CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 1
NUÑEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 3. In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the
FACTS: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails
the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He
was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several
cases. It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as
amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. With
due recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of
petitioner in his pleadings buttressed by scholarly and diligent
research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues raised by
the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, is of the view
that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No, 1486 as amended,
creating respondent Court has not been demonstrated.
ISSUES:
1. WoN P.D. No. 1486 is unconstitutional.
2. WoN there is a dilution of the right to appeal.
3. WoN due process is satisfied.
HELD:
1. NO. The decision does not go as far as passing on any
question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all
the safeguards of the Constitution. It is true that other
Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any
constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is
called for.
2. NO. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there
is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming
from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post
facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan
in the just-cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking "from an
accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life
and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial
words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a
defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the
Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive
petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The
answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his
innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of
a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote
is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall
designate two other justices from among the members of the
Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five
justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division
shall be necessary for rendering judgment. " 44 Then if
convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see
whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal
of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively
so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no
review of the facts.
accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made
to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full
opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being
imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of
course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of
competent jurisdiction."
PEOPLE vs. POMAR
FACTS: The prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila presented a
complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a
violation of section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071
of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint alleged that the said
accused, being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la
Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, in his employ and service as cigar-maker in said
factory, a woman by the name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted
vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy, did fail and refuse to pay to
said woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to
which she was entitled as her regular wages. To said complaint, the
defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not
constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act
No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of
the state.
HELD: YES. Without further attempting to define what are the
peculiar subjects or limits of the police power, it may safely be
affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for
the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals, must come
within this category. But the state, when providing by legislation for
the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the
constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights
secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the execution
of the powers and rights guaranteed to the people under their law —
the constitution. It will also be noted from an examination of said
section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of
women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to
each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who
employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under
the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.
US vs. TORIBIO
FACTS: The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for
human consumption the carabao without a permit from the municipal
treasure of the municipality in violation of the provisions of sections
30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding,
and slaughter of large cattle. It appears that in the town of Carmen, in
the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that
under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not
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prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of
the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act.
ISSUE: WoN the provision of the statute in question being a proper
exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill, and the judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed by the trial court should be affirmed.

