Lutheranism and the Inerrancy

of Scripture
Horace D. Hummel
I do not intend to attempt to break new ground in this paper. The
soil has been plowed (and disked and harrowed) many times before.
Neither is there any point in simply kicking up dust. All I can do is
restate the case, as it has been many number of times before. To some
it will be at least part of the "savor of life unto life," to others perhaps
something else.1
I have formulated the title as I have, because a common charge is
that the dogma of inerrancy is not native to Lutheranism, but an alien
concept imported from elsewhere. On the original source of the alleged
import there is less agreement, however. The very variety of answers
already suggests a rather suspect attempt to pin the blame on somebody
else—almost anybody will do.
Hence, maybe it will be fruitful if we first try to consider chronolog-
ically those on whom the "blame" is often put. First, then, must be listed
Judaism—"late Judaism" as used to be commonly said, but belatedly
recognizing the latent anti-semitism in that formulation, increasingly
today termed "early Judaism."2 At any rate, toward the end of the Old
Testament era, Judaism allegedly began to be thrown on the defensive,
and eventually formulated a doctrine of the verbal inspiration of not
only the "Tanak" (Old Testament), but also of the oral Mosaic tradition.
This development allegedly coincided to a large extent with efforts to
close the canon, determine a normative Hebrew text, and the like.
By this reading, the final "edition" of the Hebrew Old Testament
text itself shows some traces of that mentality, although the presumed
original fluidity and variety could never be completely erased.3
By the same line of reasoning, essentially the same thing could be
said of the New Testament. Only perhaps in the second century A.D.
when Christianity found itself assailed by gnosticism and various other
syncretisms, did it begin to fashion an "orthodoxy" which found the
Judaistic dogma of inerrancy very handy. Usually appearing in the same
"rogue's gallery" are the rise of the "monarchical episcopate" and other
"early Catholic" tendencies.

Dr. Horace D. Hummel is Professor of Old Testament ExegesL· at Concordia

Seminary, serves as Chairman of the Department ofExegetical Theology, and is
a member of the CONCORDIA JOURNAL Editorial Committee.

102
 Let us pause here before we continue the historical survey. A common
charge is that "inerrancy" claims more for Scripture than Scripture claims
for itself. To be sure, the precise formulation is not to be found, but
that is no more or less decisive than it is for most of our dogmatic
vocabulary. Two examples should suffice: the term "sacrament" is not
found at all, and even "justification" is not used quite so precisely, not
even in St. Paul.
But that the idea, concept, or assumption is absent is an entirely
different matter. We can, of course, trot out the familiar proof-texts:
the θεόττνευστος text of 2 Timothy 3:16; the "holy men of God spoke as
moved by the Holy Spirit" text of 2 Peter 1:21 (the explicit contrast is
"the impulse of man"—an almost precise parallel to the Christological
and pneumatological assertion of John 1:13, "born not—of the will of
man, but of God"); and possibly best of all, our Lord's own "Scripture
cannot be broken" of John 10:35.
Now, it will not do to claim that these are all "late" texts, a common
type of higher-critical ploy. The date of a text, even if it were agreed
upon, has nothing to do, as such, with its reliability. Alleged lateness is
usually based on prior assumptions of lateness of formulation, and, in
turn, alleged lateness of date tends to yield interpretations that allegedly
demonstrate a certain arteriosclerosis—all of it a classic example of the
"argument in a circle" fallacy. The assumption or presupposition has
determined the result, and the result "confirms" the assumptions.
However, I submit that, even if for a moment we do play that game
ourselves, in this case it confirms our own case. Even if we limit ourselves
initially to the indisputably genuine Pauline letters (Galatians, Romans,
1 Corinthians), we find essentially the same picture as everywhere else
in the New Testament, the unquestioned appeal to Holy Scripture (such
as the Old Testament, usually interpreted predictively and/or typolog-
ically) and a type of argumentation that simply assumes its verbal and
plenary inspiration. I don't think I need to illustrate or document that
point here. Even if we were to assume with higher critics that large
chunks of the rest of the New Testament are derived from the later
church rather than from St. Paul himself or from the "historical Jesus,"
the picture remains essentially the same. The point is that the argument
from Scripture for the "inerrancy" of Scripture is immeasurably greater
than merely the citation of a handful of arguable proof-texts, but ac­
curately reflects one part of the very warp and woof of the New Tes­
tament's and our Lord's own argumentation (κάτα τάς γράφας).
We have said nothing about the Old Testament itself so far. Because
of the general non-systematic nature of its literature, one is scarcely
surprised to find even less overt implication of an absolutely authoritative
Scripture there than in the New Testament. Even so, such implications

