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1. Spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot at Binondo.
2. 1975, they decided to construct 5-storey concrete building [NSS Building] which they contracted Contech
3. Adjacent to the spouses lot was the lot of Li Seng Giap & Sons where it has LSG building on it.
4. During the construction, tenants of LSG building were complaining for cracks on the floor, steel doors bent,
falling part of walls.
5. LSG has its building inspected and said that it was due to Sin Sing excavation which was made only 8 inches
from their boundary but failed to properly installed lateral or subjacent support during said excavation.
6. As sign of goodwill, spouses had it repaired but after sometime, still defects continued and so upon the
recommendation of the consultant of LSG, they had to demolish the building; that the spouses refused to
7. So LSG filed claim for damages due to negligence in the excavation and construction of NSS Bldg.

1. Whether spouses were liable.
2. Whether LSG was guilty of contributory negligence.

1. Trial court found spouses and contractor negligent thus liable for damages but was mitigated due to negligence
also of LSG in constructing 3rd and 4th floor when the bldg permit when LSG was constructed is good only for 2
2. Both appealed to CA, except the Contech contractor.
3. CA ruled that there was no contributory negligence on the part of LSG, thus this petition of spouses.
4. SC upheld the ruling of trial court that there was indeed contributory negligence on the part of LSG but still the
proximate cause of the damage was the negligence of Contech. Only Contech and not spouses is liable.
a. Construction is a field requiring technical expertise. The spouses, as ordinary laymen, would understandably
have no knowledge at all about the technical aspect of constructing a building. This was precisely the reason
why they contracted the services of a reputable construction firm to undertake the project. Petitioners had
every right to rely on the warranties and representations of their contractor.
b. The tortious act was the excavation done without observing the proper safeguards. Although the trial court
stated that petitioner as land owner had every right to excavate on his own land, such right is not absolute as
to deprive the adjacent owner sufficient lateral support pursuant to Article 684, NCC
5. Contributory Negligence
a. Verily, the foundation of the LSG Building which was good to support only two floors remained the same and
could not support the weight of the present 4-storey building.
b. This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on the LSG Building could have overburdened
the foundation's load-bearing capacity and contributed to the sagging of the building. The possibility of
settlement due to weak foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted.
c. A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which
might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by
agreement generally operates to discharge all.
1. Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived in the
pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. Everyday, he
comes by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works and he uses a pass, supplied by
the company, which entitles him to ride the trains free of charge.
2. One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It
appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it
came to a full stop.
3. Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries he had
received were very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was
made and his arm was amputated twice because the first operation was unsuccessful.
4. He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages from the
defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to
the security of passenger alighting from the trains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence was
attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.

1. Vehicular collision involving a public utility jeepney owned by Lamayo and driven by Calebag. Nenita
Custodio boarded the jeepney bound for her work in Dynetics Inc., Bicutan, Taguig.
2. Nenita was a minor that time and worked as machine operator with 16.25/day.
3. The other vehicle was a PUB public utility bus MMTC, gocc, driven by Leonardo bound for terminal at Bicutan.
4. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down.
5. Neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles.
6. As a consequence, the jeepney hit the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused Nenita
Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the
pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital and
regained consciousness only after 1 week.
7. Thereat, she was confined for 24 days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for 3 and 1/2 months.
8. Nenita filed complaint for damages assisted by her parents because they refused to pay the expenses she
incurred by reason of collision incident.
9. Trial court found both drivers Calebag and Leonardo, and jeepney owner Lamayo were liable as joint
tortfeasors for being concurrently negligent thus resulting in collision. MMTC was absolved because it has
proved that it was careful in selection and strict in supervision of its employees.
10. Upon appeal by Nenita, MMTC was held liable solidarily by the CA along with other defendants.
1. SC upheld the decision of CA. MMTC presented only oral testimony regarding the general process in hiring and
supervising employees without corroborating the same by documentary evidence thus failing the required
proof of preponderance of evidence. The testimony was in general, no particular document confirms the
selection of the driver itself and corresponding supervision.
2. The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the
part of the persons made responsible under the article, derived from their failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is imputed to them
by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus, the last paragraph of the article says that such responsibility
ceases if is proved that the persons who might be held responsible under it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family (diligentissimi patris familias) to prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that it is not
representation, nor interest, nor even the necessity of having somebody else answer for the damages caused
by the persons devoid of personality, but it is the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and
prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them, which
forms the foundation of such responsibility.
3. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection
and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being
the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence.

1. Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided
with a tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
2. At the time of the incident, Tuazon was in his proper lane when Foronda being then the driver and person in
charge of the Country Bus drove recklessly hence resulted in severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical
injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger
on the left hand being cut.
3. Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against spouses
Cerezo at the Makati address stated in the complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved no
longer held office nor resided in Makati. The trial court issued alias summons at their address in Barangay Sta.
Maria, Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally served on 20 April 1994 at
the office of Atty. Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty. Cerezo reacted angrily on
learning of the service of summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told Sheriff William Canlas:
"Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito.
Wala ka sa teritoryo mo."
4. Upon hearing, Tuazon was allowed to litigate as a pauper since he was jobless, his income is not sufficient for
his familys subsistence, and that he has not any real property. On the other hand, Cerezos motion to issue
new summons to the spouses due to improper service. The trial court denied its motion.
5. Then Cerezos failed to file an answer thus were declared in default and Tuazon was then allowed to present his
evidence. Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the Cerezo
spouses in the case. Judgment was rendered finding Cerezo liable for damages.
6. The Cerezo spouses filed certiorari before CA. The petition questioned whether the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses
claimed was an indispensable party. The CA denied the petition for certiorari. The CA also denied Cerezo
spouses motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
1. Whether Cerezo was liable despite non-inclusion of Foronda as defendant.
1. Yes, Cerezo was found liable. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the
case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the litigation, and
without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an
action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party
to the final resolution of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
2. The Cerezo spouses contention that summons be served anew on them is untenable in light of their
participation in the trial court proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses contention would make a fetish of a
3. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only
mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

1. This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained by Valenzuela
in a vehicular accident. [Richard Li, Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercials Inc.]
2. At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer
from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling
along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching
A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man
who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff
was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her
thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were
paid by defendants from the car insurance. One of the witnesses stated that defendant was under the
influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well.
3. After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
4. Li contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the accident was
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him
negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
1. Is Alexander, as employer of Li, liable? [Yes] Is Valenzuela guilty of contributory negligence? [No]
1. Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or
not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li,
to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of
demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based
on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

1. On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor 10 years of age , shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death.
2. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent,
and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
3. Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
4. Tamargo insisted that the natural parents were indispensable parties to the case.
5. Trial court said no.
6. CA said they lost their right to appeal for filing out of time.
7. Thus this petition.
1. Who is liable for the act of the minor Adelberto Bundoc? Natural or adopting parents?
1. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable
parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. Natural parents are indispensable for they are the parents with whom Adelberto was living at the time of the
tragic incident, and that it did not pass the parental authority to adopting parents since the adopting parents,
under the law, is vested parental authority only upon trial custody. Facts remain that the custody of the child
was still at the natural parents when the incident happened.
7. LIBI vs. IAC

1. Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December 1978, Julie Ann
decided to break up with Wendell because the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell
his second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead inside Julie Anns house. Both were
only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was 21).
2. Apparently, Wendell used his fathers gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed suicide.
3. The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of damages based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the parents of Wendell (Cresencio and Amelia Libi).
1. Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?
1. Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in safekeeping their gun.
Wendell gained access to the gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that their son had possession of said gun.
They only found out about it when the shooting happened. Further, they were not even aware that their son is
a drug informant of the local Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent and
were not acting with the diligence required by law (that of a good father of a family) in making sure that their
minor children shall not cause damages against other persons.
2. What is the nature of their liability?
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in cases like this is not
merely subsidiary. Their liability is primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by their minor child
arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is also the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will
be able to show that they have acted with the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely
subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.

Complainants are the heirs of Romeo So Vasquez who died after being hit by a company-issued vehicle driven by
Benjamin Abad, who was a manager of defendant Castilex Industrial Corporation. The incident happened around 2:00
am when Abad was on his way home from a lively restaurant after doing overtime work and leaving with the
vehicle. In their Defense, Castilex claimed that Abad was not acting within the scope of his functions when the incident

HELD: Castilex Industrial Corporation was not liable. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time
of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge [the Corporation] with liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the
negligence of an employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle:

I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends
to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of
evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and
from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.

II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee,
and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other
than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting
within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers motor vehicle.

The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in
the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with
no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer
furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the special
errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his
employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of
his employment in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where
at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal
errand of his own.

