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Pacquiao vs. CTA, G.R. No.

213394, April 06, 2016

CIR vs. Pheonix Assurance Company, G.R. No. L-19727, May 20, 1965

TRIDHARMA MARKETING CORPORATION vs. CTA, G.R. No. 215950, June 20, 2016
Sec. 11 of R.A 1125 as amended by R.A. 9282 indicates that the requirement of the bond
as a condition precedent to suspension of the collection applies only in cases where the processes
by which the collection sought to be made by means thereof are carried out in consonance with
the law, not when the processes are in plain violation of the law that they have to be suspended
for jeopardizing the interests of the taxpayer. The patent illegality of the imposition by the CTA of
a bond which was five (5) times more than the equity of the petitioner was improper.
The CTA in Division gravely abused its discretion because it fixed the amount of the bond
at nearly five times the net worth of the petitioner without conducting a preliminary hearing to
ascertain whether there were grounds to suspend the collection of the deficiency assessment on
the ground that such collection would jeopardize the interests of the taxpayer. Taxation should
not be used to kill the hen that lays the golden egg (Tridharma Marketing Corporation, vs. CTA,
G.R. No. 215950, June 20, 2016).
.

CIR vs. KUDOS METAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 178087, 5 May 2010, 620 SCRA 232
A waiver signed by a person not authorized by law to sign does not toll the prescriptive
period for the assessment of taxes. The failure of a taxpayer to submit documents for tax
assessment cannot be used against him for the government authorities can make such
assessment through best obtainable evidence (CIR v. Kudos Metal Corporation, G.R. No. 178087,
5 May 2010, 620 SCRA 232).

In order for a waiver against prescription to be valid, the same must be:
(1.) The waiver must be in the proper form prescribed by RMO 20-90. The phrase ‘but
not after ______ 19___’, which indicates the expiry date of the period agreed upon to
assess/collect the tax after the regular three-year period of prescription, should be filled up.
(2.) The waiver must be signed by the taxpayer himself or his duly authorized
representative. In the case of a corporation, the waiver must be signed by any of its responsible
officials. In case the authority is delegated by the taxpayer to a representative, such delegation
should be in writing and duly notarized.
(3.) The waiver should be duly notarized.
(4.) The CIR or the revenue official authorized by him must sign the waiver indicating
that the BIR has accepted and agreed to the waiver. The date of such acceptance by the BIR
should be indicated. However, before signing the waiver, the CIR or the revenue official
authorized by him must make sure that the waiver is in the prescribed form, duly notarized, and
executed by the taxpayer or his duly authorized representative.
(5.) Both the date of execution by the taxpayer and date of acceptance by the
Bureau should be before the expiration of the period of prescription or before the lapse of the
period agreed upon in case a subsequent agreement is executed.
(6.) The waiver must be executed in three copies, the original copy to be attached to
the docket of the case, the second copy for the taxpayer and the third copy for the Office
accepting the waiver. The fact of receipt by the taxpayer of his/her file copy must be indicated
in the original copy to show that the taxpayer was notified of the acceptance of the BIR and the
perfection of the agreement (CIR v. Kudos Metal Corporation, G.R. No. 178087, 5 May 2010, 620
SCRA 232).

The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as an exception to the statute of limitations


on the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper execution
of the waiver, which the BIR must strictly follow (CIR v. Kudos Metal Corporation, G.R. No. 178087,
5 May 2010, 620 SCRA 232).

CIR vs. METRO STAR SUPERAMA, INC., G.R. No. 185371, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 633, 647
Failure of the BIR to send or prove of sending a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) to the
taxpayer is tantamount to denial of due process. Even if the Final Assessment Notice was received
and acknowledged by the taxpayer (CIR vs. Metro Star Superama, Inc., December 8, 2010, 637
SCRA 633, 647).

LASCONA LAND vs. CIR, GR 171251


The CIR assessment does not become final, executory and demandable due to the failure
of the taxpayer to file an appeal before the CTA within thirty (30) days from the lapse of the One
Hundred Eighty (180)-day period pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC.
In case of the inaction of the CIR on the protested assessment, the taxpayer has two
options:
(1.) File a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day
period; or
(2.) Await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment and appeal such
final decision to the CTA within 30 days after the receipt of a copy of such decision, these
options are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of the other.

