G.R. No.

135385 Case Digest

G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
vs National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Facts:
Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and its implementing rules will amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources, in violation of the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Notes:

Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts
into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on
state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be
appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA
was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous
cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical
injustice to our indigenous people."

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession
of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous
societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under
claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions
and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino
majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of
conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains.

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on
two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, widen farms and tree lots."

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes:
(1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act
and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and
are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.

Article 12

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead,
or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands
and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and
national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress
shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests
and watershed areas.

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good
so demands.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the
latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land,
with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited
it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1,
Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105
meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or
less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging
in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February
18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous,
open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs.
Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony
portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do
not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the
incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason
for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec.
No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants'
assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says
that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the
land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere
occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be
acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother
or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art.
366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since
1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of
the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not
require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January
25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person.

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in
the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore,
unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically
in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457),
which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend
that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this
case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession,
the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is
registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which
states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in
the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the
present action was instituted.

As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to
all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned.
What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession:
and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No.
19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of
time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land
in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the
municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is
corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who
was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on
the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the
defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants'
possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.

We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of
the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or
paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included,
containing an area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933 to 1958 —
is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay
the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment
of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it
was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which
was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up
to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed
under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is
not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is
a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such
possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were
in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by
the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to
them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the
Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code
were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
So ordered.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTOS
[G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012]

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest by John Paul C. Ladiao (21 Sept 2015)

Topic: Survey of the Land – Form & Contents Sections 15-19

FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast
by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the
Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also
owned by Arcadio Ivan.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his
co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had
been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and
adverse possession for more than 30 years.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by
the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following
notation found on the survey plan, to wit:

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued
by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.

On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for land registration.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land property survey inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 by the Bureau of Forest
Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968 is classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.

HELD:
NO. The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; DISMISSES the application
for registration.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to
the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly,
respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of
public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong
to some other person.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989

LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED
CARNIYAN) petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD
GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD,
respondent.

Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.

Silvestre Br. Bello for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled
"Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg, et al., Defendants-Appellants", which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent
Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan,
Isabela, more particularly described as follows:

... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north, by Cagayan River; on the east, by
Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Antonio Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an
assessed value of P3,520. (par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis supplied)

On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves
Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against herein petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio
and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and docketed as Civil Case
No. Br. 111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on November 12, 1982.

The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal and/or the
forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being the only issue of
the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of the second world war; that since time
immemorial and/or before July 26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of
ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"),
situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on the North, by Cagayan River; on
the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); on the south by Antonio Carniyan; and on the
West by Sabina Mola, ... (p. 2, Record)

that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023 in the name of
Francisco Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name of Francisco Gerardo;
that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the "motherland" was
succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, namely
Soledad Gerardo, one of private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both deceased,
have also been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the same; that Primo Gerardo is
survived by herein respondents, Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is
survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad; that in 1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo,
Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland" to co-respondent
Domingo Apostol; that on September 10, 1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing
by the vendors who executed an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p.
206, Rollo); that about the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland"
already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north caused by the
northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its
accretion for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.

The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the first week of
October 1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its
accretion, they were prevented and threatened by defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to
do so. Named defendants in said case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito,
Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and children,
respectively, of Antonio Carniyan. Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of
a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela and more particularly described as follows:

... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the
East, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg,
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00. (P. 5,
Record)

that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration No. 13131 dated July
24, 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093
issued on November 25, 1968; that the area under the new Tax Declaration No.15663 was increased
from 2,790 square meters to 4,584 square meters and the boundary on the north became Cagayan
River, purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.

Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-existent; that
Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded on the
north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that
the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been in possession
and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now.

The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July 28,1983 (pp. 244-
250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to
September 1982. In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent Domingo
Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and
accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner; 2. ordering the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that the writ be made
permanent; and 4. ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondents a reasonable attorney's fee of
P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-145, Rollo).

On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on
January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition for review on the following assigned errors:

A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded on the north by the
Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents and not to the petitioners when the petitioners
"Original Certificate of " Title No. 19093 states clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its north
by the Cagayan River.

B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the herein petitioners who are
only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since the late Francisco (supposed predecessor of the
respondents) could not have executed the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-2") as
he died long before World War II and since the late Antonio Carniyan could no longer stand up to
explain his side.

C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it wrongly ruled that
petitioners have never been in possession of the land (p. 7 of Annex "A", ibid.).

D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private respondents who incredibly
claimed that the accretion occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift from the Lord. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)

This petition is impressed with merit.

