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TRANSPO VOLUNTEER POSSIBLE CASES

NECESSITO VS. PARAS


FACTS:

A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering
a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a
breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases involve actions ex
contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the heirs of the mother. Lower Court dismissed
the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the
evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755,
new Civil Code)

HELD:

Yes.

While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the defective
appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not
relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passengers has
no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while
the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering
knuckle did not measure up to the “utmost diligence of a very cautious person” as “far as human care and
foresight can provide” and therefore the knuckle’s failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that
exempts the carrier from responsibility.

DANGWA TRANSPO CO. VS. CA


FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa
Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before
bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of Pedro
Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation
of the co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the
public at large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his
death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory
damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.


 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders (EVEN when
moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril to a
passenger while he is attempting to board the same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger and is
entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and
1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition = patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito on his own
will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

LA MALLORCA V. CA
Facts:

Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired destination,
they alighted from the bus. But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest daughter followed
him without his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, it suddenly accelerated. Mariano’s
daughter was found dead. The bus ran over her.

Issue:

Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted

Held:

The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises.

ABBOITIZ SHIPPING VS. CA


FACTS:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the port at
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.

The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of
said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the
crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was
while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the
hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter.

Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of contract of
carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the exclusive
stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.

HELD:

Yes.

x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was the negligence of Aboitiz in
prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the
direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who
remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12
The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his
baggage.

It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of
the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be
made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the
nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of
the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether
in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave
the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the
victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will
justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.

It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers
of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load,
such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a
regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice,
to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus
and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim,
through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes,
that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the
doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto
Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the
act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a
carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a
reasonable time to claim their baggage.

MALLARI SR. VS. CA


Facts: Mallari Jr. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his father, co-petitioner herein. The jeep
collided with the delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. while travelling on the National Highway in
Bataan. Mallari Jr. proceeded to overtake a fiera which had stopped in front of him. He negotiated the
curve and moved in the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he passed the vehicle he saw the
delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles collided. The points of collision were the and the left rear portion
of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van. The 2 right wheels of the delivery van
were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along
the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The impact
caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of
whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari, Jr. and Sr. and Bulletin as well.
The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of the
Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped
the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower
court and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes.

Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. and Sr. who are
responsible for the death of Reyes. The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the
highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by
Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and
(b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The rule is
settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. Article 2185 of the NCC, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a
motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners herein failed to
present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. Therefore they shall be liable for the
loss of Reyes’ life.

LRTA VS. NATIVIDAD


FACTS:
 October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT station
after purchasing a “token”.
 While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard Junelito Escartin
approached him.
 Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight
 Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operated by
Rodolfo Roman
 December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages
against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards)
for the death of her husband.
 LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent
 Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
surpervision of its security guards
 LRTA and Roman: presented evidence
 Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was
negligent in his assigned task
 RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT and Roman
were dismissed for lack of merit
 CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable

ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage

HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/
compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.
 Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers
 Civil Code:
 Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances
 Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
 Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers

This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees

 Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
 Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and
the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to
force majeure
 Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent
firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage
 GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in conjunction with
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict
liability] is that which breaches the contract)
 EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee, employer can be
made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee
 Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the reason that the
negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
 NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability
 Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and Roman
 Roman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence

GILLACO VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO.


Facts: Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of
the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train reached the Paco
Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company happened to be in
said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty. Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas
Gillaco, because of this, Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him by the Manila
Railroad Company for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the train coach. Tomas
died. Devesa was convicted of homicide. A complaint for damages was filed by the victim‟s
widow. Damages were awarded to the plaintiff, hence the instant petition. Appellant's contention
is that, no liability attaches to it as employer of the Emilio Devesa because the crime was not
committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service and
that no negligence on appellant's part was shown.

Issue: Whether or not appellant could be held liable for the acts of its employee.

Held: No. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its
agents or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a
passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts
that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence
required of it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in
shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the
Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every
personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the
thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore
"caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law
applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and
pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage
with the deceased was excused thereby.

MARANAN VS. PEREZ


Facts: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by
Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was
prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found guilty. While appeal
was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action to recover
damages. The court decided in plaintiff‟s favor. Hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not defendant- operators could be held liable for damages

Held: Yes. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97
Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the
Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee.
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose
hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the
Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and
when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the
present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers
against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the
Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-
American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's
implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is
within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough
that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the
act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is
absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees. As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule
based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. (1) the special
undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded
by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the
hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants
charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to
passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract
to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the
utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear
the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard
not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total
personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the
defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the
defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and
the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was
convicted by final judgment.

PNR VS. CA
Facts: Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff, boarded a train of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot,
Camarines Sur, for repairs. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo
Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other
passengers that somebody fell from the train. Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial,
held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. The decision was sustained by the
appellate court hence the present petition, wherein PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the
doctrine of state immunity from suit.

It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of
its own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or
execution.
Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine of state immunity from suit.
Held: No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides:
The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers:
a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental
or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. Under the foregoing
section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the
Corporation Law. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected
to court processes just like any other corporation.
Now, is PNR negligent? Yes. The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train
boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had
no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that
the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the
time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off
the train at lyam Bridge. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations
and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers
gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract
of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such
presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform
between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar
found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory
negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount
adjudicated as moral damages and exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in
cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

BACHELOR EXPRESS VS. CA


Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing
Butuan City. While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger, that about fifteen
minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion
and panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the
latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted
from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of money" against
Bachelor Express, Inc., its alleged owner and the driver Rivera. The lower court dismissed the complaint.
CA reversed the decision, hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent.
Held: Yes. The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of
carriage. Art. 1732, 1733, 1755 and 1756 are applicable. There is no question that Bachelor is a common
carrier. Hence, Bachelor is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor
and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it
had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
Bachelor denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut in that their death was caused by a third
person who was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the
presumption of fault or negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death
of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common
carrier did not have any control. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the
incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started
running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and
Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved
from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The
common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such
accident. In this case, Bachelor was negligent. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the
bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a
full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still
running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the
bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in
view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due
to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in
transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.

GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM


Facts: Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's mini bus. While the bus was running along
the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of
the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off
the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch as a result petitioner sustained injuries. As she and several
others were confined in a hospital, respondent Delim paid for the hospitalization expenses and had the
passengers sign a waiver stating that they were no longer interested to file a complaint. Notwithstanding
this document, petitioner Gathalian filed a complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent were negligent.
Held: The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common
carrier. The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping
sound was heard and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them that it was normal. The
driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on
previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to
determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had
gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition,
and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and
repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the
bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the
physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in
respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any
such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it
must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. A cursory examination of the
purported waiver will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages
from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document
proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an
actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner
Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. A
scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a
violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante.

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