nterntina Jura or Philosophy of Religion AL: 15-122, 1997. (BT sr Acad Pubbrs Protein he Netherande, Friendship and transcendence DOUGLAS J. DENUYL ‘Bellarmine College, Loutvile, Kentucky, USA It is only through freedom that I become certain of transcendence. By freedom, to be sure, I attain to a point of independence from the world, bbut precisely through the consciousness of my radical attachment to tran- scendence. For it is not through myself that I am. Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy ‘There are few phrases more often repeated about friendship and yet appar- ently less true than Aristotle's claim that, ‘no one would choose to live ‘without friends even if he had all the other goods’ (1155a5). For unless one is speaking of the lower forms of friendship, such as utility and pleasure, people generally take litle care in pursuing the sort of self-perfection Aristotle thinks necessary for the highest type of friendships, namely friend ships of virtue. Even a modicum of the virtue required for true friendship ‘may be more than many are willing to pursue. Of course, people may say they want true friendship more than any other good, but what they appar cently want are the useful things Bacor: speaks of in his essay on friendshi ‘the company, help, and sympathy of ochers; such is afar ery, however, from what Aristotle required of a friendship of virtue. Friendships of virtue are rare and difficult to establish, and thus in one sense of the term they necessarily ‘transcend’ the ordinary. Our most generic isene, then, is to what extent does transcendence affect friendship. Jn Greek antiquity the problem took the form of what I shall call the ‘problem of self-sufficiency.” In later times, the two central components of classical friendship — equality and se-suficiency ~ seem to be altered or ‘undermined by new understandings of transcendence. ‘We will consider classical, shall we say for convenience ‘Aristotelian’, friendships to be paradigmatic. We do so not simply from reasons of tempo- ral priority but for other reasons as well. The most obvious of these reasons is that everyone else, in one way or another, is responding to Aristotle's ‘work on this subject. More importantly, friendship, as understood by106 DOUGLAS 1.DENUYL Acistotl, marks the pinnacle of social relations. It never again attains this status, so it seems natural to take tae most enthusiastic account as paradig- ‘matic, If our enthusiasm must later be tempered, itis that account which receives the qualification, Before we begin it is necessary 0 identify the distinguishing nature of a classical friendship. A classical friendship is one that is critically dependent (on the presence of virtue. Good will, affection, benevolence and the like ‘ay be a part ofall friendships, but the classical account of the best friend- ship requires virtue. We today, in contrast, might define best friends in terms of the strength of ther affection rather than by the presence of virtue. 1. Classical friendships! ‘The issue of transcendence and friendship in classical times is connected to the problem of self-sufficiency. Tae problem of self-sufficiency is stated most simply by Aristotle: “for it is said that blessedly happy and self- sufficient people have no need of friends. For they already have [all] the goods, and hence, being self-sufficient ((autarkesin)], need nothing added” (NE 1169b4-5). Aristotle's point is first raised by Plato in the Lysis (c.., 215b-c) and discussed at least as late as Cicero (e.g., De amicitia IX, 30) ‘The problem arises because Aristotle saw self-sufficiency as an ultimate good: ‘the final good is thought to be self-sufficient” (NE 1097b7-8). Since lacking in nothing constitutes the ultimate good, one can see why Aristotle raises the question about needing another asa friend. The response that may seem obvious to us, and which was indeed partly incorporated by Aristotle himself? would be to say that friendship is one of the goods included in the meaning of ‘possessing all good things’ and thus ‘lacking in nothing’ ‘To understand why this last soluion may not work is to understand some- thing significant about the nature of classical friendships, for the contrasts with modem ways of thinking become sharpest here. If the enjoyment or exercise of a good can be detachee from the need for it, then claiming that friendship is one of the goods possessed by the self-sufficient person? will indeed work as a solution to the problem of self-sufficiency. But if we attach ourselves to a good because we need it ~ that is, look to the good because it will satisfy some desire or deficiency we possess — then we are some distance from a solution. It is not, in other words, neediness that forms the basis of a classical friendship, for to need something would imply a lack, and that would indeed contradict the self-sufficiency crite- sion, Classical friends or friends of virtue, then, have no need of each other, because the other brings nothing