RISK ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID

OXYGEN RELEASES FROM FLAT

BOTTOM TANKS
EIGA Doc 927/17

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL GASES ASSOCIATION AISBL

AVENUE DES ARTS 3-5 B 1210 BRUSSELS

Tel: +32 2 217 70 98 Fax: +32 2 219 85 14
E-mail: info@eiga.eu Internet: www.eiga.eu
 Doc 927/17

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID

OXYGEN RELEASES FROM FLAT
BOTTOM TANKS

Prepared by WG-3 Atmospheric Gases Process and Equipment

Disclaimer
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EIGA 2017 - EIGA grants permission to reproduce this publication provided the Association is acknowledged as the source

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL GASES ASSOCIATION AISBL

Avenue des Arts 3-5 B 1210 Brussels Tel +32 2 217 70 98 Fax +32 2 219 85 14
E-mail: info@eiga.eu Internet: www.eiga.eu
EIGA DOC 927/17

Table of Contents
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Consensus on hazardous impact of oxygen on people indoors and outdoors ............................... 1
3 Consensus on hazardous impact of oxygen on vehicle occupants ................................................ 1
4 Published harm affect levels for oxygen ......................................................................................... 2
5 Alternative vulnerability equations used by EIGA members ........................................................... 2
5.1 Power law and/or polynomial equations ................................................................................... 2
5.2 Probit equations ........................................................................................................................ 6
6 Consensus on source terms for liquid oxygen releases from flat bottom tanks .............................. 9
7 Alternative approaches to risk assessment used by EIGA members ............................................. 9
7.1 Consequence based risk assessment ...................................................................................... 9
7.2 Semi-quantitative risk assessment ......................................................................................... 10
7.3 Quantitative societal risk assessment using power law and/or polynomial equations ........... 10
7.4 Quantitative societal risk assessment using probit equations ................................................ 10
8 Consensus on modelling LOX releases and dispersion PHAST and PHAST Risk ................... 12
8.1 Recommended assumptions and parameters for modelling .................................................. 12
8.2 Storage pressure and condition for modelling ........................................................................ 12
8.3 Concentrations of interest for modelling ................................................................................. 12
8.4 Averaging time for modelling .................................................................................................. 12
8.5 Catastrophic failure modelling ................................................................................................ 12
8.6 Pool evaporation modelling tank rupture ........................................................................... 13
8.7 Line break modelling............................................................................................................... 14
8.8 Weather atmospheric stability/wind speed ........................................................................ 15
8.9 Toxic parameters .................................................................................................................... 16
8.10 Height for concentration output persons and vehicles ................................................... 16
8.11 Indoor and outdoor toxic vulnerability ................................................................................. 16
9 Consensus on CFD ....................................................................................................................... 16
10 Consensus on risk reduction options ............................................................................................ 16
10.1 Spill containment ................................................................................................................. 16
10.2 Slopes and kerbing ............................................................................................................. 16
10.3 Use of insulating concrete ................................................................................................... 16
10.4 Foam glass tiles in the spill containment area .................................................................... 16
10.5 Water filled siphon traps ..................................................................................................... 17
10.6 Emergency shut-off valves .................................................................................................. 17
10.7 Automatic spill detection ..................................................................................................... 17
10.8 Vapour barriers ................................................................................................................... 17
10.9 Water sprays ....................................................................................................................... 17
11 References .................................................................................................................................... 17
Appendix 1 Typical ventilation rates for buildings ............................................................................ 19
Appendix 2 Pool evaporation results for LOX tank rupture based on GASP model equations.
Saturated liquid at 0.35 bar, 1.5 m/s wind speed, 182.9 deg C pool on concrete .............................. 20

Tables

Table 1Relationship between probit Y and percentage lethality PF .................................................... 7

Table 2Oxygen probit constants adopted by one EIGA member company ........................................ 7
Table 3Vehicle oxygen probit constant ............................................................................................... 8
Table 4Storage pressure and condition ............................................................................................ 12
Table 5Concentrations of interest ..................................................................................................... 12
Table 6Pool evaporation modelling tank rupture .......................................................................... 13
Table 7Line break modelling case 1 emergency shut off valve closes ........................................ 14
EIGA DOC 927/17

Table 8Line break modelling case 2 emergency shut off valve fails to close or break is upstream
.............................................................................................................................................................. 15
Table 9Alternative 10-minute release case ....................................................................................... 15
Table 10Release modelling case 3 to 10 mm hole ........................................................................... 15
Table 11Weather atmospheric stability/wind speed ..................................................................... 15
Table 12Toxic parameters ................................................................................................................. 16
Table 13Height for concentration output persons and vehicles ................................................... 16
Table 14Indoor and outdoor toxic vulnerability ................................................................................. 16