The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private respondents together
with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is referred to in this decision as the
"subject land."

In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land" which is an
accretion to the registered land while private respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares
accretion attached to their "motherland."

It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their alleged two and a
half (2 & ½) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1",
"A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of
ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove
ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in
Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit
"3", p. 189, Rollo) issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest) pursuant
to Free Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of petitioners' land
on the north is Cagayan River and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents. The said registered
land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956,
as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo) which states that the land is
bounded on the north by Cagayan River.

In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393,401-402,
We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are
not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of
title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
Petitioners' OCT No.P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit
"A', dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1 " undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192, 193, Rollo) offered by
private respondents in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have been subscribed by him
after the last war, when it was established during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the
outbreak of the last war.

Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which the
appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of
Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said
tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later
date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the
north by the Cagayan River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing
between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of
the original certificate of title.

It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have
existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the
decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act
496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Camiyan
subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its northern
boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment by him, granting
that he caused the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No.
P- 19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land.

Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the "subject land" but
the evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo),
stated the reason for denying private respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
that is, "... the defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to
September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents, Esteban Guingab, boundary
owner on the east of the land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of Cagayan
River, on cross-examination, revealed that when his property was only more than one (1) hectare in
1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan (T.S.N., 5
May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on direct examination
stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered by his title and
the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the same because he learned from the Office of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is the subject of an application for homestead
patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N., May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial
court and the appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not
continue to survey because persons other than defendants were in possession of the land," which
statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit "20" (p. 273, Rollo) for
petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands dated August 14,1980 in connection with the
Homestead Application of Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela.
Aguila's application was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of
the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be occupied and cultivated by, among
others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his land. It is worthy to note that none of the
private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and
cultivating said accretion.

On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the
"motherland" through their predecessors- in-interest had not been proved by substantial evidence. The
assailed decision of the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated that
since the "motherland" exists, it is also presumed that private respondents were in possession of the
"subject land" through their predecessors- in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court relied
on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one of the private respondents in this case, an interested and
biased witness, regarding their possession of the "motherland." From her testimony on pedigree, the
trial court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco Gerardo, was in possession of
the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).

The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed by private
respondents is nonexistent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of
the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:

To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five
hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five and
a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the change of
course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered
land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v.
Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the
Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for
quieting of title and damages.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 161030 September 14, 2011

JOSE FERNANDO, JR., ZOILO FERNANDO, NORMA FERNANDO BANARES, ROSARIO FERNANDO
TANGKENCGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS FERNANDO, represented by ALFREDO V. FERNANDO, HEIRS OF
GUILLERMO FERNANDO, represented by Ronnie H. Fernando, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA FERNANDO,
represented by Benjamin Estrella and HEIRS OF GERMOGENA FERNANDO, Petitioners,
vs.
LEON ACUNA, HERMOGENES FERNANDO, HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANTONIO FERNANDO AND FELISA
CAMACHO, represented by HERMOGENES FERNANDO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
75773, entitled "Jose Fernando, Jr., et al. v. Heirs of Germogena Fernando, et al.," which reversed and
set aside the Decision2 dated May 16, 2002 of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan
in Civil Case No. 256-M-97.

At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-
487 (997)3 registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A.
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died intestate,
the property remained undivided. Petitioners herein – namely, Jose Fernando, Jr., Zoilo Fernando,
Norma Fernando Banares, Rosario Fernando Tangkencgo, the heirs of Tomas Fernando, the heirs of
Guillermo Fernando, the heirs of Iluminada Fernando and the heirs of Germogena Fernando – are the
heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However, petitioners failed to agree
on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even after compulsory conciliation before
the Barangay Lupon.

Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint4 for partition on April
17, 1997 against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among others,
that they and defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the late spouses Jose A.
Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez. They further
claimed that their predecessors-in-interest died intestate and without instructions as to the disposition
of the property left by them covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). There being no settlement, the heirs are
asking for their rightful and lawful share because they wish to build up their homes or set up their
business in the respective portions that will be allotted to them. In sum, they prayed that the subject
property be partitioned into eight equal parts, corresponding to the hereditary interest of each group of
heirs.
In their Answer5 filed on May 20, 1997, defendants essentially admitted all of the allegations in the
complaint. They alleged further that they are not opposing the partition and even offered to share in the
expenses that will be incurred in the course of the proceedings.

