Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Role of Supreme Court

of India
On May 7, 2015 By admin

-Saksham Dwivedi, CNLU

INTRODUCTION
Hazardous substances pervade modern industrialized societies. Indian industry generates, uses,
and discards toxic substances. Day by day the increasing use of technology to the make the
human life easy has an equal and opposite reaction in form of claiming lives in case of mis-
handling of those hazardous substances. The world has been witness to such man-made disasters
whether it is in the form of the atom bomb dropped by the U.S on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or it
is the nuclear accident at Chernobyl. All these incidents had one thing in common that they
posed a great threat to the upcoming human generations and the environmental damage caused
thereby cannot be estimated. The question arises how far such kind of activities, that in the
present world, are carried on by the corporations can be regulated and checked, and to what
extent the liability of such bodies should be fixed.

India too has been witness to such an unfortunate event of industrial accident in the year of 1984
when in Bhopal a toxic gas Methyl Isocyanate escaped from the chemical plant of Union Carbide
in Bhopal. The event led to the death of more than 3500 people as per the initial estimates,
however today, years after that accident it is believed that the death toll was as close to 8000.
The question that arose with this incident was regarding the liability of the Union Carbide and at
the same time the regarding the adverse environmental impact that similar industries handling
the hazardous substances posed on human life and earth.

The Bhopal Gas leakage case led to the manifold developments in the India legal system. The
transition from the rule of strict liability to that of the absolute liability in the Shri Ram Gas
leakage case at the time when the Bhopal Case was pending was the consequence of the
immense loss of life that occurred in the incident of 1984. The enactment of the stricter
environmental statutes followed next. Stringent rules regarding the entities dealing with the
hazardous substances were made. Section 2(e) of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 defines
hazardous substances to mean, “Any substance or operation which, by reason of its chemical or
physic-chemical properties or handling, is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living
creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment. In the present project we will
analyze in detail as to what happened in Bhopal and what were the effects that this catastrophe
had on the Enviro-legal scenario of the country. Also the issues related to the payment of
compensation to the victims of the accident shall be considered which till today has not met its
finality in the judicial process.
THE INCIDENT
A massive leak of toxic methyl Isocyanate (MIC) gas occurred during the night of December 2-
3, 1984, at the Bhopal plant of Union Carbide, India, Ltd. (UCIL), a subsidiary of Union Carbide
Corporation, a New York corporation with headquarters in Danbury, Connecticut. Union Carbide
owned 50.9 percent of the stock of its Indian subsidiary. The Indian government’s reports put the
death toll at 2,347, over 1,600 of whom were killed as a direct result of the deadly gas leak,
while the remaining hundreds died because of its fatal effects over the next several months.
Those seriously injured number between 30,000 and 40,000 and the Indian Government received
500,000 leak-related claims. Lingering effects include shortness of breath, eye irritation, and
depression. However, the official account of the number of deaths and that of injured is far less
that the number of persons that actually were dead and injured. The lack of the documentation of
deaths that fateful night, the subsequent chaos in administering aid to the victims since then, and
the ongoing disputes over causes of illness, deaths, and the effects of the exposure lead to the
conclusion that the actual number of sick and dead will never be accurately fixed.[i] The
numbers also fail to convey the anger, resignation, fear and suffering of many thousands
survivors who continue to the evidence the patterns of psychological and physical damage
through exposure to the initial gas and the lingering fears of unknown illnesses and future
genetic mutation.[ii] UCIL was the Indian subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC).
Indian Government controlled banks and the Indian public held 49.1 percent ownership share. In
1994, the Supreme Court of India allowed UCC to sell its 50.9 percent share. The Bhopal plant
was sold to McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. UCC was purchased by Dow Chemical Company in
2001.

Following the accident there started a long unending journey quest for justice to the victims of
the incident. However, the grave questions that arose from this unfortunate incident were two
fold. Firstly the question was related to the quantification of the liability of the corporations
handling with the hazardous substances in view of the absence of any established principle.
Another much grave question was related to the impact of such hazardous substances on the
environment and the issue of prevention of such damages in future by installation of proper
safety devices and mechanisms.

