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Introduction

Welcome to the FMEA Worksheet


This spreadsheet can be used to
1. Identify potential failure modes and their impact on product reliability.
2. Rank the potential defects to establish priority - The highest RPN value items deserve the most attention.
3. Capture owners, action plans, and status on high RPN items.
Note, FMEA's are living documents and this may be updated periodically.

Organization of Spreadsheet:
Descriptions - explains the spreadsheet cells
FMEA - the actual sheet used to enter data
Severity/Likelihood/Detectability - guidelines for the 1-10 rankins in these categories
Example - a partial exmample of an FMEA document

Sheet Protection:
Some sheets are protected. There is no password. Released for review: 31-Jul-98
A. Dembski rev 1
Introduction

most attention.
Descriptions

Description of FMEA Worksheet

Protection:The spreadsheets are not protected or locked.

System Potential FMEA Number


Subsystem Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
Component (Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Design Lead Key Date Revision Date
Core Team Page of

Action Results
Potential P

New RPN
New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S D R Responsibility &
Potential Failure Potential Effect(s) Cause(s)/ r Current Design Recommended
Item / Function e e P Target Completion Actions Taken
Mode(s) of Failure Mechanism(s) of o Controls Action(s)
v t N Date
Failure b

0 0
Coolant Crack/break. Leak 8 Over pressure 8 Burst, validation 1 64 Test included in J.P. Aguire 0
containment. Burst. Side wall pressure cycle. prototype and 11/1/95 E. Eglin
Hose connection. flex. Bad seal. production 8/1/96
Coolant fill. M Poor hose rete validation testing.

0 0
Write down each failure mode 0 Response Plans and Tracking 0
and potential consequence(s) 0 0
of that failure. 0 0
0
RiskPriority Number - The combined weighting of 0
Severity - On a scale of 1- Severity, Likelihood, and Detectability.
10, rate the Severity of each RPN
0 = Sev X Occ X Det 0
failure (10= most severe).
See Severity sheet.
0 0
0 0
Likelihood - Write down the Detectability -0 Examine the current 0
potential cause(s), and on a design, then, 0on a scale of 1-10, rate 0
scale of 1-10, rate the the Detectability of each failure
0 0
Likelihood of each failure (10 = least detectable). See
(10= most likely). See 0
Detectability sheet. 0
Likelihood sheet. 0 0

Page 3
Likelihood - Write down the Detectability - Examine the current
potential cause(s), and on a design, then, on a scale of 1-10, rate
scale of 1-10, rate the the Detectability of each failure
Likelihood of each failure Descriptions
(10 = least detectable). See
(10= most likely). See Detectability sheet.
Likelihood sheet.
0 0

Page 4
System Design Verification Process Potential FMEA Number Project III
Subsystem Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By Houston Mayer
Component (Design FMEA) FMEA Date 10/22/1999
Design Lead Houston Mayer Key Date Revision Date 8/21/2000
Core Team See Project III R1 Report Page 1

Action Results
P

New Occ
New Sev
Process Operation, S D R Responsibility &
Potential Failure Potential Effect(s) Potential Cause(s)/ r Current Controls Recommended
Function or e e P Target Completion Actions Taken
Mode(s) of Failure Mechanism(s) of Failure o Evaluation Method Action(s)
Purpose v t N Date
b
Vent Gas cannot deadly gas burst 4 - out of service 4 - manually 4 64 - always keep VGS in Sep-00 OPEN 8/21/00
Scrubber (VGS) neutralize out into the - keep the VGS in check the vent active mode as long as
the MIC in case atmosphere passive mode connection the plant is operating
of release - out of alkali in VGS
/escape

Flare tower cannot burn up deadly gas burst 3 - disconnection of pipe 4 - manually 3 36 - maintained/ service Closed
the escaping out into the remove the pipe the connection pipe to 10/25/99
MIC atmosphere keep water pressure
inside

MIC Storage MIC leak Explosion 5 Over presurization 4 - clean lines 4 80 - install proper Closed 1/25/00
- use PPE instrumentation for
monitoring gas
pressure

Houston Mayer 5
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
Water jet low pressure on - pipe clogged 4 - Pressure indicator 3 - clean lines 3 36 Closed
pressure water jet and and temperature 10/25/99
inside pipe indicator not working
- wrong pressure
indication
- wrong setting

0 Closed 1/25/00

0 Closed 1/25/00

0 Closed
10/25/99

0 Closed 1/25/00

0 Closed 1/25/00

SEVIN Worker exposure Respiratory 4 Improper PPE 4 Design 3 48 - wearing proper PPE Closed 1/25/00
issue configuration - follow SOP
tool.

MIC reaction to Community Health issues 4 MIC leak 3 - workers & 3 36 - system with early Closed 1/27/00
produce SEVIN SEVIN exposure community alert warning signals
- training
0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

Houston Mayer 6
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed
10/25/99

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed
10/25/99

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Continue
current
practices.

Houston Mayer 7
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
0 Continue
current
practices.