In his Complaint in Intervention6 filed on January 12, 1998, respondent Leon Acuna (Acuna) averred that
in the Decision7 dated November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion of the
property identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to: (a) Antonio Fernando, married to Felisa
Camacho; (b) spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; (c) spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco;
and (d) Jose Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. He likewise
claimed that in a 1930 Decision of the Cadastral Court, the portion identified as Lot 1302 was also
already adjudicated to other people as well.

Respondent Acuna further alleged that Salud Wisco, through her authorized attorney-in-fact, Amador
W. Cruz, sold her lawful share denominated as Lot 1303-D with an area of 3,818 square meters to
Simeon P. Cunanan,8 who in turn sold the same piece of land to him as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.9
He also belied petitioners’ assertion that the subject property has not been settled by the parties after
the death of the original owners in view of the Decision10 dated July 30, 1980 of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Baliuag, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 80-389 which ordered the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to issue the corresponding certificates of title to the claimants of the portion of the subject
property designated as Lot 1302.11 Norma Fernando, one of the petitioners in the instant case, even
testified in LRC Case No. 80-389. According to respondent Acuna, this circumstance betrayed bad faith
on the part of petitioners in filing the present case for partition.

Respondent Acuna likewise averred that the action for partition cannot prosper since the heirs of the
original owners of the subject property, namely Rosario, Jose Jr., Norma, Tomas, Guillermo, Leopoldo,
Hermogena, Illuminada and Zoilo, all surnamed Fernando, and Lucila Tinio, purportedly had already sold
their respective one-tenth (1/10) share each in the subject property to Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor
for the amount of P35,000.00 on January 25, 1978 as evidenced by a "Kasulatan sa Bilihang
Patuluyan."12 He added that he was in possession of the original copy of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and that
he had not commenced the issuance of new titles to the subdivided lots because he was waiting for the
owners of the other portions of the subject property to bear their respective shares in the cost of titling.

Subsequently, a Motion for Intervention13 was filed on June 23, 1998 by respondent Hermogenes
Fernando (Hermogenes), for himself and on behalf of the heirs of the late spouses, Antonio A. Fernando
and Felisa Camacho. According to him, in the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Bulacan, their
predecessors-in-interest had already been adjudged owners of Lots 1302-A, 1302-F, 1302-G,14 1302-H
and 1302-J of OCT No. RO-487 (997) and any adverse distribution of the properties would cause
respondents damage and prejudice. He would also later claim, in his Answer-in-Intervention,15 that the
instant case is already barred by res judicata and, should be dismissed.

In the interest of substantial justice, the trial court allowed the respondents to intervene in the case.

The plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved to have the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings
on May 7, 1999.16 However, the trial court denied said motion in a Resolution17 dated August 23, 1999
primarily due to the question regarding the ownership of the property to be partitioned, in light of the
intervention of respondents Acuna and Hermogenes who were claiming legal right thereto.
In their Manifestation18 filed on April 12, 2000, petitioners affirmed their execution of a Deed of Sale in
favor of Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor in 1978, wherein they sold to her 1,000 square meters from
Lot 1303 for the sum of P 35,000.00.

After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued. On September 19, 2000, petitioner Elizabeth Alarcon
testified that they (plaintiffs) are not claiming the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997) but
only the area referred to as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan. She also admitted that Lot 1302 had already
been divided into ten (10) sublots and allocated to various owners pursuant to the July 30, 1980
Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan and these owners already have their own titles. She likewise
claimed that the entire area consisting of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan is based on the subdivision plan of
Lot 1303. She admitted that plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest was only allocated a portion of Lot 1303
based on the said plan. However, she claimed that the November 29, 1929 Decision subdividing Lot
1303 was never implemented nor executed by the parties.19

Petitioner Norma Fernando testified on October 3, 2000 that she is one of the children of Jose A.
Fernando and Lucila Tinio. She affirmed that plaintiffs were only claiming Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.
She also testified that Sapang Bayan was supposedly included in Lot 1302 and was previously a river
until it dried up. Unlike Lot 1302, the rest of the property was purportedly not distributed. She likewise
averred that she is aware of a November 29, 1929 Decision concerning the distribution of Lot 1303
issued by the cadastral court but insisted that the basis of the claims of the petitioners over Lot 1303 is
the title in the name of her ascendants and not said Decision.20

On November 16, 2000, as previously directed by the trial court and agreed to by the parties, counsel for
respondent Hermogenes prepared and submitted an English translation of the November 29, 1929
Decision. The same was admitted and marked in evidence as Exhibit "X"21 as a common exhibit of the
parties. The petitioners also presented Alfredo Borja, the Geodetic Engineer who conducted a relocation
survey of the subject property.