CONCORDIA JOURNAL/APRIL 1988 103

are by no means completely absent. One thinks immediately of some of
the Psalms, often characterized as of the "wisdom" genre (Psalm 1, 19B,
and 119 perhaps especially). Even earlier, especially in Deuteronomy
and in other "deuteronomic" literature, one meets similar references to
the inviolability of the Torah. The covenant sanctions or curses threat­
ened or invoked by other legislation as well as by the prophets seem to
proceed from similar assumptions. To be sure, Torah in Old Testament
usage is not simply equivalent to "Scriptures," as it tended to become in
later Judaism, but, germinally at least, the two run parallel. (The semantic
range of Torah is roughly comparable to that of "Word" in Christian
usage.) And, again, in higher-critical circles, we meet the developmen-
talistic hypotheses which seek to neutralize the evidence by labelling most
of it "late," but the argument is every bit as circular as in the New
Testament.
Hence, I conclude this section by insisting that the Scriptural evidence
for the dogmatic formulation of "inerrancy" is every bit as strong—
possibly stronger—as it is for a goodly number of other traditional dog­
matic inferences and formulations.
If we now move on to the patristic era, we meet the same now familiar
terrain. Justin Martyr's famous debate with Trypho could virtually be a
chapter from the New Testament. The copious use of "allegory" in
Barnabas, Clement, Origin, and others, whatever we may think of it
otherwise, obviously tends to set forth a spiritual meaning implanted in
the text itself. Nor was the θεωρία or more typological approach of the
Antiochene school substantially different in its attitude toward Scripture,
at least not as concerns this paper. We might, of course, quote example
after example: Irenaeus, who speaks of the perfection of Scripture be­
cause of its divine origin,4 and, as we might expect, St. Augustine, who
puts the capstone on the formulation: "And if in these writings [the
canonical books of Scripture] I am perplexed by anything which appears
to me opposed to truth, I do not hesitate to suppose that either the
manuscript is faulty, or the translator has not caught the meaning of
what was said, or I myself have failed to undertand it."5
Throughout the Middle Ages, despite the popularity of the very
uncreative catena approach (chain of glosses, or traditional comments
on Scripture), and despite the rising accents on the role of tradition and
the magisterial authority of the church, there is no hint that the theo­
retical commitment to the absolute inerrancy of Scripture, as such, ever
wavered. St. Thomas Aquinas may be cited as another capstone, this
time to medieval developments: "It is heretical to say that any falsehood
whatsoever is contained in the gospels or in any canonical Scripture."
Thus, it is at the time of the Reformation when it might have seemed
that virtually everything was up for grabs, and when, indeed, many

104
medieval doctrines were frontally challenged, there was no hint on either
side that the veracity of Scripture was in question. Whether we look at
the Augustana or its attempted rebuttal, the Confutation; whether we
study the entire Book of Concord or the Tridentine decrees, we find a
common appeal to Scriptural authority. All kinds of other things were
in dispute, to be sure, but not the article de Scriptum. And so the argument
that the Book of Concord contains no separate treatment of that locus
proves as little as that the precise vocable "inerrancy" does not appear
in the Bible. Apologetic, confessional documents (not totally unlike the
Bible itself) normally limit themselves ad hoc to the issues at hand—in
contrast to a systematics which attempts to "cover the waterfront" by
induction from all of Scripture. Sola Scriptum is not self-evidently inclu-
sive of "inerrancy," of course, but the burden of proof that the two did
not, in fact, proceed in tandem in Reformation thought lies with those
who would deny it.
Luther himself is likely to be hailed as the major exception from
whom, curiously, virtually all his fellow-workers and followers are sup-
posed to have strayed. The canard that Luther was "soft" on Scripture
and pitted Christ and the Gospel against it has become such an oft-
repeated (and usually beloved!) assertion, that it appears to be a classical
case where "truth" (in this case, untruth) is "established" by virtue of
mere repetition. Sometimes it is copied in even relatively conservative
literature, such as R. K. Harrison's widely used Introduction to the Old
Testament*
Typically, Luther is contrasted with Calvin on this point. There are,
no doubt, differences in nuance and accent between the two (and un-
doubtedly even more so between some of their heirs), and we shall have
to return to that difference shortly. But the evidence does not support
the thesis that the two fundamentally disagreed on the issue itself. And,
it is worth noting, there are Calvinists who attempt about the same "snow
job" on Calvin as many Lutherans do with Luther—and obviously out
of the same motives.
What then, do we make of Luther's well-known and oft quoted re-
mark about James as a "strawy epistle," his distaste for Esther and Rev-
elation, his principle of was Christum treibt, his remark that if anyone
urges Scripture against Christ, he will urge Christ against the Scripture,
and so on? Well, surely "contextual exegesis" is as important for the
interpretation of Luther as it is for any other writer or piece of literature.
If Luther does not simply contradict himself all over the place, those
kinds of comments must be read in the context of an entire life devoted
to establishing Scripture as the sole authority, and sometimes of explicit
statements to the effect that God and/or the Scriptures do not lie, or the
like. Luther is one of those writers who so often speaks hyperbolically,

