G.R. No.
138081 March 30, 2000 laborer[s] to stopped [sic] the unloading of the
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) and THE
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND
INVESTIGATION BUREAU (EIIB), petitioners,
vs.
NELSON OGARIO and MARK
MONTELIBANO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture
proceedings in the Bureau of Customs. In accordance
with what is now settled law, we hold it does not.
The facts are as follows: On December 9, 1998, Felipe
A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu,
issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention1 of 25,000
bags of rice, bearing the name of SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto", which
was then docketed at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant
was issued on the basis of the report of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII
that the rice had been illegally imported. The report
stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign
vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN,"
Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on
board the vessel M/V "Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings
were started in the customs office in Cebu, docketed as
Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98.
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano,
the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer,
respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for
injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, alleging:
4.) That upon arrival of the herein-mentioned
sacks of rice at the PIER 5 of Cebu City,
Philippines on the 7th day of December 1998
all of the defendants rushed to the port with
long arms commanding the plaintiff's
goods should be released to them and the
same from the vessel named M/V Alberto. The
defendants alleged that the herein-mentioned
rice were [sic] smuggled from abroad without
even proof that the same were [sic] purchased
from a particularly country.
5.) By the mere suspicion of the defendants
that the goods were smuggled from abroad,
they immediately put on hold the release of the
goods from the ship and at the same time they
jointly barred unloading and loading activities
of the plaintiffs' laborers of the herein-
mentioned rice.
6.) The plaintiffs then presented all the
pertinent and necessary documents to all of the
defendants but the latter refused to believe that
the same is from Palawan because their minds
are closed due to some reason or another Civil
[while] the plaintiffs believed that the same is
merely an act of harassment. The documents
are as follows:
A.) Certification from the National
Food Authority that the same is from
Palawan. This is hereto attached
Annex A.
B) Bill of Lading issued by ANMA
PHILIPPINES Shipping Company.
This is hereto attached as Annex B.
7.) The acts of the defendants in stopping he
loading and unloading activities of the
plaintiff's laborers [have] no basis in law and
in fact; thus, unlawful and illegal. A mere
suspicious which is not coupled with any proof
or evidence to that effect is [a] matter which
the law prohibits.
8.) That for more than three days and despite
the repeated plea of the plaintiffs that their
1
defendants should stop from barring the
unloading and loading activities, the latter
blindly refused [to] heed the same.
9.) That the acts of all of the defendants which
are greatly unlawful and erroneous would
caused [sic] irreparable damage, injury, and
grave injustices to the plaintiffs.
10.) That by way of example or correction for
the public good and to deter the defendants
from doing the same acts to other
businessmen, defendants should be held liable
for exemplary damages in amount of not less
than One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
11.) That the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief
prayed in this complaint and the whole or part
of such reliefs consists in restraining
perpetually the defendants from holding the
herein-mentioned twenty-five thousand sacks
of rice. That defendants should be restrained
perpetually from barring the unloading and
loading activities of the plaintiffs' laborers.
12.) That allowing the defendants to continue
their unlawful acts would work grave injustice
to the plaintiffs. Unless a preliminary
injunction be granted ex-parte, grave and
irreparable injury and damage would result to
the plaintiffs before the latter can be heard on
notice.
13.) That if the defendants be not restrained
perpetually from their unlawful acts, the
herein-mentioned rice will deteriorate and turn
into dusts [sic] if not properly
disposed.1âwphi1.nêt
14.) That a Warrant of Seizure and detention
issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated
 December 9, 1998 be quashed because the
defendants' act of seizing and detaining the
herein-mentioned sacks of rice are illegal. The
continuing act of detaining the herein-
mentioned sacks of rice will led to the
deterioration of the same. That no public
auction sale of the same should be conducted
by the Bureau of Custom[s] or any
government agenc[y].
15.) That plaintiffs are ready and willing to file
a bond executed to the defendants in an
amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court to
the effect that plaintiffs will pay to the
defendants all damages which they may
sustain by reason of the injunction if this
Honorable Court should finally decide that the
plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Premised on the foregoing, it is most
respectfully prayed before this Honorable Court that a
restraining order or temporary injunction be immediately
issued prohibiting the defendants from holding plaintiffs'
above-mentioned goods. That it is further prayed that a
restraining order or temporary injunction be issued
prohibiting the defendants from barring the unloading
and loading activities of the plaintiffs' laborers. Further,
the plaintiffs prayed that the warrant of seizure and
detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated
December 9, 1998 be quashed and no public auction
sale of the same should be conducted by any government
agency or authority.
It is further prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
rendered:
1.) Making the restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction permanent.
2.) Ordering the defendants jointly to pay
exemplary or corrective damages to the
plaintiff[s] in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
Such other relief which are just and demandable under
the circumstances are also prayed for.2
In separate motions, petitioners Bureau of Customs
(BOC), Port of Cebu3 and the EIIB, as well as the
Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction, but their motions were denied. In its
resolution, dated January 11, 1999, the RTC said:
The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued
by the Bureau of Customs cannot divest this
court of jurisdiction since its issuance is
without legal basis as it was anchored merely
on suspicion that the items in question were
imported or smuggled. It is very clear that the
defendants are bereft of any evidence to prove
that the goods were indeed imported or
smuggled, that is why the plaintiffs have very
vigorously protested against the seizure of
cargoes by the defendants. In fact, as revealed
by defendants' counsel, the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention was issued merely to shift the
burden of proof to the shippers or owners of
the goods to prove that the bags of rice were
not imported or smuggled. However, the court
feels this is unfair because the settled rule is
that he who alleges must prove the same.
Besides, at this time when our economy is not
good, it would be a [dis]service to the nation to
use the strong arm of the law to make things
hard or difficult for the businessmen.4
The 25,000 bags of rice were ordered returned to
respondents upon the posting by them of an
P8,000,000.00 bond.
