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Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may rather
have effect than be destroyed)
Interpretatio fienda est ust res magis valeat quam pereat. A law
should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying
it. One portion of a statute should not be construed to destroy the
other. A construction that would render a provision inoperative or
ineffective should be avoided. The provision should be harmonized
and reconciled, if possible; they should be construed together as
means to effect the purpose of the law.
JMM Promotions and Management Inc., vs. NLRC
FACTS:
JMM Promotions and Management Inc. (recruitment agency)
appealed with the NLRC the decision of POEA. The sole issue
submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992,
dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post
the required appeal bond.
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the
Labor Code and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC.
Article 223 of the Labor Code: In the case of a judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the
POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of
licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond
of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules Upon
approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license
fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000
and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company
acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the
Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid
and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for
the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and
contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise
guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment
and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant
issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the
Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include
the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the
surety and that any judgment against the principal in
connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction
shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety
bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with
Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for
valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims."
The Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but
suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to
decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules
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Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall
be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section
1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of
the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state
the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date
when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or
award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the
other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the
Administration involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award.
ISSUE:
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and
placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA
Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC? (YES)
HELD:
It was. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows
that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money,
an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment
of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in
escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal
claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment
have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for
violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement
of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide
for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and
not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of
recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This
amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it
could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other
subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary
award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein
private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA
Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not
against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow
money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee
to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds
and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local
employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple
explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our
workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against
whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas
recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and
the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of
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the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our
overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a
statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
2
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Under
the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it
has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of
the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the
same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under
Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for
perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the
working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution.
By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its
commitment to the interest of labor.
The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner
Review of law in its entirety and its intendment must be
given effect
One part of a statute is as important as the other. The statute should
be construed and given effect as a whole. A provision which is unclear
by itself may be made clear by reading and construing it in relation to
the whole statute.
In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by
the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts together;
ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each and
every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the
statute; and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and
sensible.
Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority vs. Manila Pest Control
Petitioner: Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA)
Respondent: Manila Pest Control Company (MAPECON)
FACTS:
Petitioner FPA is an attached agency of the Department of
Agriculture, created pursuant to P.D. 1144, "Creating the Fertilizer
and Pesticide Authority and Abolishing the Fertilizer Industry
Authority,"
Respondent MAPECON is a franchised and licensed urban pest
control operator. It is accredited by the National Committee on
Urban Pest Control (NCUPC) to engage in the manufacture,
distribution, and application of its 38 patented pest control products.
Respondent Woodrow Catan is the MAPECON Dumaguete City
Branch Manager.
Vicente Laohan of the FPA issued a certificate that MAPECON-
Dumaguete branch had no license to operate, and that its pesticide
products were not registered with the FPA, prohibiting them from
engaging in the business as they are violations of PD 1144.
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Respondents MAPECON and Catan filed a complaint for
injunction with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order and damages, against Laohan and Turtal before
the RTC of Dumaguete, seeking to enjoin them from disturbing their
business operations. Trial Court granted the petition.
In an amended complaint, respondents impleaded the FPA and its
officers Cornejo and Deen as defendants. Respondents
(MAPECON) alleged that Cornejo and Deen sent letters to several
clients of MAPECON advising them to desist from dealing with the
company, because it had no license to engage in pest control. RTC
ruled in favor of respondents MAPECON and Catan.
Hence, this appeal which raises a lone issue for resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N the acts or business operations of respondent MAPECON are
under the jurisdiction or regulatory power of the petitioner.
HELD/RATIO:
The MAPECON is an urban pest control operator. FPA has jurisdiction
only over agricultural pesticides, not urban pest control products.
Basics in statutory construction : "in interpreting the meaning and
scope of a term used in the law, a review of the whole law must be
made, and its intendment must be given effect. The various
provisions of P.D. 1144 show its consistent intent to apply the term
'pesticides' only to agricultural use. Thus, urban pest control
operators and their urban pesticides are excluded from its coverage."
Most significant provision - sets the parameters of the powers and
duties of the FPA.
Sec 1 of P.D. 1144 - Creation of the Fertlizer and Pesticide
Authority - The Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, herein after
referred to as the FPA, is hereby created and attached to
the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of assuring
the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer
and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing th
manufacture and marketing of fertlizer, protecting the public
from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and
educating the agricultural sector in the use of these
inputs."
Other provisions specifying agriculture:
Preamble of P.D. 1144
"to provide assistance to the agricultural sector"
"fertilizer and pesticides are vital inputs in food
production"
"need to educate the agricultural sector".... Etc.
Sec. 6 of P.D. 1144
Powers and functions -- the FPA shall have
jurisdiction over all existing handlers of pesticides,
fertilizers and other agricultural chemical
inputs."
(2) to promoted and coordinate all fertilizer and
pesticides research
Sec. 8
Prohibitions Governing Sale and Use of Fertilizers
and pesticides -- it shall be unlawful for any handler
of pesticides, fertilizer, and other agricultural
chemicals ....
Wisdom / Practicality of Law
It is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the Executive to
execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. This
division of responsibility, as mandated by the Constitution, precludes
one department from encroaching upon the power of the other.
Accordingly, since the legislature is primarily the judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any
law, Courts may not take any of these matters into account in
construing or interpreting the law. As long as laws do not violate the
Constitution, the courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary.
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Because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld
RCBC vs. IAC the delivery to RCBC of a certificate of sale covering the
auctioned properties.
Petition for the review of the decision of Intermediate Appellate Court February 13, 1985 SEC belatedly issued a writ of
(IAC) annulling the decision of trial court and directing the Register of preliminary injunction stopping the auction sale which had been
Deeds to suspend issuance of the owners copies of the land titles to conducted by the sheriff two weeks earlier.
RCBC until matters are resolved in SEC March 13, 1985 RCBC filed with the Regional Trial
Facts: Court an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal
September 28, 1984 BF Homes filed a "Petition for and his deputy to compel them to execute in its favor a certificate of
Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments" (SEC sale of the auctioned properties.
Case No. 002693) with the Securities and Exchange Commission March 18, 1985 SEC appointed a Management
(SEC). Committee for BF Homes.
One of the creditors listed in its inventory of creditors and May 8, 1985 RTC granted RCBCs petition
liabilities was RCBC. June 4, 1986 B.F. Homes filed a complaint with
October 26, 1984 RCBC requested the Provincial the IAC praying for the annulment of the judgment of RTC
Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage April 8, 1986 IAC rendered a decision, setting
on some properties of BF Homes. aside the decision of the trial court, Register of Deeds of Pasay City
October 29, 1984 A notice of extra-judicial foreclosure had taken the SEC Resolution dated October 16, 1986 (which
sale was issued by the sheriff, scheduled on November 29, 2984 denied B.F. Homes petition to annul the auction sale) as its cue for
November 28, 1984 SEC issued a TRO enjoining RCBC proceeding with the transfers of title, despite an explicit directive of
and the sheriff from proceeding with the public auction sale Court of Appeals (before IAC) to suspend issuance of new land titles
Sale was rescheduled to January 29, 1985 in RCBCs name
January 25, 1985 SEC ordered the issuance of a writ (Shorter version: B.F. Homes applied for a Petition for Rehabilitation and for
of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing of a bond. Declaration of Suspension of Payments in SEC but RCBC asked requested
for an extra judicial foreclosure sale and the sheriff issued one and
January 29, 1985 Only then did the petitioner file a
scheduled the auction on November. The SEC issued a TRO for the auction
bond
and it was rescheduled on January 29 of the following year. The SEC issued
Presumably, unaware of the filing of the bond, the sheriffs
a writ of preliminary injunction but the B.F. only filed a bond after 3 days, the
proceeded with the public auction and RCBC was the
day which the auction will be held. The sheriff continued the auction on
highest bidder
January 29 (presumably unaware of the filing of bond) and RCBC was the
February 5, 1985 BF Homes filed in the SEC a motion
highest bidder. B.F. applied to a motion to annul the auction (it was denied)
to annul the auction sale and to cite RCBC and the sheriff for
and because of this, the sheriff withheld the transferring of the title to RCBC
contempt
so RCBC went to trial court for mandamus against the sheriff and the trial
court granted the petition. B.F. went to CA for the annulment of judgment of

