgment is still under
the control of the court, the claimant loses his right to damages. 36
There is no question in this case that the Motion for Judgment on the
Attachment Bond filed by respondents on 10 December 1996 was properly
filed since it was filed with the Court of Appeals during the pendency of the
appeal in the main case and also as an incident thereto. The core questions
though lie in the proper interpretation of the condition under Section 20, Rule
57 that reads: "Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and
shall be included in the judgment on the main case." Petitioners assert that
there was no proper hearing on the application for damages and that the
Court of Appeals had wrongfully acted on the application in that it resolved it
prior to the rendition of the main judgment.
"Such Damages May Be Awarded
Only After Proper Hearing."
We first discuss whether the "proper hearing" requirement under Section 20,
Rule 57 had been satisfied prior to the award by the Court of Appeals of
damages on the attachment bond.
Section 20 of Rule 57 requires that there be a "proper hearing" before the
application for damages on the attachment bond may be granted. The
hearing requirement ties with the indispensable demand of procedural due
process. Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts
supporting the applicant's right to damages and the amount thereof under the
bond is essential. No judgment for damages may be entered and executed
against the surety without giving it an opportunity to be heard as to the reality
or reasonableness of the damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of
the writ.37
In Paramount Insurance v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court held that under the
rule, it was neither mandatory nor fatal that there should be a separate
hearing in order that damages upon the bond can be claimed, ascertained
and awarded.39 What is necessary only is for the attaching party and his
surety or sureties to be duly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. 40
In this case, both Carlos and SIDDCOR were duly notified by the appellate
court of the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond and were required
to file their respective comments thereto.41 Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their
respective comments in opposition to private
respondents motion.42 Clearly, all the relevant parties had been afforded the
bare right to be heard on the matter.
Concededly, the facts of this case differ from that in Paramount, wherein the
award of damages was predicated under Section 8, Rule 58, and the trial on
the merits included the claim for damages on the attachment bond. The
Court did note therein that the counsel of the surety was present during the
hearings.43 In this case, unlike inParamount, there were no open court
hearings conducted by the Court of Appeals, and it is precisely this absence
that the petitioners assert as fatal.
Plainly, there is no express requirement under the rule that the hearing be
done in open court, or that the parties be allowed to confront adverse
witnesses to the claim of damages on the bond. The proper scope of the
hearing requirement was explained before Paramount in Peroxide
Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals,44 thus:
. . . [It] is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having been
illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the burden of
proof to sustain the writ being on the attaching creditor. That hearing
embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable
opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and meet them. The
right to submit arguments implies that opportunity, otherwise the right would
be a barren one. It means a fair and open hearing.
From this pronouncement, we can discern that the "proper hearing"
contemplated would not merely encompass the right of the parties to submit
their respective positions, but also to present evidence in support of their
claims, and to rebut the submissions and evidence of the adverse party. This
is especially crucial considering that the necessary elements to be
established in an application for damages are essentially factual: namely, the
fact of damage or injury, and the quantifiable amount of damages sustained.
Such matters cannot be established on the mere say-so of the applicant, but
require evidentiary support. At the same time, there was no equivocal
statement from the Court in Peroxide that the hearing required under the rule
should be a full-blown hearing on the merits
In this case, we rule that the demands of a "proper hearing" were satisfied as
of the time the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed judgment on the
attachment bond. The circumstances in this case that we consider
particularly telling are the settled premises that the judicial finding on the
wrongfulness of the attachment was then already conclusive and beyond
review, and that the amount of actual damages sustained was likewise
indubitable as it indeed could be found in the official case record in CA-G.R.
CV No. 53229. As a result, petitioners would have been precluded from
27
either raising the defenses that the preliminary attachment was valid or
disputing the amount of actual damages sustained by reason of the
garnishment. The only matter of controversy that could be litigable through
the traditional hearing would be the matter of moral and exemplary damages,
but the Court of Appeals appropriately chose not to award such damages.
Moreover, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to counter the arguments
extended by the respondents. They fully availed of that right by submitting
their respective comments/oppositions. In fine, the due process guarantee
has been satisfied in this case.