Figures

Figure 1Prediction of probability of fatality given ignition during an O 2 enriched atmosphere ............ 3
Figure 2Percentage of people becoming fatalities in an O2 enriched oxygen atmosphere (indoors,
outdoors and roadway population ........................................................................................................... 5
Figure 3BEVI step function .................................................................................................................. 5
Figure 4BEVI step function compared with section 5.1.1 power law equation ................................... 6
Figure 5Probability of fatality PF versus concentration of oxygen in air for different exposure
durations compared with the relationship given in Reference [4] ........................................................... 8
Figure 6Probit equation approximation for vehicle occupants ............................................................ 9
Figure 7Changes in the General Tab of the Oxygen Material Data in PHAST Risk/SAFETI ........... 11
Figure 8Changes in the Toxic Tab of the Oxygen Material Data in PHAST Risk/SAFETI ............... 11
Figure 9PHAST catastrophic failure model ....................................................................................... 13
Figure 10PHAST continuous release model ..................................................................................... 14
EIGA DOC 927/17

1 Introduction

This publication has been developed to document the current knowledge and the different work
practices amongst EIGA members on risk assessment methods for liquid oxygen (LOX) releases from
flat bottom tanks (FBTs); this publication is intended to be used in risk assessment work by EIGA
members, when evaluating the tolerability of risk within the company or to meet regulatory requirements.

Consensus was reached in many areas and is indicated in the section titles. For the areas where EIGA
members take different approaches (vulnerability equations (see Section 5)) and risk assessment
approaches (see Section 7), the different approaches have been summarised.

Risk assessment is a complex subject and requires the application of technical judgement. It is the
intention that this publication be used by qualified personnel. Qualified personnel are those who have
sufficient training and experience in hazard identification and risk assessment methods.

2 Consensus on hazardous impact of oxygen on people indoors and outdoors

Additional oxygen in the atmosphere (above the approximately 21% oxygen normally present) increases
the likelihood of ignition and the rate of combustion. If oxygen is released into the atmosphere, and a
source of ignition is present nearby, ordinary combustible materials can ignite unexpectedly and burn
rapidly. An oxygen release into the atmosphere may not be detected - cryogenic vapour is visible as a
fog, but warm oxygen vapour is not detectable. On the other hand, if a source of ignition is not present,
an oxygen vapour cloud can pass by unnoticed with no harmful effects.

Sources of ignition which are close to the person (for example, a lighted cigarette, sparks from mobile
phone electronic circuits, etc.) can start a fire on a persons clothing that has been saturated with oxygen
vapour. For a person, an enriched oxygen concentration, for example, at 25% total oxygen, burn injuries
are possible. As the oxygen concentration increases, the severity of burn injuries after ignition increases,
and the chances of survival decrease.

When an oxygen-enriched cloud envelops a building, the personnel indoors have some degree of
protection. For some period of time, the oxygen concentration indoors will be lower than that outdoors.
The oxygen has to permeate inside via door or window openings, or via the ventilation or air conditioning
system intakes. However, for long duration oxygen releases, the concentration indoors will approach
the outdoor concentration.

If ignited in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere, interior furniture and furnishings can burn, trapping
occupants.

Potential ignition sources indoors include lighted cigarettes, electrical equipment, kitchen appliances
and heating units.

Buildings which should be considered in risk assessments of oxygen releases include residential
housing, industrial and commercial premises, (both temporary and permanent buildings/structures that
are occupied), public buildings, hospitals, hotels, restaurants and shopping malls.

For people outdoors, the sources of ignition are considered to be fewer than indoors, examples are
lighted cigarettes, mobile phone electronic circuits, music players and other portable electronic or
electrical devices.

Outdoor populated areas to be considered in risk assessments include public streets, squares, sports
grounds, parks.

3 Consensus on hazardous impact of oxygen on vehicle occupants

For vehicles, a running engine could provide both the source of ignition and the fuel for the enhanced
fire. Vehicles driving into enriched oxygen clouds are more likely to catch fire, causing a traffic jam and
possibly more vehicle fires. The fog created by the cold oxygen vapour could also cause vehicle crashes

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and result in traffic jams. An oxygen release occurring during peak traffic conditions (rush hour) on busy
highways could impact large numbers of vehicles.

4 Published harm affect levels for oxygen

The following harm effect levels have been published:

23.5 % U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defines oxygen-
enriched mixtures or atmospheres as those containing more than 23.5% oxygen by volume.
23.5% is the typical alarm setting for atmospheric monitoring prior to confined space entry. [1,
2].

25 % 25% total oxygen concentration is the oxygen concentration below which no irreversible
harm is anticipated to members of the general public from a LOX spill [3]. Also it is the SEI
threshold of irreversible effects value used by French regulatory authorities.

30% This is the dangerous dose level for oxygen [3]. Lethality probability = 1% for
concentrations of oxygen in air between 30 and 40% volume [4].

35% This is the dangerous dose level for oxygen [5]. This report justifies raising the
dangerous dose level from that stated previously [3].

37% This is the SEL threshold of the first lethal effects value used by French regulatory
authorities.

40% This is the value for 90% probability of fatal or serious injury, given ignition of oxygen
saturated clothing, based on burning rate of material and reaction time of victim [5]. A lethality
probability = 10% for concentrations of oxygen in air greater than 40% volume [4].

42% This is the SELS threshold of the significant lethal effects value used by French
regulatory authorities.

See also a summary of harm affects [6].