Petitioners BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration,
but their motion was denied by the RTC in its order
dated January 25, 1999.5 In the same order, the RTC also
2
increased the amount of respondents' bond to
P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals,
the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained. 6
Accordingly, on April 26, 1999, upon motion of
respondents, the RTC ordered the sheriff to place in
respondents' possession the 25,000 bags of rice.
Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the
Collector of Customs of Cebu (Cebu Seizure
Identification Case No. 17-98), a decision was rendered,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority
vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the
25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the
two (2) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GCC 844
and GHZ 388 are all FORFEITED in favor of
the government to be disposed of in the
manner prescribed by law while the seven (7)
trucks bearing Plate Nos. GFX 557; GFX 247;
TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548
are RELEASED in favor of their respective
owners upon proper identification and
compliance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations.
Since this decision involves the release of
some of the articles subject matter of herein
case which is considered adverse to the
government, the same is hereby elevated to the
Commissioner of Customs for automatic
review pursuant to Republic Act 7651. 7
The District Collector of Customs found "strong reliable,
and convincing evidence" that the 25,000 bags of rice
were smuggled. Said evidence consisted of certifications
by the Philippine Coast Guard, the Philippine Ports
Authority, and the Arrastre Stevedoring Office in
Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had never docked in
Palawan since November, 1998; a certification by
Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo of the National Food
Authority (NFA) Palawan that her signature in NFA
Grains Permit Control No. 00986, attesting that the
25,000 bags of rice originated from Palawan, was
forged; and the result of the laboratory analysis of a
sample of the subject rice by the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) stating that the sample "does
not compare with any of our IRRI released varieties."
Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the
proceedings before the District Collector of Customs
despite due notice sent to his counsel because he refused
to recognize the validity of the forfeiture proceedings. 8
On April 30, 1999, petitioners filed the present petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated April 15, 1999, upholding the resolution
of the RTC denying petitioners' motions to dismiss. They
contend that:
I. SINCE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF CEBU CITY DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE INSTANT
CONTROVERSY, AND THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS HAD ALREADY EXERCISED
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
OVER THE SAME, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE EXERCISE BY THE
TRIAL JUDGE OF JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE BELOW AND IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RESOLUTION
DATED JANUARY 11, 1999 AND ORDER
DATED JANUARY 25, 1999 IN CIVIL CASE
NO. CEB-23077.
II. SINCE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT
EXHAUSTED ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
DENIALS OF PETITIONERS' SEPARATE
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS
FOR RECONSIDERATION.9
In Jao v. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court, reiterating its
ruling in a long line of cases, said:
There is no question that Regional Trial Courts
are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere
with these proceedings. The Collector of
Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
Regional Trial Courts are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus.
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of
the Tariff and Customs Code and that of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise
known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals," specify the proper fora and
procedure for the ventilation of any legal
objections or issues raised concerning these
proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of
Customs are appealable to the Commissioner
of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject
to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the
Court of Appeals.
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no
review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no
unnecessary hindrance on the government's
drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other
frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to
render effective and efficient the collection of
import and export duties due the State, which
3
enables the government to carry out the
functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of
Customs were illegal, which has yet to be
proven, we have said that such act does not
deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction
thereon.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals
that regular courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as in
this case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious
doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under
Customs jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture
proceedings" 11 They overlook the fact, however, that
under the law, the question of whether probable cause
exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not
for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that the articles on board a vessel were imported
from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before
they may exercise the power to effect customs' searches,
seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with
the administrative hearings. 12 As the Court held
in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya: 13
The governmental agency concerned, the
Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive
authority.1âwphi1 Even if it be assumed that in
the exercise of such exclusive competence a
taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the
most that can be said is that under certain
circumstances the grave abuse of discretion
conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It
does not mean however that correspondingly a
court of first instance is vested with
competence when clearly in the light of the
above decisions the law has not seen fit to do
so. The proceeding before the Collector of
Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the
Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to
the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach
this Court through the appropriate petition for
review. The proper ventilation of the legal
 issues raised is thus indicated. Certainly a
court of first instance is not therein included.
It is devoid of jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate
issuance of writs of injunction, the Supreme Court issued
on June 25, 1999 Administrative Circular No. 07-99 to
all judges of lower courts entitled EXERCISE OF
UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND
JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. The circular states in
part:
Finally, judges should never forget what the
Court categorically declared in Mison v.
Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that
"[b]y express provision of law, amply
supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the
Collector of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, and regular courts cannot
interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or
put it to naught.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see
to it that this circular is immediately
disseminated and shall monitor
implementation thereof.1âwphi1.nêt
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND
COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby
enjoined.
WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued
on May 17, 1999 is hereby made permanent. The
decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004
FELICISIMO RIETA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the
crime. It may be proven by the credible testimonies of
witnesses, not necessarily by physical evidence. In-court
identification of the offender is not essential, as long as
the identity of the accused is determined with certainty
by relevant evidence. In the present case, there is no
doubt that petitioner was the same person apprehended
by the authorities and mentioned in the Information. His
possession of the smuggled cigarettes carried the prima
facie presumption that he was engaged in smuggling.
Having failed to rebut this presumption, he may thus be
convicted of the crime charged.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the December 22,
2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CR No. 17338. The CA affirmed with modification the
February 18, 1994 Consolidated Judgment3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)4 of Manila (Branch 46) in
Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VI-137(79) and CCC-VI-
138(79), finding Felicisimo Rieta guilty of smuggling.
The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
4
"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
trial court finding Felicisimo Rieta, Arturo
Rimorin, Pacifico Teruel and Carmelo
Manaois GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime
charged.
(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo
Ferrer, Fidel Balita, Robartolo Alincastre and
Ernesto de Castro are ACQUITTED as
recommended by the Solicitor General."5
Reconsideration was denied in the April 16, 2001 CA
Resolution,6 which petitioner also assails.
Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin,
Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo Alincastre,
Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco -- were charged in
an Information, which reads:
"That on or about October 15, 1979, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, with the evident intent to
defraud the government of the Republic of the
Philippines of the legitimate duties accruing to
it from merchandise imported into this country,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully [and]
fraudulently import or bring into the
Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to
law, three hundred five (305) cases of assorted
brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign
articles valued at P513,663.47 including duties
and taxes, and/or buy, sell, transport or assist
and facilitate the buying, selling and
transporting of the above-named foreign
articles after importation knowing the same to
have been imported contrary to law which was
found in the possession of said accused and
under their control which articles said accused
 fully well knew have not been properly
declared and that the duties and specific taxes
thereon have not been paid to the proper
authorities in violation of said Sec. 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, in
relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec.
184 of the National Internal Revenue Code."7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution (Respondent)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)8 presents the
prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson,
the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group (MISG for brevity), received
information that certain syndicated groups
were engaged in smuggling activities
somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further
revealed that the activities [were being] done
at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a
delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being
escorted by some police and military
personnel. He fielded three surveillance stake-
out teams the following night along Roxas
Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan
Bridge, whereby they were to watch out for a
cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for
Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis
of his investigation, [it was discovered that]
the truck was registered in the name of Teresita
Estacio of Pasay City.
"At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men
returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson
posting himself at the immediate vicinity of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area,
Manila, because as per information given to
him, the said cargo truck will come out from
the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment.
COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore
Anti-Crime Battalion. The night watch lasted
till the wee hours of the following morning.
About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from
the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It
returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.
"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that
morning, a green cargo truck with Plate No. T-
SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC
Detachment followed and escorted closely by a
light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No.
GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time,
Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information
whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order
by radio to his men to intercept only the cargo
truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col.
Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following
the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn
towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that]
was going south. Almost by impulse, Col.
Lacson's car also made a U-turn and gave
chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was
running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col.
Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for
less than 5 minutes until said car made a stop
along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan
Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the
car and they found several firearms,
particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and one
(1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered
that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the
Toyota car, and his companions inside the car
were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita
and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, [all] belonging
to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were
found not to be equipped with mission orders.
"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-
167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or
untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The
cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was
able to escape while the other passengers or
5
riders of said truck were apprehended, namely:
Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City
Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit
Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Lacson's men hauled the intercepted vehicles,
the arrested men and confiscated goods to
Camp Crame, Quezon City. All the 371 cases
(305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes were turned
over to the Bureau of Customs. Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit of
Arrest together with Arnel Acuba. The
Booking and Information Sheet of Ernesto de
Castro showed that he was arrested by the
MISG after delivering assorted blue seal
cigarettes at 185 Sanciangco St., Tonsuya,
Malabon."9
Version of the Defense (Petitioner)
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of
the alleged smuggling of the blue-seal cigarettes. He sets
forth his version of the facts as follows:
"Petitioner Rieta testified that he was a
policeman assigned at Kawit Cavite. In the
early morning of October 15, 1979, he was in
Manila together with Boy. He met Boy in 1978
when the latter figured in a vehicular accident
in Kawit, Cavite. x x x After a week, Boy
visited him at the Kawit Police Station and
thereafter, met him four to five times. He
learned that Boy was a businessman hauling
slippers, fish and vegetables from Divisoria.
For several times, he had accompanied Boy on
his business trips when [the latter] hauled fish,
vegetables and slippers from Divisoria to
Cavite. He was requested by Boy to
accompany him on his various trips because
there were times when policemen on patrol
were demanding money from [the latter]. At
other times, other policemen accompanied Boy
aside from him, on his trips.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he
met Boy in front of the Kawit Town Hall. He
learned that Boy will haul household
appliances from Divisoria. They boarded a
jeep driven by Boy and they proceeded to
Cartimar, Pasay City. At Cartimar, Boy left
him at a gasoline station, and told him to
standby because Boy will get the cargo truck
they will use. When Boy returned, he had
companions, who were introduced to him as
Gonzalo Vargas and Sgt. Rimorin, the
petitioner's co-accused in Criminal Case No.
CC-VI-138 (79). From Cartimar, the four (4)
of them proceeded to Divisoria and they
passed under the Del Pan Bridge. While
passing therein, he told Boy that he was
hungry, so that when they passed by a small
restaurant, he alighted and Sgt. Rimorin
followed. Boy told them that he and Gonzalo
will proceed to the Port Area and will be back.
After thirty to forty five minutes, Boy and
Gonzalo returned, and he and Sgt. Rimorin
boarded the truck and proceeded to Roxas
Boulevard. While they were along Roxas
Boulevard near the Daily Express Building,
two (2) vehicles intercepted them and ordered
them to pull-over. The passengers of the said
vehicles introduced themselves as Metrocom
soldiers, and ordered them to alight and to
raise their hands while poking guns at them.
They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their
belly on the pavement and were bodily frisked
and searched. The Metrocom soldiers did not
find anything from their bodies. Thereafter,
they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were
ordered by the Metrocom soldiers to transfer to
a jeep. While they were aboard the jeep, he
overheard from the Metrocom soldiers that
their driver was able to escape. Likewise, they
were also informed by the Metrocom soldiers
that the cargo truck was loaded with blue seal
cigarettes. The cargo truck was not opened in
their presence, nor were the contents thereof
shown to them upon their apprehension. From
the time he boarded the cargo truck in
Cartimar until he and Sgt. Rimorin alighted to
take their snacks, up to the time they were
apprehended by the Metrocom soldiers, he had
not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the cargo
truck. He did not notice whether the Metrocom
soldiers opened the cargo truck. At Camp
Crame, he was investigated without the benefit
of counsel, but, nonetheless, he executed and
signed a statement because as far as he was
concerned he has done nothing wrong. He was
detained at Bicutan for more than a year.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he
was not carrying any firearm because he has
no mission order to do so, and besides Manila
was not his jurisdiction. He was suspended
from the service, but was reinstated in January
1981. After he was released from Bicutan, he
looked for Boy so that he could clear the
matter, but he [did not find] Boy anymore.
