NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.

(NMSMI) v
Department of National Defense (DND)
G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013

FACTS:

By virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels

of land for the Fort Bonifacio. Pres. Marcos amended the same (Proclamation No.
2476) and excluded areas known as Libingan ng mga Bayani and some barangays and
declared it open for disposition.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a

handwritten addendum, which reads:P.S. This includes Western Bicutan".
However, the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476
was published in the Official Gazette. This written addendum was the basis of the
petitioners to claim that all Western Bicutan is included in the reclassification of
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue
of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law

RULING:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

xxx all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs Republic of the Philippines
GR. No. 180705, November 27, 2013

FACTS:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC)
to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be
sourced from a P 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Charged with the duty
of collecting and administering the Fund was Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA).

Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions
scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy. Per Cojuangcos own
admission, PCA paid, out of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), the entire
acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares. The list of First United Bank
(FUB) stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955
shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining
Cojuangcos equity position in the Bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its
subscriptions to:

(a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB; and

(b) the increase in FUBs capital stock.

In all, from the mother PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB
(UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10%
(649,800 shares) = 95,304

ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded
the status of law without publication.
RULING:
NO. It bears to stress at this point that the PCS-Cojuanco Agreemenbt referred
to above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the
same law. It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication
is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. In Tanada vs Tuvera (G.R.
No. L-63915, 1986) said as much: Publication of the law is indispensable in every case
xxx.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
The publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of
publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the
number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of
effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in
the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. The
Supreme Court cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law.
Consequently, the Court joined the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing
minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.

SEC v GMA Network , Inc.

G.R. No. 164026, December 23, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner GMA filed an application for various amendments to its Articles of

Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent SEC. The amendments include,
among others, the change in the corporate name of from "Republic Broadcasting
System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term
for another 50 years.

The petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal
Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term
(P1,212,200.00) The petitioner formally protested the assessment. SEC approved the
other amendments. (corporate name and the principal purpose)

The petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the
validity and propriety of the assessment. SEC, through Assoc. Commissioner Fe
Eloisa C. Gloria, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment.
 An appeal was taken by the petitioner on the ground that the assessment is not
in accordance with law. SEC En Banc issued the assailed order dismissing the
petitioners appeal for lack of merit.

It filed an appeal with CA. GMA argued that its application for the extension
of its corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of
incorporation. It further averred that the basis for the assessment is not valid. (SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994)

CA agreed with the SECs submission that an extension of the corporate term
is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation. As such, it is not an ordinary
amendment. However, the CA ruled that the Memorandum Circular is invalid and
ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum Circular (MC) is valid

RULING:

GMA points out that the MC No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fees for
amended articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of extending the term
of corporate existence. The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to filing
fees for articles of incorporation. Thus, the former circular should apply to its case.
Assuming that MC No. 2, Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the latter did
not take effect for it was neither filed with the UP Law Center nor published either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

R.A. No. 3531 provides SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same
fees it assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the
filing of an amended articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of
corporate existence.

R.A. No. 3531 provides a standard which should guide the SEC in fixing and
imposing its rates and fees. If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court
would have been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees
as outlined in the questioned MC.

However, we agree with the CA that the questioned MC is invalid as it was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Furthermore it has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the
Administrative Code of 1987.
 The MC cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This is
an implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and
affects the public at large. It cannot be considered a mere internal rule or regulation,
nor an interpretation of the law. The petition is denied.

Castillo v Castillo
G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016

FACTS:

On 25 May 1972, Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista

(Bautista) and on 6 January 1979, Lea married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her
subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while
unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license and neither
of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged.

Lea thereafter filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On
22 January 2003, the RTC of Paraaque City,declared that Lea's first marriage to
Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a
Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become
final and executory.

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that

the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of
their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner
countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her
previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's
demurrer in its Order dated 8 March 2005.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The dispositive portion reads:

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when
she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not
obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior
marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting
her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the
validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law
in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.

CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Respondent filed her Comment praying that the CA Decision finding her
marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the
spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the previous marriage of Lea to Bautista was null and void ab
initio under Art. 41 of the Family Code

RULING:

NO. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in
force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of
the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect . Hence, the Court must
resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in
particular, Articles 80,81,82,and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages
are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from
the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a
competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can
be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally
attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void
marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by
legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void
marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.33

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable

social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the
State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life."

"As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect
to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse
and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially
significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an
open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be

retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights
of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family
Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present
case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x
 The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is
valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence
of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC
of Paraaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid. The petition is
DENIED.

