Bernal v. House and Tacloban Electric, 54 Phil 327, Jan 20, 1930.

Facts: On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban,
Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to
attend the religious celebration. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter,
accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto and Elias, passed along a public
street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her
mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and
automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to
run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter
or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions
reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her clothes were immediately
removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There
she was attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night at 11:40 o'clock.

Dr. Benitez, who, of course, was in a better position than any one to know the cause of the death,
and who had no reason to depart from the true facts, certified that the cause of death was "Burns,
3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and
visceras of the chest & abdomen". The treatment record of the attending nurse was much to the
same effect.

Contention of Defendant: The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the
side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause
of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own
fault and negligence.

RTC: The sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due principally to the nervous shock
and organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns from the hot water. He nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs appealed.

Issue: W/N the RTC judgment is correct?

SC: The judgment appealed from shall in part be reversed and in the court of origin another
judgment shall issue in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the amount of
P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.

Ratio: The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch
filled with hot water. Furthermore, The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any,
does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of
the damages.

Having reached the conclusion that liability exists, we next turn to discover who can recover
damages for the obligation, and against whom the action will lie.

The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of Purificacion
Bernal and the former was the natural father, who had never legally recognized his child. The
daughter lived with the mother, and presumably was supported by her. Under these facts,
recovery should be permitted the mother but not the father. As to the defendants, they are
J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., J.V. House was granted a franchise by Act
No. 2700 of the Philippine Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only transferred this
franchise formally to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is,
nearly a year after the death of the child Purificacion Bernal. Under these facts, J.V. House
is solely responsible.

Counsel for appellees point out that there is no satisfactory proof to establish the pecuniary loss.
That is true. But in cases of this character the law presumes a loss because of the impossibility of
exact computation. There is not enough money in the entire world to compensate a mother for the
death of her child. In criminal cases, the rule has been to allow as a matter of course P1,000 as
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. In the case of Manzanares vs.Moreta ([1918], 38 Phil.,
821), which in many respects is on all fours with the case at bar, the same amount of P1,000 was
allowed the mother of the dead boy eight or nine years of age. The same criterion will have to be
followed in this instance.
37. Cipriano v. CA, 263 SCRA 711, GR, 107968, OCT 30 1996

FACTS: On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee,
brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to petitioner Elias Ciprianos shop for
rustproofing. The Job Order No. 123581, which showed the date it was received for rustproofing
as well its condition at the time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however,
was specified. According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 oclock in the
morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours
to complete the process of rustproofing.

In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also
owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the
restaurant, including private respondents Kia Pride. The car had been kept inside the building,
allegedly to protect it from theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there
was simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which had been
saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage.

On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement

for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire
was a fortuitous event. This prompted private respondent to bring this suit for the value of
its vehicle and for damages against petitioner.

Respondents Contention: Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the
negligence and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioners failure to register his business with
the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the
rules implementing the Decree. Moreover, private respondent argued that petitioner was
liable for the loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended that
the nature of petitioners business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No.
1572, petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.

Petitioners Contention: petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the
loss which he alleged was due to a fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed an
electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. In
addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an accident
entirely independent of his will and devoid of any negligence on his part. He further averred that
private respondents car was ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it
was private respondents delay in claiming it that was the cause of the loss.

Petitioner explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like materials underneath motor
vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the materials and chemicals used for this
purpose are not inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due to
fire. He also claimed that he was not required to register his business with the Department of
Trade and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.

The trial court sustained the private respondents contention that the "failure of defendant to
comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant
[petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire," even as it
ruled that the business of rustproffing is "definitely covered" by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner
did not register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his
customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent
P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the case and attorneys fees in the
amount of P10,000.00. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received by him
in the course of his business and, if so, whether his failure to do so constituted negligence,
rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against. Yes.

RULING: CA decision is affirmed with modification as to the deletion of attorneys fee.

RATIO: We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. In F.F.
Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure
to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v.
Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act negligence, but
also the proximate cause of the death.

Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar
a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v.
Court of Appeals. Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held
liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not
complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss
occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioners
negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Thus, P.D. No. 1572, requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of
petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such
registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure
insurance coverage.

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty
that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While
the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt
petitioner from liability for loss.

The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of attorneys fees by the lower court. It is now
settled that the reasons or grounds for an award of attorneys fees must be set forth in the
decision of the court. They cannot be left to inference as the appellate court held in this
case. The reason for this is that it is not sound policy to penalize the right to litigate. An award of
attorneys fees, being an exception to this policy and limited to the grounds enumerated in the
law, must be fully justified in the decision. It can not simply be inserted as an item of
recoverable damages in the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no
justification for the award of attorneys fees in the decision of the trial court, it was error
for the Court of Appeals to sustain such award.
49. Kim v. Phil. Aerial Tax 58 Phil 838, G.R. L-39309, November 24, 1933

Facts: The plaintiff Te Le Kim bought a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo from Madrigal Field in
Pasay. The engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which he was to take the flight, was not working the
said plaintiff had to wait for some time. While the engine was being tested, the plaintiff saw how it
was started by turning the propeller repeatedly and how the man who did it ran away from it each
time in order not to be caught by the said propeller. Before the plane Mabuhay was put in
condition for the flight, the plane Taal arrived and it was decided to have the plaintiff make the
flight therein. The plaintiff and his companion were carefully carried from the beach to the
plane, entering the same by the rear or tail end, and were placed in their seats to which
they were strapped. After an uneventful flight, the plane landed on the waters of Guimaras
Strait, in front of Iloilo, and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom, when the
plane stopped. The pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe, permitting the engine, however, to
continue to function until all the gasoline was drained from the feed pipe and carburetor. This
operation was necessary in accordance with the established practice of aviation in order to avoid
danger of fire which would exist if the pipes and carburetor remained full of gasoline, and to
prevent the sudden cooling of the engine which might cause serious damage, especially to the
valves.

When the pilot observed that a banca was approaching rapidly on the right hand side of the
plane, he arose signalled and shouted to the boatman to keep his banca at a distance from the
plane, inasmuch as there were waves and quite a strong current, and he feared that the banca,
which had a high prow, might collide with the plane and damage either the wing or the pontoon
thereof. While he was doing this, he heard the propeller strike something. He immediately turned
off the switch and, looking on the other side, he saw Bohn picking up the plaintiff out of the water.

What really happened was that at the moment the pontoons touched bottom and while the pilot
was signalling to the banca, the plaintiff unfastened the straps around him and, not even
waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to
the pontoon and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller
first grazed his forehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving
blades thereof and so injured that it had be amputated.

Bohn and Garrett of Warner, Barnes & Co., consignees of the defendant in Iloilo, were on the
beach to meet the plane and to make arrangements for the disembarking of the passengers.
Upon seeing the plaintiff walking toward the propeller, they shouted frantically and motioned to
him to keep away from it, but the said plaintiff took no heed of them.

The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the
propeller stops, then turn the plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and
thereof towards the beach, and then take the passengers to shore in a banca. The pilot in
charge of the plane has had fourteen years experience, having first learned to fly during
the World War. He is duly licensed by the Department of Commerce of the United States
and by the Department of Commerce and Communications of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant entity has complied with its contractual obligation to carry the
plaintiff-appellant Teh Le Kim safe and sound to his destination.

Ruling: The contract entered into by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim and the defendant entity Philippine
Aerial Taxi Co., Inc., was that upon payment of the price of the passage, which the carrier had
received, the latter would carry the former by air in one of its hydroplanes and put him, safe and
sound, on the beach at Iloilo. After an uneventful flight, the hydroplane, which carried the plaintiff
and his companion, arrived at the Iloilo beach, as usual, with nothing more left to do but to take
the plaintiff and his companion, safe and sound, ashore.

In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end
of the plane towards the shore, take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end
thereof, place them in a banca and take them ashore.

By sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an
aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught
and injured thereby. He ought to know furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water,
he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore. Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals
given him from the shore by the representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, not
being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked along one of the
pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while the banca which was to take him ashore
was still some distance away and the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe
distance from the plane. Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the
plaintiff-appellant acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was
still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That the plaintiff-
appellant's negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident, is so clear that it is not
necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the conclusion that the injury to his
right arm and the subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his
own imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the defendant entity or
to its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer the consequences of his act.
61. Philippine National Railways (PNR) v. Brunty GR no 169891, 2 Nov 2006

Facts: Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the
Philippines for a visit. She, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to
Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00
midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its
way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.

By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad
crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove
past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with
PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the
train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. Rhonda Brunty was
pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival in the hospital. Garcia, who had suffered severe
head injuries.

When PNR did not respond to a demand letter for damages, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a
complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila. RTC ruled in favor of
plaintiffs and ordered defendants to pay damages. The appellate court affirmed the findings of the
RTC as to the negligence of the PNR. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the
fatal accident, it ruled that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad
crossing were not merely inadequate they did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in
transportation. However, the CA did not agree with the RTCs findings on the contributory
negligence of Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have
foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other passengers under the prevailing
circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory negligence.

Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap was Mercelitas disregard of traffic rules
and regulations. Had the court considered the fact that Mercelita had overtaken another vehicle a
few yards before the railroad track, it would have reached a different conclusion. Moreover,
petitioner asserts, considering that the decisions of the RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not
Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, the findings of the RTC should prevail. Thus,
Mercelitas contributory negligence should not have been ignored. Lastly, petitioner avers that
since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is
obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an
unwanted accident from taking place.

Respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that the breach by petitioner of its legal
duty to provide adequate and necessary public safety device and equipment within the area or
scene of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap. While it is true that as a general
rule, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate and observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses presented during the trial, the CA, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has
the vested right to modify, reject, or set aside the trial courts evaluation and findings. As to the
application of the doctrine of last clear chance, respondents claim that said issue is being raised
for the first time in this petition. Lastly, respondents cite foreign jurisprudence stating that if the
violation is one which gives rise to liability per se for any resulting injury, the defenses ordinarily
available in actions for diligence are barred and the contributory negligence of the person injured
is no defense.

Issues:

(1) As between petitioner and Mercelita, whose negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision?
(2) Is Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes Benz) guilty of contributory negligence?
(3) The application in this case of the doctrine of last clear chance is likewise in question.

1. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In determining whether or not
there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the
following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the
person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.

In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
put into issue, and questions of fact as a general rule, cannot be entertained. The finding of
negligence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass
upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based.
The established rule is that factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are
conclusive and binding on this Court.

The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA carefully examined the
factual circumstances surrounding the case, and we find no cogent reason to disturb the same. It
is, however, worthy to emphasize that petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to
provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the
railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code, viz:

Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

The following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission,
of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3)
connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage. Applying the foregoing
requisites, the CA correctly made the following conclusions:

It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein) sustained damage or

injury as a result of the collision. That there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise,
beyond cavil. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident,
the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only
inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. x x x

x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as

evidence by PNR itself would yield the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars;
(2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area.
Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would
still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an
approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since ones view would be blocked by a
cockpit arena. x x x

Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in
knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour
as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment
in the area.
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a
reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which
duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover,
every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where
such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such
points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every
kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the
railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a
cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring
it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.

In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as well as its conclusion on
petitioners negligence.

2. As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree with

petitioner.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that
he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an
impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was
not properly illuminated; ones view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not
familiar with the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes
Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the
railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. However, while his acts
contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioners liability. Pursuant
to Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is
to mitigate liability, which, however, is not applicable in this case.

We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1) 50,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) 1,000,000.00 as actual and moral damages due the heirs of
Rhonda Brunty; and (3) 50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. No damages, however,
were awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the latter never interposed an appeal before
the CA nor even before this Court. The record is, likewise, bereft of any allegation and proof
as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier
finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect
of mitigation of liability, does not apply.