It should be noted that this case poses a situation different from what is
normally contemplated under Section 20, Rule 57wherein the very
wrongfulness of the attachment remains one of the issues in contention in
the main case. In such a case, there would be a greater demand for a more
extensive hearing on the application of damages. The modality of hearing
should remain within the discretion of the court having jurisdiction to hear the
application for damages. The only demand, concordant to due process,
would be the satisfaction of the right to be heard, to present evidence, and to
rebut the evidence and arguments of the opposing party.
Some disquisition is necessary on whether or not, as petitioners submit, a
full-blown hearing in open court is compulsory under Section 20, Rule 57. To
impose this as a mandatory requirement would ultimately prove too onerous
to our judicial system. Perhaps such a demand would be less burdensome
on the regional trial courts, which, as a matter of routine, receive testimonial
or documentary evidence offered de novo, and to formulate conclusions on
the admissibility and credibility of the same.
However, a different situation applies if it is the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court before which the application for damages is filed. Both these
courts, which are capacitated to receive and act on such actions, are
generally not triers of facts, and do not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. It is partly for such reason that Section 20, Rule 57 authorizes
these appellate courts to refer the application for damages to the trial court
for hearing and decision. The trial courts are functionally attuned to ascertain
and evaluate at the first instance the necessary factual premises that would
establish the right to damages. Still, reference of the application for damages
to the trial court is discretionary on the part of the appellate courts. The latter,
despite their traditional appellate jurisdiction and review function, are still
empowered under Section 20 to rule on the application for damages,
notwithstanding the factual dimension such question presents.
To impose as mandatory on the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to
hear the application for damages through full-blown hearings in open court is
supremely unwise and beyond the demands of Section 20, Rule 57. The
effect would be unduly disruptive on the daily workflow of appellate courts
such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, which rarely conduct
open court hearings. Neither could the Court see what is so markedly special
about an application for damages, fact-oriented as it may be, that would
require it to be heard by the appellate courts in open court when no such
mandatory rule applies to other judicial matters for resolution that are also
factual in nature.
For example, the review of death penalty convictions by the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court necessitates a thorough evaluation of the evidence
presented, notwithstanding the prior factual appreciation made by the trial
court.45 Notwithstanding the factual nature of the questions involved, there is
no rule requiring the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to call death
penalty cases for hearing or oral argument. If no such mandatory rule for
hearing is imposed on the appellate courts when the supreme penalty of
death is involved, why then should an exceptional rule be imposed in the
case for the relatively insignificant application for damages on the attachment
bond?
If open court hearings are ever resorted to by appellate courts, such result
from the exercise of discretion rather than by imposition by statute or
procedural rule. Indeed, there is no existing statute, procedural rule, or
jurisprudential fiat that makes it mandatory on the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court to conduct an open-court hearing on any matter for
resolution. There is nothing demonstrably urgent with an application for
damages under Section 20, Rule 57 that would necessitate this Court to
adopt an unprecedented rule mandating itself or the Court of Appeals to
conduct full-blown open court hearings on a particular type of action.
This pronouncement does not contradict our ruling in Hanil Development v.
IAC,46 which Carlos interprets as requiring the Court of Appeals to conduct a
proper hearing on an application for damages on the attachment
bond.Hanil concerned the refusal by the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) to take cognizance of the application for damages on the
attachment bond, such refusal being reversed by the Court, which ruled that
the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) had jurisdiction to accept and rule on
such application. While the Court therein recognized that the IAC was
empowered to try cases and conduct hearings, or otherwise perform acts
necessary to resolve factual issues in cases, 47 it did not require the appellate
court to conduct a hearing in open court, but merely to reinstate the
application for damages.
Admittedly, the dispositive portion of Hanil required the Court of Appeals to
conduct hearings on the application for damages, 48 but nowhere in the
decision was a general rule laid down mandating the appellate court to
28
conduct such hearings in open court. The ascertainment of the need to
conduct full-blown hearings is best left to the discretion of the appellate court
which chooses to hear the application. At the same time, the Court cautions
the appellate courts to carefully exercise their discretion in determining the
need for open-court hearings on the application for damages on the
attachment bond. The Court does not sanction the indolent award of
damages on the attachment bond by the appellate court without affording the
adverse party and the bonding company concerned the opportunity to
present their sides and adduce evidence in their behalf, or on the basis of
unsubstantiated evidence.