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trial court and CA reversed the decision of trial court. It was only on March
18, 1985, after RCBC filed a petition in the trial court, that SEC appointed a
Management Committee for B.F. Homes.)
Issue:
Whether or not preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand
on equal footing with all other creditors gains relevance and
materiality only upon the appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board, or body
Ruling:
The ruling of CA upholds the executive jurisdiction of SEC over the
assets and properties of a distressed firm under PD 902-A (Section 5
d), as amended
Whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer
assert such preference, but stand on equal footing with other
creditors.
Foreclosure shall be disallowed. If foreclosure is undertaken despite
the fact that a petition, for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate
of sale shall not be delivered pending rehabilitation. No transfer of
title shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation.
Prohibition against foreclosure attaches as soon as a petition for
rehabilitation is filed
Dissent: (Feliciano)
Actual language used in Section 6 c and d of PD 902-A, as
amended, does not support the position taken in the ponencia
Appointment of management committee or a rehabilitation receiver is
not ordinarily effected immediately upon the filing of an application
for suspension of payments and for rehabilitation
The SEC must determine first whether the jurisdictional
requirements for the appointment of a management
committee are present
Only upon such appointment of the management committee did the
provision in Section 6 c which decrees suspension of actions for
claims against the petitioning corporation take effect
Lacson vs. Roque
Overview: The case is about a petition for PROHIBITION and PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION on the suspension of LACSON as City Mayor. The suspension
was issued by the President. Lacson is contesting whether the suspension
was legal or not.
Facts:
Arsenio Lacson was suspended by the President because of libel
against a certain Judge Montesa
Judge Montesa was the trial judge of a case where he acquitted the
suspect in a case of malversation of public property.
Because of this decision Arsenio Lacson gave the following
remarks
"I have nothing but contempt for certain courts of
justice. . . . I tell you one thing (answering an
interrogator), if I have the power to fire Judge
Montesa (the trial judge) I will fire him for being
incompetent, for being an arrogant . . . an
ignoramus."
Because of the remark, Judge Montesa filed a libel suit against
Lacson.
Following the suit, the President then gave this letter to Montesa:
In view of the pendency before the Court of First Instance of
Manila of criminal case No. 20707 against you, for libel, and
pursuant to the present policy of the administration,
requiring the suspension of any local elective official
which is being charged before the courts with any offense
involving moral turpitude, you are hereby suspended from
office effective upon receipt hereof, your suspension to
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continue until the final disposition of the said criminal
case.
Issue:
W/N the suspension was valid.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
Contrast between 2 laws
By section 9 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Republic
Act No. 409), "the Mayor shall hold office for four years unless
sooner removed."
But does not contain any provision for this officer's removal
or suspension.
This silence is in striking contrast to the explicitness with
which Republic Act No. 409 stipulates for the removal and
suspension of board members and other city officials.
Since the Charter is silent on this part, section 64 (b) of the
Revised Administrative Code does confer upon the President
the power to remove any person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the Philippines for disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines.
The Congress is presumed to have been aware of section 64 (b) of
the Revised Administrative Code and to have in mind this section
and other removal statutes that may be enacted in the future, in
employing the phrase "unless sooner removed."
Why the suspension is invalid
But the contention that the President has inherent power to remove
or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials.
The Constitution (in their time) says that the President "shall . . .
exercise general supervision over all local governments," but
supervision does not contemplate control.
The President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs
disqualified by the proviso " as may be provided by law," a clear
indication of constitutional intention that the provision was not to be
self-executing but requires legislative implementation.
the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins that the said
power should be exercised conformably to law, which we assume to
mean that removals must be accomplished only for any of the
causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
the power of the President to remove or suspend the Mayor of
the City of Manila is confined to disloyalty to the Republic or, at
the most, for the other causes stipulated in section 2078 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and that the suspension of the
petitioner for libel is outside the bounds of express or unwritten
law.
It is clear that the case of Lacson is libel and NOT disloyalty,
dishonesty or oppression,
The most closest condition to the suspension or removal is
misconduct but the Court could still not uphold the suspension
because the President should not be given the power to remove any
officer at his own pleasure.
"Fixity of tenure destroys the power of removal at pleasure
otherwise incident to the appointing power . . . The reason of
this rule is the evident repugnance between the fixed term
and the power of arbitrary removal . . ."
WHEREFORE the petition must be, and the same is granted, without costs.
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Quintos vs. Lacson
Note : no construction of laws involved ; main takeaway would be As long
as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary, I think but im not sure haha
Facts :
Jose Quintos was appointed patrolman in the Manila Police
Department and 2 years thereafter on December 1947 was promoted
to the position of Detective.
he was duly qualified to hold both offices
Arsenio H. Lacson, the City Mayor, dismissed Quintos along with 4
other detectives.
Quintos file case to annul the order in the CFI of Manila against the
respondent mayor and Police Chief Dionisio Ojeda
CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction not to carry our order and
subsequently the court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff.
Respondents appealed judgement directly to the Supreme Court
Issues:
W/N summary dismissal of a Manila city detective under the
provisions of EO 264, in view of RA 557 is valid
Held / Ratio
City detectives are members of the police force and that the manner
of their dismissal is governed by the provisions of RA 557
Sufficient to refer to the case of Olegario v Lacson where
petitioner contended that
Manila Police Department detective is a position
confidential in nature as declared by EO 264 and
that RA 557 did not repeal said EO
Olegario not being a civil service eligible, his
appointment should only be considered as
temporary under Sec. 682 of Revised Admin Code
First issue has been thoroughly addressed by Mission v Del
Rosario where the court held that EO 264 has been repealed
by RA 557
Second issue answered by Uy v Rodriguez where the court
explained that unless it is shown that a detectives
appointment is temporary he may not be dismissed except in
accordance to RA 557.
This was reiterated in Palamine v Zagado, Mission v
Del Rosario and Abella v Rodriguez
Counsel of appellants urges the court to review the mentioned
rulings but the court sees no reason or occasion for making any
change of revision.
If said law is detrimental to the detectives in Manila,
proper representations and requests may be made to
the legislature
As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary
Decision is affirmed
Victoria vs. COMELEC
Juan D. Victoria, petitioner v. COMELEC and Jesus James Calisin,
respondents.
GR No. 109005 January 10, 1994
Petition for Certiorari to set aside a resolution of the Comelec
FACTS
- May 11, 1992 Province of Albay District Elections
o Winners
First District
Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes
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Second District
Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes
- Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay was suspended
- Vice Governor Danilo Azana assumed the position of governor
leading to a vacancy in the position of vice-governor
o Under the law, a vacancy of vice governor should be occupied by
the highest ranking Sanggunian member, a post being contested by
petitioner and private respondent
o Respondent Calisin previously petitioned to be declared senior
Sanggunian member so COMELEC issued a resolution certifying him
as first ranking member with petitioner Victoria, second ranking
member.
ABOVE RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON NUMBER OF
VOTES OBTAINED IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS
- February 15, 1993 respondent Calisin was proclaimed vice-governor
- Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should
be based not only on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total
number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district
who ACTUALLY VOTED therein.
- Petitioner gives following formula (FIGURES TAKEN PER DISTRICT)
o Respondent Calisin
107,216 (actual voters) / 129,793 (registered voters) x 28,335
(votes obtained)
= 23.40%
o Petitioner Victoria
121,423 (actual voters) / 154,665 (registered voters) x 32,918
(votes obtained)
= 25.84%
ISSUE
- W/N The number of actual voters should be factored in determining
Sanggunian rank
HELD
- NO.
- The Law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered votes of each district. It
does not mention anything about factoring the number of voters who actually
voted.
RATIO
- SEC 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the governor, or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor shall
become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices
of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking
Sanggunian member, or in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking Sanggunian member shall assume the position.
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking the
Sanggunian SHALL BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE
PROPORTION OF VOTES OBTAINED BY EACH WINNING CANDIDATE
TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS IN EACH DISTRICT
in the immediately preceding local election
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- In such case, Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. It
does not mention anything about factoring the number of voters who actually
voted.
- In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable v NLRC, it was held that Under
the principles of Statcon, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.
o Verba legis plain meaning
o Index animi sermo speech is the index of intention
o Verbal egis non est recedendum from the words of a statute
there should be no departure
- Considering the foregoing, no grave abuse of discretion on
COMELEC. Petition DISMISSED.
Executive / Administrative Interpretation
The duty of the executive branch to enforce the law necessarily calls
for the interpretation of its ambiguous provisions. Accordingly,
executive and administrative officers are generally the very first
officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement. These
interpretations are in the form of rules and regulations, circulars,
directives, opinions and rulings. They are entitled to great weight and
respect by the courts in the interpretation of ambiguous provisions of
law, and unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous, it will control the
interpretation of statute by the courts. In the absence of error or abuse
of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, the action
of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts.
University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioners: President of the University of the Philippines, UP Board of
Regents, and the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
Action: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the CA
FACTS:
Pursuant to the authority of the President to reorganize Executive
Departments, EO 94 states that the Philippine General Hospital is
transferred from the Office of the President to the University of the
Philippines, together with its personnel, powers, functions, duties,
records, equipment and unexpended balance of appropriations
After the transfer, the UP-PGH investigative committee was planning
to dismiss private respondents Camilo Pena and Domingo Cajipe
(employees of the hospital) due to grave misconduct and dishonesty
Private respondents therein sought to restrain the UP President from
dismissing them since the Philippine General Hospital is governed by
the Civil Service Law from year 1936 until the transfer to UP
Insisting that since they are Civil Service Employees, it is not within
the authority of the UP president, but of the Civil Service
Commissioner to dismiss them from their jobs
Private respondents cited Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of
1959 or RA 2260, which states that:
It shall be among the powers and duties of the
Commissioner of Civil Service: (i) except as otherwise
provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers
and employees
Petitioner University, on the other hand invokes disciplinary power
over the private respondents on the basis of Section 6 of the
University Charter or Act No. 1870, which declares that UP can
dismiss its employees only after a proper hearing and investigation.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, as well as the CA has ruled in
favor of the Private respondents, thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of the private respondents is within the authority of the
University President.
HELD/RATIO:
YES
WHERE DO WE BEGIN? IN THE TEXT OF COURSE
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the act of the President in transferring the PGH to the administration
of the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the intention to
also place the Hospital under the rules and regulations of the
University Charter
Had it been otherwise, EO 94 should have stated exceptions in
reserving the matters of discipline, suspension and removal of the
employees under the Civil Service Commissioner.
in other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for
the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees
and the only exception is if it is otherwise provided by law
EO 94 falls within the first sentence of Section 16 (i) of RA 2260, or
in the statement except as otherwise provided by law.
Therefore the authority of the Civil Service Commissioner in
dismissing the private respondents has already been
transferred to the University President by the same
Executive Agreement and it doesnt violate Section 16 (i) of
RA 2260
Enrique vs CA
Petitioners: Rodolfo Enrique and Jesus Basilio
Respondents: Court of Appeals (CA) and Civil Service Commision (CSC)
Stat Con Takeaway: Repeals by implication are not favored.
Facts:
Petition to review the decision of the CA in affirming CSC Resolution
No. 84-411
The Alleged Guilty Parties: Corazon Pacheco, Jesus Basilio
(petitioner herein), Virgilio Valencia and Rodolfo Enrique (petitioner
herein), all employees of the Civil Service Regional Office No. 3, San
Fernando, Pampanga, together with Rogelio Maglagui, Eduardo
Garcia and Lilia Cunanan
The Scheme: Above mentioned were part of the Recruitment and
Examination division. Allegedly received considerations ranging from
P500-1000 to help or assist examinees by placing them in particular
rooms called chocolate rooms. Rooms contained an expert (Haligi)
who would pose as an examinee, but would instead help the other
examinees. Proctors were paid P250 for their cooperation.
Preventive suspensions issued due to dishonesty, grave misconduct,
being notoriously undesirable, receiving fees and gifts for personal
use in the course of official duties, and others unprofessional conduct
Petitioners denied charges against them. Requested for formal
hearing if dismissal / lifting of the suspension was not possible.
Request DENIED in accordance with Sec. 40 of PD 807
Petitioners filed motion to reconsider because A) Sec. 40 of PD 807
not applicable due to absent circumstances, and B) constitutional
rights would be placed in jeopardy if summary of proceedings
replaced formal proceedings since they opted for formal
investigation. Motion to reconsider DENIED due to lack of merit.
Additional evidence submitted (sworn statements they were not
aware of examination syndicate and attesting their integrity and
honesty) Prompted Resolution 84-411: Rogelio Maglagui and Lilia
Cunanan reduced to one year suspension
Rodolfo Enrique, Jesus Basilio, Corazon Pacheco, and Virgilio
Valencia appealed to CA CA affirmed decision in Resolution 84-
411 BUT Corazon Pacheco and Virgilio Valencia reinstated.
Current case is the Petition to the SC from Rodolfo Enrique and
Jesus Basilio
Issues:
1. W/N CSC has jurisdiction to decide disciplinary cases. (Stat Con Issue)
2. W/N petitioners were denied due process of law.
3. W/N dismissal of petitioners from service through a summary proceeding
by CSC was proper.
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Held / Ratio:
1. YES CSC does have jurisdiction to decide this particular disciplinary case.
(Stat Con Focus)
Petitioners contend that CSC has no original jurisdiction, instead
jurisdiction lies with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
Sec. 37(b) of PD 807 states
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction.
CSC is an agency within purview of Sec 37(b) therefore can
discipline its officers and employees
BUT Petitioners claim that PD 807 was IMPLIEDLY REPEALED by
PD 1409 which created the MSPB, an office under the CSC. Sec 5 of
PD 1409 states board has power to:
(5) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry.
The Board shall have the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the rules of court under the same procedure
with the same penalties provided therein.
Court rules that repeals by implication are not favored. **Court must
first try to reconcile conflicting provisions. If it is irreconcilable THEN
the earlier law can be said to have been impliedly repealed by the
later law** In the case of Government Service Insurance System v.
Civil Service Commission it was ruled that when the law bestows two
government bodies with the same jurisdiction they shall have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. PD 807 and 1409 have
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to CSC officials and employees
Memorandum Circular No. 6 Series of 1978 of the CSC further
stresses: decisions and determinations are appealable to the MSPB.
The CSC, however, remains the final administrative appellate body in
these matters, as provided in Sec. 8 of PD 1409
2. No. Petitioners were not denied due process of the law when they were
dismissed through a summary of proceedings instead of formal proceedings.
Allowed in Sec. 40 of PD 807 which provides:
Sec. 40. Summary Proceedings. No formal investigation
is necessary and the respondent may be immediately
removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances
is present;
(a) When the charge is serious and the
evidence of guilty is strong.
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has
been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable
ground to believe that he is guilty of the present
charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously
undesirable.
Resort to summary proceedings by disciplinary authority
shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the
end that no injustice is committed: Provided, that removal or
dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his
order, may be appealed to the Commission.
This section was later repealed in the Abalos v. CSC case in May
1988, but offense took place on Nov 1983 therefore still applicable
3. Yes, their dismissal was proper as clearly provided for in Sec 40 of PD 807
Referring again to the Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service
Commission case. Sec 40 is valid if the respondents are duly informed of the
charges against them, and were given reasonable opportunity to defend
themselves. Petitioners filed their answer to the charges against them, and
submitted additional evidence for their defense when asked to do so.
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Literal Interpretation
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. If a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. The rule rests on the presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a stature correctly expresses its
intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. It
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no
choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for
construction or interpretation.
Bello vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioners: Juan Bello and Filomena C. Bello
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals (Third Division: Magno S. Gatmaitan,
Guillermo S. Santos, and Ricardo C. Puno, JJ.); Hon. Francisco Llamas, as
Judge of Pasay City Court; and Republic of the Philippines
Teehankee, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged on Aug. 25, 1970 for estafa before the City
Court of Pasay
Petitioners allegedly misappropriated a ladys ring with a
value of Php 1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio
de Guzman for sale on commission basis.
Petitioners were convicted after the trial and sentenced under
respondent city courts decision of Feb. 26, 1971 to 6 months and 1
day of prision correctional and to indemnify the offended party in the
sum of Php 1,000.00 with costs of suit.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal to the Court of First Instance of
Pasay City
Prosecution filed a petition to dismiss appeal
Prosecution argues that since the case was within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first
instance and the trial in the city court had been duly
recorded, the appeal should have been brought to the Court
of Appeals
Basis is Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Act, RA 296, as
amended.
Petitioners invoked the provision of Rule 50, Sec. 3 which directs that
the CA in cases erroneously brought to it shall not dismiss the
appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific
and clear statement of the grounds therefor,
They pray that if the court of first instance should find their
appeal to have been wrongly brought to it, to certify the
same to the CA or the SC
Court of First Instance found that the appeal should have been taken
directly to the CA and thus they dismissed the appeal.
Petitioners were not notified of the dismissal of the appeal
until they were called by the Pasay city court for execution of
judgment (for estafa sentence)
Petitioners filed a motion to elevate appeal to CA in the city court
City court denied the motion for having been erroneously
brought to the city court instead of the court of first instance
Petitioners then filed for a petition for prohibition and mandamus