5 Alternative vulnerability equations used by EIGA members

Vulnerability equations are equations which relate the vulnerability (or probability of fatality) to the
concentration of a hazardous gas or vapour in the atmosphere. With some vulnerability equations, such
as probit equations, the exposure duration is also taken into account, so that the vulnerability is related
to the dose of a hazardous gas received by a receptor.

5.1 Power law and/or polynomial equations

A best fit equation can be applied to the values of probability of fatality against total oxygen concentration
given in the table [5]. The British Compressed Gas Association (BCGA) data points are shown in
Figure 1.

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Probability of Fatality when 0.1

Ignited

0.01

0.001
20 25 30 35 40 45
Total O2

Figure 1Prediction of probability of fatality given ignition during an O2 enriched atmosphere

This power law equation which fits these data points is:

V = 1.74534E-6 * Pign * (1.38731)X (5.1)

Where:

Pign = Fractional probability of an ignition source being present close to a person

X = Peak total oxygen concentration expressed as a percentage (i.e. 30 rather than 0.3)

V = Fractional vulnerability (probability of fatality) given ignition.

Values of Pign can be selected based on judgement of the number of ignition sources present in different
environments.

5.1.1 Outdoor vulnerability

If a generic 10% of people who are outdoors are assumed to be close to an ignition source, Pign
becomes 0.1 and the equation becomes:

V = 1.74534E-7 * (1.38731)X (5.2)

It can be assumed that this equation applies only when the peak total oxygen concentration outdoors is
between 25% and 40.5%. For concentrations greater than 40.5%, it should be assumed that the
vulnerability is 1 if an ignition source is present, meaning that the maximum number of people who can
become fatalities is 10% of the population outdoors. For peak concentrations below 25%, the
vulnerability is assumed to be negligible.

5.1.2 Indoor vulnerability

If a generic 20% of people indoors are assumed to have an ignition source, between 25% and
approximately 40.5% total oxygen concentration indoors, the fraction of people who can become
fatalities is estimated from the following equation:

V = 3.49067E-7 * (1.38731)X (5.3)

Where:

X = Peak total oxygen concentration indoors expressed as a percentage

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EIGA DOC 927/17

V = Predicted fraction of occupants who become fatalities.

For peak concentrations greater than 40.5%, it is assumed that the vulnerability is 1 if an ignition source
is present, meaning that the maximum number of people who can become fatalities is 20% of the
population indoors. For peak concentrations below 25%, the vulnerability is assumed to be negligible.

For any indoor location, the maximum indoor concentration X i of a hazardous cloud can be calculated
using equation 5.4 (assuming perfect mixing of the oxygen with air).

[Xi/Xo] = [1-(e- *tp)] (5.4)

Where:

Xo = Outdoor concentration (for example from Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool (PHAST)
output)

= Ventilation rate in air changes per hour

tp = Cloud pass time

Concentrations in the equation are excess values, and the equation is taken from Reference [8]. Typical
building ventilation rates are given in Appendix 1. Cloud pass times can be obtained by analysing the
appropriate dispersion program output in dynamic mode.

It should be noted that equation 5.4 is only true while the passing cloud persists outside the building.
When the cloud has passed, the hazard persists as the concentration reached inside building will only
be reduced if fresh air ventilation exists. This phenomenon is called the tail time. The rate of reduction
is a function of the fresh air ventilation rate.

5.1.3 Vehicle occupant vulnerability

A vehicles engine, when turned on, could provide an ignition source and a supply of fuel. Therefore,
the probability of a person having an ignition source nearby while in a vehicle on the roadway could be
considered to be higher than for an average person outdoors or indoors.

A value of 2.6 fatalities per 1000 vehicle fires in normal air (21% oxygen) has been reported [9].

An oxygen enhancement factor to account for increase in fatalities per fire in oxygen-enriched
atmospheres, based on the square of the ratio of the burning velocity of fabric in oxygen relative to that
in air, could be applied to the fatality fraction.

The model can be adapted to allow for people escaping from vehicles who could have sources of ignition
close by (for example, use of mobile phones, attempts at rescue, etc.), and the model combines the
vehicle fatalities and the escapee fatalities:

V = [5e-5 * X3] [0.0034 * X2]+ [0.0753 * X] 0.5447 (5.5)

This model predicts that at approximately 49.5% peak total oxygen concentration outdoors, all
occupants of vehicles become fatalities. For peak concentrations above 49.5%, it should be assumed
that the vulnerability is 1, meaning that 100% of the vehicle occupants would become fatalities. Below
25% peak total oxygen concentration, no fatalities are predicted.

Equations 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 are shown in Figure 2.

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EIGA DOC 927/17

Oxygen Vulnerability Models

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Vulnerability

0.6
0.5 Indoor
0.4 Outdoor
0.3
Vehicle
0.2
0.1
0
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Total Oxygen Concentration (%)

Figure 2Percentage of people becoming fatalities in an O2 enriched oxygen atmosphere (indoors,

outdoors and roadway population

5.1.4 BEVI step function

For oxygen enrichment, the calculation can be based upon the TNO approach and that the probability
of dying is 0.1 for 40% oxygen or more (10 minutes exposure) and 0.01 for 30% oxygen (10 minutes
exposure) and 0 for concentrations of oxygen in air between 20 and 30% volume [4]. The relationship
is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3BEVI step function

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EIGA DOC 927/17

The (BEVI) step function is in relatively good agreement with the outdoor vulnerability power law
equation, with ignition probability = 0.1, as described in 5.1.1 and as shown in Figure 4.