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE

No sooner than the accident in Bhopal took place, it was flocked by the American personal
injury lawyers. The Government of India, to ensure that the claims arising out of the disaster
were dealt properly and speedily, enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims)
Act, 1985.

Section 3(1) of the Bhopal Act read as follows:

Power of Central Government to represent claimants

Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Central Government shall, and shall have the
exclusive right to, represent, and act in place of (whether within or outside India) every person
who has made, or is entitled to make, a claim for all purposes connected with such claim in the
same manner and to the same effect as such person.

This Act conferred the exclusive right on the Indian Government acting as parens patriae, to
represent all claimants both within and outside India, and directed the Government to organize a
plan for the registration and processing of victim’s claims.

Initial Litigation Strategy: Filing of suit in American Courts

In April 1985, immediately after the Bhopal Act was passed, the Indian Government sued the
Union Carbide in the United States. An answer to the question that may reasonably arise in the
mind of any person that why did the Indian Government take recourse of the U.S courts, would
be the probable lack of confidence in its own judicial system coupled with the desire for the huge
sum of damages that may be awarded by the American jury. Also the skepticism about whether
the UCC would submit to the jurisdiction of India or not, might have been the factor leading to
the preference of the Indian Government for the American forums. In April 1985, the Indian
government, on behalf of the victims, filed as parens patriae a lawsuit against Union Carbide in
the federal district court for the Southern District of New York, seeking both compensatory and
punitive damages in an unspecified amount[iii], invoking six separate theories of liability on the
part of Union Carbide-absolute liability, strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty,
misrepresentation, and the multinational enterprise liability theory.

The U.S. lawyers filed a lawsuit in India challenging the Indian government’s action of filing a
lawsuit on behalf of all the victims in the United States, alleging that the Bhopal Act violated the
right of Indian citizens under the Constitution of India to choose their own counsel, and alleging
a conflict of interest by the Indian government, for it could not represent the victims because of
its shared responsibility for the disaster by failing to enforce safety regulations.[iv]

The Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all the lawsuits brought in the United
States in federal district court in the Southern District of New York.[v] On May 12, 1986,
District Judge Keenan dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens under three
conditions: first, that Union Carbide consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of India
and continue to waive defense based upon the statute of limitations; second, that Union Carbide
agree to satisfy any judgment rendered against it by an Indian court, provided that the minimal
requirements of due process are met; and third, that Union Carbide comply with U.S. rules of
discovery under the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[vi]

Settlement Efforts Rejected

Efforts at a negotiated settlement did not succeed as the Indian government rejected a Union
Carbide offer of 350 million dollars, an offer accepted by lawyers representing private plaintiffs
in litigation.[vii] Attorneys for the individual plaintiffs in the Bhopal case appealed the ruling by
Judge Keenan that sent the proceedings to India.[viii] Union Carbide cross-appealed the judge’s
ruling contending that the Indian government must also be bound by U.S.-style discovery rules,
and that Judge Keenan should retain authority to monitor the Indian court proceedings and be
available to rectify any possible abuses of Union Carbide’s right to due process in India.[ix]
Subsequently, on September 5, 1986, the Indian government sued Union Carbide in the Bhopal
district court in India for damages arising out of the gas leak, seeking at least 3 billion dollars.[x]
The Second circuit Court however, rejected the appeal to the extent it called for the supervision
of the proceedings in the Indian Court by the Judge Keenan for the reason that the same was
opposed to the basic jurisdictional principles and was an impractical step. However, it granted
the UCC the U.S style discovery powers.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

Literally Forum non conveniens is a Latin term for “forum not agreeing”. It is a mostly common
law legal doctrine whereby courts may refuse to take jurisdiction over matters where there is a
more appropriate forum available to the parties. As a doctrine of the conflict of laws, forum non
conveniens applies between courts in different countries and between courts in different
jurisdictions in the same country.[xi]This is a public policy doctrine directed against the move
for buying jurisdiction by the parties to be in more advantageous position in trial.

