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Brian Abbinanti
Gregory Spendlove
PHIL 1000-405
There is a major theological problem that has vexed thinkers for thousands of years. If
God knows what people will do before they do it then no-one can do otherwise. If no one can do
otherwise then free will does not exist. So, if God knows what everyone will do before they do it
then free will doesnt exist. Kevin Tempe takes this problem into light by outlining, The
traditional Christian doctrine of Hell . . . is that Hell is a place of eternal punishment for non-
repentant sinners. But if theological determinism is true, then whether or not agents repent is
ultimately up to God, not to the agents themselves. Is it really right that people be punished for
what they cannot control? In this essay I will argue that the argument presenting this problem is
unsound, or in other words that divine foreknowledge and free will are compatible. In order to do
this, I will first explain the nature of free will, second explain that if God knows what people will
do before they do it they can indeed do otherwise, and finally respond to anticipated critiques to
my argument.
Before we begin any real discussion of free will and how it relates to Gods knowledge
we first have to understand what is meant by those words, free will. Now, this is a topic that is
well deserving of its own conversation, but this is not the setting for such a conversation. To
begin lets look at some basic intuitions of free will. One, to be free a person must have viable
options to choose from. Second, free will implies the ability to do otherwise. Third, if your
actions are free then you are worthy of praise or blame. These three features are key in the
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conventional definition of free will. For the duration of this paper, I will be functioning under
The first major point that will be discussed is exactly what divine foreknowledge is. A
more elaborate argument for theological fatalism goes something like this. God knows yesterday
that I will take my dog Bittsey for a walk tomorrow. His knowledge is accidentally necessary
today. For a belief to be knowledge it has to be true. Through the transfer of necessity, the truth
that I will take my dog for a walk tomorrow is also accidentally necessary. If I cant change that I
will take Bittsey for a walk tomorrow then I cannot do otherwise conflicting with our established
This argument implies that it is Gods knowledge that brings about my action. This is
false. In actuality, it is my action that brings about Gods knowledge. Some will say that idea of
an action in the present being sufficient to bring about knowledge in the past is counterintuitive,
and simply makes the problem more obscure. To this I would argue that those people are not
considering the reality of time. I function under the B-Theory of time which, simply put, is that
all time exists at once. Past, present, and future. Ned Markosian adds, time is very much like
the dimensions of space. Just as there are no genuine spatial properties (like being north),
but, rather, only two-place, spatial relations (like north of) God is eternal, or outside of time,
and as such is able to see the whole of it all at once. There is no knowing the future for God,
With that in mind I ask you to consider this. Imagine you are walking through a very
busy city and are about to cross the road. Just before you take your first step two cars collide
with each other directly in front of you. You now possess the knowledge of those two cars
crashing with each other. Why? Because you observed it. Why did the cars crash? Surely it
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wasnt because you knew about them crashing. It was because they were moving toward the
same space and did not stop. The vehicles moved independent of your knowledge. They were not
forced by your knowledge, your knowledge did not prevent the cars from doing otherwise by
stopping, and the drivers of at least one vehicle would be worthy of blame. All three of these
conditions allows free will of the drivers to be compatible with your knowledge of it. So, it is
with God. Since all of time exists at once, God is able to perceive it all at once, as it happens
before Him. Knowledge is no different if you hold it, or if God holds it. So, Gods knowledge
doesnt interfere with free will, just as your knowledge cant interfere with free will. As David
Hunt said, God foreknows what you are going to do, because you are going to do it. You dont
Now, some may say that this understanding of Gods relationship of knowledge and time
are counter intuitive. That the present cannot affect the past. That For her contribution to the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Linda Zagzebski stated, Gods past beliefs seem to be as
good a candidate for something that is strictly past as almost anything we can think of she
even goes as far as to call this way of thinking ad hoc. Yes, saying that I can change the past
is counter intuitive. And it should be! What needs to be understood is that me taking the
action of taking my dog for a walk does not, did not, and will not change Gods knowledge
of weather or not I would take my dog for a walk in the past. What Zagzebski and others
seem to have forgotten is that his knowledge is not is the past. He and His knowledge are
outside of time. So my actions bringing about his knowledge does not change his knowledge
in the past. It may just appear to be in the past as a result of us living within time.
To conclude, we have first explained the nature of free will, second explained that if God
knows what people will do before they do it they can indeed do otherwise, and finally responded
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to criticisms that this model of Gods obtaining of knowledge can change the past. To be clear, I
have not made arguments attempting to prove or disprove Gods existence, or whether or not free
will exists. The purpose of this argument is to show that divine foreknowledge cannot impede on
Works Cited
Hunt, David If God Knows the Future, What is Free Will? Closer to Truth,
www.closertotruth.com/series/if-god-knows-the-future-what-free-will.
2002, plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#PreEteGroUniThe.
foreknowledge/#OckhSolu.