3. As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the negative. The
doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of
plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence
of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of
petitioner, we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao, GR 141480, November 29, 2006

Facts: Petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab
motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment
of P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest.
The vehicle was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner
demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after
traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain based on an implied warranty. Respondent
countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty. Petitioner filed
a complaint for damages against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, the petitioner's cause of action
had prescribed as the case was filed more than six months from the date the vehicle was
sold and/or delivered. The RTC granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Petitioner thereupon filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court.

Issue: W/N RTCs order to dismissal based on prescription proper?

Ruling: The petition should be denied.

First, on procedural grounds, the petition should forthwith be denied for violation of the
hierarchy of courts. Petitioner states that the present petition is an "appeal by certiorari on pure
questions of law, from the final Order of Branch 105 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-99-37381 - under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." The RTC's order dated
September 9, 1999 and its subsequent order dated December 21, 1999 partake of the nature of a
final disposition of the case. Hence, the appropriate remedy petitioner should have taken was to
file a notice of appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, not a Petition for Review
on Certiorari directly with this Court.

Although petitioner intended his petition, filed on February 2, 2000, to be one filed under Rule 45
and he filed it well within the 15-day reglementary period counted from January 18, 2000, the
same was in effect a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, and is therefore dismissible for violation
of the hierarchy of courts under Section 4 thereof. Petitioner failed to show that special and
important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances exist to justify a direct filing of the
petition with this Court instead of first taking an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Likewise,
petitioner cannot find refuge in the argument that he was raising pure questions of law. The sole
matter petitioner assails in this action is the RTC's order of dismissal of his complaint for
damages on the ground of prescription which was tantamount to an adjudication on the merits.
Again, petitioner should have resorted to the remedy of appealing the case to the Court of
Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC.

Second, even if the Court were to disregard the procedural infirmity, the petition should be
denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner contends that the dismissal on the ground of prescription was erroneous because the
applicable provision is Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394 (otherwise known as "The Consumer
Act of the Philippines" which was approved on April 13, 1992), and not Article 1571 of the Civil
Code. Petitioner specifies that in his complaint, he neither asked for a rescission of the contract of
sale nor did he pray for a proportionate reduction of the purchase price. What petitioner claims is
the enforcement of the contract, that is, that respondent should replace either the vehicle or its
engine with a new one. In this regard, petitioner cites Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394 as the
applicable provision, so as to make his suit come within the purview of the two-year prescriptive
period. Tangentially, petitioner also justifies that his cause of action has not yet prescribed
because this present suit, which was an action based on quasi-delict, prescribes in four years.
Respondent maintains that petitioner's cause of action was already barred by the statute of
limitations under Article 1571 of the Civil Code for having been filed more than six months from
the time the vehicle was purchased and/or delivered. Respondent reiterates that Article 169 of
Republic Act No. 7394 does not apply.

Petitioner's argument is erroneous. Article 1495 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of sale,
the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale.
Corollarily, the pertinent provisions of the Code set forth the available remedies of a buyer against
the seller on the basis of a warranty against hidden defects:

Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against the hidden defects which the
thing sold may have, should they render it unfit for the use for which it is intended, or should they
diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he
would not have acquired it or would have given a lower price for it; but said vendor shall not be
answerable for patent defects or those which may be visible, or for those which are not visible if
the vendee is an expert who, by reason of this trade or profession, should have known them.

Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six
months from the delivery of the thing sold.

Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept
or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an
existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in
petitioner's complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an
implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which
respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold
respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with
defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within
six months from the delivery of the thing sold. Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20,
1999, or more than nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of
the motor vehicle), his cause of action had become time-barred.

Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No.
7394. Thus, petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to Article 169 of Republic Act No.
7394. Article 4 (q) of the said law defines "consumer products and services" as goods, services
and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural
purposes, which shall include, but not limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The
following provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 state:

Art. 67. Applicable Law on Warranties. - The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and
warranties shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and warranties.

Art. 68. Additional Provisions on Warranties. - In addition to the Civil Code provisions on sale with
warranties, the following provisions shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty:

e) Duration of warranty. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the
express warranty shall be enforceable. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an
express warranty, both will be of equal duration.

Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year
following the sale of new consumer products.
Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the
same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty
thereunder, which is one year, had likewise lapsed.