,.

The 26th D1vi1ion Eost of the Meuse

October 1918

by

Rexmond c. Cochrane

GAs IQRFARE IN IIQ!LD 111\R I

study Number 20

U.5. ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS

HISTORICAL STlDIES

u.s .I\Zmy Chemical Corps Historical Office

Office of the Chief Chemical Officer
.I\Zmy Chemical Center, lleryland

1960
 The 26th Division East of the Muae

Prepared by

ReJaDOnd C. Cochrane, Ph.D.

Under Contract DA-18-.108-CML-6214

with
U.S. Army Chemical Corps

This ls an accepted draft study on 911 warfare in World Wir I

~--~fil
~~~ QnlC
ni

Director for Military ,..._,

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history.

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~,1.,.J,.2..1Mlu1.ll= Cmrrments and su.gg!!ct.ion:i; :rela.tiva to

accu:racy and adeq.a&cy of trea:t.m.,nt are 1-ntiti,d~ and .may be
tran$mitted to the Chief, u.. s~ Army Cb~mfoal Corps Histc.1:tc.al.
Office, eu,my Chemi~sl Cer:rrtel"., Merrl0.r,CL
 '

THE 26TH DIVISION EAST OF THE MEUSE

Octobe:r. 1918

~
Yankee Division 2
I
f "The Seicheprey affair" 9
i
l "This is the first time". 16
I "This sad affair" 19
I
;
The 1st Gas Regiment Fires a Mission. 25
'
"Evel'ything came through as planned" 31

"How an organization should NOT act during a gas attack. 40

Gas Exhaustion 46

"A new campaign" .. 59

Battle Casualties 65

Gas Casualties 67

Le-ssons Learned
Map No. l st. Mihiel Salient, Boucq Sector 8
Map No. 2 Gas for Raid on Camp du Moulin, 31 May 1918 23
Map No. 3 V Corps Sector, St Mihiel Salient 33
Map No. 4 Amlle-Al!~tU~ng .; , Situation l,up, 11 and 13
Sep 1918. 37

Map No. 5 Gas Attacks Sep 26 - 27 and Sep 29 - 30 42a

Map No. 6 26th Division East of the Meuse, October 1918. 5Q

Map No, 7 Disposition of German Forces, 29 October 53
Map No. 8 Gas Attack, 7 November 61


THE 25th DlVISICIN EAST OF THE MEUSE

No division in tho AEF ~d so JWJCh sheer 111 fortune as the 26th.

Though p:raieed by !ta French instructHs as a splendid, battle-worthy

eutfit, sup..rior t the 42nd and even the vaunted 1st Division, it found
n5 favor with Pershing and his staff, possibly because it was a National
Guard diviiln and had an argumentative, independent-minded colIIJl8.nder
in General Edwardiv !he division was destined to spend mo~e time in
quiet settor1, and at gr*'iter cost, than any division in the AEF

Single- handedly, th.e 26th Division demon&trated al.moat every pos-

sible mistake that could be made in the use of gas. The Fl'ench were
genel"GUS and gave the division cenaiderably gas armm.inition, most of it

odd lt.s of cyanic and lachrymatory $hells that when fired served larg~

enemy trenches, when the division fired a sufficient quantity of phosgene

to be effective, the gas swept down on the %'aiding troops and gassed
every man. The 26th Oivieion had the unhappy distinction of suffering the
greatest number of 9aa catualties, AlOst of them on qUi~t fronts, in the AEF

Thd Pl'eaent stUQy spans the career of the 26th D1Y1s1on in France,
concentrating on the gas ephOd.es that did so much to nullify the ertginal
splelldid pz,efDise of the division.

- l -
 fbe 26th (Yankee) D1v1a1on was activated on 22 Auguet 1917 under the
co11111and of Maj. Gen. Clarence R Edwards, who had seen service in the
Philippines and had late:r been in command of the Panama Canal zone. His

division was ha,tily organized from National Guard units throughout New
England, assembled in se'Ven cities in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island. Two weeks after activation, under War Department pressure
to get token trP1 to France, the division wa~ on its way overseas

As it eabarked, the division comprised of the 101st and 102nd Infantry,

51st Brigade, under .Brig. Gen. Peter E Traub; the 103rd and 104th Infantry,
52nd. Brigade, under B:rig. Gen. Charles H. Cole; the 51st FA Brigade under

Brig. Gen. William L. Lassiter, and machine gun, engineer, signal, medical,
and supply components. Hardly a single officer that sailed with the division,
including its eo111nander, was to return with it. Some were lost in combat,
more to harassment by highe~ headquarters, but most were casualties of the
hurried build- up of the American Army in France. In ten months overseas
the 51st FA 13:t'igade, for example, had six commanders, and regimental and
battalion connanders in the infantry seem to have been replaced as often.
It happened in other divisions, of course, but in none with more serious ef-
fects on ~1Rri1 SI. corps than in the 26th.

By the end of October 1917 the units that had landed in England and
France were collected near Neufchateau in the Vosges and set to work con-
structing an AEF training center. They were in uniform, had rifles, and a

- 2 -


credit for six millien dollars to buy the rest of their eqUipment and sup...
plies, their trench artillry, 1nechine guns, animal and motair transporta-

tien, rdaance, enginer, ar.d signal equipment, additional clothing, and

fotd

r.hile O.neral Edwards toured the British front near Cambrai to learn

~hw they used gas, laJ"ge calibe~s and barrages niade raids fand every
night gave the Ge:rmane] a bit of chemical barrage,n his .Engineers built
ba~racka for tha 42nd Divi,in, then on t.he high saa!, hia quartermaster
gtaff screunged trucks from the French and toured Paris, Nancy, and !eul
buying up supplies a~d materi&l, and the rest of the division, when it
wasn't n WON. details:, bt9e,n training and attending the infantry apecial-
1
ty school.s f the A.EF recently established at Gondrecourt and l..1ngres
r
Gas training w~s not b~gQn until 10 December when a shipment of 25~000 ''

small .box re~pil"cd;.or~ (sm) ~nd 6,000 M- 2 masks was received and distribut-

eu .. w:..-c;h ii..s hancinJJ. r:.i qUB.ii::1ed gas otn.cers, tne d1.v1s1on trained the

men a battalhn at a tirr.(,. In mid,-february an inspectOr from the Gas

Se:rv:icc found gas defone.e training fn;.idequat.e and neglected, end the next

month Capte 1'horuais J.., Ctit.ler came in at. Divhian GM Officer, replacing 2nd

Lt. ilowm,an. Still it w.as l.ate May 1918 before all units cempleted the test-
2
ing ~t th,eir rna.1,ks 111 ib~ gas chamber.
_,----.,~m~=,-,---
1
Har.ey J.. .. Be0w1tll, .tl!_i:t!-~L-~!. .,J}}!J=Yan.!s!!!..J2.!Y,!eion (Boston= Cornhill, 1919),
pp. 33 - 7,
2
Ltr, 2nd I.t !. :;. Bowraan DGO 26th D:i:.v t() C of Gas serv 1 13 Dec 1917, sub:
Rpt; Ltr, C f Gas Sero, te Ct1fS AEF} 17 Feb, sub: Condition of gas defense in
?6th Div (AF~F GHQ G - 3 R.ph 13(,,:,c 3lq2) fol 1567); Ltr, Capt Gutler DG0 26th
Ct.lv -t~ G - 1 XXXI1 F.t' Ctr.pi,, 31 ,1,tay, sub: Gas Chamber {both in 26th Div Bex
. "" >, ._,f: C J ")
')"r,
.1
- .. ...
,:;
 In January 1918, on Petain's Ul"gent plea to Pershing, the preliminary,
training f the diYisien was cut short and it wa~ as,igned t~ de Maud'huy'S

XI French Corpe (Duchesne'e Sixth Army) on the Chemin des Dames front, north
tf the Aiene~ At frightful cst the French under Nivelle had taken th@ Chemin
du Damee from the Germans the previc.us October. Ctit of sheer exhaustion and

depletion on beth sides it had been a q0iet sector since that time but
,erieusly undermanned en the French side.

S thin were the French ranks that on arrival the twelve battalions of
the 26th Division were spread across a 30- kil'1eter front. As companies

toek over the French cY2A d!:. ~ positions -- groups of 20 to 40 men

with tw or more machine guns each in knee-deep trenches -- on the north of

the Chemin de:5 r:::ames platea1J, the balance of their battalions occupied the

great quarries er caves along the edge of the crown of the Chemin de~
Dames. 3

The division went intc the Aisne line on 6 February and remained until
':P March, making occasional raids with their French in5tructors, learning

trench warfare routine, but ffering no more provocation to the enemy ti'an
the French permitted. French headquarters spoke glowingly of the training
and readiru~s, of the 26th Divhion t:raops, saying they had made "'very much

better P.ra9l"e:5s" than the 42nd Divhion and were "almost better11 than the 1st

3
FO l, 26th Div, 3 Feb (26th Div Box 13, 32.1); Benwell, pp. 60 - 1.

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Divltien.4 To de ~ud 'huy, their only fault that they were wtoo much
'MU

5
prepared fer attack,~ rather than for trench life.

In the six weeks in the cave,, a historian reported, the division

suffered ...,.ry f.w ca1ualtiea and [had] but twelve men evacuated with

gas pe1an1ng.6 His aubsequent m~mgry of another 250 gas cases still
fell far shgJ:'t of the !,'.'Obable true total~

Following ne flutrY of gas hells, the 104th Infantry aid station

ns awampd Li,eutenant Beiwnan:1 then Divislon Gae: Officex-, admitted

that the dugeuts and caves in th& sectr ffered little pl"Otectien against
gas, b~-t th~ ~n were lal'gely at fault for nt wearing their masks at the
ale,rl ._pes1t1en. All had ~lled the gas before they could mask and were
theref~re crtain they were ca,ualtieg. The regimental medical officer
wh saw the men said they "were suturing from suggestin rather thai'1

frem the ttf'fect, of ene,;ny gai, shell.! .. "Ir, spite f large numbers who

r~ported, net. ene m~n sh~d any ~ign of gas intoxicatior, after his mental
7
a.mr:lety had been al::ayec!," All were returned to duty the next daY

Shortly bef~re the relief ~f th~ division the Gel'lnans put over a

gae ber:tbardment that was sairl to have lasted thirty ... six hours. In a

5.....-------
Ltr, CG Xl Fr Ccrpe t CG 26th Div, 11 Feb {26th Div Box 192, 320) ..
6
Benwell, p, ~4,.
7
Lt.r, OCO 26th Div to CG 26th [dv, 10 Ma!', sub: Rpt of Insp~tion1 1st
Ind, MO 104th Inf t CO 104th Inf, l? Mar; 5th Ind., CO 104th Inf to CG
26th Div, 19 Mar (26th Div Bh 249, fol 5),

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splendid centradictin, an hietorian f the event said that the gas dis-
8
cipline was so gd the diviain had nly 250 casualtie1." This may have
been the fifth gas attack reperted by Spencer -- the four in February and
early March accounted fr 7 gas casualties --when appreximately l~,000
phosgene, diphesgene, chlrine, mustard gas, and xylxl bromide (tear gas)
shells were said to have fallen during the night of 16 March along a frent
held by the French that included a battalion ef the 102nd Infantry. Failure
to- reugnizt the nature of the bmbardment and delay in masking :r-esulted,
said the Regimental Gas Officer, in at lea!t 155 casualties in the 102nd.
9
and wer 100 - - an entire cempany - - among the French.

Divhhnal records r,f casualties - - indeed of anything -- in the

cv~ 100 killed and wounded and almest 500 gas casualties in March, 446
f the gas cases 1n the 102nd Infantryv Ihat m~re is not kncwn of this
attack may be ewing tt the fact that the evacuation of wounded land gas-
sedj to the rear [in this sector] was not entirely sati~factory. some
wounded were l'!Vacuated witheut the knowledge af the medical officers
because they were sent directly through the French [aid] stations and all
10
the reP-xts went t the F~ench autOsrities, who did not inform u,.~

9
Ltr, RGO and Regtl SUrg, 102nd Inf t CO 102nd Inf, 19 Mar, sub: Gas
Casualties, with atchd deca (26th Div B9x 44, 33~6); Spencer, "History f
Gao Attack upon the AEF" (15 Fob 1928), II, 189 - 9!:>,
10
Analyois, P 65Ltr, Rogt SUrg 101st Inf to Div Surg 26th Div, 28
Mui sub: P.relim rpt 1n aecerd with Ci;rc Ltr !>6 (26th Div Box 40, 43.a).

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~A its relief in the Aisne sector, the division was on its way te

an AEF training area, carrying out maneuver, on the march, when it was de-

flected a, a re1ult of the g~eat German offensive on 21 March against the

French and British at the SOmlne. It wae sent to the Toul area, below

Verdun, to relieve a French division and the American 1st Division in

Pauaga 's XXXII Crps, releasihg. beth for the ruptuzed battlef.ront to

the nrth.u

After some cnfuehn in rders and relh:f p%'0cedures -- the divhhn's

erders were changed nine times before it !ettled in the Toul sector -- on

the morning ef l APril the 26U, D:tv:i.._sion completed the relief of the 1st

Divisien brigade and its adjat,;ent French unit along a 15- ki1111Deter fNnt

from APref'Dnt. to Flirey. Though 1st Divhhn records sajc} t.he relief was

26th Divisin repfl"te<i n c;as att.ack and n~ casualtiee There were at

least 6') gas caeualtiea ,u1cng the departing 1st Divisin trops, and at
1
leaet one Ill.in f the 26th ilfas se-en ga!sed He had no ma!lk. 2

As finRlly dispri.,ed" th" 1:J4+;t,, Infantry ccrve:red the frent bt'!fore

Apr,einant, th" 10:3:.-d he1d the X!.vray frnt, the 101st. was deplyed above

Bam.bucaurt ~ and the 102nd CO"Ve,red Seic.hprey snJ the Beh de Remieres

(Map Ne. l). Facing the 26+.h D1viin in the trenches at the fHt f

rr- . .---""--
Fo 2, 2bth Div, 8 Mar; FO l3t 1900, 29 Mar; fO 15, 2200, 31 Mar.
12
See Study Ne. 9, "The lit Divhhn at An.sauville," pp .. 45 - 6.

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.J
(

e
forces~ Ment Sec and the heights f the Meuse. This Ge:rman unit came int
A
the W.evre - C etes de Mtuee aeetr in September 1914 and was still there in

SepteMber 1918, when 1t was driven nerth during the st. Mihiel attack. 13

Except for d.tily HE fire averaging 500 shell~, with a few gas rounds
mixed in, and all fit 1eemingly echeduled at mealtime, the !ector was
raported as fairly quiet fer 1.veral week!. Nevertheless, the Germans
frni thei:r e:uperhr podtions created a diversin at lent ont;e a week,
either bembe.rding: one r mere of the towns in the 26th Division sectr
14
or MIiking a m.ino.r raid en t~e outpo1ts French rders kept large numbers
cf men in these sacrif'ici, po~ithns in f.rnt of the trenche~ and denied re-
enfercaments t thtOI in the event fan at~ack~ They made inviting target,.

In the third week, t~ough the divi$1on received warnings that a major
enemy raid MIi bre~ingt when it came it had all the frce and effectiveness

of a ~urprise ;;i.ttack~ M&j. Gl'9e JQ Rau's 1st Battalion, 102r.:d Infantry,

wa! relieving the ~~rd &ttalion n 'the night of 19 - 20 April when the pre-

lhe f!ol'lftlRY bemh.:i.rdment ~gan .:it 0300 on 7.0 April and shortly after

dawn, under C$V"1" of a l,eavy mi.st, a German force of ~bout 1,800, a special

13'

PP
14
C!'~ Memo (asked far fl:, Ch in-C), Col Fox Ccnnor G - 3 AEF fo1: CofS AEF,
16 Spr, sub~ 26th Div Affair C!f APr 12th (26th Div Box 25, 33.6), concerning
poer d.i.e.c in 104th Inf du:":"in.9 an enemy raid on S.is Brule. See msgs, 104th
!nf, 1J APr (26th Divs., 50, 32-16).
- 9 A
storm battalien of twe cmpanies leading the way~ fell upon Company C f
the 102nd Infantry eettling into the trenches befol'e Seicht2Prey and after
a short, vicie1.11 fight captured pract1c:ally the whole unit.

The success of the raid KIRSCHBLC'IE ( "Cherry Blossom'") $Ul'Prhed

even the Germans themaelves, who had intended it only "to keep the enemy

fo1-ces in check" by deetroying their !;trong point at .Seicheprey~ 15 The

26th Division 'Ml:S never to live down this episode, though explanations

and defense, continued to be made into the 192()'~v

General Edwards insisted that the capture of the ~ompany could not
have been avoided since they "had definite orders that their mis.don

was warning and sacrifice [and] resistance to the last was demanded.
he dld not eay 'they tlad Deen ta.ken by surprise~ rney were, even tnougn

the division had been warned just the week befOl"& by the French that the

Powerful raid, ... and thh fact was confi:rme<J be.fore the raid oi;curred. by

artillery 1ntelligenceol6

Edwards Wi:I! later qUDtad as sying that 1,300 Germans ,,ttacked at

S~i,heprey Ar~ another l,~00 in tho Boi~ de RerniereS1 and in the Jog over-

ran thE! forward Jlli.C:hine gun podUon, of the l02nd and swept through Seiche-

~----
Ora.er Ia 929~ 7 8 ~ , 18 A.pr, 5ub: Cherry Blossom (aPP~ to 40 -
Pa9 War Filu .Extracts, 78tb,,_,Jlg. giv, Geman Files Box 202)M
16
G = 3 Memo 1844/31, Staff of Passa3a for staff at E.oucq, 13 APr (26th
Div Box 12, 227); Opns Rpt 13, 51,t FA Brig, 17 Apr (26th Div Box 59,
33.6).

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 '

prey. In the 36-hour fire fight {or period of near panic) that followed
i

ha claimed over 1,200 German casualtie8, including, drama,tically enoLgh,

~over 400 Boche helmets on the ground.~1 1 German caau~lties, according
to a French obeerver, were estimated at 2~, including 125 killed. The
Germans themselves reported lo$ses of 361, including 75 killed and one
19
artilleryman gaseed

APert from gas officer reports, none of the many accounts of the
Se1cheprey affair mention that the hour and a half bombardment preceding
the raid consisted wholly of gas~ (Hence the gassed German artillerymano)
German rwcorda ehow that the reenforced artillery of the ~~

.Qiviai,09, totaling 5~ batteries, fired wer 20,700 77-mm., 105-mm.,

I
150 - rmi., and. 10- cl!I. blue and green cross shells (diphenylchloroa:rdne

I and phosgene) and 900 10-cmo yellow c.rcss !hells (mustard gas) on the

front from Xivray to Remiere!I wood east~ Most of it was concentrated

on 32 French and American batteriee that the Germans had located back of

tt>.e front, around Rambucourt~ Beaumont~ Bois de la Hazelle, Voisogne~ and

lironvi.lle. Some part of the gas was fired during and after the raid, to

maintain the gas screen, along with 42 1 000 HE shells and 6,000 trench

yr---
Benwell, PA 74; Ltr, CG 26th Div to CG I Corps 9 11 May, sub: Rpt on
atk, APr 20 - 21; Ltr, Col John H. Parker (CO 102nd Inf) to Editor,
].n{Jll)tr~ Journ,,,, '2P Feb 19'2!); Memo, G - 3 26th Div to GofS 26th Div,
17 Apr 1920, eubi Notes on Seichepxey Raid (all 1n 26th Div Box 25 1 33.6,
33, 7),

18
Rpt)l Fr Mil M:i!don atchd to 26th D.iv to CG 26th Div, 9 May, .:,ub:
SUm of Intel in regard to Enemy - Seicheprey affair (26th Div Box 25,
33,6); Wa:r Files Extract!!, l l i . ~ x , above.

- ll ,.,
 mortar shells- 19

Regimental gas officers estimated that the bombardment comprised

between 4 1 000 and ~,O(X) gas shelle, all calibers, the "small amount of
high explosive" mixed with the gas obviou!lly that in the blue cross shells.
Casu.lties were said to be 98 gassed in the infant~y and 139 artillerymen,
or 237. The gae fire and the HE bombardment that began as the raiders
advanced and continued through the day destroyed all corrmunications in
the sector, amashing artill~ry liaison and causing the infantry units
to lose all track of each other. Almost very battery position had to
be temporarily vvacuated. 20 Hird hit by the HE fire were the battalions
of the 101st, 102nd, and 104th Infantry and the company of Engineers that
came up to Seicheprey later that morning to repel the raider~.

Debouching from their trenches oppos!.teSeicheprey, the xaider! l'tlshed

Sybille Trench ir. f;ront of the town, e,;eloped and brlefl:,' occupied the
town it~elf, destroying all its dugouts and defenses, and then withdrew
to the trenchQ fhey had captured moet of Company C~ ten heavy a:nd fifteen

light ma.ch.ine guns, and destroyed ten more, in d fight that lasted little
more than an hour. Back in Sybille Trench the German force waited out the

Hanelian, "Gasangriffe an der Ainerikanischen Front" (CMLHO), PP. 113 - 14;

qJns Rpt 318, ~ , 23 APr (War Files Extracts, above, ppa 35 - 40).

20
Ltr, RGO 102nd Inf to COO 26th Div, 22 Apr, sub: Gas Casualties
atk of Apr 20 (26th Div Box 249, fol 7); Frank P. Sibley, .m.:!ih th@ '[;,nkH
~~~ (Boston: Little, Brollfl, 1919), p. 151; Spencer, II, 197 -
201. See also collection of 102nd Inf unit rpts in 26th Div Box 44, 33.6.