HELD: YES. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the
statute touching the branding and registration of such cattle, and
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food
were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the
State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the
provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner
enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the
exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to
protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further
reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes.
US vs. VILLAREAL
FACTS: The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of
the appellant of the offense of carrying a concealed deadly weapon as
defined and penalized in section 26 of Act No. 1780. The weapon was
concealed from public view inside his trousers. The only contention of
counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that
the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and
prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a license, is in
violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of
Rights. Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the
United States Constitution against the infringement of the right of the
people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution,
amendment 2), which is not included in the Philippine Bill.
ISSUE: WoN the restrictions placed on the carrying of deadly
weapons have the effect of depriving the owner of the free use and
enjoyment of his property.
HELD: NO. We think there can be no question as to the
reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the
too frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and
excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a
regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to
suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the
practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without
being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons.
It follows that its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state.
US vs. GINER CRUZ
FACTS: The defendant, a cochero, having solicited an American
soldier to go with him in his rig to find a woman of loose moral and
having secured a Delilah for the soldier, is "a pimp or procurer," guilty
of the offense punished by section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of
the city of Manila.
ISSUE: WoN the conviction is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
HELD: YES. Section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila enumerates eleven classes of individuals who shall be deemed
to be vagrants. The section includes any person who "acts as pimp or
procurer." The words "pimp" and "procurer," practically synonymous
in signification, are terms of opprobrium. The commonly accepted
definition of the word "pimp" (alcahuete) is "one who provides
gratification for the lust of others; a procurer; a panderer." The clause
in question standing alone within semi-colons, it is not essential, in
order to convict one of vagrancy because a pimp or procurer, that this
person have no visible means of support, or be an agent for a keeper of
a house of prostitution, etc.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 2
A comparison of section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila of 1917 with the corresponding section of the preceding
Revised Ordinances discloses that the phrase "or acts as pimp or
procurer" was not found in the old ordinances. Since the legislative
body of the city of Manila has taken the pains to include these words
in the new ordinances, it must have done so for a purpose, which
plainly is to put a stop to vile traffic in human flesh. Such a laudable
object on the part of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila should
now be effectuated by judicial enforcement.
MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the
opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations
angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the
objection and so did the women's groups and the youth.
Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators.
PAGCOR leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas
season. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted
Ordinances No. 3353 and 3375-93 prohibiting the issuance of permit
and the operation of the casino. Pryce assailed the ordinances before
the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner. Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.
Reconsideration of this decision was denied.
ISSUE: WoN the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation
of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are
detrimental to the people.
HELD: The Court understands and admires the concern of the
petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions
that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the
opening of the casino. Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of
the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms
of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the
Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court
only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official
acts. We do not find such contravention here.
Separate Opinion of J. Davide Jr. on procedural matters:
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties
Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-
called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's
original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of
B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein
is one for declaratory relief. The intervention therein of public
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the
action. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction
over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is
one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative
to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City.
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RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held
on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation. The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE: WoN the Manguianes illegally deprived and habeas corpus
shall be issued.
HELD: NO. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes,
leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate
neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing
for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. Further, one cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go
back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are
further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is
a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the
Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional.
US vs. LING SU FAN
FACTS: This defendant was accused of the offense of "exporting from
the Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins," in a complaint filed in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Ling Su Fan was
freight clerk, supercargo, comprador, and person in charge of all
shipments of freight on board the steamship Taming, was then and
there about to depart from the port of Manila, to the port of Hongkong;
that the said Ling Su Fan did place, conceal, and hide 20,600 pesos in
Philippine silver coins. Ling Su Fan, through his counsel, demurs to
the complaint filed against him. After examining the demurrer and the
complaint, the court said that the grounds of the demurrer are not well
taken. The defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded "not guilty." The
case then proceeded to trial.
ISSUE: WoN the court below erred in overruling the demurrer
presented to the complaint by the defendant and appellant.
HELD: We are of opinion, and so hold, that Act No. 1411 was enacted
by the Philippine Commission with full power and authority so to do.
We are of opinion, therefore, and so hold, that the lower court
committed no error in overruling the demurrer presented by the
defendant. The Civil Commission on the 17th day of November, 1905,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 3
regularly and under the methods prescribed by law, enacted Act No.
1411, providing for the punishment of all persons who should export
or attempt to export from the Philippine Islands Philippine silver coins.
This law had been enacted and published nearly eleven months before
the commission of the alleged offense by the defendant. A complaint
was duly presented, in writing, in a court regularly organized, having
jurisdiction of the offense under the said law, and the defendant was
duly arrested and brought before the court and was given an
opportunity to defend himself against the said charges.
PEOPLE vs. DELA PIEDRA
FACTS: Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her
conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the
constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty to these
charges. In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that
Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol
dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any authority to
recruit when asked by the investigators. The accused denied in court
that she went to Jasmines residence to engage in recruitment. She
claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom she
could confide since she and her husband were having some problems.
ISSUE: WoN the petitioner is deprived of due process.
HELD: Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code
defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus,
violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of
a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties. A criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions, is void for vagueness. In support of her
submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes
People vs. Panis. She is misplaced. A statute may be said to be
overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the
freedom of speech or religion. In the present case, however, appellant
did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are
embraced by the definition of recruitment and placement that would
render the same constitutionally overbroad.
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking
official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to
impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in
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crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which
are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. On 4 April 2001 the Office of the
Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in

Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under
which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on
the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26
June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July
2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process.
HELD: NO. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the
"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It
is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This
"reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause
which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
PEOPLE vs. CAYAT
FACTS: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did
receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or
custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the
so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act
No. 1639. Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the
trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded
not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and
submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty
of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos
(P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
case is now before this court on appeal.
ISSUE: WoN this is violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 4
HELD: NO To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are
not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be
left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to
particular cases. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall
be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable
in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable
alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. Thus, a person's
property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without
judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be
confiscated, or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the
instant case.
HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company
of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp
Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin
Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
informations for murder and attempted murder were filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992,
the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise
known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990.
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days.
Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section
47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his
case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial was, likewise, denied.
ISSUE: WoN the requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 are both
substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not
terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must
be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
HELD: Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading
of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal
cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which
states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall
apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police
insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which
limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to
members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides
differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law
exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
HENRY vs. UNITED STATES
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FACTS: There was a theft from an interstate shipment of whiskey at
a terminal in Chicago. The next day, two FBI agents were in the
neighborhood investigating it. They saw petitioner and one Pierotti
walk across a street from a tavern and get into an automobile. The
agents had been given, by the employer of Pierotti, information of an
undisclosed nature "concerning the implication of the defendant
Pierotti with interstate shipments." But, so far as the record shows, he
never went so far as to tell the agents he suspected Pierotti of any such

