[G.R. NO.
167261 : March 2, 2007] MCTC heard the Motion of FlorentinaManacnes notwithstanding the latter's
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner, v. CATHERINE MANACNES-
DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and FLORENTINA
MANACNES, Respondent.
FACTS:
November 9, 1994 - an Action4 for recovery of possession of real property
situated in SitioAbatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner
before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Provinceagainst the spouses
Leoncio and FlorentinaManacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein
respondent
February 23, 1995 partiesagreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon
(Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions
of the KatarungangPambarangay Law.proceedings before the MCTC were
suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.
February 26, 1995 - the Lupon issued a Certification to File Actiondue to the
refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration
and their insistence that the case should go to court.
March 8, 1995 - the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were
forwarded to the MCTC
April 7, 1995 MCTConce more remanding the matter for conciliation by the
Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon. Based
on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the
parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award
as provided under the KatarungangPambarangay Law, so that, the case
must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.
May 10, 1995 - the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Awardordering herein
petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses Manacnes of the
amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved, Leoncio's
widow,7 FlorentinaManacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her
repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished
with copies of the Arbitration Award.
June 1, 1995 - petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the
Arbitration Award. On the other hand, FlorentinaManacnes filed a Motion with
the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for
recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation
of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.
failure to appear before the court despite notice.
MCTC - denied FlorentinaManacnes' Motion to repudiate the Arbitration
Award elucidating that since the movant failed to take any action within the
10-day reglementary period provided for under the
KatarungangPambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final and
executory. Upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an
Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of
the Arbitration Award.
August 31, 1995 - incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of
Execution of the Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented
October 16, 2001 - herein petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action
for enforcement of the Arbitration Award which was sought to be dismissed
by the heir of the Manacnes spouses.8 The heir of the Manacnes spouses
argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void,
the Agreement for Arbitration not having been personally signed by the
spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in English
- a language not understood by the parties.
August 20, 2002 - MCTC dismissed the Petition for Enforcement of
Arbitration Award.
MR: Denied
Appeal to RTC: reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and
remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings.
CA: enforcement of Arbitration Award is REINSTATED
Hence the current petition
ISSUE: WON the proceedings before the lupon is valid
HELD:
An "Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the above-
entitled case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as
mandated by the KatarungangPambarangay Law but instead made a finding
that the case may now be brought to the court. This is violative of the KP
Law, which cannot be sanctioned by the court.
it must be stressed that the object of the KatarungangPambarangay Law is
the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings
voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties.15 Through this mechanism,
the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring the rigors
of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to
settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or
the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in the courts 16 in the
event that no true compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under
the KatarungangPambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of
the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the
Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission
by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the
KatarungangPambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived
at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further
remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the
arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses
Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case
for arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the
part of the parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award
is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of
the proceedings under the KatarungangPambarangay Law which espouses
the principle of voluntary acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable
settlement.
What is compulsory under the KatarungangPambarangay Law is that there
be a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before
a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or
any other government office for adjudication.18 In other words, the only
necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the authority of the
Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been
personal confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to
conciliate, there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be
emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon
during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign
the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent
to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon
ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed because
the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted
that the case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the
proceedings in the case for recovery of possession which it suspended in
order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the case through
arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Petitioner's assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective
counsels' agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter
into an amicable settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties'
respective counsels was the remand of the case to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings and not the actual amicable
settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may only be compelled
to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at
bar, to sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes
spouses personally appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa, they had already complied with the agreement during the
pre-trial to submit the case for conciliation proceedings. Their presence
during said hearing is already their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC
remanding the case to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, as there has
been an actual confrontation between the parties despite the fact that no
amicable settlement was reached due to the spouses Manacnes' refusal to
sign the Agreement for Arbitration.
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the
spouses Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration
award will not bind the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised
KatarungangPambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an
arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide
by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other
contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be
bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be
binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it. 19 In
view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to
settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for
arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb
mark on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot
be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award
since they never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for
arbitration by the Pangkat.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED

G.R. No. 169890 March 12, 2007
FELICIANO ESGUERRA, CANUTO ESGUERRA, JUSTA ESGUERRA,
ANGEL ESGUERRA, FIDELA ESGUERRA, CLARA ESGUERRA, and
PEDRO ESGUERRA, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGINIA TRINIDAD, PRIMITIVA TRINIDAD, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Felipe Esguerra and Praxedes de Vera (Esguerra spouses) were the owners
of several parcels of land in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacancovered by Tax
Declaration No. 10374, half of whichthey sold to their grandchildren, herein
petitioners Feliciano, Canuto, Justa, Angel, Fidela, Clara and Pedro, all
surnamed Esguerra; and a 23,989-square meterparcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 12080, 23,489 square meters of which they also sold to
petitioners, and the remaining 500 square meters they sold to their other
grandchildren, the brothers Eulalio and Julian Trinidad.
Also sold to the Trinidad brothers were a 7,048-square meter parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9059, a 4,618-square meter parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 12081, and a 768-square meter parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 13989.
The Esguerra spouses executed the necessary Deed of Sale in favor of
petitionersin favor of the Trinidad brothers. Both documents were executed
before notary public Maximo Abao.
Eulalio Trinidad later sold his share of the land to his daughters-respondents
herein, via a notarized Kasulatan ng BilihangTuluyan ng Lupa.
A portion of the land consisting of 1,693 square meters was later
assigned Lot No. 3593 during a cadastral survey conducted in the late
1960s.
On respondents application for registration of title, the then CFI of
Bulacanawarded Lot No. 3593 in their favor.
Land Registration Commission (LRC, now the Land Registration Authority
[LRA]) issued Decree No. N-114039 by virtue of which the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan issued OCT No. 0-36315 in the name of respondents.
November 10, 1958 - under a notarized Bilihan ng Lupa6petitioners sold to
respondents parents Eulalio Trinidad and DamianaRodeadilla (Trinidad
spouses) a portion of about 5,000 square meters of the 23,489-square meter
of land which they previously acquired from the Esguerra spouses. 7
During the same cadastral survey conducted in the late 1960s, it was
discovered that the about 5,000-square meter portion of petitioners parcel of
land sold to the Trinidad spouses which was assigned Lot No. 3591 actually
measured 6,268 square meters.
In a subsequent application for registration of title over Lot No. 3591,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-335-V, the CFI, by Decision8 of
August 21, 1972, awarded Lot No. 3591 in favor of Eulalio Trinidad. Pursuant
to the Decision, the LRC issued Decree No. N-149491 by virtue of which the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued OCT No. 0-64989 in the name of
Trinidad.
Upon the death of the Trinidad spouses, Lot No. 3591 covered by OCT No.
0-6498 was transmitted to respondents by succession.
Petitioners, alleging that upon verification with the LRA they discovered the
issuance of the above-stated two OCTs, filed on August 29, 1994 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan two separate complaints for
their nullification on the ground that they were procured through fraud or
misrepresentation.
RTC: Both cases were consolidated, both case were dismissed after trial.
CA: Denied
MR: Denied also
Hence the current petition.
ISSUE: WON fraud is involved
HELD: Negative
Appellant Pedro Esguerra even testified that he does not know how
appellees were able to secure a title over the lot in question and that they
never sold Lot No. 3593 to Virginia Trinidad since it is part of the whole lot of
23,489 square meters. The said testimony is a mere conclusion on the part
of appellants. On the other hand, the evidence shows that appellees
acquired title over the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale executed
by their father Eulalio Trinidad in their favor.
[T]hey failed to establish that appellees acquisition of the certificate of title is
fraudulent. In fact, in their two complaints, appellants acknowledged that
appellees observed and took the initial procedural steps in the registration of
the land, thus ruling out fraud in the acquisition of the certificate of title.
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final, conclusive and binding on this Court, 20 which is not a trier of
facts,21 hence, bereft of function under Rule 45 to examine and weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented,22 its jurisdiction being limited only
to the review and revision of errors of law.23Albeit there are exceptions24 to
this rule, the cases at bar do not fall thereunder, there being no showing that
the trial and appellate courts overlooked matters which, if considered, would
alter their outcome.
Under the Torrens System, an OCT enjoys a presumption of validity, which
correlatively carries a strong presumption that the provisions of the law
governing the registration of land which led to its issuance have been duly
followed.25 Fraud being a serious charge, it must be supported by clear and
convincing proof.26 Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof,
however.
On the questioned interpretation and application by the appellate court of
Article 1542 of the Civil Code reading:
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a
certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or
decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number
than that stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a
single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is
indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should
be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is
included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer
a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or
number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not
accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.
while petitioners admittedly sold Lot No. 3591 to the Trinidad spouses, they
contend that what they sold were only 5,000 square meters and not 6,268
square meters, and thus claim the excess of 1,268 square meters.
In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of
pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is
determined by way of reference to a stated rate per unit area), or a lump
sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area
of which may be declared based on an estimate or where both the area and
boundaries are stated.
In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive
and the price may be reduced or increased depending on the area actually
delivered. If the vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon, the vendee
may oblige the vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or
demand for the proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not
possible. If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the contract, the
vendee has the option to accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept
the whole area, provided he pays for the additional area at the contract rate.
In the case where the area of the immovable is stated in the contract based
on an estimate, the actual area delivered may not measure up exactly with
the area stated in the contract. According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in
the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain
sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease
of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number than that
stated in the contract.
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the
area covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated
area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which
should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area,
calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific
boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with
respect to the area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital
consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area
with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated
with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the
superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver
everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that
distinguishes the determinate object.28 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The courts below correctly characterized the sale of Lot No. 3591 as one
involving a lump sum contract. The Bilihan ng Lupa shows that the parties
agreed on the purchase price of 1,000.00 on a predetermined, albeit
unsurveyed, area of 5,000 square meters and not on a particular rate per unit
area. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the identity of the realty was
sufficiently described as riceland:
It is clear from the afore-quoted Bilihan ng Lupa that what appellants sold to
Eulalio was the "bahagingpalayan." Though measured as 5,000 square
meters, more or less, such measurement is only an approximation, and not
an exact measurement. Moreover, we take note of the fact that the said deed
of sale mentioned the boundaries covering the whole area of 33,489 square
meters, including the "bahagingpalayan." Had appellants intended to sell only
a portion of the "bahagingpalayan," they could have stated the specific area