CONCORDIA JOURNAL/APRIL 1988 105

even unguardedly, especially in his Table Talk or in the heat of contro-
versy, that if one forgets about total context, he can be quoted out of
context on virtually every side of every question. Indeed, Luther protests
against wooden, legalistic reading of Scripture that fails to pivot around
Christ (as must also be done with some contemporary inerrantists), and
that we shall need to underscore more shortly, but that is far from a
repudiation of inerrancy, as such.
When we come to seventeenth-century Lutheran orthodoxy, the pos-
sibility for any kind of cavil disappears completely. Quotes to that effect
from Gerhardt, Calov, Quenstedt could be multiplied with ease. Nor do
we need to go into much detail here about the subsequent rise of ra-
tionalism or the so-called "Englightenment"7 and the countervailing forces
of Pietism and the Confessional revival of the nineteenth century. Pie-
tism's forte was more on life than on doctrine, of course, but the contrast
should not be overstated any more than with the obverse in the case of
orthodoxy. De facto, I doubt if Pietism ever called into question the
authority of Scripture, and as a matter of fact, the two regularly made
common cause against the rising tide of positivism and secularism.
This scenario sets the stage for the rise of Lutheranism in America.
The eastern groups which eventually gravitated into the former LCA
perhaps never needed to put quite the same accent on inerrancy that
some later midwestern groups did, but Muhlenberg and especially Krauth
later would, I suspect, have had few bones to pick with the assumption.
As the east gradually drifted leftward and, slowly but surely, began to
adopt the historical-critical method, "inerrancy" came explicitly to the
fore with the 1925 "Minneapolis Theses" and the formation of the Amer-
ican Lutheran Conference and eventually the old ALC (1930). In fact,
as is well known, "inerrancy" continued to be used in the constitution
of the 1960 ALC, although, as President Schiotz explicitly admitted later,
somewhat tongue-in-cheek.8 Inevitably, the implicit soon became ex-
plicit, and the situation today, when only a small minority within the
former ALC continued to clamor for inerrancy, is well known. People
of such a mind could be found within the former LCA, too, but one
had to search hard and long to find them!
What really was new, as inerrancy came to be openly rejected in favor
of higher criticism, was the claim, which we still hear on all sides today,
that "inerrancy" was a new concept, really alien to genuine Lutheranism,
and an import from "fundamentalism." Most of my paper so far has
been devoted to the illustration of the opposite thesis, so at this point
we must consider the issue itself.
If what I have asserted so far is at all true, about the only new thing
on the recent scene is the abstract term "inerrancy" itself. But that is an
entirely different issue from the concept itself. To assert the contrary,

106
I think, would be comparable to claiming that there was no Eucharist
until that very noun came into use (and in many places it is still quite
unfamiliar), or, to take an example from the Old Testament, it would
be like claiming that there was no ritual of "laying on of hands" in the
Old Testament because the abstract noun semikhah does not appear (only
forms of the verbal root, s-m-k).
Perhaps the emergence of the term "inerrancy" does signal somewhat
greater apologetic accent on the concept in the struggle of orthodoxy
against the various manifestations of "modernism," and, no doubt, par-
ticularly the rise of higher criticism. In defense of the truth, there is
always the danger that one may overstate his case and unwittingly car-
icature his position (and that may have happened sometimes), but that
is a different matter, too.
The common rhetoric charges that the inerrantist position is "fun-
damentalistic." Part of the problem, of course, is that that term has
become such an all-purpose slur to hurl at virtually anyone or anything
judged to be to the "right" of one's own position that it is often hard
even to determine its content. As a result, very few people are willing
even to own it. Lutherans have even less reason to accept it. Let me
remind you of the now venerable work of Milton Rudnick, Fundamen-
talem and the Missouri Synod (St. Louis: Concordia, 1966), which, however,
is essentially by no means dated. In the light of Rudnick's careful in-
vestigation, it is hard to chalk up the continued hurling of that label
simply to unfamiliarity with his work. Rather, it simply seems to be too
handy a slingstone in the anti-inerrantists' psychological warfare to let
go, no matter what.
What then does differentiate "fundamentalism" from the historic
Lutheran (and traditionally Christian) position? Quite a number of things,
possibly among the most obvious: Sacraments.9 That has all kinds of
implications, which I cannot begin to explore fully here. One of the most
palpable will be a liturgical form of worship, rather than a free-church
style. Presumably that will include liturgical (pericopal) preaching, as
well as a certain type of hymnology. It will certainly be a counterweight
to the individualism so endemic to Protestantism and now reenforced
by various sub-Christian or non-Christian personalisms. It is fairly ob-
vious that Lutheranism has a long way to go in recovering such sensi-
bilities, but I would challenge anyone to demonstrate that the lines in
any way correspond to an inerrantist position. Pietism and an irrational
anti-Catholicism have been just as culpable, and various secular fashions
today scarcely help.
Perhaps even more central will be the equilibrium to Scriptural au-
thority necessarily lent by authentic Lutheranism through equal em-
phasis on Christ and/or the Gospel and/or "justification by faith." Here

