Mind (1981) Vol.

xc, 422-427

Plantinga's Defence of the Ontological Argument

MICHAEL TOOLEV

In chapter 10 of his book, The Nature of Necessity,1 Alvin Plantinga con-

tends that although many versions of the ontological argument are un-
sound, there is at least one that is valid, and whose premises may reasonably
be accepted. I shall argue that Plantinga's defence of this contention is
unsatisfactory.

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The version of the ontological argument defended by Plantinga is
closely related to the modal version of the argument advanced by Harts-
horne and Malcolm. Plantinga argues that the Hartshorne-Malcolm
version of the argument has at least 'one fairly impressive flaw', and that
as a result 'the argument does not show that there is a being that enjoys
maximal greatness in fact; it shows at most that there is a being that in
some world or other has maximal greatness' (p. 213).
Plantinga's statement here is incorrect. What the argument shows, if
sound, is that there is a being that exists in every possible world, and which
is maximally great in at least one world. And it requires only a trivial
modification of the argument to have one that, if sound, shows that there
is a being that not only exists, but which is maximally great as well, in
every possible world.
Plantinga's version of the ontological argument can be sketched as
follows. Let us employ the expressions 'God', 'maximal excellence', and
'maximal greatness' in such a way that an entity is God if and only if it
possesses maximal excellence; an entity possesses maximal excellence if
and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect; and an
entity possesses maximal greatness if and only if it exists, and possesses
maximal excellence, in every possible world. The argument then is as
follows:
(1) The proposition that a thing has maximal greatness if and only if it
has maximal excellence in every possible world is necessarily true.
(2) The proposition that whatever has maximal excellence is omnipotent,
omniscient, and morally perfect is necessarily true.
(3) There is a possible world in which the property of possessing
maximal greatness is exemplified.
(4) The property of possessing maximal greatness is exemplified in every
possible world.
(5) God exists.1
The argument is certainly valid. For given (1) and (3), there is some
individual x that exists, and possesses maximal excellence, in every possible

1 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974).

2 Compare the two statements of the argument given by Plantinga on
pp. 214-216, especially the second.
422
PLANTINGA'S DEFENCE OF ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 423
world. Let W be any such world. Could x fail to possess maximal greatness
in Wl Clearly not, since x exists and possesses maximal excellence in every
world. So (4) follows from (1) and (3), and then (5) follows from (4)
together with (2).
Is the argument also sound? Since (1) and (2) are true in virtue of
stipulative definitions, the soundness of the argument is a matter of
whether (3) is true. So the crucial question is whether the concept of
maximal greatness, as here defined, is coherent.
After considering some objections to the argument, and to the crucial
premise'(36) Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified' (p. 214)
Plantinga attempts to defend the latter by arguing that it is acceptable for
reasons comparable to those one has for accepting a philosophical claim

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such as Leibniz's Law that for any objects x and y, and property P, if
x = y, then x has P if and only if y has P. There are, Plantinga argues,
considerations that can be offered for and against Leibniz's Law, but
there does not seem to be any compelling argument in support of it that
'does not at some point invoke that very principle' (pp. 220-221). Plantinga
then contends:
So if we carefully ponder Leibniz's Law and the alleged objections,
if we consider its connections with other propositions we accept or
reject and still find it compelling, we are within our rights in accept-
ing itand this whether or not we can convince others. But then the
same goes for (36). Hence our verdict on these reformulated versions
of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps,
be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational
to accept their central premiss, they do show that it is rational to
accept that conclusion (p. 221).
In order to evaluate this claim, let us consider what objections might be
directed against the proposition that it is logically possible for the property
of maximal greatness to be exemplified. Perhaps a good place to begin is by
considering an objection discussed by Plantinga. This objection starts
from the observation that there are many properties that can be exempli-
fied only if the property of maximal greatness cannot be exemplified. An
example is 'the property of near-maximality, enjoyed by a being if and
only if it does not exist in every possible world but has a degree of great-
ness not exceeded by that of any being in any world' (p. 218). The objec-
tion then continues that since there is no reason to suppose that the
proposition that the property of maximal greatness can be exemplified is
more likely to be true that the proposition that the property of near-
maximality can be exemplified, and since both cannot be true, the reason-
able conclusion is that both should be rejected.
Plantinga has no difficulty showing that this argument will not do as it
stands. For consider the property of no-maximality, defined as 'the
property of being such that there is no maximally great being' (p. 218).
The proposition that the property of no-maximality can be exemplified is
also incompatible with the proposition that the property of maximal
greatness can be exemplified. But since at least one of these properties
must be exemplified, we cannot assign likelihoods of less than one half to
424 MICHAEL TOOLEY:
both propositions, and hence cannot be justified in rejecting both
propositions.
This is fine as far as it goes. But Plantinga has made things far too easy
for himself, and in two ways. First, the reasonable conclusion is surely not
that both should be rejected, but that there is no justification for accepting
either since we have been given no reason for ascribing a likelihood greater
than one half to either proposition. Secondly, and more important, there
are related, and equally obvious objections that are much stronger.
First, let 'P' be any predicate, and introduce the new predicate '. . . is
maximally P', defined as follows:
x is maximally P if and only if x exists in all possible worlds and is P