in the deed of sale and not the entire "bahagingpalayan"
In fine, under Article 1542, what is controlling is the entire land included
within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater
or smaller than that recited in the deed. This is particularly true since the area
of the land in OCT No. 0-6498 was described in the deed as
"humigitkumulang," that is, more or less.30
A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A
vendee of land sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with
reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the
land.31
Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the
excess or deficiency in area. Courts must consider a host of other factors. In
one case,32 the Court found substantial discrepancy in area due to
contemporaneous circumstances. Citing change in the physical nature of the
property, it was therein established that the excess area at the southern
portion was a product of reclamation, which explained why the lands
technical description in the deed of sale indicated the seashore as its
southern boundary, hence, the inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared
unreasonable.
In OCT No. 0-6498, the increase by a fourth of a fraction of the area
indicated in the deed of sale cannot be considered as an unreasonable
excess. Most importantly, the circumstances attendant to the inclusion of the
excess area bare nothing atypical or significant to hint at unreasonableness.
It must be noted that the land was not yet technically surveyed at the time of
the sale. As vendors who themselves executed the Bilihan ng Lupa,
petitioners may rightly be presumed to have acquired a good estimate of the
value and area of the bahagingpalayan.
As for the last assigned error, the appellate court, in finding that the
complaints were time-barred, noted that when the complaints were filed in
1994, more than 27 years had elapsed from the issuance of OCT No. 0-3631
and more than 20 years from the issuance of OCT No. 0-6498. The
prescriptive period of one (1) year had thus set in.1awphi1.nt
Petitioners reliance on Agne v. Director of Lands33 is misplaced since the
cancellation of title was predicated not on the ground of fraud but on want of
jurisdiction. Even assuming that petitioners actions are in the nature of a suit
for quieting of title, which is imprescriptible, the actions still necessarily fail
since petitioners failed to establish the existence of fraud.
A word on Republic Act No. 716034 which was raised by petitioners in their
petition. It expressly requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process
under the KatarungangPambarangay, as a precondition to filing a complaint
in court,35 non-compliance with this condition precedent does not prevent a
court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over
a case unless the defendants object thereto. The objection should be
seasonably made before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint,
and must be raised in the Answer or in such other pleading allowed under
the Rules of Court.36
While petitioners admittedly failed to comply with the requirement of
barangay conciliation, they assert that respondents waived such objection
when they failed to raise it in their Answer. Contrary to petitioners claim,
however, the records reveal that respondents raised their objection in their
Amended Answers37 filed in both cases.
IN FINE, it is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such
indefeasibility commences after the lapse or expiration of one year from the
date of entry of the decree of registration when all persons are considered to
have a constructive notice of the title to the property. After the lapse of one
year, therefore, title to the property can no longer be contested. This system
was so effected in order to quiet title to land.38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
[G.R. No. 146195. November 18, 2004]
AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA-NICOL, SONNY NICOL,
TERESA ZAMORA-UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO
ZAMORA, ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA,
MICHELLE ZAMORA and RODRIGO
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS of CARMEN IZQUIERDO,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, ANITA F.
PUNZALAN, respondents.
FACTS:
1973 - Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal
stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units
located at 117-B General Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the
following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises is only for
residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita
Punzalan, representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new
contract of lease wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00
to P3,600.00 per month.[3] However, petitioners refused to sign it.
January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their
children (two of whom have their own families), herein petitioners, continued
to reside in the apartment unit. However, they refused to pay the increased
rental and persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same
apartment.
Petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks &
Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since
a written consent from the owner is required for such installation, she
requested respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter
declined because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated
the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion thereof for
photocopying business and allowing three families to reside therein.
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Barangay 16, Sona 2, District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a
complaint against Anita Punzalan
August 24, 1997 - during the barangay conciliation proceedings,
petitioner Avelina Zamora declared that she refused to sign the new lease
contract because she is not agreeable with the conditions specified therein.
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter[4] informing her
that the lease is being terminated and demanding that petitioners vacate the
premises within 30 days from notice.
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to
settle their dispute amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a
Certification to File Action.
October 2, 1997, respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint
for unlawful detainer and damages against petitioners. petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss[7] the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not
referred to the barangay for conciliation. First, they alleged that
the barangay Certification to File Action is fatally defective because it
pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents attorney-in-fact to
give her written consent to petitioners request for installation of water
facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement before the LupongTagapamayapa, the Punong
Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should
have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter
7 (KatarungangPambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No.
7160[8] (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991)
SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman Upon receipt of the complaint,
the lupon chairman[9] shall, within the next working day, summon the
respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses
to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails
in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the
parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of
the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
MTC: Denied the motion to dismiss
MR: rendered a Judgment[14] in favor of respondents and against petitioners
RTC: Affirmed MTC decision
CA: Affirmed the RTC ruling
MR: Denied
Hence the current petition.
ISSUE: WON a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or
the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court
HELD: Affirmative
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.
No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by
the lupon or pangkat chairman.
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute
between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners contention, the complaint
does not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents
attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the
premises, but also petitioners violation of the terms of the lease, specifically
their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure
to pay the increased rental.
Summary Procedure, quoted earlier. Section 19(a) permits the filing of such
pleading only when the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to
refer the subject matter of his/her complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation prior to its filing with the court. This is clear from the provisions
of Section 18 of the same Rule, which reads:
SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be
dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to
criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
(Underscoring supplied)
As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for
conciliation. Obviously, petitioners motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is
bereft of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by defendant-