CONCORDIA JOURNAL/APRIL 1988 107

we must tune into some of Luther's statements quoted above. No doubt,
there are differences in at least nuance evident already in Reformation
times, and no less so today in most of the heirs of Calvin, Zwingli,
Arminius, and others. One might compare the accentual difference in
this respect to much of Protestantism's somewhat different accent on
the "kingdom of God," "lordship of Christ," "covenant"—none of which
Lutheranism disclaims, but the focus is surely different.
Even on its face, it is obvious that many sects also subscribe to Biblical
inerrancy, but come out somewhere else if the wrong key is used. In the
LCMS, the Aristotelian jargon on the necessity of holding to both the
"formal" and "material" principles (such as to both an inerrant Scripture
and to the solus Christus principle) has become widespread. Let me call
your attention to a classic litde monograph, in my judgment, published
by our CTCR over a decade ago, entitled Gospel and Scripture.10 We are
not converted to Christ because we have first been convinced of the
inerrancy of Scripture, but, if anything, vice versa. We become convinced
of the absolute reliability of the inscripturated Word because of the
proclamation of the viva vox, and because the Spirit of Christ has opened
our eyes (Jesus at Emmaus) and taken possession of our hearts. "The
letter kills, but the Spirit gives life" (and, be it noted, by that assertion,
St. Paul did not deprecate the Old Testament one bit!).
Sometimes ourfirst-yearseminarians, who don't quite have their lines
down yet, when given the question, "Why do you believe the Bible is
inerrant?", give the answer: "Because God wrote it," or the like. Now,
of course, the statement is not untrue, as such, but it is tautological. It
merely restates the axiom, but does not really offer a Lutheran answer
to the "Why?" Similarly, we often hear people carelessly talk about "be-
lieving in" the Bible, as though it were itself an icon to be venerated.
We believe in Christ/Gospel, but simply believe (direct object) the Bible.
Of course, then we don't normally preach inerrancy of Scripture, as
such, any more than any good sermon is a doctrinal essay, but our
preaching is to be constitutively Scriptural as well as evanglical, and
balance is even more crucial when it comes to our teaching office, to
defining and articulating what we confess. A Sunday-School song has it
straight! "Jesus loves me/This I know/For the Bible/Tells me so." And,
of course, we continually have to instruct people in the various inter-
related meanings of "Word of God" (including the Sacrament!), of "faith,"
etc.
But the latter point, the various uses of the word "faith," reminds us
that we should not protest too much, or why it is necessary to insist on
the formal as well as the material principle. What is the doctrinal or
intellectual content of that faith which captivates heart and will (fides
quae, "the Christian faith," vs. fides qua, "faith" as personal acceptance,