thefts. The agents followed the car. The agents observed the transaction
from a distance of some 300 feet, and could not determine the size,
number or contents of the cartons. As the car drove off the agents
followed it and finally, when they met it, waved it to a stop. The agents
searched the car, placed the cartons in their car, took the merchandise
and petitioner and Pierotti to their office and held them for about two
hours when the agents learned that the cartons contained stolen radios.
They then placed the men under formal arrest. A timely motion to
suppress the evidence was made by petitioner and overruled by the
District Court; and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals on a divided vote.
ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for the arrest leading to the
search that produced the evidence on which the conviction rests.
HELD: NONE. The fact that packages have been stolen does not make
every man who carries a package subject to arrest, nor the package
subject to seizure. The police must have reasonable grounds to believe
that the particular package carried by the citizen is contraband. Its
shape and design might at times be adequate. The weight of it and the
manner in which it is carried might at times be enough. But there was
nothing to indicate that the cartons here in issue probably contained
liquor. The fact that they contained other contraband appeared only
some hours after the arrest. What transpired at or after the time the car
was stopped by the officers is, as we have said, irrelevant to the narrow
issue before us. To repeat, an arrest is not justified by what the
subsequent search discloses. Under our system, suspicion is not
enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth
Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that
citizens be subject to easy arrest.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
FACTS: A total of 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace
officer, to search the persons and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described
in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code." Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors,
their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and
void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives
to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67,
of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys
seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question. On March
22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the
writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents
and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
ISSUE: WoN the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of
are null and void.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 5
HELD: YES. None of these requirements has been complied with in
the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection
with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."
SOLIVERN vs. MAKASIAR
FACTS: Petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. Petitioner
Beltran also argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
2. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
HELD:
1. No. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
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regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.

2. Yes, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether
to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
PEOPLE vs. VELOSO
FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the
crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article
252 of the Penal Code. A building was used by an organization known
as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member
of the House of Representative. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the Parliamentary
Club was a gambling house. Indeed, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the
gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result,
Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila,
applied for, and obtained a search. The police attempted to raid the
Parliamentary Club and found the doors to the premises closed and
barred. Accordingly, one band of police ascended a telephone pole, so
as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by
Townsend, broke in the outer door. Nearly fifty persons were
apprehended by the police. Veloso read the warrant and told Townsend
that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the
police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that
Veloso was considered as John Doe.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure thus to name the person is fatal to the
validity of the search warrant.
HELD: NO. It is undeniable that the application for the search warrant,
the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as
the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did
state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the
building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling
Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the
Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the warrant in
this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus,
and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized.
NOLASCO vs. PANO
FACTS: Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a
Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, to be served
at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the
clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house
of the CPP/NPA." TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the
premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably without
a warrant of arrest. The search was made in the presence of Dra.
Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay
Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list
of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by
the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang. The PETITIONERS
principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general
warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has
not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant's witness.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 6
ISSUE: Whether or not there is lack of particularization in the search
warrant.
HELD: YES. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or
to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a
definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. The lack of
particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness
presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE
before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a
Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a
criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result
of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE
should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure.
The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have
the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
PAPA vs. MAGO
FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence
unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at
gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left elements of the
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them.
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the
two trucks, were seized. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued
by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the
two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for
mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not seizure and detention of the goods and the
trucks and of their other actuations are legal and the Bureau of Customs
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had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and
charges thereon had not been paid.
HELD: YES. It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the
goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of
seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of

Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. it
cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said
warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by
respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in
question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so
there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired
jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance
of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967 releasing said goods.
TERRY vs. OHIO
FACTS: Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon. Following the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the
prosecution introduced in evidence two revolvers and a number of
bullets seized from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, by
Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden. Officer McFadden
testified that, while he was patrolling in plain clothes in downtown
Cleveland his attention was attracted by Chilton and Terry. He had
never seen the two men before. However, he testified that he had been
a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35, and that he had been
assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters
and pickpockets for 30 years. He testified that, after observing their
elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window
on Huron Road, he suspected the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up,"
and that he considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate
further. After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and
Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty. The court adjudged
them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District,
Cuyahoga County, affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the admission of the revolvers in evidence violated
petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
HELD: NO. We merely hold today that, where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this behavior, he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
PEOPLE vs. ANDRE MARTI
FACTS: The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went
to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4)
gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, and
assured her. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection
and smelled a peculiar odor. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside and discovered
cellophane wrapper containing several grams of the contents thereof.
He reported it to the NBI which made an inventory and took charge of
the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 7
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
HELD: YES. the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained
by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. The contraband in
the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without
the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search
and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not
be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
ESCOBEDO vs. ILLINOIS
FACTS: Petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction, was arrested
with his sister and taken to police headquarters for interrogation in
connection with the fatal shooting, about 11 days before, of his brother-
in-law. He had been arrested shortly after the shooting, but had made
no statement, and was released after his lawyer obtained a writ of
habeas corpus from a state court. Petitioner made several requests to
see his lawyer, who, though present in the building, and despite
persistent efforts, was refused access to his client. Petitioner was not
advised by the police of his right to remain silent and, after persistent
questioning by the police, made a damaging statement to an Assistant
State's Attorney which was admitted at the trial. Convicted of murder,
he appealed to the State Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: Whether the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request
to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation
constitutes a denial of "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment," and thereby renders
inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement
elicited by the police during the interrogation.
HELD: YES. Under the circumstances of this case, where a police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect in police custody who has
been refused an opportunity to consult with his counsel and who has
not been warned of his constitutional right to keep silent, the accused
has been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and no statement extracted by the police
during the interrogation may be used against him at a trial.
MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA
FACTS:
In No. 759, Miranda v. Arizona
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his
home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there
identified by the complaining witness. The police then took him to
"Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he was
questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at trial that
Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present.
Two hours later, the officers emerged from the interrogation room with
a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement
was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made
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voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full
knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may
be used against me." At his trial before a jury, the written confession
was admitted into evidence. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping
and rape.

In No. 760, Vignera v. New York
Petitioner, Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on
October 14, 1960, in connection with the robbery three days earlier of
a Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to the 17th Detective Squad
headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime thereafter, he was taken to the
66th Detective Squad. There a detective questioned Vignera with
respect to the robbery. Vignera orally admitted the robbery to the
detective. The detective was asked on cross-examination at trial by
defense counsel whether Vignera was warned of his right to counsel
before being interrogated. The prosecution objected to the question,
and the trial judge sustained the objection. Thus, the defense was
precluded from making any showing that warnings had not been given.
In No. 761, Westover v. United States,
Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a
suspect in two Kansas City robberies. A report was also received from
the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. The local
authorities took him to a police station and placed him in a line-up on
the local charges, and, at about 11:45 p.m., he was booked. Kansas City
police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. He denied any
knowledge of criminal activities. The next day, local officers
interrogated him again throughout the morning. Shortly before noon,
they informed the FBI that they were through interrogating Westover
and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There is nothing in
the record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to
his rights by local police. At noon, three special agents of the FBI
continued the interrogation in a private interview room of the Kansas
City Police Department, this time with respect to the robbery of a
savings and loan association and bank in Sacramento, California. After
two or two and one-half hours, Westover signed separate confessions
to each of these two robberies which had been prepared by one of the
agents during the interrogation.
In No. 584, California v. Stewart
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch, Roy Allen
Stewart, was pointed out to Los Angeles police as the endorser of
dividend checks taken in one of the robberies. The police officers went
to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the officers asked Stewart
if they could search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead." The
search turned up various items taken from the five robbery victims. At
the time of Stewart's arrest, police also arrested Stewart's wife and
three other persons who were visiting him. These four were jailed
along with Stewart, and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the
University Station of the Los Angeles Police Department, where he
was placed in a cell. During the next five days, police interrogated
Stewart on nine different occasions. Except during the first
interrogation session, when he was confronted with an accusing
witness, Stewart was isolated with his interrogators. During the ninth
interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the
deceased and stated that he had not meant to hurt her. Police then
brought Stewart before a magistrate for the first time.
ISSUE: Whether the privilege is fully applicable during a period of
custodial interrogation in each of these cases.
HELD: YES.
In No. 759, Miranda vs. Arizona
From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent,
it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to
consult with an attorney and to have one present during the
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate
himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these
warnings, the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he
signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he
had "full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 8
knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights.
In No. 760, Vignera vs. New York
The foregoing indicates that Vignera was not warned of any of his
rights before the questioning by the detective and by the assistant
district attorney. No other steps were taken to protect these rights.
Thus, he was not effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege
or of his right to have counsel present, and his statements are
inadmissible.
In No. 761, Westover vs. United States
Although the two law enforcement authorities are legally distinct, and
the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were different, the
impact on him was that of a continuous period of questioning. There is
no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation, nor is
there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI
commenced its interrogation. The record simply shows that the
defendant did, in fact, confess a short time after being turned over to
the FBI following interrogation by local police.
In No. 584, California v. Stewart
In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his
privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded
on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or
that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing
and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record.
Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses through
eight of the nine interrogations over a period of five days is subject to
no other construction than that he was compelled by persistent
interrogation to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Summary:
In this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal
construction. We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement
officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical
matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police
station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard
against intimidation or trickery.
To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective
means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to
assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the
following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one
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will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make
a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him.

Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan joined by Justices Stewart
and White:
However, the Court's unspoken assumption that any pressure violates
the privilege is not supported by the precedents, and it has failed to
show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that relatively mild pressure
the Due Process Clause permits. The Court appears similarly wrong in
thinking that precise knowledge of one's rights is a settled prerequisite
under the Fifth Amendment to the loss of its protections. While the
Court finds no pertinent difference between judicial proceedings and
police interrogation, I believe the differences are so vast as to
disqualify wholly the Sixth Amendment precedents as suitable
analogies in the present cases. Until today, the role of the Constitution
has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous
confessions.
PEOPLE vs. GALIT
FACTS: The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the
occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost
continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his
innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,
something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely
necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to
torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner
could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain
inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been
broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to
admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his
will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting
it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigators followed the correct
procedure in custodial investigation.
HELD: NO. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if
possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of
the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. There were no eyewitnesses, no property
recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence
against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore
to give it a close scrutiny.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 9
PEOPLE vs. PONCE
FACTS: The accused and ALBERTO JUMAWAN who is still at
large, are were charged to be conspiring together and mutually helping
one another, with intent of gain and with the use of assorted bladed
weapons (and firearms) with which they provided themselves, by
means of force and intimidation, criminally rob, take and carry away
One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
owned by Gaudencio Gepitacio, to the damage and prejudice of said
owner of said amount. In the occasion of said Robbery, the above-
named accused did assault, attack and hit Gaudencio Gepitacio,
Cornelio Gepitacio and Calixta Gepitacio. On the basis of the
foregoing account of events, the following information, as amended,
for "robbery in band with double homicide and physical injuries" was
filed against the accused, to which all of them pleaded not guilty. The
appellant further contends that he was coerced into admitting
participation in the felonies charged and that his sworn admission,
besides lacking in credibility as to contents, becomes further
inadmissible in the absence of a counsel to assist appellant during the
custodial investigation, despite a waiver on his part to be assisted by a
counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
HELD: NO. The rule in People v. Galit that the waiver of the right to
counsel can be made only with the assistance of counsel cannot be
made to apply to the case at bar. Appellant waived his right to counsel
on March 16, 1977, long before the aforesaid guideline was
enunciated. It was only after the pronouncement of the Galit doctrine
that this Court prospectively applied the said rule in its decisions. The
requirements and restrictions under this doctrine, however, have no
retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken before the date
of its pronouncement. In the case at bar, the conviction of appellant
was not solely on the basis of the disputed extrajudicial confession.
There are other findings independent of the said confession which,
standing by themselves, are sufficient to establish the participation of
appellant in the crime imputed to him.
CHAMBERS vs. FLORIDA
FACTS: Robert Darsey, an elderly white man, was robbed and
murdered in Pompano, Florida, a small town in Broward County about
twelve miles from Fort Lauderdale, the Count seat. The opinion of the
Supreme Court of Florida affirming petitioners' conviction for this
crime stated that "It was one of those crimes that induced an enraged
community. . . ." Between 9:30 and 10 o'clock after the murder,
petitioner Charlie Davis was arrested, and, within the next twenty-four
hours, from twenty-five to forty negroes living in the community,
including petitioners Williamson, Chambers, and Woodward, were
arrested without warrants and confined in the Broward County jail, at
Fort Lauderdale. It is clear from the evidence of both the State and
petitioners that from Sunday, May 14, to Saturday, May 20, the thirty
to forty negro suspects were subjected to questioning and cross-
questioning (with the exception that several of the suspects were in
Dade County jail over one night). sheriff who supervised the procedure
of continued interrogation testified that he questioned the prisoners "in
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the day time all the week,"
ISSUE: Whether proceedings in which confessions were utilized, and
which culminated in sentences of death upon four young negro men in
the State of Florida, failed to afford the safeguard of that due process
of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

