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PART- I: EVENTS UPTO WAR

Pakistan Psyche

1. Pakistan has a built-in psyche of fear of India since partition. In this environment,
Pakistan grabbed the opportunity to join the US sponsored military pacts of SEATO and
CENTO.

Indo China Dynamics

2. India supported Chinas entry into the UN despite US opposition which earned India
the ire of USA. Nehru moved ahead to sign the Panch Sheel Agreement with China which
ushered in a brief era of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indo-Chinese Brotherhood). The relations
between the two countries soured after the Tibetan revolt against Chinese rule and the
grant of political asylum to the fugitive Dalai Lama by India in 1959.

3. The situation along the Indo-Tibet border heated up in the summer of 1962 and led to
the border war in which the Chinese came on top.

4. The military aid to India by the USA during 1962 conflict had its repercussions on the
US- Pak relations. Pakistan wanted the aid to be employed as a lever on India to resolve
the Kashmir tangle to her satisfaction.

USA Pak Relations

5. Soon after the Sino-Indian war, Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations and Averall Harriman, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs, played a moderating role in steering negotiations between India and
Pakistan. India offered some territorial concessions but Pakistan found the offers falling
short of her expectations. The failure of Indo-Pak parleys indirectly contributed to the 1965
War as Pakistan gave up all hope of a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir problem.

Pakistan China Relations

6. During the Sino-Indian War, Pakistan had supported Chinas point of view. Pakistan
had not attacked India during the 1962 Sino-Indian War under pressure from US and in the
hope of using the growing American influence with India to settle the Kashmir dispute to
her satisfaction.

7. Pakistan was uneasy about the US arms aid to India and made overtures to China.
Pakistan believed that by winning the friendship of a formidable neighbour, she would be
able to prevent India from undertaking military operations against her.

8. China gave an ultimatum to India on 16 Sep, 1965 stating that so long as the Indian
Govt persists in its unbridled aggression against Pakistan, China will not cease supporting
Pakistan. Within 24 hours of that ultimatum, there were reports of a forward move of the
Chinese troops in Ladakh and Sikkim. On 19 Sep, the Chinese extended the ultimatum for
another three days. The ceasefire became effective before the Chinese got involved in the
war. Interestingly US Seventh Fleet had discp an aircraft carrier from the Pacific to Indian
Waters in Nov 1962.

US USSR Peace Attempts

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9. Both US and USSR adopted a policy of near equidistance between India and
Pakistan, thus ensuring their hold on both.

10. As soon as hostilities started between India and Pakistan, USA froze supplies of
armaments and munitions to both sides. The drying up of war-making material supply
helped to bring about an early end to the fighting.

11. Pakistan expected military help from the Muslim members of CENTO. Iran showed
sympathy and agreed to give ammunition and explosives. Turkey, a member of NATO,
also agreed to give munitions and arms. Both expressed inability to help with aircraft and
tanks as these could not be transferred by them to a third party without US approval.

Indonesia dispatched two submarines and four missile boats which reached Pakistan after
the ceasefire. Afghanistan chose not to intervene enabling Pakistan to move all her troops
against India. Egypt and Yugoslavia, the two founder member comrades of India in the
non-aligned movement remained neutral. For all practical purposes, India and Pakistan
fought alone.

PART II: MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

Geographical Overview

1. The mountainous terrain of J&K lies on the Northern extremity, while the Great Indian
Desert and the marshy Rann of Kutch forms the Southern extremity. The fertile plains of
Punjab and Ganganagar provide an obvious opening for large scale operations in the
Central Sector.

Geography of Pakistan

2. Pakistan comprised two isolated and separate entities of East and West Pakistan at
either extremity of nearly 1600 kilometres of Indian mainland. East Pakistan had a number
of airfields of World War II vintage but only a few like Dacca, Jessore and Chittagong were
suitable for use by modern aircraft.

3. West Pakistan has an area of nearly 8,04,000 square kilometres. It comprises the
provinces of NWFP, Sind Baluchistan and the partitioned portion of the Punjab.

4. West Pakistan is a lower riparian country whose rivers have sources in India or flow
through India before entering Pakistan. West Pakistan, located in South Asia, has strong
religious links with West and Central Asia. West Pakistan, like India, is not homogeneous.
Both contain different races with different language / dialects.

Indus and the Plains

4. In West Pakistan, the Indus Plain is the most prosperous agricultural region. It
extends approximately from the rim of the Potwar plateau near Islamabad to the Arabian
Sea.

5. The Indus river flows through the whole length of Pakistan, and separates Punjab
from the NWFP. Its main tributaries, the Sutlej , Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum cover the
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Punjab province and flow generally North-East to South-West before they join the Indus
near Mithankot in Sind Province.

Punjab is covered with an elaborate system of canals for the irrigation of land between the
rivers (Doab). These rivers and canals are obstacles for East-West vehicular movements
and can be crossed over bridges along the important roads.

The main road and rail trunk line runs between Lahore and Peshawar in a North Western
direction while roads and railways emanating from this trunk line cover the Doabs. The
average annual rainfall in the Punjab is 20 to 40 cms. During the monsoons, between Jul
and mid-Sep, the rivers get flooded and the area becomes difficult for cross country
movement for wheeled and tracked vehicles.

6. Karachi, the sole port in West Pakistan, lies West of the Indus which protects it
against an Indian attack from the East or from the Rann of Kutch.

Pakistan like India, depended on imports of armaments, ammunition and oil which were
received at Karachi for transhipment by rail and road to other parts of West Pakistan.
Karachi is linked to Lahore by rail and road which cross over the Indus near Hyderabad
(Sind). The Karachi-Lahore trunk line thereafter runs between the Indus river and the
border and passes through Rahim Yar Khan opposite the border within striking distance of
Indian raiding forces.

If communications between Karachi and Lahore were severed, the Punjab and NWFP
would be starved of supplies from the outside world. Karachi was linked to Quetta rail and
it via Sukkur. Quetta had a rail and road system connecting it to Zahedan, a border town in
Iran. Zahedan, in turn, was ideal for receiving mil supplies from abroad via a friendly Iran.

The Lahore Sensitivity

7. Lahore, the second biggest town in Pakistan and the capital of united Punjab (in pre-
independence India). It is the hub of rail and road communications in the Punjab Sector of
Pakistan and has a prestigious place in history. It is located on the Eastern side of the Ravi
and is linked by rail and road to all the important towns in Punjab.

The Lahore-Peshawar rail and road trunk line runs North West between Wazirabad and
Jhelum close to the Southern boundary of Jammu province. Wazirabad is located at the
junction of the Jammu-Sialkot and Lahore-Peshawar rail road systems. Its location near
the railroad bridge over the Chenab gives it an additional military importance.

8. Pakistans life-line, along the Lahore-Peshawar was therefore exposed to Indian

threats from the Jammu area between the Ravi and Chenab rivers (Rachna Doab)
especially in Wazirabad area. Any interference with the Pakistani life-line in Wazirabad
area can cut West Pakistan in two, with dire consequences to the defenders in the Lahore
Sector, East of the Ravi.

9. To cope with the threats to Lahore and her trunk line communication network,
Pakistan had constructed the lchhogil Canal a few kilometres inside her territory in the
Lahore Sector linking the Ravi with the Sutlej Parallel to the India-Pakistan border.
Similarly she had connected the Chenab with the Ravi by the Marala-Ravi Link Canal
(MRLC). The important towns of Sialkot and Pasrur are, however, unprotected being on
the Indian side of the MRLC.
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CHAPTER-II : MILITARY STRATEGY PART I : STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVE

Pakistans Plan

21. Pakistans plan of war was briefly as under:-

(a) J&K State. Induct guerrillas under Army control from Kargil to Chhamb along the
whole length of the CFL to create turmoil and disrupt civil auth. The guerrilla ops war were
planned for a long drawn out campaign.

(b) Sialkot Sector. Defend Sialkot-Narowal-Jassar Sector with 1 Inf Div supported
by adequate armr. The newly raised Armd Div was to be located in Pasrur area as reserve.

(c) Lahore Sector.

(i) This sector covered the area from exclusive Jassar to inclusive Hussainiwala.
10 Pak Div was resp to guard the GT road and Khalra-Barki axes. A newly raised 11
Pakistan Div was resp for guarding Khemkaran-Kasur and Ferozepur - Kasur axis.

(ii) Pakistans strategic strike force consisting of 1 Armd Div and 7 Inf Div was
tasked to capture the rail-cum-road bridge at Beas and thereafter to cut Amritsar off
from the rear.

(d) Sulaimanke Sector. One Inf Bde was earmarked to defend the Pakistani
enclave and the canal headworks.

(e) The area South of Sulaimanke was the responsibility of the Desert Rangers. In addn
one Bde was dply in def role in Barmer Sect.

(f) 12 Pakistan Div exercise command and control over the extensive deployment of
troops in J&K including Azad Kashmir troops and Para-Mil forces along the CFL.

(g) Pakistan had one Corps HQs and a new Corps HQs had been planned for raising.

Indias Plan

26. The Indian plan was as under:-

(a) 11 Corps with 15 Inf Div, 7 Inf Div, 4 Mtn Div, 67 Inf Bde Group and 2 Indep Armd
Bdes to operate in the Amritsar Sector DBN to Fazilka both inclusive. Task allotted to 11
Corps was to secure the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal and capture/destroy all the
bridges along its entire length in the Bari Doab.

(b) 1 Corps with 1 Armd Div, 6 Mtn Div, 14 Inf Div and 26 Inf Div to launch a
simultaneous offensive towards Pasrur from the Samba-Ramgarh area. The task was to
secure the home bank of MRLC and cause max attrition to the Pak Forces in the sector.

(c) In J&K State, 15 Corps was to chase and eliminate the guerrillas inside Indian
territory and to attack guerrilla bases across the CFL. It was planned to improve our
defence posture along the CFL particularly in Tithwal, Kargil and Hajipir Bulge. In the
Hajipir Bulge, the intention was not only to eliminate the guerrilla bases but to establish a
road link between our forces in Uri and Poonch.
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(d) India had no intention of starting ops against East Pakistan; even though Indian
troops were moved forward in that area in case Pakistan chose to create incidents there.

(e) India did not plan to lower her guard against the Chinese but could not gather
adequate forces for an offensive in the West without pulling out troops earmarked for tasks
against the Chinese. After cautious scrutiny, min tps from the Chinese front were moved to
the Indo-Pak front to build up an adequate strike forces against Pakistan.

PART II: THE AIR FORCES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Role of IAF & PAF

13. The IAF and PAF played no roles in the ground fighting in the Kutch except for photo
reconnaissance by the IAF. The PAF used transport aircraft and helicopters to supply their
infiltrating columns while the IAF confined its activity to supply and support the Search
and Destroy columns.

14. The Pak offensive in Chhamb on 1 Sep was not supported by the PAF. The IAF flew
28 missions on the afternoon of 1 Sep causing confusion on both sides. From 02 Sep
onwards, the IAF and the PAF operated openly in Chhamb Sector without extending the
area of ops.

15. The Indian Army launched an all out counter offensive on the Lahore Front before
dawn on 6 Sep. By about 10 AM, the leading Indian troops along the GT road were
attacked by F86s who swooped over the advancing column without fear of fire from Air
Defence Guns or interference from the IAF. 3 JAT, the leading bn lost 5 Jeep mounted RCL
guns, a number of ammunition vehicles and the rear link wireless vehicle for
communications with the Bde HQs.

16. On 06 Sep 65, Peshawar had launched strike against Pathankot on time. Two MIG
21, four Mysteres, two Gnats, and one Packet were lost with no loss to the PAF. The PAF
raided Srinagar, Jamnagar and radar installation at Amritsar, Ferozepur and Porbundar
without effect in the early night. In addition, B57s bombed Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot
and Jamnagar during the night.

18. The SSG Commando paradrop on Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara airfields were a
fiasco. The plan was to drop a team of 60 commandos each on Pathankot, Adampur and
Halwara by midnight. In execution, things went amiss. A number of key members of the
commando teams had been employed by the Army in Operation Gibraltar. None of them
achieved anything. The Punjab Police with the active and aggressive support of the
villagers and National Cadet Corps (NCC) staff hounded them out of the sugarcane and
maize fields.

19. The IAF took time in launching its strategic air offensive and attacked Sargodha, the
PAF main base, at 0530 hours Indian Standard Time on 07 Sep in half light. The IAF
launched 33 sorties, between 0550 hours and 1540 hours in six waves. In the ensuing
dogfight, both sides suffered losses.
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20. Both India and Pakistan had intended not to extend the war to East Pakistan. Owing
to some confusion, Canberras of Eastern Air Command attacked Chittagong and Dacca
airfields. The PAF retaliated immediately against Indian air bases at Kalai Kunda,
Bagdogra and Calcutta hitting a number of aircraft on the ground.

21. On 07 and 08 Sep the IAF concentrated on Sargodha while the PAF made
determined attacks against Amritsar radar. PAF attacked on 10 Sep with 12xF86 and
2xF104 Starfighters in a desperate attempt and managed to do some damage at high cost.
However the radar was made operational within 15 hours.

22. The IAF Canberras continued to hit Peshawar, Chaklala, Kohat and Sargodha by
night whilst the PAF bombers raided Jodhpur, Jamnagar, Ambala in addition to night
bombing of Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot. Both sides fought the ground battles without
much direct contribution from their Air Forces. Even in the main battles of Khem Karan and
Chawinda, the air support was not fully integrated as a part of the battle plans.

24. The IAF had shattered the myth of the superiority of the F86 Sabre and particularly
that of the F104 Starfighter. The IAFs Gnat, an untried midget fighter, had shot down an
F86 in a dogfight on 3 Sep.

25. Between 6 and 23 Sep, the IAF flew 1357 offensive fighter bomber sorties out of
which 795 were in ground support role, while the PAF claimed 481 sorties for ground
attack. In 11 Corps, total demands for Immediate Air Support were 99. It was only on three
occasions that the Air Contact Team could effectively direct the aircraft on to the targets.
Neither the IAF nor the PAF played a significant role in the important battles of Khem
Karan or Chawinda.

Operation Ablaze

Reason

15. Ayub planned to gauge Indias reaction and intentions to a Pak military venture
against India.

Pakistan had tactical and logistical advantages there. She had better roads on her side
and Badin Cantonment and airfields near the chosen area of operations gave her
advantage. India had no troops in the area and had hardly any roads to support operations
in that area.

In any case, the operations would come to an end with the onset of monsoons.

If India chose to move troops, it would be at the cost of her strategic core area of Punjab
which would be strategically advantageous to Pakistan.

Operation

16. During Jan 1965, Indian Central Reserve Police (CRP) patrols discovered that
Pakistan Rangers had established a post at Kanjarkot. The CRP reacted by establishing
posts at Vigokot and Sardar about 10 kms South-East of Kanjarkot and 1 km south of Ding
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to check further intrusions. Local official level meetings between the two sides produced
no results, so both sides moved Army troops into the area.

Pakistan moved two bde of 8 Inf Div with Patton tanks and artillery from Badin Cantonment
whilst India moved two bde including 50 Parachute Bde under an adhoc Sector HQ
commanded by Maj Gen PO Dunn. The Indian force had no tanks and was short of anti-
tank guns and artillery.

On 24 April, 8 Pakistan Division launched an attack with tanks and infantry with artillery
support capturing Sardar Post, Vigokot and Chhad Bet. Pakistan followed her success by
capturing Biar Bet on night 26/27 April.

General JN Chaudhuri, COAS, advised the government that India should not commit her
forces to a major operation in the Rann where Pakistan had logistic and tactical
advantages over India.

The Rann was not an area of strategic importance to India, and any major movement of
troops into that area would be time consuming and also at the cost of troops needed for
operations against China and Punjab, strategically more important to India.

He recommended that India should, if required, use maximum force in an offensive against
Pakistans Punjab, the strategic core area of Pakistan. Such a course would not only force
Pakistan on the defensive but offer India the advantages of initiative and profitable gains of
territory for bargaining while giving added security to the Indian Punjab.

India could reduce the potential of Pakistani offensive in J&K by exerting greater pressure
against Pakistani Punjab giving India a choice of moving troops from J&K to Punjab and
vice versa.

To placate the public, the Indian Government ordered, `Operation Ablaze` and moved
army formations into their battle locations in Punjab during May. Pakistan reacted by a
reciprocal deployment on her side.

Indian troops under Brig Vijay Ghai captured three Pakistani posts in Kargil area during
night 16/17 May. These were later vacated consequent to the Cease Fire Agreement in the
Rann.

A general agreement regarding the demarcation of the Rann boundary through a binding
arbitration was signed on 30 Jun by Shastri and Ayub. Both sides agreed to withdraw their
troops to the pre-Rann positions.

17. India had undertaken to raise one Corps HQ and three Inf Div on 1 Apr, 1965. In
POK, compulsory military training was organized for youth between the ages of 16 and 25
and four centres were set up to impart training in guerrilla techniques in a two week
intensive training programme.

A Mujahid Force was set up in POK and placed under the Army. In Jun, an Ordinance was
issued by the Pakistan Govt whereby employees were obliged to release military
reservists for service and to guarantee their re-employment on return.
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CHAPTER III : OPERATIONS IN J&K PART I : OPERATION GIBRALTAR

Reasons for Adopting Guerrilla Warfare

7. Pakistans military did not consider itself strong enough to annex Kashmir by force.
India was stronger, especially in the infantry, which was the decisive arm in the
mountainous terrain in Kashmir.

Considering the overall balance of military power, Pakistans High Command did not see a
military victory in a direct conventional war but did perceive a chance of success through
guerrilla warfare.

8. Pakistan perceived a strong anti-India feeling amongst the Kashmiris who had been
resorting to frequent agitations and show of hostility towards India since the Hazratbal
incident.

Pakistan calculated that India would not extend her anti-guerrilla operations across the
CFL thus fighting the guerrillas on her side of the line.

10. Pakistan reckoned that, in the unlikely event of India increasing her strength in J&K in
violation of the Karachi Agreement.

11. Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding Pakistan troops in POK
favoured the guerrilla venture. Being the commander on the spot, his professional opinion
added considerable weight to the arguments of Bhutto and other likeminded people.

Plan : Operation Gibraltar

20. Pakistan planned the operation for the first week of Aug which is a fav campaigning
season in Kashmir while the monsoons restrict major operations in the plains of Punjab.

Gibraltar Force comprises three to six companies grouped together on a task basis. A
company had 30 to 40 soldiers from Azad Kashmir (AK) battalions, 3 to 4 Special Service
Group (SSG) personnel for demolition tasks and about 60 Mujahids mainly from POK
areas.

Each task force operated under the overall control of the AK battalion through whose area
the guerrillas were to cross the CFL. The companies were commanded by Pak or AK
officers and were equipped with light machine guns (LMGs), rifles, two inch mortars and
rocket launchers.

They had wireless sets for communicating with their force commanders and the Bn HQs in
the area of their operations.

Execution : Operation Gibraltar

21. Each force was given an evocative name of an Islamic hero for inspiration. The
infiltration across the CFL started on 1 Aug over a 700 km front from Kargil to Chhamb.
Small parties infiltrated, avoiding contact with Indian pickets and grouped themselves into
columns on task basis without detection.
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The idea was to paralyse the State and Army machinery in J&K by creating confusion and
to embolden the local population to rise in a massive insurrection against Indian rule.