against the People and respondent city court to prohibit execution of
judgment and to compel the respondent city court to elevate their
appeal to the CA
CA dismissed the petition, affirming the city courts judgment though
the CA holds that the CFI should have not dismissed the appeal and
endorsed it instead to the CA, but since the CFI was not a principal
party respondent in this case, the CA cannot grant any relief
Petitioners moved for reconsideration
Denied by the appellate court
Thus, petitioners filed the present motion for review
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ISSUES:
Did the courts acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petitioner-accuseds appeal?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. Petition is granted, appeal is elevated to the CA and petitioners are
given relief.
CIF acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition
when it should have endorsed it to the CA
CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition
instead of setting aside the challenged order of the CIF because the
CIF was not a principal party respondent
CA erred in saying that it could not correct the acts of the
CIF and grant the relief sought of having the appeal elevated
to it since said courts presiding judge who should have
been made under Rule 65, Sec. 3 herein principal party
respondent, but he was not.
Respondent judge is only a nominal party.
Absence of CIF as principal party respondent could have
been overlooked
The real party in interest, the People as plaintiff and represented by
the Solicitor General, agreed to set aside the decision of the CIF in
the interest of justice and equity
CAs setting aside sacrificed substance to form and
subordinated substantial justice to procedural technicality
The Court thus grants the relief sought by the petitioners.
STATCON ISSUE:
Rule 50, sec 3 expressly provides that the CA shall not dismiss the
appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court
No logical reason why the CIF in a misdirected appeals to it
should not be likewise bound by the same rule
The failure of the rule to provide for such cases of
misdirected appeals to the CIF would not be a cause for
unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right of
appeal
This Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute as to
defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the
essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such
deplorable result of injustice or absurdity
A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results
ESGUERRA, J.: Dissenting
Rule 50, Section 3 of the Rule of Court apply to the courts expressly
given in the foregoing provisions
The Supreme Court cannot supply the deficiency through a judicial
fiat
It must promulgate a new rule governing transfer of cases
erroneously appealed to the CIF from judgments of inferior
courts in cases directly appealable to the CA
Furthermore, CIF was not party to the case hence it cannot be bound
by any judgment herein, thus the decision of the CIF and the CA will
stand.
Salaria vs. Buenviaje
Petitioner: Ramon Salaria
Respondent: Hon. Carlos R. Buenviaje, Executive Judge of the CFI of
Camsur Branch 7 Iriga City and Antonio V. Mendiola
Concur: Makasiar, Munoz Palma, Fernandez, Teehankee(chairman)
Ponente: Guerrero
Statcon: Literal Interpretation, Construction made by the one implementing
the law should be given weight.
Facts:
Salaria is a lessee in the land of Eliodoro Cailao
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Salaria and Cailao agreed that his monthly rental fee of P 6.00 which
was later raised to P 10.00, they had NO agreement in the duration
In Dec. 1972, Cailao advised Salaria not to pay anymore and vacate
the land because Salaria liked Ceferina Flores, wife of the
respondent Antonio Mendiola. Land was sold to Antonio Mendiola
and Ceferina Flores for P 300.00. After December of 1972, no rental
was collected either by Cailao or Mendiola, which is why Salaria
deposited P 200.00 with the Clerk of Court while the case was being
tried
On Aug. 23, 1974, a complaint for unlawful retainer was filed by
Antonio Mendiola against Ramon Salaria in Branch 2 of the City
Court of Iriga, Civil Case lr-431.
On Sept. 6, 1974, Salaria filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action because PD No. 20
suspends Art. 1673 of the Civil Code and the need of Mendiola of
the land for his own use does not fall in the exception provided in the
PD. On Sept. 26, 1974, Judge Buenviaje denied the motion to
dismiss
On Oct. 21, 1974, in Salaria's answer: 1. He admitted that he has
been occupying the land of Cailao as lessee but the agreement was
without a fixed period. 2. As special and affirmative defenses, he
alleged that no cause of action exists because PD No. 20 Sec. 4
suspends it;
City Courts decision ordered: 1. Salaria to vacate the land in 3
months. 2. Salaria is excused to pay back rentals, because of
financial hard up, from Jan. 1973 to the time he vacates it, the P
200.00 will be returned to him
In the appeal to the CFI of Camsur, the decision was affirmed with
modification. The P 200.00 is given to Mendiola.
Issues:
1. W/N under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, the private
respondent can eject the petitioner from the lot in question on the
ground that he needs the lot for own use
2. W/N this case is covered Presidential No. 20
Held:
1. Petitioner CANNOT be ejected from the lot. (Literal Interpretation)
Sec. 4 of PD No. 20 states that: "Except when the lease is for a
definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or
land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended until
otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the
Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they
are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply."
Art. 1673 Par. 1 of the Civil Code States that the lessor may judicially
eject the lessee if: "(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is
fixed for the duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has
expired;"
Lease agreement has no duration therefore it comes under Art. 1687
which states that "If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year"
Construing Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 in relation to Art.
1673 par. I and Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, it is clear and explicit that
Presidential Decree No. 20 suspends paragraph (1) of Article 1673.
Hence, the petitioner cannot be ejected at the expiration of the
period provided under Article 1687 of the Civil Code.
2. Case is covered by the PD No. 20 (Statcon)
- The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal
use of the property by the owners or lessors or their families is not
one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in
Article 1673 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6359, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 20.
Accordingly, the lessee, petitioner herein, cannot be ordered to
vacate the premises of the land in question pursuant to said law.
- Memorandum Circular No. 970 issued by the Office of the President
construes PD No. 20 (protection of low-income members of society)
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1. Although the construction put by the executive branch of the
government on a particular law is not necessarily binding upon the
courts, it must be given some weight as it comes from that branch of
the government caned upon to implement the law. (Gabio vs.
Ganzon, No. L-11664, March 16,1961, 1 SCRA 713,718)
2. The construction of the office charged with implementing and
enforcing the provision of a statute should be giving controlling
weight. (Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, l
9337, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617).
Note: Sec. 4 of RA 6126 and Sec. 4 of RA 6359(amended by PD No. 20)
protects low-income members of society too.
Decision: Decision of the CFI is reversed except the withdrawal of Mendiola
of the P 200.00. Salaria is ordered to pay back rentals at P 10.00 per month.
Valid in part, void in part
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant
to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent.
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute
are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the
nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.
Barrameda vs. Moir
Petitioner: Juan Barrameda vs. Judge Percy M. Moir (Judge of First
Instance)
Petition for Mandamus. Barrameda went to justice of the peace then the
court of First Instance to try a parcel of land, both courts decided against him
with the Court of First Instance dismissing him and ordering the justice of the
peace to proceed with execution of judgment. Case did not state sufficient
facts to cause action from the courts. Judge states that Act Nos. 2041 and
2131 are repugnant to the Philippine bill of July 1, 1902.
2041: Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
questions of title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the
property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such
value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the
justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the court of first
instance.
2131: above provision was amended by substituting exclusive original
jurisdiction to exclusive jurisdiction
Philippine Bill: Original jurisdiction of court of first instance is ALL civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property, or of any interest
therein
All is a comprehensive word, the Philippine Bill orders The Court of First
Instance to have jurisdiction on ALL civil actions. Jurisdiction of Supreme
Court and Court of First Instance can be added to but not diminished by
Philippine legislature.
ISSUE:
Are Acts No. 2041 and 2131 void and repugnant to the Philippine Bill?
HELD:
Only part of the Act is voided: where the Justice of the Peace is given
jurisdiction to try land title cases because the Philippine Bill only allows the
Court of First Instance to do so with exclusive jurisdiction. See above.
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Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy
G.R. No. 124360
Petitioner: Francisco Tatad
Responent: THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 127867
Petitioners: Edcel C. Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto
Tanada, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM
DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS,
Respondents: Hon. Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), Hon. Francisco
Viray(Secretary of Energy) CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation,
and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.
Intervenors: EASTERN PETROLEUM CORP., SEAOIL PETROLEUM
CORP., SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., TWA, INC., and DUBPHIL GAS
Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents concerning RA 8180
FACTS:
On Nov. 7, 1997 the SC declared R.A. 8180 as unconstitutional for
three reasons:
- It gave more power to an already powerful oil oligopoly
- It blocked the entry of effective competitors
- It will give the oligopoly unchecked power that will prejudice
consumers and compromise general welfare
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on December 3, 1998
Respondents contend:
- EO 392 is not a misapplication of RA 8180
- Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 do
not contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution
- Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 do not
permeate the essence of the said law; hence their nullity
will not vitiate the other parts thereof
Intervenors also argue:
- The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores
the disproportionate advantage of the three big oil firms
Caltex, Shell and Petron over the small oil firms
- The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180
"disarms" the new entrants and seriously cripples their
capacity to compete and grow
- Ultimately the total nullification of Republic Act. No.
8180 removes substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to
monopolistic practices and unfair competition and trade
practices harmful not only to movant-intervernors but
also to the public in general
Section 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff
Treatment.
b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of
this Act, tariff shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate
of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of
seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the
same as that for imported crude oil Provided, That beginning on January 1,
2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall
be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by
an Act of Congress.
Section 6. Security of Supply. - To ensure the security and continuity of
petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and
importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever
is lower.
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Section 9. Prohibited Acts. - To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels
and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following acts are hereby
prohibited.
b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a
price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract
customers to the detriment of competitors.
Respondents argue further:
- 4% tariff differential in Sec. 5 (b) will be beneficial, as it
will encourage construction of new refineries and the use
of local labor and goods
- The minimum inventory requirement in Section 6 will
not prejudice new players as it will be easier for them to
burden the costs after their first year of operation
- The Section 9 provision on Predatory pricing does not
offend the Constitution
- The SC cannot review the wisdom of an economic
policy as it lacks the power and competence
Respondents, Petitioner Garcia, and the Intervenors all argue that
Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) should be independent and
separable from the rest of RA 8180 and therefore should not affect
the validity of the act as a whole. As a defense they cite the acts
separability clause:
Section 23. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not
affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.
Which they feel clearly shows that the intent of the legislators to make the
provisions independent.
ISSUES:
W/N Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) of RA 8180 are unconstitutional
W/N The validity of Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) of RA 8180 should affect
the validity of the entire act
Held/Ratio
YES.
Statistics shown in a hearing of the Senate
Committee on Energy show that the 4% tariff
difference gives a 20 centavo/ liter advantage to the
Big 3 of the oil industry and the new players
themselves have said that the 4% differential is
oppressive to them
The necessary equipment to import and store oil will
ensure that the minimum inventory requirement will
not become any less burdensome to new players in
their second, third or fourth years of operation
The definition of predatory pricing is too loose. The
presence of this provision does not dissolve the
clear danger of oil oligopolies dictating prices
The SC is not reviewing the wisdom on the
economic policy. It is merely its compatibility with the
constitution. All other issues with the repeal of RA
8180 must be dealt with by Congress
YES.
The SC ruled that these provisions cannot be
independent despite the inclusion of a separability
clause.
Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) of RA 8180 are the
ones intended to carry out the policy of the law
embodied in Section 2 of the act
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It shall be the policy of the State to
deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly competitive market
which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and
adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high-quality
petroleum products.
Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) are the key
provisions of RA 8180 and without these in place,
Congress could not have deregulated the oil industry
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED
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Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kapunan:
General Rule of Statutory Construction: The valid portion of a of a statute, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a
separability clause creates the presumption that the legislature intended
separability
Exception: When the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest
This case does not fall under the exception
Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and Sec. 9 (b) are severable from the main statute
and their removal would not affect the validity and enforceability of
the remaining provisions. The law can still stand on its own
The principal intent of RA 18180 is to open the country to fair and
free competition and the reasoning in assailing Sec. 5(b), Sec. 6 and
Sec. 9 (b) is that they are all anti-competition. By removing these
provisions, the deregulation law realizes its objective.
The crucial test is to determine if the removed provisions cripple the
whole statute. In this case they do not, but rather, the removal of
these provisions strengthen the Act.
To declare RA 8180 void as a whole is to bring us back to our
original problem of regulation, and prejudice those who have already
invested in the oil industry under the context of RA 8180
Dumlao vs. COMELEC
Petitioners:
Patricia Dumlao - former Nueva Vizcaya governor who filed a CoC
for the position of Governor in the next elections
Romeo Igot - taxpayer, qualified voter, member of the JBC
Alfredo Salapantan - taxpayer , qualified voter
Respondent: Comelec
FACTS:
Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order seeking to enjoin respondent from implementing certain provisions
of B.P. Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of
Section 4 (paragraph 1) of B.P. Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary
to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In addition to violation of
section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who
has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired
Dumlao alleges that such provision is directed insidiously against
him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan assail the validity of the several
statutory provisions including section 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, and sections 1, 4
(paragraph 2), and 6, of B.P. Blg. 52
Same petitioners question the accreditation of the some political
parties by respondent, on the ground that it is contrary to Section 9 of
XII
Petitioners pray that the statutory provisions be declared null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is valid.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, the first paragraph of section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is valid
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No, the second paragraph of section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is declared null and
void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
Valid in part, void in part
I. The Procedural Aspect:
Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution
Misjoinder of parties and actions (Petitioner Dumlao's interest is
alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan)
The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions
Such petition falls short of 3 out of 4 criteria which should be complied
with in the exercise of the function of judicial review
1. Actual case and controversy
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application
of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC
His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical
issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion
from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a
detailed factual record
2. Proper Party
People vs. Vera: The long-standing rule has been that "the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement"result of its enforcement"
It was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot
is said to be a candidate for Councilor.
3. Unavoidability of constitutional question
People vs. Vera"it is a well-settled rule that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary
to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
This case is not an appropriate case because neither
Dumlao nor petitioners Igot and Salapantan are with cause
of action
II. The Substantive Aspect:
Dumlaos contention that Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 is discriminatory
against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the
disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer
guard of equal protection is neither well taken.
In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from
a provincial, city or municipal office
There is reason to disqualify him from running for the same
office from which he had retired: The need for new blood
assumes relevance
The retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again
Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated
It bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all
legal classification, what it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary
and unreasonable
That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification based upon substantial distinctions
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in
local governments
To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
breach
It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe
qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office
provided they are reasonable
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2nd paragraph of Section 4
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt.
The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on
the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil
or military tribunal
No distinction is made between a person convicted of acts
of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed
for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima
facie evidence, there is "clear and present danger" that
because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints
will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Teehankees separate opinion:
Dissents from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and
declining to the rule on the invalidity of the first part of section 4
The provisions of section 4 are discriminatory and arbitrary
which thus imposes a special disqualification on Dumlao
from running for the elective local office of governor simply
because of the classification (being a retired provincial
governor who has receive payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office......)
Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated --
arbitrary discrimantion
Such classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and is not
based on substantial distinctions
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification
or disqualification.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly
violative of the equal protection clause which mandates
that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike.
Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant
conditions that call for consideration, there should be none
as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Concurs with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the
second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
Also concurs with the majority decision that in order that a judgment of
conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's
disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such
judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable
Concurring opinions: CJ Fernando, J. Barredo, J. Abad Santos, J. Aquino
(concurring and dissenting)
Ambiguity, construed against party who caused it
contra proferentem also known as interpretation against the
draftsman. Where a promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the
preferred meaning should be the one that works against the interests
of the party who provided the wording. The doctrine is often applied to
situations involving standardized contracts or where the parties are of
unequal bargaining power. However, the doctrine is not directly
applicable to situations where the language at issue is mandated by
law, like in insurance contracts and bills of lading.
The reasoning behind this rule is to encourage the drafter of a
contract to be as clear and explicit as possible and to take into
account as many foreseeable situations as it can.
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Reyes vs. dela Cruz
Petitioner: ARSENIO R. REYES
Respondent: MARCIAL DELA CRUZ et al
Ponente: MONTEMAYOR
Takeaway: Petitioner made the ambiguous provision in the contract. The
same shoud not favor the party who caused the obscurity
Facts:
This is an appeal by Atty. Arsenio R. Reyes seeking to reverse decision of
CFI.
CFI ruled:
That respondents pay petitioner Reyes an amount equivalent to 5%
of the amount adjudicated to each of them, from the estate to which
they were the heirs, based not on the market value but on the
assessed value of the property, appearing on the project of
partition and distribution, with legal interest from the date of the filing
of the complaint
Respondents are the 5 heirs of the estate of deceased Anselmo S. Hilario
and on September 26, 1950, respondents hired Atty. Reyes for the estate
distribution:
"We are hiring your services to represent us in Special Proceeding
No. 7501, court of First Instance, Manila, in such a way that we will
be given all the due share arising out of the will and of the law. You
will exercise all duties of an attorney to preserve and defend our
rights until the project of partition is approved by the court. For and in
consideration of the services which you are going to render to us in
the said case we will pay you 5% of the amount adjudicated to
us. You will not be paid in cash by us for the time being that the case
is pending in court. We have no money to pay. You will not be paid
of your services when the case is terminated and our respective
shares are delivered to us by order of court."
The CFI held that the 5% mentioned in the contract for services referred
to the assessed value, not the market value, because the latter was too
speculative.
Issue:
Whether the contract for services referred to the assessed value (not the
market value of the properties)
Held/Ratio
YES
The 5% could refer only to the assessed value for that was the
only value then known to the parties. The market value of a
property is, as correctly said by the lower court, too speculative. The
determination of the actual or market value of real property is quite
difficult.
If we follow the theory of the petitioner, at what time was said
market value to be ascertained?
Real state values fluctuate from time to time
Being a lawyer, petitioner knew the meaning and value of every word
or phrase used in said contract. It would have been so easy for him
to have used and inserted said phrase, "market value", in order to
remove and avoid all ambiguity and uncertainty.
The petitioner himself was the very person who prepared the
contract. Therefore, if there is any ambiguity or obscurity in the
interpretation and meaning of said contract, the same "shall not
favor the party who cause the obscurity" (Art. 1377 of the Civil
Code corresponding to Art. 1288 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889)
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Idelfonso vs. Sibal
FACTS
Direct appeal from a judgment by the Court of First Instance of
Manila dimissing plaintiff's complaint
October 13, 1953 plaintiff and defendant reached a compromise
agreement and thereafter filed ajoint motion to dismiss the case
in the CFI of Manila
o Case was dismissed
o Compromise agreement reads as follows:
o 2b. That the defendant promises that within two (2) years
from the date hereof, he shall course through the plaintiff
as Realtor the former's real estate purchase or transaction
and should he (defendant) fail thereof, that is, to make
such real estate purchase and to course the same to
plaintiff as Realtor, the defendant is liable further to pay the
plaintiff an additional sum of TWO THOUSAND pesos.
Pursuant to the agreement, defendant commissioned plaintiff to sell
some properties in Quezon Citybut these properties were sold not
by the plaintiff but by the defendant himself
o Defendant expressed intention to purchase properties to
expand his book-selling business
o Paintiff offered to sell properties he found (the Great Eastern
Hotel, Borja Building, a Rizal Avenue lot) to defendant for
the expressed purpose of the latter of expansion
o Defendant declined for reasons that such properties were
beyond his means and that such properties
Now plaintiff claims that defendant has failed in relation to 2b of the
compromise agreement
o Defendant's answer: denied liability as such would arise only
in the event that he buys ir sells real estate without
coursing the same through plaintiff
Decision of CFI: absolve defendant
Hence the present appeal
ISSUE
W/N defendant violated the obligation imposed on him by the
compromise agreement
HELD/RATIO
NO
o There is nothing in 2b that can be construed to mean that
defendant bound himself to purchase real property and to
pay the Php 2,000 penalty in case he failed to do so
o Defendant's principal undertaking was to "course" or make
his real estate purchases and salesthrough plaintiff, and
should defendant fail to fulfill that obligation, he becomes
liable to pay plaintiff the sum of Php 2,000
Defendant had constituted, in 2b, plaintiff as his
exclusive agent in the purchase or sale of real
property with liability to pay Php 2,000 in case of
breach
o There is no dispute that defendant has, in fact, coursed
through plaintiff his real estate transactions
o Ambiguity in the provision ("that is, to make such real estate
purchase and to course the same to the plaintiff as
Realtor" inserted after the phrase "should he fail thereof"
which follows the statement of defendant's obligation)
But following the rule that ambiguities or obscure
clauses in contracts CANNOT favor the one
who has caused them, the ambiguity must be
construed in favor of defendant
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Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union Rock and Insurance Company Ltd.
December 17, 1955
Takeaway: The ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured
FACTS
Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, instituted this action in 1940, in
the Court of First Instance of said province, seeking to recover the
proceeds of certain fire insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued
by the Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., upon certain bodegas
and merchandise of the insured that were burned on June 21, 1940.
Insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of
warranties and conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire
had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other persons in
connivance with him.
Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee Pao, and some
employees of his, were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of
arson. However, acquitted by the trial court.
ISSUES
W/N the insurance is void based on the following grounds:
1. Breach of hydrant warranty
2. (STATCON ISSUE) That the insured violated the "Hemp
Warranty" against the storage of gasoline
3. That the insured connived at the loss and that the
fraudulently inflated the quantity of the insured stock in the
burnt bodegas
HELD - No.
1. The insurance company alleges that the trial Court should have held
that the policies were avoided for breach of warranty. It is argued
that since the bodegas insured had an external wall perimeter of 500
meters or 1,640 feet, the appellee should have 11 fire hydrants in the
compound, and that he actually had only 2, with a further pair
nearby, belonging to the municipality of Tabaco.
SC held that where the insurer, at the time of the issuance of
a policy of insurance, has knowledge of existing facts which,
if insisted on, would invalidate the contract from its very
inception, such knowledge constitutes a waiver of conditions
in the contract inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is
stopped thereafter from asserting the breach of such
conditions.
2. That the insured violated the "Hemp Warranty" against the
storage of gasoline, since appellee admitted that there were 36
cans of gasoline in the building designed as "Bodega No. 2"
that was a separate structure not affected by the fire. It is well to
note that gasoline is not specifically mentioned among the
prohibited articles listed in the so-called "hemp warranty." The
cause relied upon by the insurer speaks of "oils (animal and/or
vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a
flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit", and is decidedly
ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, "Oils" mean
"lubricants" and not gasoline or kerosene. And how many
insured, it may well be wondered, are in a position to
understand or determine "flash point below 300 degrees
Fahrenheit.
SC held that by reason of the exclusive control of the
insurance company over the terms and phraseology of
the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially
to avoid a forfeiture
If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that
character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the
policy.
3. Appellant insurance company contends that the claims filed by the
insured contained false and fraudulent statements that avoided the
insurance policy.
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The trial Court found that the discrepancies were a result of
the insured's erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the
insurance policies and claim forms, caused by his imperfect
knowledge of English, and that the misstatements were
innocently made and without intent to defraud.
Trial Court ruling was affirmed.
Villacorta vs. Insurance Commission - Lambert
Petitioner: Jewel Villacorta
Respondent: The Insurance Commission & Empire Insurance
Company
Ponente: Teehankee
Statcon Nutshell: The pertinent issue here is the application of Empire
Insurance Companys Authorized Driver clause which states that for
insurance to apply in a case where the owner of the car was not the one
driving, the driver must be one who is authorized by the owner/insured
person. Empire Insurance company wanted to invalidate Villacortas claim to
insurance because she did not personally authorize Benito Mabasa to drive
her car. However, SC ruled that since Villacorta entrusted her car to Sunday
Machine Works Inc, she also necessarily entrusted it to its employees as
well. The SCs ruling implies that when there is any doubt as to the intention
of a statute, it should not be applied so restrictively as to be contrary to other
established principles in law (in this case, the principle of courts to protect
weaker parties in an insurance contract). This sia lso consistent with the idea
of contra proferentem that provides that in a case of ambiguity, the
preferred meaning should be the one that works against the interests
of the party who provided the wording.
An appeal against the April 14, 1980 decision of the respondent
Insurance Commission
FACTS:
Jewel Villacorta owned a Colt Lancer which she brought to Sunday
Machine Works Inc. for general check-up and repairs.
Car was allegedly taken by 6 persons including one, Benito Mabasa
( an employee of Sunday Machine Works) and taken for a joyride in
Montalban. The car figured in an accident which caused extensive
damage to the car (as well as the deaths of 2 of the persons
including Benito Mabasa, who was driving)
Empire Insurance Company has a Comprehensive Motor Car
insurance policy for P35,000 that can indemnify loss or damage to
the car by:
Accidental collision or overturning, or collision or overturning
consequent upon mechanical breakdown or consequent
upon wear and tear
Fire, external explosion, self-ignition or lightning or burglary,
housebreaking or theft
Malicious act
Villacorta petitioned for recovery of total loss of vehicle from Empire
Insurance Company but respondent Insurance Commission
dismissed Villacortas complaint. They sustained Empire Insurances
contention that the accident did not fall within the provisions of the
policy either for the Own Damage or Theftcoverage
Respondent Commission upheld Empire Insurance Companys
contention that there is an Authorized Driver clause in relation to
the provisions on their Comprehensive Motor Car insurance policy
which they stated as such: "It must be observed that under the
above-quoted provisions, the policy limits the use of the insured
vehicle to two (2) persons only, namely
The insured
Any person driving on the Insured's Order, or with his
permission; Provided, that the person driving is
permitted, in accordance with the licensing or other
laws or regulations, to drive the Scheduled Vehicle, or
has been permitted and is not disqualified by order of a
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Court of Law or by reason or any enactment or
regulation in that behalf."
The respondent Insurance Commission ruled that if the person
driving is not the insured person, it should be someone authorized by
the insured person and since Benito Mabasa is not known by the
Insured Jewel Villacorta, this case does not qualify under the
Authorized Driver clause of the policy
Respondent Insurance Company also ruled that the car was not
stolen and therefore not under the theft clause because under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, taking means depriving
another of the possession and dominion of a movable thing with the
intention, at the time of the taking, of withholding it with the character
of permanency
The insurance Company stated that Benito Mabasas taking of the
car cannot be construed to have felonious intent as it was only for a
joyride. Benito was also an employee of Sunday Machine Works Inc.
so there was likely no intent to withhold the car permanently
ISSUE:
Should Empire Insurance Company pay the insurance?
HELD/RATIO
YES.
Respondent Insurance Commissions ruling on the Authorized
Driver clause is to restrictive and contrary to the established
principle on Insurance Contracts
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion where the only
participation of the other party is to place their signature/adhesion on
the contract. This calls for greater strictness and vigilance on the
parts of the court to protect the weaker party for abuse and
imposition.
The main purpose of the Authorized Driver clause as seen in its
text, is simply to ensure that the person whom the Insured one
entrusts his car to is a person who is duly licensed and not have any
disqualification to drive
When a car owner entrusts his car to an established car service and
repair shop, he/she necessarily entrusts his car keys to the shop
owner and the shop employees, who are presumed to have
permission to drive the car for legitimate purposes. This would
therefore include Benito Mabasa, an employee of Sunday Machine
Works Inc.
The fact that the car was unlawfully and wrongfully taken in this case
constitutes a nature of theft as per Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code
"Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent,"
Benito Mabasas body was found to have a Cal. 45 Colt pistol and an
apple-type grenade, indicating that this was not just a joyride but
that he had no intention of giving back the car.
Court rules that one who takes possession of a vehicle without the
consent of the owner is guilty of theft because his felonious intent is
already evident from the act itself because he gains utility,
satisfaction and pleasure
Petition Granted. Empire Insurance Company to pay petitioner sum of
P35,000 with legal interest
Baylon vs. Court of Appeals - Jet
Petitioner: Pacionara Baylon
Respondent: Court of Appeals and Leonila Tomacruz
Ponente: Gonzaga Reyes
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Take-away: If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulation shall control. No need to resort to extraneous
sources. The transaction in this case is a loan not an investment.
Facts:
1996: Petitioner Baylon introduced Respondent Tomacruz to
Rosita Luanzon. Rosita Luanzon is a contractor for twenty-
years. Petitioner Baylon invited Respondent Tomacruz to lend
Luanzon P150,000 with a monthly interest rate or 5% to be
used a capital for Luanzon's business. Tomacruz agreed.
June 22, 1987: Luazon issued and signed a promissory note
acknowledging receipt of P150,000 from respondent and
obliging herself to pay the respondent on or before August 22,
1987. Petitioner Baylon signed the promissory note,
affixing her signature under the word "guarantor"
Luanzon issued a post-dated check dated Aug. 22, 1987 in the
amount of P150,000. Subsequently, she replaced the first
check with another one dated Dec. 22, 1987. Monthly checks
of P7,500 were issued by Luanzon. However, the P150,000
was not paid.
Respondent Tomacruz made a written demand upon petitioner
for payment, which petitioner did not heed thus, on May 8,
1989, respondent field a case for collection with the RTC of
QC.
Petitioner denied having guaranteed the payment of
the promissory note.
Petitioner argues that respondent gave the money to
Luanzon, not as a loan but rather as an investment.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. The CA maintained the
decision of the RTC.
In this present case, petitioner argues:
There is no loan to begin with.
Respondent gave Luanzon P150,000 not as a loan but
rather as an investment in the construction project of the
latter
In the respondent's testimony before the lower court,
Tomacruz used "investment", "dividends" and "commission"
(Note: These are the extraneous sources referred to in the
Ratio)
Issue:
Whether or not the P150,000 transaction was a loan
Held/Ratio:
YES.
All circumstances mentioned by the petitioner cannot
override the clear and unequivocal terms of the June 22,
1987 promissory note whereby Luanzon promised to pay
respondent the amount of P150,000 on or before August 22,
1987. The promissory note states as follows:
June 22, 1987.
To Whom It May Concern:
For the value received, I hereby promise to pay Mrs. Leonila
Tomacruz the amount of P150,000 on or before August 22,
1987.
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The above amount is covered by ___ Check no. ___ dated
August 22, 1987.
(signed)
Rosita B. Luanzon
Guarantor:
(signed)
Pacionara O. Baylon
Tel No. 801-2800
18 P. Mapa St., DBP Village
Almanza, Las Pinas, MM
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as
to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of the its stipulation shall control.
Resort to extrinsic aids and other extraneous sources are
not necessary in order to ascertain the parties' intent when
there is no ambiguity in the terms of agreement.
SC ruled however that respondent must exhaust all possible
legal remedies first against Luanzon before she compels
petitioner to pay her since the petitioner is only a guarantor
(Art. 2058 of the Civil Code)
Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule,
founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and
general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase
should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the
other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of law. In other
words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated. Courts should administer the law not as they
think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.
The axiom applies not only in the construction of general words and
expressions used in a statute but also in the interpretation of a rule
laid down therein. Thus, where the legislature has clearly laid down a
rule for one class of cases it is not readily to be supposed that, in the
same act, a different rule has been prescribed for another class of
cases within the same as the first.
ROBLES V. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. ET AL.
Facts:
Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation entered into a contract
with Jose Robles et al. for Zambales Chromite to provide and
deliver mining properties and Jose Robles to mine, extract,
and sell ores from said properties upon payment of royalties.
Robles did not comply with contract, he under-produced ore,
did not pay wages, did not repair needed pathways and
bridges towards mining areas (all of which are agreed to be
done in a contract) and did not pay royalties.
Upon violation of contract, Zambales Chromite wrote to Robles
and ordered for him to vacate the premises. Robles continued
operation so Zambales Chromite filed for unlawful detainer
(illegal occupancy or usage of property once owned but which
ownership has terminated) in the Justice of the Peace Court.
Robles sought to dismiss in the Court of First Instance
claiming that the Justice of the Peace did not have jurisdiction
over mining lands.
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ISSUE: Colgate Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez
W/N the Justice of the Peace have jurisdiction over mining Petitioner: Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc.
land. Respondent: Hon. Pedro M. Gimenez as Auditor General and Ismael
Mathay as Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines
HELD:
Court of First Instance rejects robles appeal and confirms jurisdiction FACTS:
Petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General
of Justice of the Peace.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three
STATCON PART
applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in
The appeal is clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 provides the aggregate sum of P113,343.99
that, The basis of this claim is Section 2 of Republic Act 601, which
a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the provides that:
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or transportation and/or other charges incident to
assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned
at milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors,
any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks,
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior
reference books, and supplementary readers approved
court by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the for publishers for use in the publication of books,
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper,
Any book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of
land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of
land, Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under
whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well known contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the
quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing;
maxim
anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films,
in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we
laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and
should not distinguish. pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding
medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the
appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the

