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A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering
a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a
breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex
contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed
the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the
evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755,
new Civil Code)
HELD:
Yes.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the defective
appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not
relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passengers has
no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while
the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering
knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a very cautious person” as “far as human care and
foresight can provide” and therefore the knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that
exempts the carrier from responsibility.
ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore
LA MALLORCA V. CA
Facts:
Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired destination,
they alighted from the bus. But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest daughter followed
him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, it suddenly accelerated. Mariano’s
daughter was found dead. The bus ran over her.
Issue:
Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted
Held:
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises.
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the port at
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.
The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of
said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the
crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was
while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the
hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of contract of
carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the exclusive
stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.
HELD:
Yes.
x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was the negligence of Aboitiz in
prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the
direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who
remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12
The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his
baggage.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of
the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be
made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the
nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of
the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether
in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave
the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the
victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will
justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers
of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load,
such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a
regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice,
to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus
and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim,
through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes,
that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the
doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto
Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the
act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a
carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a
reasonable time to claim their baggage.
The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari, Jr. and Sr. and Bulletin as well.
The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the
Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped
the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower
court and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes.
Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. and Sr. who are
responsible for the death of Reyes. The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the
highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and
(b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The rule is
settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. Article 2185 of the NCC, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a
motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners herein failed to
present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. Therefore they shall be liable for the
loss of Reyes’ life.
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/
compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers
Civil Code:
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers
This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and
the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to
force majeure
Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent
firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage
GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in conjunction with
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict
liability] is that which breaches the contract)
EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee, employer can be
made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee
Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the reason that the
negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability
Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and Roman
Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence
Issue: Whether or not appellant could be held liable for the acts of its employee.
Held: No. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its
agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a
passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts
that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence
required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in
shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the
Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every
personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the
thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore
"caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law
applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and
pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage
with the deceased was excused thereby.
PNR VS. CA
Facts: Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff, boarded a train of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot,
Camarines Sur, for repairs. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo
Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other
passengers that somebody fell from the train. Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial,
held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. The decision was sustained by the
appellate court hence the present petition, wherein PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the
doctrine of state immunity from suit.

It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of
its own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or
execution.
Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine of state immunity from suit.
Held: No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides:
The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers:
a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental
or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. Under the foregoing
section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the
Corporation Law. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected
to court processes just like any other corporation.
Now, is PNR negligent? Yes. The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train
boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had
no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that
the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the
time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off
the train at lyam Bridge. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations
and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers
gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract
of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such
presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform
between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar
found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory
negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount
adjudicated as moral damages and exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in
cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.