After plaintiffs rested their case, respondent Hermogenes testified on December 7, 2000. In his
testimony, he claimed to know the plaintiffs and defendants as they were allegedly his relatives and
neighbors. He confirmed that according to the November 29, 1929 Decision, portions of Lot 1303 was
designated as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C and 1303-D which were adjudicated to certain persons,
including Jose Fernando, while the rest of Lot 1303 was adjudicated to his parents, Antonio A. Fernando
married to Felisa Camacho. According to respondent Hermogenes, his family’s tenant and the latter’s
children occupied the portion of Lot 1303 allotted to his (Hermogenes) parents while the rest of Lot
1303 was occupied by the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision. He admitted,
however, that nobody among the purported possessors of Lot 1303 registered the lots assigned to them
in the Decision.22

On January 18, 2001, respondent Hermogenes presented a witness, Engineer Camilo Vergara who
testified that the subject land is divided into Lots 1302 and 1303 with a creek dividing the two lots
known as Sapang Bayan. He also identified a Sketch Plan numbered as PSD-45657 and approved on
November 11, 1955.23 During the hearing on January 30, 2001, respondent Hermogenes made an oral
offer of his evidence and rested his case. On the same date, respondent Acuna, in lieu of his testimony,
offered for the parties to simply stipulate on the due execution and authenticity of the Deeds of Sale
dated April 6, 1979 and December 28, 1980, showing the transfer of Lot 1303-D from Salud Wisco to
Simeon Cunanan and subsequently to respondent Acuna. When counsel for plaintiffs and defendants
agreed to the stipulation, albeit objecting to the purpose for which the deeds of sale were offered, the
trial court admitted Acuna’s exhibits and Acuna rested his case.24

On February 15, 2001, plaintiffs recalled Norma Fernando as a rebuttal witness. In her rebuttal
testimony, she identified the tax declaration25 over the said property in the name of Jose A. Fernando;
an official receipt26 dated October 3, 1997 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of
Baliuag, Bulacan for payment of real property taxes from 1991 to 1997; and a real property tax
clearance27 dated October 6, 1997, to show that plaintiffs have allegedly been paying the real property
taxes on the entire property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997). However, she further testified that they
were now willing to pay taxes only over the portion with an area of 44,234 square meters, which is
included in their claim.28

In a Decision dated May 16, 2002, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs and defendants (petitioners herein)
were indeed the descendants and successors-in-interest of the registered owners, Jose A. Fernando
(married to Lucila Tinio) and Antonia Fernando (married to Felipe Galvez), of the property covered by
OCT No. RO-487 (997). After finding that the parties admitted that Lot 1302 was already distributed and
titled in the names of third persons per the July 30, 1980 Decision of the CFI of Baliuag, Bulacan the trial
court proceeded to rule on the allocation of Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan.

With respect to Lot 1303, the trial court found that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral
Court, adjudicating said lot to different persons and limiting Jose Fernando’s share to Lot 1303-C, was
never implemented nor executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years. Thus, the said decision has
already prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot 1303 to
the ownership of spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe
Galvez under OCT No. RO-487 (997) and allowed the partition of Lot 1303 among petitioners as
successors-in-interest of said registered owners. Excluded from the partition, however, were the
portions of the property which petitioners admitted had been sold or transferred to Ruperta Sto.
Domingo Villasenor and respondent Acuna.

As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the same had not been alleged in the
pleadings nor raised as an issue during the pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the
parties failed to clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot 1302 or
Lot 1303. Neither was there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river that just dried up or that it was an
accretion which the adjoining lots gradually received from the effects of the current of water. It was
likewise not established who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The trial court
concluded that none of the parties had clearly and sufficiently established their claims over Sapang
Bayan.

The dispositive portion of the May 16, 2002 Decision of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the reversion of Lot
1303, except the portions allotted to Acuna and Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor, to the ownership of
Jose Fernando and Lucia Tinio and Antonia Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT No. 997 and
thereafter allowing the partition of said Lot 1303 among the plaintiffs and the defendants as successors-
in-interest of Jose and Lucia as well as Antonia and Felipe after the settlement of any inheritance tax,
fees, dues and/or obligation chargeable against their estate.29
All the parties, with the exception of respondent Acuna, elevated this case to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed November 24, 2003 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated May 16, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 256-M-97, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the complaint dated April 17, 1997 filed by plaintiffs-appellants is dismissed. Costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.30

Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter for our review through the
instant petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 and the Sapang Bayan portion of the piece of land covered
by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) or Plan Psu-39080 should revert to the descendants and heirs of the late
spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and Antonia Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez;

2. Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of title is
the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.31

The petition is without merit.

