Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege.
A bar
CASE DIGEST PALE
Ui v. Bonifacio
Petitioner: Leslie Ui
Respondent: Atty. Iris Bonifacio
Facts of the case: Leslie Ui filed an administrative case
for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an
illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui,
whom they begot two children. According to petitioner,
Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between
them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront
said respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail.
According however to respondent, she is a victim in
the situation. W hen respondent m et Carlos Ui,
she had k nown him to be a bachelor but with
children to an estr anged Chinese wom an who is
alread y in Am oy, China. Mor eover, the two got
married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their
relationship. When respondent knew of the real status of
Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent
further claims that she and Carlos Ui never lived
together as the latter lived with his children to allow them
to gradually accept the situation. Respondent however
presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage
contract.
Ruling: The practice of law is a privilege. A bar
candidate does not have the right to enjo y the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. One
of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good m oral character.
More im portantl y, possession of good m oral
character m ust be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise,
the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. In
the case at bar, Atty. Bonifacio was not proven to
have conducted herself in a gr ossly im m oral
m anner. Thus, the case is dismissed. But she is
reprimanded and given a stern warning with regards to
the of her marriage contract with an inculcated date.
UI vs. BONIFACIO
Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by the
complainant, Leslie Ui against respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP on the grounds of immorality, for carrying on an
illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos
Ui. It is respondents contention that her relationship with
Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad
and that after June 1998 when respondent discovered
Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with
him.
Issue: Did the respondent conduct herself in an
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law?
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good
moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the
bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. A
lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.
Circumstances existed which should have
aroused respond33ents suspicion that something was
amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask
probing questions. Respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact
remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it
was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered as an immoral. For
immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of society and to opinion of good and
respectable member of the community. Moreover, for
such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must be grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
A member of the Bar and officer of the court
is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from
Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had
no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession.
N RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as
the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was,
An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no
grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed
to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the
general average in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal
defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As
per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of
1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are
not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared
unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for
admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact
that this was very close to the end of World War
II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts
primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid
down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the
judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and
amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court
could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in
1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.
G.R. No. 1179 January 8, 1913
IN RE: MARIO GUARIA
024 Phil 37
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 1179. January 8, 1913.]
In re application of MARIO GUARIA for admission to
the bar.
Mario Guaria in his behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; ACT NO.
1597; ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW. Whether the
word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory
and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and
conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case
from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered
from the context as well as from the language of the
particular provision. The question in each case in
whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of
surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose
existed on the part of a legislator to enact a law
mandatory in its character.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME
COURT. This court is vested with authority and
charged with the duty to pass upon the "moral character"
and the "qualifications and ability" of all candidates for
admission to the bar.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMIT UPON LEGISLATIVE
POWER. Any act of the Philippine Legislature
repugnant to the Act of Congress which created it, or
which is repugnant to any other lawful Act of Congress
defining, prescribing or limiting its authority is invalid and
void as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS OF LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY. The various Acts of Congress
conferring power upon the Philippine Legislature, and
defining, prescribing and limiting this power, especially
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are to that
Legislature in the nature of an organic act with its
amendments, binding on it in like manner as is the
Constitution of the United States upon Congress itself.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOURCE OF GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY. The Acts of Congress of the United
States are to the Commission, or rather to all the
Departments of the Philippine Government, what a law is
to individuals; they constitute not only a rule of action to
the various branches of the Government, but it is from
them that the very existence of the power of the
Government flows, and it is by virtue of the Acts of
Congress that the powers (or portions of the right to
govern) which may have been committed to this
Government are prescribed.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT BE
DEPRIVED OF ITS POWERS. Section 9 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, placed it beyond the power of
the Philippine Legislature to deprive the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands of the jurisdiction or power
theretofore granted to it; leaving, however, to local
legislative authority the right to confer additional
jurisdiction or to change the practice and the method of
procedure.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COURTS IN
CONSTRUING LAWS. It is the duty of the courts in
construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission, not to give it a construction which would be
repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the
statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in
conflict with the higher law; and in doing so, contentions
touching the apparent intention of the legislator will be
disregarded which would lead to the conclusion that the
Commission intended to enact a law in violation of an
Act Congress.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBTFUL LANGUAGE OF A
STATUTE. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the legislator, if the words of provisions of
the statute are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that
interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect
of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary,
for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent
import of the language employed. (Black on
Interpretation of Laws, p. 93.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD
"MAY," ACT NO 1597. The word "may" as used in the
concluding paragraph of section 2 of Act No. 1597,
construed so as to give it its permissive and not its
mandatory effect; and as conferring a discretion and not
as imposing a duty upon the Supreme Court to grant
licenses to the officials mentioned in the Act to practice
law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without taking
the examination prescribed by general rule.
DECISION
CARSON, J p:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597,
the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar,
without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the
Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is
as follows:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act
Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"'1. Those who have been duly licensed under the
laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and
regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code: Provided,
That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or
at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance,
or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney-
General, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila,
assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, city
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without an examination, upon motion before the
Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court.'"