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Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals
applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said
appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may
be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time
to promote and protect the health of the people of the
Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual
importation under the rules and regulations to be
promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
The officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax Administration of the
Central Bank advised the petitioner that of the total sum of
P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 had
been approved.
Such amount represents the 17% special excise tax on the
foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract,
sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate
However, the auditor of the Central Bank refused to pass in audit the
petitioners claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by
the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, arguing
that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under
Section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General
Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central
Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in
section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
preparation or manufacture of food or food products; Hence,
such petition
ISSUE:
W/N the foreign exchange used by Colgate-Palmolive for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise
tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to
entitle it to refund
HELD/RATIO:
"Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "Where
the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish"
Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and
flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the
manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not
authorized to make any distinction and must construe the
words in their general sense
"General terms restricted by specific terms -- General terms
may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general
language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
statute's object and purpose."
The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to
cases where, except for one general term, all the items in
an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific
class.
Though the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a
number of articles that may be classified as food or food
products, items immediately following it do not belong to
the same classification.
To illustrate, "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under
the category of food or food products because they are used
in the farming and poultry industries, respectively.
Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it
cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and
flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
manufacture of food and food products
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection
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with them does not require the rejection of general terms
entirely.
The decision under review is reversed and the respondents are
ordered to audit petitioners applications for refund which were
approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.
Guevara vs. Inocentes 1966
Disputed Provision:
Article VII, Section 10, Subsection 4 of our Constitution
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
FACTS
The case is written in keeping with the statement we made in our
resolution dated February 16, 1966.
Petitioner Guevara was given an ad interim appointment as
Undersecretary of Labor
The incumbent President Issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 which
declares all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive
as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of
Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966.
In spite of this, the appointment is STILL INVALID
Petitioner now goes to the Court of a quo warranto proceeding.
Petitioner Contends:
ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and may only
become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of
the regular session of Congress of 1966;
in this case there was no express disapproval
there was no special session
the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" must
be related with the phrase "until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments" so that the adjournment
contemplated should refer to a regular session during which
the Commission on Appointments may be organized and
allowed to discharge its functions as such.
Respondent (Solicitor General) contends:
petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress
adjourned its last special session called under Proclamation
No. 2 of President Marcos;
an ad interimappointment ceases to be valid after each term
of Congress and so petitioner's appointment must have
lapsed
ISSUES/HELD
W/N the ad interim appointment of Guevara is valid? NO IT IS NOT.
RATIO
Plain reading of the text would at once reveal that it is the clear intent
of the framers of our Constitution to make a recess appointment
effective only
(a) until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, or
(b) until the next adjournment of Congress, and never a day
longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned.
well-settled rule of statutory construction that "when the intention of
the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute that there
can be no question as to its meaning there is no room for
construction" (Vol. 2, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 316).
The provision contemplates two modes of termination of an ad
interim appointment, or of one made during the recess of Congress,
which are completely separate from, and independent of, each other
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The phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" does not
make any reference to any specific session of the Congress,
whether regular or special
When the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish.
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE
DEBEMUS
The framers of our Constitution in employing merely the word
adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment made during
the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or special
session, and not simply the regular one as contended by petitioner.
Wherefore, petition is DENIED.
Phil. British Assurance Co. vs. IAC
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC. V INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (IAC)
Petitioner: Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.
Respondent/s: Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), Sycwin
Coating & Wires, Inc., and Dominador Cacpal, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila
FACTS
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint
for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial
Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent Sycwin Coating
& Wires, Inc. succeeded in attaching some properties of Varian
Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond
NOTE: A supersedeas bond is issued on behalf of the
defendant to appeal judgment that is rendered against
him/her and who is appealing to a higher court.
Varian Industrial Corporation posted a counterbond in the sum of
Php 1,400,000.00 through petitioner Philippine British Assurance
Co., Inc.
The attached properties were released
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin
Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against
the properties of Varian in the IAC
The IAC granted the petition of Sycwin
The IAC ordered the execution pending appeal
HOWEVER the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied
as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal
properties upon demand
Sycwin filed a petition with IAC praying that the surety (petitioner
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.) be ordered to pay the value
of the bond
ISSUE
W/N an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment may be
enforced on a counterbond
HELD/RATIO
YES
The counterbond was issued in accordance with
Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
Section 5. to secure payment to the
applicant of any judgment which he may
recover in the action
Section 12. to secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching creditor may
recover in the action
Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond
limited its application to a final and executory judgment
It is specified that the counterbond applies to the
payment of ANY judgment (any means any!!!) that
may be recovered
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THUS the only logical conclusion is that an
execution of ANY judgment including one
pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be
charged against such a counterbond
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLE: Ubi lex non
ditinguit nec nos distinguere debemos
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish
Since the law in this case does not make any
distinction nor intended to make any exception when
it speaks of ANY judgment which may be charged
against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to
refer not only to a final and executory but also a
judgment pending appeal
Bayan vs. Zamora
Doctrines: 1. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos -
when no distinction is made by the law, the court should not
distinguish ( this falls under the heading)
2. Use of comma and or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from the others included in the
enumeration.
3. Lex specialis derogat generali- special provision of
law prevail oveer general ones
Facts:
1947 : Philippines and U.S. forged a Military Bases Agreement
1991 : Both countries negotiated for a possible extension but
was rejected by the Philippine Senate
1997 : Negotiations were once again held which led to a final
series of conferences and a draft text.
1998: President Ramos approved the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and
U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard
President Estrada ratified the VFA through the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and transmitted to the Senate the Instrument of
Ratification
Senate concurred and the VFA entered into force after an
Exchange of Notes between Secretary Siazon and
Ambassador Hubbard
Petitioners assail constitutionality of VFA and impute to herein
respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the
agreements.
Issues: (relevant to statcon)
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article 7
or Section 25, Article 17 of the Constitution
Held / Ratio:
VFAs ratification is governed by both provisions
Sec 21 , Art 7 deals with treaties or international agreements
in general and requires the concurrence of of all the
members of the Senate for ratification.
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least of all the
Members of the Senate
Sec 25, Art 17 applies to treaties which involve the presence
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
Concurrence of the Senate being one of the requisites for
ratification under this provision
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...foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and...
Both provisions dont contradict each other and even share
some common ground
Clear that the Constitution mandates that a treaty be
concurred with by the Senate
Sec 25 Art 17 undoubtedly applies because it specifies foreign
military bases, troops or facilities ( Lex specialis derogat
generali) but to an extent Sec 21 Art 7 also applies with regard
to the purpose of determining the number of votes required to
ratify a treaty
General provision only takes effect in such cases within
its general language which are not within the provision
of the specific enactment
It is a mistake to argue that Sec 25 Art 17 is inapplicable to
temporary agreements because there is no placement of
permanent structures to establish military bases.
the Constitution makes no distinction between
transient and permanent
nothing in Sec 25 Art 17 requires that foreign troops or
facilities be placed permanently in the Philippines ( di
ko ma highlight but eto yung relevant ratio under the
heading, yung last 2 points i mean)
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos
Court rejects the argument that Sec 25 Art 17 is not controlling
because no military bases, but merely foreign troops and
facilities are involved
provision is not limited to the entry of troops and
facilities without the any foreign bases being
established
provision does not refer to the 3 collectively but treats
them as separate and independent subjects
..foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.. ->
comma an or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from the others included in
the enumeration
intent of framers is consistent with this interpretation
Father B: Definitely, it can cover only one.
Whether it covers only one or it covers three,
the requirement will be the same.
Mandatory / Directory / Prohibiture
A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively
that something should be done, or performed in a particular way, or
negatively that something should not be done, leaving the person no
choice on the matter except to obey. A mandatory statute is one that
contains words of command or of prohibition.
A directory statute is a statute which is permissive or discretionary
in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that
no injury can result from ignoring it.
Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends
on its effect. If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can
result from ignoring it; and the purpose of the legislature can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, then the statute
will be generally regarded as directory; but if not, it will be mandatory.
A statute will not be construed as mandatory of it will cause hardship
or injustice on the part of the public who is not at fault. Nor will a
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statute be interpreted as mandatory if it will lead to absurd, impossible annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) 372 since it
or mischievous consequences. requires Local Government Units (LGUs) to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their regular appropriates
Mandatory enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of AO 372,
which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments
shall, must, ought, should
Pertinent sections of AO 372:
cannot, shall not, ought not
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies,
Directory including state universities and colleges, government-
generally, may and other words importing permissiveness owned and controlled corporations and local
governments units will identify and implement measures
Use of may and shall in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the
Whether the word may is to be construed as mandatory and year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations
imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is for non-personal services items, along the following
to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the suggested areas:
statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the language of SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
the particular provision.
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10%
The word may will, as a rule, be construed as shall where a statute
of the internal revenue allotment (IRA) to local
provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or government units shall be withheld.
public duty, or where it concerns public interest or rights of an Petitioner contends that the above mentioned sections was
individual. The word shall may be construed as may when no exercising the power of control over LGUs when the Constitution
public benefit or private right requires that it be given an imperative vests in the President the power of supervision. Also that the
meaning. DIRECTIVE to withhold 10% of their IRA runs contrary to the Sec
286 of Local Government Code and Section 6, Article 10 of the
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre Constitution which provides for automatic release to each of these
units its share in the national internal revenue.
Solicitor General on the other hand argues that AO 372 was issued
GR number: 132988
to alleviate economic difficulties brought about by the peso
Petitioner: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
devaluation and that it constituted the Presidents power of
Respondent: Hon. Alexander Aguirre in this capacity as Executive Secretary
supervision because it merely directs LGUs to identify measures that
*CAPITALIZED, Bolded, Underlined AND Italicized are important statcon
will reduce total expenditures and the withholding of 10% of the
focus points.
LGUs IRA does not violate statutory prohibitions because it is
temporary in nature.
Facts:
Case is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to:

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Issue: need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Not mandatory
Main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" proven by the fact that it does not contain any sanction for noncompliance.
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 Being ADVISORY it is still within the Presidents power of supervision.
of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of (b) Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. Basic feature of fiscal autonomy is
general supervision over local governments. the automatic release of the shares of the LGUs in the national internal
revenue as mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Held / Ratio: States that within 5 days after every quarter of the year LGUs SHALL not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
Difference between Power of Control and Power of Supervision: government for whatever purpose. The word SHALL is a word of
Control: Power to nullify or alter or modify what a COMMAND that must be given compulsory meaning. Therefore, Section 4 of
subordinate officer has done in performance of duties and AO 372 in withholding 10%, even though it is only temporary does not
substitute judgement of the former for the latter matter. ANY retention is PROHIBITED.
Supervision: Oversight to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties In sum. Section 1 is upheld as ADVISORY while Section 4 is not valid at all.
Cannot interfere with LGUs as long as they act within the
scope of their authority (Taule v Santos) Ruling:
If rules are not followed, they may order the act undone or
redone... On the other hand supervision does not cover such Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are permanently PROHIBITED from
authority (Drilon v Lim) implementing AO 372 and 43.
Local Autonomy
a more responsive and accountable local government Dissenting Opinion:
structure instituted through a system of decentralization
(Ganzon v CA)
Justice Kapunan dissents on the grounds that: (1) the Petition is premature;
Enjoy administrative autonomy as well as fiscal autonomy.
(2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and
Fiscal autonomy = power to create their own sources of
(3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority to
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.
taxes released by the national government.