"And Shall be Included in the
Judgment on the Main Case"
Section 20, Rule 57 does state that the award of damages shall be included
in the judgment on the main case, and seemingly indicates that it should not
be rendered prior to the adjudication of the main case.
The rule, which guarantees a right to damages incurred by reason of
wrongful attachment, has long been recognized in this jurisdiction. 49 Under
Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1964 Rules of Court, it was provided that there
must be first a judgment on the action in favor of the party against whom
attachment was issued before damages can be claimed by such party. 50 The
Court however subsequently clarified that under the rule, "recovery for
damages may be had by the party thus prejudiced by the wrongful
attachment, even if the judgment be adverse to him." 51
The language used in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure
leaves no doubt that there is no longer need for a favorable judgment in favor
of the party against whom attachment was issued in order that damages may
be awarded. It is indubitable that even a party who loses the action in main
but is able to establish a right to damages by reason of improper, irregular, or
excessive attachment may be entitled to damages. This bolsters the notion
that the claim for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may arise
and be decided separately from the merits of the main action. As noted by
the Court in Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals:52
The surety does not, to be sure, become liable on its bond simply because
judgment is subsequently rendered against the party who obtained the
preliminary attachment. The surety becomes liable only when and if "the
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled to the
attachment." This is so regardless of the nature and character of the
judgment on the merits of the principal claims, counterclaims or cross-
claims, etc. asserted by the parties against each other. Indeed, since an
applicant's cause of action may be entirely different from the ground
relied upon by him for a preliminary attachment, it may well be that
although the evidence warrants judgment in favor of said applicant, the
proofs may nevertheless also establish that said applicant's proferred
ground for attachment was inexistent or specious and hence, the writ
should not have issued at all; i.e., he was not entitled thereto in the first
place. In that event, the final verdict should logically award to the applicant
the relief sought in his basic pleading, but at the same time sentence him
usually on the basis of a counterclaimto pay damages caused to his
adversary by the wrongful attachment. [Emphasis supplied.]
Moreover, a separate ruleSection 8, Rule 58 covers instances when it is
the trial court that awards damages upon the bond for preliminary injunction
of the adverse party. Tellingly, it requires that the amount of damages to be
awarded be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure
prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57.
In this case, we are confronted with a situation wherein the determination
that the attachment was wrongful did not come from the trial court, or any
court having jurisdiction over the main action. It was rendered by the Court of
Appeals in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction in the original action
reviewing the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against the private respondents. Said ruling attained finality when
it was affirmed by this Court.
The courts are thus bound to respect the conclusiveness of this final
judgment, deeming as it does the allowance by the RTC of preliminary
attachment as improper. This conclusion is no longer subject to review, even
by the court called upon to resolve the application for damages on the
attachment bond. The only matter left for adjudication is the proper amount of
damages.
Nevertheless, Section 20, Rule 57 explicitly provides that the award for
damages be included in the judgment on the main case. This point was
apparently not lost on the Court of Appeals when it rendered
its Resolution dated 23 March 1998, certifying that the case may now be
referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to a ponente. The appellate
court stated therein: "The Resolution of defendants-appellants motion for
judgment on the attachment may be incorporated in the decision by
the ponente for study and report,"53 and such observation is in conformity
with Section 20.
However, this reasoning was assailed by respondents, who argued that the
motion for judgment on the attachment bond was a pending incident that
should be decided before the case can be re-raffled to a ponente for
29
decision. Respondents may be generally correct on the point that a case can
only be deemed submitted for decision only after all pending incidents are
resolved. Yet since Section 20, Rule 57 provides that their application for
damages on the attachment bond "shall be included in the judgment on the
main case," it is clear that the award for damages need not be resolved
before the case is submitted for decision, but should instead be resolved and
included in the judgment on the main case, or the decision on the Appeal by
Certiorari filed by the respondents.