The law regarding the FNC has been laid down in the United States by the Supreme Court in the
case namely Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert[xii] and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno[xiii]. The Gilbert
case was decided in the 1947 along with the companion case Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co.[xiv] In the former two case the U.S Supreme Court laid down the standards for the
application of the doctrine forum non conveniens and in the later case the Supreme Court
reviewed the earlier cases and added two more distinct principles to the test laid down in the
Gilbert. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Gilbert and its companion case
can be summed as follows:

1. The ultimate inquiry in the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is, “where
trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice?[xv]
2. The plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed unless the balance is strongly
in favour of the defendant.[xvi]

Further in the Piper’s case the Supreme Court held that the ‘impact of the change in the
substantive law because of the dismissal on the ground of forum non convenience should not be
given ‘conclusive or even substantial weight in the enquiry thereof.[xvii] However, along with
the foregoing general principle the Supreme Court maintained that the unfavourable change in
law could be considered as a factor in the enquiry of the forum non conveniens and may be given
a substantial weight, where the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, in the interests of justice.[xviii]

In case of the suit filed by the Indian Government in the District court of New York, the Court
applying the principle of Piper held that:

The courts of India appear to be well up to the task of handling this case. Any
unfavourable change in law for plaintiffs which might be suffered upon transfer to the Indian
courts, will, by the rule of Piper, not be given substantial weight. Differences between the two
legal systems, even if they are injurious to plaintiff, do not suggest that India is not an adequate
alternative forum.[xix]

However, two conditions were imposed by the district court on the UCC as pre-requisite to the
dismissal of the case filed by the Indian Government, they being:

1. Union Carbide shall submit to discovery on the American model.

2. It should agree to be bound by and to satisfy the judgment of the Indian tribunal.

Reasons for which the case was dismissed: the ground of forum non conveniens

According to the rule established in the Gilbert the balancing of the public and the private
interest keeps a great significance in the determination of the application of forum non
conveniens. The district court while determining the balance of public and private interest held
that the private interests weighed greatly in favour of the dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens.[xx] It found that relative ease of access to sources of proof bearing on liability
favoured dismissal, for most of the documentary evidence concerning design, manufacture and
operation of the Bhopal plant, training of employees, and issues of safety, was to be found in
India. 2 Similarly, the court found that consideration of the other two factors articulated in
Gilbert, ease of access to witnesses, and the ease of arranging a view of the premises should one
be required, also favoured dismissal. So far as the public interest factors are considered, the
Court considered that since the plant was heavily regulated by the Indian government, and there
was no American interest involved, the outcome of this litigation outweighed the interest of India
in applying Indian law and Indian values to the task of resolving this case.[xxi]

THE BATTLE IN INDIA

After the American courts refused to entertain the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens,
the legal battle with the corporate giant was pursued further in India. The District Court of
Bhopal awarded an interim payment of ` 350 Crores. However, in an appeal to this judgment
given by District Judge Deo, Justice Seth in the Madhya Pradesh High Court reduced the interim
award by 30 percent, against which the Union of India appealed in the Supreme Court where a
five judge bench heard the case. In the High Court the interim award was given by the Justice
Seth on the basis of a more than prima facie case being made out against the defendants. The
lawyers of UCC claimed that the judgement given by the High Court amount to verdict without
trial. While in appeal the Supreme Court observed that there was dismal situation of the principal
lawsuits and there was hardly any progress. The hopes of the victims were dimmed by the
ineffectiveness of different manoeuvres adopted by the Government and the apparent disregard
for the victims by the UCC.[xxii]