108
trust, etc.)? How do we know what the truth is—as well, of course, Truth
as a person? Every discipline, every faith, has its hermeneutics, its epis-
temology. If Scripture, confessionally read, is not sufficient, how is it a
norm} If its authority is to be shared with something else, how do we
test it—or them? How do we not succumb to some new brand of Pietism,
mysticism, subjectivism, emotionalem, etc.?
I submit that the present state of world Lutheranism amply illustrates
what happens to one degree or another if the dogma of inerrancy is let
go of. This is no mechanical "domino" theory, as it is sometimes scorned.
Some depart further from the norm than others, and God alone knows
those who are His. We do not presume to test the "heart and reins," but
if it is ultimately up to us to decide what parts of Scripture are still Word
of God for us, the fatal concession in principle has already been made. I
look about on the current ecclesiastical scene, and say: "What further
need have we of witnesses?"
"Pluralism" of doctrine has become something virtuous, and "unity"
recedes into the mystical indeed. "Reconciled diversity" has become a
catch-all catchword for all kinds of "ecumenicity" (or syncretism?). Look
at the former ALC's Invitation to Action on even the sacramental presence
in the Eucharist, and on the other side, an apparent willingness some-
times to submit to episcopal ordination without the crucial counter-
concession that the procedure is de iure humano. Look at the attempt to
neutralize the clear Biblical condemnations of homosexuality in the re-
cent LCA statement on the issue,11 or the extent to which, indeed, the
"world is writing the church's agenda"—such as a left-leaning, counter-
cultural stance that virtually becomes part of the Gospel (feminism,
apartheid, "pro-choice" stand, aid to the contras, asylum to San Salvador
refugees, etc., ad infinitum). Comparable "right-wing" confusions of Law
and Gospel are abroad too, but I doubt that Lutheranism has been nearly
so much tempted by them.
All of this seems to me to expose clearly the fallaciousness of claiming
that we can cling to the "Gospel" content of Scripture and let the rest
go. How shall we know what is and is not "Gospel?" Shall we fall into
some kind of antinomianism (denial of "third use of the Law"), always
one of Lutheranism's Achilles' heels? Or how shall we "test the spirits,"
whether it is some mere affirmation of the "human spirit," the spirit of
this age, or the Holy Spirit?12
We might have formulated Lutheranism's "material principle" earlier
as "Law-Gospel" (Gospel in the broad sense), and the proper distinction
between the two. And a corollary ofthat is the "two kingdoms" principle?
Do the actions of the majority of Lutherans today give us any cause for
optimism here? "Justice" and "justification" are mentioned in the same
breath, and often "justice"first,not only sequentially but quantitatively—

CONCORDIA JOURNAL/APRIL 1988 109

which seems to me to make a mockery of Lutheranism's heavy investment
in distinguishing justification and sanctification. And, somehow, pre-
cisely what "justice" is, always seems so dogmatically self-evident, a strange
contrast to a frequent aversion to other dogmas! The label "prophetic"
is bandied about, but obviously not defined according to New Testament
usage, but sociologically. Likewise, "fulfillment" is understood often more
readily in personalistic categories ("being all you can be") rather than,
Biblical, as God's answer in Christ to Old Testament predictions and
promises.
The utlimate culprit, I am convinced, is the "historical-critical method,"
precisely because it is an almost precise antithesis to inerrancy. By no
accident, has H. George Anderson recently characterized this issue as
the "black hole around which every other issue circles for a while before
being pulled into obscurity." Sam Nafzger has agreed, in effect, by as-
serting that virtually all LCMS-ELCA differences root in this one. 13
It is not just a matter of a couple of inconsequential errors on some
trivial chronological or geographical data, but often of an assumption
of errancy, in fact a veritable search for them, and usually consummate
scorn for any attempt at "harmonization." The approach is often labeled
"historic^, "which Allan Bloom in his brilliant, recent work, The Closing
of the American Mind, has defined as "the view that all thought is essentially
related to and cannot transcend its own time."14 The more popularly
put slogan (Semler) is: "Treat the Bible like any other book," which tends
to mean, at best, that it is only a "record" or "witness" to "revelation"
(defined solely existentially), or, at worst, that it is "guilty until proven
innocent," that everything is, on principle, subject to "criticism," that it
is not "scientific" to accept anything until empirically demonstrated. And
since "science" by definition cannot handle the supernatural or the mi-
raculous, these tend to be denied or explained away—although, fortu-
nately, there are varying degrees of consistency in application (some at
least stopping short at the resurrection, some not even there). And if
the Bible has not come by supernatural, miraculous revelation and in-
spiration, then it must, to one degree or another, be a product of or-
dinary human (historical, literary, sociological, political, psychological)
processes. If we only had sufficient knowledge, we could explain fully
how Yahwism evolved or mutated from its religio-cultural environment,
and how later Christianity also did out of its Judaeo-Hellenistic matrix.
I need not recount the scores of models or hypotheses which have been
and still are proposed along these lines. And if Biblical "religion"—maybe
"God" Himself—is merely one species of a universal genus, the partic-
ularities of which are dispensable "reifications" or "mythologizations,"
there may, indeed, still be "faith" of some blind, fideistic sort, but where
is our vaunted "theology of the cross" (one, specific cross!) in all this?