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in every world.
One can then parallel Plantinga's argument for the view that it is reason-
able to believe that the property of maximal greatness can be exemplified,
thereby deriving the conclusion that it is reasonable to believe the property
of being maximally P can be exemplified. It will then follow that it is
reasonable to believe that it is exemplified. As this can be done for any
coherent predicate, the result will be a world that is rather overpopulated
with necessary beings. The point, of course, is hardly a novel one, having
been around at least since the time of Gaunilo. Some advocates of the
ontological argument have at least made weak attempts to answer it.
Plantinga prefers to ignore it.
Secondly, the problem is not merely one of over-population. For one
can, using predicates of the form '. . . is maximally P', construct arguments
that lead to contradictory conclusions. Consider, for example, the two
predicates defined as follows:
A: is a maximal universal solvent if and only if x exists in every world
and is a universal solvent in every world, where something is a
universal solvent in a given world if and only if it is capable of
dissolving anything in that world.
x is maximally insoluble if and only if x exists in every world and is
insoluble in every world.
Paralleling Plantinga's argument in the case of these two properties will
lead to the conclusion that there is a maximal universal solvent in the one
case, and in the other, to the conclusion that there is something that is
maximally insoluble. And these conclusions are inconsistent.
It is important to notice that this point is different from the maximal
greatnessInear-maximality objection considered by Plantinga. There one
was dealing with arguments that involved predicates whose definitions
were structurally quite different. In contrast, the predicates " . . . is a
maximal universal solvent' and '. . . is maximally insoluble' might be held
to have the same logical form, since an interchange of the expressions
'dissolves' and 'is not dissolved by' in the definitions written in primitive
form maps each definition into the other. This means that one has here a
case of structurally similar arguments, the one based upon the relational
predicate 'dissolves', the other based upon the relational predicate 'is not
PLANTINGA S DEFENCE OF ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 425
dissolved by', which lead to contradictory conclusions. Given the struc-
tural similarity, it would seem unjustified to accept one argument while
rejecting the other. The proper conclusion would seem to be that the
form of argument involved here is unacceptable, and hence that both
arguments must be rejected. And if the form of argument is unacceptable,
it is equally unacceptable in the case of the ontological argument.
Thirdly, there are predicates with the same logical structure as those
employed in Plantinga's version of the ontological argument which can be
used in arguments of precisely the same form to establish conclusions
incompatible with the conclusion that God exists. If, for example, we use
the expressions 'the Devil' and 'maximally evil' in such a way that it is
analytically true that x is the Devil if and only if x is omnipotent, omni-

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scient, and perfectly evil, and that x is maximally evil if and only if x
exists in every possible world, and is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly
evil in every world, we can construct a precisely parallel argument to show
that the Devil necessarily exists. And from this it follows that God does
not exist. For even if it is not logically impossible, as some have contended,
for there to be two distinct, co-existent beings, both of whom are omni-
potent, it is impossible for there to be two distinct, omnipotent, co-
existent beings which are such that it is not necessarily the case that their
wills coincide. And this will certainly be so if one being is perfectly good,
and the other perfectly evil.
Not surprisingly, Plantinga prefers the ontological argument to the
demonological one. But as he offers no argument in support of this
preference, it is difficult not to view it as logically arbitrary.
This point can be extended in a quantitative way. For God and the
Devil represent extreme ends of a spectrum, and one can consider predi-
cates of the form '. . . is omnipotent and omniscient, and possesses a
character whose moral worth falls at some point m between being perfectly
good and perfectly evil'. It is clear that there will be at least a fair number
of predicates of this form. Is there any reason for supposing that some of
the corresponding maximal properties are more likely to be possible than
others? Plantinga has certainly offered none, and it is hard to see what
reason there could be. In the absence of such a reason, it would seem
arbitrary and unjustified to treat them differently, given that they are all
of the same form, in a very strong sense. So it would seem that each of
those maximal properties ought to be assigned the same likelihood of
possible exemplification. And given that there are at least several, and that
at most one can be exemplified, it follows that it cannot be rational to
believe that any particular one, such as the property of maximal greatness,
is exemplified in some possible world. 1
Finally, one can also construct predicates that can be employed in
similar arguments to establish conclusions known to be empirically false.
Suppose that P is the property of being an omnipotent, omniscient, and
morally perfect wombat doing the twist on the top of this page. Given that
this page does not exist in all possible worlds, the property of being
maximally P cannot be exemplified. But one can introduce a slightly
1 Plantinga considers a probabilistic objection on p. 219, but the one he
examines is of the straw-man variety.
426 MICHAEL TOOLEY:
different notion, of relative-maximal properties, as follows. Suppose R is
any relational property. Let us say that the relational property R involves
individual a if and only if it is necessarily the case that for any x, x's having
R entails the existence of individual a. The relational property, within five
mitts of the Eiffel tower, for example, involves the Eiffel tower, but no
other individuals. Given this notion, one can then define, for every
relational property P, a corresponding relative-maximal property Q(P) as
follows:
x has the relative-maximal property Q(P) if and only if x has property
P in every possible world which contains all of the individuals
involved in property P.