"In corroboration with the testimony of
petitioner Rieta, accused Rimorin, a policeman
assigned at Pasay City, testified that the first
time he met Boy was in 1978 in the wake and
internment of the Late Police Officer Ricardo
Escobal. Thereafter, Boy dropped by on
several occasions at the Pasay Police Station to
request for assistance. Prior to October 15,
1979, Boy again dropped by at the police
station and asked him if he had an appointment
on the next day. He told Boy that he had no
appointment, and the latter requested to
accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan to get
some rice. Prior thereto, in one of their casual
conversations, he learned that Boy was a
businessman engaged in hauling various
merchandise. He agreed to the request of Boy
to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, they proceeded to a
6
warehouse containing bags of rice, and they
hauled several bags into a truck, and thereafter,
proceed[ed] to Quezon City. As compensation
Boy gave him a sack of rice. The said
transaction was followed by another on
October 15, 1979. In the afternoon of October
14, 1979, Boy again dropped by at the police
station and requested him to accompany him to
haul household fixtures. They usually haul
vegetables and rice early in the morning to
avoid the traffic and that was the reason why
they met in the early morning of October 15,
1979. He told [Boy] that he will see if he will
have [the] time, but just the same they made
arrangements that they will see each other at
Cartimar, Pasay City not later than 2:30 a.m. in
the early morning of October 15, 1979. At the
appointed time and place, he met Boy with a
companion, who was introduced to him as
Gonzalo Vargas, his co-accused in the instant
case. Thereafter, they proceeded to a gasoline
station nearby. At the gasoline station, at the
corner of Taylo and Taft Avenue, near
Cartimar, they picked up another person who
was later on introduced to him as Felicisimo
Rieta. Then the four of them (Boy, Gonzalo,
Rieta and Rimorin) boarded the cargo truck
and they proceeded to Divisoria. It was Boy
who drove the cargo truck, while petitioner
was seated next to Boy while accused Rimorin
and Gonzalo to his right. While enroute to
Divisoria, along Roxas Boulevard before
reaching Del Pan Bridge, Boy turned right
under the bridge. He commented that it was
not the route to Divisoria, and Boy answered
'meron lang ikakarga dito'. On the other hand,
Rieta told Boy that he was hungry, and thus,
Boy pulled-over at a carinderia at Del Pan
Bridge near Delgado Bros. When Rieta
alighted he followed, while Boy and Gonzalo
proceeded. After less than an hour, Boy and
Gonzalo returned. They then proceeded
towards Roxas Boulevard, Bonifacio Drive,
and Boy drove straight at the corner of Aduana
to Roxas Boulevard. When he noticed that the
truck was not bound for Divisoria as earlier
informed, he asked Boy why they were not
taking the route going to Divisoria. Boy
replied 'bukas na lang wala ng espasyo'.
Immediately, they were intercepted by two
vehicles and one of the occupants thereof
ordered the driver to pull over. The driver
pulled over, and they were ordered to raise
their hands and to lay flat on their belly on the
pavement right in front of the truck, and they
were bodily frisked but they found nothing. He
asked the Metrocom soldiers what was it all
about, but the Metrocom soldiers were
shouting 'asan ang blue seal'. Then they were
ordered to board a jeep owned by the
Metrocom soldiers, and they were brought to
Camp Crame. Before they left the area, he did
not see the Metrocom soldiers open the cargo
truck. He was brought to the MISG at Camp
Crame. When they arrived at Camp Crame, the
soldiers thereat were clapping their hands, thus
he asked 'ano ba talaga ito' and he got an
answer from Barrameda, 'yun ang dahilan
kung bakit ka makukulong', pointing to a
truck. When he saw the truck, it was not the
same truck they boarded in the early morning
of October 15, 1979. The truck they boarded
was galvanized iron pale sheet covered with
canvass while the one at Camp Crame was
color red and not covered. He entertained the
idea that they were being framed-up. Two days
after, he was interrogated and the alleged blue
seal cigarettes were shown to him, and he was
informed by the investigator that the same blue
seal cigarettes were the contents of the cargo
truck. When the alleged blue seal cigarettes
were taken out of the cargo truck, he was not
asked to be present. He asked for the
whereabouts of Boy, but he was informed that
the latter escaped. The more he believed that
there was something fishy or wrong in their
apprehension. It was very [conspicuous] that
the driver was able to escape because at the
time they were apprehended they were the
only people at Bonifacio Drive, and thus the
possibility of escape was very remote,
considering that they were unarmed and the
Metrocom soldiers were all fully armed. In
both cases at bar, there were about three Pasay
policemen who were apprehended. He was
detained at Camp Bagong Diwa for more than
a year. He knew nothing about the charge
against him. When he was at Camp Crame he
tried getting in touch with a lawyer and his
family, but the MISG did not let him use the
telephone."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the CA noted that while petitioner
and his co-accused had mainly raised questions of fact,
they had nonetheless failed to point out specific errors
committed by the trial court in upholding the credibility
of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense of denial
proffered by petitioner was considered weak and
incapable of overturning the overwhelming testimonial
and documentary evidence of respondent. Further, the
appellate court ruled that the non-presentation in court of
the seized blue-seal cigarettes was not fatal to
respondent's cause, since the crime had sufficiently been
established by other competent evidence.
The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his
arrest was irregular. It ruled that the alleged defect could
not be raised for the first time on appeal, especially in
the light of his voluntary submission to and participation
in the proceedings before the trial court.
The appellate court, however, found no sufficient
evidence against the other co-accused who, unlike
petitioner, had not been found to be in possession of
blue-seal cigarettes.
Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
7
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following
issues for the Court's consideration:
"1. The respondents trial and appellate courts
committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction when [they] convicted herein
petitioner notwithstanding the prosecution's
failure to prove the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt.