- 12 -

-
rI '

the expected counta~ardment and counterattack, with order5 to return

linee after dark. 21
I' to thiir Od'I

sometime before noon Major Rau reached Seicheprey with the reserve

bati.lion of the 102nd, found it evacuated, and advanced on the raiders

in Sybille Trench. A1 hia troops apPrOached the trench, the guns of the
69th French and 26th Diviaion5 that had been manned again after the gas
,'
attack opened fire en the trench and town, driving Major Rau 's forces

back to cover in SeichePJ"eY The shelling of the town continued for over
four hours before it could be stopped.. six men were wounded and two

machine guna were SIii.Shed by this fire. 22 something very like panic,
beginning with the gaa bombardment and maintained by the enemy's heavy
HE fire, seems to have prevailed throughout the sector all that daY

A aeci:ind count~rattack, 1)rdered by the French corps at daylight on

?.l APTll, with six ~onipanie!I of the '51st Brigade under Major John J.
Gallant and twe companies of the 69th French never got launched When

ona of tr,e companies failed t,J arrive ~t the hour for the .attack, Major
23
Gallant, on his own initiative, called it off.

21
A 26th Div 1na.p ot +he atk is in 26th Div Box 23, 32,l, and the Ge.i,nan
map of the atk, with rpt of the opn, in GFB 202

22
Msg, Rau to Parker CO 102nd, 1450, '20 APr, quoted in Ltr, CG 26th Div,
11 May, above; Ltr, Div Insp to CG 26th Div, 10 May, sub: Arty fire in
Seicheprey, '-Pr .20 (26th Div Box 25, 33.6). See also rpts in 26th Div
Box 45, 39.
23
FO :4a~ 26th Div, 1500, 2() Apr, ordered the atk; Hi,t of the 102nd
.:.nf, n.d. i P 14 (26th .Olv Box 41, 11.4); Sibley, pp 146 - 47.

- 13 -
 As it happened, the enelly had withdrawn completely from the area the
previoue night, but Patrols had failed to find this cute About 1100 houre
on 21 APril the old position, were reoccupied and the killed and wounded

there evacuated The re,t of the day wae !Pent preparing court- martial

chargee against Major Gallant, counting casualties, and reorganizing the

102nd Infantry At fir!t on tht.t SUnday morning it was thought that
whole companies had been utterly wiped auto But detachment after detach-
ment turned up, and in the end the total loss was found to be really very
1oW .24

How low c1eualtle1 were eeams to have been more a matter of opinion

than of count. Fi9Uree for the gae and HE bombardment, the raid, and the

Edwarde in hie final report to I Corps said the killed, seriously wounded,
!leriously gassed~ arid missing did not exceed 210. G - 3 at the time t'e-

ported 21 killed, 138 wounded, 94 gassed, 33 -,hel.l - ~hocked, and 209

captured, for a total of 493. 25

Sibley, in hie history of the divi8ion~ ~id 80 were killed and 554

were wounded, gassed, and C:ptured, or 634Q Pershing's note of the affair

Sibley, pu l48u Memo, Div Adj for CofS 26th Div, 2-0 May, n.5. (26th
Div Box 222, 704), indicates that a month 1.ter 37 members of the 102nd,
ir,cluding an office.?', were rptd for the first time as ml,ling in that
actione Cf. ht Ind~ Div Adj to CRO TAG, 14 Jun, ,ame file.

25
Ltr, CG 26th Div, 11 May, above; DOR, 26th Div~ 20 - 22 APl' (26th
Div Box 23, 32.l)o Gen Edward.a' first 20- page account, Rpt of Enemy
Raidu, 23 APr (26th Div Box 25, 33~8), said 58 were killed, 145 wounded,
and 226 c;ptlU:ed, or 429, with no ~ention of gas casualties"

- l4 -
 '

in his memoi.i-3 said the raid cost 81 killed, 187 wounded, 214 gassed, and
5 officers and 182 men captured, a tot1l of 669. The largest total, 914,
waa attributed to Gener~l Edwards by another divieion historian who quoted
him ,a saying that 164 officers and men were killed in the fray, 600 gassed
and wounded, and l~O captured that day. 26

The Rag1mentl Ga! Officer count of 237 gas casu~lties in the infantry
and artillery during the raid h not supPorle<l J;,y Medic.-! Department sta-

tietics, which indicate that only 49 of the 184 gas cases that month
occurred on 20 - 21 APril, wit.h none in the artillery. 27 A hospital count
of casJalties is not possiDJe !inca hLiapital admiuion lists for that

period are missing in the records. It seems hirly certain howevel.' that

the raid coet well war 600 casualties, including over 200 gae cat:ualtie:s

and precisely 5 officeri and 178 men captured. 28

~The taking c,f t.heee p.rieoner!I, .. a.id 1n AEF his.torian, ~put the

Americilr: Army in rathe.r unhvorabllif light at the time, and the German~

o omide the moet cf it Thl'<Jugh neut~al countries, dropped by airplane

went long accounte with pictv:0! cf th:i., a.ff.air; tnd the wireless st.ition
29
neax Berlin t-.old all the world about it in bo.aetful tel"fll!."

Sibley, p. 139; l'el'!lhinq, ~~.!19~~!l~tb.!.JYO....E!sL'.l..:t (New York,

1931), 1I~ P 16; BentNll, p. 74.

27
An.alyd.,, p. 6~. The ec,u-i 15ource ~howe 65 kUJ.ed and 94 M)Unded in the
I l02rJl.i Inf on 20 - .21 AP?'
28
Wr .Filu Extr.icts, ~i,t.Jl.l'!, abovt;;; Mil Attache
.19:22, 111ub1 Atk on Seichep:reY (26th Div Box 12, 22~ 7).
29
_, Shipley Th.,-,Olae, Tht,J.:!:l.~2L.~~"1:.:. (New York; Dor~n, 1920), pp.
1
2 - 3. Thomae suggests that the 1st Oiv atk at Cantigny on 28 May wae made
to vlndicato the n.me of tht Ane,:-1.can Army.
- 15 -
 After aevel'l.l hectic days, life in the sector returned to ite normal,,
nerve-wracking routine. G - 2 reported over 30,000 HE ~hells, 3 1 100 gas;'

and 1,050 .a!xed gas ard HE in April, &xclueive of the 20 April banbardments,
ov9r two-thil"dti of tbis fire in the first hlf of the montho Since G - 3

aPParently isaued no daily reports until 13 APril, its casualty count

for April of SJ killed, 234 wounded, 100 gassed, 31 shell shocked, and
:;.()9 captured, or 657, is inadequateo lk>re accurate may be Medical Dep1rt-

ment statistics for A.Pril showing 1-46 killea, 328 wounded, and 184 gassed.
With the 183 ,a?tured t Seicheprey, total caeumltiee came to 841. 30

Through moat of May fewer than 300 enemy shelle a day fell in the
diviaion secto~ and as in the latter part of April, G - 3 reported more
accident a 1 injuriee than shell casualtie.h Shell :fire resulted in a total

of 19 killedj 73 wounded~ 48 gaseed, and 4 ehell shoeked, aecording to

G - 3 daily 1eport1~ r,,o more were killed nd 9 wounded on patrols. 31

An enemy gas projei:tor att.ck and ,. g,u bombardment.. by the division's

Own artillery were to coet the 26th Division an addition~! 409 gas casual-
the:~

Although th~ diviaion had been warned of projector attacks in the

Toul Heter, and its obeervers and reconnaiuanc:e aircraft had kept a
cloee wat;h for telltale tigns, the attack came with complete and stunning
3(')"'===-,,.._.,,~,
SOI 1 - 29, 26th Div, 2 - 30 AP'z (26th Div Box 8, 20.1); !:OR, 26th
Div, 13 - 30 Apr; Analysis, P 65 ..
0

31
IJOR, 26th Div, l - 30 May; SOI 30 - 60, l - 31 May, reported l0,105
HE, 339 gas, and 300 mixed ges and HE shells~
- 16 -

 surprise. At 011, hours on 10 May, in heavy fog, 1,141 18-cm. projector

bombs containing over 2'.J tons of pho59ene exploded on the south slope of

Hill 322, woods of Aprerllont, and the trenches in the vicinity occupied by

Co~pany D of the 103rd. Infantry and its machine gun unit. Six men died

within five ainutee, 17 euccumbed later in the day, and 162 were evacuated

as &erious hospital cases- !he remains of the company were relieved that
night,

"This h, the first time," a staff report of the t\EF Gas Service was

to say, "'that an attack of this kind has been made upon a high position,

and no warning of the attack had been given by Intelligence officers

Ot1 the wholt:-, owing to the unusual character of the attack, the number

of casualties can hal!lly be attributed to poor discipline.t132

The SPeeo wt.tn which the C,erman pioneers set up this operation c'lnd

e-xecut.ed it made it almost lmpossible to detect in time~ The projectors,

Gen,1:1n records shew. were .brought into the sector two days before, em-

placed norlhwes.t of APre"m0r;t the next night, and fired before the divisior:.