22. The tasks allotted to the infiltrating columns were to disrupt road, electric and
telecommunication systems, raid Headquarters, Police Stations, ammunition and POL
dumps, ambush vehicles and parties of troops thus creating confusion and panic. Different
columns became active on 6 Aug and had varying degrees of success.

Tariq Force
> damaged bridges between Kargil and Ganderbal
> Raided a Border Road Camp at Dras
> Raided Gandarbal Power House
> Raided Waterworks near Srinagar.

Qasim Force (Gurez Sector)

> Raided HQ 268 Bde
> Raided gun position in Kangan, Bandipur and Kupwara area.

Khalid Force (Tithwal Sector)

> Killed Lt Col Gore and wounded 2IC 8 KUMAON at their base camp
> Raided an amm dump at Chokibal
> Ambushed a vehicle convoy.

F Force created incidents in Baramula and Uri area.

Salahuddin Force (Gulmarg area)

> Firing in Srinagar
> Raided a Police Station and amm dump at Khundru
> Created incidents in Pahlgam, Anantnag, Shupian and Badgam.
> Fired at the Tattoo ground, airfield and the airport road.

Causes of failure

> The locals kept aloof in most areas.

> The guerrilla ops had not been planned jointly with local leaders to secure info.
> They had no underground org in the Valley to coordinate activities such as the
provision of information, guides, food, medical help, porters or freedom fighters joining
them.
> The raiders presence was noticed by chance before they hit any target. On 05 Aug,
Mohammad Din, while grazing sheep and goats in Gulmarg area, was approached by two
armed strangers in salwar kameez uniforms. He informed the police station at Tangmarg
about the presence of the suspects.
> Kashmir did not rise in the war of their liberation.

Indian Response to Operation Gibraltar

27. After the initial surprise, the Army and Para Military Forces reacted swiftly. Some
battalions of the Punjab Armed Police (PAP) were flown into Srinagar by 7 Aug while
others followed by road.
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By the morning of 11 Aug, 163 Inf Bde with two Bns reached Srinagar. Infiltrators had
successes in Mandi, Budil and Darhal areas so 52 Inf Bde ex-Jammu area was moved on
9 Aug to clear the area of infiltrators.

PART- II : BATTLE OF THE BULGES (Development Post Op Gibraltar)

1. Bombardment started at 0745 hours 15 Aug. Pak GHQ tasked 4 Arty Bde and the
Indian Field Regiment was attacked with 4 Med and 4 Fd Btys each. Brig BF Masters, Cdr
191 Inf Bde Group had assembled his O group at Dewa for giving orders to evict the
infiltrators from the Kalidhar Ridge area. One shell landed in the gun area and the
ammunition started exploding.

This trend was to continue until the first week of Sep when that Div was left with two Bde
out of four, and had lost two of its Bde Cdrs, one to Chhamb and the second to 29 Inf Bde
for DBN Sector.

Options for India

4. India had two alternatives to defeat Pak design in Kashmir. One was to fight the
infiltrators on the home side of the CFL. The second alternative was to hit the infiltration
bases and force Pakistan to divert her forces to the defence of POK.

Hajipir Bulge was one of the main bases of ingress. Another jump off area for infiltration
was through the Northern Gallies which could be choked by clearing the Kishanganga
Bulge.

India decided to launch simultaneous offensives to sever the enemy entry routes, and to
destroy the administrative and staging bases of infiltration in the two Bulges. India could hit
across the CFL on operational necessity grounds and, in any case, the POK territory was
legally Indian.

Indian Offensive: Kishanganga Bulge

7. The offensive in the Kishanganga Bulge was undertaken by 104 Inf Bde on night
24/25 Aug.1 SIKH less two coys, supported by 138 Mtn Bty and 7 Fd Regt, captured
Richmar Ridge during the night. On the following night, 1 SIKH captured Pir Sahiba and
dominated Nauseri Bridge (already destroyed) over the Kishanganga.

Phase II of Bde attack started on night 3/4 Sep, when 3/8 GR, supported by artillery,
captured Sunjoi feature after a hand to hand fight. The enemy counter-attacked on night
4/5 Sep and again on night 6/7 Sep, The attacks were beaten back with artillery support.

After a pause for reconnaissance and preparations, 3/8 GR captured an intervening

feature on night 10/11 Sep and found that the enemy had blown up Mirpur Bridge over the
Kishanganga.

Preparations then started for the capture of Pt 9013 by 4 KUMAON. The position was held
by two companies of 23 Azad Kashmir (AK) Battalion and the likely approaches were
mined. It took three hours of determined fighting before 4 KUMAON captured Pt 9013 on
21 Sep.
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The enemy left behind 55 dead bodies and the Jura Bridge over the Kishanganga intact. It
required considerable ingenuity and improvisation by 4 KUMAON to destroy this bridge.
With a borrowed 106 RCL gun and an improvised platform, the bridge was rendered
unusable.

104 Bde now dominated the Kishanganga from Mirpur to Jura bridges. It would additionally
threaten Kahuta, Bagh, Rawalkot and Hajira inside PoK.

HAJIPIR BULGE

Indian Offensive: Hajipir Bulge

8. The plan in brief was to launch a pincer assault along the axis Uri-Hajipir Pass with
68 Bde from the North and 93 Bde from Poonch.

10. The main role in this audacious offensive was allotted to 68 Inf Bde under Brig ZC
Bakshi.

11. The operation from the North was conducted under the overall command of Maj Gen
S S Kalan, GOC 19 Div.

Force Level: 68 Infantry Bde

12. 68 Inf Bde had under command 1 PARA, 19 PUNJAB, 4 RAJPUT, 6 JAK RIF, 164 Fd
Regt less battery, 144 Mtn Battery troop, 39 Med Regt, 18 Fd Regt Battery, Section 4.2
inch Mortars troop, animal transport, two pioneer platoons, field ambulance less one troop
and a stretcher bearer company. 4 SIKH LI was available to hold ground after capture so
as to relieve the battalions of the Bde for further attacks.

Outline Plan

13. The plan was to attack along the Sank-Lediwali approach with 1 PARA while 19
PUNJAB were to attack along Bedori approach. The two pincers on either side were to
close at Hajipir Pass. The main effort was along the Western approach. The outline plan
was as under:-

(a) 1 PARA to capture Lediwali Gali by 0500 hours D plus 1.

(b) 19 PUNJAB to capture Bedori By 0900 hrs D plus 1.

(c) 4 RAJPUT to capture Hajipir Pass by 1800 hours D plus 1. D-Day was fixed as
24 Aug.

Execution

14. At 2130 hours on 25 Aug, 1 PARA and 19 PUNJAB moved forward to their respective
objectives on slippery slopes in the rain. 19 PUNJAB secured Pathra, but having made
little headway against the formidable feature of Bedori, it fell back to Pathra by first light. 1
PARA attempted a frontal assault on Sank feature but fell back after suffering 30
casualties. The artillery fire in support of the attack had to be repeated a number of times.
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17. On the morning of 26 Aug, Bakshi decided to attack Sank with 1 PARA again. He
suggested to HQ 19 Div to assign the task of capturing Bedori to HQ 161 Bde with the
troops under its command.

18. About 1500 hours on 26 Aug the General Staff Officer Grade 1 (GSO-1) from HQ 19
Div rang up Bakshi to inform him that 161 Bde had captured Bedori.

4 RAJPUT were ordered to skirt round the Western slopes of Bedori and press onto
Kuthnar Di Gali, while 19 PUNJAB were concentrated behind for further exploitation
towards Hajipir Pass.

19. 1 PARA moved forward at 2130 hours on night 26/27 Aug. By 0400 hours the Bn had
formed up for the assault a few hundred yards short of the top. After a brief heavy
concentration of artillery fire, 1 PARA assaulted Sank ridge and were on top of the enemy
who fled in panic leaving behind two MMGs, three LMGs and other weapons and
equipment. The bn pressed its advantage and secured Sar and Lediwali Gali by midway
27 Aug.

20. As 4 RAJPUT advanced along the Western slopes of Bedori after dark, the leading
troops came under fire from Bedori feature. The CO called for artillery fire to neutralize the
enemy firing on his troops. Bakshi had placed a ban on artillery fire on Bedori for fear of
shelling friendly troops, who according to his information were on Bedori.

He spoke to the Divisional HQ and Cdr 161 Bde who insisted that our troops were in
occupation of Bedori. In the meantime, 4 RAJPUT were suffering casualties. They were
ordered to fall back to their original position pending clarification of the situation.

21. By midway of 27 Aug, Bakshi decided to exploit his success along the Sank approach
irrespective of the situation on the Bedori axis.

22. Bakshi spoke to CO 1 PARA that he was looking for an officer who was prepared to
undertake a difficult and hazardous task. The CO suggested his 2IC, Maj (Later Maj Gen)
Ranjit Singh Dayals name. He wanted Dayal to capture the knolls on either side of the
Pass by a bold move during the night avoiding the direct approach along the ridge from
Lediwali Gali to the Western knoll.

Dayal had to descend from Lediwali Gali into the Hyderabad Nala, then climb to the
Western Knoll, thus approaching it from an unexpected direction. Dayal was given an
infantry company with an additional pl from his Bn and an artillery forward observation
officer (FOO) for the task. 6 JAK RIF was to relieve 1 PARA from Sank and Lediwali Gali
so that the entire battalion could move to Hajipir.

23. While the above preparations were going on, the GSO-1 of HQ 19 Div informed
Bakshi that Bedori had been wrongly reported as captured by our troops and was in fact
still in enemy hands. Shortly afterward, General Kalaan spoke to Bakshi that Bedori must
be captured at the earliest and had priority even over Hajipir Pass.

24. At last light on 27 Aug, Major Dayal led his column on its arduous mission in the rain
over boulders and through rain swept nalas. Unknown to Dayal, Pakistan had moved 20
PUNJAB less two companies to secure the Hajipir Pass. On 28 Aug, in the morning mist
and rain, neither side suspected the presence of the other. Led by Dayal, the paratroopers
 13
reached the top and then pounced on the Pakistanis who fled in panic, leaving weapons
and digging tools. The capture of Hajipir was reported at 1000 hours.

26. In capture of Bedori, Brig Bakshi ordered one 3.7 inch howitzer (mountain gun) to be
deployed forward for destruction of enemy sangars on Bedori by direct shooting. While 19
PUNJAB was getting ready for their left flanking attack, the gun picked out sangar after
sangar before defenders. After a heavy concentration of artillery on the enemy from the
left, 4 RAJPUT had kept the enemy engaged from the front all this time. Bedori was
captured by first light on 29 Aug. By that time, one more Coy of 1 PARA had joined Dayal
on Hajipir Pass.

27. On 29 Aug, Bakshi ordered 1 PARA to capture East knoll. He ordered 6 JAK RIF to
relieve 1 PARA from Sank-Lediwali Gali area which was done by midnight of 29/30 Aug.

On 30 Aug, 1 PARA captured East knoll with the loss of 6 killed and one officer and 26
other ranks wounded. By 1400 hours, 1 PARA had consolidated on both sides of the pass
and 68 Bde reported its capture to the Div.

On 30 Aug, 19 PUNJAB linked up with 1 PARA and the entire area between Bedori,
Lediwali Gali and Hajipir Pass was now clear of the enemy. In this operation, Brig Z C
Bakshi, Lt Col Sampuran Singh and Major R S Dayal were awarded Maha Vir Chakras.

28. At 1000 hours on 2 Sep, Gen Kalaan met Bakshi and ordered him to capture Bisali
(Pt 11229). 4 RAJPUT was tasked to capture it. Considering the difficult nature of the task,
Bakshi placed two coys of 6 JAK RIF under command of CO 4 RAJPUT to carry
reorganization stores. 1 PARA was to be used in Phase 2.

4 RAJPUT launched their attack on Bisali at 2200 hours on 04 Sep. Under cover of artillery
fire, the attack progressed well despite stiff opposition from the enemy. The CO reported
the capture of his objective at 1530 hours on 05 Sep, and asked the Bde HQ to cancel
Phase 2 as he considered it unnecessary.

Having captured the objective, they settled down to some rest. It was the FOO with the
leading company who was the first to realize that in the dark they had not secured the top.
As visibility started improving, the enemy started firing from the top. The en CA led to an
uncontrolled withdrawal with a loss of two offrs and 63 OR killed and 04 Offrs and 42 OR
wounded.

Linkup Plan

29. The plan was for 93 Bde to undertake an offensive from Poonch towards Kahuta
while 68 Bde was to simultaneously press South. 1 PARA was to capture Ring Contour
South of Pt 8786 in Phase 1 and in Phase 2, 19 PUNJAB was to capture Pt 8777. 1 PARA
planned a silent attack with artillery on call. The attack would not achieve success and
Bakshi then decided to switch his thrust to the Eastern Approach.

On 8 Sep, he ordered 1 PARA to relieve 6 DOGRA. The revised plan was to capture Pt
9270 with 19 PUNJAB and Pt 7720 by 6 DOGRA. Both battalions captured their objectives
by first light on 9 Sep and pressed South. By about 1600 hours, 19 PUNJAB had secured
Ziarat while 6 DOGRA captured Halan Janubi further South by midday on 10 Sep. During
ni of 11/12 Sep, 19 PUNJAB captured Kahuta.
 14
Operation Faulad

30. 93 Inf Bde had to push towards Kahuta from Poonch. The plan involved the capture
of two strongly defended features, Raja and Chand Tekri. 3 RAJ RIF was rushed into
attack at short notice to secure jump-off positions enroute to Raja and Chand Tekri.

31. The bn succeeded in clearing the enemy screen position in front of the enemys main
defences by 30 Aug. On midnight 1/2 Sep, 3 DOGRA attacked Raja without success. It
was then decided to launch a Bde attack with full preparations and Arty support. On night
5/6 Sep, a simultaneous attack was launched by 2 SIKH on Raja and 3 DOGRA on Chand
Tekri.

The battle opened with an Arty bombardment on the strongly constructed enemy bunkers.
Under covering Arty fire, the assaulting troops trudged up the steep slopes and by dawn
had passed through the scattered mines and barbed wire when they were pinned down by
accurate small arms fire from bunkers near the crest line.

Lt Col NN Khanna, CO 2 SIKH decided to lead his reserve company personally in attack
from a flank along a narrow spur. In the emerging daylight, the enemy fought determinedly
with accurate fire from well placed bunkers. During this phase, Major (later Lt Gen)
Jagdish Singh Virk, undertook to engage the enemy with single gun (3.7 Howitzer) fire to
provide close support with safety to the leading troops.

Virk engaged the enemy bunkers till our troops crawled to within rushing distance of the
active bunker. In his exposed position, he was soon wounded. Bandaged but bleeding, he
kept on engaging the enemy from bunker to bunker till the capture of the objective. He was
awarded the Vir Chakra for gallantry and dedication to duty.

Operations of Meghdoot Force

32. Maj (Later Lt Col) Megh Singh of 3 GUARDS volunteered to lead a force of
commandos behind enemy lines. He raised a small force of volunteers and after a brief
intensive training, led them against the Pakistani rear areas with considerable success. He
was awarded the Vir Chakra and the Army Cdr pinned Lt Cols badges on his shoulders on
16 Sep.

33. On 15 Sep, the enemy attacked 19 PUNJAB positions between Kahuta and Gitian
three times without success, so on 18 Sep Brig Bakshi ordered 6 DOGRA to capture the
enemy occupied positions South of Gitian consisting of Left Knoll, Tree Hill and Hut Hill.

34. On night 20/21 Sep, 6 DOGRA moved stealthily and both companies reached within
200 yards of their objectives before the enemy opened fire on them. It was a hard slogging
match but the assault companies succeeded in capturing their objectives before first light
with the loss of Major Lalli, one of the Coy Cdrs. While the fighting was at a high pitch on
Hut Hill, the enemy brought down accurate Arty fire on the assaulting troops causing a
degree of disorganization.

Gitian was cleared with the loss of Major Ranbir of 19 PUNJAB. In this action, one FOO
from 164 Fd Regt was killed and another was wounded. It was the toughest battle of the
Hajipir Bulge operations in which we lost 3 officers, One JCO and 32 other ranks killed
while 5 officers, 3 JCOs and 80 Jawans were wounded.
 15
PART III : OPERATION GRAND SLAM

Necessity of Grand Slam

1. As a military dictator, the failure of Op Gibraltar was galling both to Ayubs ego and
his position as the military dictator.

2. Pakistan had limited options to regain initiative in J&K. Pakistan could not expect
quick or spectacular results in the mountainous terrain as India had the capacity to seal off
any such offensive with her superiority in infantry.

Factors Favouring Offensive Action

3. The Akhnur area was contiguous to Pakistani territory and was well connected to
Pakistani rail and road network for quick induction and de-induction of forces from the
nearby cantonments of Sialkot, Kharian and Jhelum.

The plains sector Chhamb-Akhnur is suitable for armour employment.

If the Akhnur bridge was captured, Pakistan could starve the large Indian forces West of
the Chenab of logistic requirements and hope to destroy the isolated formations in
piecemeal battles using her armour and artillery superiority.

Execution: Operation Grand Slam

11. Pakistan launched Op Grand Slam on the morning of 1 Sep.

12. Force Level. The task force for the offensive under GOC 12 Div, Maj Gen Akhtar
Hussain Malik consisted of:

102 Inf Bde (two bns),

4 Azad Kashmir (AK) Bde (three bns),
10 Inf Bde (two bns) ex 7 Inf Div,
two armd regts ex 6 Armd Div,
two reconnaissance and support (R&S) Coys ex 7 Inf Div and
4 Corps Arty Bde under Brig AAK Chaudhry.

In addition, 7 Inf Div, 14 Para Bde and 22 CAVALRY were moved to Gujarat on 30 Aug.

14. Indian Dply. On the Indian side, 191 Inf Bde Group commanded by the recently
posted Brig Manmohan Singh, was responsible for the defence of the Chhamb Sector.

In view of the reports of enemy armour build up opposite Chhamb, 15 Corps ordered the
move of one AMX 13 squadron of 20 LANCERS west of the Tawi. 20 LANCERS less two
squadrons were still at Pathankot and were not moved into J&K to comply with the Karachi
Agreement.

No one anticipated a Pakistani offensive against Chhamb on 1 Sep, and even tank
transporters, located at Jammu, had not been moved to Pathankot to ensure an early
induction of 20 LANCERS in case of a Pak offensive.
 16
15. Chhamb area West of the Tawi was criss-crossed by numerous tracks, and there
were three main axes of advance into the Chhamb plain from the CFL, as under:

(a) Pir Jamal-Phagla-Sakrana-Chhamb.

(b) Koil-Moel-Khairwal-Chhamb.

(c) Burejal-Dalla-Khairwal-Chhamb.

16. 191 Inf Bde group was deployed as under:-

(a) 6/5 GR Kalidhar Ridge.

(b) 3 J&K Militia in coy localities at Pir Jamal, Dewa and Gauhra area.

(c) 3 MAHAR in coy localities at Laliali, Dewa, Kalidhar Ridge with HQs at Dewa
Water Point.

(d) 6 SIKH LI in coy localities at Burejal and Moel along the CFL with the remainder
at Sakrana.

(e) 15 KUMAON-Mandiala area.

(f) Bde HQ between Mandiala and Chhamb.