"2. The evidence obtained against the accused
is inadmissible in evidence because petitioner
and his co-accused were arrested without a
warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure
order (ASSO) which was subsequently
declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable
Supreme Court."12
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner contends that the existence of the untaxed blue
seal cigarettes was not established, because the
prosecution had not presented them as evidence. He
further argues that there was no crime committed, as the
corpus delicti was never proven during the trial.
Corpus Delicti Established
by Other Evidence
We do not agree. Corpus delicti refers to the specific
injury or loss sustained.13 It is the fact of the commission
of the crime14 that may be proved by the testimony of
eyewitnesses.15 In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not
necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered, 16 to
the firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of
unlicensed firearms,17 to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom,18 or -- in the present case -- to Q What did you notice thereat? Q P/Sgt. Of what department?
the seized contraband cigarettes.19
A Inside the truck were hundreds A Of Pasay City Police Force,
In Rimorin v. People,20 the petitioner therein similarly of cases of blue seal cigarettes, and I Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo Rieta.
equated the actual physical evidence -- 305 cases of also found out that my men were
blue-seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti. The able to apprehend the occupants of Q Of that police department?
appellate court allegedly erred in not acquitting him on the cargo truck although they
reasonable doubt arising from the non-presentation in reported to me that the driver
court of the confiscated contraband cigarettes. Holding managed to make good escape, Sir. A Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force,
that corpus delicti could be established by circumstantial and Gonzalo Vargas, Sir.
evidence, the Court debunked his argument thus: Q Now you stated that a search
was made on the truck and you Q Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?
"Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the found how many cases of blue seal
commission of the crime, this Court has ruled cigarettes? A Civilian Sir.
that even a single witness' uncorroborated
testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it A Three hundred five (305) xxx xxx xxx
and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus cases, Sir.
delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence. Fiscal Macaraeg:
Q Blue seal cigarettes?
"Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the I am showing to you a
corpus delicti had been competently A Yes, Sir. Custody Receipt dated
established by respondent's evidence, which October 15, 1979, which
consisted of the testimonies of credible Q What do you mean by blue states: Received from Lt.
witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by seal cigarettes? Col. Rolando N. Abadilla,
the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated AC of S, M2/CC, MISG.
goods. PC METROCOM
A Blue seal cigarettes are
untaxed cigarettes, Sir.
"Col. Panfilo Lacson's testimony on the (Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo
apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure Bucao, PC) THREE
Q Did you find out how many HUNDRED SEVENTY
of the blue seal cigarettes was clear and were there on board the truck which
straightforward. He categorically testified as ONE (371) cases of
was intercepted by your men per assorted brands of 'Blue
follows: your order? Seal' Cigarettes, which
were intercepted and
Q Let us go back to the truck A Yes, Sir, [there] were three. confiscated by elements of
after you apprehended the COSAC the MISG, PC
soldiers on board the [C]orona car, METROCOM on or about
what did you do thereafter? Q Who?
0400 15 October 79 along
Bonifacio Drive, Manila,
A We took them to the place A They were P/Sgt. Arturo which for [purposes] of
where the cargo truck was Rimorin, Sr. identification we
intercepted, Sir. respectfully request that it

8
 be marked [on] evidence
as Exhibit 'A'.
COURT:
Mark it Exhibit 'A'.
Fiscal Macaraeg:
Q Will you please do examine
Exhibit 'A' and tell us whether this is
the same receipt?
A This is the same receipt, Sir.
Q By the way, were photographs
taken of the car as well as the vehicle
involved in this case, together with
the blue seal cigarettes that were
confiscated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you have copies of these
photographs?
A The copies are with our
evidence custodian, Sir.
Q Can you bring those pictures if
required next time?
A Yes, Sir.
"So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo –customs
warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau –
categorically testify that the MISG had turned
over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for
which he issued a Custody Receipt dated
October 15, 1979.
"We find no reason to depart from the oft
repeated doctrine of giving credence to the
narration of prosecution witnesses, especially
when they are public officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner."21
Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a
customs official, was beset with doubt because: 1) it did
not state specifically that the blue-seal cigarettes
identified therein had been confiscated from petitioner
and turned over to Abrigo by Colonel Lacson and/or his
men; and 2) it mentioned 371 (instead of 305) cases of
confiscated blue-seal cigarettes.
We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself
identified the Custody Receipt as the same one issued for
the 305 cases of cigarettes found in the cargo truck, in
which petitioner and his co-accused rode, and from
which the 66 cases of cigarettes -- subject of Criminal
Case No. CCC-VI-138(79) -- were confiscated in
Malabon, Metro Manila.22This fact (305 plus 66)
explains why 371 cases were indicated therein. At any
rate, petitioner argues on minor discrepancies that do not
affect the integrity of the Receipt, issued in due course
by a customs official who was duty-bound to put the
seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.
The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes
found in the possession of petitioner and his co-accused
was duly proven by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo. They had testified in
compliance with their duty as enforcers of the law. Their
testimonies were rightly entitled to full faith and credit,
especially because there was no showing of any
improper motive23 on their part to testify falsely against
petitioner. Further, the Court accords great respect to the
factual conclusions drawn by the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court as in this case. 24
Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel
Lacson was not the officer who had actually intercepted
the cargo truck in which the former rode, the latter's
9
testimony was therefore hearsay. The testimony of the
colonel on his participation in the apprehension of the
truck sufficiently rebutted this contention.
Lacson testified that he had personally received
information regarding the smuggling activities being
conducted by a syndicated group in that place. He was
also informed that smuggled items would be transported
from the 2nd COSAC Detachment in the Port Area to
Malabon by a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167.