110
 I am well aware that there is an opposite extreme: ignoring historical
context completely, literalism (with which "inerrancy" is often falsely or
even slanderously equated), or other scandals besides the "scandal of
particularity," but I submit that it is tilting at windmills to act as though
the church's dominant problems lie in that direction today.
It is precisely for the sake of the Gospel as well as totally thanks to
the Gospel, that historic, Confessional Lutheranism always has, and still
does, proclaim an inerrant inscripturated Word as one indispensable
article of "the doctrine of the Gospel," an integral component of the
seamless robe of the Word of God, the eternal and life-giving Gospel of
salvation solely through our Savior's vicarious death and triumphant
resurrection.

Notes
1
This paper (now in slightly altered and updated form) was originally delivered at a
free conference of Lutheran pastors in the metropolitan New York City area in June,
1987.
1 shall no more attempt any exhaustive bibliography of the subject than attempt to
break new ground—if there is any. The bibliography is (it is almost trite to say) literally
boundless, and this is as true of specialized, professional discussions as it is of popular
ones. Perhaps it will suffice here if I call attention only to the various publications of "The
Conference on Biblical Inerrancy" (ICBI) in the last decade or so. On the popular side,
I should call attention to the two well-done articles by David Liefeld, pastor of St. John's
Lutheran Church, Springfield, PA in successive issues of The Lutheran Witness: 1) "Iner-
rancy: The Roots Run Deep" (Vol. 106, No. 5 [May 1987]), pp. 4-6; and 2) "Inerrancy:
It's Not Enough," (Vol. 106, No. 6, [June 1987]), pp. 4-5.
Neither need one point out the obvious: that the discussion has unfortunately become
largely a "dialogue of the deaf," that is, both sides speak and preach almost exclusively to
those already "converted" to their viewpoint. This state of affairs is lamentable, to be sure,
but it is simply a fact of life, a major factor in the general stand-off between "conservative"
and "liberal" groups.
However lamentable, though, I submit that such an atmosphere (especially to the extent
that rancor can be avoided) is preferable to the temptation to indulge in duplicity by
playing word-games, such as using "inerrancy" and related terms in different ways than
they are normally and traditionally understood, without clearly informing the audience
of the redefinition. I constantly caution my students against attributing "dishonesty" to
those with whom we disagree. But surely if such a charge will stick anywhere, it will in
such semantic sleight-of-hand. (One of the latest such to come to my attention is: "A
Defense of Inerrantia" by Walter Sundberg of Luther Northwestern Seminary in Dialog,
Vol. 26, No. 4 [Fall 1987], pp. 310-312).
2
This point has been classically urged by especially Charlotte Klein (herself a convert
from Judaism) in: Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978). This
significant shift (part and parcel of the classical higher-critical attempt to reverse the
traditional "Law-Prophets" sequence of the Old Testament) has recently begun to take
root even in Germanic scholarship.
3
A recent wrinkle in establishment scholarship attempts to put a little more positive
face on this attitude, but with ambivalent results. We speak of what is often termed