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An argument parallel to Plantinga's will then allow one to show that it
is reasonable to believe that there is an entity that possesses the relative-
maximal property Q which is based upon the relational property of being
an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect wombat doing the twist
on the top of this page. And since every individual which is involved in
that relational propertynamely, this pageexists in this world, it follows
that it is reasonable to believe that this world contains an omnipotent,
omniscient, and morally perfect wombat doing the twist on the top of this
page. A conclusion which, though religiously comforting, might be rejected
even by Plantinga.
The situation, then, is this. There are a variety of ways of constructing
predicates that can be employed in arguments with the same logical form
as Plantinga's version of the ontological argument. Some of these argu-
ments generate mutually incompatible conclusions, while others lead to
consequences known empirically to be false. Such difficulties can in part
be avoided by arbitrarily maintaining that predicates constructed in
certain ways cannot possibly apply to anything. But we have seen that this
would not suffice to save the ontological argument, since even if one
restricts oneself to properties that have, so to speak, the same structure as
the property of maximal greatness, one can construct arguments that lead
to conclusions incompatible with that of the ontological argument. The
claim that it is reasonable to believe that the property of maximal greatness
is capable of being exemplified must thus be rejected.
It is one thing to say that it is not reasonable to believe that a given
property can be exemplified, and quite another to say that it cannot be
exemplified. How does one determine what properties can be exemplified?
A natural line of thought is this. The concept of a possible world is
introduced to provide a semantical account of the truth conditions of
modal sentences. Whether or not a given modal sentence is true in a
particular world may depend upon what is true in other possible worlds.
However possible worlds involve both modal and nonmodal propositions.
Are we then saying that whether a modal sentence is true in a given world
depends upon what propositions, both modal and nonmodal, are true in
other worlds? In some cases, yes, but that does not mean that the resulting
account is circular and unilluminating. For if we characterize a modal
sentence as of order n if it has embedded modal operators of depth n,
and of no greater depth, then whether.a modal sentence of order n is true
PLANTINGA S DEFENCE OF ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 427
in a given world depends upon what sentences of modal order less than n
are true in other possible worlds.
But there is a further requirement that must be satisfied if circularity is
to be avoided, namely, that what sets of modal sentences of order less than
n are logically consistent must not be dependent upon the truth values of
sentences of modal order equal to or greater than n.
Setting n equal to one gives the requirement that what sets of sentences
of modal order less than one are logically consistent must not be dependent
upon the truth values of sentences of modal order greater than or equal
to one. Since modal sentences of order less than one are just nonmodal
sentences, we have the requirement that what sets of nonmodal sentences
are true in some world cannot be dependent upon the truth values of

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modal sentences.
Consider now two properties, the first that of being a unicorn, and the
second that of being such that no possible world contains a unicorn. Only
one of these properties can be exemplified. How do we decide which one?
Given the view just set out, the answer is clear. The sentence, 'There is a
unicorn', is a nonmodal sentence, and therefore whether there is a possible
world in which it is true cannot depend upon the truth values of modal
sentences. So it will not do to argue that there is no possible world in
which it is true on the ground that it is incompatible with the proposition
that there is a possible world in which there is something that has the
property of being such that there is nothing in any possible world that is a
unicorn. The only way in which it can be argued that there is no possible
world in which the sentence, 'There is a unicorn', is true is by showing
that it entails a contradiction. Since that cannot be done, one is justified
in concluding that the property of being a unicorn is capable of being
exemplified, and hence that the property of bein^ such that no possible
world contains a unicorn is not.
Similarly, the statement 'There is no maximally excellent being' is a
nonmodal sentence, so unless it can be shown to entail a contradiction,
one is justified in concluding that there is a possible world in which it is
true. And it will then follow that the property of maximal greatness is not
capable of being exemplified.
To sum up, then, Plantinga's version of the ontological argument is
unacceptable for two reasons. First, it involves a form of argumentation
which if applied to structurally identical, and equally justified premises,
leads to contradictory conclusions. Secondly, the crucial premise in the
argument can be seen to be necessarily false, given an adequate account of
the truth conditions of modal sentences.
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