During the stakeout surveillance on the night of October
14, 1979, he saw -- from his post within the vicinity of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment -- the identified cargo truck
coming out of the Port Area. While trailing behind, he
radioed his men posted along Roxas Boulevard to stop
the truck. Later in court, he described how his men had
actually intercepted it.25
Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given
chase to a Toyota car and was not among the officers
who had intercepted the truck, could not have seen him
as one of the passengers of the latter vehicle. Notably,
however, the chase of the Toyota car had lasted no more
than 5 minutes, and the colonel's team immediately
returned to the subject truck after the chase. 26 Lacson,
however, categorically said that he had seen 305 cases of
blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo vehicle, and that
petitioner was one of its passengers.
It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as
head of that particular surveillance operation -- had full
knowledge, control and supervision of the whole
process. He had organized the surveillance teams and
given orders to his men prior to the apprehension of the
vehicles suspected of carrying smuggled items.
Furthermore, he was present during the surveillance
operations until the apprehension of the cargo truck.
Thus, he was clearly competent to testify on the matter.
The denial by petitioner that he was among the
occupants of the truck is highly self-serving and riddled
with inconsistencies. He had been directly identified as
one of its passengers. Besides, he himself admitted that
he had been on board the vehicle when it was
intercepted, and that there were no other person in the
area.
Courtroom Identification Unnecessary
Next, petitioner belabors the failure of the prosecution to
ask Colonel Lacson to identify him in open court.
However, the colonel's positive and categorical
testimony pointing to him as one of the passengers of the
cargo truck, as well as petitioner's own admission of his
presence therein, dispelled the need for a courtroom
identification. In People v. Quezada, the Court said:
"x x x. While positive identification by a
witness is required by the law to convict an
accused, it need not always be by means of a
physical courtroom identification. As the Court
held in People v. Paglinawan:
'x x x. Although it is routine
procedure for witnesses to point out
the accused in open court by way of
identification, the fact that the
witness x x x did not do so in this
case was because the public
prosecutor failed to ask her to point
out appellant, hence such omission
does not in any way affect or
diminish the truth or weight of her
testimony.'
"In-court identification of the offender is
essential only when there is a question or
doubt on whether the one alleged to have
committed the crime is the same person who is
charged in the information and subject of the
trial."27
In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was a
passenger of the truck, that he was apprehended by the
authorities, and that he was the same individual charged
under the Information in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-
137(79).
Prima Facie Proof of
Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient
There is no merit, either, in the claim of petitioner that
the prosecution failed to prove the nonpayment of the
taxes and duties on the confiscated cigarettes. There is an
exception to the general rule requiring the prosecution to
prove a criminal charge predicated on a negative
allegation, or a negative averment constituting an
essential element of a crime. In People v. Julian-
Fernandez, we held:
"Where the negative of an issue does not
permit of direct proof, or where the facts are
more immediately within the knowledge of the
accused, the onus probandi rests upon him.
Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to
support a negative averment the truth of
which is fairly indicated by established
circumstances and which, if untrue, could
readily be disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence within the
defendant's knowledge or control. For
example, where a charge is made that a
defendant carried on a certain business without
a license x x x, the fact that he has a license is
a matter which is peculiar[ly] within his
knowledge and he must establish that fact or
suffer conviction."28 (Emphasis supplied)
The truth of the negative averment that the duties and
specific taxes on the cigarettes were not paid to the
proper authorities is fairly indicated by the following
circumstances that have been established: (1) the cargo
truck, which carried the contraband cigarettes and some
passengers including petitioner, immediately came from
the 2nd COSAC Detachment; (2) the truck was
intercepted at the unholy hour of 4:00 a.m.; (3) it fitted
the undisclosed informer's earlier description of it as one
10
that was carrying contraband; and (4) the driver ran
away. Hence, it was up to petitioner to disprove these
damning circumstances, simply by presenting the
receipts showing payment of the taxes. But he did not do
so; all that he could offer was his bare and self-serving
denial.
Knowledge of the Illegal
Nature of Goods
The fact that 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes were
found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his co-
accused were riding, was properly established.
Nonetheless, he insists that his presence there was not
enough to convict him of smuggling, because the
element of illegal possession had not been duly proved.
He adds that he had no knowledge that untaxed
cigarettes were in the truck.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. Persons found to be
in possession of smuggled items are presumed to be
engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.29 The burden of proof is thus
shifted to them. To rebut this presumption, it is not
enough for petitioner to claim good faith and lack of
knowledge of the unlawful source of the cigarettes. He
should have presented evidence to support his claim and
to convince the court of his non-complicity.
In the case adverted to earlier, Rimorin v. People, we
held thus:
"In his discussion of a similarly worded
provision of Republic Act No. 455, a criminal
law authority explained thus:
'In order that a person may be
deemed guilty of smuggling or
illegal importation under the
foregoing statute three requisites
 must concur: (1) that the
merchandise must have been
fraudulently or knowingly imported
contrary to law; (2) that the
defendant, if he is not the importer
himself, must have received,
concealed, bought, sold or in any
manner facilitated the transportation,
concealment or sale of the
merchandise; and (3) that the
defendant must be shown to have
knowledge that the merchandise had
been illegally imported. If the
defendant, however, is shown to
have had possession of the illegally
imported merchandise, without
satisfactory explanation, such
possession shall be deemed
sufficient to authorize
conviction.'"30 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner
was found to be unacceptable and incredible by both the
RTC and the CA, which said:
"Now on the explanations of Police Sgt.
Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat.