(a) Wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 has a commanding tone, but it is merely

a DIRECTIVE to IDENTIFY and IMPLEMENT measures that will reduce total
expenditures by 25%. Merely ADVISORY in character. Does not constitute a
MANDATORY or binding order the interferes with local autonomy. Language
is authoritative but does not amount to a COMMAND. Only recognizes a

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Marcelino vs. Cruz
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983
Petitioner: Bernardino Marcelino
Respondents: The Hon. Fernando Cruz, Jr., as Presiding Judge of Branch
XII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, People of the Philippines, and the
Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Rizal
petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent
Judge Fernando Cruz from promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No.
C-5910 and for release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case,
on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case
for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety days from
submission thereof.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of the crime of rape before the CFI of Rizal,
Branch XII. The trial was concluded on August 4, 1975.
On the same date, the attorneys for both parties moved for time
within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial court
granted the motion as follows.
Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to
submit their respective memoranda, simultaneously, and
thereafter the ase shall be deemed submitted for decision of
the Court.
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no
memorandudm was filed by the People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent Judge filed his decision in said
case for promulgation.
On the date set for promulgation, counsel for the accused moved for
postponement, raising the issue of loss of jurisdiction for failure to
decide the case within 90 days.
Judge granted the motion and moved the promulgation date
to January 19, 2976.
On January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before the SC
the present petition. On the same day, Court issued an order
temporarily restraining the judge from promulgating his decision.
Petitioner contends that the 3-month period prescribed in Sec.
11 of Art. X of the 1973 Constitution is mandatory in character
and that non-observance would result in loss of jurisdiction of the
court over the unresolved case.
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in
full, to wit:
SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this
Constitution, the maximum period within which a
case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the
date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for
the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior
collegiate courts, and three months for all other
inferior courts.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Judge violated Sec. 11 of Art X of the
Constitution
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision on
November 28, 1975 (85 days from September 4 when the date was deemed
submitted)
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be
construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." "The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less
injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing
the letter of the law."
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In Trapp v. McCormick, it was held that statutory provisions which
may be considered directory are those which relate to the mode or
time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the legislature.
The same construction applies equally to the constitutional provision
under consideration.
Mikell vs. School Dis. of Philadelphia - "the legal distinction
between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to
fundamental law as it is to statutory law."
"Unless reduced by the court" - it is evident that the period
prescribed therein is subject to the modification of the Supreme
Court.
Said provision refers to a procedural matter. Accdg. to Albermarle Oil
& Gas Co. vs. Morris, constitutional provisions referring to procedure
are merely directory.
Lastly, in practice, the Court has taken a liberal stand regarding this
provision.
PETITION DISMISSED.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
Abad Santos
Decisions rendered beyond the 90-day period are not void. The
erring judge is merely subject to administrative action.
Brehm vs. Republic
September 30, 1963 PAREDES, J.:
FACTS
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with
temporary assignment at Subic Bay.
He married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter
Elizabeth, by another man
The spouses filed a Joint Petition claiming that they have mutually
given their consent to the adoption.
An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was
registered by the Republic of the Philippines disqualifying him from
making an adoption being a non-resident alien.
Respondent argues that Article 335 of the Civil Code, provides -
The following cannot adopt:
(4) Non-resident aliens;
Petitioner responded with Art. 338, Civil Code which states -
The following may be adopted:
((3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
ISSUES
W/N Brehm, a non-resident alien, can adopt his step-daughter
HELD
No
Article 335 is mandatory, because it contains words of positive
prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that
the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated
Article 338 is merely directory, and which can only be given
operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory
provisions of Art. 335.
Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira is denied.
Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. vs. Florentino
Petitioner: Don Tino Realty and Development Corp.
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Respondent: Julian Florentino
Concur: Kapunan, Pardo and Santiago
On Leave: Davide Jr.
Ponente: Puno
Doctrine: Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is MANDATORY, it must
NOT be liberally interpreted.
FACTS:
Appeal seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which ordered the
admission of late and defective answer in an ejectment case
Don Tino filed an ejectment suit against Florentino. Don Tino alleges
that Florentino occupied a portion of his land and built a house
thereon by means of force, strategy and stealth
As prescribed in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
summons were served requiring Florentino to answer within 10 days
from receipt
Florentino filed his answer through Roel Alvear, president of the
Samahan Magkakapitbahay ng RMB. His answer was NOT verified.
The municipal trial court set the date for preliminary conference
Don Tino filed a motion for rendition of judgement and motion to
cancel the preliminary conference on the ground that the answer of
Florentino was DEFECTIVE and filed OUT OF TIME
The municipal trial court granted Don Tinos motions. It ruled that
Florentino failed to comply with Sec. 3b (verification) and Sec. 5(10
day prescription period) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
It also noted the Alvear had NO authority to represent Florentino
because NO special power of attorney was executed.
Municipal trial court rendered a decision ordering Florentino to
vacate the premises and deliver its possession to Don Tino, the
amount of P2,000 was fixed as reasonable rental and Florentino was
ordered to remove the improvements he made.
Florentino filed a Manifestation with Motion to Lift Order, he alleged
that his answer was filed late and by a non-lawyer because he is
ECONOMICALLY DESTITUTE. Though a decision was already
rendered, the municipal trial court admitted the motion and set it for
resolution.
With Florentinos motion still UNRESOLVED, he filed a notice of
appeal to the Municipal Trial Court which was approved
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 AFFIRMED the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court. It stated that Florentino cant claim deprivation
of due process because he was given the opportunity to be heard
but he filed one day late. The lower court rendered judgement in
compliance with Sec. 6 of the Revised Rule Summary Procedure.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the decision of the
RTC. It held that the would be NO substantial prejudice and damage
on the part of Don Tino if the answer will be ADMITTED. On the
other hand, Florentino will suffer injustice and injury if the answer is
not considered.
ISSUE: W/N the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be liberally
interpreted in order to allow the admission of an answer filed 1 day late.
HELD: NO, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure CANT be liberally
interpreted. Its provisions clearly states that:
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons,
the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof to the plaintiff
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu propio, or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for therein:
STATCON: Mandatory character of the Rule of Summary Procedure
In Gachon vs Devesa Jr, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of the
word SHALL in the Rule on Summary Procedure UNDERSCORES
their mandatory character because "Giving the provisions a directory
application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary
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Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of Escribano v Avila
suits.
Therefore, the view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions can This
case
is
about
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
to
conduct

be liberally construed is WRONG. The liberality in the interpretation
the
preliminary
investigation
of
a
complaint
for
written
defamation.
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. Litigation is NOT a game of
technicalities, BUT every case must be prosecuted in accordance FACTS:
with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy On
September
25,
1968
Congressman
Salipada
K.
Pendatun,
the

administration of justice. governor-elect
of
Cotabato,
filed
directly
with
the
Court
of
First

In Bayog vs. Natino , the Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in Instance
of
that
province
(now
North
Cotabato)
a
complaint
for

Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 (law in which the Rule on Summary
libel
against
Mayor
Jose
Escribano
of
Tacurong,
Cotabato
(now
the

Procedure was promulgated on)
province
of
Sultan
Kudarat).
The
complaint
was
subscribed
and

SEC. 36. Summary procedures in special cases - The
Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures sworn
to
before
respondent
Judge
David
P.
Avila.
It
was
supported

applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious by
the
affidavit
of
Acting
Governor
Simeon
Datumanong.
and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to In
that
complaint
Escribano
was
charged
with
having
said
in
a

technical rules. Such simplified procedure may provide that speech,
which
was
broadcasted
on
August
26,
1968
by
a
radio

affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of
station
at
Cotabato
City,
that
"Mr.
Pendatun
is
the
worst
animal

oral testimony and that the periods of filing pleadings shall
that
ever
lived
in
this
province".
be non-extendible.
Judge
Avila
in
his
orders
of
March
5,
20
and
27,
1969
ruled
that
he

That prohibits the courts from taking late answers. However in the
current case, Florentinos explanation was not sufficient, his had
the
power
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation.
Escribano

allegation that he is economically destitute is not convincing because questioned
Judge
Avila's
authority
to
conduct
the
preliminary

he did not even wait for the Municipal Trial Courts resolution. Thus, investigation
of
the
offense.
the Municipal Trial Court was correct when it refused to admit his On
April
1,
1969
Escribano
filed
in
this
Court
against
Judge
Avila

answer and proceeded to render judgment in accordance with Sec. 6 and
Pendatun
the
instant
special
civil
actions
of
certiorari
and

of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
prohibition,
praying
that
the
said
orders
of
Judge
Avila
be
set
aside.

DECISION: Petition Granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Escribano
also
filed
a
supplemental
petition
to
annul
Judge
Avila's

REVERSED and the decision of the RTC Branch 14 is REINSTATED. order
of
March
29,
1969.
In
that
order
he
found
that
Pendatun's