0.12

0.10

probability of fatality 0.08

EQUATION 2
OUTDOOR
VULNERABILITY
0.06

BEVI STEP
FUNCTION
0.04

0.02

0.00
0 20 40 60 80 100
% TOTAL OXYGEN

Figure 4BEVI step function compared with section 5.1.1 power law equation

5.2 Probit equations

For toxic gases and for radiation from fires the probability of fatality PF for the population in the local
environment resulting from events is usually calculated using probit functions which give a relationship
between PF, and the concentration or radiation intensity, and the duration of exposure.

For toxic releases the probability of fatality PF results from the toxic dose due to exposure to a cloud of
released toxic material. PF depends on the toxicity and concentration of the substance and the exposure
duration. It can be calculated using the following equation:

Y 5
PF 0.5 1 erf (5.6)
2

The probit function Y for death due to toxic exposure is given by:

Y A B ln C n t (5.7)

In this equation, the dimensionless constants A, B and n describe the toxicity of the substance. C is the
concentration in ppm and t the exposure duration in minutes. The values for the constants A, B and n
can be directly inserted in the material properties of Phast Risk/SAFETI. The relationship in equation
5.6 is given numerically in Table 1.

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EIGA DOC 927/17

Table 1Relationship between probit Y and percentage lethality PF

Table 1 shows that 1% lethality is equivalent to a probit of 2.67, 50% lethality is equivalent to a probit of
5.00 and 99.9% lethality is equivalent to a probit of 8.09.

Whilst oxygen is not a toxic material, probit equations have been used for estimating probability of
fatality for persons in an oxygen enriched atmosphere. However, in this case the assumption made is
that probability of fatality is a function of both the excess oxygen concentration in ppm [C] and the
exposure time [t] in minute, and not just the peak oxygen concentration [X] as in the equations in Section
5.1.

In this assumption, the probability of ignition and the oxygen concentration at a location can both be
thought of as varying with time; probability of ignition can increase with time since a smoker is more
likely to light a cigarette as time passes, so a probit equation may be considered a valid approach.

5.2.1 Probit equation adopted by one EIGA member company

A single probit equation is used by one EIGA member company to reflect the lethality of exposure to an
oxygen enriched atmosphere in quantitative risk assessment (QRA) calculations performed with the
commercial software Phast Risk/SAFETI from (DNV-GL). Table 2 lists the constants for this probit
equation.

Table 2Oxygen probit constants adopted by one EIGA member company

A B N
5.84 0.62 1

The basis of the probit is the BEVI step function described in 5.1.4 and the matching of the probit results
to the step function is shown in Figure 4.

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EIGA DOC 927/17

0.5

0.4

Probability of Fatality
0.3
t = 30 min
0.2 t = 10 min
Ref. 4 relation
0.1

0.0
20 40 60 80 100
Total Concentration of Oxygen in Air [Vol%]

Figure 5Probability of fatality PF versus concentration of oxygen in air for different exposure
durations compared with the relationship given in Reference [4]

Figure 5 shows the relation given in Reference [4] which is related to a given exposure duration t = 10
min. The results show that using this approach with the probit parameters presented previously, the
relation given in Reference [4] roughly matches the results for an exposure duration of t = 10 min.

A 10-minute exposure time is a reasonable assumption since pool evaporation from catastrophic
release from an un-banded, typical large LOX FBT (1500 tonnes capacity) onto concrete would last for
about this time and for a large liquid line break case where an emergency shut off valve would be
expected to be closed within this period. However, it should be noted that bunded pool evaporation from
a catastrophic FBT failure would last for a longer time, whilst giving a smaller vapour cloud, and releases
from un-isolated line breaks would also last for longer periods.

It is expected that the probit equation will predict more fatalities compared with the BEVI step function
for a catastrophic release from an un-bunded, typical large LOX FBT (1500 tonnes capacity) onto
concrete modelled in PHAST.

5.2.2 Separate probit equation for people in vehicles

The probit described in 5.2.1 is suitable for use for predicting fatalities amongst indoor and outdoor
populations. For indoor populations, the building ventilation rates and tail times are input in PHAST Risk
to allow the program to predict the indoor oxygen concentrations and hence the number of indoor
fatalities. However, where significant road traffic exists in the vicinity of the LOX FBT a different probit
might be applied to reflect the higher probability of fatality in the vehicles. A probit has been developed
which approximately matches the polynomial vulnerability equation 5.5 for vehicle occupants described
in Section 5.1.3 for 10 minutes exposure and this can be used for these road traffic populations.

The probit equation for 10 minutes exposure, has the constants in Table 3.