Rieta of Kawit Police Force, riders in the
loaded cargo truck driven by 'Boy.' Their claim
that they did not have any knowledge about
the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is not given
credence by the court. They tried to show lack
of knowledge by claiming that along the way,
'Boy' and Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a
certain point for snacks and picked them up
later after the cargo had been loaded. The
Court cannot see its way through how two
policemen, joining 'Boy' in the dead of the
night, explicitly to give him and his goods
some protection, which service would be paid,
yet would not know what they are out to
protect. And neither could the Court see reason
in 'Boy's' leaving them behind when he was
going to pick up and load the blue seal
cigarettes. 'Boy' knew the risks. He wanted
them for protection, so why will he discard
them? How so unnatural and so contrary to
reason."31
Being contrary to human experience, his version of the
facts is too pat and stereotyped to be accepted at face
value. Evidence, to be believed, not only must proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness; it must also be
credible in itself, as when it conforms to common
experience and observation of humankind.32
The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of
petitioner was not in accordance with human nature. The
involvement or participation he and his co-accused had
in the smuggling of the goods was confirmed by their
lack of proper and reasonable justification for the fact
that they had been found inside the cargo truck, seated in
front, when it was intercepted by the authorities. Despite
his protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of
the strange nature of the transaction, and that he was
willing to do his part in furtherance thereof. The
evidence presented by the prosecution established his
work of guarding and escorting the contraband to
facilitate its transportation from the Port Area to
Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the
Tax Code.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest
Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid,
as the law upon which it was predicated -- General Order
No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos --
was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v.
Tuvera,33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts,
any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in
evidence.
We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the
possible effects of its declaration of the invalidity of
various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how
11
such a declaration might affect acts done on a
presumption of their validity, the Court said:
"x x x. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
'The courts below have proceeded on
the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that
it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. x x x It is quite
clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute,
prior to [the determination of its
invalidity], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various
aspects –with respect to particular
conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand
examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a
 principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.'
xxxx xx xxx
"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication
in the Official Gazette is 'an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot
be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that
an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.'"34
The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior
to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative
necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an
operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done
while the legislative or the executive act was in
operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be
valid in all respects.35 The ASSO that was issued in 1979
under General Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision
in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative
fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected
to have been introduced into the country in violation of
customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted
exceptions36 to the constitutional provision. Such
provision mandates that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
who has personally determined the existence of probable
cause.37
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure
and arrest may be made even without a warrant for
purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant,
the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter,
pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse,
store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on
board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law.38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005
TOMAS SALVADOR, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
Tomas Salvador assailing the Decision2 dated August 9,
2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186.
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin,
Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador, then
aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport, were
nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF) for possessing thirteen (13) packets
containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries
valued at more than half a million pesos.
12
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City with
violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The
Information reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the
NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and
unlawful importation of the following items:
198 pieces of means watches…………… ₱187,110.00
76 pieces of men’s diving watches……… 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches……………… 11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry…………. 322,000.00
with a total market value of ₱537,500.00 FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREEE
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine
Currency, without authority or permit from proper
authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW."3
When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued.
The prosecution established the following facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF
Special Operations Squadron, headed by Major Gerardo
B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts. Rodolfo A.
Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio M. Sindac and
Edwin B. Ople, conducted routine surveillance
operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on
reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being
facilitated by certain PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople
to keep close watch on the second airplane parked inside
the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus
300 with tail number RPC-3001. It arrived at the NAIA
at 10:25 in the evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong
as Flight No. PR-311. After its passengers disembarked
and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground
crew and parked at the ramp area of the Domestic
Airport terminal.
At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported
over his radio that three (3) persons had boarded the
Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its
surveillance.
At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves
reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded
the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal
areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck
with its lights off.
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their
vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima
Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and
stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified
himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight.
They were later identified as Tomas Salvador, petitioner,
Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor,
the driver of the tow truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that
Mandin’s uniform was partly open, showing a girdle.
While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package
wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that
the package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled
to his teammates, "Positive!" Thereupon, the rest of the
team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who
surrendered without a fight. The team searched their
bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles
beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped 62 pcs. Seiko 5 Men’s watches with yellow dial with
in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, gold metal bracelet (1) x $25
while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team 34 pcs. Seiko 5 Men’s watches with black dial with gold
confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to metal bracelet (1) x $25
the PAFSECOM Office. ____ pcs.
At around 8:00 o’clock the following morning, Emilen 248
Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs, arrived
at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest
packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, and thereafter recommended that petitioner and his co-
she proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized accused be charged with violating Section 3601 of the
from the accused. She then prepared an inventory of the Tariff and Customs Code. Accordingly, the Information,
items seized and listed the weight of the mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC.
packets.4 Thereafter, she brought the seized packets to
the In-Board Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office
where their contents were identified and appraised. The After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a
Joint Demurrer to Evidence.
Bureau of Customs found 248 pieces of assorted watches
and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries valued as
follows: In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court
denied the demurrer and directed the accused to present
QTY. UNIT DESCRIPTION their evidence.
10 pcs. Half-bangles with Charms Tricolors
6 pcs. Bracelet with Charms Tricolors All the accused denied committing the offense charged,
8 pcs. Bracelet (Tricolor) claiming they were framed-up by the military.
5 pcs. Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor
Baby’s Bangles with charm Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994,
he was assigned to the Airbus 300 with tail No. RPC-
L-Bangles with charm
3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then
L-Bangles working on said aircraft. He was conducting a visual
L-Creolla Earrings check of the plane when a tow truck arrived on its way to
TOTAL GRAMS Nichols Airfield. He told one of the junior mechanics
that he would take a break and be back in an hour. He
1,495 x ₱200.00/gm. then boarded the tow truck. When it was near the Lima
Assorted Watches Gate, a jeep with four (4) men in civilian attire aboard
204 pcs. Citizen M watches with black dialapproached
with gold him. The four pointed their firearms at him
metal bracelet (-1) x $25 and, after searching him for drugs, he was frisked but
24 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with bluenothing was found. He was nonetheless brought by the
dial with
white metal bracelet (-1) x $25 men to the PAFSECOM Office, then to Villamor Airbase
Hospital for a medical examination and alcohol test.