significant to the relationship that the first does not already possess (and vice versa)* The sorts of friends who [FRIENDSHIP AND TRANSCENDENCE, 107 need cach other are relegated to Aristotle's category of “friendships of utility’ Being modem people we are used to thinking of friendship in the way Bacon does, and Bacon's essay, Of Friendship, is undoubtedly a self- conscious effort to undermine the classical view In this essay we have friends because we need them. ‘They do things for us, and Bacon catalogues their uses: friends can share feelings and experiences, we can learn from friends, and friends can help us succeed in life. We need friends for busi- ness, pleasure and to solve life’s many problems. In short, friends are useful, While antiquity would certainly agree that friendships can be useful in these ways, the highest type of fiiendship is not defined by utility or benefit® Ordinarily our relationships with others are based upon mutual benefit, {just as Bacon indicates. Classical frierdships of virtue, by contrast, are con versely centered. In these friendships, the benefits — which are surely still there ~ are a consequence of, nota reason for, the relationship. In this way fiendships of virtue transcend not simply because they are unusual, but also because they demand an extraordinary level of self-perfection. One is called upon, in other words, to attain a dispesition of character where benefits are of secondary concer in a relationship. Dealing with others in this way requires a substantial level of self-sufficiency in the sense of possessing a character secure enough in its own purposes and sense of self (integrity) to relate to another solely because of that other’s own qualities, and not for ‘what one may receive from the other. Since friendships of virtue only come to the virtuous (e.g., NE 116962Sii), a significant degree of independence is required to raise oneself above the ord nary. ‘As we have noted, the problem of transcendence in antiquity was finding a place for the other once one becomes self-sufficient. One strategy for solving this problem is to say that human beings are not monads, and thus ‘self-sufficiency’ does not mean self-enclosed with no outside attachments.” Sill, if we have transcended the orcinary to the point where others are viewed in terms besides those of pleasure and usefulness, what exactly is the role of others? The question cannot be answered fully here, but some points need to be made. First, ‘others’ as @ general term do not have a role to play in this context. It is not any others that will do, but rather very specific others ~ those at least who have attained the same level of excel- lence as oneself. The original question is thus misconceived; the problem is not others, but specific sorts of others. ‘Others’ in general play the same role they always have ~ they are sources of pleasure and usefulness (and potentially more). Once the question is clarified we realize that the act of ‘transcending the ordinary does not per se pose the problem of the role of the other, because that other has also transcended the ordinary. It would there-108 DOUGLAS 5.DEN UY fore seem that the problem, if there-is one, lies in what is meant by ‘self sufficiency’, not transcendence. Does transcendence have any role to play in the connection between self sufficient others in a classical friendship? Transcendent objects, such as Plato's Forms or Aristotle's nous, undoubtedly acted as teleological pulls in ‘moving one beyond the ordinary (as in Plato's Symposium). Yet although ‘such transcendent objects encourage excellence and can serve as a common object of aspiration, there is nothing in their nature that explains the connec tion between self-sufficient persons.” Rather the attraction of one person to another is based upon the fact thatthe other isin some way a manifestation of the transcendent to which one is already attracted." If this is the case, then friendship and transcendence are linked by the fact that one is drawn to the friend in the same way, and forthe same reason, one is drawn tothe transcen- dent object. Notice how agent-centered this is. One does not become: the ‘other or become the transcendent object, but simply more fully oneself. ‘This might be termed ‘self-transcendence’ as opposed to transcendence of self. While the agent-centered character of antiquity does not imply self centeredness or a lack of attachment to others, it might nevertheless be argued that agent-centeredness can never appreciate the other as an other in his or her own terms, precisely because the perspective is agent-centered. It therefore seems appropriate at this stage to move to Christianity as a significant response to antiquity," not only because of its importance to Westem civilization, its self-conscious evaluation of antiquity, and its deep ‘concer with transcendence, but also because the sort of transcendence ushered in by Christianity may have superior prospects for appreciating others as themselves. God's love, having no restrictions itself, could atleast serve as a model for how we could transcend our own limited agency and embrace that of others. 