HELD: For five days, petitioners were subjected to interrogations
culminating in Saturday's (May 20th) all-night examination. Over a
period of five days, they steadily refused to confess, and disclaimed
any guilt. The very circumstances surrounding their confinement and
their questioning, without an formal charges having been brought,
were such as to fill petitioners with terror and frightful misgivings. We
are not impressed by the argument that law enforcement methods such
as those under review are necessary to uphold our laws. [Footnote 15]
The Constitution proscribes such lawless means irrespective of the
end. And this argument flouts the basic principle that all people must
stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.
Today, as in ages past, we are not without tragic proof that the exalted
power of some governments to punish manufactured crime
dictatorially is the handmaid of tyranny. Under our constitutional
system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge
for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak,
outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice
and public excitement. Due process of law, preserved for all by our
Constitution, commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this
record shall send any accused to his death. No higher duty, no more
solemn responsibility, rests upon this Court than that of translating into
living law and maintaining this constitutional shield deliberately
planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being subject to
our Constitution -- of whatever race, creed or persuasion.
HERRAS TEEHANKEE vs. ROVIRA
FACTS: Petitioner, through her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed
with the People’s Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of
Executive Order No. 65 praying for her immediate release be ordered
on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged
with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People’s
Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the
aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order
be forthwith issued directing the officer having official custody of her
person to immediately release her. Hon. Antonio Quirino, one of the
Associate Judges of the People’s Court required the Solicitor General
"to file his comment and recommendation as soon as possible."
Solicitor General recommended a bail amounting to 50,000 pesos. the
Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People’s Court, entered
an order referring the petition for provisional release but adding the
following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied
notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for her
provisional release under a bond of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000)."
Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of said Court, entered an order
disposing of said petition and denying the same A motion having been
filed by petitioner praying said court to reconsider its order.
ISSUE: Whether or not in denying her petition for provisional liberty
under bail, as well as her motion for reconsideration, the judges acted
in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: NO. Of course, it may also happen that, either because no such
further evidence has come into his possession or because, in his
judgment, the public interest would be better served by his withholding
the evidence that he has until the trial in the merits, he would prefer
not to oppose the application for bail. At the hearing of the application
the Solicitor General will be free to adopt one course or the other. If he
opposes, the burden of proof will be on him to show that petitioner is
not entitled to bail. Petitioner will have the right to offer evidence to
prove her right thereto. In fine, the hearing is for the purpose of
enabling the People’s Court to exercise its sound discretion as to
whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force petitioner is
entitled to provisional release under bail.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 10
ENRILE vs. PEOPLE AND SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the PDAF. Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed
to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the same day that the warrant for his
arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later
on confined at the (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the
PNP General Hospital and his Motion to Fix Bail which was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory
that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
HELD: We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail
the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he
voluntarily surrendered. Yet, we do not determine now the question of
whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged
against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally
to be made by the trial court. Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s
petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is
further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. It is relevant to observe that granting
provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
MARCOS vs. CRUZ
FACTS: The provincial fiscal of Laguna, who was assigned as such in
Ilocos Norte, charges Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand
Marcos, Quirino Lizardo, and John Doe (whose identity has so far not
been established), with the crime of murder. Being of the opinion that
the crime charged was penalized with a capital punishment, and that
the accused were not entitled to bail, the court likewise decreed that
the accused remain in detention. Here as in the original motion the
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accused urgently prayed that they be released on bail, and in their
sworn statements Mariano Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino
Lizardo declared that the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin
Rubio accusing them of murder was false, and that they were innocent.
The latter asked that the prosecution present its evidence. The fiscal
refused to do so and contended that under the law the prosecution was
not bound to adduce such evidence, that the judge might take into
account that adduced during the investigation he had made, and that at