32
lt:t, Maj G. N. Lewis, A..-:tg C Dof Div, Gas Sen to Lt Col J. N. W
Sch:Jlz, Cias Se.rv F~oJ:)rel:i, 1..1 - 4 GHQ .:&.EF, 2C May, sub Recent Gas Atks
(26th Div Box 249, fnl 1).

ii:i.nslian, PP 17 - 2t:ic Col John L. Miles' account of this atk

(ttCc 1Jld rt Happ,en to YC'lu?* MJ!J::I., Aug 1957, pp. 41 - 3) stresses the warn-
in;s the division had of proj9ct~r attacks in the sector and suggests that
the la.st aerial photos that wzrq taken, on 4 May, might possibly havoe
showr: the emplat.:ements. 7he Ger.nan "ccount would deny this. Seft also
5Poncer, II, 202 - 06 1 used by Mill!'s

- 17 ....
 G - 3 reported at first that thP- attack had ')Ccurred ,3.t 052:> and was

in reta::Hation for diversirmary fire put down by the diVi$iOn artillery

to covel." u raid of tha 10th Goloda1, on th~ Jeft. The next day tha se-

quence of events was corrffcted: the projector attack, a~ operation of

enemy pioneez- tr,.)ops working along the Woevre front, had occurred at 011.5,

follOW<i:~1 h.f ;:, h;,li hou:r of rtinen;,,e:de1 and artillery fire back of t.he gas-

sed area. The 26-t.'1 D.b,isicn fire had begun as .scheduled about 0500, and

in reta:::.1.ivt!on fi)r that~ ei,emy artillery opened up with gas and HE fire

at 0!:i:25,, 7his lat.t.er fire~ said G - 3, killed lO ,Ml"!. and wounded 12.

fr.e gas ~a:t.ualty c,:;.unt of 177 did not di$tin4uish between the projectfJ.r
~ ~4
attac.~ and the later i;,a~ fi:re~

th~n 300 prc,Jeo:;tiles had be,~n fired. Panicking in the sudden cloud of

J(,
{,'..J:i' :.:e.1; ri:!1,: :iut (' th;c!.r hoBt.k, anJ 1,vOuld .1,ot P:ii.. 'Jn masks 1 and knocked off ',.,

t.h.e m11c1b )f (',i!-i.e-r.t." Cffects of th~ cloud we:re f~1t downwind in the areas

in,; to ~~r1:-l the >c1tt;...d: t.hay e:xpeetfod. to follow be~ame C.:.".UalUes later in

l'he D.t'vis-Jo~) Ga.:.: Officer estimated 600 18- cmQ p:rojectiles in the at-

tack, and thc.tsht they had .been fired from the west edge of Bois Jura t about
---~-~----
34
20th f.d.v~ 9 - 1l May; Lt:.s, CG 52nd Brig to CG 26th Div, lO May,
i)(fl,
-.,.i.(v: $pedal situc,tior:, rpt No. ?.,H.:10. 4 (26th Div Box 37, 33 .. 6) .. Rpts
NoQ l ..'l:;J 3 il,;1Vc n.:it been found ..
- 18 ..
 600 meters frJm the target area He confirmed the final total of 185

casualties, including an unspecified number in Compcl.ny B in st. Agnant,

a kilometer back of Hill 322, Mo5t of the men, he said, had changed from

thei;r SBR to their M-2 mask sometime after the attack and almost all had

aggravated their condition by their exertions at the scene or in walking

to the aid station, a mile away, 35

Early in May preparations began far the first large- scale r-aid made

by the division. M;:ij. James F. Hickey with 300 cf hi~ 101,t Inf~ntry bat-
talion began intensive training far in the rear, With detachments of the
10::>..nd and 103rd Machine Gun Battalions, special signal and engineer stc-

tions, and two sq1,1adrons of planes flying cover, he was to jump off just

P.ichecourt, collP.cting prisoner~ and matf:riel and squaring the Seichepr-ey

Although no gas wr,~ called for in the infantry plan or order for the
36
raid, 151st Brigade headquarters ;,,pparently asked for 9.1s to the i:rma-

diate right and left of the box barrage that was to be put around Camp
35 -------
Lt.r, 000 to C of G..:s Sel"'J, 12 May, ::;ub: Rpt of Gas Atk (26th Div Box
,, '.?4S); Fl.pt on Ga~ Atk, RGO 103rd Inf, n.d.; Rpt on Gas Atk, CGO 26th Dlv,
n.J.; suppl Rpt on Gas Atk, RGO 103rd I~f n.d.; Ltr, RGO 101st Eng to I)G0,
3

11 May, sub: Gas Atk night of May 9 - 10, ;i.ptd an engineer gassed in a
working p.:1rty near the impact area (all r-pts in 26th Div Box 2.49, fol 7).
36
See pl<;1ns for raid d.:;.ted 7 and ?l ,.a:, (26th. Div Box 40, 33.e), and
FO :sA. 26th Div) l80(J, 22. M..1y.
- 19 -

;;
du Moulin. This Wl!S too near the point of attack, the <'rtillery commander,'

G4!ner11l Aultman aaid, but gas would be used to neutralize enemy machine
37
gun, and 111inm.,.rfer eut of the camp, from Lah.i.yville to Le Sac Sub-
Hquent ~idence stJgg .. ts either that Colonllll L9gan, coll'lll8.nder of the 101st

Infantry, and Maj1:1r Richy W'&re not informed of the gas plan Ol' that no one

believed that gas on lahayville could possibly cause casualties at Camp

du Moulin.

Tt'le HE bOmba.rdment of the Gel'll'lan positior.s began at 2300 hours on

30 May and at 0230 the raide.rs advanced behind a rolling barrage, As

they reached the first line of German trenches their artillery poured

pho...-into Lehayville, a village on alightly higher ground about three-

,ind engulfed the raiders. lbawere that it was gas or unwilling to admit

it, Major HicJr"'y was to say in his report that "U,e men -re bothel:'ed

considerably by the fumu from our ,hells, many men being rendered very

sicl<, vomiting and gasping."

38

In the brief pas.age in the German trenches nnd catnp som& 40 GeJ:ff'<ans

m,iy havf! been killitd, moatly by the ngineers who bombed every enemy dug-

31 - -~. --
Ltr, CG 51st FA Brig to CG 5lat Brig, 23 May, sub; Plan of Raid! 51st
fA El.rig, Plar, of employ,nent for Coup de Main east of Richecourt, 28 May
(both in 26th Div Box 119, 33,8), Note1 Cpns Rpt 58, 51st FA Brig, 31
May (.!!,, 33,6) did not rpt any gas fired thnt day,
J8
Rpt of raid by 3N Bn, 101st Inf, n.d, (26th Div Box 40, 33.s).

- 20 -
 '
,.,
',/.

out they came to. Few live Germans were seen since the enemy, warned of
the raid by the bombardment, had withdrawn most of his forces to the rear.
The raiders found little use for the stout clubs they had been issued,
and retut-ned with a single prisoner, a mere boy, and several machine
guns. Except for two men killed by their own grenades and fourteen
wounded by enemy shell fire, the raiders returned safely about an hour
after jumping off. 39

By noon that day nea:-ly every man in the party began to show signs

of having t,een mo~e or less seriously gassed. Early reports of the raid
glossed the gas incident. G - 3 said only that gas shells were inten-
sively uaM du:ring the whole of the operation," without saying who used

them, and rePol"ted 2 killed, 17 wounded, 2 shell shocked, and 39 very

another 170 gas cases were accounted for by G - 3 and on 6 June a final
25, for a total of 234. 40

The Division Gai;, Officer's first report was eqtially vague, saying
that an unknown number of gas shells had resulted in 209 casualties in
the 101st Infantry, 103rd "'3 Battalion, and Engineer detachment. The
men had "run into the gas, smelling of new mown hay and a1m1onia, between
--------
39
Sibley, pp. 159 - 76.
40
Rpt of Ga& .Bombardmentt 31 May (26th Div Box 249, fol 4). Cf Ltrs,
Med Off, 101st Inf to Div Surg 26th Di'Y, 31 May and 2 Jun, sub: P.pts on
Raid (26th Div Box 40, 43,8),

- 21 -
 Lahayville and Richecourt," the powder smoke of the artillery fire conceal-
ing the gae $Uffic1ently so that appa,rently none had masked. 41

Captain Cutler's report and map sent the next day to General Edwards
was more specific (Map No. 2). Without consulting him the artillery had
fired 1,660 7'-mm. and 155-mm. No. 5 phosgene shells into the Lahayville
area, the gassed area about 600 meters from the edge of the box barrage
area under attack. "This sad affair," he said, resulted from choosing a
target without watching wind direction and velocity. A seven mile per
hour wind from the northeast had swept the gas down on Richecourt, ex-
posing the men to the vapor fo~ the 30 to 45 minutes of the actiono cri

their return they had hiked almost four miles back to their trucks at

By evening all in the raiding party had been hospitalized and 209
of them showed sign~ of fairly severe phosgene poisoning. Five days
lat.er 231 men had been evacuated to base hosp:l.tals and the remainder of
the party was still sick in quarters. Over the next two weeks, five died
in the hospitalo The rest, said the Division Surgeon, seemed to be on the
road to recovery,, The leader of the raiders, Major Hickey, after more
than a month in the gas hospital, came out only to be 11tossed by a shell

41------
Rpt; of Gas Bombardment, 31 May (26th Div Box 249, fol 4) Cf Ltrs,
Med Off, 101st Inf to Div Surg 26th Div, 31 May and '2 .Jun, sub: Rpts on
8-id (26th Div Box 40, 43.8).

- 22 -
 GAs ro~ R ... 10 ON CAMP o,u MouL1N
JI MA.)' 1,1~

GA~ \,,< ... -.~~,

1S'""'"
,..., S"'~- ____ _
,..,,.., /IS

-- -- i

/
,,/
'
/ ~-j'
I
I
i '\
I

MAP /VD, Z

23
 shortly after his return," and had to be invalided out of the division. 42

The attempt to hush up the incident is clear from Colonel Logan's

qttery to General Edward& on 4 June; ~there is a belief prevalent that
the gas from which these men hove suffered came from shells fired by our

own artillery." He asked for an investigation. 1wo days later General

Edwards repliedo He admitted that the artillery program for the raid
1
'was silent on the que&tion of gas, 11 but "heard that the infantry had

asked for gas on the back areas, and even in Richecourt, whicf. was d.enied"

However, gas had been put on Lahayville, in the belief, as he understood

1t1 "that a 600 meter danger zone in the direction of the wind was all
that had to be seriously considered, and that gas would not penetrate

u
\..~-'-
-:, -
~....... , .. -~ ....... ,.,. .----
""I"-- _ ~ "
. _,..,l:t""
It ia a great lost.an~. ult is one of those .tnstances in this war where,
after everything is taken into consideration, I do not see that any person
or persons can ba held distinctive.ly culpable to such an e;(tent that purr-
itive measures in thi; great emergencr would be wise or necessa.1yo Briga-
dier Genera] Aultman l5lst f:'A Brigade convnander, y..Jlo had :replaced General
1.assiter three ~eeks before] comes to the ~ame c0~~lusion a~ I do, and it
has given him the greate.st regret and i::oncerno !hank the Lord the serious
casualties were few, and th~ others were slight.

'J. believe t;h~ l':'rro:r should be frankly confessed gr:d admitted among our-
""'f.!lves; that it sh::iuld 90 no farther, that advantage should be taken of
the &!lriously l~arned lesson, that it is water that has run under the
bddge 'that i:annot be 11tturned, and we ehould make the best of it in the
spl:,,:,it ot seH~ s8c:i-if1ce ar.d cl'.arity that prevails as one of the controlling

~~-----~--
Lt~, DG0 tj CG 26th Div, 1 Jun, subi Gas Casualties on Raid of 101st
Inf (26th Div Box 249, fol :i); .ttr, CO 101st Inf to CG 26th Div, 4 Jun,
sub: U"!ssing ~f 101st Inf (26th Div B0x 31, 61.l)i Ltr) Div Surg 26th
Div tc D:l.t.:1 Service de Sant~, XXXJI Gorps$ 14 ,.Am, sub; Rpt on Gas Atk,
M<1y 31 (Med ~pt Box 3586, fol 19); Sibley, p~ lQS; Spencer, II, 211, who
~:pts 236 cai::un.lties.

- 24 -
 43
spirits of this division, and the incident should be closed ..

Aultman himself "confessed" that the gas order had been drafted in his
office. In putting gaa on La.hayville he had followed French doctrine as
republished for the AEF, and the XXXII French Corps artillery commander
had aipPrOved the plan as fired The doctrine, he said, was obviously
44
defective.

The error was alluded to, but no more, in the Gas Service Weekly
summary of Infol'fflation on 5 June, under the heading, 1Travel of Gas,"
But the incident, as might be expected, was soon well known throughout
the AEf, and was to strengthen the natural :reluctance of commanders to
45
use gas, ?S1"ticularly in an offensive op~ration.

After a week of investigation by the Office of the Chief of the

Chemical Warfare Service, the Corps Gas Officer, French corps headquarters,
the Medtcal Director of the Chemical warfare Sarvice, and General Aultman,
43 __ _
Ltr, CO 101t Inf to CG 26th Div, 4 Jun, sub1 Gassing of 101st Inf,
May 31st, and 1st Ind to CO 101st Inf, 6 Jun (2bth Div Box 31, 63.1).

44
Mo!mo, Lt Popp ~sst CGO l Corps for Capt Goss, 6 Jun, sub: Suppl Info
on Gaa Casualties in Raiding. Party (GAF - 26th Div); Ltr, CG 51st FA Brig
to CG 26th Div, 19 Jun, sub: Gas Poisoning (26th Div Box 59, 63).

45
CWS WSI S - 19, 5 Jun (l',!l Hist Box 298). Ltr, Mc.\ndrew Off of Cofs
GHQ A.EF to CofS I Corps, 12 Jun, sub: Dangerous Use of Gas (2nd Div Box
106, 470. 72), said mrne intdligent study of the use of gas and closer
liaison between g~s officers and their commanders was indicated.

- 25 -
51st Field Artillery Brigade co111Dander, General Aultman and General

Edwards came to a mutuaJ understanding and "the unfortunate incident

was clo,ed~ A month later the French ord\ued a change in their artillery

manuala, increasing the margin of safety from 500 to 2,000 meters when

wind and terrain were unfavoJ'able and requiring the wearing of masks
unde.?' these condi t,ions~ 4 6

The month of ~June in the Toul sector saw an acee-leration of activity

on botr.. sides~ w1 th G ... 3 .reporting 50 officers and men killed, 256

wounded, and 180 9a1s~, a total of 4860 Spencer reports nine gas at-

1:.acks that month, resulting in just 18 gas casualties. Medical Department

st3tistics, on the other Mnd, reVeal a total of 63 l.:111.ed, 339 wounded,

and ~31 gassed in June~ -:-'he latter figures incJ.ucie 2.45 gai;,i,,t,J !r.

Infar.try~ 92 in the 102ndi and. 120 in the 103rd, although nothing in the
47
division reeords 5UPPorlli so h\.gh a gas casualty total. Nothing, that

is, but G - 3 1 1 repeated 1epo:rts of "good rraany ga;:; shells used," conliide:r-

able percentage of gas shells," and "ga::. again used extensively, wi'th just

180 gas casualtit>o to support these remarks. The 26th D:\vision, with much

less access to gas than the enemy, replied as often as it coold, once in

con61darable quantities in areas wh~:r-e the long - .-ange gun [that ragula.rly

'4t>~-----...,,=
Spe:1:::ar, Il, 2141 G - 3 Meiao, A:rmia/S of the North and Northeast for
the Al:-mi.es, 3 July, trans.mitted to C of Gas S!:!rv AEF, 10 Jul (A.EF GHQ
G - 3 R~< Bvx 319J, fol 1583).
47
DC1t:, 26th Div~ 1 - 27 Jun; spencert II, 218 - 27; Analysis, p. 600
SCI (,1 - 86, l - 27 Jim, reveal a minimum of 24,000 HE and 3 1 500 gas
sha 11 ~ fh.ed ir,to the sectorq

e'
- .t:O ...
 shelled division headquarters at BoucqJ was suspe~ted to be. The gun
wa& not ail.need until the 19th following an HE bombardment of Heudi-
48

Probably the aost interesting event dlJ.X'ing the 26th's occupation

of the Toul 1ector," said a historian, was the gas projector attack
carried out ty a company of tnt 1st Gas Regiment on the second line of
enemy trenche! running through Sonnard woodJ on the morning of 19 June
It was also the largeet shoot ever carried out by the regiment on an
Amrican front. The ga~ and flame troops of the AEF were destined
to be a highly trained but little used adjunct of the infantry.