Table 3Vehicle oxygen probit constant

A B N
48.390 3.588 1

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EIGA DOC 927/17

A comparison of the probit equation with equation 5.5 (see 5.1.3) is shown in Figure 6:

1.2
Probit equation
A= -48.390, B= 3.588 n=1
1

0.8
probability of fatality

0.6
POLYNOMIAL
EQUATION
0.4
PROBIT EQUATION 10
min exposure

0.2

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
total oxygen percent

Figure 6Probit equation approximation for vehicle occupants

6 Consensus on source terms for liquid oxygen releases from flat bottom tanks

Instantaneous release of the full vessel contents, representative of a catastrophic failure. Two release
cases an instantaneous release and a release of the vessel contents in 10 minutes in a continuous
and constant stream [10]]. Catastrophic tank failure scenarios are extremely unlikely and, therefore, not
mandatory scenarios to assess, but are included for completeness as some local authorities can require
their consideration.

Largest liquid line break, (lines connected to the bottom of the inner tank), producing a continuous
release, representative of a significant loss of containment from a crack in the jacket releasing liquid
from the annulus or an external pipe/valve breakage or failure of equipment connected to tank piping.
A 10 mm hole, representative of a smaller opening in the jacket, releasing liquid from a minor loss of
containment in the inner vessel, or from the piping in the annulus, or from external pipe, or flange leak,
or an instrument line break.

Other release cases such as tanker filling hose failure or failure of piping downstream of a LOX back up
vaporiser due to embrittlement are not considered as part of the LOX FBT since they may be located
some distance away from the tank. The need for risk assessment for these cases should be considered
by the QRA analyst.

7 Alternative approaches to risk assessment used by EIGA members

7.1 Consequence based risk assessment

In this approach a consequence analysis program such as DNV PHAST is used to generate maximum
concentration isopleth shapes and effects zones for a defined release case (FBT rupture and/or liquid
line break), worse case weather condition (atmospheric stability and wind speed), averaging time, height
for concentration output and selected harm effect level (see Section 4). This isopleth profile is then
superimposed on a scaled map or photograph and rotated through 360 degrees. The maximum number

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of people within the isopleth shape in any of the directions is estimated and this is compared with
tolerability criteria for impacted population established by the company, to determine if the consequence
is tolerable. This consequence based approach can be used to determine which LOX FBT sites are in
the higher hazard category requiring an internal company QRA where this is company policy.
Furthermore, the national competent authorities require that the operating company submit an estimate
of the frequency of the release cases with the isopleths for regulatory review. Depending on the results
of the review, measures could be required to reduce the likelihood of the release cases, or to mitigate
the consequences.

7.2 Semi-quantitative risk assessment

This approach is similar to that described in 7.1, but typically three harm effect levels (see Section 4)
are selected and the isopleths for each are superimposed on the map or photograph and the population
in each harm effect zone is estimated. Based on which range the number of people impacted fits into
(for example greater than 1000, 100 to 1000, 10 to 100, 1 to 10, less than 1) and the harm effect zone,
a matrix is used to classify the release case in terms of severity (for example catastrophic, major,
serious, significant, and minor). Another matrix is used to compare the severity rating with the estimated
frequency of the release. This second matrix is used to determine if the risk is tolerable, whether risk
reduction measures are needed or whether the risk is intolerable. In France, the matrices referred to
have been determined by the regulatory authority.

7.3 Quantitative societal risk assessment using power law and/or polynomial equations

A consequence analysis program such as DNV PHAST is used to generate dispersion isopleths out to
25% total oxygen concentration (5.1% oxygen greater than that in the air) which are superimposed on
a suitably scaled map or photograph of the area around the tank and rotated through 360 degrees to
help identify buildings, places of public assembly and busy roadways which might be covered by the
isopleths. Once the populations within the isopleth radius have been identified, the dispersion model is
used to predict the peak oxygen concentration at each population area. For indoor populations,
knowledge or judgement of building ventilation rates and the duration of presence of the oxygen cloud
is used to estimate the peak indoor oxygen concentration.

The appropriate vulnerability equations (see 5.1) are used to predict the number of fatalities at each
population area.

Prediction of the frequency of fatalities in each populated area takes into account the estimated
frequency of the release case, the probabilities of atmospheric stability and wind speed and wind
direction towards the populated area and the probability of presence of people in the area.

The frequency of fatality and number of fatalities for each location (f, N pairs) are then accumulated to
produce a societal risk FN graph in which the cumulative frequency F of events causing N or more
fatalities is plotted against N.

The FN graph is used to judge the tolerability of the risk to people in the impacted areas against
corporate risk elevation criteria, or national/regional risk guidelines and this comparison will aid the
decision on acceptability of the LOX tank location.

7.4 Quantitative societal risk assessment using probit equations

Societal risk is usually presented in FN-curves, which show the cumulative frequency of all system-
related hazardous events that result in N or more fatalities. FN-curves are usually plotted with
logarithmic axes. The FN-curve is used to determine whether the risk of a given establishment is
considered to be tolerable or not.

The commercial software Phast Risk/SAFETI from DNV-GL is widely used to determine the
consequences of relevant hazardous events and generate the FN-curve by calculating the societal risk
using a QRA approach.