16 pcs. Seiko Divers Watch Mens- Black dial with
Thereafter, he was brought back to the PAFSECOM
rubberized bracelet (-1) x $50
Office. There, another military man arrived and brought
4 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with yellow
out dial
a boxwith
containing packets. Then he and his
gold metal bracelet (1) x $25 companions were told to put on their mechanic’s
4 pcs. Citizen L-watches with white dialuniforms
(4) x $20and to wear girdles. The packets were placed
13
on their bodies, after which they were photographed. He
further testified that he was asked to sign a certain paper
but was not allowed to read it thoroughly. During the
investigation, he was not apprised of his rights nor
assisted by a counsel.
Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any
knowledge of the questioned items seized from him. He
testified that during the incident in question, he only
boarded the tow truck to take a break at the PAL canteen.
He saw a box on the tow truck but was not aware of its
contents. After his arrest, he was made to sign a
document under duress.
Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense
charged. He declared that after his arrest, he was made to
sign a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of
which he was not able to read. He signed it because he
was struck with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the
military men and threatened him with summary
execution if he would not do so. He was not informed of
his rights nor given the services of counsel during the
investigation.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision
convicting all the accused of the offense charged, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds the accused Aurelio Mandin y Liston, Danilo
Santos y Antonio and Tomas Salvador y
Magno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the court sentences each of the accused to
an indeterminate term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (₱8,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The court also orders the forfeiture
of the confiscated articles in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED."5
All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20186.
On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its
Decision affirming the trial court’s Decision, thus:
"We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of
the contested Decision.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."6
They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001.7
Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this
Court by way of the instant petition for review
on certiorari. He submits for our consideration the
following assignments of error:
"I
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE
UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF
UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES AND
CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE PERSONS OF THE
ACCUSED.
14
III
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT
OF THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL.
IV
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF
THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO
WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS."8
The above assignments of error boil down to these
issues: (1) whether the seized items are admissible in
evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
warrantless search and seizure conducted by the PAF
operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,9 he
maintains that at the time he and his co-accused were
stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware
that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law
enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition
in violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
under the factual circumstances of the case at bar, there
was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance
team to stop and search petitioner and his companions.
They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the
time when there were no other PAL personnel working
therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and
surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then
stopped and looked around and made apparent signals.
All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable
suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to
something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was
conducted in connection with the enforcement of
customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were
riding a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was
conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila
Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the airport
perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and
his companions agreed to the search after one of them
was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under
these circumstances, the search and seizure is legal and
the seized items are admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the
law enforcers to a person’s body, personal effects or
residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of
Court. Thus, Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution provide:
"SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
x x x."
The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit
searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for
privileged areas where searches and seizures may
lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk
situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 10
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in
question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was
to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of
drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL
personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words,
the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his
co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As
such, the team properly effected the search and seizure
without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law.11
12
In Papa vs. Mago involving a customs search, we held
that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant,
any article, cargo or other movable property when there
is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have
been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the
tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of
holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at
bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State
to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers
who evade payment of customs duties. The
Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of
smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence
on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty
has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional
protection as an individual’s private papers and effects.
15
Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy
which we have continued to affirm.13
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search,
petitioner and his co-accused were on board
a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the
search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this
jurisdiction as a valid exception to the requirement for a
search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A
search warrant may readily be obtained when the search
is made in a store, dwelling house or
other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to
obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in
a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they
can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
where the warrant must be sought.14 Verily, we rule that
the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
holding that the articles involved in the instant
controversy were validly seized by the authorities even
without a search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence
against petitioner and his co-accused.
On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of
Appeals for readily sustaining the trial court’s finding
that the witnesses for the prosecution were credible,
notwithstanding that their testimonies contain glaring
inconsistencies which tend to detract from their veracity.
Petitioner submits that these inconsistencies create
serious doubt which should have been resolved in his
favor.
We are not persuaded.
After a careful examination of the purported
inconsistencies mentioned by petitioner, we find that
they do not relate with the elements of the offense
charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and
insignificant matters as for instance: which PAF
operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how
the girdles (garters) were removed; and what time the
aircraft in question arrived.
It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from
the fact that all members of the special PAF team who
conducted the search positively identified the petitioner
and his co-accused as the same persons who boarded the
PAL plane; stayed therein for a significant length of
time; disembarked in a manner which stirred suspicion
from the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms,
rode an aircraft tow truck towards Lima Gate where they
were caught in flagrante delicto.
As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
which refer to trivial and insignificant details do not
destroy their credibility.15 Moreover, minor
inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish
the prosecution’s case as they tend to erase suspicion that
the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby negating
any misgivings that the same were perjured.16
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
part:
"SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. – Any person who
shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or
assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall
receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner facilitate the
importation, concealment or sale of such article after
importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling…
xxx
When, upon trial for violation of this section, the
defendant is shown to have had possession of the article
in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant
shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the
court: Provided, however, That payment of the tax due
after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in
any prosecution under this section."
Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1)
fraudulently imports or brings into the Philippines or
assists in importing or bringing into the Philippines any
article, contrary to law, or (2) receives, conceals, buys,
sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation,
concealment, or sale of such article after importation,
knowing the same to have been imported contrary to
law.17 Importation commences when the carrying vessel
or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with
intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges due upon
the articles and the legal permit for withdrawal has been
issued, or where the articles are duty-free, once the
articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs. 18
In the instant case, the prosecution established by
positive, strong, and convincing evidence that petitioner
and his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team
from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, while in the
possession of highly dutiable articles inside the premises
of the airport. The contraband items were taken by
petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which
arrived from Hong Kong on the night of June 3, 1994.
Petitioner and his colleagues then attempted to bring out
these items in the cover of darkness by concealing them
inside their uniforms. When confronted by the PAF
team, they were unable to satisfactorily explain why the
questioned articles were in their possession. They could
not present any document to prove lawful importation.
Thus, their conviction must necessarily be upheld.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in affirming the trial court’s Decision convicting
petitioner and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL
RESPECTS. Costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.
16