Petitioners based their claims to the disputed areas designated as Lot 1303 and Sapang Bayan on their
ascendants’ title, OCT No. RO-487 (997), which was issued on February 26, 1927 in the name of Jose A.
Fernando married to Lucila Tinio and Antonia A. Fernando married to Felipe Galvez. The Court now rules
on these claims in seriatim.

Petitioners’ claim with respect to Lot 1303

As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan (in
Cadastral Record No. 14, GLRO Cad. Record No. 781) which was written in Spanish, Lot 1303 had already
been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses Antonia A.
Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho; spouses Jose Martinez
and Gregoria Sison; and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from whom respondent Acuna
derived his title. The English translation of the said November 29, 1929 Decision was provided by
respondent Hermogenes and was adopted by all the parties as a common exhibit designated as Exhibit
"X." The agreed English translation of said Decision reads:

Lot No. 1303 – This lot is decreed in record No. 448, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25414 and actually with
Original Certificate No. 997 (exhibited today) in the name of Jose A. Fernando and Antonia A. Fernando,
who now pray that said lot be subdivided in accordance with the answers recorded in the instant
cadastral record, and the sketch, Exh. "A", which is attached to the records.

A part or portion of the lot has been claimed by Antonio A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felisa
Camacho; another portion by the spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; another portion by Antonia
A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Felipe Galvez; another portion by Jose A. Fernando, of legal age,
married to Lucila Tinio; and another portion by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco, both of
legal age. The part claimed by the spouses Jose A. Martinez and Gregoria Sison is Lot 1303-A of Exh. A;
the part claimed by Antonia A. Fernando is Lot 1303-B of said exhibit; the part claimed by Jose A.
Fernando is Lot 1303-C of said exhibit, and the part claimed by the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud
Wisco is Lot 1303-D of the aforementioned Exhibit.

The subdivision of said lot is hereby ordered, separating from the same the portions that correspond to
each of the claimants, which portions are known as Lots 1303-A, 1303-B, 1303-C, and 1303-D in the
sketch, Exh. "A", and once subdivided, are adjudicated in favor of the spouses, Jose Martinez and
Gregoria Sison, of legal age, Lot No. 1303-A, in favor of Antonia A. Fernando, of legal age, married to
Felipe Galvez, Lot No. 1303-B; in favor of Jose A. Fernando, of legal age, married to Lucila Tinio, Lot
1303-C; in favor of the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco, of legal age, Lot 1303-D; and the rest
of Lot 1303 is adjudged in favor of Antonio A. Fernando married to Felisa Camacho. It is likewise ordered
that once the subdivision plan is approved, the same be forwarded by the Director of Lands to this Court
for its final decision.

It is ordered that the expense for mentioned subdivision, shall be for the account of the spouses Jose
Martinez and Gregoria Sison, Antonia A. Fernando, Jose A. Fernando, the spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and
Salud Wisco, and Antonio A. Fernando.32

From the foregoing, it would appear that petitioners’ ascendants themselves petitioned for the cadastral
court to divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were only allocated Lots 1303-B
and 1303-C. Still, as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never fully implemented
in the sense that the persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy the lots assigned to them
without having complied with the other directives of the cadastral court which would have led to the
titling of the properties in their names. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the persons named in the said
November 29, 1929 Decision and, subsequently, their heirs and assigns have since been in peaceful and
uncontested possession of their respective lots for more than seventy (70) years until the filing of the
suit for partition on April 17, 1997 by petitioners which is the subject matter of this case. Respondent
Hermogenes, who testified that petitioners were his relatives and neighbors, further affirmed before the
trial court that the persons named in the November 29, 1929 Decision took possession of their
respective lots:

ATTY. VENERACION:

Q – This Jose A. Fernando married to Lucila Tinio, you testified earlier are the parents of the plaintiffs.
Did they take possession of lot 1303-C?

A – Yes, sir. They took possession.

Q – Did they take possession of the other lots?

A – No. Yes, the portion…

Q – The other lots in the name of the other persons. Did they take possession of that?

A – Yes, they took took possession of the other… No, sir.

Q – I am asking you whether they took possession, the children…

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

The questions are already answered, your Honor.

ATTY. VENERACION:

What is the answer?

ATTY. SANTIAGO:

It’s in the record.

COURT:

The persons named in the Decision already took possession of the lots allotted to them as per that
Decision. So that was already answered. Anything else?