Rotairo vs Alcantara
G.R. No. 173632, September 29, 2014

FACTS:

Rovira Alcantara (Rovira) filed suit for the recovery of possession of a parcel of
land in Cainta, Rizal. Said property was formerly owned by Roviras father, and
Alfredo C. Ignacio, who mortgaged the property to Pilipinas Bank and Trust
Company (Pilipinas Bank) in 1968. A part of the land was sold to AmbrosioRotairo
(Rotairo) who completed his payments. Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan
obligations causing Pilipinas Bank to foreclose the mortgage on the entire property.
Pilipinas Bank was the highest bidder. Pilipinas sold it to Rovira, who happens to be
the daughter of Alfredo.

RTC ruled that the transaction between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo was
covered by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957.7 Rovira, as "successor-in-interest of
Wilfredo S. Ignacio [and Victor Alcantara] was well aware of the condition of the
property which she bought from the Pilipinas Bank, because she lives near the land,
and at the time she purchased it she was aware of the existing houses or structures on
the land." She is entitled to the claim.

CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of possession of the
property to Rovira.

ISSUE: Whether P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case. But the more crucial issue
before the Court is who, as between the petitioners and Rovira, has better right to the
property in dispute
RULING:

The retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 to transactions entered into prior
to its enactment in 1976 is already settled. In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which
involved a land purchase agreement entered into in 1972, the Court stated that the
unmistakeable intent of the legislature is to have P.D. No. 957 operate retrospectively.

Moreover, the specific terms of P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect
even to contracts and transactions entered into prior to its enactment. In particular,
Section 21 of P.D. No. 957 XXX "..shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer
of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree XXX" (RATIO for 2 years: provides the developer the opportunity to comply
with its obligation to notify the buyers of the existence of the mortgage, and
consequently, for the latter to exercise their option to pay the instalments directly to
the mortgagee)

In this case, the contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was
entered into in 1970, and the agreement was fully consummated with Rotairos
completion of payments and the execution of the Deed of Sale in his favor in 1979.
Clearly, P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case.

Nevertheless, such concomitant obligation of the developer under Section 21

did not arise in this case. It must be noted that at the time of the enactment of P.D.
No. 957 in 1976 and as early as 1974, Pilipinas Bank had already foreclosed the
mortgage and bought the properties in the foreclosure sale. There was, thus, no
mortgage to speak of such that Rotairo should be notified thereof so that he could
properly exercise his option to pay the installments directly to Pilipinas Bank.

Rovira is not a buyer in good faith.

Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, the Court finds that Rovira cannot
claim a better right to the property because she is not a buyer in good faith.

Under different circumstances, the prior registration of the mortgage between

Pilipinas Bank and Alcantara and Ignacio, and Rovira's subsequent purchase of the
subject property would have been valid and binding, and could have defeated
Rotairo's unregistered claim over it. But given Rovira'sprivity with her father Victor C.
Alcantara and the fact that she had actual knowledge of the disposition of the
property and Rotairo's possession thereof, her acquisition of the property cannot be
upheld.

The contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was entered into in
1970, and the agreement was fully consummated with Rotairo's completion of
payments and the execution of the Deed of Sale in his favor in 1979. Clearly, P.D.
No. 957 is applicable in this case.

Given Rovira's privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and the fact that she
had actual knowledge of the disposition of the property and Rotairo's possession
thereof, her acquisition of the property cannot be upheld.

Dueas vs Santos
G.R. No. 149417, June 4, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Gloria Santos Duenas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who,
during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at
General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty
subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision (for
brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then Land Registration Commission (LRC)
approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required
Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilios death in 1988,
there were already several residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision.
Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational
and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, ]as
amended by P.D. No. 1216. Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting
the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.
On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to
Romulo Q. Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB
in Quezon City.
SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration, docketed as HLURB Case
No. REM-070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No. 957 should
apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans
were approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos Dueas should be bound by the verbal
promise made by her late father during his lifetime that an open space would be
provided for in Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which were at that time
already for sale.
Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that she
was not a party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation nor
involvement in the development of Santos Subdivision and the sale of the
subdivisions lots. As affirmative defenses, she raised the following: (a) It was her late
father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned and developed the subdivision, and she was
neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this suit was filed by an unauthorized entity
against a non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos Subdivision are not juridical
entities, authorized by law to institute or defend against actions; (c) that P.D. No. 957
cannot be given retroactive effect to make it applicable to Santos Subdivision as the
law does not expressly provide for its retroactive applicability; and (d) that the present
petition is barred by laches.