The relevant loss of containment scenarios for LOX flat bottom tanks which are included in the QRA are
those listed in Section 6.

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To reflect the lethal effects of oxygen enriched air, the material properties of oxygen have to be altered
as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

Figure 7Changes in the General Tab of the Oxygen Material Data in PHAST Risk/SAFETI

Figure 8Changes in the Toxic Tab of the Oxygen Material Data in PHAST Risk/SAFETI

The same probit relationship of probability of fatality and oxygen concentration in air is used for
modelling the risk to both indoor and outdoor populations. However, different concentrations of oxygen
are calculated inside occupied buildings compared to outdoor locations by the dispersion models in
PHAST Risk/SAFETI, for the same release from an outdoor flat bottom tank. The indoor concentration
is influenced by the values selected for the parameters Building Exchange Rate or Tail Time in the
PHAST Risk/SAFETI software.

An effective probit relationship cannot be worked out for oxygen. However, the probit equation approach
described in this publication provides an approximate method for estimating societal risk for LOX
releases, which is generally conservative and particularly so for release durations greater than 10
minutes [4].

For those EIGA members who use QRA to produce societal risk FN graphs to evaluate the tolerability
of risk to the company, it is proposed that the indoor/outdoor probit described in 5.2.1 can be used. This
probit is considered to be generally conservative. However, if there is significant traffic in the vicinity and
therefore a focus on risk to people inside vehicles, it is proposed that the vehicle probit described in
5.2.2 can be used in addition. The PHAST Risk/SAFETI probit coefficients in Figure 8 do not exactly
match those in Table 2 due to a minor difference between PHAST Risk/SAFETI and traditional probit
equation formats. Also, note that the vulnerability probit equations for oxygen exposure are related to
total oxygen concentration. Most software models require use of "excess" oxygen thresholds to account
for the 21% concentration of oxygen normally in air (see Table 5).

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8 Consensus on modelling LOX releases and dispersion PHAST and PHAST Risk

8.1 Recommended assumptions and parameters for modelling

8.1.1 Discharge parameters

For discharge parameters the PHAST defaults are used.

8.1.2 Dispersion parameters

For dispersion parameters the PHAST defaults are used.

8.1.3 General parameters

For the general parameters, the PHAST defaults are used, except for the "height for concentration
output" general parameter that should be adjusted in accordance with Table 8.10 for the denser-than-
air oxygen cloud.

8.2 Storage pressure and condition for modelling

Table 4Storage pressure and condition

Process Condition Saturated liquid

Tank failure due to Pressure at or above tank pressure relief operating pressure
overpressure
Line break or other failure Normal operating pressure
during normal operation

8.3 Concentrations of interest for modelling

Table 5Concentrations of interest

Parameter Total oxygen concentration Excess oxygen concentration for

PHAST input
Primary 25% 5.12%
Concentration
of interest
Other 30% 11.45%
Other 35% 17.77%
Other 40% 24.1%
Others See Section 4

8.4 Averaging time for modelling

In PHAST or PHAST risk the averaging time (in the location tab) for the release cases to be modelled
shall always be set to the same value as the core averaging time (in the dispersion parameters, far field
tab), as recommended by DNV GL. For PHAST risk modelling using a probit equation for oxygen, an
averaging time of 600 seconds is proposed.

8.5 Catastrophic failure modelling

The PHAST catastrophic failure or instant model, models the release as an expanding gas with liquid
aerosol travelling at an upward angle. Rainout/pool formation occurs if non-vaporized aerosol hits the
ground as shown in Figure 9.

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Figure 9PHAST catastrophic failure model

This model predicts significantly lower rainout than the continuous model used for line breaks due
to assuming much smaller droplets sizes, higher release velocities and upward trajectory which causes
higher droplet evaporation. The instant model is not validated against data, and may severely under-
predict rainout. DNV agrees that there is a problem with the instant release model and that the
approach of running a 1 second continuous release in PHAST (versions 6.7 and earlier) is a good
approach to predict liquid rainout fraction from tank rupture (the rainout fraction is read from the pool
vaporisation report).

8.6 Pool evaporation modelling tank rupture

It is recognised that the current pool vaporization model needs improvement. The PHAST model
incorrectly predicts that the pool expands to maximum and then shrinks to nothing resulting in lower
vaporization rates at later stages and longer overall pool durations.

Because of these shortcomings for tank rupture, an alternative pool evaporation model should be
considered which is relevant for cryogenic pool evaporation following a tank rupture.

Reference [7], Appendix A compares two models, GASP AND SOURCE5. It is suggested that more
accurate dispersion results can be obtained from use of one of these models, or another relevant expert
reviewed model, together with the correct rainout fraction (see 8.5). Release rate, duration, temperature
and pool radius output data from the selected pool evaporation model can be imported into PHAST as
user defined source data. See Appendix 2 for evaporation data derived from GASP equations.