Thus, the action of the Court of Appeals in resolving the application for
damages even before the main judgment was issued does not conform to
Section 20, Rule 57. However, the special particular circumstances of this
case lead us to rule that such error is not mortal to the award of damages.
As noted earlier, the award of damages was made after a proper hearing had
occurred wherein all the concerned parties had been given the opportunity to
present their arguments and evidence in support and in rebuttal of the
application for damages. The premature award of damages does not negate
the fact that the parties were accorded due process, and indeed availed of
their right to be heard.
Moreover, we are compelled to appreciate the particular circumstance in this
case that the right of private respondents to acquire relief through the award
of damages on account of the wrongful preliminary attachment has been
conclusively affirmed by the highest court of the land. This differs from the
normal situation under Section 20, Rule 57 wherein the court having
jurisdiction over the main action is still required to ascertain whether the
applicant actually has a right to damages. To mandatorily require that the
award of damages be included in the judgment in the main case makes all
the sense if the right to damages would be ascertained at the same time the
main judgment is made. However, when the said right is already made viable
by reason of a final judgment which is no longer subject to review, there
should be no unnecessary impediments to its immediate implementation.
And finally, any ruling on our part voiding the award of damages solely for the
reason that it was not included in the judgment on the main case, and
remanding the motion to the Court of Appeals for proper adjudication
together with the main case may exhibit fealty to the letter of the procedural
rule, but not its avowed aims of promoting a just and speedy disposition of
every action and proceeding. After all, if we were to compel the Court of
Appeals to decide again on the application for damages and incorporate its
ruling in the judgment on the main action, the appellate court will be
examining exactly the same evidence and applying exactly the same rules as
it already did when it issued the assailed resolution awarding damages on
the bond. This would be unnecessarily redundant especially considering that
the Supreme Court had already affirmed that there was wrongful attachment
in this case.
There is also the fact that remanding the question of damages, singly for the
purpose of adhering to the letter of the procedural rule, would further prolong
the resolution of the main case, which has been with the Court of Appeals for
more than nine years now.54 Our Rules of Court precisely requires liberal
construction of the procedural rules to promote the objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.55 With this precept, all the more justification is supplied for
allowing the award for damages despite its apparent prematurity, if it is in all
other respects proper.
The same reasons apply in resolving the question of whether the Court of
Appeals could have decided the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment
Bond considering that the case had not yet been re-raffled under the two-
raffle system for study and report. Under Section 5, Rule 3 of the RIRCA, a
case filed with the Court of Appeals undergoes two raffles for assignment to
a particular Justice. The first raffle is made for completion of
records.56Afterwards, "all raffled appealed cases, the records of which have
been completed and submitted for decision, shall be re-raffled for assignment
to a Justice for study and report."57
The fact that Section 20, Rule 57 provides that the award of damages on the
attachment bond "shall be included in the judgment on the main case"
necessarily implies that it is to be made only after the case has been re-
raffled for study and report, and concurrently decided with the judgment of
the ponente in the main case. Again, the Court of Appeals failed to consider
Section 20, Rule 57 when it acted upon the application even before the
second raffle was made.
Had Section 20, Rule 57 been faithfully complied with, a different Justice of
the Court of Appeals would have penned the ruling on the application for
damages, in accordance with the RIRCA. Yet this circumstance does not
outweigh the other considerations earlier mentioned that would warrant a
liberal interpretation of the procedural rules in favor of respondents. The
parties had adduced all their arguments and evidence before the Court of
Appeals, and indeed, these were appreciated on first instance by Justice
Demetria, who eventually penned the assailed resolutions. There was
already a final determination that the attachment was wrongful. And any
delay brought about by requiring that it be the ponencia, determined after the
second raffle, who decides the application for damages may bear pro
forma adherence to the letter of the rule, but would only cause the delay of
the resolution of this long-pending case. Procedural rules are designed, and
must therefore be so interpreted as, to give effect to lawful and valid claims
and not to frustrate them.58
30
Even SIDDCOR acknowledges that there are recognized instances where
the award of damages or judgment on the attachment bond may not be
included in the decision on the main case, such as if the main case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and no claim for damages could have been
presented in the main case.59
Scope of Damages
Properly Awardable
Next, we examine the particular award of damages made in this case,
consisting of P15,384,509.98, plus interest, as well as P1,000,000.00 as
attorneys fees. There seems to be no dispute that the former amount
constituted the amount drawn against the account of Sandoval by reason of
the writ of execution issued by the trial court on 27 May 1996. This fact was
confirmed by the PNB, in its Manifestation dated 19 July 1996, confirming the
garnishment.