appellant Avelina Zamora because herein plaintiff-appellee was given by the
Sangguniang Barangay the authority to bring her grievance to the Court for
resolution. While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is
entitled Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig,
this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings.

Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua

non for the filing of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose
anymore since no new issues would be raised therein and the parties have
proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to settle their
differences amicably.[20]

We cannot sustain petitioners contention that the Lupon conciliation

alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang Pambarangay.
Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the
conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened
in the present case), or the Pangkat.
We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful
detainer is proscribed by Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on
G.R. No. 153567 February 18, 2008
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ERNEST S. AURE1, respondent.
FACTS:
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated in Roxas
District, Quezon City, with an area of 449 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City.
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint
for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC.
In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the
subject property from Aquino and her husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by
virtue of a Deed of Sale8 executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after
the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the
subject property, they refused to vacate the same.9
Aquino countered that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 17450 lacks cause of
action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject
property. Aquino admitted that there was a sale but such was governed by
the Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) signed by Aure. As stated in the
MOA, Aure shall secure a loan from a bank or financial institution in his own
name using the subject property as collateral and turn over the proceeds
thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully
secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds thereon or
benefited therefrom.
MeTC: rendered a decision in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint
for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the
barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. The MeTC observed
that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no
showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at
the barangay level. The MeTC further observed that Aure Lending was
improperly included as plaintiff for it did not stand to be injured or benefited
by the suit. Finally, the MeTC ruled that since the question of ownership was
put in issue, the action was converted from a mere detainer suit to one
"incapable of pecuniary estimation" which properly rests within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTC: affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the same ground that the
dispute was not brought before the Barangay Council for conciliation before it
was filed in court.
MR: denied
CA: rendered a Decision, reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and
remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and final
determination of the substantive rights of the parties. The appellate court
declared that the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation
is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aures
Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer.
MR: Denied
Hence the current petition
ISSUE: WON NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT
HELD:
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing
up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished
through a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according to the
conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is
essentially arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it should
also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice
system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy
of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served if an out-
of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties.17
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of
justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the
courts.18 To ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
150819 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition
to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions 20 which are
inapplicable to this case. The said section has been declared compulsory in
nature.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which took effect on 1
January 1992.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code
on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss.22 Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject
matter or over the person of the defendant.23
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack
the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted
herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquinos Answer
before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any
objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the
MeTC of its jurisdcition.
By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint,
she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant
thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of
the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lendings failure to resort to
the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing
so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her
Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse
to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim.
While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading (specifically, an
Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar or identical rule is provided for all
other motions in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same Rule which states:
Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party
filing a pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the
single opportunity so that single or multiple objections may be avoided.26 It is
clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that
failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an
answer is deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory
construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.27 As has been our
consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for
application.28 Thus, although Aquinos defense of non-compliance with
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no
longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by
the omnibus motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court