III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside of regular working
hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use,
even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the
employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his
house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer
is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine
of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the
employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee
was acting in his employers business or within the scope of his assigned task.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioners office, which was located in
Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about
seven kilometers away from petitioners place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor,
testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still
open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.

At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the
restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the
time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy, Daddy! This woman
could not have been ABADs daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line
with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way
beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed.
His being at a place which, as [the Corporation puts] it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers
and addicts, had no connection to [the Corporations] business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached
to his position.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, [the
Corporation] had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a
service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences
of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. (Citations omitted.)
9. MARTIN vs. CA

1. Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o'clock in the
morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on
Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco
subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him
for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in the sum of
P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and litigation costs as the employer of Nestor Martin.
2. After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no evidence
had been adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was denied. The case was
considered submitted for decision with the express waiver by the defendant of his right to present his own
evidence. The defendant thus did not rebut the plaintiff's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's employer.
1. Petition of owner Ernesto Martin was granted. Decision of lower court awarding damages against Ernesto was
2. It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was filed by the private respondent against only
Ernesto Martin as alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the time of the accident. Nestor
Martin was not impleaded. The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
3. The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not necessary
that the employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, which requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony
committed by his employee in the course of his employment.

4. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the
employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that article.

5. In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the
employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the
employer-employee relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that
although the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to
substantiate his allegation."

6. In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to drive and do not have to employ others to drive
for them unless this is needed for business reasons. Many cannot afford this luxury, and even if they could,
may consider it an unnecessary expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more plausible
assumption is that Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed
the car for some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere
employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.

7. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was
necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty "to present
evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action.
1. Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez
when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
2. Valenzuela found guilty for homicide, and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P6,000. He appealed at CA.
3. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in Court
of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son.
4. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing
him from behind.
5. Perez [owner] further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
6. Trial court awarded damages against owner [excluding driver]
1. Whether Perez the employer is liable for the acts of his employee Simeon.
1. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. [2 nd View, since the 1st view w/c is the resp superior is ugly]
a. (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of
protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from
violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the
carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety;
b. (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the
formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the
passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed
by law; and
c. (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power
to select and remove them.

1. In the evening of February 22, 1954, between 9:00 and 9:30 PM, a passenger bus Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday, Polo, Bulacan,
while travelling on its way to Manila.
2. As a result of which, Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child, who were then inside the bus as passengers were
thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple injuries.
3. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his
lower extremities which up to the time when this case was tried he continued to suffer. The physician who
attended and treated plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza opined that he may never walk again.
4. Driver of said bus Silverio Marchan was prosecuted for serious, less serious and slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and thereafter convicted as charged on June 29, 1956.
5. Conviction affirmed by Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
6. Marchan said that when he turned his headlight from dim to bright, he saw a truck parked at his lane, such
that he has to passed the truck and take the other lane because even if he should applied the break, they
would still hit the parked truck[6x6].
7. He is a boxer earning 100 pesos
1. Whether the employer is liable even though the employee acted beyond the scope of authority.
1. The SC noted the decision of CA that the riding public is not expected to inquire from time to time before they
board the passenger bus whether or not the driver who is at the steering wheel of said bus was authorized to
drive said vehicle or that said driver is acting within the scope of his authority and observing the existing rules
and regulations required of him by the management.
2. Thus, it is clear from the above Civil Code provision that common carriers cannot escape liability for death of
or injuries to passengers through the negligence and willful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders.

1. On July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036
bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
2. At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the Leticia saw a cargo truck parked at the
shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was
too narrow to accommodate the whole truck.
3. There was a kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device.
4. The truck driver, Julio, and his helper, Arturo, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by respondent
A & J Trading.
5. Santiago was driving fast, and did not heed to the request of Leticia to slow down because there was a parked
truck. Santiago was conversing with a co-employee, and that time was drunk.
6. When they are approaching, Leticia shouted babangga tayo! Santiago stepped on the break but was too late
7. They bumped onto the truck parked which caused the instant death of Santiago and Arturo.
8. Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. Spouses Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, A&J and Julio for
9. Trial court rendered judgment awarding damages against the Baliwag, A&J and Julio.
10. CA absolved A&J and Julio there being no fault on their part.
1. Whether Baliwag is liable because of the incident.
1. Yes, Balilwag is liable.
2. SC considred also the testimony that at that time, he is under the influence of alcohol, was talking to his co-
employee and did not heed to the plea of his passengers to slow down in driving. It was also testified that the
bus was running at the very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. All of these taken
into consideration, that the bus drivers wanton disregard for the physical safety of his passengers which makes
Baliwag, as a common carrier, liable for damages.
3. An employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction
and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted is safely.