(g) 14 Fd Regt and 123 Medium Bty-Sakrana-Mandiala area.

Progress of Operations

20. Pak plan was to employ 102 Inf Bde (two bns) with 11 CAVALRY in the South,
simultaneously with 4 AK Bde (three bns) and 13 LANCERS attacking in the North.

On 1 Sep 65, by about 0900 hours Pak troops had secured Pir Jamal, Moel and Burejal
and had captured Manawar, Jhanda and Barsala by 1030 hours while our troops fell back
behind Phagla Nala.

23. Simultaneous with the above, 4 AK Bde with 13 LANCERS launched an attack along
Pir Manguwali-Dewa appch. Hearing about the enemy tank thrust behind Dewa area, the
Bde Cdr ordered the reserve tank troop at Barsala to rush North to block the enemy
advance. All the tks were knocked out by the en.

24. At about 1100 hours, 13 LANCERS with a motor bn undertook a deep thrust towards
Mandiala. This combat group pounced upon the two forward coys of 15 KUMAON
unexpectedly. After dealing with the KUMAON, they moved forward and occupied positions
about 500 yards from the Bde HQ by about 1600 hours.

The Bde Cdr asked for imdt close air support at about 1100 hours. The aircraft, launched
from Pathankot in a hurry, could not establish contact with the Air Contact Team (ACT) and
hit tanks and vehicles indiscriminately destroying three Indian tanks, an armd recovery
vehicle and several vehicles carrying artillery and armour ammunition.
 17
While making the situation worse for our side, they caused the Pakistanis to pause until
darkness before making further progress. After last light, the Pakistanis drove a small
wedge between Mandiala and Chhamb and reached the West bank of the Tawi.

25. Cdr 191 Inf Bde Gp asked permission to withdraw from Chhamb after last light. The
bde was ordered to fall back to Akhnur at about 2000 hours. Enemy tanks crossed the
Tawi during the night after. Pak Engineers laid concrete slabs on its bed to help the tank
crossing.

191 Inf Bde fell back to Jaurian at 0300h on 02 Sep when 41 Inf Bde was digging
defences. Thereafter 191 Inf Bde fell back to Akhnoor. 3 MAHAR and 3 J&K Militia had
moved into their positions along the Kalidhar Ridge and contd to harass enemy raiding
parties. 3 MAHAR under their enterprising and aggressive CO, Lt Col GS Sangha, fell
back only after requisitioning the machine guns from battle casualty tanks in order to
bolster his fire power. All this time, the Bde Cdr had failed to contact 3 MAHAR and had
reluctantly come to believe that the battalion had been overrun by the enemy.

Lt Col GS Sangha of 3 MAHAR, Lt Col Nand Gopal of 6 SIKH LI and Major Bhaskar Sen
of C Squadron 20 LANCERS were awarded Maha Vir Chakras (MVC).

Response to Pak Offensive

26. Maj Gen DB Chopra, GOC 10 Inf Div, while on a familiarization visit to Naushahra on
1 Sep, was ordered to assume immediate command of ops in Chhamb and Akhnur Sector.

191 Inf Bde and 41 Inf Bde, were placed under comd of 10 Inf Div on 01 Sep. HQ 41 Bde
reached Akhnur while its only bn, 1/8 GR was on the move to Akhnur. 9 MAHAR ex 26 Inf
Div was allotted to the bde. Similarly 6 RAJPUT ex 163 Inf Bde was moved from Srinagar
and reached Akhnur, on the morning of 2 Sep.

Realising the gravity of the situation, 41 Bde was ordered to occupy an intermediate
defensive position at Jaurian while 191 Bde started preparing a defensive position for the
protection of Akhnur.

27. General Chaudhuri ordered the move of HQ and squadron of 20 LANCERS from
Pathankot to Chhamb. The move was delayed as no one had foreseen it and the tank
transporters had to be moved from Jammu to Pathankot for transporting the tanks which
reported to 41 Bde at Jaurian on the morning of 2 Sep. 191 Inf Bde had already started
preparing defences ahead of Akhnur.

28. 41 Bde, consisting of two battalions, deployed during the night with one battalion on
Troti Heights on the West Bank of Thindewali Khad while the rest of the Bde took up
positions around Jaurian on the East of the Khad. The bde had under command a field
regiment and a medium battery.

33. Both sides spent 2 Sep in preparing themselves for the coming battle. Pakistan failed
to advance on 02 Sep as they had taken more time than expected to capture Chhamb.
Also op comd was changed from Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik to Maj Gen Yahya Khan
which led to loss of crucial 36 hrs.

34. Maj Gen Yahya Khan (Later President of Pakistan during 1971 War) assumed
command of operations in Chhamb at 1100 hours on 02 Sep and ordered 102 Bde to clear
 18
the area of (non- existent) Indians West of the Tawi. Later he ordered 10 Bde to establish a
bridgehead which was done without opposition after last light of 02 Sep.

Progress of Pak Offensive

36. Pakistani tanks led the advance along Kalith track on the afternoon of 03 Sep.
Pakistans 102 Bde followed the tanks while 4 AK Bde advanced along the Jaurian track.
By about 1500 hours, our tanks supported by artillery engaged enemy tanks from the Troti
Heights. Sometime later, enemy tanks were seen moving North of Troti to outflank the
battalion there.

Around 1630 hours, enemy Air OP shelled the gun area of 161 Fd Regt scoring hits on two
guns which were damaged and the gun ammunition started exploding. The guns were
ordered to move to an alternative position while the enemy Air OP was still on top. With the
enemy shells and our own ammunition exploding around them, the gunners abandoned
their guns in the descending darkness.

About 1915 hours, the enemy mounted an attack on Troti Heights with tanks and infantry
with artillery support but our tanks and medium artillery checked the enemy attack. Finally
it was decided at about 0300 hours on 04 Sep that the Army Cdr should visit Jaurian area
in the morning and take a decision on the spot. 41 Bde was ordered to stick to their
defences in the meantime.

37. 28 Inf Bde (two battalions) was ordered to occupy an intermediate position at Fatwal
Ridge to delay the enemy advance for 48 hours. 191 Inf Bde was instructed to prepare
their defensive positions earliest.

38. Harbaksh along with Katoch arrived at HQ 10 Inf Div at about 1000 hours on 04 Sep.
While they were discussing the situation, the enemy launched a strong armr and inf attack
against Jaurian supported by heavy artillery concentrations. 41 Bde reported at about
1225 hours that the Pakistanis had overrun two forward company localities. The Army Cdr
asked GOC 10 Div to convey a personal message from him to the Bde Cdr to counter
attack the enemy.

Soon afterwards came the report that the counter attack had succeeded in recapturing the
lost localities. He ordered the Div Cdr to retrieve the guns and then withdraw from Jaurian
area during night 4/5 Sep. 41 Bde pulled back, without interference from the enemy, during
the night leaving behind the abandoned guns and some non-runner AMX tanks.

Withdrawal of Pak Forces

39. On the afternoon of 5 Sep, the enemy probed Indian defences in Fatwal Ridge area
followed by a strong attack on the Southern flank on the morning of 06 Sep. Indian Army
tank losses had been replaced and the attack was beaten back by 2 GRENADIERS with
the support of tanks and artillery.

40. GHQ enquired from Yahya Khan whether he could take Akhnur if the Corps artillery
and the armoured regiments were not taken away from him. Since it was not possible, the
Corps artillery bde started moving out around 1030 hours on 06 Sep. Pakistan mov out
armr and arty from the Akhnur Sector in a hurry. The IAF was requested to intercept the
movement but the Pakistanis succeeded in pulling out their troops by day with minimum
losses.
 19
Counter Offensive By 15 Corps

41. 10 Div Plan of counter attack was as under:-

(a) 28 Inf Bde with a major portion of 20 LANCERS to advance along Jaurian axis
to secure Troti Heights. The bde was to be prepared to capture the Chhamb crossing.

(b) 191 Inf Bde with two troops 20 LANCERS to advance along Kalit axis to secure
Kalit and seize the Mandiala crossing.

(c) After capture of Jaurian by 28 Bde, 41 Bde to pass through and size the
Chhamb crossing if not already secured by 28 Bde.

42. The attack by 191 and 28 Bdes was launched during night 6/7 Sep. The enemy
artillery and tanks pinned down the assault before the assaulting troops could close with
the enemy. At this stage, 7 Arty Bde of Pakistan was still deployed in support of Pakistani
troops and had not pulled out of the area. 10 Indian Div launched another attack on Chak
Karpal just short of Jaurian on night 9/10 Sep.

The plan was in three phases:-

(a) Phase 1. 2 GRENADIERS under 28 Inf Bde to capture Chak Karpal during
night 9/10 Sep.
(b) Phase 2. One company 15 KUMAON with two troops 20 LANCERS under 191
Inf Bde to advance at first light on 10 Sep to threaten Chak Karpal from the North and
rear.
(c) Phase 3. On completion of the above phase, 41 Bde to advance to Jaurian.

43. 2 GRENADIERS attack against Pak positions failed with heavy casualties as did the
attack by Coy 15 KUMAON with tanks. It was then decided to adopt a general defensive
posture in Akhnur Sector. Meanwhile the Pakistanis had started penetrating into the
Kalidhar Ridge.

Ops in 15 Corps

32. 10 Divs plan of the attack during night 9/10 Sep failed with heavy losses. After that
the Army Cdr moved 41 Bde from Akhnoor to 11 Corps Sector on 10 Sep.

10 Inf Div then reorganized for ops in Akhnoor and Kalidhar Ridge area. 191 Inf Bde was
made resp for clearing the enemy from the Kalidhar Ridge while 28 Inf Bde contained the
enemy along Akhnoor-Jaurian axis.

29. 191 Bde started ops on 14 Sep and cleared most of the area, but the enemy held on
to positions like Gulaba, Chaprar and Keri despite hard fighting to evict them.
 20
CHAPTER IV: OPERATIONS IN PUNJAB PART I : OPERATION RIDDLE

Comparison of India & Pak Army

6. The Indian armoured regiments were still equipped with World War II vintage tanks
except for the centurions and AMX 13s while Pakistan had acquired a whole new
generation of post war weapons.

By 1965 India had 16 including one under raising while Pakistan had eighteen Armoured
Regiment.

The performance of the gun fitted in Sherman IV was inferior to the Patton and Pak tank-
destroyer armament. Another handicap from which Indian Armour suffered was the totally
outdated communication equipment.

Pakistani armoured division had three balanced armoured bdes.

Pak mech inf had armoured personnel carriers and a 50 inch machine gun fitted on each
APC.

India had no medium self-propelled artillery and its anti-aircraft guns were antiquated 40
mm Bofors on a motorized platform.

7. Pakistan artillery was equipped with modern guns with better mobility, long range and
heavier shell. It had 105 mm guns for the field regiments and 155 mm Howitzers in the
medium regiments.

Pak artillery had better locating devices and Air OP compared to India.

8. Pakistan inf div had more fire power than an Indian division as it had more RCL guns,
Mortars, MMGs and LMGs at the unit and formation level.

Tasks of 11 Corps

25. The tasks allotted to 11 Corps, under Lt Gen JS Dhillon, were as under:-

(a) Destroy enemy forces which may enter the Punjab and Ganganagar Sector.

(b) Launch three simultaneous thrusts along the axes GT road, Bhikkiwind-Barki
and Bhikkiwind-Khem Karan-Kasur with the aim of securing the East bank of
Ichhogil canal from Ichhogil Uttar to its junction with Dipalpur Canal. In the process
capture following bridges on Ichhogil :-

(i) Road bridge Bhaini-Malikpur.

(ii) Road bridge at GT road at Dograi.

(iii) Road and bridge over UBDC and Ichhogil Canal at Jallo.

(iv) Barki Bridge over Ichhogil Canal on road Khalra-Lahore.

 21
(c) On completion of (b) above, be prepared to pose a threat to Lahore.

(d) Eliminate DBN enclave, and capture rail-cum-road bridge at DBN, if possible.

(e) To hold bridgehead at Hussainiwala, contain Pak bridge head at Sulaimanke

and destroy any enemy forces intruding into Ganganagar Sector.

Deployment: Pak 10 Infantry Division

28. 10 Pak Inf Div was commanded by Maj Gen Mohd Sarfraz Khan.

114 Pak Inf Bde, with one squadron 23 CAVALRY under command, was responsible for
the defence of the extended front from the Ravi to Jallo Bridge inclusive. The bde area
was more of less identical to the area of operations of Indias 15 Div.

103 Pak Inf Bde, both with under command one squadron 30 TDU was responsible for the
defence of the area from Jallo Bridge to Bedian, both exclusive. This bde sector was
nearly identical to the area of 7 Indian Div except that Bedian as inclusive to 7 Indian Div.

22 (Pak) Inf Bde (18 BALUCH less two companies, 15 Frontier Force Rifles less two
companies and 23 CAVALRY less squadron) was the divisional reserve.

Deployment: Pak 11 Inf Div

29. 11 (Pak) Inf Div under Maj Gen Abdul Hamid Khan was given the task of defending
the area from Bedian to Hussainwala inclusive. This division had been raised on an adhoc
basis by grouping 21 and 52 Inf Bdes ex 8 Inf Div and 106 Inf Bde ex 10 Inf Div. Pak had
selected this area to launch counter offn against India.

15 INFANTRY DIVISION - OPERATIONS

Plan: 15 Infantry Division

33. 15 Inf Div under Maj Gen Niranjan Prashad was tasked to secure the East bank of
Ichhogil Canal from Bhaini Malikpur to Jallo bridge.

34. The final plan was for 54 Inf Bde, with under command one squadron14 HORSE, to
capture the bridges at Dograi and Jallo.

Simultaneously 1 JAT ex 38 Inf Bde with two troops 14 HORSE, under direct command of
15 Div, was to capture the Bhaini-Malikpur bridge.

38 Bde ex 15 Div was the 11 Corps reserve in Taran area.

One squadron 14 Horse was grouped with 29 Inf Bde for operations in DBN area. 60
Heavy Regt (7.2 inch Howitzers) was also under command 15 Inf Div.

The plan of 54 Inf Bde was as under:-

 22

(a) Phase 1. 3 JAT to cross the border at 0400 hours to secure a firm base in area
Gosal-Dial (Milestone 15). One company 15 DOGRA was to move with 3 JAT to
capture intact the bridge over the UBDC near Milestone 16. Simultaneously one
company 13 PUNJAB led by a commando platoon to move along the railway line to
capture Jallo Bridge.

(b) Phase 2. 15 DOGRA with under command squadron 14 HORSE to advance

along GT Road at first light to link up with their company on the UBDC bridge and
then make a dash to capture the Dograi Bridge.

(c) Phase 3. 13 PUNJAB to build up on their company at Jallo Bridge.

Conduct of Ops: 54 Inf Bde

06 Sep 65, 0400 hrs

35. 3 JAT crossed the border North of the GT Road at 0400 hours and secured the firm
base by 0700 hrs. At about the same time, 15 DOGRA coy captured the UBDC Bridge
intact.

1 JAT also reported the capture of Bhaini-Malikpur Bridge on the Ichhogil Canal. Coy of 13
PUNJAB had reached Jallo Bridge where they were fired upon.

36. On the GT Road axis, 15 DOGRA had cleared the Ranger post at Wagah by first light
and moved forward to link with their coy at the UBDC when they were fired upon by enemy
R&S elements. The opposition was eliminated after a brief fire fight and the Pakistani
escapees were shot up by 3 JAT troops in the Gosal-Dial area.

3 JAT was not in wireless contact with the bde HQ, and the affiliated battery cdr and FOOs
with 3 JAT were not in contact with their guns. During the night march, these parties
carrying their heavy wireless batteries, had not kept pace with 3 JAT.

38. As Brigadier Rikh had lost wireless contact with 3 JAT, he drove forward to contact
them. En route he met the CO of 15 DOGRA who told him that his bn had suffered heavy
cas and was not capable of advancing further. On meeting Hayde, Rikh asked if he could
undertake the task of securing the Ichhogil Canal. When Hayde showed willingness, Rikh
modified his plan. 3 JAT was allotted a squadron of 14 HORSE and ordered to make a
dash for the Canal about 3 kms ahead.

3 JAT ACTION IN DOGRAI (6 SEP 1965)

06 Sep 65, 0930 hrs

39. Before the attack on Dograi, six F86 PAF aircraft appeared over 3 JAT and started
strafing the F ech. It was about 0930 hours and the enemy aircraft shot up every vehicle
on the road for about 15 minutes, undeterred by any fire from our troops .

11 Corps had not been allotted any air defence (AD) guns and no friendly aircraft was in
the area to challenge the enemy. 3 JAT lost 5 out of 6 RCL guns, 3 Mortars with their
 23
carriers and a number of men. An artillery OP officer of the light battery with 3 JAT was
killed.

3 JAT was now without any artillery OP officer except one FOO with C Squadron who had
no wireless communications with 3 JAT. Similarly 38 Bde on the GT Road behind 54 Bde
lost vehicles and men to the PAF strike.

40. Undaunted by the loss, Hayde led his bn on to the Canal.

He led 3 JAT onto Dograi along the right side of the GT Road ordering the troop of tanks to
advance on the left of the road to support his bn by fire, if required.

When 3 JAT reached within about 2000 meters of Dograi, they came under small arms fire.
The JAT spread out and continued their advance. Soon the enemy guns opened up but
under the determined leadership of Hayde, 3 JAT kept on moving ahead. Under
unrelenting and spirited pressure from 3 JAT, the few Pakistanis on the Ichhogil Canal ran
back to safety without pausing to hold even the Western Bank of the canal.

06 Sep 65, 1130 hrs

3 JAT, having secured the East bank of the canal North of the bridge, exploited the
situation to capture the bridge. Hayde arrived at the Dograi Bridge at about 1130 hours
which was partially damaged.

41. Before 3 JAT could settle down, the enemy started shelling them in Attoke Awan and
Batapore areas. Enemy machine guns and tanks engaged 3 JAT in Attoke Awan wounding
8 and killing one. Three lorry loads of enemy troops, seen driving towards Dograi Bridge,
were shot at by our tanks and leading troops of 3 JAT in the bridgehead. Two enemy tanks
moving towards Attoke Awan from Batapore were knocked out by our tanks from the east
bank of Ichhogil.

3 JAT, still out of contact with the bde or anyone else, were coming under increasing
pressure and artillery fire. Without artillery support and out of touch with his higher
commanders, Hayde decided to withdraw from the bridgehead to hold the home bank of
Ichhogil.

3 JAT was ordered to fall back to the area of Dial. 3 JAT casualties on 6 Sep were 11
killed; one JCO and 44 wounded.

44. 1 JAT, supported by two troops 14 HORSE and artillery crossed the border near
Ranian at 0400 hours. They captured the Bhaini- Malikpur Bridge on the Ichhogil without
opposition by 0700 hours.

An engineer platoon under command 1 JAT got separated so the bridge was not blown.
The bn failed to secure the objective due to lack of digging tools and reorg stores. The
artillery FOO was not in communication with his guns.

The enemy reacted with heavy artillery shelling and 1 JAT fell back to Ranian at about
1100 hours. Later 11 Corps moved 6 KUMAON ex 96 Bde to recapture the bridge during
night 6/7 Sep. The attack by 6 KUMAON captured the bridge but a Pak counter-attack
forced 6 KUMAON to fall back to Ranian by about 1500 hours.
 24
Failure of 15 Div

45. Pak reacted sharply with PAF along the GT axis and with artillery fire against 1 JAT at
Bhaini-Malikpur. The PAF knocked out a number of vehicles of 3 JAT and in 38 Bde but it
failed to inhibit the advance of 3 JAT to Dograi and across the Ichhogil.