any rate it was the defense that was bound to establish the right of the
accused to bail.
ISSUE: Whether the accused Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and
Quirino Lizardo are entitled to be admitted to bail at this stage of the
criminal proceedings, that is, before conviction.
HELD: The fundamental reason the courts had in holding that the
accused must prove his right to bail is the presumption of guilt arising
from the filing of the indictment. It has further been said that the filing
of the indictment likewise destroys the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused. In this jurisdiction there is no jury, and the
evidence for the prosecution is gathered and organized by the fiscal,
who later files the information. Undoubtedly the legal requirement that
the indictment be presented by the jury aims at surrounding the citizen
with greater guarantees before being molested with his arrest,
preliminary investigation, trial, and the consequent expenses of his
defense. This guarantee in favor of the citizen does not exist in our
jurisdiction, because we have no jury, for which reason we incline
towards the second theory that the filing of the information does not
raise the presumption of guilt or destroy the presumption of the
defendant’s innocence provided for in section 57 of General Orders,
No. 68. That when a person accused of a capital offense asks to be
admitted to bail before conviction, the burden of proof lies, not on him,
but on the prosecution to show that he is not bailable.
US vs. KARELSEN
FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and
Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are charged with the crime of illegal
detention. The said defendants, together with other persons unknown,
armed with revolvers and daggers, went one night to the house of one
Felix Punsalan, and by force and violence him, without, up to the date
of this information, having given any information as to his
whereabouts or having proven that they set him at liberty. The
defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty. The court below
rendered judgment condemning each one of the defendants. Under the
Penal Code, for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding
the whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that
he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from
imprisonment for a term of six years to life imprisonment. So the
evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the
Penal Code, would have the effect of convicting him under article 481.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was doubtless lawful to require a suspected
or accused person to give evidence touching the crime of which he was
charged or suspected.
HELD: NO. It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law
that no prosecution under this article would have ever been possible
without a concomitant provision of the procedural law which made it
the duty of the accused to testify and permitted the prosecution to draw
an unfavorable deduction from his refusal to do so. It is the duty of the
prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence
showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be
called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production
of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him.
He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the
prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged.
In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd case, "any
compulsory discovery by extorting the party’s oath . . . to convict him
of a crime . . . is contrary to the principles of free government; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 11
instincts of the American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power
but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom."
Separate Opinion:
MAPA, J., with whom concur WILLARD and TORRES, JJ.,
dissenting
Far from it. Nothing could be further from the true meaning of article
483 under consideration. What is therein punished is the disappearance
of the person detained. These it is which constitutes the crime defined
in that article, and this it is which must be proven by the prosecution.
If the prosecution does not prove the detention of the supposed victim,
and does not moreover prove his disappearance, no matter how
complete the silence of the accused or how obstinate his refusal to give
information as to the whereabouts or liberty of the person detained,
there can be no possibility of his conviction under the article in
question. This conclusively shows that the ground of conviction would
not be the silence of the accused, but the proof offered by the
prosecution upon the two facts above mentioned, which are, as we have
stated, essential elements of the crime we are now considering.
MAGAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming with modification the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Branch 1, Olongapo City, for Robbery
convicting Leonardo Magat, of said crime. Petitioner-accused denied
the commission of robbery and claimed that complainant lost the
money to him in a card game. The case was immediately raffled and
set for arraignment and trial. Only petitioner-accused was arraigned at
4:35 that same afternoon, as the others had not been apprehended.
Petitions-accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Trial proceeded and
lasted up to 7:30 in the evening. The following day, trial was resumed
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning when petitioner-accused and his witness,
testified on direct, cross, and re-direct examination. At 11:35 that same
morning, a judgment of conviction was promulgated. Petitioner-
accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing a Brief for
the People, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion and
Manifestation joining the accused's cause, and recommending the
reversal of the Trial Court's judgment on the ground that complainant
is not a transient visitor; that said Court acted with unusual haste in the
arraignment, trial, and rendition of the judgment of conviction; and that
the evidence adduced failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals
erred in brushing aside the mute but clear import of lack of adherence
to the basic fundamental formulation of due process whereby counsel
and client must be accorded the right to be heard.
HELD: Applicable to this case is General Order No. 39 amending
General Order No. 12, dated September 30, 1972, which gave Civil
Courts concurrent jurisdiction with Military Tribunals over crimes
committed against tourists and transients, and mandates that cases
involving tourists be disposed of within 24 hours from the filing of the
complaint. Considering that explicit requirement, the Trial Court had
no other alternative but to speed up trial. That defense counsel was
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aware of the prescribed time element is shown by the fact that he had
asked for only one hour within which to confer with his client although
normally he would have been entitled to at least 2 days to prepare for
trial. In point of fact, the Trial Court did not deny defense counsel's
request for conference with petitioner-accused. The Trial Court merely
deferred such conference till after the prosecution had presented its
witnesses. It is to be noted further that defense counsel was not totally
unprepared for trial for he was ready with two witnesses when asked