ISSUE: (1) whether the respondent had any right to demand an open space and the
petitioner had any legal obligation to provide said open space within Santos
Subdivision under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, and
(2) whether the action had already prescribed under Article 1145 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
The petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for holding that P.D. No. 957
has retroactive application. She points out that there is no retroactivity provision in
the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 4[28] of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which
amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 and imposed the open space requirement in
subdivisions. Petitioner stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14,
1977 or more than ten (10) years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio
Santos.
Although it may seem that this particular issue, given our ruling on the first issue
regarding the lack of capacity of SSHA to bring any action in its name, is now moot
and academic, we are constrained to still address it.
This petition was brought to us not by respondent SSHA but by Gloria Santos
Dueas who assails the appellate courts finding that our ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec.
Drilon[29] allows P.D. No. 957, as amended, to apply retroactively.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
 Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant
case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase
agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment
of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. We held therein that
although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless,
the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and
machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers justify its
retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, we
ruled that the non-payment of amortizations was justified under Section 23 of the said
decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision
project.
Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case,
nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a
subsequent case[30] that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in
view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus:

Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its
retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in
both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that
occurred years before their promulgation.

At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an
amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus on the
retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se.
We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause
or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that
no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect
unless explicitly stated.[31] Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216
should apply retroactively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the HLURB dated January 20, 1999 sustaining that of
its Regional Office is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Isidro Ablaza vs Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

Doctrine

The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper
interest can file the action.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party
in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that petition is
filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the
action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of
the parties to the marriage. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?

RULING:

YES. The applicable law when marriage was contracted between Cresenciano
and Leonila on December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to
the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC for further proceedings.

Ratio:

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCexplicitly provides

the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the
Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is
prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March
15, 2003.

Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory
heir, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions
stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff must still be
the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lackof
cause of action.

Guy vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992,
prompting them to file a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of the
estate of the latter.
 The legitimate son of the deceased prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled
without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court; that they have already waived their hereditary rights per Release and Waiver
of Claim executed; and private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the
Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents can no longer prove their filiation as Article 175
of FC as they should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of the parent

RULING:

NO. Private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional
rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children
of the deceased. xxx

We agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be
premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before
the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of
illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 285. The action
for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority; xxx

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at
the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.
Bernabe v Alejo
G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of
twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born
on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died
on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year,
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying
that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as
such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held
by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under
the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of
Appeals, the complaint is now barred

RTC ruled granting Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial
courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing
Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had
barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father
had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him
the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
CA ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was
the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to
be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition
with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written
acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. and
(2) Whether or not respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file
an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete
disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the
applicable jurisprudence.

RULING:

NO. Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, SC discussess them
jointly.

Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for

recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the
provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given
retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for
recognition as follows:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear
of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of
the document.

The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been
omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
 In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no
distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the
putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering
that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus
be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she
cannot do if he or she is already dead.
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already
vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:

ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for
recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested
prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to
the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself
and not dependent upon a contingency x x x. Respondent however contends that the
filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.

x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may
be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot
impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had
already vested prior to its enactment.

Not Limited to Natural Children

To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of
natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by
respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from
marrying each other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not
disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v.
Angeles, the Court explained:

A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]

A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by
this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for
recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There,
the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an
extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two
illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children
were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at
the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from
marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had
been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his
death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the rules
on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the
prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children.
Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:

The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children,
commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of
wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a
married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to
support and successional rights. But their filiationmust be duly proven.

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the
investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is
that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious
children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules
on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.

That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is
used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or
instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish
the filiation of spurious children.

A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes
of voluntary recognition of natural children.

In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then
his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for
compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.

The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children,
as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.
 Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights
over spurious one. However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights,
including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested
right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Ofelia Ty v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony on

March 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 1977. However,
on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City
declared their married void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before
the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, thru civil rites on April 4. 1979 in Pasay. Three years after of April 4,
1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati.

On January 1991, Edgardo filed a case with the RTC of Pasig, praying that his
marriage to Ofelia Ty be declared null and void because they allegedly had no married
license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner,
he was still married to Anna Maria. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979.

Ofelia, in defending her marriage to private respondent, submitted their

Marriage License which was issued in Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question
this document when it was submitted in evidence. However, the fact that the civil
marriage of Edgardo and Ofelia took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable
that petitioner and respondent had a church wedding ceremony on April4, 1982.

The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of Edgardo Reyes and declared his marriage to
Ofelia Ty null and void ab initio. Both parties appealed to the CA, which subsequently
affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: (a) is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
(b) May the Family Code be given retroactive effect to the instant case
(c) What is the effect of re0-using for a church wedding the marriage license that was
1st used in a civil wedding 3 years ago

RULING:

(a) And (b) NO. The Supreme Court ruled different rulings regarding the matter
however, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code.
The rulings in Gomez Conseguerra and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration
for nullity of marriage.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo vs CA (1993), the
Court Ruled that: Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be

retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights
of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v CA, the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.

(c ) Coming not to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner
married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the
civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raise this matter properly. Obviously,
the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.

In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a
valid license in the first of the two ceremonies That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in
the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter
rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.