The IAF was missing on this front as in the entire 11 Corps Sector throughout the day.

The air defence guns had not yet reached the battle zone form their peace locations to
deter enemy aircraft from strafing our troops at will.

The intercommunication failure proved a major handicap. The training for war proved not
to be battle oriented.

Affiliated artillery Ops, engineers, signal communications, reorganisation stores, digging

tools, dispersal of vehicles and close air support did not work under battle conditions.

Even the squadron of tanks in support of 3 JAT did not move to Dograi with the battalion.

45. Maj Gen Mohinder Singh, MC had assumed command of 15 Div at 2300 hours on
night 7/8 Sep. He visited 54 Bde at 0700 hours after its abortive attack of night 7/8 Sep.

Progress of Ops

10 Sep 65, 1000 hrs

21. After a heavy artillery bombardment, the Pak Strike Force launched an attack against
38 and 54 Bde`s. There were instances of panic and withdrawal in 54 Inf Bde which was
stooped by GOC.

22. In Ranian, 1 JAT and 6 KUMAON abandoned their defences on 10 Sep when Pak
tanks threatened to assault them following a heavy artillery bombardment. Both battalions
fell back to Lopoke, thus exposing the right flank of 15 Div.

23. Considering the situation, GOC 11 Corps allotted 96 Bde to 15 Div to block
approaches from Ranian direction and also to secure the Bhaini- Malakpur Bridge. With
the allotment of reinforcements, the deployment of troops in 15 Div by last light of 10 Sep
was as under:

(a) 54 Inf Bde temporarily under Brig Kalha in Santpura.

(b) 38 Inf Bde under Brig Pathak in Sadhanwala area.

(c) 96 Inf Bde under Brig SS Malhotra in Lopoke area.

(d) 50 Para Bde under Brig Nambiar in Hudiara Drain area as 11 Crops reserve.

(e) 41 Inf Bde was allotted to 15 Div on 11 Sep, on arrival from Akhnur.

Exploitation Plan of 15 Inf Divs

 25
17. General Mohinder Singh had planned an additional attack by 50 Para Bde for the
capture of Bhasin by first light on 14 Sep and the bde was moved to area Pul Kanjri during
night 11/12 Sep.

Operations

18. During the period 12-14 Sep, 11 and 15 Corps Sectors remained relatively quiet. On
the GT road axis, Brig Niranjan Singh MC assumed comd of 54 Inf Bde on 12 Sep.

25. Maj Gen Mohinder Singh secured the Bhaini-Malakpur Bridge during night 13/14
Sep with 96 Bde. This was the second place after Barki, where 11 Corps had secured the
East bank of the Ichhogil Canal. The capture of Bhaini-Malakpur Bridge blocked any
enemy approach via Chugawan and provided security to the Northern flank of 11 Corps.

Op of 50 Para Bde

26. 50 Para Bde secured a firm base in the Bhama-Bhatta area with a bn and attacked
its objectives with two bns up. They found the bridges demolished. Pak artillery shelled the
assaulting bns heavily throughout the night. The bde cdr ordered the battalions back to the
firm base area before first light.

GOC 15 Div then ordered 50 Para Bde to recapture and secure the East bank of the canal
by first light on 20 Sep. The attack failed due to heavy shelling by enemy artillery and
Brigadier AMM Nambiar was replaced as Cdr 50 Para Bde.

Outline Plan of 54 Inf Bde

8. The outline plan for the capture of Dograi was as under:-

(a) Phase 1: 13 PUNJAB to capture the enemy position in Milestone 13 area.

(b) Phase 2: 3 JAT to capture Dograi township by a right flanking attack.

Execution: 54 Inf Bde

21 Sep 65, 2330 hrs

11. Phase 1 of the attack was launched astride the GT road after a heavy preliminary
artillery and mortar bombardment. The sqn of 14 HORSE joined in with direct fire at night.
The attack did not make progress due to intense enemy artillery, mortar and machine gun
fire.

22 Sep 65, 0045 hrs

12. Under cover of the noise of battle and artillery fire from both sides, 3 JAT reached
their forward assembly area without detection by the enemy.

At this stage, they learnt about the failure of Phase 1. Niranjan, after a brief exchange on
the tactical situation and advice by Hayde, ordered 3 JAT to carry out Phase 2 of the bde
attack.

22 Sep 65, 0130 hrs

 26
13. 3 JAT launched the attack on Dograi after the pre-arranged artillery bombardment.
After a stiff fight in the built-up area, Dograi was in 3 JAT hands by about 0330 hours on 22
Sep.

Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the bitter struggle. 3 JAT had 4 offrs and 59 other
ranks killed while 6 offrs, 5 JCOs and 142 other ranks were wounded. A total of 300 enemy
dead was counted and about 100 were taken prisoners including Lt Col Golewala, CO of
16 PUNJAB and his affiliated battery cdr.

22 Sep 65, 0730 hrs

14. After first light, 13 PUNJAB pressed forward supported by a sqn of 14 HORSE and
linked up with 3 JAT in Dograi. A number of Pakistanis from the Milestone 13 area tried to
flee, unaware of the presence of 3 JAT in Dograi. Most of them were taken prisoner or
shot. The tanks were just in time to help beat a Pak counter-attack with heavy loss to the
enemy.

15. Niranjan`s plan was based on deception and surprise which ensured success.
Victory was ultimately achieved by the grit and determination of 3 JAT under the
indomitable spirit of its CO Lt Col (later Brig) Desmond E. Hayde who had been awarded
the MVC on 12 Sep for his outstanding qualities of leadership during the first week of the
war.

Ops of 38 Inf Bde

16. In keeping with the intention to reach the canal all along its length, 38 Bde under Brig
Pathak attacked Wagrian and Dogaich on night 18/19 Sep but failed to capture his
objectives.

Capture of DBN Enclave

41. Pakistan had deployed 115 Inf Bde (two bns, one squadron of Sherman tanks and a
field battery) for the defence of Jassar-Narowal area. They had prepared the DBN bridge
for demolition, in case of its likely capture by the Indians.

42. 11 Corps had tasked 29 Inf Bde ex 7 Inf Div to eliminate the Pak enclave and if
possible, to capture the bridge with a squadron of 14 HORSE, a field regiment, light
battery and a field company.

43. 29 Bde started its operations in DBN at 0400 hours on 06 Sep which was the Corps
H-hour. The bde cleared the adverse Pak enclave near the bridge. The Pakistanis held on
to the observation tower from where an enemy OP kept up an accurate artillery fire on our
troops.

44. 1/5 GR had occupied the Dhusi Bund overlooking the bridge exit on the Indian side.
About 1400 hours on 06 Sep, the enemy launched an attack on 1/5 GR positions on the
Dhusi Bund. Under cover of artillery fire, a troop of enemy tanks accompanied by infantry
moved across the DBN Bridge while the rest of the sqn gave fire support to the attackers
from surprise and the two forward companies vacated their defended localities under the
enemy assault.
 27
The bde commander conveyed to the corps HQ that he might not be able to hold DBN
area. He sought permission to occupy a new defensive position behind DBN. The Bde Cdr
was ordered to counter attack and recapture the lost ground.

45. The enemy attacked 1/5 GR positions again at 2100 hours to enlarge the bridgehead
but without success. At 0245 hours 29 Inf Bde launched its attack to clear the enemy from
the Southern side of the DBN bridge. The enemy fell back across the bridge leaving two
tanks behind.

At about 0900 hours on 07 Sep, the Pakistanis blew up a span of the bridge close to their
side. The demolition of DBN Bridge indicated to 11 Corps that Pakistan had no plan to
launch a major offensive in the DBN Sector.

Op of 67 Inf Bde

46. To guard its southern flank, 11 Corps deployed 67 Inf Bde (three battalions, field
regiment (TA), 61 CAVALRY (Horse) and a squadron 14 HORSE ex Inf School, Mhow).
The units were located over a vast area in Jodhpur, Delhi, Mathura, Mount Abu and Mhow.
It was to be deployed as under:-

(a) Hussainiwala Headworks - one battalion, one field battery, one troop
(Shermans) and two bns of Punjab Armed Police (PAP).

(b) Area Fazilka - bde less bn, fd regt less battery and sqn less troop (Shermans).

(c) Ganganagar- Anupgarh - 61 CAV (horse) and two Armed Constabulary (RAC)
battalions.

47. The bde moved into its allotted area of op responsibility by 05 Sep. The Pakistanis
attacked in the evening of 06 Sep. By about 2230 hours, they captured Pakka and a
number of Indian villages in the neighbourhood. Between 06 and 10 Sep Pak made three
determined attacks against 14 PUNJAB positions, which were beaten back with heavy
losses to them.

7 INF DIV - OPS

Operation of 7 Inf Div

46. On the left of 15 Div, 7 Inf Div under Maj Gen HK Sibal was to operate along Khalra-
Barki axis.

47. 11 Corps gave the following tasks to 7 Div (48 and 65 Bde) with under comd battery
40 Med Regt :

(a) Advance along axis Khalra - Barki and secure the Ichhogil East Bank from
Canal Bridge west of Manihala to the junction of UBDC - Ichhogil at Bedian, both
inclusive, by last light 6 Sep.
 28
(b) Capture and hold Barki Bidge over the Ichhogil Canal.

(c) Prevent enemy advance from Bedian and thus guard against a flank attack on
the div axis.

Plan: 7 Inf Div

49. 7 Inf Div planned the op in two phases:-

(a) Phase 1. 48 Bde, under Brig KJ Shahane, with under command CIH less two
troops (Sherman V) to advance along Khalra-Barki axis and to capture Barki and the
bridge over Ichhogil by last light 6 Sep. Simultaneously a Combat Group of 17
RAJPUT was to secure Bedian and to destroy the bridge over the junction of Ichhogil
and UBDC by last light 6 Sep.

(b) Phase 2. 65 Bde under Brig Ferris was to carry out mopping up operations on
the Eastern side of the Ichhogil and to destroy all bridges over the Ichhogil Canal in
the divisional area of ops.

50. To enable a smooth start of 48 Bdes advance, 65 Bde was to clear the Pakistani
Border Posts on either side of the axis of advance as a preliminary op.

Execution

51. On 6 sep, at 0400 hours, 65 Bde undertook to clear the Ranger posts astride Barki
road. At first light 06 Sep, 48 Bde advanced across the border led by CIH. They came
under fire from Hudiara area.

At 0700 hours 6/8 GR, the advance guard, undertook to attack the enemy from the left with
the help of tanks and artillery. The Pak troops vacated the village at about 1030 hours and
occupied an extended defence line along the West bank of the Hudiara Drain.

52. In a bid to attack the defenders from a flank, 48 Bde captured Nurpur village at about
1710 hours. The enemy fell back from the Hudiara Drain after demolishing the bridge.
Brigadier Shahaney, a Corps of Engineers officer, used his influence on the engineer
officer at the bridge site to construct a causeway, on priority, for jeeps and RCL guns of his
bde, thus delaying the work on the main bridge.

53. 7 Div despatched a strong task force consisting of 17 RAJPUT with troop CIH, 82
Light Regt less battery, battery 66 Fd Regt, field company less platoon and tentacle with
ACT to capture and destroy the canal bridge at Bedian.

The bn could not capture the bridge due to enemy resistance. The enemy resorted to
intense artillery shelling and forced our troops to fall back about 1000 yards from the canal.
The enemy attacked 17 RAJPUT during night 6/7 Sep but our troops frustrated the enemy
attempts. Thereafter the Pakistanis flooded the area by breaching the UBDC. By the
evening of 6 Sep, the momentum of the offensive in 7 Divs Sector had been lost.
 29
BATTLE OF BARKI

25. 7 Inf Div continued to make slow and steady progress. 16 PUNJAB captured the
village of Brahmanabad on 09 Sep. 65 Bde then started planning the capture of Barki
which the Pakistanis had developed as a screen position which was occupied by one inf
coy and elements of R&S Coy.

The plan was to capture Barki village in phase 1 and to secure the East bank of the canal
in phase 2. 4 SIKH attacked Barki on night 10/11 Sep after a preliminary artillery
bombardment. Tanks of CIH, without infra red devices, supported the attack by engaging
pre- selected targets at night. Pak artillery hit back with heavy concentrations of defensive
fire (DFs) but 4 SIKH cleared the village by about 2130 hours after bitter and determined
fighting by both sides.

26. In Phase 2, 16 PUNJAB cleared the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal after stiff
opposition from the enemy. Our troops found that the bridge over the canal had been
demolished. B Squadron CIH moved forward to take up positions along the East bank with
the loss of four tanks due to anti-tank mines. This was the first time that our armr faced
enemy mines in 11 Corps Sector. Lt Col Joshi, CO CIH and Major Tandon, B Sqn Cdr,
discovered a safe passage for the tanks. While guiding the tanks to the East bank, they
both were fatally wounded by a mine blast.

27. There was little activity in DBN area while a Pak attack in Fazilka area was beaten
back by 14 PUNJAB on night 10/11 Sep with heavy casualties to the enemy.

18. After the capture of Barki, 7 Div secured the East bank of the Ichhogil. It was directed
to clear the area on the home side of the Canal towards 4 Div Sector. 48 Bde, was tasked
to capture Jahman bridge on the canal. 5 GUARDS failed to capture Jahman Bridge on
night 11/12 Sep.

It was decided to capture the bridge using two bns and two tank troops with divisional
artillery support. A number of tanks were bogged down enroute, and the attack on night
12/13 Sep also failed. Brig Shahaney was replaced by Brig Piara Singh, VrC, a battle-
tested officer.

19. The operations in 7 Div, after the capture of Barki followed the pattern of securing the
maximum length of the East bank of the Ichhogil.

Brig Piara Singh realized that the enemy was holding the Jahman bridge over the Ichhogil
strongly while holding Jahman village lightly, making the capture of the latter easily
practicable for his troops. Piara attacked Jahman village with the support of CIH and
divisional artillery, capturing it during the night of 17/18 Sep.

PART II : OPERATIONS IN KHEMKARAN SECTOR

Allotment of Resources

5. 11 Corps earmarked 4 Mtn Div under Major Gen Gurbaksh Singh for ops in the Khem
Karan Sector.
 30
To improve 4 Mtn Divs fighting capability, it was allotted 1 Fd Regt (SP) Meiktila ex 2
Independent Armd Bde and 40 Med Regt less battery (5.5 Inch gun howitzer).

To improve its anti-tank capability, 9 HORSE (Sherman IV with 76 mm gun) replaced its
affiliated armoured regiment (CIH) equipped with 75 mm gun, after Op Ablaze.

Task

6. 11 Corps gave the following tasks to 4 Mtn Division:-

(a) To secure Pak territory up to the East bank of Ichhogil Canal from Bedian
exclusive to Gandasingwala inclusive.
(b) To destroy the bridge over the Ichhogil canal on the Kasur-Khem Karan road.
(c) To occupy a divisional defended sector to contain a likely offensive by 1 Pak
Armd Div and an Inf div less a bde, astride the Kasur-Khem Karan and
Gandasinghwala-Khem Karan axes.

Plan

10. The plan was for 62 Bde to establish a firm base southwest of Khem Karan, covering
Gandasingwala axis with 1/9 GR ex 7 Bde.

62 Bde was then to advance to Rohi Nala while 7 Bde was to simultaneously clear the
East bank of the Ichhogil from Theh Pannu to Ballanwala. After securing the Rohi Nala, 62
Bde was to secure East blank of the Ichhogil from inclusive bridge on Khem Karan-Kasur
road upto Gandasinghwala.

Execution

12. 4 Mtn Div commenced its operations at 0500 hours on 06 Sep. 1/9 GR occupied a
firm base covering Gandasinghwala while 18 RAJ RIF had taken positions to cover the
divisional concentrations. A squadron of 9 HORSE was grouped with each bde.

The enemy was alert and opened machine gun and artillery fire, on the advancing troops.
Supported by tanks and artillery fire, 9 JAK RIF secured the road crossing over the Rohi
Nala while 13 DOGRA moved across it under enemy fire to capture the high ground at
Rohiwala village.

On the right of the Kasur road, C Sqn 9 HORSE had difficulty in crossing Dode drain and
only five tanks got across to support 4 GRENADIERS attack on Theh Pannu. 4
GRENADIERS was considerably under strength, because its advance party had gone to
the future location under the routine Annual Relief Programme. So it fought the war without
these personnel.

While 4 GRENADIERS captured its objective, 7 GRENADIERS was unsuccessful in

capturing Ballanwala and fell back to the Rohi nala near Sankatra.

14. Unknown to the Indians, Pakistan had deployed its newly raised 11 Inf Div in the
Kasur Sector from Bedian to Gandasinghwala both inclusive. The existence of this division
was unknown to the Indians till 13 Sep, 1965. 11 Pak Div under Maj Gen Abdul Hamid
Khan was poised and ready for its own offensive.
 31

Pakistans Counter Offensive Plan

18. Pakistans plan for the counter offensive, after the concentration of 1 Armd Div in the
bridgehead, was as under:-

(a) 5 Armd Bde (24 CAVALRY and two Mechanized Battalions) to advance along
valhota axis to secure the Beas and Harike bridges.

(b) 4 Armd Bde (4 CAVALRY, 5 HORSE and one Mechanized Battalion) to advance
West of the Kasur branch Canal with the dual role of protecting the left flank of the
Divs advance and to isolate 4 Indian Div from the rest of 11 Corps.

(c) 3 Armd Bde (9 LANCERS and two Mechanized Battalions) initially in reserve
was later to advance astride the Bhikkiwind axis to capture Jandiala.

19. D-Day was 8 Sep.

Progress of Operations

20. 11 Pak div ordered 52 Bde at 1400 hours on 06 Sep to push back the Indians and
establish a bridge-head across the Rohi by first light 07 Sep. 52 Bde attacked 13 DOGRA
in Rohiwala around 1500 hours.

21. Throughout night 6/7 Sep, enemy tanks and inf infiltrated through the gaps in the
forward localities thus threatening to isolate these. The enemy artillery continued to shell
our troops heavily. After dark, 13 DOGRA slunk back from their new position leaving
behind the Commanding Officer, Subedar Major and a few others.

In 7 Bde area, 7 GRENADIERS made one more attempt during the night to capture
Ballanwala. It suffered heavy causalities and lost cohesion in the dark. During the night,
1/9 GR also fell back from its position. The enemy kept up the pressure and by about 0930
hours on 07 Sep, 9 JAK RIF at Rohi bridge feared encirclement.

9 JAK RIF communicated the sit to Bde Cdr and the bn was then instructed to mov back
and subsequently the battalion was tasked to occupy defences in Asal Uttar.

22. Maj Gen Gurbax Singh ordered 7 Bde to fall back from Theh Pannu to Asal Uttar at
about 1000 hours on 07 Sep. He had decided to occupy a divisional defended area in Asal
Uttar, North East of Khem Karan.

The new defended area was sufficiently distant from the Ichhogil Canal to compel a
redeployment of enemy artillery to support an attack on the new defences thus gaining
time for the preparation of defences.