ATTY. VENERACION;

No more question, Your Honor.33

It is noteworthy that petitioners do not dispute that the November 29, 1929 Decision of the cadastral
court already adjudicated the ownership of Lot 1303 to persons other than the registered owners
thereof. Petitioners would, nonetheless, claim that respondents’ purported failure to execute the
November 29, 1929 Decision over Lot 1303 (i.e., their failure to secure their own titles) meant that the
entire Lot 1303 being still registered in the name of their ascendants rightfully belongs to them. This is
on the theory that respondents’ right to have the said property titled in their names have long
prescribed.

On this point, we agree with the appellate court.

Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, states
that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession." Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover possession of
registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership.34

However, in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan,35 the Court had
recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is
true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right
to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

Thus, in Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan,36 the Court had held that while a person may not
acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title
of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the
possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.

In the more recent case of Bartola M. Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion,37 we similarly held that while
jurisprudence is settled on the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally an
abundance of cases where we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may lose their right to recover
possession of property through the equitable principle of laches.

Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches thus operates as a bar in
equity.38 The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant’s rights
after he had knowledge of defendant’s acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of
knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.39

In view of respondents’ decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue of a
court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners’ inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to
recover the same, it is clear that respondents’ possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of the
registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property is already
a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.

In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the title of petitioners’ ascendants
wrongfully included lots belonging to third persons.40 Indeed, petitioners’ ascendants appeared to have
acknowledged this fact as they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral court to subdivide Lot
1303 as evident in the November 29, 1929 Decision. We concur with the Court of Appeals that
petitioners’ ascendants held the property erroneously titled in their names under an implied trust for
the benefit of the true owners. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has the right to recover his or their
title over the property by way of reconveyance while the same has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value.41 As we held in Medizabel v. Apao,42 the essence of an action for reconveyance is
that the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. It is settled in jurisprudence that mere issuance
of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant
may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title.43

We cannot subscribe to petitioners’ argument that whatever rights or claims respondents may have
under the November 29, 1929 Decision has prescribed for their purported failure to fully execute the
same. We again concur with the Court of Appeals in this regard. An action for reconveyance of
registered land based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date
of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
However, this Court has ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period applies only when the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its owner is in actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual possession of the land claiming
to be its owner may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right.44

Petitioners’ claim with respect to Sapang Bayan

As for the issue of the ownership of Sapang Bayan, we sustain the appellate court insofar as it ruled that
petitioners failed to substantiate their ownership over said area. However, we find that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the principle of accretion is applicable. The said principle is embodied in
Article 457 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." We
have held that for Article 457 to apply the following requisites must concur: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.45 The character of the
Sapang Bayan property was not shown to be of the nature that is being referred to in the provision
which is an accretion known as alluvion as no evidence had been presented to support this assertion.

In fact from the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not agree how Sapang Bayan came
about. Whether it was a gradual deposit received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed
connected to the main river could not be ascertained.

Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under Article 420, paragraph 146 and
Article 502, paragraph 147 of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public
dominion. In the absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in some
other person, it must continue to belong to the State.

We ruled on this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals,48 to wit:

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified
as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null
and void.49 1avvphi1

Furthermore, in Celestial v. Cachopero,50 we similarly ruled that a dried-up creek bed is property of
public dominion:

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb
and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.51

Therefore, on the basis of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, Sapang Bayan cannot be adjudged
to any of the parties in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA
UBINA, respondents.

Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the
province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the
Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925,
Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-
petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank.
The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands
covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has
been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and
7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his
possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares
were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No. W-79055 over
this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in
Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario
Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate
of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank
among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the
alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and,
in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and
Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To
cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located
on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some
policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents
from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No.
343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24,
1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his
lots and their accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio
Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre
together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre
and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the
only interested heirs of Macario Melad.

In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente
Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad,
Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan
Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879,
7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore
possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages
which were not properly proven and to costs.

SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T,
only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo
Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court
ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi
and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial
(Order dated August 15, 1975).

On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a result
of accretion;
2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to
petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the
sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents
who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal
lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court.
That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this
period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands
of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not
discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases
that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of
defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo
Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said
so when he testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of
Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao
Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed
by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been
going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when
Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario
Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to
it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its
original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River
gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial
deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason
for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due
to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof
should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil.
567).i•t•c-aüsl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and
abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed,
and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459
and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank
a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two
years.

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in
1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the
current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by
avulsion to the other side of the river.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.