The records of this court disclose that on a former
occasion this applicant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling
four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to
the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time
when he presented his former application for admission
to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law
in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination
on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contended that under the provisions of the
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to
be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed
examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of
Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which
the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the
above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in
view of the context generally and especially of the fact
that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically provides for
the admission of certain candidates without examination,
the clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts
of the Philippine Islands without and examination"
should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to
practice law in the Philippine Islands without an
examination." It is contended that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give
effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the power
exercised.
It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited strictly
to the provisions of local law touching this matter, the
contentions of the applicant would have great weight.
For it is well settled that in statutory interpretation the
word "may" should be read "shall" where such
construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent
intention of the legislator. In Rock Island County
Supervisors vs. United States (71 U. S., 435, 446), Mr.
Justice Swayne says:
"The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is
that where power is given to public officers, in the
language of the Act before us, or in equivalent language,
whenever the public interest or individual rights call for
its exercise, the language used, though permissive in
form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered to
do for a third person the law requires shall be done. The
power is given, not for their benefit, but for his. It is
placed with the depositary to meet the demands of right,
and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy
to those entitled to invoke its aid, and who would
otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held that
the intent of the Legislature, which is the test, was not to
devolve a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and
absolute duty."
Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed
as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as
permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined
in each case from the apparent intention of the statute
as gathered from the context, as well as from the
language of the particular provision. The question in
each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in
the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said
that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to
enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it
should be given a mandatory effect; if not, then it should
be given its ordinary permissive effect. (Colby University
vs. Village of Canandaigua (U.S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673;
Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628;
Kemble vs. McPhaill, 60 Pac., 1092, 1093, 128 Cal.,
444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs. Schlesinger,
82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168; People vs. Sanitary Dist.
of Chicago, 56 N. E., 953, 956, 184 Ill., 597; State vs.
Withrow (Mo.), 24 S. W., 638, 641; Leavenworth & D. M.
R. Co. vs. Platte County Court, 42 Mo., 171, 174.)
Applying these canons of construction to the statute
under consideration, and limiting ourselves strictly to the
provisions of local law touching the admission of
candidates to the bar, we might, as we have said, be
inclined to give the statute the mandatory effect which
applicant claims should be placed upon it. But we are of
opinion that such a construction is precluded by the
provisions of the Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902,
which confirm and secure to this court the jurisdiction
therefore conferred upon it. Section 9 of that Act is as
follows:
"That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by
the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of
said Government to change the practice and method of
procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided
by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to
such alteration and amendments as may be hereafter
enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court shall hereafter be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and shall receive the
compensation heretofore prescribed by the Commission
until otherwise provided by Congress. The judges of the
Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the Civil
Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Commission: Provided, That the admiralty
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance shall not be changed except by Act of
Congress."
Prior to the passage of this Act the power and
jurisdiction of this court in relation to the admission of
candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands had been
fixed by the provisions of the Organic Act (No. 136) and
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and as we
understand these provisions this court was vested
thereby with authority, and charged with a duty to pass
upon the "moral character" and the "qualifications and
ability" of all candidates for admission to the bar.
The pertinent provisions of these statutes are as follows:
(Act No. 136.) "SEC. 2. Constitution of judiciary. The
judicial power of the Government of the Philippine
Islands shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of
First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace,
together with such special jurisdictions of municipal
courts, and other special tribunals as now are or
hereafter may be authorized by law. The two courts first
named shall be courts of record.
(Act No. 136.) "SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be
of two kinds:
"1. Original; and
"2. Appellate.
"SEC. 17. Its original jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed
in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and
determine the controversies thus brought before it, and
in other cases provided by law.
(Act No. 190.) "SEC. 13. Who may practice as lawyers.
The following persons, if not specially declared
ineligible, are entitled to practice law in the courts of the
Philippine Islands:
"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the
laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and
regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Code;
"2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner
herein prescribed.
"SEC. 14. Qualifications of applicants. Any
resident of the Philippine Islands, not a subject or citizen
of any foreign government, of the age of twenty-three
years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled
to admission as a member of the bar of the Islands and
to practice as such in all their courts.
"SEC. 15. Certificate of good character required.
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character, and must
satisfactorily pass a proper examination upon all the
codes of law and procedure in force in the Philippine
Islands, and upon such other branches of legal learning
as the Supreme Court by general rule shall provide. . . .
"SEC. 16. Place and manner of examinations.
Such examinations shall be conducted at Manila, by the
judges of the Supreme Court or by a committee of
competent lawyers by them to be appointed, and shall
be held at such times as the judges of that court shall
provide by general or special rules."
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court
by the Commission and confirmed to it by the Act of
Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case
such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by
giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive
effect. But any Act of the Commission which has the
effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon
the Commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
The Act of Congress was the creator of the Commission
and indeed of the Government of these Islands, which is
the creature of its creator. Its powers are defined,
prescribed and limited by the Act which created it, and
by such other lawful acts of its creator as may further
define, prescribe, limit or expand these powers. It cannot
lawfully transcend or infringe upon the limits thus
prescribed, and any Act of the Commission repugnant to
the Act of Congress which created it, or which is
repugnant to any other lawful Act of its creator defining,
prescribing or limiting its authority is void and invalid.
