Dinglasan Jr. v.

CA (2006)
G.R. No. 145420
*sorry important yung facts talaga so medyo mahaba

On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented by its President,

Dinglasan, and Antrom, Inc. (Antrom), also represented by its President,Garcia Jr., entered into a
MOA whereby Antrom will extend credit accommodation in favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn
business.

As initial payment for the debt of Elmyra (P1,476,000.58), Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank
(drawee bank) with Antrom as payee, but postdated on 3 October in the amount of P515,000.00.
Upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank, however, the said check was dishonored
for insufficiency of funds.

Consequently, an Information charging Dinglasan with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
filed before the RTC of Makati.

RTC: Guilty.
Dinglasan: Motion for Reconsideration in the same court. Denied

CA: Affirmed.

SC Journey
1. Petition for Review on Certiorari and was raffled to the Third Division of this Court.
2. June 28 99: Affirmed CA
3. August 26 99: Motion for Reconsideration
4. Sept. 13 99: Denied MR: failure to raise substantial arguments that would warrant
reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 June 1999 with an ad cautelam that such denial is
final.
5. Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the same was merely
noted without action by this Court in view of the En Banc Resolution dated 7 April 1987 that no
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained.
6. Dec.16 99: this Court directed that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

The Resolution of this Court dated 28 June 1999 denying Dinglasan's Petition for Review became
final and executory on 14 October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. By virtue of the
final and executory judgment rendered by this Court, the prosecution, on 19 September 2000,
filed a motion with the RTC for the issuance of the warrant of arrest and writ of execution in order
to satisfy the judgment. The prosecution likewise prayed that a hold-departure order be issued in
order to
prevent Dinglasan from leaving the country until he has fully served his sentence.

Alarmed, Dinglasan on 30 October 2000, filed the instant Petition for New Trial and, in the
alternative, for the Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered evidence. He urges this
Court to uphold substantial justice, emphasizing that the newly discovered evidence he seeks to
introduce in this case is so material and of such weight.

New Evidence:
Affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her capacity as Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of
Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his
lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits, together with
the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached to Solidbank Manager's Check No.002969
dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan
made good of the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not, therefore,
be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essential elements of the
offense, that is, the drawer failed and refused to make good the said check within five banking
days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.

Vda. De Dinglasan on her part, narrated that her late husband used to bring some of Elmyra's
documents home to work on at night and after her husband's death in 1994, such documents
were kept inside a box and left somewhere in one corner of their house. It was only when a minor
renovation was made therein several years after her husband passed away that she was able to
chance upon the said documents again. The said documents were turned over to Dinglasan on
21 October 2000. It was later discovered that the said documents include the transmittal letter
dated 8 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom.

Issue: Whether the Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly
discovered evidence should be dismissed on the ground that the same is procedurally and
substantially defective?

Held: Yes.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads: Rule 124 Procedure in the Court of
Appeals.

Section 14. Motion for New Trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the
latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense.
The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121.

Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment
of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final. It bears stressing further that on 14
October 1999, the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final
and executory as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. Very clearly, the filing of the instant
Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case on 30 October 2000 was made way beyond
the prescriptive period for doing so.

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order
denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts
will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place,
in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition
of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of
finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical
but also unjust to the winning party.

Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly made because the evidence sought
to be admitted were not available at the time the instant petition should have been filed.
Accordingly, he claims that this evidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence as
contemplated by law.

The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads: Rule 121 New Trial or
Reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial; (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if
admitted, will probably change the judgment.
These standards below, also known as the "Berry Rule is the origin of the said ground. It is
incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, to
satisfy the Court:

1. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial.
2.That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3.That it is so
material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted
4. That it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on
the trial.
5. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for And
6. A new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or
credit of a witness.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
whether the proffered evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have
been discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has
two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e.,
when should or could it have been discovered.

Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan and
Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan attest, that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was
discovered recently or just before the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. The
records, however, show otherwise.

It appears, however, that in accused-appellant's letter dated October 10, 1986, no mention was
made of the two (2) manager's checks, considering that at least one of the two (2), both dated
October 8, 1988 was allegedly given to private complainant on the said .Instead a proposal
wherein payment in kind or dacion en pago was offered by accused-appellant. Also, the trial
court correctly noted that, x x x accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He will not part of more
than one million pesos, in the form of manager's checks, as replacement of a check that bounced,
without any supporting document

We are in accord with the findings of the lower court that there is no evidence establishing that
accused-appellant asked for the return of the Combank Check in the same way that the PTB
Check had been returned, other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said check had
been considered cancelled (p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check had already bounced.
(p. 10, Brief for Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd that accused-appellantwould replace the
Combank Check with an amount more than the P515,000.00, if the whole indebtedness was still
subject to final liquidation. As evidenced by the voucher (Exhibit "5") accused-appellant issued
Combank Check in exchange for PTB Check. Hence, it is quite quizzical why accused-appellant
did not ask for the return of the Combank check after having issued two (2) manager's check.

The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was already offered as
evidence in CA-G.R.CR No. 14138 and was even annexed to the Petition for Review filed before
the Court of Appeals as Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly
discovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was already weighed by the appellate
court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to an endless review of decisions, where losing
litigants, in delaying the disposition of cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through
a motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discovered evidence.