The first two companies of the ht Gas Regiment, organized in the

States, haj reache<l F!"&nce in Ja11uarY 1918~ .After training with the
Special Brig,-,,de of British gas tr.oops up on the Ypres-Lens front dLll'-

in9 Marc:h and ,i,P!'il, asshting them in a number of large-sea.le cylin-

der, livans projector, and Stokes mortar operations, the companies were
brought dorm a11a attached to F:t"en~h and American units in the line. In

late M<'t:, '.::ompany A was attad,ed to the 26th Division at Toul, company B
toe nearhy Frencn unit. rhe company waited on weather and opportunity.

At 0230 hours or, 19 June 1 in the largest independent gas shoot

ever to be carried out by t.Jie 1st Gas Regiment on an American front,

Company A fired 737 pho~gono;:-filhd projector drums from the Bois du

4~-----
flC'.E, 2~th Div- 16 - 17 and l? - 2c Jun~
 ,.

Jury on two target, in the Bo! 1 de la Sonnard, where enemy troops were

believed holding in considerable force (see Map No. l). T~n minutes
after the discharge 26th Division artillery opened fire to hold down
retaliation fire, only to be outgunned by the Germans !flo for two hours
poured an estimated 9 1 000 gas and HE shells into the projector area, gun

po5ltlons, and as far back aa Boucq G - 3 reported 7 killed, 28 wound-

49
ed, and 85 gassed as a result of this fire

An historian of the division said that prisoners taken that night

claimed a regimental relief was going on when the projector attack came
and "they estimated that 2,~00 Boches were evacuatod"
~o Nothing has
been found in the division records to support this claim, and Garman
record, Are not available for this period.

The Division Ga$ Officer aaid that the reta'!liato.ry gassing began

at 031!> and lasted solllaW.ng ever an hour. APPrOximately 2iOOO green

L:rOs.s shells (phosgene), with a few blue and yellow cross, were put into

Seichepreyj Beaumont 1 and Mand.res, and on battery positions below Beau-

mout and Rambucourt and in the Bois de la lkzelle and Bois du Jury. HE
.

mi~d with ga~ continued to fall on these same areas intermittently through ~.',
the rest of the dayq

--~-
49
FO 43, 26th Div, 1622, 13 Jun, set up the projector opni History of
CWS AEF, FS.nt Gas R9gt, Q:>ns (H - 28, CMLHO); DOR, 26th Div, 18 - 20 Juna
!he gas t.roops may have planned to fire l,~00 drums, as many accts rpt,
but less than half that number were actually fired
50
Benwell, P~ SL

- 28 -
:i
 The?'e is e sug91H,tior. in Capta1.n CutJ..ar~s :report that the 103rd

Infantry wa11 uwierved b7 this rrl;t.!lcb 3'Ji enemy gas preparation three

day: ~arlier 1!07:' anothe:t" '"Seieh,sp:l"ey,w and the fight that followed at

x1vray .... Ma.t-toi&in 1 had cost tla 103rd 28 killed, 167 wounded, and 47

g.used" After the gas shelling on t.h.e 19th, 172 man, most of them from

th~ lOOrd Infa.nt:ry, iA/iXO &r.b.itt!!-d to thia ffold hospital as gss suspect

"undoubtedly maling~rer~" and deaerved severe punishment, although he

b:reath.ed 1n. i~ g.:~ frcm th0 ur..bu:t'ia~ ~ leaking 100 - r.'Jn duds from
~l
Sunday~s bombet'clm.ftnt~~

Sot:ie '11eeks l;,.ter 1 1.1s no further missions present<?.d themselves,

flam~ reg1wmt, after mining with tha fhoitish, car:ded out minor gas

opex-ation-s on othe):' ~tabil.iz~d fronts, but nono was to match Company

Ai, exploit~ As seems fairly cl8a.r, the shoot had been inadeqi.iately

51~-~"=--==~-
Rpt$ o! Xivray action; l6 Jun (26th .Civ Sox 47 33.6); lt.1., OGO to
CGO }COtI! Fr Co:ip.s, 22 Jun, sub: Rpt of Bomb,.1rdr~iit of Gas Shells (26th
Div &,< 249f fol 3), Ltr, cco tci C'G 26th Dit~ 22 Jun., aub! ~Pt of Gas
Atlc of ...,11.,;."1 19 {~~C;.tl. Div B:;;x 25, 3:;:,6)0 Not.tn The N'li!d Dept rvcord of
120 gae&ed i~i t,\,f::i .U:;::'d !nf on 16 - 19 Jun ii; probably corl:ect ..

- 29 -
 le,en tho p:roJKto:r, and lllo:r'tar of the lst Gas Rogilll8nt later took

part in operation on active An'.erican fronts -- at Cha.teau ThierrY,_ st.

Mihiel, and ~ tbe. ' Meuiae-Argonne - - the f-.tar of higher con.ands of the
u,e of ga5 itself, ae well a& enemy reta:'11ation, restricted their fire
almost entirely to IJl'lloka and thermite, and precious little of that. Yhen
attached to attacking unit1, the heaVy, unwieldy mortars could not be
..nauver.d ovez m'Oken ten-a:!.n and nre soon left far behind the troops

they wer intend@d to ;,upporl. The iuortal'tll8n never trained with the
infeDtry they e.cvodf ad aa a 1"&i:oult got no helping hand, when better

faroilia=ity with th eapabilities of the weapon might have got it up

forward where it could be us.d~ In World War II the infantry on f1Very

front was to leu"Sl wvll 'the Uii116;!!. of t.htt mortar and in the end aPPrO-

?ritod the """"" ito o..,.

At the end of June l9l8 the 26th Division was relieved on the Toul

f1-ont by the 82nd Division and the French unit it was to train with.

en~ July orders ca1n1t to reliwve the 2nd Divi~ion ~st of Chateau

Thier.ry and on 10 July the 26th took over the line above bloody Belleau
wood.s 2 Eight days later a6 the Fren~h Sixth Army began its counter-
offens:i.ve against the German .SEm~-~ in the Marne salient, the

26th Division attacked on the Torey-Belleau- Bouresches - Vaux front.

0.,er the next eight days tha ciivi$ion advanced almost 17 kilometerst
" de Fere,
to the Foret ' as the German$ retreated to the line of the QJroq,
capt1Jring 250 priaonel"$ ~nd losing almoet 4,500 officers and men, O'Ver

52
FO 45, 26th Div, 2300, 23 Jun; FD 48, 0400, 5 Jul; FO ~o, 1330, 8 Jul.

- 30 -
 ~-,:,:"
''
.
' 1,900 of them to gas alone.
53
CK1 25 July the 42nd Divieion relieved the
26th in tht forest.

The division retraced its way back through the sector collecting it&
straggler& and missing in action. Several day& later it continued down
to the valley of the Meuse where it received repl~cements and rested and
ret~ained for ,c1l!nost a month. Here cont.:1.nued the reshuffling of the co~
mand that ble,gan when on 16 July General Trai1b of the 51st &igade ln
to take comnand of the 35th Division. Next, whc,lesaile drafts were made

on officer& and nonccm1, the diviion losing 80 captains and lieutenants

in one 9'l'OUP alonA, to fill out ne1,-ly arrived divi&ions or to return ar.d
54
train division, being formed in the states Similar siphoning of the
c0mmand was going on in oth~r AEF divisions, cf course, but General

t.:L.,(0:..-..;b w,.:;.:i high.'i.y voce:l and saem5 N have contested f!Very loss in his

division at a diluticn of lts New England Guardsman blood

'
' By lat~ Augus~, according to a division historian, the only people
l
in Fran<;~ who did not kr1ow of tht! coming ,":it. Mihiel offensive were the
55
div!5~.0ns involvedo tAl 27 Augu.st the 26th Division began moving .by

stages tu th outhi':,1st ,3nd acros~ the Meuse- On the night of 7 - 8

S~ptetnber 1 t ante red the l'ight side of the V Corps line ne.a1 Rupt -en-
,1

Study No. 4, "The 26th Divisi<'.in in the Alsne- Marne Campaign ...
54
FO 66. 26th Divi 1730, 29 Juli Sibley, pp. 243 - 50.
;: j:
''
 ... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ___________________________________________ --------------~~--'""""-~

'

r/C;jVlih batwean the 15th Colonial and 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Division,
,,_,.,
56
tha latt~=- in the !I Colonial Corps The 15th Colonial, with the 26th :;

and 4th Division, on either side, made up Cameron's V Corps for tho attack ,r,
57
~X,;;.;:; Ho~ 3). Opposite the 26th Division was the ).,2~~~- }

fo the 26th Division sector wooded heights ;rose from the Meuse in

~ 9:re1,1,',,: undulating ridge for some slx or s1.?ver1 kilometers before breaking

jc-wn. \.;"; ;.o thei t'loevre plain.. Through the woods ran the Grande TrancheQ

(Jc C;;,}.rJ1;;e, an ie:xcellent road leading to P.attonchatel, at the end of

;.\,;,.
' '"' Dhectly bolow Hattonchatel, at the foot of the hill, was

"' .' - - n., .. ,..,,.i

_.,. J - . . . .

Cfo..::n;;ion, Sa.uh, and Wadonvi.lle -- and beyond them s1:ill another --

from the ridge on a clear day

t::: wa~ pc.:.sibl5 to see eighty'- two towns in the plain, all in the hands

I11~~h.ate belts of wire entaglements, kilometers deep~ marked the ~...

r:r,:,,r:..:... t z.rcd Ge:rt"J'J,3.n trench systems in the sector, running approximately

f.rc,m M;s f.Parges dow'1 through Vau:c les Palameix to Lacrois sur Meuse-

FIJ 69 - 7f. l 26th Div, 27 Aug ~ 6 Sep~

Th-;: :ro,co:-d:.; of the !llh,,kg1t in GFB 165 are meagre and useles;;.

- 32 - ,,
,,

,
,,'/

.::r
i !
'J:
.

'
'!,.t,. !
'

l.
I
The French held the hills to the north, the Germans the plains and roads
to the :south. It hat1 been this way for almo15t four years, and only the

suspicions aroused in German intelligence over the Past month or so

had caused the enemy to begin work on a new fortified line across the top

of the salient, the Michel Stellung, along Riaville- MarcheYille-Jonville-

58
Hattonville - Dampvitoux east.

Following the 26th Division, great trains of artillery reenforcements

crammed into the sector and on rail line& built over the first ridge of
the Meuse heights came he,vy 14- inch u. S, naval guns~ The division

had MOre than two brigades of artillery under its COJIIJland, including
batteries of 220'1, 270-mm.. howitzers, and 240-mm. trench mortars - -

~.lt.oi.:,e-thar. 42 batteries totaling 252 guns~ 59

In the attack on 12 September to close the St~ Mihiel salient,

Cameron's V Corps was to take the heights beyond Les Eparges and Combres

with the 15th Colonial, the 26th Division assisting in that principal ef-

fol't Then the 15th Colonh l was to advance to th.e Longeau Farm- Hannon-

ville 1oad, the 26th Divi&ion to Hill 381 - Oommartin and an to a line

c.;onfo:rming with the 15th Colonial, marking the First Day's Objective

Thi=: 4th Division was t.o hold fast JS corps rese.rva.60

se-------
Rpt, A Study of the St .. Mihiel Salient, n.d., n. sig. (26th Div Box
12, 25.4)"

59
Conf held by Col Duncan K. Majer Jr~, Cofs 26th Div n.d. (26th Div
27~ 50.1); Sibley, PP 260 - 62.
60
fO 17, pt. 1, V '~orp1, n.d .. J FO 17, Pt. 2, 2400, 10 Sep (V Corps Box
J.4, 32.l); FO T;, 26th Div, 1330, 11 Sepv

- 34 -
 In order 11 to blow '.\,he top off Les Eparges !.heights] and Combres"

by observed daylight fire, Cameron asked that his attack be delayed

until 0800, three hours after the ~in attack began on the south of

the aalient. Parahing agreed, and the violent artillery preparation

succeeded as intended At 0825 the French were reported aver Les

61
Eparges heights.

The 26th Division, with the 104th, 103rd, and 101st Infantry in
line from north to south, mtide slow progress through the wired trench

system on it! front, and within an houx the two attack battalions of

the 101st Infantry became thoroughly mixed up. However, by midafter-

noon the re1erve battalion of the 101st, with a battalion of the 102nd,
and the 103rd Infantry had c:r-oued the st. Remy-Vaux road, their Intel"-
mediate Obje.;;i:ive, The ~nd D1arnounhci, uo thd; right, was ther. on the

DoDl!lartin-Do mpierre road. About 1700 houn, the forward elements of

the 26th Division came abreast of the 2nd Dismounted on the Dommartin
62
road~ !he First 03.y 1 s ctijective had been reached.
61 ___.._ _
FO 18, V Corp5, 1900, 11 Sepi Draft Rpt, Opns of 26th Div at st.
Mlhiel, n.d., n.s. (26th Div Bo:x 25, 33 .. 6j. Sibley, P 265, said that
gas was used during the p:repa:ration. The only confirmation is Ltr, CG
26th Div to c.-in-C 1st Army, 20 Sep, sub: Obsl:!rvations on Cl}n$ for
Redvcticn of st. Mihhl Salient (Box 27, ~Cl.!), which $tates that four
ie~tions cf the 1st Gas Regt ~ejected gas and $1DOke just before the
atk.. If the regt fired any gae: it was probably neutralized by the
heavy ~ain that morning.
Ltr, CO 102nd fA to CG 26th Div, 22 Sep, ~ub: Rpt on Recent Opns
(26th Div Bo:c; 61, 33.6), said 1,080 [phosgeneJ shella were scheduled
but "it was impossibla to get any gas shells~ In fact the regt ha1 not
recd them to this day.
';
L,'OH, 20th Div, 12 - 13 Sep {26th Div Bo:x 24, 33.l).

- 35 "
 Surprised because caught off balance by the attack that morning, the
enemy had fallen back more rapidly than Pershing had thought he would 0

By noon both cOTps on the $OUth face were on their First Day's Objective,
and by nightfall, despite the delay in moving the troops out again, they
were on their way to the Second Day's Objective as the enemy continued
to retreat {Map Noo 4).

Realizing the situation, at dark Pershing ordered his prize 1st

Division, on the left of IV Corp1, to disregard alignments and objectives

and drive for Vigneulles, then about ten kilometers awaY If the 26th
Division from the west could link up with the 1st Division in time, the
enemy streaming out of the salient with his guns and supplies might be
63
cut off.

About 191~ hours that night, Cameron, arriving at V Corps headquarters

from a visit to l!:>th Colonial, was told that "General Pershing wishn the
salient closed so that no more [enemy] artillery can get awaY" Cameron
called General Edwards at once and is reported to have saida 11
I want
you to select your best infantry regiment, or rathe~ your best infantry
colonel and have him march hie regiment straight down the Tranchee de
Calonne to Hattonchatelo"

Colonel Bearss' 102nd Infntry, in reserve, was ordered up and in

leo;s than two hours was on the march, with the II Colonial Corps alerted
to the passage of the ~egiraent through its lines At 2230 hours, when

63
FO 10, lat Army, 12 Sep (.!lA..l!Lw.Jl!i, lwashington, o.c., 1948]
V rII, 258 - 59).
- 36 -
~:,re~)i"""..-'.<~~a' '<,,,'-,o<. 'ff __ ,c ,.,,"., "'f\j "'7(;':it.0.!, ,. -~1 ' j '' -" C ~ - - - ~ C. . a..s '1\" ~"' ,-,.a..;.; r " ' '-' ,- ,;,rr#,- -~. /-' - - - ~ - ... - J 'JM- 'f'or';;;,W /ill~ fJ\rniff.Jt!7t<$p"( %
. . .
j,0
. . . . .. ..
"~
li()'"l!. , nr- 1:'\ ,Zi7"I" r-:,

_, s,

i---
---- -
'f:4ef, Iv, ~ k h , . rJ,. ~
(fp--o.,t,,-..,,~La.
~)
c..... /I .~\ ~cl'~-~'Jc
,/..,;, I 101. , SiTUATION MAP
Gr Orne s r/1" ~_:,,I m.Gl<do ml"' 11,o 13 SEP 13
.'-\_ l< rn ~
.,,.,.
l . ~J ..,.._
,,
325 ~./
I"''" 2%R. ~
.w. J
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,- ---.,

....._.