The various Acts of Congress conferring power upon the
Philippine Legislature, and defining, prescribing and
limiting this power, especially the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, are to that Legislature in the nature of an
organic act with its amendments, binding on it in like
manner as is the Constitution of the United States upon
Congress itself.
In the great case of Marbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch,
175), the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
decision written by Chief Justice Marshall, laid down the
doctrine in this regard which has been followed by that
court unhesitatingly ever since. In that case the court
held that an Act of Congress repugnant to the
Constitution cannot become law, and that the courts of
the United States are bound to take notice of the
Constitution.
Applying the reasoning of that case to the question of
the validity of an Act of the Philippine Commission
enacted since the date of the passage of the Philippine
Bill which is found to be in conflict with the provisions of
the Act of Congress dealing with the same subject
matter, and especially with the provisions of the
Philippine Bill itself, we think there can be no doubt as to
the result. The Act of the Commission in so far as it is in
conflict with or in any wise repugnant to the various Acts
of Congress dealing with the same subject matter must
be held to be void and of no effect. Paraphrasing slightly
the language used in the early case of Kemper vs.
Hawkins (1 Va. Cases, 20-24), it may be said that the
Acts of the Congress of the United States are to the
Commission, or rather to all the departments of the
Philippine Government, what a law is to individuals; may,
they constitute not only a rule of action to the various
branches of the Government, but it is from them that the
very existence of the power of the Government flows,
and it is by virtue of the Acts of Congress that the
powers (or portions of the right to govern) which may
have been committed to this Government are
prescribed. The Act of Congress was the Commission's
commission; nay, it was its creator.
Section 9 of the Act of Congress, set out above, placed it
beyond the power of the local Legislature to deprive this
court of the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it;
leaving however, to local legislative authority the right to
confer additional jurisdiction, or to change the practice
and method of procedure. The above-cited provisions of
Act No. 190, in force at the time when the Act of
Congress was enacted, conferred upon this court the
power and jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates
for the bar unless, in addition to certain other prescribed
conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the
necessary learning in the law, by passing an
examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clear,
therefore, that the Commission, while it was undoubtedly
authorized to modify the provision requiring the holding
of examinations under general rules (that being merely
the prescribed mode of procedure whereby the court
was required to ascertain the qualifications of the
candidate), had no authority to deprive this court of its
power to deny admission to any candidate who fails to
satisfy it that he possesses the necessary qualifications
for admission to the bar of the Philippine Islands.
In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a
construction which would be repugnant to an Act of
Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible of another construction not in conflict with
the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not
hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent
intention of the legislator which would lead to the
conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law
in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious
the argument may be in favor of one of two possible
constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it
is found to rest on the contention that the legislator
designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his
authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an
invalid an invalid law.
Black on Interpretation of Laws at page 87 says; "In
construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts
will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to
enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which
should change the prior law no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in
question. The construction should be in harmony with
this assumption whenever possible."
The same author, at pages 93 and 94, says: "Hence it
follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to
make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put
such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with
the constitution and give it full force and effect, if this can
be done without extravagance. If there is doubt or
uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the
words or provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the
enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which
will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it
may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the
more usual or apparent import of the language
employed."
Without undue straining of the language used in the
statute under consideration, the word "may" may be
construed as either mandatory or permissive in its effect.
But to construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct
conflict with the Act of Congress, and we conclude
therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to
the apparent intention of the legislator, that it should be
given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and
that the true intention of the legislator was to leave it
within the discretion of the court to admit to the bar
without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in
any case wherein the court is otherwise satisfied that
they possess the necessary qualifications.
Ordinarily, and in the absence of any showing to the
contrary, it may fairly be assumed that an applicant who
has held one of the offices mentioned in the statute, and
who, prior to his appointment, had been admitted to the
practice of law in the courts of these Islands under the
former sovereign or in some other jurisdiction is duly
qualified for admission to the bar of these Islands. In the
case In re Du Fresne (20 Phil. Rep., 488, 492), speaking
of the provisions of this Act, we said:
"Appointments to the positions mentioned in Act No.
1597 are made either by the President of the United
States by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, or by the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands by and with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Commission, and the legislator evidently
conceived that the fact that such an appointment is
made is a sufficient guaranty that after due inquiry the
appointee has been found to be possessed of at least
the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar."
In the various cases wherein applications for admission
to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that
such appointments had been made as satisfactory
evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all
of those cases we had reason to believe that the
applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date
of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively
appears that the applicant was not and never had been
a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior
to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it
further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied
for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on
that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to
the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof
of his possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the
Philippines should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the
examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;
and in view also of the fact that since that time he has
held the responsible office of governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such
marked ability in the performance of the duties of that
office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain
him in the Government service by appointing him to the
office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified
under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed
by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence
of his proficiency in a special examination which will be
given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefore, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by general rule. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent , JJ., concur.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and
for disciplinary action as member of Philippine
Shari'a Bar, Melendrez.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and for
disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.
FACTS:
1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron
S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of
the Philippine Sharia Bar.
1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in
his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases both for Grave
Oral Defamation and for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his
wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
2. Alleges that Meling has been using the
title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City,
despite the fact that he is not a member
of the Bar.