Table 6Pool evaporation modelling tank rupture

Model User defined source

Evaporation From GASP, SOURCE5 or other relevant expert
rate reviewed evaporation model
Duration
Temperature
Pool radius
Direction Vertical

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8.7 Line break modelling

PHAST models a horizontal line break as a continuous release with entrained liquid aerosol as shown
in Figure 10. Rainout/pool formation occurs if non-vaporized aerosol hits the ground. The continuous
model in PHAST does a reasonable job of predicting rainout based on available data (Desert Tortoise
Ammonia) and so is considered satisfactory for line break modeling.

Figure 10PHAST continuous release model

8.7.1 Line break modelling case 1 emergency shut off valve closes

Table 7Line break modelling case 1 emergency shut off valve closes

Case Line rupture

Pipe length In the range 5m to 15 m, typically 10 m
Internal diameter Largest liquid line connected to the bottom of the
inner tank
Pipe roughness 0.0457 (default from PHAST)
Release elevation 1m
Release direction Horizontal
Time varying release duration
Attended site push button activation of the 10 minutes
valve
Unattended site, remote site activation of 30 minutes
valve
Automatic spill detection activates valve 1 - 2 minutes

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8.7.2 Line break modelling case 2 emergency shut off valve fails to close or break is upstream

Table 8Line break modelling case 2 emergency shut off valve fails to close or break is up-
stream

Case Line rupture

Pipe length In the range 5 m to 15 m, typically 10m
Internal diameter Largest liquid line
Pipe roughness 0.0457 (default from PHAST)
Release elevation 1 metre
Release direction Horizontal
Time varying release duration 60 minutes

8.7.3 Alternative 10 minute release case

Table 9Alternative 10-minute release case

Case Fixed duration

Duration 10 minutes
Tank head As appropriate for tank dimensions and elevation
Release elevation 1m
Release direction horizontal

8.7.4 Release modelling case 3 to 10 mm hole

Table 10Release modelling case 3 to 10 mm hole

Case Leak
Pipe length 10 m
Internal diameter 10 mm
Pipe roughness 0.0457 mm
Time varying release duration 60 minutes
Multiple rates 10
Release elevation 1m
Release direction horizontal

8.8 Weather atmospheric stability/wind speed

Table 11Weather atmospheric stability/wind speed

Weather 1 F1.5 m/s or F 2 m/s

Weather 2 D/5 m/s
Weather 3 (optional) D/9 m/s
Weather parameters PHAST Defaults

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8.9 Toxic parameters

Table 12Toxic parameters

Building exchange rate 4 air changes per hour

Tail time 30 minutes
Toxics tab PHAST Defaults

8.10 Height for concentration output persons and vehicles

Table 13Height for concentration output persons and vehicles

People indoors 0.9 m or 1 m Representative of cigarette of portable electrical

or electronic device held a waist height
People outdoors 0.9 m or 1 m
Vehicles 0.9 m or 1 m Representative of car engine air intake

8.11 Indoor and outdoor toxic vulnerability

Table 14Indoor and outdoor toxic vulnerability

Outdoor vulnerability 1
Indoor vulnerability 1

9 Consensus on CFD

PHAST has limitations because it does not take into account plant structures, topography, etc., and also
has limitations in modelling dispersion at low wind speeds. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
software can overcome these problems; in recent times CFD has become more user friendly and has
been used by EIGA member companies for modelling dispersion from LOX releases.

10 Consensus on risk reduction options

10.1 Spill containment

Bunds (also known as dikes) or pits can be used to contain an accidental spillage of LOX from a storage
tank or associated piping or equipment. The intention is to prevent the LOX pool spreading over a large
surface area and reaching occupied buildings or vulnerable equipment. By reducing the surface area in
contact with the LOX, heat transfer from the ground is reduced and hence the evaporation rate and the
size of the oxygen vapour cloud are reduced. In this way, the consequence to offsite populations and
onsite personnel from the spill can be reduced.

10.2 Slopes and kerbing

The purpose of slopes and kerbing is to direct LOX spills away from occupied buildings or vulnerable
equipment and into a spill containment pit or evaporation area.

10.3 Use of insulating concrete

Insulating concrete has lower heat transfer properties compared to the typical industrial concrete used
for yard areas, and can be used in spill containment and diversion areas to reduce the pool evaporation
rate further.

10.4 Foam glass tiles in the spill containment area

In the event of a LOX spill into the pit, these tiles would float on top of the liquid and reduce the
evaporation rate further.

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10.5 Water filled siphon traps

It is important to prevent a LOX spill onsite spreading offsite through site drainage systems which are
connected to sewers or drainage systems located outside the plant site. These water-filled siphon traps
are designed to contain a layer of water which freezes on contact with the cryogenic liquid and prevents
further flow into the drainage system. In areas with dry climates the water level will need to be checked
and topped up periodically to maintain the integrity of the water seal.

10.6 Emergency shut-off valves

Large diameter liquid withdrawal piping which connects to the LOX FBT vessel at positions below the
maximum liquid level are fitted with emergency shut-off valves to reduce the quantity of liquid spilled in
the event of piping leakage or failure, or equipment failure downstream of the valve. The valve is
normally closed by the remote manual operation of a push button located in the control room and/or at
other suitable locations on the site.