Note: Land Transp and Traffic Code: (g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked
on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices
either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred
meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered.

1. Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer residing in Barangay Nungnungan 2, Municipality of Cauayan,
Province of Isabela. On July 15, 1994, at around 7:00 p.m., while Andres was crossing the National Highway on
his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane stopped to allow him and his carabao
to pass. However, as Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory Liner, driven by Ricardo C.
Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing, Victory Liner hit the old man and the carabao on which he was
2. Andres Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. The Victory Liner bus sped past
the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping him. His bone on left shoulder
protruded. The incident was witnessed by Malecdans neighbor and reported the same to the police.
Malecdan was brought to the hospital but died few hours after. His carabao also died.
3. A criminal case of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to property was filed against Victory
Liner and its driver.
4. Then the heirs of Andres Malecdan brought suit for damages where the trial court found Joson negligent and
also the Victory Liner was found negligent too in the selection and supervision of Joson. Thus damages.
5. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

1. Whether Victory Liner is liable for the acts of his driver [employee] Joson.
1. Yes, Victory Liner was liable. Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. For this purpose, they have the burden of proving
that they have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of
the performance of his duties.
2. Its defense that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family based on its own policies and procedures
failed to show that indeed the driver met the requirements and there was no documentary evidence
presented that would show the compliance thereof by Joson. As to selection: to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. As to supervision: formulation of standard operating procedures
and monitor implementation and impose sanctions.
3. Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict committed by an employee.
The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is
primary, and therefore, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency
of their employees.
4. The 5,900 part of claim for actual damages was removed by the court because that was used to the cost of one
pig which had been butchered for the 9th day death anniversary of the deceased. This item cannot be allowed.

1. Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, spouses Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely
allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after
doing so.
2. Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently
drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, Ferdinand
3. The spouses Castillo filed a complaint against St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando
Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas,
Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages. The trial court decided against
teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, for failing to exercise the diligence required of
them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen.
4. It dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna for failing to
show that they were responsible for Castillo's death. On appeal, the CA ruled that St. Francis HS and Illumin
were liable under Art 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, who had satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the picnic
site were absolved of liability.
1. Were the school and their teachers negligent?
1. The school and the principal are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those
under them. They cannot be held liable for damages of any kind. Under Article 2180, par. 4, before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or
prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. Mere
knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.
2. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The
incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the
teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the
incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at
Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this
picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
3. No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. Arquio, class adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
4. While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not
mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good
father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove
that they had exercised the required diligence.

1. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
2. Funtecha has students driving license only. The driver who accompanied him prior to the incident was Allan
Masa, son of Agustin Masa President of the school. Funtecha was also allowed to free-board in their house
while he was a student of Filamer.
3. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous
curb, and viewing that the road was clear. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound
as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, jeep swerved towards
the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and
hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
4. The heirs of Kapunan sought damages.
5. The lower court held Filamer liable for damages but insisted that there was no employer-employee
1. Is Filamer liable?
1. SC said at first case, No. but upon MR, the SC said Yes. Filamer was liable.
2. an issue was presented on whether the term employer as used in Article 2180 is applicable to Filamer with
reference to Funtecha who was working as scholar since under the Labor Code, there exists no employer-
employee relationship between the working scholars and the school.
3. Initially, the SC ruled that under the quoted provision of law, Filamer cannot be considered as Funtechas
employer. However, the SC reconsidered its decision and ruled that Funtecha being a working student (part-
time-janitor) and a scholar of Filamer was an employee because what he does there was in relation to school.
Even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only 2 hours in the morning of each day.
4. An employer is expected to impose discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer.

1. November 2, 1990, Baliwag Transit was driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal on 2nd Avenue, Caloocan City, for
repair of its brake system. Juanito Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matter
so that proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then alighted from the bus and told the gasman to
fill up the gas tank.
2. Shortly after, Juanito Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver's seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt
something was hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and
convulsive, sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked thereat owned by the same petitioner.
Fidel summoned his co-employees and they all helped to extricate Mario Dionisio. They rushed him to St.
Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. On November 6, 1990, he expired.
1. Whether Baliwag Transit is liable.