may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or
evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the
same parties for the same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may
not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those
mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own initiative.
inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the
issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit." These
courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an
ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and
complete adjudication of the issue of possession.33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
[G.R. No. 159411. March 18, 2005]
TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
JACINTO S. TRILLANA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into
a contract of lease[4] whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at
Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years
commencing from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the
whole term was two million two hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00)
pesos, of which one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon
signing of the contract. The balance was payable as follows:
b. That, after six (6) months and/or, on or before one (1) year from the date
of signing this contract, the amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR
THOUSAND (P344,000.00) pesos shall be paid on April 23, 1995 and/or, on
or before October 23, 1995 shall be paid by the LESSEE to the LESSOR.
c. That, the LESSEE, shall pay the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-
EIGHT THOUSAND (P448,000.00) pesos x x x to the LESSOR on April 23,
1997 and/or, on or before October 23, 1997, and on April 23, 1998 and/or, on
or before October 23, 1998 the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND (P448,000.00) pesos x x x.
Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake
all construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may
be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without
reimbursement from petitioner.
A powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond.
Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the
water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by
a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the
fishpond with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were
at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in
commencing the work.
Respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs
undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the leased
premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and
subsisting lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was
reached
KASUNDUAN
Napagkasunduan ngayong araw na to ika-17 ng Setyembre ng nagpabuwis
Teodoro Chavez at bumubuwis na si G. Jay Trillana na ibabalik ni G. Chavez
ang halagang P150,000.00 kay G. Trillana bilang sukli sa natitirang panahon
ng buwisan.
Ngunit kung maibibigay ni G. Chavez ang halagang P100,000.00 bago
sumapit o pagsapit ng ika-23 ng Setyembre, taong kasalukuyan, to ay
nangangahulugan ng buong kabayaran at hindi P150,000.00.
Kung sakali at hindi maibigay ang P100,000.00 ang magiging kabayaran ay
mananatiling P150,000.00 na may paraan ng pagbabayad ng sumusunod:
Ang P50,000.00 ay ibibigay bago sumapit o pagsapit ng ika-31 ng Oktubre
1996 at ang balanseng P100,000.00 ay ibibigay sa loob ng isang taon subalit
magbibigay ng promissory note si G. Chavez at kung mabubuwisang ang
kanyang palaisdaan ay ibibigay lahat ni G. Chavez ang buong P150,000.00
sa lalong madaling panahon.
Kung magkakaroon ng sapat at total na kabayaran si G. Chavez kay G.
Trillana ang huli ay lalagda sa kasulatan bilang waiver o walang anumang
paghahabol sa nabanggit na buwisan.
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the
foregoing Kasunduan, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before
the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and
to attend the pretrial conference. On October 21, 1997, respondent was
allowed to present his evidence ex-parte before the Acting Branch Clerk of
Court.
RTC: rendered a decision in favor of respondent
CA: modified the decision of the trial court by deleting the award
of P500,000.00 for unrealized profits for lack of basis, and by reducing the
award for attorneys fees to P50,000.00.
MR: Denied
hence the current petition
ISSUE: WON RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent
considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease
contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of
the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan
HELD:
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [8] provides that an
amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to
nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten
(10) days from its date.[9] It further provides that the settlement may be
enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months
from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond
the six-month period.[10] This special provision follows the general precept
enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code.
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract
which is the law between the parties themselves.[11] It has upon them the
effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved,[12] and
cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and
forgery.
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.
[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind
compromise agreements. Where a party violated the terms of a compromise
agreement, the only recourse open to the other party was to enforce the
terms thereof.
When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x created for
the first time the right of rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved
party the right to either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand. Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to
qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that [a] compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if
he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand,
as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an
action for rescission.[15] This is because he may regard the compromise as
already rescinded[16] by the breach thereof of the other party.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable
settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-
judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto;
and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.[21] However, the
mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041
of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from
the wording of Sec. 417[22] itself which provides that the amicable settlement
may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its
date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that
period. The use of the word may clearly makes the procedure provided in
the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory[23] or merely