2. Christianity and friendship ‘Yet almost as soon as we make the transition, the problems for friendship ‘begin. Consider these words from Book IV of Augustine’s Confessions: For what restored and refteshed me chiefly was the solaces of other fiends, with whom I did love, what instead of Thee I loved; and this was a great fable, and protracted lie, by whose adulterous stimulus, our soul, which lay itching in our ears, was being defiled... Tum us, O God of Hosts, show us Thy countenance, and we shall be whole. For whitherso- ever the soul of man tums itself, unless toward The, it is riveted upon sorrows, yea though it is riveted on things beautiful FRIENDSHIP AND TRANSCENDENCE 109 At one point Aristotle tells us that the great advantage of friendships of virtue is their stability and permanency (NE 1157a10~35). Virtue provides stability, lack of it indicates at least inconsistency and thus instability. This passage from Augustine wipes the Aristotelian project away with one stroke. There is no real stability or permanency in secular life at all. Looking to God is our only hope; there alone is the permanency, indeed self-sufficiency, sought by the ancients; but that self-sufficiency is not our fown.!# For this reason, in the passage cited, Augustine calls us away from friendship and towards God. If we return to friendship, it will be a friend- ship transformed by our having turned towards God. But can we tum back? ‘The most obvious route to reconciling Christianity and friendship would be to keep the basic structure of the classical model but diminish its supremacy and recognize its limited role. This is the approach taken by such notable pre-modern Christian thinkers as Aelred and Aquinas. Acired is perhaps the clearest on this matter. In the first place Aelred distinguishes chavty from friendship, with the former being the superior and more divine love.'® Charity requires that we love our enemies whereas friendship does not. AAclred calls the best sort of friendship ‘spiritual’, and spiritual friend- ships seek no advantage and do not arise from any extrinsic cause, but are pursued ‘from the dignity of (their) own nature and the feelings of the hhuman heart’ Like the classical model such friendships only exi between the virtuous: ‘prudence directs, justice rules, fortitude guards, and temperance moderates’.!” Moreover, self-sufficiency is still the standard, except that only God and not man can qualify as self-sufficient. God's self- sufficiency is a function of His unity, to which we are naturally drawn, Friendship attempts to imitate the unity, and thus the self-sufficiency which is God's, For our purposes, however, the central point comes to this: if it were not for sin, charity and friendship would be identical (or friendship would not be needed). In other words, in a populated Garden of Eden, s0 to speak, everyone would be equal and everyore would be loved equally by all. But after the fall of man, the good distinguished between charity and friendship, observing that love ought to be extended even to the hostile and perverse, while no union of will and ideas can exist between the good and wicked. And so friendship which, like charity, was first preserved among all by all, remained according to the natural law among the few good.!* Friendship is, therefore, the way goodness is connected to goodness in a ‘world of sin. Although & distinctly second best form of loving, friendship is10 DOUGLAS 1.DENUYL valuable because we could not understand the meaning of the unity and ‘goodness of God's love without it If, in other words, we had only charity and thos had to love everyone alike ~ sinner as well as saint ~ we would riss experiencing the purity and the unity of the goodness of God, for sin detracts from that understanding. Like the classical model, then, good befriends only good for Aelred, and we lear something important about the nature of God's goodness in the process. But friendship is a partial truth, a ‘concession to our world. dependent upon the higher charity that gives it meaning. In a way, we settle for friendship rather than glorify it ‘Aquinas appears to be doing something quite different. He seems eager to assimilate friendship and charity cather than separate the two. Charity is preci because he believes it loses sight of the transcendent. And herein lier key, fort is Jasper’s doctrine of transcendence that allows us to retain 8 of the important elements of classical ‘riendship. ‘The transcendent for Jaspers is a feature of that which is ‘neither subject nor only object’ but both, namely the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘encompassing’ (das Umbreifende).» The transcendent itself is the being that is intrinsically different from us, in which we have no but in which we are rooted and to which we stand in some