(a) 18 RAJ RIF - Area South of Asal Uttar covering Patti approach.

(b) 9 JAK RIF - Area North of Asal Uttar in depth to 18 RAJ RIF
 32
(c) 1/9 GR less - Area West of 18 RAJ RIF covering the Bhikhiwind
Two companies approach

(d) 4 GRENADIERS - Area Chima along Bhikkiwind road in depth to 1/9 GR.

Def Plan

23. Maj Gen Gurbax Singh decided to occupy a hasty defence with 7 Bde (4
GRENADIERS and 1/9 G R) covering the Bhikkiwind axis and 62 Bde (18 RAJ RIF and 9
JAK RIF) along the Patti axis.

24. 9 HORSE less a sqn with a company of 1/9 GR were deployed as covering troops in
Khem Karan area. The remnants of 13 DOGRA and 7 GRENADIERS were merged with
the bns in their respective Bdes. While the inf was digging and clearing fields of fire, the
Engineers undertook to lay mines along likely approaches. The divisional artillery was
deployed in Valtoha-Chima area.

33. While units of 62 Indian Bde were falling back in a disorganised state during the early
night of 6/7 Sep, 2 FF ex 52 Pak Bde waded across the Rohi and secured the Khem Karan
Custom Post by 2130 hours, without much opposition.

Delay in Pakistan 1 Armoured Division Operations

35. The Rohi Nala could be crossed at some places by tanks and vehicles 11 Div and 1
Pak Armd Div, new to the area, were unfamiliar with these.

The induction of 5 Armd Bde needed a class 50 bridge over the Rohi.

36. The bridge was not ready and the approach route from Ichhogil to the Br site was
choked with tanks and vehicles.

37. In the absence of proper traffic control the bridge carrying vehicles lost their way in
the dark which upset the time- table for the construction of the bridge.

The obstacle crossing control org failed to check straying vehicles from blocking the
access to units moving in accordance with the movement plan.

38. When the bridge was ready one of the tanks of 6 LANCERS hit the railing of the 12
foot wide bridge on the Ichhogil and plunged into the canal, drowning the tank with the
crew.

A tank of 6 LANCERS stalled blocking forward movement and IAF aircraft attacked the
massive jam of vehicles and tanks inflicting casualties to men and vehicles.

39. The build up of the Pak armoured division was delayed upsetting the time schedule
of the offensive but by first light 8 Sep, 4 Armd Bde had followed 5 Armd Bde into the
bridge-head. The main offensive was postponed by 24 hours.

Progress of Ops in Khem Karan Sector

 33
35. A squadron each (Sherman IV) was allotted to 7 and 62 Bdes. These tanks were dug
down in the battalion defended areas to protect their tracks and part of the hull to add to
their concealment and protection from the Pattons and also to bolster the morale of the inf.

36. Pak tanks took time to start their move forward on 08 Sep. The leading troops
entered Khem Karan without opposition about 0900 hours. Our tanks and guns engaged
the probing tanks who fell back after losing a number of tanks. 2 Armd Bdes tanks were
deployed to protect the flanks of 4 Mtn Div.

38. 6 LANCERS captured Valtoha railway station but failed to dislodge 18 RAJ RIF from
their defences. B Sqn 9 HORSE, from its dug down positions in the sugarcane crops, kept
the enemy tanks at bay with the help of concentrated artillery fire. By this time, 3
CAVALRY tanks had also been drawn into battle and in the first encounter between the
Centurions and Pattons, the Pakistanis lost five tanks.

39. The third battle group attacked 4 GRENADIERS who were deployed in depth behind
1/9 GR. 4 GRENADIERS stayed on in their trenches as instructed while the enemy tanks
drove onto the waiting guns of the Sqn of 9 HORSE. A few of the enemy tanks penetrated
close to the Indian gun area where they were engaged by our tanks and heavy artillery
fire. Under pressure from Indian tanks and isolated from their inf, the third group fell back
around 1600 hours while 5 Pak Armd Bde withdrew after last light.

6 LANCERS by 1700 hours had captured Valtoha Railway Station. The advance of 24
CAVALRY in the centre had also been successful though not to the extent of the right hook
by 6 LANCERS.

40. During night 8/9 Sep, 4 Div adjusted its defensive positions. The work of laying
mines, digging and improving fields of fire went on throughout the night. As the extent of
the Pak armour threat became clear, General Dhillon placed 2(I) Armd Bde under GOC 4
Mtn Div at 2200 hours on 08 Sep.

41. The PAF continued to actively attack tanks, guns and troops throughout 08 Sep while
our troops continued to complain of the absence of the IAF. The first Sabre was shot down
by a tank crew of 3 CAVALRY on that day.

42. By nightfall of 8/9 Sep, Pak 1 Armd Div launched her third attack against 4 Div
defences at about 0230 hours on 09 Sep. It was a repeat performance along the same
three axes. Using their infra-red driving capability, Pak expected to overwhelm the
defenders by the shock effect of the onrushing tanks at night. but the defenders did not
budge.

43. On allotment of 2 Armd Bde to 4 Mtn Div, the deployment of armr was rearranged
and coordinated at the divisional level as under:-
(a) One Sqn 9 HORSE in anti-tank role in each bde defended area while the third
sqn protected the gun area.
(b) 3 CAVALRY in general area Dibbipur-Chima in depth behind the tanks of 9
HORSE.
(c) 8 CAVALRY less two sqns in depth to its sqn covering the flooded area east of
Valtoha.

4. On 09 Sep, Pak Armd Div took time to start is op. 6 LANCERS advanced on the
Valtoha axis and captured it unopposed. The central column astride Bhikiwind axis passed
 34
through Asal Uttar and was halted in front of 4 GRENADIERS by our dug down tanks,
RCLs and concentrated artillery fire.

Move of Reinforcement in 11 Corps Zone

5. On the morning of 09 Sep, GOC 11 Corps req Army Cdr for reinforcement of 15 Inf
Div, 7 Inf Div and 4 Mtn Div.

11 Corps had moved 29 Bde less bn to rejoin its parent fmn (7 Div) on night 8/9 Sep. The
Army Cdr moved 41 Bde from Akhnoor to 15 Div Sector. Army HQ moved Parachute Bde
to Amritsar area on night 9/10 Sep.

4 Mtn Div recd a coy from the advance party of 17 SIKH. This coy was grouped under 4
GRENADIERS during night 9/10 Sep. 8 CAVALRY was placed under command of 2 Armd
Bde.

Delay of Pak Offensive & Actions of 4 Inf Div

6. Pak had failed to capture any objective during 8 and 9 Sep. By the morning of 10
Sep, 4 Mtn Div had nine squadrons (three Centurions, three AMX 13 and three Sherman
IV) against eighteen Pak squadron (15 Pattons and 3 Chaffee).

7. Lt Col (later General COAS) AS Vaidya, CO 9 HORSE, visited his forward sqns and
observed that the Khem Karan Minor and other water channels on his regiments right
front were dry. Instr were passed to 4 Inf Div to arrange flow of water.

Causes of delay of Pak 1 Armd Div

8. Pakistan had no Corps HQ in this Sector, adhoc arrangements had to be made for
command and control, coordination, guidance and supervision of operations of 1 Armd and
11 Inf Div.

The non-availability of 7 Inf Div during the crucial counter-offensive had unbalanced the
Strike force.

Progress of Ops: Pak 1 Armd Div

13. The time table of the Pak offensive had already been delayed by 48 hours, Pak ops
on 10 Sep started early with the aim of getting past in Div defs. 4 Armd Bde accompanied
by the inf in APCs advanced in extended fmn at about 0630 hours with 4 CAVALRY on the
left and 5 HORSE on the right.

4 Pak Armd Bde was deployed to break through on the right flank of the defended sector.
To counter such a move, B Sqn 3 CAVALRY was deployed astride Bhikkiwind road while C
Sqn was deployed between Mahmudpura and Rohi Nala. 4 CAVALRY reached Dholan
and waited for an engagement and 5 HORSE was on Bhikkiwind road.

14. At about 0830 hours, 5 HORSE approached 4 GRENADIERS defs astride the
Bhikkwind road. 9 HORSE tanks, in dug-down positions, waited until the Pak tanks were
within about 100 meters of 4 GRENADIERS forward localities and knocked out 4 tanks.
The RCLs and artillery joined the battle. Pak armr kept on edging forward while their inf got
separated from the tanks under intense artillery fire. Despite losses, some tanks of 5
 35
HORSE bypassed the defences and approached the gun area where they were shot up by
the depth squadron of 9 HORSE.

15. At the same time, 4 CAVALRY headed for Mahmudpura-Dibbipur area where it was
mauled by C Sqn 3 CAVALRY which had been waiting for enemy tanks for the last two
hours without moving or firing. 4 CAVALRY was by then, hedged in between 3 CAVALRY
in front and 4 GRENADIERS defences.

Pakistans first attack on 10 Sep failed and both regiments of 4 Armd Bde fell back
suffering heavy losses.

16. Undeterred by the failure Pak, 4 Armd Bde launched one more attack. After a heavy
artillery bombardment, 4 CAVALRY moved forward at 1430 hours with elements of R&S
Company on its flanks. C Sqn 3 CAVALRY under Major (later Brig) NS Sandhu had little
difficulty in knocking out Pak tanks and jeep mounted RCLs as these came in sight.

17. Since Indian resistance had stiffened and break through was not possible instrs were
passed to mov 1 Armd Div less 5 Armd Bde to Sialkot.

18. 4 Armd Bde though depleted undertook one more attack. CQMH Abdul Hamid of 4
GRENADIERS was manning a jeep mounted RCL gun when he observed four enemy
tanks advancing towards his company locality. He opened fire at point blank range as the
tanks emerged into his view one after another. He destroyed three Pattons and disabled
the fourth before his RCL was hit killing him on the spot. CQMH Abdul Hamid won a
posthumous Param Vir Chakra, Indias highest gallantry award.

Progress of Ops : 4 Mtn Div

1. The Jawans and offrs of 4 Mtn Div were up early on 11 Sep expecting another day of
gruelling battle. In the half light, the crews of A Sqn 3 CAVALRY observed silhouettes
of tanks on their front. Major (Later Brig) Suresh Vadera ordered his tanks to get ready
for battle, instructing two of his troops to get to the flank of the silent and stationary
enemy tanks. When a couple of these were hit without reaction, a patrol from 13
DOGRA with an offr of 3 CAVALRY was sent forward to investigate the strange
phenomenon of enemy inaction. The patrol reported about 25 abandoned enemy
tanks, some with engines running and wireless sets on. The missing crews including Lt
Col Mohd Nasir, CO 4 CAVALRY, two sqn cdrs, one capt and 16 men were soon
rounded up. On the spot interrogation of the prisoners indicated that 4 CAVALRY had
suffered crippling losses during the previous days fighting. Some of them had tried to
drive their tanks back after last light and has got bogged in the fields. The Canal
Department had released water into the distributaries when asked to do so by the Army
on the morning of 10 Sep. The water had flowed through the mud banks of the water
channels which had been cut by Pak tanks during the mornings advance. The enemy
tanks were surprised to find their return path flooded. Major Vaderas sqn captured
nine serviceable Patton and he drove one of these to his regimental HQ as a trophy.
He was awarded a Vir Chakra in recognition of the bravery in the previous days
fighting and for capturing so many serviceable enemy tanks.

2. The Pakistanis 5 & 4 Armd Bde despite having reached Valtoha and Asal Uttar were
withdrawn owing to contradicting orders. The Bde had no contact with the Regt and could
not replenish them and thus the offensive was called off.
 36
Exploitation Plan of 11 Corps

3. After the cease fire, about 70 Pattons were collected near Bhikkiwind for evacuation
acquiring the name of Patton Nagar for the place. The news of Pak defeat in Asal Uttar
and its extent was received with electric effect on the Indian side.

4. General Harbaksh Singh wanted to cap it by exploiting the demoralisation and

disorganization of the enemy. In consultation with GOC 11 Corps and in the presence of
GOC 4 Mtn Div, he hatched a plan to exploit the situation by immediate offensive action to
recapture lost ground in one sweep, further crippling the enemy.

5. The plan was for an inf bn, under direct comd of 4 Mtn Div, to carry out a night
infiltration into Khem Karan and occupy the built up area. 7 Mtn Bde under Brig DS Sidhu,
was to advance astride Bhikkiwind- Khem Karan road at first light with an inf bn and the
affiliated Sqn of 7 Bde to capture Khem Karan Distributary and link up with the bn inside
Khem Karan.

General Harbaksh Singh indicated desire to give the honorific task to 4 SIKH. 12 Sep was
4 SIKH Bn Honour Saragarhi Day. Harbaksh must have felt that he, as Col Comdt of the
SIKH Regiment, had a godsend opportunity to give 4 SIKH a chance of adding to the
Saragarhi Saga.

8. General Harbaksh Singh sent for Lt Col Anant Singh, CO 4 SIKH to ask him
personally if he would be willing to undertake an arduous task. Anant Singh, accepted the
challenge without even mentioning that he and his men had no sleep for two previous
nights and in their attack on Barki, the bn had suffered nearly 150 casualties. 12 Sep, the
Saragarhi Day, became inexorably linked with the op.

9. 4 SIKH was required to infiltrate into Khem Karan by a left flanking move during night
11/12 Sep and occupy the built-up area in the town by 0430 hours on 12 Sep. In phase 2,
4 SIKH was to open fire into the rear of the enemy on the distributaries, the appropriate
time, to facilitate 7 Bdes attack. 4 SIKH was to come under comd of 7 Bde.

10. Maj Gen Gurbax Singh, GOC 4 Mtn Div, briefed Brig Sidhu, Cdr 7 Mtn Bde
suggested that to ensure proper planning, reconnaissance and adequate preparations, the
op should be postponed by 24 hours. The GOC agreed to Sidhus proposal, subject to
confirmation by the Corps and Army Cdr.

On returning to his bde, at about 2015 hours, Brig Sidhu was informed by his Bde Major
that the op had to take place during night 11/12 Sep ordered initially. Sidhu telephoned the
GOC who told Sidhu that the op had to take place on 12th because Saragarhi Day was on
the 12th and so the op could not be postponed.

12. The op had been conceived in haste without adequate information about enemy
strength and dispositions. Unknown to the Indian side, Pakistan had 21 Bde, one Patton
regt and more than an artillery bde worth of guns in Khem Karan area.

Anant met his bn at about 2300 hours near Valtoha and selected 50 men from each
company who were considered fit enough for the task. He decided to manhandle two anti-
tank guns as a precaution against enemy tanks. The local guides had not joined 4 SIKH
but a Signal detachment with a wireless set to communicate with the divisional HQ had
linked up with him.
 37

Anant had not met Brig Sidhu, had no wireless communication with 7 Bde and had no
artillery OPs. 4 SIKH undertook its night march on man pack basis along the railway track
at 2330 hours, Along the way, 4 SIKH shed the anti-tank guns which were delaying their
move. The Signal detachment also separated from the bn during the night march leaving 4
SIKH with no means of communication with anyone.

They met no enemy en route and took position at about 0445 hours on 12 Sep in tall crops
believing it to be near Khem Karan. Unknown to 4 SIKH, they were sharing the night
harbour with a Pak tank unit. Around first light, Pak tank crews bestirred themselves and
observed SIKH soldiers in their area. They jumped into their tanks and, firing medium
machine guns rounded up the SIKH tps. Lt Col Anant Singh amongst 126 others was
taken prisoner. Some of the men hid in the tall crops and found their way back during the
next 24 hours. No one on the Indian side knew of the fate of the bn until Pak Radio
announced the capture of 4 SIKH on 12 Sep.

14. Phase 2 of the op was to be conducted by 7 Bde with 2 MAHAR and A Sqn 9
HORSE. 2 MAHAR reached its concentration area around midnight. A Sqn comprising
HQ and two tps B Sqn, two tps C Sqn and two tps 3 CAVALRY under Maj (Later Lt Gen)
Jagat Vohra. It led the advance from Chima at 0500 hours on 12 Sep. At about 0730
hours, the leading troops came under artillery, mortar and machine gun fire as they
approached Khem Karan Distributary. Enemy RCLs knocked out three Shermans. 2
MAHAR went to ground while our tanks and artillery undertook to neutralize the enemy.
The PAF attacked our tps while there were no signs of the IAF.

With the help of artillery and tank fire, 2 MAHAR put in two attacks to reach its objective
but were held up short of the distributaries by intense artillery, mortar, machine gun and
tank fire. The PAF again attacked around 1145 hours. 2 MAHAR fell back after suffering
heavy causalities.

15. At 1300 hours, Cdr 7 Bde sent the message to HQ 4 Mtn Div about the situ. GOCs
response was to make one more effort. One additional troop 3 CAVALRY and 2 companies
9 JAK RIF were allotted to 7 Bde as reinforcement, Sidhu represented that the force was
inadequate for the task but the GOC urged him to carry on.

16. The new plan was to assault the objective with tanks while the infantry was to follow
to consolidate captured ground. H hour was 1600 hours. Maj Vohra planned to attack with
two Sherman troops on each flank. He kept a troop of two Centurions and two Sherman
tanks in reserve under him. The tank troops on the flanks were to cross the Distributary
and get behind the enemy while the tanks in the centre were to exert pressure along the
road.

The tanks on the right could not make progress due to boggy ground and enemy
resistance, while the tanks on the left crossed the Distributary where they got engaged in a
fire fight with Pakistani tanks. The armr and infantry tried to push forward but were pinned
down by intense artillery and machine gun fire. The Centurion troop was ordered to join
the Shermans across the Distributary but failed to do so against strong opposition. As it
was getting dark, the cdr decided the troops to fall back.

There had been no news about 4 SIKH through-out the day and the enemy were
apparently fighting unaffected by any threat to his rear. The attack to capture Khem Karan
failed. Eight surviving tanks (three Centurions and five Shermans) fell back. We lost 11
 38
tanks. 2 MAHAR had 3 offrs, 2 JCOs and 45 Jawans killed and 3 officers, 4 JCOs and 83
Jawans wounded.

On 16 Sep, 29 Bde less bn with its affiliated artillery regt was placed under command of 4
Mtn Div. Next day, 41 Bde was also moved under 4 Div. The enemy was reckoned to be
holding Khem Karan township with an inf bn and a sqn of armr. An R&S coy was believed
to be holding a screen position along the Khem Karan Distributary. 4 Divs plan was to
attack in two phases:-
(a) Phase 1 41 Mtn Bde to capture Khem Karan by 0200 hours on 22 Sep.
(b) Phase 2 - 29 Inf Bde to eliminate the screen position by 0500 hours on 22
Sep.

Execution

6. The attack was to be supported by 9 HORSE and 8 CAV. After a preliminary

bombardment by divisional artillery, 41 Bde launched an attack to capture Khem Karan
with two bns up. The attack was not pressed due to enemy artillery fire but it was decided
to go ahead with Phase 2 in spite of the failure of Phase 1. 2 MADRAS ex 29 Bde partially
succeeded capturing screen position but fell back due to intense en fire. Another attack
with the same troops was planned for the night of 22/23 Sep but was cancelled due to the
cease fire.

PART III : OPERATIONS IN SIALKOT SECTOR (Op Nepal)

Options for Area of Ops

1. The finalisation of the Indian offensive plan took time as two schools of thought had
emerged on the choice of the area of operations.