Respondents burden in proving damages in this case was considerably
lessened by the fact that there was already a final judgment, no longer
subject to review, that the preliminary attachment allowed by the trial court
was indeed wrongful. Hence, all that was necessary to be proved was the
amount of damage actually sustained by respondents by reason of the
wrongful attachment. It is unquestioned that by virtue of the writ of
preliminary attachment, a Notice of Garnishment was served upon the PNB
over deposit accounts maintained by respondents. Said Notice of
Garnishment placed under the control of the RTC all the accounts
maintained by respondents, and prevented the transfer or disposition of
these accounts.60 Then the subsequent Writ of Execution dated 27 May 1996
ordered the delivery to Carlos of these accounts earlier subjected to
garnishment.61
Clearly, the amount of actual pecuniary loss sustained by respondents has
been well established. TheManifestation submitted by the PNB further
affirmed the actual amount seized by Carlos, an amount which could not
have been acquired had it not been for the writ of preliminary attachment
which was wrongfully issued.
Carlos lamely argues in his petition that there was no concrete or supporting
evidence to justify the amount of actual damages, a claim that is belied by
the official case records. The more substantive argument is presented by
SIDDCOR, which submits that any damages that may be awarded to
respondents can include only those that were incurred, if any, during the
pendency of the appeal. But this contention is belied by Section 4, Rule 57 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the bond issued for
preliminary attachment is conditioned that the applicant "will pay all the costs
which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally
adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."62
The case Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals 63 is instructive. It
discusses the scope of the bond executed by upon an application for
preliminary injunction,64 which similarly covers "all damages which [may be]
sustain[ed] by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto." 65 The
surety in that case claimed that it could be liable "only to the amount of
damages accruing from the time the injunction bond was issued until the
termination of the case, and not from the time the suit was commenced." 66 In
rebutting this claim, the Court ruled:
. . . . Rule 58, Section 4(b), provides that a bond is executed in favor of the
party enjoined to answer for all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction. This Court already had occasion to rule on this matter in
Mendoza v. Cruz, where it held that "(t)he injunction bond is intended as a
security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not
to have been granted. It is designed to cover all damages which the party
enjoined can possibly suffer. Its principal purpose is to protect the
enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of an injunction." No
distinction was made as to when the damages should have been
incurred.67
Our ruling in Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, relied
upon by the Court of Appeals, squarely applies to this case:
Under the circumstances, too, there can be no gainsaying the suretys full
awareness of its undertakings under its bond: that, as the law puts it: "the
plaintiff will pay all costs which may be adjudged to the defendant(s), and all
damages which may be sustained by reason of the attachment, if the same
shall finally be adjudged to have been wrongful and without cause," and that
those damages plainly comprehended not only those sustained during the
trial of the action but also those during the pendency of the appeal. This is
the law, and this is how the surety's liability should be understood. The
surety's liability may be enforced whether the application for damages for
wrongful attachment be submitted in the original proceedings before the Trial
Court, or on appeal, so long as the judgment has not become executory. The
surety's liability is not and cannot be limited to the damages caused by
the improper attachment only during the pendency of the appeal. That
would be absurd. The plain and patent intendment of the law is that the
surety shall answer for all damages that the party may suffer as a result
of the illicit attachment, for all the time that the attachment was in force;
from levy to dissolution. . . .