CONCORDIA JOURNAL/APRIL 1988 111

"canonical criticism," an effort to place more accent on the final product as we have it,
regardless of how it may have originated or developed. By far the most fruitful of such
efforts have been those of Brevard Childs (who disclaims the label, "canonical criticism,"
however), classically in his two "introductions" (to the Old Testament [Philadelphia: For-
tress, 1979], and to the New Testament [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984]). The establishment's
response has been decidedly cool, even hostile. Conservatives have been more laudatory,
but still with great reservations (such as recendy by John Oswalt, "Canonical Criticism: A
Review from a Conservative Viewpoint," JETS, Vol. 30, No. 3 [September 1987], 317-
325). James Sanders is more closely allied with the movement (perhaps especially in: Canon
and Community: A Guide to Canonical Criticism; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984). However,
whereas Childs' major accent is on the end-result, Sanders' remains much more on the
process by which the canon allegedly took shape. As a result, I think Sanders' work must
be viewed as litde more than a slight variant of the older (and still very active) "tradition/
redaction criticism." At best, the accent there remains on "community inspiration," not
inspiration of texts through (primarily) individuals.
4
Such as Adv. Haer. 3.1.1.
5
Letters 82.3.
6
Such as p. 8 and p. 420.
7
1 cannot help but observe that the early church tended to apply this term to the
Sacrament of Baptism. Orthodox Lutheranism, while not generally using the term, would
surely subscribe to that idea about Baptism. However, its marginality in much of actual
Lutheran theory and piety may be submitted as good an example as any of the extent to
which any real, substantially sacramental theology and practice languishes in our midst.
In the text of the paper itself, I use it in its usual sense in the history of western thought.
I think it cannot be accented too much to what an extent that so-called "Enlightenment"
is really the fountainhead of most of our compromising or even secularistic attitudes toward
Scripture today. Of course, many other religio-cultural developments preceded and fol-
lowed that "Enlightenment" in its narrow sense. Allan Bloom in his Chsing of the American
Mind (see below) summarizes much of the baleful aftermath in our culture.
8
That statement, or admission, has been so widely quoted and accepted that it scarcely
needs documentation. However, one may cite a recent article by ALC Bishop Lowell Erdahl
on the "Bible Battle" in an "I Think" column of The Lutheran Standard, December 12,1986,
pp. 14-15. ("Let's stop scrapping over the ambiguous, confusing, misleading, unnecessary
word Inerrant.' Let's stand together ...").
The Rev. Jerald Joersz of the LCMS's CTCR has also called my attention to a response
by Roy Harrisville of the Luther-Northwestern faculty to a previous article in its student
journal {The Concord, December 16, 1986, p. 12). Harrisville asserts again that Schiotz and
other drafters of the former ALC Constitution did not subscribe to any notion of "verbal
inerrancy," but retained the language of inerrancy "for the sake of 'preserving the
peace,'" and that "on occasion President Schiotz exploited the article's presumed ambi-
guity" as to whether "inerrancy" referred to the Biblical books and texts, or merely to
their message. Harrisville expresses the hope that in the new church (ELCA), "it will not
be necessary to make appeal to 'ambiguity'"—and, indeed, his hope has been fulfilled.
The "ambiguity" can be expressed in various ways—and, once the battle is won, one
tends not even to hear the word, except perhaps in scorn. In the LCMS's turmoil fifteen
years ago, the term "Gospel reductionism" became prominent to describe the position that
"inerrancy" could validly be applied only to the term's etymological meaning, namely, that
its essential content, the Gospel, will not lead one astray. Hans Rung, somewhat similarly,
speaks of the "indefectibility" of the Scriptures (and church). Scholastic theology distin-
guished between the "normative" and "causative" authority of Scripture (the latter more
often, traditionally, described as the "illumination" of the believer by the same Holy Spirit

112
through the words He had verbally inspired originally [and/or their faithful later procla-
mation]). Sometimes we distinguish "verbal" (inspiration of the Biblical text) from "func-
tional" inerrancy. The latter we will certainly want to affirm and emphasize too, but not
in opposition to the former.
9
The point cannot be developed here, but I would ultimately invoke the "hermeneutical
circle." Our doctrines derive from Scripture, and circle back as major lens for the inter-
pretation of Scripture. In my judgment, not even our classical Lutheran theology has
exploited and applied this principle as thoroughly as it might have. I would judge that
the absence of such a "sacramental hermeneutics" would fairly well parallel a sub-Lutheran
doctrine of Scripture. Naturally, one would scarcely expect much help along these lines
from Reformed or Arminian circles. (A recent, impassioned expression of classical, "Prot-
estant" fears is Jacques Ellul's Humiliation of the Word; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985).
One may summarize virtually all of the varieties of "liberalism" by its use of a radically
different "hermeneutical circle." Whether styled "a new hermeneutic" or not, some degree
of epistemological input is conceded to the reader and/or to modernity, whether articulated
as "reason," "experience," "science"—or whatever. All such approaches conflict with the
traditional understanding of "Sola Scriptum" (although, of course, that expression easily
gets redefined, too).
10
St. Louis: Concordia, 1972. Perhaps this is the place to observe also that subscription
to inerrancy by no means implies the lockstep uniformity on many exegetical issues and
even on doctrinal formulations (both only up to a point, of course), as opponents sometimes
charge. For confirmation, one need only read the Journal of the Evangelical Theological
Society (JETS) regularly.
11
A Study of Issues Concerning Homosexuality. Report of the Advisory Committee on Issues
Relating to Homosexuality. 1986. LCA Division for Mission in North America.
12
One may be permitted to observe that, if the survival of the Gospel in spite of one's
doctrine of Scripture were so self-evident, it is surely passing strange that now in ELCA
we meet more or less organized groups or caucuses concerned with making sure that
confessionalism (not mere "confessing"—who knows what?) survives in the new entity.
Such concerns are articulated in such independent publications as Ad Fontes, Lutheran
Forum and Forum Letter. For example, in Forum Letter (Vol. 16, No. 101; Jan. 31, 1988),
Neuhaus observes that "... oddly enough, the AELC was in some ways enthusiastically
accommodating—to the quota system, feminism, varieties of liberationism, and to the
theologically diluted agreement with the Presbyterians, among other things."
13
Again, this exchange has been quoted enough that documentation seems superfluous.
For example, the Lutheran Standard quotes Anderson's observation in its issue of September
26, 1986, p. 28.
Both Anderson and Nafzger speak in part out of their experiences in LCUSA's Division
for Theological Studies. Their extensive discussion on the issue at hand is summarized in
their recenüy published Statement on Historical Criticism (1987).
In the recent Festschrift for John Tietjen {Currents in Theology and Mission, Vol. 15, No.
1 [February 1988]), Edgar Krentz has rehearsed some ofthat history, rehashed the stand-
ard arguments, and even seen fit to disinter some of its prehistory, including the allegation
that Martin Scharlemann and I first "formally introduced the method into the faculty of
Concordia Seminary in a paper entitled, 'Notes on the Valid Use of the Historico-Critical
Method' (7 February 1958)" (p. 128; his entire essay extends through p. 136).
This is not the place for any extended rejoinder or apologia pro vita mea. While formally
true, such a statement is substantially only half-true, at best. While I would by no means
care to defend everything I wrote there or elsewhere in the past, permit me three obser-
vations: 1) Krentz's article perpetuates the confusion of "Method" in the sense of basic
hermeneutics, epistemology, or presuppositions with "method" (better "methods") in the