(a) Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh advocated an offensive into the Sialkot sector via the
Indian enclaves of Nainakot and Narot involving a crossing of the Ravi. His reasons
were as under :-
(i) The chances of surprise were better. A large scale concentration of troops
in Samba area was liable to be detected.
(ii) The concentration of troops in Gurdaspur area would take less time due to
availability of rail and road facilities and shorter distances.
(iii) An offensive from Gurdaspur direction would take the Pakistanis in the
Sialkot sector from a flank and threaten the rear of the Pak forces, deployed
along the Jammu border.
(iv) The existing administrative set up and communications were better to
meet logistic requirements of the forces operating from Gurdaspur area.
(v) The initial crossing of the Ravi would not face a serious problem as we
would use the Indian enclaves across the Ravi as our bridgeheads.
(vi) Concentration of forces in Samba area would take longer.
 39
(vii) An offensive form Samba direction would not permit mutual support
between 11 and 1 Corps especially as the Ravi would not permit quick switching
of forces between the two Corps.
(viii) Indian forces would be operating on exterior lines on either side of the
Ravi, while the Pakistanis could switch forces quickly between Lahore and
Sialkot sectors using interior lines and better rail and road communication
networks.

(b) General Chaudhuri preferred an offensive along Samba Ramgarh direction for
the following reasons.
(i) The terrain in the Sialkot Sector was good tank country where 1 Armd Div
could produce better results by advancing along the grain of the country.
(ii) An offensive in this sector would pick up momentum from the very
beginning. There were no major obstacles to be crossed until the Marala-Ravi
link Canal (MRLC).
(iii) Op in this sector would have a direct and close influence on Pak
operations in the neighbouring sectors of Akhnur and Naushahra.
(iv) An offensive in this Sector would automatically give added depth and
security to the vital life-line linking Pathankot with Jammu and Srinagar.
(v) India would augment her military potential by integrating the considerable
assets of 26 Inf Div located at Jammu.
(vi) In addition, an advance from Gurdaspur direction would be against the
grain of the country, thus involving crossings over a number of sandy nalas.

3. Considering the various aspects, Chaudhuri had decided, by the middle of Aug that 1
Corps offensive would be launched into the Sialkot Sector from the Samba direction.

15 Pak Div planned to hold the line Jassar-Narowal-Chawinda-Sialkot as under:-

(a) 101 Inf Bde (Two inf bns and two Sherman regiments): Sialkot Sector.

(b) 24 Inf Bde (Two inf bns and 25 CAVALRY equipped with Pattons - Chawinda
Sector.

(c) 115 Inf Bde (Two inf bns and one Sherman regiment) Jassar - Narowal Sector.

(d) 104 Inf Bde (One Inf Bn and one Sherman regiment) - behind Sialkot as
reserve.

11. 6 Armd Div was in Daska area as the GHQ reserve. The raising of this division was
not complete when the war started. Two of its armoured regiments (11 CAV and 13
LANCERS) had been committed for operations in Akhnur Sector.

State of Formation of 1 Corps

14. The raising of 1 Corps Headquarters was sanctioned in April 1965 and Lt Gen PO
Dunn assumed Command in Aug. The Corps was allotted the following formations.

(a) 1 Armoured Division under Major Gen RS Sparrow, MVC. The division had four
armoured regiments (Centurions), 2 LANCERS (Upgunned) and 62 CAV (Sherman
IV with high velocity 76 mm gun).
 40
(b) The raising of 6 Mtn Div (69 and 99 Mtn Bdes) was ordered on 26 Mar 1963.

(c) 14 Inf Div had 35 & 58 Inf Bdes. The raising was ordered on 1 Apr 1965 and the
third bde (116) joined it in Aug. Maj Gen RK Ranjit Singh, an Armd Corps officer,
assumed command of the div after Op Ablaze.

(d) 26 Inf Div, under Maj Gen ML Thapan, it had 162 and 168 bde and 18 CAV
(Upgunned).

Stage Management of 1 Corps

15. 6 Div had been earlier moved by hired civil vehicles on 1 Sep to Samba area to
protect the concentration of 1 Corps.

The trains, loaded with tarpaulin covered tanks, moved towards Amritsar before dark to
mislead the enemy about their destination but changed direction towards Pathankot after
dark.

The Engineers also undertook improvement of bridges enroute to Akhnur and the
construction of a bailey bridge over the Jammu-Tawi to indicate preparations for the move
of 1 Armd Div into Akhnur Sector.

1 Corps Plan

18. 1 Corps plan was to launch an offensive, using 6 Mtn Div, 14 and 26 Div to break the
crust of the Pakistani defences.The plan was in two phases:-

(a) Phase 1. Est of bridgehead by 6 Mtn Div in Maharajke and Charwa area. 26 Inf
Div was to secure Unche and Niwe Wains across the border astride the Jammu-
Sialkot road.

26 Div to protect right flank and 58 Inf Bde ex 14 Div was to capture Nakhnal on the
west of Degh nadi to provide left flank of 1 Corps.

(b) Phase 2. Break out by 1 Armd Div at first light to capture Phillora and Pagowal
by last light D-Day.

Launch of 1 Corps Offensive

21. 1 Corps launched its offensive on night 7/8 Sep with 6 and 26 Div,s. The attack by 58
Bde on Nakhnal was cancelled at the last minute and the left flank protection of Armd Div
advance was allotted to a CG of squadron 62 CAV and an infantry company under the
direct command of 1 Armd Bde.

22. 35 Inf Bde ex 14 Div was placed under Command 6 Div as a reserve. 99 Mtn Bde ex
6 Mtn Div attacked two bns up to capture Charwa at 2300 hours after a preliminary
bombardment by 1 and 6 Arty Bdes. 2/5 GR on the left and 4 RAJ RIF on the night both
launched vigorous attacks. The enemy offered stiff resistance but a free use of the Kukri
by 2/5 GR and a determined attack by 4 RAJ RIF succeeded in overwhelming them by
0300 hours on 08 Sep capturing large quantities of mines, ammunition and rations.
 41
69 Bde plan was to capture Maharajke in two phases. In Phase 1, 3 MADRAS and 9
KUMAON were to capture the Western half of Maharajke. Both bns captured their
objectives by 0130 hours against light opposition. Phase 2 commenced at 0300 hours on
the Eastern half of the village but was halted by heavy machine gun and small arms fire.

Lt Col Mehta, CO 4 MADRAS, rushed forward to lead the troops on the objective, which
fell to them by 0530 hours but Mehta was killed by enemy fire while pushing the attack
forward. Squadron 62 CAVALRY (Sherman IV) joined the bde before first light and 69 Bde
remained in Maharajke until 12 Sep without much activity.

23. On 26 Div front, H-hour was 2330 hours and each of the attacking bdes was allotted
a sqn from 18 CAVALRY while 26 and 1 Artillery Bdes provided fire support. 162 Bde
operating astride the Jammu-Sialkot road, captured Unche and Niwe Wains by 0230 hours
on 08 Sep.

1 Armd Div Plan

25. On the Indian side, the main thrust of 1 Corps was to be launched by 1 Indian Armd
Div for the capture of Chawinda. General Sparrows planned to advance on two axes with
1 Armd Bde along Sabzpir-Phillora axis and 43 Lorried Bde along Mastpur-Kalol-Pagowal
axis.

26. The grouping of 1 Armd Div was as under:-

(a) 1 Armd Bde under Brig K.K. Singh (16 CAVALRY, 17 HORSE, 9 DOGRA less
company) with under command:-
(i) Sqn 62 CAV (Sherman IV).

(ii) Assault Field Coy.

(iii) 5/9 GR ex 43 Lorried Bde.

(iv) ACT with tentacle.

(v) In direct support.

(vi) 2 Fd Regt (SP).

(vii) 71 Med Regt.

(b) 43 Lorried Bde under Brig HS Dhillon (5 JAT, 8 GARH RIF) with under
command.
(i) 2 LANCERS (Upgunned).

(ii) 62 CAV less sqn.

(iii) Assault Field Coy.

(iv) ACT with tentacle.

(v) In direct support.

 42
(vi) 101 Fd Regt (SP).

(viii) 24 Med Regt on priority call.

(c) Div Reserve. 4 HORSE and Coy 9 DOGRA.

Execution of Operation: 1 Armd Div

27. 1 Armd Bde crossed the border at 0600 hours on 08 Sep between Charwa and
Nakhnal and advanced to Phillora.

16 CAVALRY with under command 5/9 GR advanced along the divisional centre line to
Phillora while 17 HORSE moved to Tharoh on the left. The advance met no opposition and
the first enemy reaction came from the PAF attacking the leading tanks and 1 Armd Bde
vehicles around Chobara bout 0900 hours without causing much loss.

The advance was resumed and as 16 CAVALRY was approaching Gadgor; its leading
tanks were fired at, about 0930 hours by enemy tanks which had just moved into their pre-
selected location in Gadgor-Tharoh area.

28. On learning of the Indian attack in Charwa-Maharajke area, Pak 24 Inf Bde was
ordered to revert to its operational resp in the Phillora-Gadgor area at the earliest. 3 FF
elements North of Sabzpir had been over-run by Indian armour. The Pak 24 bde cdr
ordered 25 CAV to advance along Gadgor axis to stop the Indian armour as far North as
possible. Tank engagements took place between enemy 25 CAVALRY and own 16
CAVALRY & 17 HORSE. In the initial contact both sides suffered tank losses but the Indian
tanks were better poised.

29. As a result of the tank battle in Gadgor-Tharoh area, both 25 Pak CAV and 1 Armd
Bde fell back from the battlefield that afternoon. By the morning of 09 Sep, 1 Indian Armd
Div had captured Majarajke, Charwa, Chobara, Gadgor and Phillora villages.

30. 43 Lorried Bde had to change its route due to slush at the pre-selected crossing point
over the Aik Nala in Indian Territory. The lorried bde crossed the border near Nakhnal at
about 1100 hours and at about 1530 hours, 2 LANCERS leading the bde advance lost two
tanks to the fire of our own tanks which had fallen back to Sabzpir area. The movement of
the bde was sluggish and it harboured for the night near Maharajke without making contact
with the enemy.

35. Sparrows plan to advance to Chawinda along two divergent axes had split 1 Armd
Div into two separate groups. The flexibility of the armd div was reduced, as the Artillery
support.

Ops of 11 Inf Divs

46. Simultaneous to the 1 Corps offensive, India also launched an offensive in the far
away Barmer Sector in Rajasthan during night 7/8 Sep. It attracted sensational headlines
like India opens second front in the Indian newspapers. The aim of this offensive was to
pose a threat towards Mirpur Khas in Sind to tie down Pakistans 8 Inf Div located in that
area. 11 Inf Div (31 and 85 Inf Bde) under Maj Gen NC Rawlley, MC, started the operation
well by capturing Gadra on 08 Sep.

Progress of Ops : 1 Armd Div

 43

28. In Sialkot Sector, both sides were busy planning and regrouping after the events of
08 Sep. On 09 Sep, 43 Lorried Bde secured Kaloi beyond Maharajke without opposition.
On 10 Sep, Lt Gen Dunn issued orders for the capture of Phillora and exploitation towards
Chawinda. The main role was allotted to 1 Armd Div. 6 and 14 Divs were given the
responsibility of holding Maharajke and Charwa respectively. Sparrow was given additional
tps as under:-
(a) 35 Inf Bde, ex 14 Inf Div, with 2 LANCERS less sqn to hold firm base at Sabjpir.
1 Armd Bde was to move out of the boxes to line up with 43 Lorried Bde in Kaloi area
on night 10/11 Sep for 1 Armd Divs ops for the capture of Phillora.

(b) 116 Inf Bde, ex 14 Inf Div, with Sqn 2 LANCERS and Sqn 62 CAV to hold
Nakhnal to protect the left flank of 1 Armd Divs attack.

(c) 99 Mtn Bde, less bn to move to Kaloi, adjacent to 43 Lorried Bde after handing
over the def of Charwa to 58 Inf Bde ex 14 Inf Div.

(d) 6 Mtn Arty Bde and 24 Med Regt allotted to 1 Armd Div for its attack on Phillora.

29. For the attack on Phillora, Sparrow decided to switch his axis of attack from Gadgor
to Rurki Khurd approach. His plan was to move 1 Armd Bde from Sabzpir to Kaloi axis
during night 10/11 Sep so that the Armd Div (1 Armd and 43 Lorried Bdes) became an
integrated team.

30. Pakistan was also busy reinforcing and regrouping for the coming battle. Maj Gen
Tikka Khan had taken over as GOC 15 Div on 09 Sep when the previous GOC was
sacked.

31. Pakistan had placed the Chawinda-Pasrur-Badiana area under 6 Armd Div with 15
Pak Div remaining resp for Sialkot and Jassar. 4 Corps Artillery Bde was deployed during
night 10/11 Sep in support of 6 Armd Div.

PART V : INITIATIVE REGAINED

Ops of Strike Corps

19. In Sialkot Sector, both Indian 1 Corps and Pak 1 Corps spent 09 and 10 Sep
regrouping and planning their next move. While Sparrow had planned a divisional attack
on Phillora for 11 Sep, Pak 1 Corps divided the op responsibility in Sialkot Sector between
6 Armd Div and 15 Inf Div with effect from mid-night 9/10 Sep.

20. As a part of his plan, Sparrow launched a feint armour attack in Gadgor area in the
morning of 10 Sep to indicate to the enemy that he was improving his posture for his main
attack along Gadgor-Phillora axis. Both sides suffered tank losses but Sparrow had
achieved his aim by misleading the enemy that Indias next attack would come from
Gadgor direction. In addition, Pakistan was convinced that the Indians would not launch
another attack so soon after the failure of their attack on 10 Sep.

Revised Plan of Pak 6 Armd Div

 44
23. The plan was to redply Pak 6 Armd Div before the Indians could launch their next
offensive.
11 CAVALRY and 9 FF - Gadgor- Phillora
24 Bde - Pasrur as divisional reserve.
Guides Cavalry and 14 FF - Badiana
14 (PARA) Bde - Zafarwal under Brig AAK Niazi

4 Corps Artillery Bde was to provide fire support of six field, two medium and three heavy
batteries in the battle zone from Badiana to the west of Deg Nadi.

24. In the afternoon of 10 Sep, Yakub issued orders that 24 Bde be relieved by 11
CAVALRY and 9 FF during night 10/11 Sep.

Launch of Ops by Indian 1 Armd Div

25. The two bdes of 1 Armd Div had assembled in Rurki Khurd area by midnight on
10/11 Sep. The plan was for 43 Lorried Bde to secure Rukri Kalan by first light on 11 Sep.
1 Armd Bde was then to advance to Philora using Rurki Kalan as a firm base with two
regiments up.

27. After an intense pre H-hour artillery bombardment, 43 Lorried Bde attacked Rurki
Kalan and secured it by 0600 hours on 11 Sep. The PAF and enemy artillery, using air
burst shells, hit our troops in Rurki Kalan inflicting heavy casualties but 1 Armd Bde
commenced their advance.

16 CAVALRY secured Khakhanwali without op. A desultory tank battle went on throughout
the day between the enemy and 16 CAVALRY.

28. C Sqn of 17 HORSE occupied the High Ground North-West of Phillora while
another sqn of 17 HORSE secured Khananwali on the west of Phillora. A sqn of enemy
tanks came out of its concealed positions and engaged out tanks from Alhar area. Both
sides suffered losses but enemy fell back with greater losses.

29. 4 HORSE advanced with two sqn up to capture Saboke. Lt Col Madan Bakshi, CO 4
HORSE missed the turning near Rurki Kalan and went straight on towards Libbe. As he
approached Libbe, he came upon enemy tanks and knocked out two of them. His own
tank was hit and caught fire. He and his crew bailed out and hid in the sugarcane fields.
The rest of the regiment proceeded to their objective as planned.

Major Bhupinder Singh assumed comd of 4 HORSE when there was no response from the
CO for sometime. A sqn, on the left, was engaged by the enemy from Saboke while B
Sqn got involved in fire fight with enemy tanks North of Phillora.

It was easier to shoot down moving tanks and in the ensuing encounter Pakistan lost 23
tanks while 4 HORSE lost only one. Amongst others, Pakistan lost CO 1 Field Regiment
(SP) who was Killed while CO and Second-in-command of 11 CAVALRY were wounded
when and artillery shell burst in their midst. 9 FF had been routed and fell back to
Chawinda in driblets.

30. Under pressure from 17 HORSE, enemy tanks moved out of Phillora. Lt Col Grewal,
CO 5/9 GR seized the opportunity and occupied Phillora in the afternoon without waiting
for the attack of the lorried bde.
 45

31. While the Indians were making progress in Phillora area, GOC 6 Pak Armd Div
ordered Guides Cavalry and 14 GG ex Badiana to threaten the Indian Armd Divs flanks
and rear in the Libbe-Pagowal area. 62 CAV and 16 CAV had been ordered to protect the
Indian armr advance from any enemy interference from Badiana and Sialkot area.

32. On the left flank, 116 Bde was made responsible to provide security to that flank. As
the enemy hold in this flank was weak, there was no enemy interference with 1 Armd Divs
opn.

Ops of 26 Inf Div

33. The activity in 26 Div Sector was confined to patrolling and artillery shelling. 52 Mtn
Bde was placed under comd 26 Div on 11 Sep, to cover the Marala-Chaprar approach. On
the evening of 11 Sep, 1 Corps Cdr ordered regrouping for the next phase of op as
under :-
(a) 58 Bde ex 14 Div at Charwa under comd 1 Armd Div.

(b) 99 Bde ex 6 Mtn Div to relieve 43 Lorried Bde at Phillora and to be under comd
1 Armd Div. The Lorried Bde to move back to Rurki Kalan during night 12/13 Sep. 2
LANCERS less sqn was placed under comd 99 Bde.

(c) 35 Bde to be under comd 1 Armd Div in Gadgor Area.

(d) 69 Bde under 6 Mtn Div to capture Pagowal by 12 Sep. 62 CAV less sqn placed
under comd 69 Bde.

(e) 116 Bde to revert under comd 14 Inf Div. 5 RAJ RIF to continue to hold Rangre
with sqn each of 2 LANCERS and 62 CAV under comd 116 Bde. The bde was instr to
secure Zafarwal in addition.

34. A local pincer movement by 4 and 17 HORSE had succeeded in isolating enemy
armr in Phillora, threatening it with destruction. The enemy chose to vacate Phillora which
fell to our troops without the planned night attack.

PART VI : FIRST BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

1. Sparrow had captured Phillora on 11 Sep and he opted for a two-day pause before
making his next move. By the time 1 Corps undertook the next offensive step; Pak had not
only recovered from the mauling of her tank forces in Chawinda area but had reorganized
and strengthened her troops and defences to face the Indian attack.

2. Sparrow pulled back his div on night 12/13 Sep for rest, refit and preparations for the
next phase of his offensive. 99 Mtn Bde ex 6 Mtn Div with under comd 2 LANCERS less
sqn took over the defs at Phillora under Sparrow.

Outline Plan
 46
3. 116 Bde ex 14 Div was to secure Zafarwal. The Bde earmarked 5/5 GR for it. A Coy
of 5/5 GR moved at 2130 hours on 11 Sep to occupy Zafarwal, if not held. The coy occu
Zafarwal without opposition but was not in wireless contact with the bn.