2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the
criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle misunderstanding.
1. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said
Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, considered the three cases that
arose from a single incident as closed
and terminated.
i. Denies the charges
and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
2. Use of the title Attorney, Meling admits
that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they
were typed by the office clerk.
3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge
of non-disclosure against Meling:
1. Meling should have known that only the
court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a
law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending.
2. Even if these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose
the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character.
ISSUE:
WON Melings act of concealing cases constitutes
dishonesty. YES.
HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same
is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic
(Meling did not pass the bar).
1. Rule 7.01: A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or
 suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.
1. He is aware that he is not a member of
the Bar, there was no valid reason why
he signed as attorney whoever may
have typed the
letters. i.
Unauthorized use of the appellation
attorney may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.
2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL
PRIVILEGE.
1. Limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.
2. Requirement of good moral character is,
in fact, of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant that applicant to aver that
he or she has not been charged with any act or
omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative
body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by
any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her.
1. Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that
ZORETA V. SIMPLICIANO
Zoreta v. Simpliciano
A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004.
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a
complaint for Breach of COntract and Damaes against
Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated
22 June 2001 due to the latters failure to honor SPACs
Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where
respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the
latters counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not
a dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per
Certifications issued by teh CLerk of Court of Quezon
City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of
notarization, as evidenced by presented documents.
ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility under the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the
laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear
that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers
oath similarly proscribes. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility). The lawyer violates, likewise, Canon 7 of
the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
[A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,
vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON,
JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified letter-
complaint[1] for disbarment against Attys.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr.
and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross
misconduct in violation of the lawyers
oath. Investigation proceeded only against
respondent Villalon because it was discovered
that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while
Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on
February 3, 1996.[2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant
alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent
Villalon, as counsel for the family of
complainant, spoke to the father of
complainant and asked that he be given the
title over a property owned by complainant
located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation
Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had
to verify the proper measurements of the
subject property. Sometime in November,
1991, however, complainant and his family
were surprised when several people entered
the subject property and, when confronted by
the companions of complainant, the latter were
told that they were workers of Canares and
were there to construct a piggery. Complainant
complained to the barangay authorities in
Pinugay and narrated the incident but
respondent Canares did not appear before it
and continued with the construction of the
piggery in the presence of armed men who
were watching over the
construction. Complainant then went to
respondent Villalon to complain about the
people of respondent Canares but nothing was
done.
Complainant then filed a case for
ejectment against respondent Canares. In his
Reply however, the latter answered that the
subject property was already sold by
complainant to respondent Canares in the
amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated
December 5, 1991 and notarized by
respondent Atty. Crispulo
Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that
he never sold the property, signed any
document nor received any money therefor,
and he also denied having appeared before
respondent Ducusin who was the notary public
for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant
discovered that respondent Villalon claimed
that complainants father allegedly gave the
subject property to him (respondent Villalon)
as evidenced by a document of sale
purportedly signed by complainant.
In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon
denied that allegations of the complainant and
in turn, he alleged that the property was given
voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of
close intimacy and for past legal services
rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with
the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr.,
allowed the subject property to be used by
Andres Canares to start a piggery business
without any monetary consideration. A Deed of
Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by
Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has
conveyed the subject property to respondent
Villalon with the name of respondent Canares
included therein as protection because of the
improvements to be introduced in the subject
property. Upon presenting the title covering the
subject property, it was discovered that the
property was registered in the name of Jose
Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the
latter told respondents Villalon and Canares
not to worry because the land was actually
owned by him and that he merely placed the
name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat,
Sr. then suggested that the subject property be
transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to
respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.)
got the title and guaranteed that he would
return the document already signed and
notarized, which he did the following
day. According to respondent Canares, the
trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to
his office demanding to know why he was not
allowed to cut the trees inside the subject
property by the caretaker of respondent
Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr.
wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he
neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the
subject property nor did he appear before the
notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized
the same. He averred that respondents Villalon
and Ducusin should be disbarred from the
practice of law and respondent Villalon be
imprisoned for forging his signature and selling
the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon
denied the allegations of complainant and
maintained that he is a member of good
standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has
always preserved the high standards of the
legal profession. Respondent Villalon
expressed his willingness to have the Deed of
Sale examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation and reiterated that the subject
property was orally given to him by Jose
Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991
that the conveyance was reduced in
writing. He added that the complainant knew
that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person
who signed the said document for and in his
behalf and that this was done with his consent
and knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of
Governors passed a resolution adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of
its Investigating Commissioner who found
respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years and likewise
directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to
the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten
(10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this
will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as
follows:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in
a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The
sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying
before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of
what they are saying. More importantly, respondent
failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the
complainant and his witness which can impel them to
institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against
him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and
his witness deserves the Commissions full faith and
credence.