evidence
had
"established
a
probable
cause
to
believe
that"
libel

by
radio
had
been
committed
and
that
Escribano
"probably

committed
the
same".
Judge
Avila
ordered
the
arrest
of
Escribano,

40
StatCon Post-midterms Cases Set 1
fixed the bail at three thousand pesos, and referred the case to the Preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written defamations as
city fiscal of Cotabato for the filing of the corresponding provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal
information. A warrant of arrest was issued on March 31. of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
Sometime before April 16 the city fiscal filed for libel against province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the
Escribano. provisions of this article.
On August 10, 1970 this Court issued a resolution restraining Judge Defendants Side:
Avila from proceeding with the arraignment of Escribano. Pendatun and Judge Avila rely on section 13, Rule 112 of
Petitioners Side: the Rules of Court to support their view that the Court of
Petitioner Escribano, in support of his contention that First Instance of Cotabato could conduct the preliminary
the city fiscal of Cotabato is the only functionary investigation:
empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation of SEC. 13. Preliminary examination and
the libel charge, invokes the following provisions of the investigation by the judge of the Court of First
charter of Cotabato City, Republic Act No. 2364, as Instance. Upon complaint filed directly with
amended by Republic Act No. 3332: the Court of First Instance, without previous
SEC. 23. Powers and Duties of the City Attorney. preliminary examination and investigation
(f) He shall investigate an charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of conducted by the of the judge thereof shall
laws and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make either refer the complaint to the municipal
the necessary complaints against the persons accused. ... judge referred to in the second paragraph of
(g) He shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and section 2 hereof for preliminary examination
violations of laws and city ordinances triable in the Court of First Instance of and investigation, or himself conduct both
Cotabato, and the municipal court of the city, and shall discharge all the preliminary examination and investigation
duties in respect to Criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial simultaneously in the manner provided in the
fiscals. preceding sections, and should be find
He also invokes the following provisions of article 360 of reasonable ground to believe that the
the Revised Penal Code, which were inserted by Republic defendant has committed the offense
Act No. 4363, approved on June 19, 1965, and which do charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest,
not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for
preliminary investigation of written defamations: the filing of the corresponding information.
ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First
with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal actions for
crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or written defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from
whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of holding such investigation.
that city. It was written in the Charter of Cotabato that the exercise of that
power is tied up with the rules on the venue of a criminal action for
HELD: written defamation. That power is lodged in the Court of First
The rule is that in construing a statute the mischief intended to be Instance of the city or province where the libelous article was printed
removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment or first published or where the offended party actually resided, or
of a law are important factors to be considered in its construction. where the offended public official held office, at the time of the
Was it intended by Republic Act No. 4363, in specifying that commission of the offense.
the preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written However, Section 78 of the same charter provides that the
defamations may be conducted by the provincial or city municipal or city court of Catabato City "may also conduct
fiscal where the criminal action may be filed to exclude the preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard
Court of First Instance from conducting such preliminary to the limits of punishments", a provision which is found in
investigation and to entrust that power exclusively to those section 87 of the Judiciary Law and in section 2, Rule 112 of
fiscals and courts? the Rules of Court.
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the enumeration in the The petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
amendatory law of the public officers and the courts that may
conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for written Concurring (Teehankee):
defamation was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of The mere non-mention of judges of the Court of First Instance as
that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance of among those authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of
that same power. criminal actions for written defamation under R.A. 4363 (which
Congress did not confine the amendatory law to laying down the amended Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code So as to provide a more
guidelines for the venue of criminal and civil actions. Since its purpose restricted venue for criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of
is to minimize the filing in municipal courts of out-of-town libel suit, written defamation under said Code) cannot be construed to mean a
the lawmaking body, in order to attain that objective, deprived the withdrawal of the constitutional and statutory power of the Court of
ordinary municipal courts of the power to conduct the preliminary First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations.
investigation of a criminal action for written defamation.

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Aside from the provision of Rule 112, section 13 of the Rules of Court,
the statutory power of judges of the Court of First Instance to Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Election
conduct preliminary investigations is recognized and reaffirmed in
Republic Act 5180 StatCon Issue: RA 7941 acts as the mandatory statute,
"in the Sayo, Montelibano , and Guerrero, cases it was held that the meaning it commands the process of the whole Party-List
city court could not conduct preliminary investigations," thus giving System. The Comelec has authority to pass IRRs but these
the impression that the ruling in said cases that under the charters of discretionary rules shall be in accordance of the mandatory
the cities of Manila and Bacolod the power to conduct preliminary statute. Party-Lists that are qualified to join the elections can
investigations is exclusively lodged in the city fiscal is still in force only obey the words of the mandatory statute and in case of
merely constitute the basis of the city fiscal authority to conflict between the discretionary rule of the Comelec (Sec 13
concoct preliminary investigations but do not serve to of Resolution 7804) and the mandatory rule, the latter shall
withdraw from the Courts of First Instance as well as from prevail.
the city courts therein their power to conduct preliminary
examinations and investigations.
Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus by Luis K. Lokin against COMELEC
But the charters of the cities of Manila, Bacolod Mandamus-- To compel COMELEC to proclaim Lokin as 2nd
nominee of CIBAC
and Cebu do not contain any provision making
such grant of power to city prosecutors exclusive
FACTS:
of the courts, which cannot be deprived of such
authority to conduct preliminary examination CIBAC was a duly registered party-list group for the May 14, 2007
because said prerogative of the courts emanates elections
nd
from the Constitution itself. Luis K. Lokin was listed as the 2 nominee among the five chosen
by CIBAC
Prior to elections however, CIBAC through its president Emmanuel
Fernando (dissenting):
Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
in the absence of a statutory grant, a court of first instance cannot
amendment.
exercise the power of holding a pre investigation, as it more of the Names of Lokin and 2 others (Tugna and Galang) were withdrawn.
prosecuting rather than the judicial function unlike a preliminary Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in this order were on the
examination, which as the first Step in the deprivation of one's amended list of nominees for CIBAC
liberty, is deemed best left in judicial hands.

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Letter with signed petitions of 81% of CIBAC members was sent to
COMELEC chairperson Benjamin Abalos to confirm withdrawal of
Lokin and the others
CIBAC won 2 seats.
nd
Motion was filed to proclaim Lokin as 2 nominee. Villanueva and
Cruz-Gonzales opposed
COMELEC ruled Villanueva acted within the scope of his authority as
CIBAC president.
CIBAC also had a right to withdraw nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang based on the provisions of Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 (promulgated Jan. 12, 2007)
Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 as unconstitutional
and files for a petition of Mandamus and Certiorari
ISSUES:
a. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of nominees of
CIBAC and allowing for an amended list of nominees without any basis in the
law
b. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and
violates the Party-List System Act (RA No. 7941)
HELD/RATIO:
a. YES.
Legislature can delegate to executive and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs (Implementing rules and
regulation) as long as they are guided by standards that the
legislature sets
IRRs carry out and implement legislative purpose
To be valid, IRRs must comply with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
In a conflict between the IRR and a law, the law will prevail
Sec. 8 of RA No, 7941 (Party-List Systems Act) reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.- Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five
(45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from
which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have
given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid
for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. NO CHANGE of
names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
shall have been submitted to the COMELEC EXCEPT in cases where the
nominee DIES, or WITHDRAWS IN WRITING his nomination, becomes
INCAPACITATED in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.
The provision must be read literally because its language is plain
and free from ambiguity.
The Legislature clearly deprives Party-list organizations of the right to
change its nominees once the list is submitted unless they fall under
the 3 exceptions in the provision.
b. YES
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StatCon
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Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under
Section 8 of RA No. 7941
Section 13 of the resolution states:
Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a
nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall
be placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Another exception was added that allowed CIBAC to withdraw
Lokin and others
COMELEC said their intention was simply to reword or to rephrase
the statute. However, they established an entirely new ground not
found in Section 8 of RA No. 7941
When the statutes itself enumerates the exceptions to the
application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed
The IRR is not in harmony with the provisions of the law therefore the
insertion of the new ground is INVALID. Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 is partly nullified
Because of the invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7894, CIBACs
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and the others is ineffectual.
WHEREFORE PETITION IS GRANTED
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
The rule is formulated in a number of ways.
First variation is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to
that which is implied. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matter, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
Second variation is the canon that a general expression followed by
exceptions therefrom implies that those which do not fall under the
exceptions come within the scope of the general expression. Exceptio
firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
Third variation is the axiom that the expression of one or more things
of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all
would have been implied had none been expressed.
City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes
GR No. 127708 March 25, 1999
FACTS
Petition to review the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City entitled
Manila Electric Company v City of San Pablo Laguna.
RTC declared imposition of franchise tax under Sec 2.09 Article D of
Ordinance No. 56 Revenue Code of San Pablo City as ineffective
and void to MERALCO for being violative of Act no. 3648, Republic
Act No. 2340 and PD 551.
RTC also granted MERALCOs claim for refund of franchise taxes
paid under protest
Act No. 3648 Granted Escudero Electric Services Company a
legislative franchise to maintain and operate an electric light and
power system in the City of San Pablo
Section 10. - the grantee shall pay unto the municipal
treasury of each municipality in which it is supplying electric
current to the public under this franchise, a tax equal to 2%
45
StatCon
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1







of gross earningsSaid tax shall be due and payable and RTC ruled in favor of MERALCO that the Local Government Code
shall be in lieu of any of any and all taxes of any kind, nature, did not expressly or impliedly repeal the tax exemption / incentive
or description levied, established or collected by any enjoyed by MERALCO under its charter.
authority whatsoeverand on its franchise, rights, privileges, Hence Govt of San Pablos petition in this Court
receipts, revenues, and profits from which taxes the grantee Petitioner San Pablo
is hereby expressly exempted. o RA 7160 expressly repealed Act 3648, RA 2340 and
Escuderos franchise was transferred to respondent MERALCO PD 551
under Republic Act No. 2340 o Pursuant to Section 137 and 193 of LGC, province
PD No. 551 enacted on September 1974 Section 1. Any provision now has power to impose franchise tax
of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the o Mactan Cebu International Airport v Marcos real
franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, property tax exemption granted to airport has been
distribute, and sell electrice current for light, heat and power shall be withdrawn upon LGC effectivity
two percent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of
electric current and transactions incident (MERALCO ISSUE
CURRENTLY PAYS THIS) W/N City of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7160 Local Government Code of 1991 the LGC upon MERALCO
authorizes the province/city to impose a tax on business enjoying a Was there an implied repeal of the MERALCO Charter by RA 7160
franchise at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one one HELD / RATIO
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar
year realized within its jurisdiction.
YES. City of San Pablo may impose local franchise tax on
October 5, 1992 Sangguniang Panglungsod enacted Ordinance No.
MERALCO
56 Revenue code of the City of San Pablo
Pertinent provisions of LGC
Sec. 2.09 imposed a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at
o Section 137 Franchise Tax Notwithstanding any
a rate of fifty percent of one percent of the gross annual
exemption granted by any law or other special law, the
receipts
province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise
Pursuant to this Section, petitioner City Treasurer sent to
at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of gross annual receipts
MERALCO a letter demanding payment of franchise tax.
o Section 193 Withdrawal of Tax Exemption
Respondent MERALCO paid under protest amount of
Privileges Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
P1,857,711.67
exemptions, or incentives granted to or presently
MERALCO subsequently filed this action before the RTC to
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
declare Ordinance No. 56 null and void insofar as it imposes
including government owned or controlled corporations
the franchise tax upon MERALCO and to claim for a refund
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered
of the taxes paid.
under RA 6938, non stock and non profit hospitals and

46

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education institutions are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this code.
o Section 534 Repealing Clause All genereal and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 534 is a general repealing clause so YES TO ISSUE #2
It is the courts view that petitioners rely correctly on the provisions of
Sec 137 and 193 of the LGC.
STATCON PART
o Section 193 supports the withdrawal of extant tax
exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided
in this code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or
presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical,
including GOCCs except 1. Local water districts, 2.
Cooperatives duly registered under 6938, 3. Non stock and non
profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn
upon effectivity of this Code.
o Limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities.
o It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence,
excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim
expression unius est exclusion alterius.
o Any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO
was clearly intended to be withdrawn
Petition GRANTED. The decision of RTC is reversed and set aside
and the complaint of MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED.
The People of the Philippines v. Moro Sumaguina Macarandang
G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
Plaintiff: The People of the Philippines
Defendant: Moro Sumaguina Macarandang (Datu of Kamalig, Marantao,
Lanao)
Take Away: Inclusion of Secret Agent of peace and order in the category of
peace officer
Paras, C. J.:
FACTS:
Macarandang was accused and convicted of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao
Macarandang possessed a Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA.
SN-924131 and 8 rounds of ammunitions without possessing
a proper license
Accused invokes the appointment made by Governor Dimakuta as
his legal excuse
Accused was appointed as Secret Agent of peace and
order campaigns and detention of crimes and is authorized
to hold aforementioned firearm (Seryoso to. Secret Agent
talaga nakalagay)
ISSUE:
Should the accused be acquitted and decision of the CFI reversed?
RATIO: YES.
Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that peace
officers are exempted from the requirement of obtaining a license to
possess firearms
47
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Appointment of accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of
crimes puts him within the category of a peace officer
Equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by Section 879

RULING:
Decision of CIF is reversed and accused is acquitted.

48