The coy under pressure from en mov to Mirzapur wherein balance of the bn had already
moved. The sqn failed to link up with them. The Bn did not progress towards Zafarwal in
the absence of tanks.

On 13 Sep, 5/5 GR was ordered to capture Zafarwal with the help of Sqn, but once again
the sqn failed to link up with bn. So the attack by 5/5 GR fizzled out without the tanks.

4. As the Bajragarhi axis was adequately guarded by 26 Div, 1 Corps ordered 6 Div to
secure Pagowal crossroads which would not only protect the right flank of 1 Armd Divs
attack on Chawinda but pose as a potential base for an attack against Badiana. The task
was given to 69 Mtn Bde.

Execution

5. The orders for attack were issued at 1800 hours on 12 Sep. 3 MADRAS and B
squadron 62 CAV were to move from Kaloi at 0400 hours on 13 Sep.

6. 3 MADRAS cleared minor opposition North of Pagowal while B Sqn carried out a left
hook to cut the Sialkot-Pagowal road in an attempt to threaten the rear of the enemy. The
enemy vacated the area without a fight to avoid encirclement. The enemy was halted
about 1500 meters away from outer defended area by our tanks and artillery fire. The total
casualties to 69 Bde in the days fighting were 3 offrs, 2 JCOs and 11 Jawans killed, while
4 offrs, 1 JCO and 44 Jawans were wounded.

While the above operation was going on, Dunn ordered 26 Division to increase activity
against enemy in Sialkot. On 13 Sep, a company of 8 JAK RIF captured Kalarwanda while
2/1 GR capture Rasulpur. A troop from 18 CAV supported each attack. Next day
Pakistani's reacted strongly using tanks and infantry.

7. During the above operations, the enemy was active against Phillora. On the
afternoon of 13 Sep, two enemy Patton sqns attacked 99 Bde defences at Phillora. That
Bde had relieved 43 Lorried bde during night 12/13 Sep. Another enemy attack in this area
was beaten back with casualties to the enemy tanks.

8. Artillery played an important role during the battle of Chawinda. In addition to 6 Armd
Divs integral artillery, 4 Corps Artillery Bde was deployed in Chawinda-Pasrur area to
provide defensive fire support to Pak troops. Pakistan had thus one field regiment (SP),
one field regt less battery, one heavy regt and one LAA battery to support 24 Inf Bde.

From 16 Sep onwards, two field regs (SP) ex 1 Armd Div reinforced the above. The
artillery deployed in support of the Sialkot garrison provided additional support to Pak
troops in Pagowal area.

9. Having failed to win the offensive battle in Khem Karan on 10 Sep, Musa decided not
to lose the defensive battle at Chawinda. Musa had issued orders on night 10/11 Sep to
move HQ 1 Armd Div and a reconstituted 4 Armd Bde (5 HORSE, 19 LANCER, 10 FF) to
Pasrur. Maj Gen Sahibzada Yakub Ali Khan, an Armd Corps officer, assumed command of
the div and was made responsible for the gap between Chawinda and Badiana.
 47

Attack on Chawinda

13. Dunn issued his orders for the capture of Chawinda by 1 Armd Div on 13 Sep. 99
Mtn Bde with under commend 2 LANCERS less squadron had assumed responsibility for
the defence of Phillora. 1 Armd Bde and 43 Lorried Bde had concentrated in Libbe and
Rurki Kalan areas during night 12/13 Sep. D-Day for the operation was 14 Sep.

Sparrows plan to capture Chawinda was similar to that for Phillora.

In Phase-1, 1 Armd Bde was to isolate Chawinda or to force them out of the defended
area. In Phase-2, 43 Lorried bde was to attack Chawinda from Wazirwali direction with
support of tanks. KK Singh planned to protect his right flank with 16 CAVALRY in
Khakhanwali in line with 18 CAV and 62 CAV in Bajragarhi and Pagowal firm bases
established by 26 and 6 Div respectively.

15. 4 HORSE was to advance after first light and cut the Badiana- Chawinda and
Pasrur- Chawinda roads with a view to destroy any enemy tanks which tried to escape
from or reinforce Chawinda from Pasrur or Badiana. 17 HORSE was to neutr en armour in
Chawinda defs and then support the attack of 43 Lorried Bde on Chawinda. IAF was not
integrated into the plan of attack.

Execution

16. 4 HORSE advanced from Libbe early in the morning of 14 Sep. The leading tanks
were fired upon by enemy tanks and RCL guns, concealed in the tall crops, as they
approached Jalowali North of Alhar at about 0800 hours. 4 HORSE reached Alhar railway
station around 1400 hours when KK Singh ordered it not to cross the railway line.

17 HORSE was ordered around midday to secure Wazirwali. It met strong opposition from
enemy tanks and infantry. C squadron 17 HORSE kept on pressing forward towards
Wazirwali inflicting losses on the enemy armr and inf.

1 Armd Bde had run into an enemy anti-tank screen, manned by approximately a Patton
regt, inf and anti-tank guns.

17. 16 CAV advanced to Khakhanwali on the right of 1 Armd Bde early in the morning. It
got involved in a tank fight which continued the whole day. Enemy air and artillery kept
hitting the regt throughout the day. At about 1630 hours, 16 CAV was ordered to advance
to the railway line and to probe forward towards Badiana, if possible.

The forward movement of the regiment was met by heavy artillery bombardment and as
the tanks edged forward towards the railway line, enemy dug its RCL guns and hull down
tanks behind the railway embankment engaged them.

The enemy air and artillery kept on hitting the regiment without much loss. The enemy in
Badiana, for its part, did not act with vigour and 16 CAV indirectly but effectively contained
the enemy bde in that area.

As a result of the fighting on 14 Sep, it became clear that Pak occupied a strong screen
position in the general area of Alhar railway station-Wazirwali-Kalewali covering the
approaches to Chawinda from the Libbe-Phillora area.
 48

After dark on 14 Sep, the enemy screen fell back into Chawinda and to the South of the
railway line. 43 Lorried Bde was ordered to occupy the abandoned screen position with
two battalions ex 99 Bde and establish a firm base in Alhar and Phillora areas.

During the days ops, 1 Armd Div had not been able to create a tactical pre- condition for
the attack by 43 Lorried Bde. The attack could not be launched as no reconnaissance had
been carried out and the bns could not muster more than two coys to launch the attack.
Sparrow cancelled the attack.

PART VII : SECOND BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

Disposition of Forces

1. On the night of 14/15 Sep, when Sparrow informed Dunn to allot the task of capturing
Chawinda to an inf div. By the morning of 15 Sep, Indian 1 Corps was deployed as under:-

(a) 1 Armd Div with under command :-

(i) 1 Armd Bde and 43 Lorried Bde. - Phillora area

(ii) 35 Inf Bde (14 Div) - Gadgor area.

(iii) 58 Inf Bde (14 Div) - Sabzpir area.

(iv) 99 Mtn Bde (6 Div) - Waziwali-Alhar area.

(b) 6 Mtn Div with under command 69 Mtn Bde at Pagowal-Maharajke area.

(c) 14 Inf Div with under command 116 Inf Bde at Nakhnal-Rangre area.

(d) 26 Inf Div-Suchetgarh-Bajragarhi area.

2. It was apparently quicker and easier to move 35 and 58 Bdes for the coming attack.
Both these bdes belonged to 14 Div and the natural choice for the Attack would have been
14 Div. The GOC, Maj Gen R K Ranjit Singh, was a recently promoted Armd Corps Offr
with a long association with 1 Armd Div. It was clear that as the forthcoming operation
would require close cooperation and co-ordination between 1 Armd Div and the attacking
inf div, it had a better chance of achievement between RK Ranjit Singh and Sparrow.

On the other hand, the attack on Chawinda was essentially an inf assault at night and
GOC 6 Mtn Div, Maj Gen SK Korla DSO, MC, the most highly war decorated general
officer in the Indian Army was a promising choice.

Outline Plan

4. Lt Gen Dunn held a conference at HQ 6 Mtn Div at Maharajke at 1000 hours on 15

Sep, attended by Sparrow and Korla among others, where he issued his orders for the
coming operation. His outline plan was as under:-
 49
(a) 6 Mtn Div (35, 58 & 99 Bdes) to capture Chawinda on night 16/17 Sep and
exploit towards pasrur and Dugri cross-roads.

(b) Before the above, 1 Armd Div to isolate the enemy garrison in Chawinda from
its forces in Badiana and Pasrur so that the enemy in Chawinda is denied
reinforcements when attacked.

(c) On the capture of Chawinda, 1 Armd Div to capture Badiana and secure it with
an inf bde, ex 6 Div under command of the Armd Div.

(d) 14 Div with a sqn, ex 1 Armd Div, to capture Zafarwal as soon as Badiana was
secured by the Armd Div.

(e) At the same time, 14 and 26 Divs were to conduct offensive ops to tie down
maximum enemy forces on their fronts, and also to confuse the enemy about the
actual thrust line of 1 Corps offensive.

Plan of GOC 6 Mtn Div

5. Korla gave his orders for the attack on Chawinda at about 1630 hours on 15 Sep. He
planned to attack Chawinda with two Bdes up, with the railway line as the inter bde
boundary, in two phases on night 16/17 Sep as under:-

(a) Phase 1. Simultaneous attack on Chawinda by 58 Bde on the left and 35 Bde
on the right.

(b) Phase 2. Mopping up of the built-up area by 35 Bde. Fundamental to the above
plan was that 1 Armd Div was to protect the right flank of the attack against armour
interference and to provide a secure base at Jassoran for Korlas attack.

Execution

6. It was already late for the Bde Cdrs to carry out reconnaissance of their objectives
during the remaining hours of day-light so Korla postponed the attack to night 17/18 Sep.
While the above plans were being finalized, 1 Armd Div and the enemy 6 Armd Div were
engaged in a tank to tank battle along the general line of the rail track from opposite
Badiana to the Wazirwali area throughout 15 Sep.

7. By 15 Sep Pak 1 Armd Div had deployed 4 Armd Bde in depth to cover this gap in
order to massacre attacking Indian tanks. Pakistan had three Patton regiments (10 Guides
Cavalry, 5 HORSE and 19 LANCERS) in the area and the fire support from 4 Pak Corps
Artillery Bde which had been reinforced by two regiments ex 1 Pak Armd Div.

8. B Sqn 17 HORSE with a company of 8 GARH secured Jassoran by about 0930

hours on 16 Sep. Using Jassoran as a secure base, 17 HORSE and 8 GARH formed up
for the advance to Butur Dograndi. Under heavy artillery fire C Sqn 17 HORSE forced its
way its way to Butur Dograndi after destroying a number of enemy tanks and RCL guns
while the Garhwalis become disorganized under enemy shelling after the death of their
CO.
 50
Some of the men however kept moving forward despite heavy artillery fire. The Pakistanis,
under pressure from our advancing tanks, vacated Butur Dograndi which was occupied by
about 30 men of the Garhwalis at about 1030 hours.

11. The enemy kept bombarding our troops in and around Butur Dograndi while the
tanks of both sides were heavily engaged. As 17 HORSE had suffered considerable tank
losses, Lt Col Tarapore moved his reserve squadron to Butur Dograndi.

By about 1500 hours, 17 HORSE was deployed in Butur Dograndi with a squadron in at
Jassoran. 8 GARH had by then about one Inf Coy in the village but the enemy was
increasing pressure against Butur Dograndi. Tarapore felt that he did not have adequate
troops to hold the village during the night against an enemy counter- attack and decided to
pull out of Butur Dograndi before dark. He withdrew the tanks and infantry to Jassoran by
about 1615 hours.

12. The Cdr, on learning about the vacation of Butur Dograndi, ordered an attack to
recapture the village. The attack was launched by 17 HORSE less squadron and 8 GARH.
The Pakistanis in Butur Dograndi were astonished to see the Indians coming back so
soon. The enemy had hardly firmed in and decided to vacate in under the vigour of the
assault. Lt Col AB Tarapore had led his regt into the thick of fighting during the battle of
Phillora. He was wounded but carried on commanding his regiment in battle with his arm in
a sling.

He moved with his regt to Butur Dograndi through the enemys killing ground twice under
intense artillery shelling and was killed while leading his troops. He was posthumously
awarded the Param Vir Chakra. On 16 Sep enemy tried to push his armr through the gap
Chawinda- Jassoran.

13. At first light of 16 Sep, 4 HORSE crossed the railway line to the right of 17 HORSE
with B Sqn. The advance was held up by enemy Pattons and RCL guns from the area of
Sodreke. The sqn was ordered not to proceed beyond the Chawinda-Badiana road. The
tank-to-tank fight continued with losses to both sides.

At about 0930 hours, Lt Col Bakshi deployed one more sqn to the right of B Sqn. This sqn
destroyed some enemy tanks and took up position astride the road. The fighting between
the opposing tanks continued with heavier losses to the Pakistanis.

About 1630 hours, 4 HORSE was ordered to send a sqn to reinforce 17 HORSE at
Jassoran as 17 HORSE was sparse in the area.

15. Lt Gen Iftikhar Rana, GOC Pak 4 Corps had ordered 15 Inf Divs to exert maximum
pressure on the Indian 1 Corps to weaken India push against Chawinda. On 16 Sep, Pak
attacked Kalarwanda with an Inf bn and a sqn of tanks. The first attack came at 1030
hours and was beaten back by our tank artillery fire. The last being at 1900 hours. All the
attacks were defeated with losses to the enemy.

16. On 17 Sep the PAF, tanks and enemy artillery kept on increasing pressure on our
troops South of the railway line. The Pak Air OP engaged targets behind the front line
throughout the day. Using the newly arrived 4 Armd Bde and fire support of nearly 100
guns including heavy guns, Pakistan increased pressure against Saodreke, Butur
Dograndi and Jassoran, so KK Singh decided to vacate these positions before dark.
 51
17. To overcome the shortage of inf, Pak had moved 6 FF and 20 BALUCH into
Chawinda. 1 Armd Bde fought alone against the Pakistanis on 16 and 17 Sep and then it
was the turn of 6 Mtn Div to do the same.

18. On 18 Sep Korla came to know that 1 Armd Bde had vacated Butur Dograndi and
Jassoran and Jassoran as the firm base for his div attack was no longer available to him.
He visited Sparrow to discuss the details of his plan.
After the meeting, sparrow instructed KK Singh to reoccupy Jassoran to which KK Singh
expressed inability to comply with the order to capture Jassoran on the plea that it was not
possible to do so at short notice. He undertook, however, to position tanks at Jassoran by
first light on 19 Sep to provide the required protection and support for 6 Mtn Div.

19. Korla ordered 35 Bde to capture Jassoran in a prelim op after last night 18 Sep and
before H-Hour of the Divisional attack. After preliminary artillery bombardment, Jassoran
was captured but the enemy in Chawinda area was alerted.

Surprise was lost and Pak artillery undertook a programmed bombardment of likely
concentration and assembly areas including the FUPs.

20. Korla had planned to attack Chawinda with 35 and 58 Inf Bdes up on either side of
the rail track which was to act as direction keeping aid at night. 35 Bde under Brig
Cariappa was to capture the cross-road and Post Office area in Chawinda by advancing
along the Southern side of the railway line. 58 Bde under Brig JS Mandher, was to attack
Chawinda keeping the railway track on the right.

On ni 18 Sep under cover of pre-H-hour artillery bombardment, both bdes formed up for
the assault of Chawinda. Elements of 6 MARATHA LI in 35 Bde and 4 JAK RIF in 58 Bde
managed to infiltrate the outskirts of Chawinda but both bdes lost cohesion and
disintegrated in the dark under enemy fire.

5 JAK RIF in 35 Bde failed to make progress while 14 RAJPUT of 58 Bde lost direction
under heavy artillery fire and ended in a fire fight with 5 JAT in Wazirwali area. Enemy
artillery kept on tormenting our troops with nonstop shelling which added to the
disorganization at various levels.

In the morning Pak tanks opened fire on the small parties which had succeeded in entering
the fringes of the town and winkled them out. The remnants of the assault battalions fell
back chased by artillery and MMG fire.

21. Chawinda had eluded capture despite the exertion of 1 Armd Div and 6 Mtn Div.
Dunn now cancelled the rest of the operations for the capture of Badiana and Pasrur. By
19 Sep, 1 Corps had occupied the general line Bajragarhi-Pagowal-Alhar-Phillora.

Reasons for Failure

22. As more than one division was involved in the plan of attack on Chawinda, it had
needed careful staff work, battle management, inter-formation liaison, higher control and
coordination at the level of the Corps.

Little thought appears to have been given to keeping the formations intact. When Sparrow
expressed his inability to tackle Chawinda, Dunn was forced to plan an attack under Korla
 52
with two bdes of 14 Div. This arrangement, for the most crucial attack, was only second
best and with obvious flaws.

D Day had to be postponed day after day. The valiant but costly attack by 4 and 17
HORSE in the Chawinda area on 16 Sep was mistimed. By the time Korla was ready to
launch a divisional attack, 1 Armd Bde had been battling alone for forty eight hours and
had been forced to vacate Jassoran and Butur Dograndi under enemy pressure.

The final proof of poor coordination and control, became obvious when 4 HORSE was
launched on its valiant, costly and unnecessary miniature charge of the Light Bde on 19
Sep.

23. With the failure of the attack on Chawinda, the operational situation in Sialkot Sector
started tilting in favour of Pakistan. Taking advantage of her interior lines, Pak had
strengthened her force in the Chawinda area with tanks artillery and infantry while 1 Indian
Corps kept on battling without any reinforcement except 52 Bde.

Progress of Ops

24. 1 Indian Corps ordered 26 Div to capture Tilakpur and Mahadipur. The D-Day was
the night of 16/17 Sep, the same as that for 6 Divs initial attack on Chawinda. 52 Bde
under Brig (later Lt. Gen.) RD Hira had been placed under 26 Div. That attack kept on
being postponed to coincide with the attack on Chawinda. 52 Bde finally carried out an
outflanking move against Tilakpur on night 18/19 Sep securing Milestone 8 on the Chaprar
road by 0300 hours on 19 Sep after severe fighting. The enemy reacted with heavy
shelling followed by armour-infantry pressure without success.

PART VIII : ROAD TO CEASEFIRE

International Reactions

17. China was showing a measured sympathy towards Pakistan. On 08 Sep China sent
a formal note to Indian accusing New Delhi of violating the Sikkim border on several
occasions during July and Aug of 1965, demanding halt to further provocation.

UN Secretary General, Mr. U. Thant, visited Rawalpindi on 09 Sep and Delhi on 12 Sep for
discussions with the Pakistani and Indian Governments to end the fighting. General
Chaudhuri, expecting a breakthrough at the Chawinda front, urged the Indian Government
to avoid a ceasefire at such a crucial stage of the war.

The Indian Government, however, indicated its willingness in principle during discussion
with Mr. U. Thant who wrote to Mr. Shastri and FM Ayub khan on 12 Sep urging
suspension of hostilities at 1830 hours on 14 Sep.

18. On 17 Sep, China sent another note to demand that the Indian Government
dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China- Sikkim
boundary within twenty four hours. On 19 Sep, Beijing extended the date of its ultimatum
by another three days.
 53
On 19 Sep Alexie Kosygin, Soviet Prime Minister, invited Mr Shastri and FM Ayub Khan to
confer on their problems with him on Russian soil.