31
The fact that the second paragraph of the rule speaks only of "damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal" is of no moment; it
obviously proceeds from the assumption in the first paragraph that the
award for the damages suffered during the pendency of the case in the
trial court was in fact "included in the final judgment" (or applied for
therein before the appeal was perfected or the judgment became executory);
hence, it states that the damages additionally suffered thereafter, i.e., during
the pendency of the appeal, should be claimed before the judgment of the
appellate tribunal becomes executory. It however bears repeating that
where. as in the case at bar, the judgment of the Trial Court has
expressly or impliedly sustained the attachment and thus has given
rise to no occasion to speak of, much less, file an application for
damages for wrongful attachment, and it is only in the decision of the
Court of Appeals that the attachment is declared wrongful and that the
applicant "was not entitled thereto," the rule is, as it should be, that it is
entirely proper at this time for the application for damages for such
wrongful attachment to be filedi.e., for all the damages sustained
thereby, during all the time that it was in force, not only during the
pendency of the appeal. . . .68
The rule is thus well-settled that the bond issued upon an application for
preliminary attachment answers for all damages, incurred at whatever stage,
which are sustained by reason of the attachment. The award of actual
damages by the Court of Appeals is thus proper in amount. However, we
disagree that the rate of legal interest be counted from the date of the
"unlawful garnishment," or on 27 June 1996. Properly, interest should start to
accrue only from the moment it had been finally determined that the
attachment was unlawful, since it is on that basis that the right to damages
comes to existence. In this case, legal interest commences from the date the
Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39267 became final, by reason
of its affirmation by this Court.
The award of attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is also
questioned before this Court, considering that the Court of Appeals did not
award moral or exemplary damages. The general rule may be that an award
of attorneys fees should be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated.69Nonetheless, attorneys fees may be awarded
under the Civil Code where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered, 70 even if
moral and exemplary damages are unavailing.71
Particularly, the Court has recognized as just and equitable that attorney's
fees be awarded when a party is compelled to incur expenses to lift a
wrongfully issued writ of attachment.72 The amount of money garnished, and
the length of time respondents have been deprived from use of their money
by reason of the wrongful attachment, all militate towards a finding that
attorneys fees are just and equitable under the circumstances. However, we
deem the amount of P1,000,000.00 as excessive, and modify the award of
attorneys fees to P500,000.00 which represents merely approximately three
percent of the actual damages suffered by and awarded to respondents. We
also delete the imposition of legal interest made by the Court of Appeals on
the awarded attorneys fees.
Other Issues Raised in G.R. No. 135830
The issues raised in G.R. No. 136035 have been dispensed with, and the
remaining issues in G.R. No. 135830 are relatively minor. There is no need to
dwell at length on them.
Carlos insists that respondents were liable to have paid docket fees upon
filing of their Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond, on the theory that
they claimed therein for the first time the alleged damages resulting from the
dissolved attachment. The said motion is characterized as an initiatory
proceeding because it is claimed therein for the first time, the damages
arising from the attachment. In the same vein, Carlos argues that the
absence of a certification against forum-shopping attached to the motion
renders the said motion as fatal. Again, it is pointed out that initiatory
pleadings must contain the said certification against forum-shopping.
Our ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla 73 is instructive. It was
argued therein that the requirement of the certification against forum-
shopping, as contained in Administrative Circular No. 04-94, 74 covered
compulsory counterclaims. The Court ruled otherwise:
It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular
No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice
commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. . . . The language of the
circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory
pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.
It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly
taken, to sustain the view that the circular in question has not, in fact,
been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature
as being auxiliary to the proceeding in the suit and as deriving its
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be
appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for
independent resolution except by the court where the main case
pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso in the second paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the
violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall not be curable by mere
amendment . . . but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
32
prejudice," being predicated on the applicability of the need for a certification
against forum shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot
be independently set up.75 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that under Section 20, Rule 57, the application for damages on the
attachment bond cannot be independently set up, but must be filed in the
main case, before the judgment therein becomes final and executory. Santo
Tomas squarely applies in determining that no certification against forum-
shopping was required in the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond.