The strategy of the Government seemed in the present case to be unconventional in the sense that
instead of pursuing the principal lawsuit, it went ahead with pursuit of the pre-trial award.
However, this pursuit ultimately culminated to be a wild goose chase and at the end of 4 years
after the accident the victims remained hopeless and the agony was increasing day by day. The
Supreme Court of India might not have appreciated this litigation strategy of the government and
in order to provide an immediate solace to the victims of the world’s worst industrial catastrophe.
In its order dated 14th February 1989 the Supreme Court ordered an overall settlement of the
claims that arose from the disaster whereby the UCC was to pay an amount of US $ 470 million
to the Indian Government as full and final settlement of all the claims, past, present and future,
both civil and criminal arising out of the disaster. The settlement was formulated by the Supreme
Court in the following terms:

Consequential Terms of Settlement

1. The parties acknowledge that the order dated February 14, 1989 as supplemented by the
order dated February 15, 1989 disposes of in its entirety all proceedings in Suit No. 1113
of 1986. This settlement shall finally dispose of all past, present and future claims, causes
of action and civil and criminal proceedings (of any nature whatsoever wherever
pending) by all Indian citizens and all public and private entities with respect to all past,
present and future deaths, personal injuries, health effects, compensation, losses,
damages and civil and criminal complaints of any nature whatsoever against UCC,
Union Carbide India Limited, Union Carbide Eastern, and all of their subsidiaries and
affiliates as well as each of their present and former directors, officers, employees,
agents representatives, attorneys, advocates and solicitors arising out of, relating to or
connected with the Bhopal Gas leak disaster, including past, present and future claims,
causes of action and proceedings against each other. All such claims and causes of
action whether within or outside India of Indian citizens, public or private entities are
hereby extinguished, including without limitation each of the claims filed or to be filed
under the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme,
1985, and all such civil proceedings in India are hereby transferred to this Court and are
dismissed with prejudice, and all such criminal proceedings including contempt
proceedings stand quashed and accused deemed to be acquitted.

The aforesaid settlement apparently might seem satisfactory enough to do justice with the
victims of the accident but when compared to the pain and agony that has been suffered by them,
this settlement hardly seems to make any restitution.

Constitutionality of the Bhopal Act, 1985:

Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India
The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claim) Act, 1985 was assailed on the touchstone
of Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was contended by the appellants that the
Section 3, 4 and 11 of the Bhopal Act, 1985 insofar as they take away the right of the victims to
represent themselves should be, declared unconstitutional. It was urged to consider whether
Section 3, 4 and 11 take away the rights of the victims and the citizens to fight for their own
causes and to assert their own grievances validly and properly, in the light of the prevailing
conditions at the time, the nature of the right of the citizen, the purpose of the restrictions on their
rights to sue for enforcement in the courts of law or for punishment for offences against his
person or property, the urgency and extent of the evils sought to be remedied by the Act, and the
proportion of the impairment of the rights of the citizen with reference to the intended remedy
prescribed.[xxiii] Reliance was put by the petitioners on the case of State of Madras v. V. G.
Row[xxiv] wherein the Supreme Court held:

“…….in considering the reasonableness of the law imposing restrictions on the

fundamental rights, both the substantive and the procedural aspects of he impugned restrictive
law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness. And the test of
reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to
all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the
restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict.”

The Act was also assailed on the ground of Article 14 whereby it was contended that right to
equality is guaranteed to every person under Article 14 in all matters like the laws of procedure
for enforcement of any legal or constitutional right in every jurisdiction, substantive law defining
the rights expressly or by necessary implication. Denial of any of these rights to any class of
citizen in either field must have nexus with constitutionally permissible object and can never be
arbitrary. It was further contended that Union of India was a joint tort-feasor along with UCC
and UCIL. It had negligently permitted the establishment of such a factory without proper
safeguards exposing the victims and citizens to great danger. Such a person or authority cannot
be entrusted to represent the victims by denying the victims their rights to plead their own
cases.[xxv]

The Supreme Court of India, in its judgment, upheld the constitutional validity of the Act under
which the Indian government gave itself the exclusive right to represent all Bhopal victims in
civil litigation against Carbide. The court acknowledged that the Bhopal act entitled the victims
to notice and an opportunity to be heard on any proposed settlement and the settlement in the
February 1989 failed to give any such notice. Nevertheless the court concluded that in the special
facts and circumstances of the case ‘a post decisional hearing would not be in the ultimate
interest of justice.’ The Court noted that the hearings to be held during the review of the
settlement afforded sufficient opportunity to the victims and rationalized its view by declaring
that ‘to do a great right after all it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong.’