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much
to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself
the owner of the subject property which was allegedly
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face
of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat,
Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property
unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant
through a Special Power of Attorney. No such
authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr.
has vigorously denied having given the subject property
to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to
believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is
not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in
writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would
consider himself the owner of the subject property on the
basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property by Jose
Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may
have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for
the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant)
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of
respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres
Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which
respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose
Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to,
Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said
property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land
is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent
himself when he said that the signature over the
typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.)
was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose
Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is tantamount to
a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said
Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of
worthless paper instead of relying on the same to
substantiate his claim that the subject property was
given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact
that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having
executed said document which denial is not too difficult
to believe in the light of the circumstances already
mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
(Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in
favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property
(which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction
of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable
character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously
denied having executed said document. He claims that
he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr.
whom he does not know; that he has never appeared
before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the
document; and that he has never received the amount of
P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said
transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by
the respondent no less when he admitted that there was
no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was
placed in the document only to make it appear that the
conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and
being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the
irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the
document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of
utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.[8]
After a careful consideration of the record
of the instant case, it appears that the findings
of facts and observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, which were all adopted by its
Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same
being supported by the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly
enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer
may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, in
probity and good demeanor, thus rendering
unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the
lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to them. To this end, nothing should be
done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the profession.[10]
It has been established that the subject
parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares
located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is
owned by and registered in the name of
complainant herein, Jose Ducat,
Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless
that the property was orally given to him by
complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly
with the complete knowledge of the fact that
the subject property belonged to his son, Jose
Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that
conveyance or transfer of any titled real
property must be in writing, signed by the
registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-
fact by virtue of a proper special power of
attorney and duly notarized. Respondent
Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or
ought to know, this process. Worse, when the
transfer was first reduced in writing in October,
1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land,[11] purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C.
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.,
respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose
Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of
sale without any Special Power of Attorney
from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat,
Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for
his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word
Conforme. As regards the subsequent Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property dated
December 5, 1991, covering the same
property, this time purportedly in favor of
Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon
admitted that there was in fact no payment
of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was
placed in that document only to make it appear
that the conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and
credible denial that he allegedly sold the
subject property to respondent Villalon and/or
Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly
appeared before respondent notary public
Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalons
acts herein complained of which constitute
gross misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may
be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every
lawyer should act and comport himself in such
a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the Bar are expected
to always live up to the standards of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the
relationship between an attorney and his client
is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.[12]
We find, however, the IBPs
recommended penalty of two (2) years
suspension to be imposed upon respondent
Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts
obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces
vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,[13] this Court
suspended therein respondent Atty.
Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from
the practice of law for two main reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the
preparation and notarization of the falsified
sale of his clients property merits the
penalty of suspension imposed on him by
the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1)
respondent misrepresented himself to
Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized
by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it
was respondent who prepared the various
deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots;
(3) Isabel was already confined at a
hospital in Metro Manila on January 4,
1980, the deeds date of execution; (4)
respondent knew that Isabel was
hospitalized in Metro Manila when he
subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that
Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her
confinement; and (6) he did not give the
seller a copy of the questioned deed of
sale.[14]
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said
case of Aportadera, the record does not show
that respondent Villalon had any direct
participation in the notarization by respondent
notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property dated
December 5, 1991,[15] which was supposedly
signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who,
 however, strongly denied having signed the
same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land dated this ___day of October 1991,
allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as
vendor, covering the same property, in favor of
respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres
Canares, Jr. was not notarized. The record
also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son
and that they live in the same house at 912
Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also
disputed that respondent Villalon has been the
lawyer for a number of years of the family of
Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY.
ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found
guilty of gross misconduct, and he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon
is further directed to deliver to the registered
owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latters
TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property
within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt
of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that
failure on his part to do so will result in his
disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
Atty. Villalons personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, et al. vs. ATTY. HOMOBONO
T. CEZAR
Facts:
Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino
citizen currently residing in Cannes, France with
her sons.
Complainants and respondent entered into a
Deed of Assignment regarding a townhouse unit
and lot for P1.5M. Respondent transferred his
rights and interests over and promised to give a
copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with
Crown Asia, the townhouse developer.
Respondent received P750K upon execution of
the DOA. The balance will be paid in four equal
quarterly installments of P187.5K each.
Respondent encashed the first check.
Crown Asia informed the complainants that
respondent has not paid the full price yet.
Respondent also failed to give a copy of the
Contract to Sell. For these reasons, complainant
Marili ordered the bank to stop payment on her
checks.
Complainants wrote the respondent to inform
him that they were willing to pay the balance if
he can have Crown Asia to issue a Deed of
Absolute Sale in their favor. Otherwise, they are
asking for their money with legal interest within
10 days.
Respondents response was that he will work on
the DOAS or return the money in 20 days. The
period lapsed but respondent did not fulfill his
promise.
Complainants sent a second letter demand
letter. The demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint since
respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law. The IBP
Board of Governors, approved the
recommendation.