0 Continue
current
practices.

0 Continue
current
practices.

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 8/21/00

Houston Mayer 8
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 8/21/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/27/00

Houston Mayer 9
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/25/00

0 9/11/2000

0 Closed 1/27/00

0 Closed 1/25/00

Houston Mayer 10
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
Project III
Houston Mayer
10/22/1999
8/21/2000
of 6

Action Results

New RPN
New Det
0

Houston Mayer 11
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
0

Houston Mayer 12
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
0

Houston Mayer 13
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
Houston Mayer 14
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
Houston Mayer 15
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
Houston Mayer 16
Six Sigma Blackbelt
August 21, 2000
Severity

Effect SEVERITY of Effect Ranking


Hazardous without Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 10
warning affects safe system operation without warning
Hazardous with Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 9
warning affects safe system operation with warning
Very High System inoperable with destructive failure without 8
compromising safety
High System inoperable with equipment damage 7

Moderate System inoperable with minor damage 6

Low System inoperable without damage 5

Very Low System operable with significant degradation of performance 4

Minor System operable with some degradation of performance 3

Very Minor System operable with minimal interference 2

None No effect 1

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Probability

PROBABILITY of Failure Failure Prob Ranking


Very High: Failure is almost inevitable >1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2,000 4
Low: Relatively few failures 1 in 15,000 3
1 in 150,000 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely <1 in 1,500,000 1

Page 18
Detectability

Detection Likelihood of DETECTION by Design Control Ranking


Absolute Design control cannot detect potential cause/mechanism and 10
Uncertainty subsequent failure mode
Very Remote Very remote chance the design control will detect potential 9
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Remote Remote chance the design control will detect potential 8
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very Low Very low chance the design control will detect potential 7
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Low Low chance the design control will detect potential 6
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderate Moderate chance the design control will detect potential 5
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderately High Moderately High chance the design control will detect 4
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
High High chance the design control will detect potential 3
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very High Very high chance the design control will detect potential 2
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Almost Certain Design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and 1
subsequent failure mode

Page 19
EXAMPLE

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Seals
Coolant
containment.
Hose
connection.
Coolant fill. M

Sensor mount. Compression set


Seal

Sensor mount. Loosen during


Seal sensor
assembly/servic
e

Sensor mount. Damaged


Seal internal thread

Sensor mount. Damaged


Seal external thread

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.


Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Page 20
EXAMPLE

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.


Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.


Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack


Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion
Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion


Heat transfer
structure

Page 21
EXAMPLE

System
Subsystem
Component
Design Lead
Core Team

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Hold fluid, flow path, Puncture


Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Seam fail


Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Burst fail
Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Plugged
Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Ballooning


Heat transfer
structure

Page 22
EXAMPLE

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

0
0

Leak 8 Gasket material 7 Pressure cycle 1 56 Use imported


w/cold shock. material

Leak. Fall inside 8 Fitting not held 2 Added rib. 1 16 Implement J.P. Aguire
tank in place holding rib in 11/1/95
design. New
fitting design.
Prototype
validation.

Cannot install 5 Damaged during 2 1 10


sensor installation or
transportation

Cannot install 4 Damaged during 3 1 12 Damaged fitting


wire nut shipment to not used by
piracicaba Piracicaba

Leak 8 Over pressure 8 Burst, validation 1 64 Test included in J.P. Aguire 11/1/95
pressure cycle. prototype and E. Eglin 8/1/96
production validation
testing.

Page 23
EXAMPLE

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

Failed mount 5 Vibration 9 Vibration w/road 3 135 Obtain GMB J.P. Aguire
tapes vibration road tape.

Hose leak 6 Overpressure. Poor 5 Burst, validation 2 60 Obtain GMB clamps J.P. Aguire 12/1/95
clamp pressure cycle and clamping
w/GMB clamps. specification.

Air conditioning does This is a test of the 0 Operator instruction


not work. Sudden ADD POTENTIAL
refrigerant loss. CAUSE/MECHANIS
M OF FAILURE
system functionality
Air conditioning does This is a test of the 0 This is a test of the
not work. Sudden ADD POTENTIAL ADD
refrigerant loss. CAUSE/MECHANIS RECOMMENDED
M OF FAILURE ACTION system
system functionality functionality
Leak. Loss of heat 8 Wicking. Material 7 Thermal cycle 1 56 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. strength Specification

Air conditioning does this is a test while 0


not work. Sudden dan is here
refrigerant loss.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Coolant quality. 7 SWAT, service 5 280 Brazilian coolant to J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
transfer. Contamination. simulation. Coolant be evaluated. Zince
Environment - int/ext. evaluation. lined tubes may need
to be released.
Simulated service
test w/GMB coolant
to be performed.

Page 24
EXAMPLE

Potential FMEA Number


Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Prepared By
(Design FMEA) FMEA Date
Key Date Revision Date
Page of

Action Results

New Occ
New Sev

New Det
S Potential Cause(s)/ D R Responsibility &
Potential Effect(s) r Current Design Recommended
e Mechanism(s) of e P Target Completion Actions Taken
of Failure o Controls Action(s)
v Failure t N Date
b

Leak. Loss of heat 8 External damage. 10 Leak test. Simulated 1 80 100% cores tested in E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. Coolant velocity. No service. production.
reinf sawcut. Simulated service
included in Product
Specificatin.
Leak. Loss of heat 5 Environment - int/ext. 1 SWAT, service 1 5 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. simulation. Specification.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Over pressure 2 Burst/leak pressure 5 80 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95 Study originated
transfer. contamination. cleanliness.

Loss of heat transfer. 8 Contamination. 7 1 56 GMB coolant to be J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
Leakage due to Coolant quality. evaluated. GMB to
increase flow velocity study engine
cleanliness.
Leak. Loss of heat 5 Over pressure 9 8 360 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95
transfer. contamination. cleanliness.
Clustomer profile to
be determined.
0
0
0

Page 25
EXAMPLE

on Results
New RPN

0
0

Page 26
EXAMPLE

on Results
New RPN

Page 27
EXAMPLE

on Results
New RPN

0
0
0

Page 28

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