10.7 Automatic spill detection

Where the plant is partially unattended (for example at night time or weekends) and there are no
personnel on site to operate the push button which closes the emergency shut-off valve(s), automatic
detection of a LOX spill can be installed to give an alarm at the continually attended remote operating
centre and shut the emergency shut-off valve(s). Low temperature sensors can be installed in spill
diversion paths and spill containment areas to detect the spill. Activation of the emergency shut-off
valve(s) is expected to be quicker and the quantity of LOX spilled will be smaller than for situations
depending on human response.

10.8 Vapour barriers

Vapour barriers are solid walls or fences located around the storage area or around the site perimeter.
The effect of the vapour barrier is to partially hold-up the vapour cloud generated by the cryogenic spill,
forcing the heavy vapours to spread crosswind and to rise above the top of the barrier. Even though the
cloud is not fully contained by the barrier, increased turbulence and mixing accelerates the dissipation
of the smaller cloud that extends beyond the fence. In this way, the vapour barrier reduces the downwind
vapour concentration below that expected if the barrier were not present. CFD modelling carried out by
EIGA member companies has shown that suitably positioned vapour barriers of adequate height can
provide significant benefits in reducing oxygen concentrations downwind of the barrier.

10.9 Water sprays

Fire-fighting water hoses fed from fire hydrants can be used as part of emergency response procedures
for LOX spills to contain or divert the vapour cloud generated by the spill. These water sprays can be
used to help entrain air into the vapour cloud generated by a LOX spill, thus helping to dilute the cloud
and increase its buoyancy.

11 References

Unless otherwise specified, the latest edition shall apply.

[1] CGA P-39 - Oxygen-Rich Atmospheres (2003)

[2] OSHA 29 CFR1920.146 - Hazardous atmosphere.

[3] BCGA Technical Report TR1 (1984) A method for estimating the offsite risks from bulk storage
of liquefied oxygen (LOX).

[4] Reference Manual RIVM Bevi Risk Assessments, version 3.2 [01-07-2009].

[5] BCGA Technical Report TR2 (1999) The probability of fatality in O2 enriched atmospheres
due to spillage of liquid O2 (LOX).

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[6] EIGA Position Paper PP-14, August 2006 - Definitions of Oxygen Enrichment/Deficiency Safety
Criteria Used in IHC Member Associations.

[7] Research Report RR789 - LNG source term models for hazard analysis - A review of the state-
of-the-art and an approach to model assessment, prepared by the Health and Safety Laboratory
for the Health and Safety Executive, 2010.

[8] Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd edition, section 15.51.

[9] Highway Vehicle Fires, Topical Fire Report Series, Volume 9, Issue 1/September 2008, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security

[10] PGS 3 - Guideline for quantitative risk assessment, Purple book, CPR 18E, RVIM, Part one:
Establishments, Table 3.5. Also Netherlands Reference Manual, Bevi Risk Assessment version
3.2 Module C, Table 17, single containment atmospheric tank, no outer shell.

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Appendix 1 Typical ventilation rates for buildings

Domestic buildings

Air changes per hour

Lounge 1.0
Dining Room 2.0
Bed sitting Room 1.0
Bedroom 0.5
Hall and Landing 1.5
Bathroom 2.0
Kitchen 2.0
Water Closet/Powder Room (i.e. small room) 1.5
with only a toilet)
Average for domestic building 1 to 2

Commercial/Industrial buildings

Air changes per hour

Bakery 20 to 30
Canteen 8 to 12
Commercial kitchen 30+
Dairy 8 to 10
Electroplating shop 10 to 12
Boiler house, Engine room 15 to 30
Factory or workshop 8 to 10
Foundry, furnace room 8 to 15
Garage 6 to 8
Warehouse or store 3 to 6
Paint shop 30 to 60

NOTE Air changes assume mechanical ventilation equipment is operating properly.

Public buildings

Air changes per hour

Classrooms 2 to 4
Offices 4 to 6
Theatres, Cinemas 6 to 10

Woods Practical Guide to Fan Engineering

Air changes per hour

Churches 1 to 2
Storage areas 1 to 2
Banks 2 to 4
Libraries 2 to 4
Assembly hall 4 to 6
Laboratory 4 to 6
Hospital wards and treatment rooms 6 to 8
Public lavatories 6 to 8
Bars 6 to 8
Cafes 8-12
Dance halls 8 to 12
Restaurants 10 to 15
Laundries 10 to 15
Restaurant kitchen 15 to 30
Swimming baths 15 to 30

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Appendix 2 Pool evaporation results for LOX tank rupture based on GASP
model equations. Saturated liquid at 0.35 bar, 1.5 m/s wind speed, 182.9 deg C
pool on concrete

Figure A2.1LOX flat bottom tank rupture release into 40 m radius bund EVAPORATION
RATE FROM POOL

Figure A2.2LOX flat bottom tank rupture release into 40 m radius bund EVAPORATION
DURATION FROM POOL

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Figure A2.3Unbunded LOX flat bottom tank rupture release EVAPORATION RATE FROM
POOL

Figure A2.4Unbunded LOX flat bottom tank rupture release POOL RADIUS

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Figure A2.5Unbunded LOX flat bottom tank rupture release EVAPORATION DURATION
FROM POOL

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