,.,; ~ , ./
13.l
. ..' _107,
I I~ (/ Mi;TZ
. .....
A:..
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~"-
)j,.
; )\,."':,
1

Gr Comb':'"_e s, . . ,. .
, (VJ.
' '\'
3 L \_, 15".
:,;"" /x 192 Q;;;;:-; ',"-'of\ i
;.
Ku""
,,

~
~.~
/
./ _/

FC..

JL ,.,/
'.\l
I
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1'2.3!;
/~
/17 f{.
I

l./7_) . '19t~, ~
. / "i\
'f,1':l':i.
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u~s
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...../.
Gr M e\z

e;u~ 3\- \, ..... ~ n.\ I JJ

.;..?
-
__.- -~ -
~.--u.u<,
~ ./
"--=.==-= 'l.1 \
J.
a
lf
- - Gr.M:ri,e\ / .. .rr,i -.255 \l.
(.'lll.> c/ .. 0. '1 .
1cz,2s . R. /
-
"'-" (.oz .. ' - 'l.<5
lGI(& 'i,7&)
...
v . ~
. --~-;
/'"/ Pa ... tl,-111\glJ':,',Ol"\
.. I 10. Ill

Sc: I I lOII: ooo

n"'
:i.o..ru, tots ''" folm \ n ()...,
~A.P /-10.4 l
 Col. Hugh Drum, Pershings Chief of Staff, phoned that he wanted the

26th Divizion unit to link up with the 1st Divi~io~ in Vigneulles by

daylight, Cameron replied that the 1e9iment hq.d long been on ite way

and should be nearly there 2v~rything came thxough as planned, 11

Cameron later said, "although tha 26th was .slc-w, as usual. Even so

our troops were in Vigneulles when the 1st Uivision came up and shelled
64
them, inflicting seve:ral casualties" In what w~y th!::! 26th was slow

was not explained, i'lnd no other :record of the shelling of the 26th

by the 1st Division h~s been foond.

It was a darir:g maneuver that succeeded,, Niarching straight down

the Tranchee de calonn~, in column formation ahd flankers out, the

chat el about 0245 and VignetJlles, nine k! l ometexs from its starting

point, at 0315 on th.Q morning of the 13th.. ~ome five hours behind the

102nd came the lOlet Infa.nt.ry and twn hours fate1 the fixst accompany-

ing gun with thase unit~.

En .route, al.most ?.jQ pl'isoners from the ~i!:L~ were taken,

64-----
Di-aft Rpt, Cpns of the 26th Dlv at St .. Mihielt nod~ 1 n.1;,.; CG 26th
Div, Rpt of C,:,nsu st. Mihiel salinet, 7 Cct; Extract from Statement
of 1.'laj Gen Geo. H Cl"tmeron regarding march of 26th Div on night of
Sep 12, n~d. (all three in 26th Div BoY. 2~, 33.6)~
FG 78, 26th Div, Z300, 12 Sep, had the ~1st Brig marching down the
C'.>J.;.nd Tr.;,nch()e to Vigneulles, th~ 52nd Brig ever the .roads north of
the Tran<hee to st. Maurice and Ha.ttonchatel, the 51st FA-Brig following
the 51st lnf 13:tg, and the 101st M3 Bn alone in div reserve back on the
Vaux- St Remy road.
0

- '.38 -

--------------------------------------
 Giiiil~~ fo-zct'i-. -.n.J (IJqU!~nt had q:,4,:apsd th:to-ugh the gap and was safe

li'i th~ M!Gh~l -Stalltn:,;; t..:.. thi! north.

6~

In th:1 t-wo- dey operatii,m, G - 3 .upo:rted~ thiii 26th Division lo,t

428 woundd and loa dckj eh~ll &hoek11d, o:r e:xhau.11tad, Thi.tty- seven

in th~ Une O$lPQlliite the 26th foi:' the next ten d;sy1, when it woe l'e-

66
Plcod by the ,!QZ:l,!lJli.J/11'1<>J!

Ori 13 and 34 S&pt.mbei-, ,11, the Gel'1Jlftna. corupleted their retzeat

into thti lilichl Stll!lilung, lvaving ea,h town in the plain abl.az,e. as

tht,y &bia::1do11ad it, the 26tt, Division took ovei- from the 15th Colonial

the f:rorit f.ro11 Les EPArgas and Corab1u down to Thillot, putth,g Patrols

.:.n- W:06'\i~~eo st., Hi.lai~e was Orie-fly c,;<,uphd bvt P2,a.red too hot ar, out-

po&t to hc>ld 0
Thi& 2nd :Oiwrioui1cttd Cav~lry tock ovel' the adjacent iront,

froni. Thillot down to Vignaulloa~67

ilif""'" '""""' -,, " "'"

Benwell, PP 140 - 41; Hp-t,g, io1b,:n10; Cpnt. R,i-"t 16, V Corp, 13 Sep
(\!!.iJLJJ!/L\t!, VI!I, 269).
66
DCR1 26th Div, H - 14 ~Pt 16 - 16 Sep, 23 - 24 Sep (26th Div Box 24,
::.n,.l); SO.I 14 - 16, 26th Div, 20 .... 23 SirtP
67
SO! 6~ 26th Div, 12 - 13 Sep (Bo,;; 9, ~0.,1)1 FO 79, 26th Div, 0130,
14 Seip; DOR, 26th Div~ 14 - 17 S;tP
_, ,39 -
 Oo 16 September Cameron' V Corpe headquarte~s, as well as liggetts

1 Co~ps on the far l'ight, left for the Meuse -Argonne front and the 26th

Division in the watronville- Thillot (Troyon) sector was transferred to

Blondlat's II Colonial Corps. 68 It was to fight in the forgotten battle

east of the M&use.

_"H1:."!-~~~~~on tho_~"'~-act

,!~.;~'!~~~-_[~~~
Th! sector taken over ~t the end of the st. Mihiel operation, 9aid
a division historian~ w,e an ideal on, on the crown of a range of hills,
69
with the advanced posts in the towns out in the plain below. The 26th
JJivhion came to doubt it, aa did the divisions that succeeded the 26th
in the Troyon sector~ ~ile the division from the heights dominated the
terrain for mile3 around, the exposed towns in the plain below were ideal
targets for enemy gaa. Whether the Germans had also found them 10 under
French domination of the heights is not known

For ten days there was little activity, allied or enemy, as both
sides conaolidatd their po1iti0D1 The 26th Division made the first
move. As a diversion fox: the Meuse- Argonne attack ~ery division east
of the Mause wae ordered to feint with strong forces and pierce the
enemy lines, to m.k.e him think the main attack was to be launched on
Metz. The 26th D1vie1on was assigned the enemy towns of MarcheV"ille
and Riaville~ in the enemy's Michel Stellung. These were to be assaulted

gs------..-
Fo so, 26th Div, 0145, 16 Sep.
69
Benwell, P 164.
- 40 -
 70
on the morning of 26 Septer~6':?' and helc1 for 24 hOUT5

p:rl!IP6:r$ti<;n fo:r th\il divm-aloo began at 2330 on th-, 25th, but for lack of

a.mrur:d.tion wat thin by ccmr,.:i.-hon with the thunder on the left. At 0530

hoJJl"~ a b1tttaHon nch of the l02nd ,r,nd 103rd Infantxy advanced with ita

rolling ~rrage, heading into A thick smoke screen put down in front of
the two townm~ Impeded by morning fog a.nd smoke screen, againist enemy

tt-t.ille.ry in no wu.y intimidt.ted by thi& thin s:t:x-b,ur bombardm,ntt the

&e$ault t8ema of alm~t 1 1500 men each found the way acro11 the plain
71
cotly~ Conce~led machin~ gun; ripped th~m apart as they came th...---ough
th~ wire and trenche into the to'Nfla~ Marche'lille changed hands four
t111t11 that d&Y, Riaville at least twice.. At nightfall thf! teams re-

~ and a single captured raaehine gun. They had lost 50 killed, 268
72
wounded~ nd 59 mi1oing~

70-~~-,~--~--.. ,~---"--"
FO 82! 26th Divt 14DO, 25 s~p.
71
Rpt~ ~* O, 51st FA B::oig, n-d~, sub, Opn:: of Sop 26 (26th Div Box
59, 33~8), aaid th ~11 a=no allowanc~ had to b~ dietribut~d ClVer th~
whol111 f:ront 10 1u not to gi\'"q; 4WY the objective.
72
DOR, 26th Div, 26 - 27 SePi Lt!.-, CO 10111d !nf to CG 26th Div, 28 sep,
-iUb: Rpt of at.k 01:: i4a:rchtrvill~ ar.d Riav:Ul~H Ltr, CG 26th Div to CG II
Col Corp,, 29 S.P: ub,
Rpt on atk of Sep 26 (26th Div Box 2:5, 33.6)~
SOI 19 - 20t 2".:i - 27 Sep, rpt~ juet 9 pri:Jone::..:!!! taken.

- 41 -
~
,;

l'
"'' into the Ch.,mplon - Saul;( ector held by the 3rd Battalion, 103rd In-
fant:iy {Map. No. 5). With them were elements of the 102nd Infantry

and 103rd Ki Battalion that had bctcome separated from their organiza-

tions during the raids that morning. Disregarding the most elementary
rulea of gas discipline, $aid the Division Gas Officer, these troops
demontrated completely "how an organization should not act during a
gas attack. 'ft

The gae shells, with their high HE content, had been fired over a
six -hour period and the concentrction of mustard was therefore light.
In some cases the men weren't even ordered to mask, and in others
they were allowed to remove their masks within fifteen minutes of
the attacka Shortly afte~ the ga~ shells stOPPed falling, the Company
I kitchen, "in an atmosph~re of gas," served breakfast to its men and
several platoons of Company M. All the cooks and almost P!Very man they
served were later eVacuatedG

Neither battalion headquarters nor the Regimental Gas Officer were

notified until 1300, almost eight hours later, and it was some time
aft~r that before the ComPany M command~r and his gas NCOs heard of the
attack. The 3rd Battalion had no ga6 officer, nor did the 2nd Battalion

which replaced the 3~d that night~

When the Regimental Gu Officer arrived not one of the off'icvs or

men in tht area had his maek on, even though the odor of mustard gas was

strong evl!rywhere~ Although the battalion had been issued lime and h.ad

- 42 -
-.,
-~

"
' GAS Al'"'fACKS
S f P1, 2.fr 17
A" 5 EPT. :Z~-lO

\"

''
'

Sevi-al ~Y l~t~~ b:ig~dw head~~al"t&rs r~ported 1 with con$idarable

chagrin, t.1*t it had b~en info%Vled the~e had been only 25 gas casualtis
ae a l'.!f1.ilt o::f the !ih11llin9, and had not !.earn.ad the true figure until

the Diviaion Gas O:ffier repo~t wo, fo.r.,,:arded to brigade for investiga-
73
C:i,,ipUnt!"

Horses wl!t~a aa vulnerablit to m1.urt.ard g.u as the men were, and

every r,;,_1.1t-,rd 914t :tt'h.ck on a.rti!lery poaitione was almost certain to

r"i:sult in Ca$u,ilH-t:i! in the picket lil"!$ en the mol"f!ing of 29 September,

vf th0 102nd F'A , half mile north of St. Rl!'my~ Ev,e:n though tht men and

Ltr, DOO to CG ?frt.h Dlv~ 29 $~(', ;wb~ Rpt ot (";qi:; ~tk Night S,a,p 26 -
2"?, 29 Sep, a.00 at\~hcl in.:!z. (2.6t:i: ::iv 3.:..x 31v 6:,.~!); KGO :r-pta, nd (26th
Div Bo~ 248); Sp:.-n;::::ei'~ II, 240 - 41.

- 43 -
noticed and it was some hours later before the condition of the horses

was observed. Two had such bad mouth, eye, and body burns that they had
to be deet:royod while the remaining ten had to be evacua-ted during the
74
next week with aevere eye and body bUX'nt

That night, 29 - 30 September, another Lorraine cro,s bombardment

with almc,t 1,200 shells hit the same areas as two nights earlier.
This time elements of the 2nd Battalion, 103rd Infantry, occupied
ChaJJPlon and almot 300 men of the 102nd Infantry lined the trenches
near Saulx ~d this time respirator, were put on intnediately and
kept on for two to 1ix hou~a. As soon as the ahelling ceased, the
txoopg wer-e ~ed out of their dugouts and trenches away from the
,.,.,
., ..... .,.,,_.4
a strong wind tPrang up ju6t as the 1hells stopped falling and helped
to dilute and di1aipate the gasQ

The Divi~ion Ga.a Officer, Regimental Gas Officer, and all command-

ing officers were notified promptly, and as aoon as it was daylight

the gassed areas we~e thoroughly decontaminated. That was how an or-
ganization .hs!~l.s act, wind or no wind. As a reault, there were juat
7 gas caaualtiea in the 103rd and 19 in the 102nd Infantry, all body
burns except fo~ five who retnoved their masks too soon and suffered
slight eye bu%ns~ ~ethe~ the 2 killed and 7 w0und.ed in the division
that day were also casualties of the Lorraine cross shells is not

r.i- --,--,'",,,,,.
spen~er, Il, 242 - 43.

- 44 -
 75
known.

Once more the se,:tor aettled dc,wn, until 4 October when the division

received a apecial consignment of 1,000 yperite shells (muatard gaa)

from the frnch. After a ha~ty conference with G - 2 it was decided
to fire the yperite on a unit of ~tt.A."'~~- J:!llil9AA:IrJ! troops believed
to be in the Eoit d '!!.:ville and another of lltJl_l,;!19.!!!!.!lA: troops in
PinthoYillo.

A battery of 75 ' wa.1 b~ught down. from the heighte ths.t night and

moved into position northeaat of Hannonville- Early on the morning of

the 5th, 500 of the yperite shells were put. on each of ths targets and

followed by 180 HE 1helle, to catch any troops that might come into the
open. In the absence of ~er.man records it can only be said that German
ambulances were een later that day making ~oPeated trips into the woods
and town. 76

The 26th Division infantry had cleared the sector, making way for
th 79th Division, when on the night Df 9 - 10 C-i:.tober al! the town&

from Combres down to Ha.nnorr.1ille ar::d the hia-ights above them c.i.:ne under

a massive yellow crou bom.ba.::dti<ent~ Almost 200 men in the 79th Division

and another 2)0 in the 26th Division artills::y, still in the soctor,

~=,~-"'~"-=""'"''-'~""

Rpt quoted in Ltr, DGO to C CWS, 20 Nov~ $lib: Rpt on Recent Opna (26th
Div Box 25, 33,6); DOR, 26th Div, 29 - 30 SP Rpi;, DM:;O, l. Oct (Box 248),
said all ca.aes we:re body burna, none teen with conjunctiva.I o~ respiratory
le1iDn1; they'd kept thei~ masks on.
76
Ltr-, DGO 26th Div to C cws, 7 Oct, nub Use of Gas againist the Enemy
(26th Div Box 249, fol 3); DCl<, 26th Div, 5 - 6 Oct,
- 45 .
were evacuated the next morning. It was not, as was surmised, in retalia-
tion for the 9a1 on Pintheville but a planned interdiction along the whole
77
German army front, to diucourage any intentions of an attack towa~d Metz.