optional in nature.
Thus, although the Kasunduan executed by petitioner and respondent
before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court, petitioners non-compliance paved the way for the
application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the
compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case
No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of
advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he
agreed to the amount in the Kasunduan, it is axiomatic that a compromise
settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there
is a dispute and an impending litigation[24] which the parties hope to prevent
by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the
hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing.[25] Under the Kasunduan,
respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims
arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations
thereunder.[26] It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not.
[G.R. NO. 130864 : October 2, 2007]
MARIA L. HAROLD, Petitioner, v. AGAPITO T. ALIBA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Harold engaged the services of respondent Agapito T. Aliba, a geodetic
engineer, to conduct a relocation survey and to execute a consolidation-
subdivision of their properties including that of Harold's sister, Alice Laruan,
located in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. After completing his work, Aliba was
paid P4,050 for his services, but he failed to return the certificates of title of
the said properties for more than one year, despite repeated demands to
return them.
Aliba prevailed upon Harold and her husband to sign a document which was
supposedly needed to facilitate the consolidation-subdivision and the
issuance of separate transfer certificates of title over the properties. Harold
and her husband signed the document without reading it.
A truck loaded with G.I. sheets and construction materials came to the
subject lot2 owned by Harold. Upon inquiry, Harold and her husband were
informed that Aliba had sold the lot to a third person.
On several occasions, Aliba tried to convince Harold to accept the sum
of P400,000 which was later on increased to P500,000, as purchase price of
the said lot. It was only after such offers were made that Aliba told Harold
that he had indeed sold the lot.
Harold agreed to accept the P500,000 from Aliba but only as partial payment,
considering that the lot has an aggregate value of P1,338,0003 or P6,000 per
square meter. On the same date, Harold was made to sign an
acknowledgment receipt and other papers which were made to appear that
Harold accepted the sum of P480,000 as full and final payment for the lot.
Harold later discovered that Aliba made it appear that she had sold the lot to
him for P80,000 and had her certificates of title cancelled and transferred to
him. Harold also found out that the alleged deed of sale was the document
that Aliba caused Harold and her husband to sign in January 1994.
Harold asked for the payment of the fair market value of her property but to
no avail. The dispute between Harold and Aliba was referred to Punong
Barangay Limson Ogas and the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
June 8, 1994 - barangay conciliation proceedings, the parties herein agreed
that Aliba will pay an additional amount of P75,000 to the initial P500,000
Aliba had already given to Harold. In the same proceedings, Aliba
tendered P70,000, which Harold accepted.4 The receipt of the amount given
was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the parties herein,
attested to by the Lupon chairman, and witnessed by several barangay
officials.
June 9, 1994 - Aliba tendered the remaining P5,000 to Harold to complete
their amicable settlement. Unfortunately, Harold refused to accept the same,
saying that P5,000 is not enough and insisted on the elevation of the case to
the court.6 Thus, a certification to file action7 was issued by the Office of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa on June 29, 1994. Immediately thereafter,
Harold filed a Complaint8 against Aliba before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
MTC: issued an Order dismissing Harold's complaint
RTC: Affirmed in toto
CA: denied
hence the current petition
ISSUE: WON the dispute between the parties had already been amicably
settled during the barangay conciliation proceedings.
HELD:
Harold's main contention was hinged on the alleged non-perfection of the
questioned amicable settlement between her and Aliba because there was
allegedly no meeting of the minds between them regarding the subject matter
and the cause thereof.14 On the other hand, Aliba's principal defense is
anchored on the alleged existence and validity of the said amicable
settlement.
Harold's submission that there was no meeting of the minds between the
parties herein pertaining to the subject matter and cause of the questioned
amicable settlement is a clear deviation from the facts on record. Admittedly,
both parties agreed during the June 8, 1994 barangay conciliation
proceedings for Aliba to pay an additional amount of P75,000 (which was the
object or subject matter of the amicable settlement) to the initial P500,000
Aliba had given to Harold as purchase price for the subject lot in order to put
an end to their dispute (which was the cause or reason of the amicable
settlement). Thus, it is evident that the parties herein entered into an
amicable settlement, or more specifically, a compromise agreement, during
the said barangay conciliation proceedings.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise agreement was defined
as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced."
Harold expressly acknowledged that the offer made by Aliba to pay an
additional P75,000 was made in order for her to desist from pursuing her
case against him.18 By reason of her unconditional acceptance of the offer
and the P70,000 tendered to her, Harold had already effectively waived
whatever claims she might have against Aliba regarding the subject lot.
Moreover, she is likewise barred from pursuing her case against Aliba under
the principle of estoppel now.
Furthermore, to rule against the validity of the cited amicable settlement
herein would militate against the spirit and purpose of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law,24 which is to encourage the amicable settlement of
disputes at the barangay level as an alternative to court litigation.
Harold's refusal to accept the remaining P5,000 that Aliba had tendered
cannot constitute an effective repudiation of the questioned amicable
settlement, considering that the reason for her refusal to accept the said
amount or alleged repudiation of the assailed amicable settlement is not one
of the grounds for repudiation clearly specified under Section 418 25 of the
LGC. As borne out by the records, her refusal to accept the same was based
on the alleged insufficiency of the remaining P5,000 as settlement for the lot,
without any reference to vitiation of her consent by any fraud, violence or
intimidation on Aliba's part.

Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel, an admission or WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it.

The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair
dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.

The issue concerning the alleged non-compliance of the amicable settlement

pursuant to the mandate of Section 41122 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code (LGC) arose because there was no formal
document denominated as "Amicable Settlement" signed by the parties.
However, we agree with the similar holdings of the Court of Appeals and the
RTC that the requirements under Section 411 of the LGC had been
substantially complied with. The minutes of the barangay conciliation
proceedings readily disclose the terms agreed upon by the parties for the
settlement of their dispute, and that the acknowledgment receipt, which was
written in a language known to the parties, signed by them, attested to by
the Lupon Chairman, and witnessed by several barangay officials, serves as
an indubitable proof of the amicable settlement and of the substantial
compliance of its terms by respondent Aliba.

Moreover, even without the minutes of the meeting and the acknowledgment
receipt, the amicable settlement, or more specifically the compromise
agreement, entered into by the parties is undeniably valid, considering that "a
compromise agreement is a consensual contract, and as such, it is perfected
upon the meeting of' the minds of the parties to the contract."23
CHAPTER 7 - KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
SEC. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. - (a) There is hereby created in each
barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon,
composed of the punong barangay as chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20)
members. The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner
provided herein.
(b) Any person actually residing or working in the barangay, not otherwise
expressly disqualified by law, and possessing integrity, impartiality,
independence of mind, sense of fairness, and reputation for probity, may be
appointed a member of the lupon.cralaw
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon, which shall include the names of
proposed members who have expressed their willingness to serve, shall be
prepared by the punong barangay within the first fifteen (15) days from the
start of his term of office. Such notice shall be posted in three (3)
conspicuous places in the barangay continuously for a period of not less than
three (3) weeks;
(d) The punong barangay, taking into consideration any opposition to the
proposed appointment or any recommendations for appointments as may
have been made within the period of posting, shall within ten (10) days
thereafter, appoint as members those whom he determines to be suitable
therefor. Appointments shall be in writing, signed by the punong barangay,
and attested to by the barangay secretary.cralaw
(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous
places in the barangay for the entire duration of their term of office;
and cralaw
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous
cultural communities, local systems of es through their councils of datus or
elders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of
this Code.cralaw
SEC. 400. Oath and Term of Office. - Upon appointment, each lupon
member shall take an oath of office before the punong barangay. He shall
hold office until a new lupon is constituted on the third year following his
appointment unless sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of residence
or place of work, or withdrawal of appointment by the punong barangay with
the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the lupon.cralaw
SEC. 401. Vacancies. - Should a vacancy occur in the lupon for any cause,
the punong barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall
hold office only for the unexpired portion of the term.cralaw
SEC. 402. Functions of the Lupon. - The lupon shall: (a) Exercise
administrative supervision over the conciliation panels provided herein;
(b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a forum for exchange of ideas
among its members and the public on matters relevant to the amicable
settlement of disputes, and to enable various conciliation panel members to
share with one another their observations and experiences in effecting
speedy resolution of disputes; and cralaw
(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions
as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.cralaw
SEC. 403. Secretary of the Lupon. - The barangay secretary shall
concurrently serve as the secretary of the lupon. He shall record the results
of mediation proceedings before the punong barangay and shall submit a
report thereon to the proper city or municipal courts. He shall also receive
and keep the records of proceedings submitted to him by the various
conciliation panels.cralaw
SEC. 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. - (a) There shall be constituted for
each dispute brought before the lupon a conciliation panel to be known as
the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo, hereinafter referred to as the pangkat,
consisting of three (3) members who shall be chosen by the parties to the
dispute from the list of members of the lupon. Should the parties fail to agree
on the pangkat membership, the same shall be determined by lots drawn by
the lupon chairman.cralaw
(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among
themselves the chairman and the secretary. The secretary shall prepare the
minutes of the pangkat proceedings and submit a copy duly attested to by
the chairman to the lupon secretary and to the proper city or municipal court.
He shall issue and cause to be served notices to the parties concerned. The
lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his
custody that is not by law otherwise declared confidential.cralaw
SEC. 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat. - Any vacancy in the pangkat shall be
chosen by the parties to the dispute from among the other lupon members.
Should the parties fail to agree on a common choice, the vacancy shall be
filled by lot to be drawn by the lupon chairman.cralaw
SEC. 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members. - (a) The
lupon members, while in the performance of their official duties or on the
occasion thereof, shall be deemed as persons in authority, as defined in the
Revised Penal Code.cralaw
(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except
as provided for in Section 393 and without prejudice to incentives as
provided for in this Section and in Book IV of this Code. The Department of
the Interior and Local Government shall provide for a system of granting
economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who
adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve
cases referred to them. While in the performance of their duties, the lupon or
pangkat members, whether in public or private employment, shall be deemed
to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in
compensation or allowance from said employment by reason thereof.cralaw
SEC. 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law. - The
provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal officer shall
render legal advice on matters involving questions of law to the punong
barangay or any lupon or pangkat member whenever necessary in the
exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang
pambarangay.cralaw
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. - The
lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:chanrobles virtual law library
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to