The same reasoning also sustains a ruling that neither legal fees were
required for the filing of the said motion. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court provides that legal fees are prescribed upon the filing of the pleading or
other application which initiates an action or proceeding. 76Since the said
application for judgment on the attachment bond cannot be considered as an
initiatory pleading, as it cannot be independently set up from the main action,
it is not likewise chargeable with legal fees.
As to the issue relating to the other Resolution dated 26 June 1998 denying
the motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of forum-shopping, we find
Carloss arguments as unmeritorious. Forum-shopping allegedly existed
because petitioners had filed two cases before the Court of Appeals, CA-
G.R. CV No. 53229, and the Petition for Certiorari with Temporary
Restraining Order dated 2 June 1996 attacking the allowance of execution
pending appeal. Evidently, the two causes of action in these two petitions are
different, CA-G.R. CV No. 53229 being an appeal from the Summary
Judgment rendered by the RTC, and the second petition assailing the
subsequent allowance by the RTC of execution pending appeal. There is no
identity between these two causes of action that would warrant a finding of
forum-shopping.
Issues Raised in G.R. No. 137743
To recount, respondents, having obtained a favorable decision on
their Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond, filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution of the award of damages. This was granted by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 16 October 1998, said resolution
now specifically assailed by SIDDCOR in G.R. No. 137743.
In their Motion for Immediate Execution, respondents theory in seeking the
immediate execution of the award of damages was that said award was not
subject to appeal, the ruling thereupon being an interlocutory order. 77 This
position was not adopted by the Court of Appeals in its 16 October
1998 Resolution, which was otherwise favorably disposed to respondents.
Instead, the Court of Appeals predicated the immediate execution on the
following grounds: (1) that the judicial finding that the writ of preliminary
attachment was wrongful was already final and beyond review; (2) there
were no material and substantial defenses against the motion for the
issuance of the judgment bond; (3) Sandoval was elderly and sickly, without
means of livelihood and may not be able to enjoy the fruits of the judgment
on the attachment bond; (4) that immediate execution would end her
suffering caused by the arbitrary garnishment of her PNB account.
There is no doubt that a judgment on the attachment bond is a final and
appealable order. As stated earlier, it is, under normal course, included in the
main judgment, which in turn is final and appealable. Respondents admit that
they had erred in earlier characterizing the said judgment as an interlocutory
order. Still, SIDDCOR argues that such earlier error is fatal, and that the
Court of Appeals abused its discretion in ruling on the motion on a theory
different from that urged on by respondents.
By no means could respondents be deemed as estopped from changing their
legal theory, since the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact and not
questions of law.78 Moreover, courts are empowered to decide cases even if
the parties raise legal rationales other than that which would actually apply in
the case. The basis of whether respondents are entitled to immediate
execution arises from law, particularly Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, and not solely on whatever allegations may be raised by the movant.
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals, even though it allowed execution pending appeal on a legal basis
different from that originally adduced by respondents. After all, the reasoning
ultimately employed by the appellate court is correct, and it hardly would be
judicious to require the lower court to adhere to the movants erroneous
ratiocination and preclude the proper application of the law.
We need not review in length the justification of the Court of Appeals in
allowing execution pending appeal. The standard set under Section 2(a),
Rule 39 merely requires "good reasons," a "special order," and "due hearing."
Due hearing would not require a hearing in open court, but simply the right to
be heard, which SIDDCOR availed of when it filed its opposition to the
motion for immediate execution. The Resolution dated 16 October 1998
satisfies the "special order" requirement, and it does enumerate at length the
"good reasons" for allowing execution pending appeal. As to the appreciation
of "good reasons," we simply note that the advanced age alone of Sandoval
would have sufficiently justified execution pending appeal, pursuant to the
well-settled jurisprudential rule.79 The wrongfulness of the attachment, and
the length of time respondents have been deprived of their money by reason
of the wrongful attachment further justifies execution pending appeal under
these circumstances.
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WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued in the Resolution dated 9 June 1999 is hereby LIFTED. The
assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals Special Fourth Division dated 26
June 1998 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the legal interest on
the award of actual damages should commence from the date of the finality
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 39267 and that the
award of attorneys fees is in the amount of P500,000. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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