Issue: Whether Cezar violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ratio:
YES. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3)
grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule,
does not refer exclusively to the performance of a
lawyers professional duties. This Court has made clear
in a long line of cases that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Radjaie v. Alovera A.C. No. 4748. Aug. 4, 2000. 337
SCRA 244
PER CURIAM
FACTS: Atty. Alovera, former RTC Judge, faces
disbarment for having penned a Decision long after his
retirement from the Judiciary, which ultimately divested
complainant of her property. The gist of the anomalies
committed by the respondent judge are:
(1) The case was not tried. What transpired was a mock
or simulated trial inside his chambers where only the
lawyer of the plaintiffs and a court stenographer from
another court were present. No Judge or court personnel
were present as there was actual Court session in open
court going on at that time;
(2) The records of the case were with Judge Alovera
and remained with him even after his retirement. He did
not return the record to the Court Clerk in Charge of Civil
Cases; (3) The record of the case turned up on the table
of the Court Clerk together with the Offer of Exhibits of
the lawyer of the plaintiffs and the Order, after the
retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the
Order admitting the exhibits were not properly filed and
do not bear markings of having been received by the
court;
(4) The decision of Judge Alovera was filed with the
court by Judge Alovera himself and because he was no
longer a judge his submission was refused.
HELD: Disbarred. Respondent has thus sufficiently
demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to
remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the
legal profession. The evidence against respondent were
all quite telling on how the latter acted in a grossly
reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision
come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution divesting
the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely
abused his relationship with his former staff, pompously
flaunting his erstwhile standing as a judge. He
disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court,
who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede or
pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry. In
so doing, he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded
public confidence in courts and lawyers.
[G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000]
REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR.,
MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL,
ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and
SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners,
vs. PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-
QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO
QUILAT-QUILAT, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Parties who prayed for and were granted several
postponements and caused repeated delays cannot ask
for the reopening of the trial for the purpose of
presenting additional evidence.After squandering several
opportunities given them to ventilate their claims, they
can no longer complain of alleged violation of their right
to due process.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
assailing the October 17, 1997 Decision[1] and the March
19, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)[3] in
CA-GR SP No. 42660.The CA affirmed the Order of the
trial court, which had denied their Motion to Reopen the
Case and to allow them to complete the presentation of
their evidence. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:[4]
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED."
The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged
Decision.
The Facts
Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and
Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat -- filed an action
for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners
Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind,
Mary Jean -- all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-
Valenzuela. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dumaguete City.[5] The Court of Appeals
presented the facts of this case as follows:
"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP)
Negros Oriental, who was also an [e]lection [r]egistrar of
the COMELEC, filed the complaint in 1975;
Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the
following dates:
July 10, 1981
First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old,
was presented;
July 16, 1981
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
August 24, 1982
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
November 20, 1984
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
February 28, 1984
Direct Examination of 2nd Plaintiffs' witness Ignacio
Tomias. Cross-examination was waived.
August 21, 1985
Plaintiff Pedro Quilat-Quilat was presented on direct
examination.
"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance
Office (CLAO) entered its appearance as new [private
respondents'] counsel after Atty. Gerardo Lituanas has
filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as
follows:
February 23, 1987
The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987.
April 21, 1987
The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment
of the complainant to implead Primitiva Torrecampo.
June 19, 1987
The third amended complaint was admitted.
September 9, 1987
Hearing was postponed at the instance of the
defendants [herein petitioners].
October 22, 1987
The hearing was suspended for the reason that the
Court would require the [private respondents] to submit a
certification from the Bureau of Forest Development that
the land involved in this case [was] not a part of the
public forest.
December 17, 1987
The hearing was postponed at the request of [private
respondents'] counsel for the reason that she [would] be
attending [a] conference in Cebu City.
March 18, 1988
The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau
of Forest Development report ha[d] not yet been
finished.
July 5, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon agreement of both
counsel.
September 15, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon the Court's instance.
December 8, 1988
No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau
of Forest Development [was] being awaited.
March 16, 1989
The said certification [was] still being awaited.
May 25, 1989
The testimony of [Private Respondent] Pedro Quilat-
Quilat [was] suspended after a question was
[propounded] that would require him to use reading
eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.
December 14, 1989
Hearing [was] reset due to the illness of [private
respondents'] counsel.
September 20, 1990
Atty. Eleccion, [petitioners'] counsel did not appear
despite due notice. At this time, the [private respondents]
rested their case.
October 15, 1990
Atty. Eleccion [private respondents'] counsel did not
appear. Hearing [was] reset to October 16, 1990.
October 16, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to
December 10, 11 and 12.
December 10, 1990
Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing [was]
reset to December 11, 1990.
December 11, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted
for decision as of th[at] day.
August 21, 1992
The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken
down by stenographer Alexander Yberley, was
missing. He was ordered to produce the transcript.
October 30, 1992
Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross-
examination since stenographer Yberley manifested that
the record was burned. Despite due notice, nobody
appeared for the [petitioners]. So as of this day, the
cross-examination of Atilano Ramirez was considered
waived and the case was finally submitted for decision.
December 11, 1992
Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case
[was] set for hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.
March 22, 1993
Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved
for a resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was]
advised by the Court to be prepared on the next
scheduled hearing.
June 4, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to July 2,
1993.
July 2, 1993
Flaviano Umbac was presented as first [petitioners']
witness. Hearing [was] scheduled [for] August 27, 1993.
August 27, 1993
[Petitioners] moved for a resetting to October 7, 1993.
October 7, 1993
Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for
the [petitioners]. His testimony [was] terminated and
hearing [was] reset to December 13, 1993.