the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other
and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the
lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio
refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.cralaw
SEC. 409. Venue. - (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of
said barangay.cralaw
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or
any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant.cralaw
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought
in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is
situated.cralaw
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall
be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the
punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal
question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to
venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his
duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding.cralaw
SEC. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. - (a) Who may initiate
proceeding - Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual who
has a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within
the authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon
chairman of the barangay.cralaw
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman - Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon
chairman shall within the next working day summon the respondent(s), with
notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before
him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation
effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him,
he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance
with the provisions of this Chapter.cralaw
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses - While the dispute is under
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses
and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the
complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume
upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty
(60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.cralaw
(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification - The pangkat
shall convene not later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day
and hour set by the lupon chairman, to hear both parties and their witnesses,
simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this
purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of
parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to disqualify
any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias, interest, or any
other similar grounds discovered after the constitution of the pangkat, the
matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat
whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the
resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.cralaw
(e) Period to arrive at a settlement - The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement
or resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes
in accordance with this section. This period shall, at the discretion of the
pangkat, be extendible for another period which shall not exceed fifteen (15)
days, except in clearly meritorious cases.cralaw
SEC. 411. Form of Settlement. - All amicable settlements shall be in writing,
in a language or dialect known to the parties, signed by them, and attested to
by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be. When
the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the
settlement shall be written in the language or dialect known to them.cralaw
SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. -
No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat
chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties
thereto.cralaw
(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. - The parties may go directly to
court in the following instances:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Where the accused is under detention; (2) Where a person has otherwise
been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente
lite; and cralaw
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations.cralaw
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. - The
customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in
settling disputes between members of the cultural communities.cralaw
SEC. 413. Arbitration. - (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings,
agree in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon
chairman or the pangkat. Such agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated
within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same grounds and in
accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award
shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within ten (10)
days thereafter.cralaw
(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to
the parties. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or
dialect, the award shall be written in the language or dialect known to
them.cralaw
SEC. 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception. - All proceedings for
settlement shall be public and informal: Provided, however, That the lupon
chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be, may motu proprio or
upon request of a party, exclude the public from the proceedings in the
interest of privacy, decency, or public morals.cralaw
SEC. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.cralaw
SEC. 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. - The
amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date
thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to
nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon
under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the
compromise settlement agreed upon by the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court and upon
approval thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.cralaw
SEC. 417. Execution. - The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be
enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the
settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court.cralaw
SEC. 418. Repudiation. - Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days
from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the lupon
chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is
vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient
basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove
provided.cralaw

SEC. 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration Award to the Court. -

The secretary of the lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration
award to the appropriate city or municipal court within five (5) days from the
date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day period repudiating the
settlement and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the
settlement and the lupon chairman.cralaw

SEC. 420. Power to Administer Oaths. - The punong barangay, as chairman

of the lupong tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby
authorized to administer oaths in connection with any matter relating to all
proceedings in the implementation of the katarungang pambarangay.cralaw

SEC. 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. - The city or municipal

mayor, as the case may be, shall see to the efficient and effective
implementation and administration of the katarungang pambarangay. The
Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to
implement this Chapter.cralaw

SEC. 422. Appropriations. - Such amount as may be necessary for the

effective implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall be provided
for in the annual budget of the city or municipality concerned.