The 26th Division went into Army reserve near Verdun on 7 October to
rest and refit. Eight days later two battalion, of the 104th Infantry
were sent to the assi,tance of Andlauer'a 18th French Division in the Boi1
d 'Haumont. In a onct- clay battle in a sea of mud that cost 14 o.llt"llif 15 French
tank~ and a reported 250 offi~er1 and men (120 of them to gas), the 104th
, 78
Infantry made little gain and fib.atlly withdrew to its point of departure

,,,, .....
.k- -'~-.z-~,... .. ,...,..,,..
rna na:x"t; oay, .,,. o ................
~ _,.. __ _

up to re1erve position near Samogneux and HaumontQ Late in the day the
102nd Infantry advanced into the Bois de la Reine and Boi1 d 10rmont, to
complete the relief of the 16th French In the line on the left wea the
29th Division, on the right the 26th French. Back of the regiments of
the 26th was thei~ own artillery, heavily reenforced with French unit1,

n----..
RGO 102nd FA, Rpt on Gas Atk, 9 - 10 Oct (26th Div Box 249, fol 4);
Sibley, P 299; Study No. 19, "The 79th Dividon at M:mtfaucon.
78
FO 67 1 26th Div, 1230, 6 Oct; FO 90, 2100 1 13 Oct; SO 879/3, 18th
Fr Div, 1015, 14 Oct (26th Div Box 14, 32-1); DCR, 26th Div, 14 - 15,
17 - 18 Oct, showed 17 killed, 27 wounded in the infantry, 23 wounded
in the Engineers that day. See also RGO 104th Inf, Rpt on Gas Atk, 14 -
15 Oct (26th Div Box 249, fol 4); k ~ ( ! ! . . ~ ) WD, 15 Oct
(CiFB 141, fol III); 1st Bn 104th :rt,f Rpt on action in support of tanks.,
16 Oct (26th Div Box 52, 33.6); Sibley, :l> 306; Benwell, p. 180.

- 46
and acron the Meue1 aeve.ral 14 - inch naval gunt looked for long - range
targets But all this a%tillery we.1 net to be enough against the mased
gun and the gas defen$e tactic, of the ~ (replaci?d _by ~he ~Alli! on
25 October) and 1'.t.!,11ri.m!.t-ll!:tltl&nl, of J:liAL9~.Jall and ~
79
JlgJI.~ facing the 26th Divioion,

The Regimental Ges Officer of the 102nd Infantry was not haPPY about
the coming operation. Q-1 the way from Verdun one of hie battalions had
been ahell&d with yellow croa, resulting in 47 ca$Ualt1es before they
reached their poaition. The strong smell of mustard gas everywhere in
the Ormont sector indicated repeated gasiing. It was an unhealthy place
80
to be.

The whole of the secto.r waa under an almost perpetual gas atmosphe:r-e,

with the French re~l1ating in kind. If the other American dlvi1ion1

assigned to XXXII French Corps were reluctant to U$e gas, the 26th
Divbion wasn't, and got small ,uppliea almost daily. Saving up its gaa

shells, on the morning of 21 October~ two days before it~ attack~ the

79~="~''"-=~~--=~-
FO 91, 26th D!v, 15 Oct. For dbpr.1~itiori of t.l!s 26th Div regto, eee
&ketch atchd to SOI 2, 19 - 20 Oc't (26th Div Bax 10, 20.1.); for .:.he fo.-
midable concentration of ~.6U!.L.Qiv, };...,-,:t_MY.J, and l5~i!LR!Y arty (55 btys)
between Ecurey and Chaumont, ,ee sktch i_n GFB 141, fol I, p~ 123 The
arrival of additional heavy arty h rptd in JAt.~!!t~t}Ji'!. Weeki~' F.pt, 22
Oct (GFB 141, fol IV, p. 73).

60
Ltl', RGO 102nd Inf to DGO 18 Cc+, n-*~ (26th Div Box 249, foJ .1)~
oon, 26th Div (26th Div Box 43, 33.1), rptd 60 gassed on 17 - 18 Oct,
101 on 16 - 19 Oct,
 r
Ii
shell, on enemy strongpoint1 in the Bois de Crepion, Ravin de la Hazelle,

and Ravin du Chuchu, masking the ga1 fire with high exploaivea, A mortar
platoon of tha lat Gas Regi.tnent, with the 102nd Infantry in the Bois

d'O:rmont, put a total of 20 phogane, 75 'i'6lite phoaphoru,, and 41 thermite

rounds on enemy po1ition1 on Hill 360 that day and the next. And preced-

ing the 45- mirnrte HE preparation for the attack on the morning of the

23rd, the artillery fired another 324 No. 5 1hells into the Boi, de
CrePion and Ravin du Chuehu

Reporting theoe artillery ga1 misaiona to higher headquarter,,

Captain Cutle:.r wa.1 told that the gas Nm had been wasted The fire

Pattern had averaged one gaa shell for every 37 square meter, of target,
much too little, and in each case had been put down over a period of an
hour, when it 1hould have been knawn that No. 5 hell had to be fired
within two minutea or not at all. The masking JiE fire that had accom,..

panied each miaaion had proba,bly diaaipated or destroyed the gas complete-
81
ly. An enem}' report waa to say the AJDerican artillery fire that week
82
waa 11
rnoderate with aome gas 1hella.1

Captain Cutler's reply ha, not been fcund, but it would appear that
the artillery, a once before, may have fired gas shell without consu)ting

Ltr, .DGO 26th Div to C CWS, 24 Oct, aub: Use of Arty Gas again1t the
Enemy; Ltr, CGO ht .A1'my to 000 26th Div, 25 Oct, 1ub: U1e of lethal Gas
by Arty (26th Div Box 249, fol 3); Atkiason, RPt of Opn1 by lit Ga, Ret,
27 Oct (ibig., fol 4); SIience~, II, 249 ff.
82
l!L!,!lJ!:.Q!,y, Weekly Rpt, 29 Oct (GFB 141, Fol II, P 95),

- 48 -
,
,,
.I
.
! him~ It h aho APParet~t th.at th~ CWS manuala, 11
Initruction.; on the Use

of Chemical Chell by J>.rtllle:ry" (January 1918) and t1If'l&tI'1Jction:s reg,1.r.d--

ing Uaa of G:3.3 Shelll!lt1 (.July J.918) 1 had not been con:aulted, although both
83
had be8n i.1,uttd to the divbion.

The morale of the diviaion, undermined by month of almost conti~

uou, front line duty and littla praise for it$ efforts, was badly jolted
when on 22 Oetobe~ General Edward, recaivad unexpected orders relieving
bim of hls command. Lhder a new AEF poHey, it was aid, he was to be

the first of a .number oI coaunander returned to the State1 in order to

train naw divhiona. Two daya later Brig. Gen Frank E Bamfo:rd, from

the 1st Diviion, aa1U1t1Gd command MeaAuring a division~ achievements

by its lo1~e5 (Bamfoxd pointed with pxide to a mythical 33,000 ca1ualtie1

in thie l3t Divitionj, hie had allegedly been sent by higher headquarters
84
to promote aggreuiveneu in the 26th Division

Ger.ere.l Bamford had not yet taken over when en the morning of 23

on thei.r. 12ft, attackcid from ~,,c.UevU.h rav:i.nf!~ Tll-2 two divh:!.ons,

working 1,,Jholly upl-'-1.11 ~ had been orde:ted to clea.:c- the li.eighh'. between

Pylon d 1 Etr-aye,;,, Belleu Boht and Bob de Moil'E'Y, the easte:rnmost ridge

of the h,dghts of the ~IJM !1: the 1;Hidor (Mr.iP No. 6). 85

83 -c~.,,-~><=,u~-.c<"-'"'"""
I.t:r-, OC-0 26th Div t.o C CWSt J..4 Sep, sub: Ci.ec lt:u, memoe and so
forth (26th Div .Box 249, fol 3)? listad over 70 itemi recd from the
Offic.: of the Chief CWS since 3 Dec 1917: .i'.r:.cluding the1a mami,ah.
84
Sibl~y, PP~ 75, 308, 323.
85
FO 92,, 26th ui~,, arno. 21 Oct., S~t-1 S1;udy No. 17 'The 29th Division
i!"l the CS't.e~ de Maue1,..e, .. pp,, ,a:3 ff.
- t:/;I -
 "'

+ ~;;,
.
..
' .

~L:~ ~
Crep'"
,'
Mc.1!1v,lle e '"

> ,'
"'

50
 !\'t" -
-
; ,,,

Pretede-d by a prePa2'etion of juet 324 gaG shells and 30,000 HE

sh11;1llA, conv~ging battalion, of the 101:Bt Infantry cleared the Boil

a,,d Belleu Boh, only to be driver. out of Belleu that night
de1 Chen.~

by inten.taa a:rt!!lery and machine g1,1n fi:r-e A.dvancing south f:rom the

BoiA des Ch~nes, the 102nd Infantry,was itopped cold on ths ,lopes
86
of Hill 360 in the Boil d 'Ormor.rf;. The 52nd Brigade remained in place,

prote<::ting the right flank of the division.

C.,.sus.ltiee in the 51st Brigade were extremely heavy, G - 3 reported,

owing to the deadly ma.chine gun fire of the German defenders on eve-ry
height and in every wood. Ga attack reportl!I filed every day that week

showed almoet continual heavy gaa fixe but few or no casualties at the
\ time of the repo::rts. Nevertheless gas cases arrived in great numbers
at the triages and ga1 hoapital, and were seen to exceed by far the
87
machine gun easualtiea.

On the afternoon of the 24th, with a amolce .ecreen of 800 white phOB-
pho.ruw shellt laid to the ;right of tho 811.is d ;~u1~i01,t. a fre,h battalion.

of tho 101st lnfant;ry assaulted Bel10u Bois agair. ai\d two battalions of
the 102nd returned to the attaek on Hill 360. Gener11l Bamford l!iaw his

aei<<<<<<<<--<----
ro 93, 1915, 23 Octi i~~sLRlv. Order Ia 905 and Weekly Rpt 23 Oct
(GFB 214, fol .I, PP 25, 34); Bamford, Rp'l of 26th Di;, A- M Opr,, 23 -
27 Ott, 18 Nov {26th Div Box 25, 33.7), eaid the bn withdrew f~om
Belle~ without order~.
87
l)()i, 26th Div, 23 - 24 Oct; Gas Atk P.:pts.- 21 ... 28 Oct (26th Div Box
249, fol 4).

-
ca1ualtie1 grow without the gain of a yard Through the next two days,
de1pite ~epeated artillery preparationa and troop reenforcement,, the
enemy could not be budged. Not until the afternoon of 27 October, fol-
lowing a massive artillery preparation, did the last of 511t Brigade
resource, and a battalion of the 104th Infantry finally take and hold
88
a wedge in Belleu Boia. To the ,outh, a merciless enemy baabardment,
estimated at 10,000 shella, on the tr0pp1 at Hill 360 ~destroyed or
scattered the meager group, who had driven through" to the dope (Map
No. 7). 89

When about noon on 27 October au,pected counterattack forces were

ob1eJ:'\l'ed in the ravine above the Bois de Crepion and in the Ravin de
Chuchu, the field guns fired a concentration of 520 No. 4 hydrocyanic
acid shells, 80 No. 7 chlorpicrin, and 32 No. 5 phoegene into each

ravine~ There was no counterattack, and prisoners were quoted aa saying

90
that 20 death and over 100 evacuation, resulted from the gas Since

~-----
The remaini of the 101st Inf was eatimated at 6 officers and 451
rifles Ltr, Med Off lOlat Inf to Div Surg 26th Div, 29 Oct, aub: Pre-
lim rept on atke on Belleu Boia (26th Div Box 39, 33.6).
89
Bamford Rpt, 18 Nov, aboveq See Maga, 102nd Inf, 27 Oct (26th Div
Box 43, 32-16).

90
SOI 10, 26th Div, 27 - 28 Oct (26th Div Box 9, 20.l); Ltr, l:x30
26th Div to C CWS, 28 Oct, sub; Use of Arty Gas against the Enemy (26th
Div Box 249, fol 3); Lt~, 1Xi0 to ccws, 20 Nov, sub Rpt on Recent Opns
(26th Div Box 25 1 33.6),
Evidence of th'e odd lot of 98 1 :recd by the 26th Div is an undated
lOlat FA memo, probably written about thi1 time, acknowledging receipt of
61 No. 6 cipalite ahell,, 450 No. 7 chlorpicrin, 65 No~ 8 papite, and 10
No. 12 fraisite ahell, all lachrymator (26th Div Box 249, fol 4).

- 52 -


- -DISPOSITION 1
OF GtPMMI 'FC)QC.:S i
f'il,C:tNG :I ... O t V \ \ . t O N I ,I

c~ ~9 OCTOe'l!ll

I
I
I

5,.\ . T/'l5.ooo
!J P"'ff" ~q,, .~, ir, ,r
:tt(JMI) 19 W 1!

['\Pl~ HO 7 I
I
I -- ----- " ~ .1
C

53
?>" .
~),t}->
 hydrocyanic acid wa, practically worthle in the field, and the amounts
of chlorpic:in and pho1gene fied weie too small to be effective, it h

highly doubtful whether theae eoncentrationa stopped anything. An im-

preuion of poor re,ulta from auch uae of gas, expreaaed later by the

division artillery commander, wat p,:obably more correct;

From intel"l'Ogation of pria:onua it would seem that our gas r.:oncentrationa

were not particularly effective, all the Priaonera tating that they much
preferred to be uru:!e~ our gas than our ahell fire. The ineffectivene11
of our gaa may have boen due to the tact that the enemy had very deep and
good dugout~ and waa subaeq.:ently able to protect himelf effectively
against it 1

Allowing for the natuxal 1)%eference of the artillery for HE, and doubt
about the auperior gaa proof quality of German dugout,, the conclusion,

considering the gaa made available to the 26th Diviaion, i, valid.

The fighting died down on the afternoon of the 27th and the division
remiined in place over the naxt four days. Some seven months later a
milita:iy observer 'found the "U~ s.. line from [Boh d'Ormont] along Bah
d'Haumont [clearly marked by the litter of] equipment, including helmets,
belts, ;helter halves, all kindi of grenade,, rifle grenades, rifles,

Chauc!lQ.ta, Hotc:hkiu ammunition, litters, ration boxes, respirators,

1192
e t C

91 "''" ,,_,, ____ _

Rptj Col O. W~ B. Farr, CO 5lat FA Brig, 17 Nov, sub; Rpt of Opn&

Oct 15 to Nov 11 (26th Div Eox 59, 33.6).