December 13, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to February
14, 1994.
February 14, 1994
Hearing [was] reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who
want[ed] to recall his witness Atty. Bonganciso. Hearing
[was] reset to March 23, 1994.
March 24, 1994
Hearing [was] postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue
for settlement.
May 6, 1994
Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due
to the absence of recalled 2nd [petitioners'] witness
Bongaciso, hearing [was] reset to June 17, 1994.
June 17, 1994
Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He [would] attend
a Kiwanis Training Conference. Hearing [was] reset to
July 4, 1994.
July 4, 1994
Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez
[was] available at 10:00 a.m. so the case [was] reset to
August 15, 1994.
August 15, 1994
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to October 3,
1994.
October 3, 1994
The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to
non-availability of [petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque
Bonganciso who [was] on recall.
November 17, 1994
There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing
[was] held in abeyance.
January 6, 1995
Since no settlement [was] realized a [private
respondents'] motion to set [the] case for hearing was
filed and the case was reset to [February] 27, 1995.
February 27, 1995
Earlier, [petitioners'] counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion
for postponement as he [would be] appearing in a case
in Manila. Atty. Ybanez manifested that on February 26,
1995 Atty. Sedillo was in Dumaguete and further that
this case ha[d] been delayed by the failure of the
[petitioners] to complete the presentation of their
evidence. The Court then ordered the case submitted for
decision for the THIRD TIME.
March 16, 1995
The Court issued an order reconsidering the February
27, 1995 order upon motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the
case for the [petitioners] for June 16, 1995 with a
STERN WARNING TO THE [PETITIONERS].
June 16, 1995
The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the
Judge [was] on leave and reset to September 8, 1995.
September 8, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was]
reset to November 16, 1995.
November 16, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Neither did his
client. The hearing [was] reset to February 13, 1996.
February 9, 1996
The [petitioners'] counsel filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel.
February 12, 1996
The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the
[petitioners'] counsel. The [petitioners were] directed to
immediately engage the services of a new counsel. This
notice was received personally by the wife of [Petitioner]
Mauro Edrial, Jr.
February 13, 1996
The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26,
1996. This order was received by the wife of the
[Petitioner] Mauro Edrial, Jr.
April 26, 1996
There was no appearance from the [petitioners]. Hence,
the case was submitted for decision for the FOURTH
TIME.
July 8, 1996
Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in
effect reentered his appearance.
August 20, 1996
Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to the
motion of the [petitioners].
September 6, 1996
The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to
reopen hereby affirming the April 26, 1996 order
submitting the case for decision.
September 11, 1996
[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration.
October 2, 1996
Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
October 23, 1996
Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for
Certiorari."[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in
issuing the questioned Orders, the trial judge committed
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more than ample time to
complete their presentation of evidence and in granting
their Motions for Postponement, the judge was
accommodating them more than they actually deserved.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
Issues
Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin
Orders of the Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They
contend that a reversal thereof would have allowed them
to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by
affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly violated their
right to due process.[8]
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is without merit.
Main Issue
Due Process and Reopening of Trial
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his
clients on file in his law firm were incorrect; hence, the
notices and other forms of communication he had sent to
them were not received. He allegedly discovered this
fact only after he had filed his withdrawal as their
counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to
Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious and oppressive"
because private respondents were equally guilty of delay
and procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing
petitioners to present their remaining evidence would be
"in the interest of substantial due process and humane
justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court
thrice reconsidered its Order to submit the case for
decision; that is, petitioners were given several
opportunities to present their evidence, but they
squandered them. Petitioners, they further point out,
were intentionally seeking to delay the resolution of the
case because they were in physical possession of the
land in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and
unacceptable. The CA ruled that petitioners were given
"more than enough time" to complete their presentation
of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as
September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request,
was allowed to start presenting evidence only on April
12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a
period of three years, counsel presented only two
witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting
petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough was
enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some
more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go
along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but
petitioners were ultimately to blame for the inexcusable
delay. The case was submitted for decision three times -
- on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and
February 27, 1995 - but petitioners and/or their counsel
did not appear in court each time. After having failed to
take advantage of opportunities to ventilate their claims
below, parties may no longer be accorded the same
chances, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court, as in this case.[9]
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly
seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and
thereafter simply letting the period lapse without
submitting any pleading or even any explanation or
manifestation of their failure.[10] The same principle
applies more forcefully to motions for
continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be
disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a clear or
manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of
substantial justice.[11] We concur with the CA that there
is no such denial in this case.
It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners
continued to represent his clients effectively for several
years despite allegedly having lost their correct
addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct
ones. Indeed, it was too late for him to do so after he
had withdrawn as their counsel. According to him, after
April 16, 1996, he sent an office employee to verify the
whereabouts of Mauro Edrial Jr. The inquiry yielded the
information that Mauro actually resided in San Jose,
Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial Valenzuela
resided in Gomez St., Dumaguete City.[12] He should
have undertaken the search before withdrawing as
counsel. Further, notice might not have been received by
petitioners themselves, but that did not excuse counsel's
failure to appear during trials.
Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty
in presenting Atty. Roque Bonganciso because of the
latter's prior commitments which conflicted with the
scheduled trial dates.The last witness was Mauro Edrial
Jr., but counsel had the wrong address on file. He
should just have adjusted the order of presentation of
witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could
have prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an
available date in his calendar would not have taken Atty.
Bonganciso three years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that
lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so (Rule
12.03).[13] Moreover, they should avoid any action that
would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is
the CA's reminder to petitioners' counsel of his duty to
his client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the
machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court
itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends-the
speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or
improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their
realization, charged as he is with the primary task of
assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice."[14]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
QUINGWA VS PUNO
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint
charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with
gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an
educated woman, having been a public school teacher
for a number of years. The respondent took her to the
Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel
register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea
for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise
of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a
certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how
intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money
to the respondent whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the
complaint, and as a special defense averred that the
allegations therein do not constitute grounds for
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of
the former Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be
disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants
for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain
good moral character. When his integrity is challenged
by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the
special defense raised by the respondent in his answer
to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in
the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules
of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer.
The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot
be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court
held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of court states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental
ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that
members of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with the highest
standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the administration of
justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby
disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
ROYONG VS. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera
FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent
Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with
rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an
investigation and found out that there was no rape, the
carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent
seems to be consensual sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his
investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other
misconduct. The Solicitor General made another
complaint charging the respondent of falsely and
deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of
living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina
Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law,
praying that this Court render judgment ordering the
permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and
judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with
Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of
respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and
professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and
in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the
privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify
positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of
the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant
for license to practice law is required to show good moral
character, or what he really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by
the public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral
character at the time he applied for admission to the bar.
He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the
fact that people who knew him sqemed to have
acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of
good moral character. It is of no moment that his
immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
Bolivar vs. Simbol
[A.C. No. 377 April 29, 1966.]
FACTS: Concepcion Bolivar lived with and financially
supported Abelardo Simbol y Manuel in his studying for
law school and other personal necessities since he
promised marriage to Bolivar. But as soon as Simbol
finished his studies he married another woman while
keeping it a secret from Bolivar and continuing to get
money from her. But when Bolivar found his secret,
Simbol still tried to ask money from her and persuade
her to continue their relationship. This prompted Bolivar
to file a Civil Case of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court against Simbol but this did not prosper since Atty.
Simbol and Miss Concepcion had executed a
compromise agreement. But the Sol Gen filed for
disbarment proceedings on moral grounds against Atty.
Simbol. So, on October 31, 1963, the Clerk of Court
sent a mail to respondent thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro,
his counsel of record, a letter with a copy of the
foregoing complaint. Atty. Castro replied that after the
execution of the compromise agreement between
Bolivar and Atty. Simbol, he no longer heard from Atty.
Simbol. He further stated that he tried to get in touch
with the respondent but was unable to do so and he
requested that copy of the complaint be sent directly to
said respondents address. So the Court did as what
was requested but the letter returned with the notation
on the envelope that said respondent was no longer in
that city. At the hearing set by the Court on February 3,
1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty. Tomas
Yumul for complainant appeared and they submitted the
case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case against Atty. Simbol can
prosper even though he did not respond to the letter of
the Solicitor General.
2. Whether or not Atty. Simbol is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" under Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court.
RULING:
1. Under Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which states that Attorneys has to be heard before
removal or suspension. But if upon reasonable notice as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
may proceed to determine the matter. In view of this
rule, respondent knew that the disbarment proceedings office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
were pending. His right to practice his profession was at his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
stake. He could ill-afford to just stand by and wait. It was for any violation of the oath which he is required to
his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hidebound by
his obligation to inform this Court of his whereabouts. take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
Furthermore, notice of hearing was sent to him at both disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
his Manila and Dumaguete addresses and he did not or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
bother to get it from the post-office. Even his two
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
attorneys of record, who received said notice, did not
appear before this Court. On the face these facts, practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
respondent gave the Court ample reason to believe that gain, either personally or through paid agents or
he purposely stayed away and waived his right to be brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
heard. Therefore, the case can prosper.
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
2. Respondent's acts of making a dupe of complainant, Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of
living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling an attorney from practice for any of the causes
before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another
girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his named in the last preceding section, and after such
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money suspension such attorney shall not practice his
from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and profession until further action of the Supreme Court
persuade her to resume their broken relationship after
in the premises.
the latter's discovery of his immoral acts, are indicative
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to
of a character not worthy of a member of the bar. The
and affects the good moral character of a person
fact that complainant has withdrawn her complaint
convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a
against respondent does not wipe out the grievous
serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
offense he had committed. Respondent "has failed to
public interest and public order. The effects of the
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
required of a member of the bar. Therefore, he is guilty
interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and
of "grossly immoral conduct" within the meaning of
touches the interest of the community at large. Putting
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade
PEOPLE VS TUANDA
and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from
also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath
the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of
and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both
the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received
of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry
with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the
basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall
jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These
remain suspended from the practice of law until further
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
orders from this Court
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort
to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed,
wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty
of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing CheckLaw).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in
the practice of law, on the ground that the offense
involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the
Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing
that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of
the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no
damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A.
Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda

be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that

"the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office