Digested Cases in Wills and Succession

ATUN v. NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the
plaintiffs, her neices and nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by
plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for
cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In
1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuez, who thereafter
refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The
defendant turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property
with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no
prior judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the
decedent.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the
decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the
name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her
legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants
and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs
herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action
arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial
declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding
for the settlement of the decedent's estate.

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children
as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her
mother, sued to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two
years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and
real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court
order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following
such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory
note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate
proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties
inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a
compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her
grandfather's estate?

HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased
grandfather by representation are not subject to the payment of debts and
obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property. While it
is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child
presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said
child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother,
because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring
to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory,
that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their
predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of
their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father
from whom they did not inherit anything.
LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE
GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a

certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San
Juan to the respondent despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in
allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for,
which is said to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would
have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final
conclusion. No one would have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of
respondent to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its
nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of
his estate, for which right was a property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied his application, although under the facts of the case,
the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to
maintain and operate the ice plant.

USON v. DEL ROSARIO

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife
Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession
of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-
law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation
agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement
giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to
any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to
any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the
law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because
these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall
be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land
he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir,
his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had
entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and
be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights
which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but
this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of
the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of
ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the
death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the
law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment
of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code
in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment
of a sum of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied,
petitioner then proceeded to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of
Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been properly
probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of
the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil.
345, it was held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to
collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only
after the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets
that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased
must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person
who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene
either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement
of the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case
at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr.
and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir,
before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ

GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to
Pedro Magat; the latter then assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the
death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2 of his rights to the property to Honoria for the
sum representing 1/2 of the consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat.
Severino later died leaving the defendants as heirs. Honoria also died, with the
plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement and
distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in
question which was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants.
Plaintiff sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir
of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was
adjudicated in their favor after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable
against the intestate estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had
been all paid and accounted for out of the estate of the deceased; so that, in the
eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the defendants are presumed to
be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint
should have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special
Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this action
against the defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of contract between
plaintiff and defendants upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the
present defendants.

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse
Catalina Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to
Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After
some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again
sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to the children as heirs,
to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to
confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as
it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the
competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been
recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-
registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than
his own opposition.

OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a

natural son of one Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been
in continuous possession of the status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as
proven by direct acts of the latter and of his family; that the defendant Soledad
Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y Reyes, be ordered to
recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is entitled to
share in his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to
furnish subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem proper to fix.
The evidence offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio
Reyes is strong and unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of claim
of Osorio y Garcia to be properly established.

ISSUE: Has the plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the
rights appertaining to his deceased father's estate?

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in
continuous possession of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his
baptism, in the certificate in which his name and that of his mother appear, though
the document contains errors, and by his father's statement to various friends that
the boy was his natural son, and by his father's always having attended to the care,
education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this
case and the law on the subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a
legitimate daughter of the father of both of them, recognize him as being the
natural, recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights
granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's estate, all of which is in
possession of the defendant spouses.

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar,

defendants in this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of
the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate,
alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased.
Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio
Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then
filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to
file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was
bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court.
Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging
among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests.
Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause
of action.

ISSUE: Have the plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically
transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a
rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial
confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights
from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual
vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the
commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception
as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in
his place."

DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of
Judge Mencias, denying their petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to
satisfy the money judgment in a civil case rendered in favor of petitioners against
respondent Crisanto de Borja. Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the
decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending
settlement in Special Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned
court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja
may have in the testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of
Francisco de Borja are subject to attachment and execution for the purpose of
satisfying the money judgment rendered against the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is

understood that the sale shall be only of whatever rights, interest and participation
may be adjudicated to said heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates, and
that delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale
thereof shall be made only after the final settlement of the estates and in the
manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above.

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to

the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez,
meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported
will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The
petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of
the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition
for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary
or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a
valid operative will.

CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso

among her 6 children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three
of her children sold each their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating
4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the conformity of
Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the
siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the
later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their
mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last
will supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills;
however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds
of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a
contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who
signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed
by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to
revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in
favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who
had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the
partition inter vivos.

NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185
FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents,
with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The
omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that
he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a
land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was
denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money
which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is
there disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy
on the ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by
his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage
but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his
property than those given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance
made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of
heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987

FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her
supposed heirs, the herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already
taken possession of 6 parcels of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of
questionable sales which the late widow had also sought the reconveyance which did
not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of the decedent, now sought the
annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question the petitioners
legal standing, them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the
parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging
to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said
decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of
the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's
estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the
reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the
decedent, for distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could
question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of
the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their
deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact
were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to
impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.

BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious
children of the late Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners,
legitimate children of the deceased, the trial court decreed reconveyance of the
portion of the property belonging to the legitime and further declaring partition that
sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents. Petitioners come now
questioning the partition and seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share that went to
the spurious children, relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby
questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court,
ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the
complaint? Could the provisions of the new civil code be applied over a case which
occurs prior to its effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in
spite of the broad challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial
court to order the distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part
of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children
of the deceased, upon the ground that under the old Civil Code illegitimate children
other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights. They do not contest the delivery
of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions decreed by
the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the
error of the court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having
been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have become final and
executory. A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the case
between the parties upon attaining finality.

CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children
by herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her
children, sued for the settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the
acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased. The trial court, with
the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased,
rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of
the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his
behalf to receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child
lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment
of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the
presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during
the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of
express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by
him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death
residing at Palma de Mallorca, sought the annulment of the order of the trial court
admitting the probate of a purported will of her husband. The purported will was
submitted to be admitted to probate by respondent Consul General Palmaroli. The
petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in view of her absence, deprived her
of her right to contest the original application.

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?

HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the
disposition of his property after his death. Out of consideration for the important
interests involved the execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous
safeguards, among which is the provision that after death of the testator his will may
be judicially established in court. xxx The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its
due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If, therefore,
upon the distribution of the estate of the decedent, it should appear that any
provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must
necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.

MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA

FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of
possession of personal property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa
Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither party is entitled to the possession of
such property, relying principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a
line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino people. The court argued
that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a holographic will giving the State all
his property.

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice
but does not contain a disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi
cannot be legally considered a will. Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of
work, and was so intended. It may be considered a will in a grammatical sense but
not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it also lacks the requirements of a
holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day of its execution and
his signature.

MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil
(Exhibit B), disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The
two documents were submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon
the grounds such as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh.
cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the testator a day before
Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the

testator prior to a supposed last will, be probated?

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed
one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as
the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of
Appeals added that "the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily
used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have the legal effect and force to a
testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article
667 of the Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his
property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act
whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B
comes within this definition.

CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426
FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the
ground that although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed
the will in the presence of three witnesses who also each signed in each presence,
the will was not actually written by the testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and
(2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed
by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical
work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this
case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no
consequence.

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses
states that the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his
nationality, and that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions
accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre
Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of having opposed
the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be
probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern. Said condition then, in the light of
the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to
the herein oppositor.

BELLIS v. BELLIS
GR No.L-23678, June 6, 1967
20 SCRA 358

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a native of Texas and US national, executed a will in the
Philippines that specifies legacies for his first wife and three illegitimate children, and
the residue estate be divided among his legitimate children. When he died, the
executor administered the will but his illegitimate children opposed the partition
claiming that aside from the legacies, they should still have a share from the legitime
as complusory heirs of the decedent. Texas law, however, does not provide for the
legitime.

ISSUE: Are the decedent's illegitimate children entitled to such portion of the
legitime? What law shall govern the decendent's will?

HELD: No. The parties admit that the decedent was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Hence, the illegitimate
children of the decedent has no claim to the inheritance aside from those expressly
provided legacies.