92
Lt Col John A\lgruder, Fiald Note on 26th Div (pns East of Meuae,
May 1918 (26th Div Box 7, 18.8).

- 54 -

_,______________ _______ ________

, ,
rf
,. '

l
lI
j
!
On
.
31 Oc;;tober, e the 79th Division arrived to x-eliave the 104th

Infantry in Belleu and Chenbt wood1 and the lOlat and 102nd Infantry in
'
l the Bola de la Reine, the di\'i'aion C;Quntad its loeaea for thou eight
-+ 93
I
j day,. At least 163 we~e k""" to be dead, 1,790 wounded, and 515
gaeaed.. Eatimating alma.et 200 mhd.ng and Pl'eaumed captured, there

I ,till remained over 1,500 unaccounted fo?". By 5 NoveIW?er-, 649 of the

unaccountad fo~ had been located in 29th Divi1ion hoapital,. The other
94
850, trag9lnra fo:r- the moat p,-rt, we:re back in their or9~Jlization1

that week support the t::C?el"3.a~cll'! :recorded by the Yankee Division. The

!.a.~~,...Qi,,x.t~n, ontr,,nthod f""lll the Bois d 'Ormont south, reported

losses of just l.40 PNtn Its field strength oo 29 October totaled 148
offic::ars and J.pi:fflj men, marming 11:i. heavy liiach::.r,1;;> g:..;".i> .i'i.:-,.;:! 2!6 light
95
machine guns. the 26th Division bad attacked a wall of machine guns.

Tht1 weather during the second half of (k.tober, said the ~k'l9!ffih,
had been very bad, mald.ng a a.oras.s of the heavy tl.17 ,aarth in the sector

and fi1J.1ng dugoute and tranche$ knae-cleep with !i':i.l.siG .. Th., $1.,c,,:.asaful

defenH against the 26th D1vido:1. had :raised the mo:tt:ili uf t.b.;;; d1:visicn

considerably, but a >JNt.ak latar, on 5 NOYt>NiliEt':', it had EiUl',,k u.ga!n, ow-1.ng

9;r-----.s--
Fo 97, 26th Div, 30 Oct! IJ(lt, 26th Div, 31 Oct - 5 Nov,

JU.Jt9l!L,Q!Y Wkl.y Rpts, 22 ano 29 Oct (GFB 141, fol !i, PP 73, 95),

- 55 -
 to reports of the political situation at home, general exhaustion, pPor

shelter, the tensions of the front line, and particularly 111

the constant

short a of our own aitillery." The Germ.an division needed a long period

of rest before it could again be useful as a line-holding unit, 11

prefer-

ably in another sector~" 96

In the attack of the 29th and 26th Divisions on 23 - 27 Octobel',

one of the three regiments of the ~-fllll~On rePOl't&d losses of 36

. ,.
killed~ 78 wounded, and 77 missing~ fllany of the latter presumed left
97
dead or wounded in the woods The 19~~t Divi!!19.B, zeplacing the 32nd

on 25 Oetober, reported 58 killed, 2Z3 wounded, and 48 missing in the

division ove.r the next six days. Like t h e . ! ~ and t h e ~

~ Q t , . the ~ was virtually a solid :machine gun unit, with 114

heavies and 191 lights, manned by 1,670 effectives in its three .regi-
98
ments~ Even thi~ was not enough_ when under heavy attack, and in the

12.rui~ as in the 32nd ea~lier, labor and supply train personnel had been
~ro,1-,l.'t"" o..p 99
"repeatedly to st.rengthen the units fighting in the line.

96-~--~-<>'-'~-"'~-
:L'l~, .Jil-~l: IID, 31 Oct, 5 Nw (GFB 141, fol II, pp. 55, 107 ).
97
10:J,..-~, ii.s!l!L/l1:t, IID, 23 - 26 Oct (GFB 184, fol IIl). Losses for the
month, 9 - 26 Oct, totaled 798 in the regt.

98
J.2~J1JL,Q.1Y.. W~elcly Rpts, 31 Oct, 6 Nov (GFB 214, fol I, pp. 76 - 7,
115 - 17).

99
lllli!.Ji.J.:! Weekly Rpt, 23 Oct; JJ. .2!l~.L.J2i'!. Order Ia 7127, l Nov {both in
GFB 214, foll, pp. 34, 98 - 9).

- 56 -

-
~-

Sometime just prio~ to itB relief, the Division Inspector, Col. lf'.)race
P. Hobbs, with supporting evidence of the Division Surgeon and Division

Psychiatrist, is said to have de$cribed the morale of the division as

low, th men shell shy,ft and in such a state of exhaustion as to be unfit
100
even for defensive operations. Genaral Bamford's vocal opinion of the
division did not hlP morale, nor did his removal of Colonel Logan, the
101st Infantry commander, en 2~ October. But the final and utter exhaus-

tion of the division was attributed by the Division Gas Officer to the
~marked detersaination of the en~y to neutraliz our activity by means
of extensive and almost continuous use of gas" G - 2 agreed, saying
that the enemy made ~use of all his available resources in order to
prevent our breaking through in this sector 11... - a circumlocution met
101
before in staff repo:t"t~ meaning the troops had been stopped by gas

The succession of winding ravines in the sector, the woods, roads

and bac;k areas, 11 remarkable adapted to the use of gae, said Captain Cut-

ler, had been heavily shelled with blue cross and mustard ga~ night and

of the troops was not al:a,ays practical~ .. thou!,l.h i;?i.~ artille.:ry had made

frequent tempoxa~y evacuations of thei~ positions Practically every

man in the forward area LwasJ inoxe or less exposed to gas, .. and the

long ptJJrioda of e::cposuxeand weal'ing ths :r1;s;:>h.ator, together with the

activity necessary~ [wore] the 1~n out, rodu,;M. their endurance, and in-

I66""""""""""""""--
sibley, p .. 325.
10! I'
SOI 9, 20 - 26 Oct. I'
,1
- 57 -
I
I

I
''
!!
 102
creased their chances for getting gassed'"

On the basis of G - 3 daily reports, Captain Cutler reported division

casualties in the period 15 to 31 October as 261 killed, 1,831 wounded,

674 gassed, and 231 missing (cf. p. 55). Among the 674, he was certain,
were a number professing to be gassed who hadn't been, or who had "in-
tentionally slightly gassed 'themselves in order to be evacuated"
Cutler's figures are at considerable variance with hospital admission
data which show approximately 1,287 wounded and 1,229 gassed in that
pe~iod, and with the repo~t of Maj. Robert E DeCeu, Division Medical
Gas Officer, who reported 1,332 gas casualties in Octobe1', excluding
the considerable number of cases entering the triage with gas diagno-
-~-"' ~.+ ..,J.." ,,r,,...,.. ...,i,.. _ _ _ ._~.~,...~.
--- - -r- ........... , ..... -.., .. ,.. _ _ _ _ ..,
It" ... ~
:--- -~ ___,..r-. ... --..
.,. . . . . . . . ~~ -
_.._~ .
. , , ...

AIIIOng these latter were an officer and 95 men with bad cases of
"gas fright," who during 80 advance had "turned back after a brisk
bomba:rdment with ar$enical shell evidently. 11 Seventy- nine of the group
were returned to duty the next dayo

Almost all the 1,332 were evacuation cases, with mustard gas effects
or respiratory distress from diphenylchloroarsine predominating among
their symptoms. Half or more of the evacuees we~e riflemen who had been
!02......,,_ __
Ltr, IXiO 26th Div to C CWS, 5 Nov, sub; Rpt on Gas Casualties in
Verdun sector (26th Div Box 249, fol 6); Ltr !:GO to ccws, 20 Nov, sub:
Rpt on Recent Opns (26th Div Box 25, 33,6), itemized almost:daily gas atks
from 17 Sep to 7 Nov, resulting in 1,428 gas casualties and 3 gas deaths

- 58 -
r
ing gc,:s shells. !he, l'~mai.ncloa.r for th,e moi.rt part wer.e :runners, signal rnan,
3
mel'Jlbars of ration 3r.d t1Gt1t1r dataih:., and littel" bearGl'5 1

Whsi< the 79th t:.al'l:i,e in, the '51:crt nr."1.gadet 26th Division, withdrew

:slight.ty, spent ~~@ral de.ye r'Y>::-:;ar..izin.; the cornni;,1od, and then swung

arm.ind to th& ~ight of the 52nd Brigade, taking ove:r French positions from
104
ttaa Eo1$ d 'Ha.umQnt t!--.s<.i'tJt;h ths SOis de:;; Cau:i.~es down to Beaumont-

Except for .recon~.z:i:-.wance patrols and some f1.:rther light gas fire by

the 26th Div1;:!.on artillery, 2"undly :retu:rned, there was little activity
105
until 7 Noi.~$._m.bwr when word c~~ that the enemy wa& preParing to withdraw

front line and battery po5ition e~rly that mo~ning with an estimated
3,000 l'lilllt}w c:r,:i5s shell::; and at least twice as many HE Regimental gas

163"--''-""~""'""""'"'"""==,,,,
Lt:r, DUGO to Col CUchi.s:.: Jbd l)!:,; CWS, 23 Nov, sub: Rpt of DM30 26th
Div for Oct n.n<l N"' (26th :::Ji; Bo:c 246, fo1 6) ! t.tr~ 000 26th Div to C CWS,
5 N0",.1, above~ Not.,;;~ Gpi:ir'.<>t:::t 3 n, 247 - 51, rpts but th1"ee gas atks in the
period 2! - 31 Oct, :'ith .J tot,3l of 13 gas c~,u1}-H$:s~
104
FO 98 11 ::?.6th Div, 1930, 4 .No-,1,o

105
Ltr, IGO 26th Div to C Ci:fS, 7 Nev, sub: Use of A:rty Gas against the
Enemy {26th Div Box 249, fol 3), snid a total of 257 No~ 5 and 110 No. 7
tea.r gas ehells W<Brti fi:rtsd on 4 -- 5 Nov on three enemy ta.rgets, all in
one -minute concent:ra.tfons, fo.;,1.0-,;p:,,J by HE and shrapnel.
- 59 -
9 casualties, all in the 102nd Field .Artillery, was premature and mis-
106
leading (Map No. 8). Tho Ge:r,nan lai!JJlal'!!ll!1 reported firing 2,500
rounds of yellaw cross alone on new be.1,tery positions it had loc;ated
107
south of Mormont Farm.

Gas casualties for the Period l - 6 November, from delayed effects

of the gas in the Ormont - &umont sector and the incessant gassing with

green and blue crou by ~,,!lg)f.tb~:ld!?.n. artillery, were reported

by the D~vision Medic;al Gas Officer as totaling 342 From 7 to 10 Nov-
ember, Major de Ceu reported an additional 113 gas cases, most of them
Preswnably from the mustard gas fired by the enemy to cover his wittr
108
drawal.

Patrols on the night of the 7th and 'the next morning found that
the enemy had indeed left the irrrnediate front. In the forenoon his
troops in full marching equipment were seen moving east towards Flabas
A general advance was ordered.

With regiments in line and scouts out front, the division moved
out late on the morning of 9 November, with orde~s "to maintain general
106__,__.___ _
Rpts on Gas Atk, B Nov (26th Div Box 249, fol 4); Spencer, II, 252 -
57. SOI 20, 26th Div, 6 - 7 Nov, rptd 1,486 gas shells including 1,000
yellow crou oil the ,i1rtillery. SOI, 102nd Inf, 6 - 7 Nov (26th Div Box
41, 20~7), rptd 1,750 gas shells in its sector.
107
15!Jl.Jli'!! Q>ns Rpt, 6 - 7 Nov (GFB 167, fol I, P 113).
108
Ltr, to Mod Dir CliS, 23 .Nov (26th Div Box 249, fol 6); lt
Or.,()
~ Orders, 29 and 30 Oct (in l2alL!L~ records, GFB 214, fol I,
PP 81 - 83); Rpts, - ~ ~ . !I.ts~~. 1 - 7 Nov (,GFB 141, fol II).

- 60 -
 7 NovEMeER

/J()(} fl.S. SHcLI..S -~--

Mo\'

~,-- )
q~(Z92.
:-l+ ",
'' ., .
, ~.,.vCV:: . /
,' ~ '.

, --._ e='~ .. ~
~,
,>ecrv
,....
.

""' .,
i::"!;'
.fl!.....~ Jko~d .. D(aC
, At-I,,..., (,.... o,,,
-. -.f-i ct
$<-L tj10..,

(:)

61
I:'
i
'
'r pressure and vigorous pursuit of the retreating enemy. 11 But spirit& were

low, raults were meager, and that night was spent in reorganizing the
109
line. As a division historian said 1 the men were exhausted after
fighting for three weeks under continual rain, with scanty food, and
little or no shelter They had been gassed and shelled heavily. And
their "regimental and brigade coumanders had been sent away, ~nd strang-
110
ers had been put in their places" He referred to the relief of

Colonel Logan of the 10l$t Infantry on 25 October, to the relief of

Colonel aim.a of the 103rd Infantry on 6 November, and of Brigadier Ge~
eral Cole of the 52nd Br-igade on 8 November, the latter two for failing
to PrEWent alleged traterni~ation with enemy troops in early November.
111
(All three officers were to be exonerated.)

In at least one case, said the division historian, a new commander

had the greatest difficulty in getting any response from his men. Not
even a thousand replacaments that came into the 101st and 102nd Infantry

on 8 November could make these regiments effective agai.n, particularly

when all knew that an armistice was days or even hours away. 112

109-"=-,--"'~"'"'
FO 100, 26th Div, '7 NOV"; FO 103, 1730, 9 Nov; Ltr, CO 101st Inf to
CO 51st Brig, 17 Nov, sub: Opns Rpt of 101st Inf, Nov 8 - 11, and atchd
docs (26th Div Box 39, 33.6).
110
Sibley, P 318.
111
For fraternization, see Rpt 102nd Inf, 19 Oct (26th Div Box 41,
22.9) and 103~d Inf docs in 26th Div Box 46, 24.9.
112
Sibley, P 318.

- 62 -
!
j
I Tho stubborn regiment was the 101st, which w~s reported ~shattered~

I' by enemy rearguard action and had to be withdrawn from the line on the
! night of 10 Novernb~r. Or as Colon~! Hobbs, the Division Inspector maded'J

reg:l..mental COTill'lander, said, NStraggling w-cs very bad and I was able to
I inuster only 240 men on the firing line from tOe entire regiment during
th~ opezations." The other regiments JJ!c\de better progress that day,
reaching the road dirttctly south of Chaumont, in line with the 79th
113
Division, before coming to a halt.

The orders of the F:r-anch corps on thft night of 10 November foX' an

advance beyond Ornes were said to have been set forth with Mall the
114
earnestnre1;;s of the beginning of a new cami::a.ign~" But early the

ne~t moroin9 the attack was called off, then ordexed on again, and

appeared to be firing at random all tha ammunition at their guns, the

troops advanced sufficiently to stra.ighten the division front. The

casualties that morning were said to have been largely the result of
11~
the h.;,ph~::~rd fire.

113 ~ , = - " " ' - ' " -

Maj Gen Henry c. HBle, CG 26th Div, Rpt of Op,1f~ ... 7 - 11 Nt.--v, 2.2 Nov
(26th Div Box 25, 33.7); Rpt of Col H. P. Hobbs, co 101st Inf, 27 Nov
(26th Div Box 39, 33.6j.
114
Sibleyj P 3l9i F0 105, 26th Div, 2100, 10 Nov.

!15
Sibley, p .. 340,

- 63 -
 .(
.,..

'
L
ir, and wounded and close to ~00 gassed, according to Medical Department data
;
The Division Medic,l Gas Officer reported 455 gas casualties that month
The balance were doubtless in adjacent division hospitals. 116 soon after
the Al'mistice the division was relieved by French troops and marched to
the rear to begin the long wait- Before Christmas the men who had been
captured at SeichePrey and at Trugney th.at spring and &U111Der were back

with the division. In Ma~cb 1919 the division was homeward bound

I
'

~--
Analysis, P 65; Ltr, IX30 to Med Dir CWS, 23 Nov, sub, Rpt of DM30
26th Div, months of Oct & Nov (Med Dept Box 3586, fol 25).

- 64 -
 ANALYSIS

ll..ll!L(ilt~~

The total casualties of the 26th Division during its 200 days in the

lino .... reported by Ayres in 1919 15,168 killed and wounded, the high-

est recorded for the divi&ior.~ The low~st tct,:i.l, 11,078, but obviously in-

complete, was that reported by the Battle Monuments Con:mission in 1944

117
(Table No. 1).