CIR vs. TMX SALES INC. 205 SCRA 184, G.R. No. 83736, January 15, 1992
If Section 292 (now Section 230) is literally applied, what then is the reckoning date in
computing the two-year prescriptive period? Obviously, the most reasonable and logical
application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing
the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained
if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid
income tax.
It is the Final Adjustment Return, where the figures of the gross receipts and deductions
have been audited and adjusted, that is truly reflective of the results of the operations of a
business enterprise. Thus, it is only when the Adjustment Return covering the whole year is filed
that the taxpayer would know whether a tax is still due or a refund can be claimed based on
the adjusted and audited figures (CIR vs. TMX Sales Inc. 205 SCRA 184, January 15, 1992).

The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and
implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be
considered mere installments of the annual tax due. These quarterly tax payments which are
computed based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to arrive at
a net taxable income, should be treated as advances or portions of the annual income tax due,
to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or fiscal year. This is reinforced by Section 87 (now
Section 69) which provides for the filing of adjustment returns and final payment of income tax.
Consequently, the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the
Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income
Tax Return and final payment of income tax (CIR vs. TMX Sales Inc. 205 SCRA 184, January 15,
1992).

CIR vs. PRIMETOWN, G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the
Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously
exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori (CIR vs. Primetown, 531 SCRA 436).

CIR vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. No. 161997, 25 October 2005, 474 SCRA 303
PNB’s request for issuance of a tax credit certificate on the balance of its advance income
tax payment cannot be treated as a simple case of excess payment as to be automatically
covered by the two (2)-year limitation in Section 230. Such provision (Sec. 230, NIRC), as couched,
particularly its statute of limitations component, is intended to apply to suits for the recovery of
internal revenue taxes or sums erroneously, excessively, illegally or wrongfully collected. The term
erroneous or illegal tax as one levied without statutory authority. In the strict legal viewpoint,
therefore, PNBs claim for tax credit, that which is based on its advance income tax payment, did
not proceed from, or is a consequence of overpayment of tax erroneously or illegally collected.
It is beyond cavil that PNB paid BIR in the concept of tax payment in advance, thus eschewing
the notion that there was error or illegality in the payment (CIR vs. PNB, 474 SCRA 303).

Sec. 7 of Revenue Regulation No. 10-77 provides that:


x x x Any excess of the total quarterly payments over the actual income tax computed
and shown in the adjustment or final corporate income tax return shall either (a) be refunded to
the corporation, or (b) may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for
the quarters of the succeeding taxable year. x x x
The mandate of Rev. Reg. No. 10-77 does not apply to PNB’s advance payment which,
needless to stress, are not quarterly payments reflected in the adjusted final return, but a lump
sum payment to cover future tax obligations. Neither can such advance lump sum payment be
considered overpaid income tax for a given taxable year, so that the carrying forward of any
excess or overpaid income tax for a given taxable year is limited to the succeeding taxable year
only. Clearly, limiting the right to carry-over the balance of respondents advance payment only
to the immediately succeeding taxable year would be unfair and improper considering that, at
the time payment was made, BIR was put on due notice of PNB’s intention to apply the entire
amount to its future tax obligations (CIR vs. PNB, 474 SCRA 303).
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. GRECIA-CUERDO, G.R. No. 175273, 4 February 2014, 715 SCRA 182
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental
matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may,
when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the
proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases (City of
Manila vs. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo, 4 February 2014, 715 SCRA 182).

CIR vs. KEPCO ILIJAN CORPORATION, G.R. No. 199422, June 21, 2016
The Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily thereto
provide for no instance in which the en banc may reverse, annul or void a final decision of a
division. Nevertheless, there will be extraordinary cases, when the interest of justice highly
demands it, where final judgments of the Court of Appeals, the CTA or any other inferior court
may still be vacated or subjected to the Supreme Court's modification, reversal, annulment or
declaration as void. But it will be accomplished not through the same species of original action or
petition for annulment as that found in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, but through any of the actions
over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction as specified in the Constitution, like 65 of
the Rules of Court (CIR vs. Kepco Ilijan Corporation, G.R. No. 199422, June 21, 2016).

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