by the Court. Moreover, after the prosecution had rested its case, trial
was resumed the next day, thereby giving the defense enough time to
prepare for the presentation of its direct evidence. Besides,
notwithstanding the brief span of trial time, rebuttal and surrebuttal
were presented by the prosecution and the defense, respectively.
PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY
FACTS: On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant
case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in
effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation
of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the
said motion that can disturb our verdict. On August 6, 1996, accused-
appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG). A Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG was received on
behalf of accused-appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant was denied his
constitutional right to due process.
HELD: It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape
case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the
admission made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed
an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that
she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter
might do the same sexual assaults to other women." Thus, this is one
occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with
disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court
that she was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses
mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the
positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the
prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim
herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing
on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly
on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
KEPNER vs. US
FACTS: Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, was charged with a violation of the law in the
embezzlement of the funds of his client (estafa). Upon trial in the court
of first instance, without a jury, he was acquitted, it being the judgment
of the court that he was not guilty of the offense charged. Upon
appellate proceedings by the United States to the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, the judgment of the court of first instance, finding
the accused not guilty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused had been put in jeopardy a second
time by the appellate proceedings, in violation of the law against
putting a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and contrary
to the Constitution of the United States.
HELD: The islands after American occupation had been under
military rule prior to the creation of the Philippine Commission. Under
the control of the military government, orders had been issued, among
others, military order number 58. On July 1, 1902, Congress passed
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 12
"An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of
civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes."
The act just quoted became a law before the final conviction of the
accused in the Supreme Court of the islands. It is, then, the settled law
of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted
by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the
verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection
is not, as the court below held, against the peril of second punishment,
but against being again tried for the same offense. It follows that
military order No. 58, as amended by act of the Philippine
Commission, No.194, insofar as it undertakes to permit an appeal by
the government after acquittal, was repealed by the act of Congress of
July, 1902, providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same
criminal offense.
PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN
FACTS: Against the appellee, Elisea Ylagan, a complaint for physical
injuries in the justice of the peace court of Batangas, Province of
Batangas. After preliminary investigation, the case forwarded to the
Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an information
charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment, the
defendant pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the private
prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved
for the dismissal of the case, which motion was granted by the court.
The attorney for the defendant said nothing about the dismissal of the
case. Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another
information in the same justice of the peace court, charging the same
defendant with the same offense of serious physical injuries. After
another preliminary investigation, the case was again forwarded to the
Court of First Instance, where the information filed in the justice of the
peace court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered
a plea of double jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. After hearing, the court sustained the plea and dismissed
the case. From this order of dismissal, an appeal was taken by the
Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused in twice placed in jeopardy.
HELD: YES. It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law,
defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed
on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has
been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint of
information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the
appellee has been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now
prosecuted.
US vs. DIAZ
FACTS: Cornelio Alcansaren, a laborer employer on the hacienda of
San Antonio, went to Gabriel Diaz, an employee in charge, and asked
to be excused from work that day because he had been confessed the
day before in preparation for his marriage. Diaz became angry and,
instead of granting the permission asked for, illtreated the laborer,
Alcansaren, thereby inflicting upon the said laborer various contusions
and bruises. The justice of the peace of San Carlos at once investigated
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the matter, and, after examining some witnesses, sentenced the
accused. However, as the injured party died the justice of the peace,
by order of the Court of First Instance, ordered Luis Garcia Suarez, a
Spanish surgeon, to make a post-mortem examination. The justice of
the peace thereupon found the accused guilty of homicide and
forwarded the record of the preliminary investigation to the provincial
fiscal. Proceedings were instituted, and the trial court entered judgment
sentencing the accused. From said judgment the accused appealed. The
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [Case Digests] 13

accused pleaded not guilty at the trial for homicide, but when being
tried for misdemeanor, he answered that he would plead guilty because
he had given decedent two or three slaps in the face.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused had already been placed in

jeopardy, he having been tried, convicted, and sentenced in the action
brought for maltreatment.

HELD: NO. The plea that the accused had already been placed in
jeopardy when charged with and prosecuted for a misdemeanor before
the justice of the peace of San Carlos and sentenced to pay a fine is not
in accordance with the law, for the reason that the act he was charged
with committing constituted a crime, and the said justice of the peace
by whom he was improperly tried was incompetent and had no
jurisdiction in the case.

PEOPLE vs. FERRER

FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-

Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
directed the Government prosecutors to file an information. Co moved
to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder. another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion.
After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Act is a Bill of Attainder.

HELD: NO. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or
the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is
simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization.
The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist
Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the
same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but
on conduct. Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the
law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But
the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially
established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the
existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place
the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

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