relation. is the being that never becomes world but that speaks as it were thre the being that isthe world.” For purposes of our discussion itis to the connection between trans dence and the self that we must look. Although the sel is rooted inthe 1 scendent, it only sees the world a is. That is, the self soes itself as pa a visible phenomenal structure which defines what it is at present. The ization that the self is connected to more than the world around it as it appears is what Jaspers calls “faith proper’. It is also the beginning understanding of our freedom. The world gives us a recognition of finiteness, but in that recognition we also realize that no finite descrit completely captures what we are. We thus gain a glimpse that we are nected to the transcendent as well as the world and that through the scendent we can always achieve a cern independence from the world. for Jaspers, just asthe empirical workly self is not of one’s own mab neither is the self informed by transcendence. Our freedom is not a rac nothingness, but rather the vehicle by which we come to understand ‘radical attachment to transcendence’. We transform ourselves become what we are by bringing the transcendent into our lives: "For not through myself that Iam’. It's easier to understand why we are not completely the authors of selves by imagining freedom without transcendence. As I see it, Jas Would hold that in this situation ‘man {would spit] into his potential taking up one today and another tomorrow — life (would become] forge ness’? What transcendence seems to give us is our true self, and by Jaspers means an integrated unified self: ‘man as existence in his free should experience the fact of being given to himself by transcendence. 1 hhuman freedom is atthe heart ofall his potentialities and through trans dence, through the one, man is guided to his own inner unity." This i unity is the essence of one’s own selfhood and will, once discoveus DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL ‘provide the integration one needs in the face of diversity, Jaspers also refers to this inner unity as ‘self-existence’? Its interesting to note that this state of self-existence is dependent upon philosophy. In this respect self-existence is but a reissuing of the Socratic injunction to “know thyself.” Jaspers tells us, for example, that, ‘The aim of philosophy is at all times to achieve the independence of man 1s an individual... Philosophy adresses itself to the individual. In every world, in every situation philosophical endeavour throws the individual bback upon himself. For only he who is himself - and can prove himself in solitude — can truly enter into communication. (emphasis in original)” Philosophy for Jaspers, as for the encients, turns out to be the link between self and others. If the pursuit of truth characterizes philosophy, Jaspers believes that ‘truth is what joins us together; and, truth has its origin in ‘communication’. But only those who are self-existent can truly communi- cate, and, as We have seen, self-existence is a function of incorporating the transcendent through philosophy. What exactly is it bout self-existence that engenders connectedness to the other? The answer is the sense of ‘solidar- ity’ that exists among such individuals and only such individuals. In Man in the Modern Age Jaspers discusses friendship directly under the heading of ‘solidarity’. It is worthwhile to spead a moment considering a large portion of his remarks: ‘True nobility is not found in an isolated being. It exists in the interlinkage ‘of independent human beings... Though they have entered into no formal agreement, they hold together with s loyalty which is stronger than any formal agreement could give... The solidarity of these persons has to be distinguished from the universally arising preferences dependent upon sympathy and antipathy; from the peculiar attractive force which all mediocrities exercise on one another because it is congenial to them to be among those who do not make lofty demands; .. Whereas all of these latter categories feel themselves more secure because they exist as and encounter one another as masses and deduce their rights from mass- power, the solidarity of the self-existent is infinitely more assured in its personal trustworthiness... The others, those of the mass-categories, have dozens of men as friends who are not really friends; but a member of the elite is lucky if he has but one friend. © ‘What is remarkable about this passage is how ‘Greek’ it is in both sense and substance. What else really is ‘selfexistence’ but our old friend ‘self sufficiency’? And were not the classical authors struggling in their way to FRIENDSHIP AND TRANSCENDENCE clucidate what Jaspers says here about friendship being dependent upot development of the self to a point o° independence? And is not inde dence achieved with nobility of character rather than in the pursuit o useful or pleasurable? Did not classical authors also