The Gulf Of Mexico Oil Disaster

On April 20, 2010, a tragic disaster hit the Gulf Coast. British Petroleum’s (BP) Deepwater
Horizon rig exploded spewing crude oil into the ocean from the three major cracks in the rig. It
rivaled the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill within days of exploding (Gerstein, 2010). A few years
earlier, BP was fined $20 million for neglecting to prevent leaks in a pipeline in Alaska’s Pruhoe
Bay. From June 5, 2010 to June 14, 2010, BP had collected 127,000 barrels of oil in their
containment cap alone; while it is believed that a total 60,000 barrels of oil a day are gushing
into the Gulf[xxvi]. The oil slick can be seen from space and covers an area of 130 miles by 70
miles even though BP has dumped 50,000 barrels of heavy mud on the leaks to help stop the
flow of oil (2010). After the insistence from government officials, BP began drilling a relief well
that will intersect with the original well and will pull up oil so that BP can dump more mud and
concrete into the old well and retire it for good. BP is attempting to help the states affected by the
oil spill. Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana received $15 million each from BP, while Florida
received $25 million (New Orleans is asking that BP shell out another $75 million to them alone
to help maintain their image); all the states plan on using the majority of the money to fund
advertising campaigns to draw in tourists. BP has also set aside $20 billion for “tourism and
leisure businesses” who file compensation claims[xxvii].

Doctrine of Absolute Liability: M.C Mehta v

Union of India
In the December, 1985 just a day after the first anniversary of the Bhopal Gas accident in the
suburbs of Delhi, oleum leaked from the sulphuric acid plant located within the premises of
caustic chlorine plant, thereby affecting several people. A writ petition was filed by the
environmentalist and lawyer M.C Mehta as public interest litigation. Justice P.N Bhagwati who
decided the case took the opportunity to enunciate the principle of absolute liability of the
corporation dealing with the hazardous substances. When this case was brought before the
Supreme Court, the Bhopal case was pending. The decision given in this case had to have an
impact on the decision of the Bhopal case. This is to emphasize that the Shriram was one of the
largest corporations in India. However, the litigation strategy adopted by Shriram was quite
different to that of UCC in the Bhopal case. Shriram easily conceded to and complied with the
directions given by the Supreme Court in the case.

The Supreme Court in its first order considered the question concerning the true scope and ambit
of Articles 21 and 32 of the Constitution, the principles and norms for determining the liability of
large enterprises engaged in manufacture and sale of hazardous products, the basis on which
damages in case of such liability should be quantified and whether such large enterprises should
be allowed to continue to function in thickly populated areas and if they are permitted so to
function, what measures must be taken for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the hazard to
the workmen and the community living in the neighbourhood.[xxviii] The most important
development in this case was made in its third order, wherein a milestone in the Indian legal
system was created whereby the rule of strict liability[xxix] as laid down in the case of Rylands v
Fletcher[xxx] was carried a step further to develop the concept of absolute liability. The Court
observed regarding the aforesaid rule:

“It is not necessary for us to consider these decisions laying down the parameters of
this rule because in a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and
technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry as part of
the developmental programme, this rule evolved in the 19th century at a time when all these
developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in
evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the
present day economy and social structure. We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was
evolved in the context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy
the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking
place in the country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the
challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static……..We are of the view
that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses
a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the
surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no
harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity
which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the
hazardous or inherently dangerous.”