On 20 Sep, the Security Council adopted its Third Resolution demanding a cease fire on
the morning of 22 Sep.

Ceasefire

19. Both India and Pakistan accepted a cease-fire effective from 0330 hours on 23 Sep
1965.

21. India had occupied the Hajipir Bulge and captured territory in Tithwal and Kargil in
J&K and strips of land in the Lahore and Sialkot areas. Pakistan had made gains in
Chhamb and Khem Karan.

India had captured about 720 square miles of Pak territory including about 150 square
miles in the Barmer area, while Pakistan held about 400 square miles of Indian territory.

Pakistan claimed possession additionally of a considerable strip of territory along the

periphery of the Rajasthan border. In a smart move, Pak Desert Rangers had secured a
number of posts along the border during the night of 22/23 Sep in a pre cease fire
offensive.

22. Pakistan had nearly reached the end of her tether. She had all her troops out front
and no reserves. In addition to 23 Mtn Div, India could muster considerable fresh troops
out of her larger strength as also the resources for continuing fighting.

23. On 22 Sep, the PAF was left with only a modest reserve to cater for the possibility of
war breaking out again.

Enforcement of Ceasefire

25. After the acceptance of the cease fire, a team of UN observers arrived in India and
Pakistan to help enforce it and to organize disengagement of troops.

Even though Pakistanis had intruded at a number of places along the Rajasthan border
after the cease fire, India decided not to use force to vacate these border intrusions.

India undertook to recapture OP Hill, in Mendhar Sector, in a costly attack on 02 Nov 1965.
2 DOGRA, 5 SIKH LI and 7 SIKH captured it suffering heavy casualties after a two day
struggle. Lt Col Sant Singh CO 5 SIKH LI was awarded MVC.

Similarly our troops had captured Pt 9013 and Bugina in the Kishanganga Bulge by 15 Oct
to improve our tactical posture in that sector.

26. In the middle of Nov 1965, Kosygin offered to mediate between Shastri and Ayub
Khan and finally the Indian and Pakistani delegates assembled at Tashkent on 03 Jan,
1966. Both sides were initially rigid and there was a deadlock on 08 January, but Kosygin
persisted in his mediating efforts.
 54

CHAPTER V: ADMINISTRATION AND LESSONS LEARNT

PART I : ADMINISTRATION

1. Self sufficiency. Due to indigenization, India had achieved a degree of self

sufficiency in its requirements of small arms, munitions, and other war like materials while
Pakistan had lagged behind in this field.

The choking of supplies of war material by the US and her Western Allies had made the
Indian and Pakistan High Command take note of their logistical capabilities for the
continuation of war.

2. Eqpts and Spares. The expansion of the Army from nearly 3 to 8 lakhs and the
simultaneous decision to phase in new equipment while phasing out old weapons,
equipments and vehicles made equipping units and stocking depots complicated.

The change over or introduction of new weapons and equipment had, of course, to be
spread over a long period during which spares for the old and new equipment had to be
available.

The IAF also faced similar problems. Some of the new equipment had to be procured by
developing indigenous sources while the rest came from abroad.

Production in the factories, controlled by the Directorate General of Factories (DOFF), was
geared up. A Heavy Vehicle Factory was set up at Avadi while Public Sector Undertakings
producing defence material were expanded.

3. Mil Aid. The US and her Western Allies had undertaken to give military aid to India
after the Sino- Indian war but this was limited and strictly restricted to the operational
requirements of mountain divisions facing the Chinese in the Himalayas. Tanks, anti-tank
guns, field guns, and fighter aircraft were not supplied under pressure from Pakistan.

4. Vintage Fleet. The Indian Army had been making do with World War II
weapons and equipment under the niggardly defence budget until 1962. The vehicle fleet
suffered not only severe shortages and lack of spares, but many vehicles were old and
unreliable.

The shortages were formidable even after nearly the whole production from Premier
Automobiles and Mahindra and Mahindra were bought.
 55
5. Maint Areas. By 1965, the territory of Punjab provided the support base for 11
Corps, while 15 Corps had its depots and administrative installations suitably located in the
J&K State with the railhead at Pathankot.

With the induction of 1 Corps into the Samba area, the existing administrative layout had
to meet its logistical requirements until a Corps Maintenance Area (CMA) could be
organised. It was decided to support 1 Corps from Pathankot with certain augmentations
to develop it as an Army Maintenance Area (AMA).

6. Vehs Res. The army had no forward holdings of reserve tanks to replace tank
casualties. 45 CAV, under raising at Babina, was moved to Delhi and at the last moment
converted into an Armoured Delivery Regt but without a kitting sqn. The result was that
tanks that were despatched with deficient fire control instruments and other accessories
could not quickly be made functional.

8. The handling of vehicle battle casualties posted a problem. After the battle of Asal
Uttar, the area was littered with over a hundred abandoned or knocked out Pakistani tanks
which the coy was not able to mov.

9. 1 Corps had no third line transport. Overall deficiency in 1 and 11 Corps was 900
vehicles. With the help of the civil authorities, a fleet of over four thousand civilian vehicles
as assembled in time for troops in 11 Corps to move to their battle locations from their
peacetime locations.

10. Battle Cas. From 06 Sep, battle casualties started coming quickly stretching
existing resources in the forward hospitals to the limit. Ward coaches provided for the
forward hospitals were found to be inadequate, so eventually ambulance trains were
stabled at Amritsar, Ferozepur and Pathankot for the continuous evacuation of casualties
to the rear hospitals.

The existing staff at the Military Hospitals, in spite of working for nearly 18 hours daily,
could not cope with the influx. Civilian doctors, surgeons and anaesthetists volunteered to
help, providing much needed relief. Between 06 Sep and 23 Sep, the Military Hospitals in
1 and 11 Corps handled 6100 battle casualties, and 6500 non-battle casualties.

12. Ration mgt. Dry rations posted no problem as Army HQ automatically sent special
train loads for additional requirements to the forward supply depots without demands.
Fresh supplies, on the other hand, were not available to new troops.

The local Punjabi population organised cooked food for the troops in their areas. The milk
shortage was met by milk powder from the Government Factory at Verka. Tinned
substitutes made up for lack of fresh rations. General Transport Companies functioned
without the relief driver increments. These were not sanctioned during the preparatory
stage of the war so the relief drivers did not reach until hostilities had nearly ended.

13. Mob. A serious weak spot in the administrative plans was the mobilisation. No
personnel, stores or vehicles had been earmarked for the Territorial Army (air defence or
infantry units) including ordnance and ASC units. This affected the op fitness of these
units, particularly in the early stages of war. Even routine turnover of units had not been
stopped so several units arrived in the Western Sector without essential equipment.
 56
14. Ord stores and Amn. Ordnance establishments bear a heavy burden in the
administrative support of the fighting machine. CODs had to work day and night,
replenishing the forward ordnance depots (FODs) and replacing equipment of the
formations, especially those entering the operational zone.

15. The availability of ammunition for actual fighting is a decisive factor in battle. As the
movement of ammunition from the rear depots involved very heavy tonnages, a number of
special trains were run during the day and at night from distant places like Pulgaon
(Madhya Pradesh) towards the depots in the Western theatre of war. As trains could run
only at night beyond Ambala, the railway network in the Punjab almost reached a breaking
point.

16. 1 FOD and 15 FAD (Forward Ammunition Depot) were well established to meet the
requirements of the Jammu Sector to support the operations of the troops in the Jammu,
Akhnur and Poonch areas.

17. 1 Corps had no suitably located FAD to meet their ammunition requirement. 15 FAD
in Jammu Sector or 17 FAD in 11 Corps Sector was too far away to provide satisfactory
ammunition backing. It was therefore decided to raise 18 FAD at a place suitable for 1
Corps.

The first instalment of the depot personnel and the military special ammunition trains for 18
FAD arrived on 6 Sep. In the absence of employed labour, the locals including students
from the local school helped to unload these ammunition trains. Later on, immediate
employment of 400 labourers was sanctioned. 150 combatant personnel of all ranks were
moved in hired civilian buses from Jullundhar to 18 FAD which started functioning by 12
Sep.

19. In war, artillery ammunition followed by fuel consumes maximum tonnages. During a
battle, guns move a number of times a day due to danger from counter-bombardment
(CB), or other operational reasons. Large quantities of ammunition were frequently
dumped at gun positions and on moving, the guns leave the ammunition behind to be
picked up later.

This compounds the problem of transport and gunner manpower is needed to service the
current gun positions and stocking the next gun positions. In a high intensity war, large
amounts of unexpended ammunition is thus left scattered over the battlefield while the
units keep on drawing ammunition from the Ordnance depots. Such a situation thus gives
an unrealistic impression of expenditure and state of holdings at higher HQs.

PART II : LESSONS LEARNT

Intelligence

1. The intelligence system first failed to give timely and adequate warning on the
induction plans and preparations regarding the Pak trained raiders into J & K.
 57
Next came the Pak counter- offensive in Chhamb which wrong-footed us. Reports of
enemy activity from our forward troops and other agencies provided strong indications of
enemy attack on Chhamb but the local higher commanders had disdainfully ignored the
evidence.

No intelligence agency reported the presence of 1 Pak Armd Div in such close proximity to
Kasur from where it could launch a counter-offensive in a matter of hours of our crossing
the international border.

Similarly the raising of 11 Pak Inf Div, and its deployment opposite Khem Karan, came as
complete surprise to us. Reports indicated the raising of 6 Pak Armd Div after Operation
Ablaze while our operational plans were being finalised. Accepting the existence of two
Pak armoured divisions would have meant changing the threat perceptions necessitating
procurement of tanks and anti-tank weapons.

During actual operations, little information of tactical utility was given by intelligence
agencies or air reconnaissance. After the ceasefire, the Army took up a case highlighting
intelligence inadequacies, but later considered it expedient to abandon it, in view of the
strong reaction from the civil intelligence agencies.

Unified Command Structure

2. World War II had shown the advantage of a centrally controlled, integrated and
unified command structure of the three services. That system led to a joint doctrine of war,
improved fighting effectiveness with clear lines of accountability, and integrated war
capabilities of the three Services under one commander.

A division of resources for any joint effort becomes of secondary consideration until his
own battle is won.

In the COSC system, each Chief functions independently in the spirit of competition rather
than co-operation and each Service works on its own doctrine of war. After the 1965 war,
the IAF modified its doctrine to give priority to close air support to the Army and Navy in
that order.

Civil Military Relationship

7. The civil-military relationship in India is based on the premise that the civil authority
is supreme and the military must work under its direction. The British have a large number
of military officers who function as a part and parcel of the MoD ensuring economy,
professional orientation, harmonious and speedy working.

In our case, the MoD staff comprises civilians, mainly Indian Administrative Service and
Finance Ministry representatives without military experience or expertise. Optimum and
economical employment of the Armed Forces demands specialization, expertise and
centralized command and control system.

Joint Ops

9. The chinks in the system became apparent when the Pak offensive threatened to
overwhelm our troops in Chhamb. The commander of the ground troops asked for
immediate close air support at about 1100 hours on 01 Sep. The first sortie of the IAF
 58
came over Chhamb around 1730 hours and aggravated the tactical situation of our ground
troops by hitting friend and foe indiscriminately.

On the commencement of the war, the IAF worked on its plan to win its Battle of Air
Superiority before diverting resources to support the ground operations. Even in the later
stages of the short war, pre-arranged air support was not provided even for the
deliberately planned battles of Chawinda, Khem Karan, Barki or Dograi.

The IAF claims to have undertaken a large number of air sorties to support ground
operations but the ground troops kept on complaining of the scarcity of IAF Aircraft.

Operation Preparedness

10. After Operation Ablaze, both India and Pakistan agreed to revert troops to peace
time locations. An attitude of complacency therefore prevailed in the Defence Services with
little thought for the immediacy of war. Leave was opened while postings and retirements
continued. Officers and NCOs were sent on training courses causing considerable
reduction in the strength in the units.

The turnover of units between peace and field areas unbalanced the units and formations.
The raising of units and headquarters lacked war-like urgency and went on at a leisurely
peacetime pace.

No urgency was given to collective training of formations to knit them with the affiliated
supporting arms for their specific operational tasks.

No training exercises were laid on to test the functional efficiency of the Army-Air
infrastructure for battle cooperation.

Concentration of Forces

11. General Chaudhuris top priority for offensive operations was the Samba-Chawinda
sector where he concentrated strong forces under 1 Corps. He had considered the
Amritsar-Lahore sector as the strategic core area where 11 Corps had a limited offensive
task. This Corps, operating with three div of two bdes each, had created a corps reserve of
a bde by withdrawing it from one of the div.

Chaudhuri chose to commit 11 Inf Div (two bdes) in the remote Barmer area held by a bde
of the Pakistanis. This div made little impact locally and even less at strategic level at
which a bde would have contained the Pakistanis adequately. All in all an additional bde in
11 Corps would have given it a stronger punch and better balance. Later on, 23 Mtn Div
was moved into Ludhiana area but played no role in operations.

Ability to Take Risks

13. A study of the operations in 1 Corps shows that the main thrust against the chosen
objectives was launched by a comparatively small force while a major portion of 1 Corps
was employed on other tasks for secondary offensives, flank protection and security of
rear areas.

Exploitation of Success
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14. Cdr 1 Armd Bde ordered the withdrawal of his bde, nearly to the border because he
misread the tactical situation and over-assessed the enemy strength in front of him on the
first day of 1 Corps offensive. The enemy situation continued to be progressively
favourable until Pakistan had achieved armr and artillery superiority around Chawinda by
the time of the cease-fire.

During the first week of 1 Corps offensive, while 1 Armd Div undertook its spurt of offensive
actions against Chawinda, the rest of the Corps remained more or less passive. A golden
opportunity was lost on the very first day through lack of enterprise, misjudgement and
excessive caution.

Reserves

15. Opposite 11 Corps, Pakistan had deployed not more than a battalion each on the
east of the Ichhogil Canal along the GT, Barki and Kasur axes. The enemy had no tanks in
front of the Ichhogil so 11 Corps had adequate superiority in armour, artillery and infantry
on the three chosen axes of its advance.

Before midday, 11 Corps troops had reached the Ichhogil at a number of points e.g.
Ranian, Bedian and opposite Kasur. It had a rare lucky break when 3 JAT crossed the
Ichhogil at Dograi opposite Lahore before midday but 15 Div failed to retain its bridgehead.
3 JAT was not reinforced but ordered to fall back much farther east than the east bank of
the canal. The decision was an inexcusable military blunder.

On the Kasur axis, 4 Div had advanced on a broad front with both bdes simultaneously
and reached the canal by midday without establishing a secure firm base. The enemy
struck back unexpectedly and by the morning of 07 Sep, 4 Div was forced to fall back in a
disorganised state.

11 Corps was forced on to the defensive on 07 Sep throughout its sector except in the
Barki area. It had not secured any position on the Ichhogil on the first day of its offensive
and was in fact under heavy pressure from the Pakistanis in Khem Karan, GT and Ranian
axes until the night of 10/11 Sep.

Lack of reserves at the divisional and corps level had deprived the commanders of any
offensive action to regain initiative until 11 Sep by which time two additional bdes and
armour had reinforced 11 Corps.

Speed and Momentum

16. An important ingredient of offensive operations, especially those of armoured

formations, is speed and persistent momentum of advance in defeating an enemy. A
valuable rule of advance is not to give up ground once captured. A surrender of captured
territory, even of ones own volition, affects the morale of advancing troops while raising
that of the enemy who invariably claims it as a victory.

17. In addition to the powerful element of surprise, Pakistan had contrived a local
superiority in the Chhamb sector. Similarly, they had an overwhelming superiority
particularly in armour and artillery, as well as the impact of surprise, against an imbalanced
and shaken division in the Khem Karan Sector.
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Pakistani generalship showed ineptitude by failing to calculate their available force to gain
a battle winning superiority in time and space against their chosen point of attack in the
Khem Karan Sector, resulting in their ignoble failure. Pakistan failed to launch a
coordinated armour-infantry assault using its powerful artillerys fire support to dislodge the
Asal Uttar defenders.

India had her golden opportunities on the first day of the offensives in 11 Crops along the
GT axis and at Phillora in 1 Corps. An enterprising cdr, using vigour and expedition, could
have tilted the scales of war immeasurably for his side by a daring exploitation of the
fleeting opportunity in front of him.

Coordination

18. In the final attack on Chawinda, practically every div in 1 Corps was involved which
required good stage management, firm command, control, and co-ordination at the Corps
level. The attack was to be launched by two bdes ex 14 Div under Maj Gen S.K. Korla,
GOC 6 Div. The GOC and the attacking bde cdrs were, until then, unfamiliar with each
other and the area of their objectives.

1 Armd Div, already operating in the area, was to continue to hold Jassoran as a firm base
for 6 Divs attack. 26 Div was to undertake offensive operations around Sialkot to keep the
troops in that area away from Chawinda.

Being a Corps level attack, the IAF should have been adequately integrated into to attack
plan to soften up the enemy defences, including enemy armour and gun positions, in
addition to providing close air support by day.

19. The last-minute grouping of the bdes ex 14 Div, under GOC 6 Div, had teething
troubles in mutual understanding, staff and team work. Korla discovered that the timings of
the attack as given by the Corps cdr and accepted by him were insufficient to prepare and
launch it. He sought postponements on a day-to-day basis with its fall-out impact on the
other formations involved in the attack.

Korla had to secure the firm base as a preliminary operation after dark, just before the
attack. This removed any chance of surprise in the direction and timing of the attack.
Enemy artillery greeted the assaulting troops with pre-arranged defensive fire (DF). The
IAF played no role in the battle. Dograi was brilliant and only success.

Recognition and Awards

20. Battle honours bestow an aura and pride of place for regts, and war gallantry awards
confer distinction, and a hero image on the recipient. A soldier in battle lives in an
atmosphere of universal fear and overcomes it, to a degree, by associating with war
veterans, inducements like gallantry awards and the fear of punishment, ignominy, and
social ostracism in the case of cowardice.

The gallantry award, in turn, induces a compulsive alter ego in the hero to act and
behave in battle as a worthy recipient of that award.

21. In 1965, all the div cdrs in 11 Corps were awarded the Mahavir Chakra (MVC). In 1
Corps, 1 Armd Div got the lions share of gallantry awards including MVCs, for the
divisional and armoured bde cdrs.
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Political Vs Military Objective

23. The political objective determines military objectives and continues to be the guiding
factor at peace talks. India recaptured OP Hill in Mendar area on 02 Nov 1965, and
cleared the Mirpur-Bugina Bulge in Tithwal Sector during Oct. The Indian delegation at
Tashkent led by Mr. Shastri, the Prime Minister, somehow accepted a status quo as on 05
Aug 1965, so that all the gains at Hajipir, Tithwal and Kargil in POK, won with heavy loss of
blood and sweat, were returned to Pakistan at the political level.

International Support

24. During the 1965 war, US froze supplies of armaments and munitions to both India
and Pakistan which hurt Pakistan more as it was dependent entirely on US for its
weaponry. The reluctance of US and China to come to the aid of Pakistan, during its dire
need in the 1971 war, forced Pakistan to face the real-politick of her situation. She saw the
futility of her dreams of military parity with India. On visit to India during Oct 1974,
Kissinger endorsed Indias pre-eminence in South Asia. By mid-seventies US had
recognised India as a regional power.