tell us that philose ‘was the road to self-sufficiency because philosophy was linked to the scendent and the transcendent lights the way to what is stable, essential, etemal about human nature? Jaspers’ doctrine of friendship is surprisingly classical in character. t allows for an independence of self and other that some might argue not be easily accommodated by the classical model. Jaspers accompli independence by making our understanding of transcendence depen upon our first grasping our own unique finitude. This assures an underst ing of ourselves as unique separate selves. It also has, in a manner simil those who sought immanence, the effect of bringing the transcendent the finite, whereas antiquity seemed to want to bring the finite to the scendent. With Jaspers, then, we may have a theory which is not grow in classical teleology or hierarchicalism that nevertheless manages to i in a largely classical theory of friendship. A full appreciation and cri assessment of how such is possible would certainly require more that have provided here. But perhaps Jaspers offers an opportunity to re ‘upon what must be done to reconcile classical friendship with a mo metaphysics. Acknowledgments wish to thank Steve Erickson, Douglas Rasmussen, Charles Griswold, Evanthia Speliotis for helpful comments on early drafts of this paper. 1 wish to thank the members of the Jaspers Society for their comments + this paper was read at their session of the APA Pacific Division meetir 1996. Notes 1, Isha se the term ‘classical’ or ‘antiguiy" to mean primarily the ancient Greek possibly at times the tems may include most of the noted thinkers of the pre-m fer This is broadly painted stroke tht ignoces many differences among thi [Nevertheless the ancienvmadem split is perhaps ao where more evident than i issue of friendship. Friendship was the pinnacle of social relations for much ¢ Period, butt has more modest value, and sometimes positive disvalue, in modem (Ge, since Bacon; see below). Part of our point here is that Christianity ushers ambiguity about the value of friendship an perhaps its ultimate demise, It the stands, for purposes ofthis paper, somewhue“barween' the two periods.120 DOUGLAS J.DEN UL 2. The passage from the Nicomachean Ethics onthe ultimate goodness of self-sufficiency includes the statement that Aristo daes not ‘mean that which is sficient for aman by himself, but would include ohers suc as family and frends 3, Equality is also a necessary componen of friendship (11S8b1f. 44, Douglas Rasmussen has pointed out © me, however, that ends of virtue would have need of each other if e tink of such siendships as formal causes of self perfection. ‘5. The essay is found inthe standard fendship reader ~ Michael Pakaluk, Other selves ‘Philosophers on friendship Indianapols, IN: Hacket Publishing Co, 1991), pp. 202-207 6. If saying friends ‘need’ each other were to make any sense with respect tothe highest ‘ype of classical endship, it would te more on the order of saying hak Auman beings ‘ar suited to this elatonship than that they are in need of it 17. Iulia Annas (The moray of happines, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 40) scems to endorse EB. Cole's formulsion of selfsulicieny as being close to what we Would call ‘self-determination’, although she doubts Cole's futher coanestion to the ‘modem notions of autonomy. Ths Gilding the caveat) seems right me, but ony if ‘we understand self determination to include a significant amount of character develop- ‘ment. For her own discussion of the emnection between self-sufficiency and friendship ‘in antiquity, see chapers and 12 from which Thave letred much, 8, Nancy Sherman, The fabric of character: Aristotle's theory of vrte (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 1388, ‘9. One reason might be that these transcendent or eternal objects have no intrest in the Inuman asthe Christian God is thoughtto have. See below. 10. But is one atracied because of the otier’s attraction to the transcendent or because of ‘what the ther has become because of his othe tration tothe transcendent? In Plato's case, it seems tobe something of the ltr. In any ease, fora discussion of thee issues ina way not limited simply tothe Phaedrus, see Chasis L. Griswold, Sel knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus (New Haven, CT Yale University Pres, 1986), p. 124-131 11, Thave come to realize, parly through the help of Douglas Rasmuste, tha ox reason — ‘both speculative and practical ~can abstract the form, essence, or principal of something without the matter. Ie does not follos, however, that instantiation is not important. Indeed, since fiendship falls largely under the rubric of practical wisdom, the excel ences in question must in some Way become one's own (be instantiated in oneself) and ‘hen one's frien’. 12 Iecould be that antiquity had no concen for appreciating the ober, as othe, ofr that ‘mate, the self a sel If, fr example th character of oth paris is the same, i that ‘ontological condition that connects then, noe thei uniqueness s individuals. We oer a different eading below. 