Having observed the transition of the Court from strict liability to absolute liability, it can be
very well said that the aforesaid judgment adds support to the supposition that the court’s hidden
agenda was to anticipate and nullify the ‘third party sabotage’ defence in the Bhopal case. Apart
from this other observation that were made by the court were regarding the establishment of the
green courts, green belts around the industrial areas along with a special emphasis by the court
on the need of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The court also advocated the need to
establishment of the Ecological Science Research Group consisting of independent and
competent experts to provide need scientific and technological input to the government in such
cases.[xxxi]

CONCLUSION
Who is to blame here? Many years after the Bhopal Gas leak, the worst industrial catastrophe in
history, it remains unclear who must bear the legal responsibility. Certainly there is plenty of
blame to go around and the recipients include Union Carbide, UCIL and the governments of
India and Madhya Pradesh. The role of the India government in the Bhopal disaster was that of
an actor in many parts. The government was keen that transnational corporations such as carbide
set up shops in India, in the hope of creating jobs and drawing new technology and industry into
this rapidly developing country. The Government was also responsible for overseeing the
construction and management of the carbide plant ensuring that applicable health and safety
standards were met. Then with the passage of the Bhopal Act the government named itself as the
sole plaintiff in all litigation, which created enormous conflict of interests. And while the issues
of liability, adequate amount of compensation, and strategies to resolve the Bhopal controversy
are of great significance and ought to concern us, the issues often ignored relate to the Bhopal
victims for whom the bell continues to toll. Consequently, what is of utmost concern is to devise
ways to ensure justice for the Bhopal victims in the long run and to make certain that their relief
and rehabilitation needs are appropriately met.

[i] Divan, Shyam and Rosencranz, Armin, Environmental Law and Policy in India: Cases,
Materials and Statutes, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2008, p. 547
[ii] Ibid.

[iii] In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844; See also Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So
Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEXAS INT’L L. J. at p.286 [as
cited in Nanda, Ved P., For Whom the Bell Tolls In the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy:
Reflections on Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal
Dispute, 15 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 235 1986-1987, p.239]

[iv] Lewin, Carbide Is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at D2,
col.4

[v] In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp.
842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) [as cited in Nanda, Ved P., For Whom the Bell Tolls In the Aftermath
of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative Methods of
Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 235 1986-1987, p.239]

[vi] Ibid at 867

[vii] Int’l Env’t. Rptr. (BNA) 107 (April 9, 1986) [as cited in Nanda, Ved P., For Whom the Bell
Tolls In the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on Forum Non Conveniens and
Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 235 1986-
1987, p.240]

[viii] Supra at note 5

[ix] Ibid. at 202

[x] Hazarika, India to Seek at Least $3 Billion From Union Carbide for Bhopal, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1986, at 10, col. 6; Meir & Miller, India Plans to Seek at Least $3 billion From Union
Carbide for Bhopal Claims, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 3, col. 1[as cited in Nanda, Ved P., For
Whom the Bell Tolls In the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on Forum Non
Conveniens and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 Denv. J. Int’l L. &
Pol’y 235 1986-1987, p.241]

[xi] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forum_non_conveniens, visited on 11th November 2011, 15:05

hours

[xii] 330 U.S. 501 (1947)

[xiii] 454 U.S. 235 (1981)

[xiv] 330 U.S. 518 (1947)

[xv] 330 U.S. at 527

[xvi] 330 U.S. at 508

[xvii] 454 U.S. at 247

[xviii] Ibid. at 254

[xix] In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp.
842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256, 261

[xx] Ibid, at 860

[xxi] Ibid, at 860

[xxii] Supra at note 1, p. 548

[xxiii] Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480, para 28

[xxiv] AIR 1952 SC 607

[xxv] Ibid, at para 30

[xxvi] Walsh, B. (2010). Stopping the Oil Spill. Time, 176 (5), 24-27

[xxvii] Beard. E., Hannan, M,. & Hayward, P. (2010). After the Spill. (Cover Story). Parks and
Recreation, 45 (11), 38-45.

[xxviii] M.C Mehta v Union of India AIR 1987 SC 965

[xxix] Rule of Strict liability: A person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he
fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.

[xxx] 1868 LR 3 HL 330

[xxxi] Supra, at note 26