Table No, 1

.8ATTUl MOilll'ENTS SU/,t,\\RY OF

26th DIVISION Ci\SUALT !ES f!'l ENGAGEMENTS

Date Killed wounded

Chemin des Oune9 sector 6 Feb - 20 Mar {not given)

Toul sector 31 Mar - ?3 Jun (not giv"'riJ

Pas Fini sctor 3 - 17 Jul 137 899

Aisne - Marne offensiv-e 18 - 31 Jul 623 3,272

Attached units 21 - 31 Jul 30 119

Rupt sector ~ - 1: s~r l 3;~

st. Mihiel offensive 12 - 16 SP 109 370

Attached units 5 - 16 Sep 0 5

Troyon sector 17 Sep - 9 Oct 139 660

Meuse -Argonne offensive 12 ~ 31 Oct 729 3,104

Meuse - Argonne offensive l - 11 Nev

-~--
92
1,660
756
,--
9,218 ,
TOfA.I. 11,078
 Between theae extreme totals are two sets of figures arrived at by
tabulation of data found in Division Adjutant records and in Medical
118
Department statistics (Table No, 2),
Tabla No, 2
CCJIPARISCllOF DIVISICII ADJllfANT
AND MEDICAL DEPT DATA

Month Div1aion Adjutant L\1.ta Medical Dept Data

1918 Killed Wounded Gassed Nl.ssing Killed wounded Gassed

Jan
Feb
March
13
18
61
52
27
283
-ll
0
0
9
5
.:7
32
97 496
l
12
APr11 148 504 250 162 146 328 184
May 67 151 226 57 26 219 465
June 89 259 875 3 63 339 531
July 536 1,879 898 78 527 2,401 1,908
Aug 192 1,167 433 40 5 148 51
Sp 168 705 0 16 151 783 285
Oct 255 813 336 b9 :,c4 . ""'"
... , 71(.V ., ..... -
, '"IIOC!

Nov 292
1,778 -
8:25
6,416 - 0
3,328
213
-649 - 56
1,492
356
6,638
484
5,815

Total casualties exclusive Total casualties -

of missing - 11,522 13,945
~=--~~w--~~ -
A later report of the Division Personnel Adjutant showed revised
total casualties as 1,785 killed, 6,763 wounded, 4,150 gassed, and 64~
119
missing. Despite certain discrepancies between Medical Department data

rrs---
Maj. c. A Stevens, Div Adj, Rpt of Casualties (based on daily casual-
ty telegrams), 24 Dec.1918 (26th Div Box 191, 319,l Misc)1 !:l!!!!;gal D1Ptl:!,-
!Jl..rul~:~-L!!L..~!L\l1U:, 'fc,/, .sJ;atj.:;.t;.., Part II, !!!!i1St.~
~ ~ L ( w a s h i n g t o n , D,C,, 1925J, pp. 1030 ff, Note Med
Dept data covers inf, mg bns, arty, and engineers only.
119
Ltr, DPA to TAG AEF, 8 Mar 1919, sub1 Hist of Stat Sec, 26th Div
(26th Div Box 5, 11,1),
- 66 -
 {p,rticula%"ly !n gaa casual-tis~) 1,:11'id the event:s (lli':aruined in the present

st.udyJ it ia probable that the Mstiiclll napa.rtment figw:u are the most
120
accu~ate available.

If Gene:ral Bamford, who c:omma.ndad t11a 26th Division for three weeks,

wa, right a.bout. high c.!eualtie.'3 taing the measure of a divislons achleve-

mente , th.en the 26th won the ~u~ war in the AEF.

tie$ in the 1st Divi,ion as tha result of 35 gas attack6 in the ten months

b..;tween Februa::-y and ffwembe.l:" 1918, and just 1615 gas cases in the 26th

Division as the result of 38 gas attacks in tha same period. Both

fot.md, and certainly took far more ga.$ -eat.ualt!es than his collection of

D1via!on.,

Iii_,_,,,,,_,,,,,,,,,
Cf. narrative, pp. l~ -

- 67 -
Department figu~,a wa& the method of reporting. Division gas officers
reported gas attacks on tha day they occurred and took no uccount of
delayed casualties, as division medical personnel did. Furthermore,
Captain Cutler, like moat division gas officers, made a serious effort
to minimize the number of gas cases. He saw more malingerers than there

really were, and ?ersi1ted in this attitude despite the testimony of the
Division Medical Gas Officer as to the real numbers of gas cases (narra-
tive, P ~8).

CUtlers attitude towards gas and gas casualties seems swnmed up

!n a remark he made in one cf his reports that he had been with the
troops as observer in 30 out of 37 gas attacks in the Taul sector, wear-
ing the respirator under the same conditions as the troops themselves.
He fe_lt it was good fo:, the raen to see him among them, and it demon-

strated that if, with PrDP~r precautions, he could outlast gas, so

could they.1 21 But Captain cutler's example was not the same thing as
being in the area at the moment of the gas attack, or having to prepare
for an expected enemy attack while masked

01 the othel' hand, cutler appears to have kept singularly complete

record& (though some are no longer available), and while he seems not to
have made full use of them in his summary reports, his Assistant DGO,
1st Lt. K. P.. Ribble did. In a post-war account Ribble reported 1,906
gas cases in .July, 188 in the last week of September, 1,435 in October
121-----
Ltr, 000 to CWS and COO 1st Army, 25 Nov, sub: Rpt. on Gas Opns,
Accompl.ishments, etc. (1st Army Box 340). Cf, Msg, RGO 102nd Inf to
DGO, 1800, 26 Sep (26th Div Box 248), reporting 20 mustard gas shells
back of Saulx, ended: "You dug out just in time.
- 68 -

.. "'.ii
.,.,.!"l
,"
 (tht result of 11 9 272 gas shells), and 585 in N~1$mbe~ (the result of
l ...
'
3,742 v sholle), 122

:,. The gas experience of the 26th Division, as of the whole AEF, wae
almost entirely different in the last two months of the war from anY,-:

; -
thing it had exprienci,d earlier. lkltil October gas attacks were just
' that - - isolated evants in which a unit was hit with e gas concentration

the last two months gaa warfare began to app:ro.ximata 'the pattern of HE
fire -- continuous gea ehelling punctuated by bomb3~dments to roetablieh
a high level of effectiveness~ And it was thsn that gas proved its extra-
ordinary superiority c:,ver HE in producing mental as well as physical casual-
ties. By then ?,J"Cb;i.bly every dividon in the AEF had, through bitter ex-
perience~ learned as much gas discipline as it wau ever going to, but it
~s simply not enoi..gh~ .As Lieutenant Ribble said, echoing Captain Cutler

and Other division gas officers in the AEF, "The gTEat number of casual-
ties was causE!d more by fatiguis a.nd :reduced lllOrale from being in gas con-
123
tinuously nther th.;n f::rom 9-ny lack of gas dh-t:rplin-e~ "

24
which shows tho1 daily gassed and wounded admitt~d to the division hoepS.tals!

Ltr, Ribble, 1130 26th Div to c cws~ 20 Jan 1919, sub; Rpt on f3as
Activities (l,t Army Box 340).
123
Ltr, Ribble, l)G(J 26th Div to C CWS, 20 J~.n 1919: sub: Rpt on Gas
Activities (ht l=ly Box 3i0).
124
Admission lists of 26th Div l'H 101 (Mod O..pt Box 3609), FH 102 (Med
D~pt Box 3612), FH 104 (Med Dept Box 361/l; 29th Div- FH 1141146-dDept Boll:
2650); 33rd Div FH 13'.2 (Med Deet Box 3714 , 79th Div FH 314 M&c! De~t Bo.:t
3873), FK 315 (Mod Dept Box 3815), FH 316 (Med Doi't Box 3876 .
- 69 -
 Table No. 3

26th DIVISICtl CASU.U.TISS IN FISLD HOSPITAL LISTS

- -101st -
Inf '# - - - - - - ~ ' '"' WOtheG
zj-- --Total
Date 1ord I8f 11\"d raf 104th I8f
26
27
Sep
Sep
w
7 - - - - -w- ~ - -56 -
G
0 30 0 7 0 0 0 12 0
W
0
G

l 1 61 0 35 0 0 0 19 0 116 l
28 Sep 5 3 4 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 148
29 Sep 8 2 3 15 II 0 0 0 3 3 18 20
Sep 0 0 l 0
~
l
30

1 Oct 0
2 0 4

0
12

18
5

0 0 0
IM
2 2 4 2 4 24
2 Oct 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 3 4
3 Oct 2 0 0 0 0 2 l 0 0 0 3 2
4 Oct 1 0 5 2 0 8 l 0 0 0 7 10
5 Oct 0 0 l l 0 6 0 0 0 0 l 7
6 Oct 0 0 0 0 0 l l 0 0 0 l 1
7 Oct 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 Oct 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
9 Oct 0 0 0 22 l 0 l l 0 0 2 23
10 Oct 0 0 0 28 0 l 0 0 0 73 0 102
ll Oct 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 138 2 141
12 Oct 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 47 0 49
13 Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 Oct 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
15 Oct 1 0 0 0 0 0 26 134 19 5 46 139
16 Oct O 0 0 0 0 0 21 6 0 2 21 8
17 Oct 2 1 0 51 l 0 101 12 4 13 108 77
18 Oct 1 1 2 41 3 0 13 6 0 l 19 49
19 Oct l 0 5 1 4 0 2 5 3 0 15 6
20 Oct 0 0 1 9 0 12 4 2 0 4 5 27
21 Oct 9 0 7 6 2 0 ll 2 9 4 38 12
22 Oct 5 2 12 l 0 0 4 0 0 6 21 9
23 Oct 157 38 41 18 5 0 10 10 26 8 239 74
24 Oct 28 58 39 20 3 ll 4 1 15 20 89 110
25 Oct 49 58 93 24 4 2 3 12 6 5 155 101
26 Oct 8 25 33 18 ll 4 2 2 2 11 56 60
27 Oct 22 22 96 26 20 9 1 7 20 8 159 72
28 Oct 45 21 119 50 16 27 37 31 19 17 236 146
29 Oct 7 14 16 60 3 19 9 31 5 29 40 153
30 Oct 2 10 4 49 0 17 4 14 5 16 15 106
31 Oct l ll 7 46 9 38 6 7 11 17 34 ll,9
1,319 1,639
l Nov l 8 3 43 5 20 3 8 7 45 19 124
2 Nov l 0 0 7 0 8 2 8 l 25 4 48
:1 Nov 0 3 2 9 2 8 0 10 6 3 10 33
4 Nov 3 0 1 6 13 14 0 10 1 27 24 57
5 Nov 1 0 3 3 l ll 0 1 4 9 9 24
6 Nov 0 1 1 3 l 5 0 2 1 9 3 20
7 Nov 0 2 2 5 9 5 2 5 2 6 15 23
8 Nov 0 0 0 4 0 3 6 2 0 18 6 21
9 Nov 22 3 4 19 24 2 25 6 4 1 79 37
10 Nov 23 2 16 5 36 5 27 3 7 32 109 47
11 Nov 0 0 0 ll 0 9 0 6 0 8 -2 .M
278 474

- 70 -
 Of these casualtit 13 wounded and 495 gassed were found in 29th

Division and 79th Divi1ion hospital records. No distinction is possible

betwen machine gun and rifle casualties and artillery shell casualties,
bUt it is probable, considering the nature of the fighting on the hills

and in the ravine, of the sector, that they may be almost equally divided

These same hospital lists also show 141 exhaustion cases and 103
PN (psychoneurosis) cases between 17 and 31 October but do not diatin-
guiah. between those suffering from gas or gas masl< exhaustion and from
shell fire or battle exhaustion. The vile weather during the period
and the conditions of corabat are represented in the 71 trench foot cases
admitted in that sa,.. period,

Of interest is the wide disparity between gas casualty counts for

October and November. The Division Adjutant found 336, the Medicdl
DePartment shows 1,ea2 (Table No, 2), Lieutenant Ribble reportad 2,020
(narrative, p, 68), and hospital roeords show 2,ll3 (Table No, 3).

G - 2 and DGO data found ii1 the narrat~.ve give r~n cluea t,~ th,~
probable nl.UIW1ir of gas eh.ells fired by th enemy 1.n Octobc.!' and N.:'o',am.
ber, and Ribble's count of 15,014 for those two months must suffice~
Cn the basis of his total of 2,020 gas cases, 7.4 gas shells w!lri)

required for each casualty. Accepting the Medical De~rtlllent trit.a 1 cf

1,882, 8 gas shells were n,cessa~y to produce~ easualtyff

- 7l -
 The rivalry between the 1st and 26th Divisions, implicit when it
is not made explicit in the records, began with the original plan to have
these twc divisions f~m the first American Army corps in France. It was
perhaps inevitable that the National Guard division could not stand the
comparison. Baiting the division began when it relieved the 1st Division
in the Toul sector on l April. 1st Division complained to higher head-
qUarters that the 26th made a mess of the relief, and the suspicion of
incompetence planted then became rooted with the Seicheprey affair 0

It is possible, as General Edwards said of the Toul front, that the

French insisted on large forces being maintained in the outposts (nar-
rative, P 10), even when a bombardment warned of a coming raid or at-
tack. The Germans long before that had learned to withdraw the bulk of
their outpost forces before an attack, but the French did not learn to
do it until July.

l..hlike the 1st Division, the 26th obeyed French orders. And as
late as September, still under French orders, the 26th Division again

oc,upied in force an outpost zone, out in the woevre plain of the Troyan
sector, and suffered for it. other divisions learned to circumvent
French orders, bttt no-t the 26th

The gas bombardment preceding the Seicheprey raid created havoc,

as it was intended to, if not high casualties. It was the same kind,
if not degree, of preparation used by the Germans in their March attack '
72 -

_.; .
.~
 But gQ s t:ra ining

:;Ll.sclplim1 r~mained {I

'<., :l

'
'
',tti'-

.,, ~ ,''

..

of <'' ,,; r::;'

- 1:3 ..
 COMOINEO AIIMS IIESEARLH C IIIIIARY
FOAT lEAVENWOATl1, KS

"

The distinction that the 26th Division holds in CWS records, of hav-

ing the largest gas shoot by the 1st Gas Regiment fired on its front

(narrative, p~ 27 - 8), is diminished by the consequences of the enemy

retaliation, when the division artillery failed to support the shoot

adequatelyG It was one of the first independnt shoots of the gas :t'egi-
ment, and probably because of the violent reaction of the enemy, the

last. Yet no one was to suggest that greater cooperation and coordina-
tion should have existed between the gas troops, the infantry, and the
artillery. The English and German.s learned to use theiir gas troops with

conspicuou.s success, and the AEF might have as well had the war cont.inued
into 1919u

I"he gas experience of the AEF during the last two months of the wdr,

discussed in the previous section, pointed up a lesson and problem t.hat

wa$ never faced. Troops might be chewed out or even threat.ened wi t;h

couzt-ma:rtial for gas discipline infractions during a .specific. gas at-

tack, but officers and men alike were helplessly vulnerable undet pro-
longed or continuous ga$sing. A new and more comfortable mask was on
its way as the Armistice was signed, but it is doubtful whethe.r even

t.ni.::1 would have provided protection against heavy gassing over a period
,-,
cf two or more days and nights in a row,or.-,a week in a gas atmosphere.

It is likely that had the war continued, time would have been

found for further training in wearing .the mask for long periods of time

under combat conditions, and more frequent reliefs of companies and bat-

ta lions weuld have been the rule ratljier than the ex1,;eption.
1
- 74 -