13. Foran excelent account of the iterfue between Christianity and friendship, atleast cl in Christan history, ee Carolinne White, Christan friendship in the forth century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 14. The movement here, though, may be one of going ftom an essentislly ethical undet- standing of self-suficiency to an ontological oe. The need to establish the reality of @ ‘new form of transcendence may partly scount fr this movement, 18, See the Aclrod selection in Pakaluk (1991, p. 137. 16. Bid, p. 140, 17 Bid 18, Thi, pp. 2-13, 19. Ieshould be noted that one ofthe reasons this isso is because unity for Aquinas is more pesfect than union, STI, Q26, Ad, Se also our discussion below. FRIENDSHIP AND TRANSCENDENCE 121 20, Cf. Robert M. Adams, “The problem of total devotion’, in Neerh Kapur Badwaer (ed), Friendship: philosophical reader, pp, 108-132. Adams corr nots that pointing to Scriptural examples of friendship to jus it does not explain why i legitimate, It right, however, give usa motivation For tying to squae the concept with Christianity 21, Bid, pp. 112,118 22, Plato will resort to myth and give the tanscendent human-ike qualities inthe form of the gods, See, for example, Griswold (Of. cit, pp. 124-125) where diferent gods epre- sent diferent characters. How literally one takes the gods in such a case would have some bearing on our pont here. We, abvnusly, donot ake them to literal. 23, Griswold (Op. cut, pp 1281) notes that m the Phaedrus lovers seem to 100k trough each other forthe Beauty and eventually te divinity they see or imagine ther beloved 0 possess. Aparenly istrumeataling th ote is a source of controversy in Platonic schol- lrsip as well. Griswold also notes that ‘he beloved remains essentially passive in this proces; being mostly an objec tothe lover IFT may be permed t speculate, we may see here a difference between eras and pila In eros one may lose the other (and by the ‘way oneself in some vision one is drava to. "The beloved may in this sease be another self aswell. But fiends can never be pasive inthis way, not jst because friendship is a to way sires, but also because the othe seliess ofthe frend is oneself inact and not as object and therefore never passive, The objectification properties of ers may’ be pre- cisely why AristodeJeaves eros ot of his dseussions of phila or feendship. This seems quite sight tome, hough Martha Nussbaum objects to Aristo on this sere. 24, See Kierkeguad in Pakula (Op. ct, 191) for the most extreme, or consistent (Sepend- ing on one’s evaluation of the mate) indication ofthe inconsistency between frend ship and Christian love, Quoted below. 25, Annas, The morality of happines, Ch. 12. 26. Tid 265. 21. The Kierkegaard selection in Pakaluk, pp. 242-245, 28. This is the view of Robert Adams ("The problem of total devotion’, Op. ct) when speaking of what is wrong with Auguste. But theologians in general have dealt with {Siendsip more extensively than philosopters and most seem o have abandoned teleal- ogy ether in whole or par, giving as we shall mention presen, inumanence mote of & play. In this respect it seems to me that Andres Nygren isthe most consistent and infuenta on this tope. Fora nice summary ofthe various approaches to the topic by ‘theologians, as wells his own contribution, see Paul J, Wadell, Friendship and the ‘moral life (Notre Dame, IN: University of Nowe Dame Pres, 1989) 29, Wadell (1989) discusses this view in some detail, se pp. 8890. Thee is perhaps some vestion of whether the teleological mut always be associated with the hierarchical This seems natural enough given thatthe teleological would always involve stages of development. Whetber the stages must be the sime forall, of can be relatvized some ‘what to the inavidua 6 perhaps more of an open question. ClasialIendship seems more open to some relativism than do the pre-medem Chistian counterparts. 30. See, et, Kal Jaspers, Way to wisdom (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951), G8 lso Man inthe modern age (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1957), p. 14 ‘31. Kant desribes the ‘vw’ of friendship as ‘minor’ Se Pakalu,p. 217 32, Bug. Jaspers, Man in he moders age, p. 21-29. 33, Karl Jaspers, The perennial scope of philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 1218 34, Jaspers, The perennlal scope of philosophy, pp. 121. 35. bid. 9122 DOUGLAS J. BEN UYL 36, Ibid, p. 12 37, id, p. 17. 38. Ibid, p65. 39, Ibid, p 130, 40. bid, pp. 70-71. 41, See Jaspers, Manin the modern age, p, 193-218. 42. Jaspers, The perennial scope of philosophy, pp. 165-161 48. bid p46. “44, Jaspers, Man in the moder: age, pp. 2:0-211. ‘Address for correspondence: Professor Douglas J. Den Ul, Department of Philosophy, ‘Bellarmine College, Louisville, KY 40205 USA Phone: (502) 452-8031; Fax (S02) 452-8441; E-mail: theow! @ibm.et