CONCORDIA JOURNAL/APRIL 1988 113

sense of discrete scholarly tools or techniques. The two were blurred in many peoples'
minds at the time (certainly mine, at least), and, in my judgment, it is simply disingenuous
to continue to discuss the two in the same breath. 2) To no little extent, it was precisely
what I saw happening within Lutheranism from the sixties on (and in sundry ways con-
tinuing, if not worsening, today), much as I detail it in this paper, that caused me to
reconsider. If that was what the historical-critical method could—and did!—lead to—
"thanks, but no thanks." 3) Some of the debate was—and remains—semantic. "Criticism"
can be used neutrally, even positively—in the sense of "the ministerial use of reason" (not
an "Aristotelian . . . skewing of the discussion," as Krentz claims, but except for the lan-
guage, straight out of Luther!). However, it is futile to try to rewrite the English dictionary,
and in modern Western culture, especially in connection with Biblical studies, "critical"
or "criticism" has assumed some very definite contours. The same point can be made
about "history." Nobody wishes to disregard, even minimize, the importance of historical
context. We in the LCMS have become accustomed to signal that by the label we give our
contrasting hermeneutics: "AwfoncaZ-grammatical," that is, the "historical" defined and
controlled by the grammar of an inspired text, not at the mercy of critical reason or other
subjectivities. Hence, in a way, it strikes me as perhaps a bit unfortunate that LCUSA's
final statement speaks of "historical critricism." That is, of course, common shorthand for
"historical-critical method," but the necessity of attention to the "historical" dimension is
not, as such, at issue. The document adquately lays out the completely conflicting positions,
and, probably inevitably, ends up at the same impasse with which the discussion started.
14
p. 40 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). The book as a whole is not directly
relevant to this paper, but it is an excellent analysis of the "openness" and almost total
relativism of many of the "brightest and best" at our colleges and universities—a "lifestyle,"
where the greatest threat comes from the "true believer," and that could not conceivably
embrace "inerrancy." But historicism is a variant of relativism, and, dominating Biblical
studies for nearly a century, it thus becomes relevant here nonetheless. Bloom's solution
comes nowhere within sight of the Gospel, but as an instrument of "Law" he may be very
helpful.
One more quote toward the end of the book (p. 374) seems very pertinent, however:
"... professors who now teach them [the classic books] do not care to defend them, are
not interested in their truth. One can most clearly see the latter in the case of the Bible.
To include it in the humanities is already a blasphemy, a denial of its own claims. There
it is almost inevitably treated in one of two ways: It is subjected to modern 'scientific'
analysis, called the Higher Criticism, where it is dismantled, to show how 'sacred' books
are put together, and that they are not what they claim to be. Or else the Bible is used in
courses in comparative religion as one expression of the need for the 'sacred' and as a
contribution to the very modern, very scientific study of the structure of 'myths.' (Here
one can join up with the anthropologists and really be alive.) A teacher who treated the
Bible naively, taking it at its word, or Word, would be accused of scientific incompetence
and lack of sophistication. Moreover, he might rock the boat and start the religious wars
all over again. . . . Here one sees the traces of the Enlightenment's political project, which
wanted precisely to render the Bible, and other old books, undangerous."

114
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