1. The circumstances clearly show that the proximate cause of the death of Mario Dionisio was the negligence of
driver Juanito Fidel when he failed to take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident.
2. He boarded his bus, sat on the driver's seat and was at the steering wheel when the bus moved pinning down
the deceased who was repairing the defective brake system below. Driver Fidel should have known that his
brake system was being repaired as he was in fact the one who told Dionisio to do the repair. Fidel should have
parked the bus properly and safely. After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he should
have placed a stopper or any hard object against a tire or two of the bus.
3. But without taking the necessary precaution he boarded Bus causing it to move and roll, pinning down the
deceased which resulted in his serious injuries and eventual death. The reckless imprudence of Juanito Fidel
makes him liable to the heirs of offended party for damages together with his employer.
4. When an injury is caused by negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law [juris
tantum] that there was negligence on the part of employer either in the selection or supervision over him after
such selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that
he had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his

1. This is an action for damages, arising from a vehicular accident, filed by the plaintiff Godofredo Poblete as
owner of the damaged taxicab against the driver and owner of the allegedly offending vehicle, Donato Fabros
and Godofredo de la Cruz, respectively.
2. After trial on the merits, and the case submitted for decision, the trial court, the Court of First Instance of
dismissed the case on the ground that from the allegation of the complaint, the action is one to hold Donato
Fabros, as the employer of the allegedly negligent driver, Godofredo de la Cruz, subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused the plaintiff, and is, therefore, premature, there having been no criminal action filed against
the driver who had died during the pendency of the case at bar, and, in effect, states no cause of action. A
motion for reconsideration was filed to the order of dismissal, but to no avail. Hence, this appeal because the
lower court judge thought that it was based on crime and not on quasi-delict.
1. Whether the civil case based on quasi-delict against employer Fabros may proceed notwithstanding the death
of his driver during pendency of the case.
1. Yes. Liability arising from tort is direct, primary and solidary. It is such a firmly established principle, as to have
virtually formed part of the 'law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and supervision of the
2. The case remanded to the lower court.

1. On June 12, 1981, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the morning, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their
three children, along with spouses David Ico and Fe Ico, their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were
onboard a passenger jeepney on their way to Malalam River, Isabela, to have a picnic in celebration of spouses
Baesas fifth wedding anniversary. David Ico was driving.
2. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right at a speed of about 20 KPH. A speeding PANTRANCO bus
from Aparri, on-route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with
it. David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children, died while the rest of the
passengers sustained injuries. The jeepney is extensively damaged.
3. The driver of the bus went into hiding, and has never been seen since. Maricar Baesa through her guardian
and Fe O. Ico filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. The other
victims settled with Bus Company.
4. PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the
accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.
1. Can PANTRANCO invoke the defense of Last Clear Chance?
1. No. Petitioner claims the driver of the jeepney had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and hence, was
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence the opportunity to avoid the harm. The
doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine of "last
clear chance" finds no application in this case.
2. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who had the last opportunity to avert
the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it
In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger.
3. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately
swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approach from the opposite direction. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At
the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to
swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The Court held that the last clear chance doctrine "can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered"
4. There is no presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were observed. The mere
issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various company policies on safety, without showing
that they are being complied with, are not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the
negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring
driver, the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner
failed to do this.

1. At around 3:30 p.m. of May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was being driven by her driver, Ceferino
G. Venturina along the northbound lane of Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA). Suddenly, the bus bumped
Herminigildo Zuiga, a pedestrian. Such was the force of the impact that the left side of the front windshield
of the bus was cracked. Zuiga was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was given medical
attention, but due to the massive injuries sustained, he succumbed shortly thereafter.
2. Private respondents, heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for
damages. The complaint alleged that Venturina drove the bus in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner, in
violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due regard to public safety, thus resulting in the victims
premature death. In her Answer, the petitioner denied the allegations of the complaint, trying to shift the
blame to the victim, theorizing that Herminigildo bumped into her bus, while avoiding an unidentified woman
who was chasing him. She further alleged that she was not liable for any damages because as an employer, she
exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of her bus

1. Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees, thus absolving her from any liability.
1. Petitioner claimed that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her driver, Venturina.
Her allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his drivers license and clearances is
worthless, in view of her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances.
Moreover, petitioner contradicted herself. She declared that Venturina applied with her sometime in January
1992 and she then required him to submit his license and clearances. However, the record likewise shows that
Venturina submitted the said requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal accident itself.
In other words, petitioners own admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not exercise due
diligence in the selection of her bus driver.
2. In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances when he applied with
petitioner in January 1992, the latter still fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver.
Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturinas qualifications,
safety record, and driving history.
3. Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. For as pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training
programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any showing that
petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence,
petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
4. No sane person would bump his head or body against a running bus along a big highway like EDSA at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City and neither did any of the defendants presented (sic) any evidence or proof to show that
the victim was mentally deranged at the time of the accident and the presumption therefore is that he was in
his normal senses.

1. On March 17, 1991, in Bgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, Vivian Lee Tan and her husband Silvino Tan, while
on board a motorcycle with driven by Silvino, and a Metro Bus driven by Margarito Avila, were involved in an
2. Silvino Tan died on the spot while Vivian Lee Tan suffered physical injuries. The deceased Silvino Tan is survived
by his wife, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and four children, three of whom are now residents of US.
3. Defendant Margarito Avila is an employee of defendant Philippine Hawk [driver].
4. Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with her husband,
who was on the wheel, at a place after a Caltex gasoline station in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon on
the way to Lopez, Quezon. They came from the Pasumbal Machine Shop, where they inquired about the repair
of their tanker.
5. They were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a
bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and their
motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where she was
confined for a week. She was later transferred to St. Lukes Hospital in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered a
fracture on her left chest, her left arm became swollen, she felt pain in her bones, and had high blood
pressure. The immediate cause of his death was massive cerebral hemorrhage.
6. Ernest Ovial, the driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident, testified that in the afternoon of March
17, 1991, his jeep was parked on the left side of the highway near the Pasumbal Machine Shop. He did not
notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and
then the bus bumped his jeep and sped away.
7. He heard a loud banging sound. From his side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned turtle (bumaliktad).
He did not stop to help out of fear for his life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he
bumped the motorcycle.
1. Whether petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
driver Avila.
1. Yes. PHC failed to exercise due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
employees. Where the employer focused his test only on the employees ability to drive and his physical fitness
to do so, as in this case, forgetting to sufficiently inculcate in the employee discipline and correct behavior on
the road, the employer was held to have failed to show due diligence in the supervision of the employee.
2. If the bus were on the right side of the highway and Margarito turned his bus to the right in an attempt to
avoid hitting it, then the bus would not have hit the passenger jeep vehicle which was then parked on the left
side of the road. The fact that the bus hit the jeep too, shows that the bus must have been running to the left
lane of the highway from right to the left, that the collision between it and the parked jeep and the moving
rightways cycle became inevitable. Besides, Margarito said he saw the motorcycle before the collision ahead of
the bus; that being so, an extra-cautious public utility driver should have stepped on his brakes and slowed
down. Here, the bus never slowed down, it simply maintained its highway speed and veered to the left. This is
negligence indeed. Avila was previously involved in sidesweeping incident for how many times he could not

1. On june 22, 1992, respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by
Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepey (his right
foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by
Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney.
Respondent fell anf fractured his left thigh bone. He also suffered lacerations and abrasions in his left leg.
2. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carrier's contractual
obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Ernesto
Syki, the owner of the truck and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the truck.
3. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena but ordered petitioner Ernesto
Syki and his truck driver to pay respondent Begasa, jointly and severely, actual and moral damages plus
attorney's fees. Petitioner appealed to the court of appeals, but the court denied their motion for
4. Syki filed the instant petition for review, arguing that the CA erred in not finding respondent Begasa guilty of
contributory negligence. Hence, the damages awarded to him should have been decreased or mitigated for he
believes that he observed the dileigence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee, thus he should not be held liable for the injuries sustained by the respondent.
Issue: Whether Syki employer of Sablayan is liable.
1. The sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner's driver who, as found by the
lower courts did not slow down even he was already approaching a busy intersection. The passenger jeepney
had a long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already
partly inside the jeepney when the petitioner's driver rear-ended. No doubt petitioner's driver was reckless.
2. And after failing to prove that Syki, the owner, observed the dileigence of a good father of a family in selecting
and supervising his driver and since the negligence of the driver was the sole and proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner is liable.
3. Based therefore on jurisprudential law, the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove
that he had observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The
reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employers testimony or that of his witnesses