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MATHEMATICAL

MODELS OF
MORPHOGENESIS

'
RENETHOM
'
Professor, Tnstitut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques,
Bures-sur-Yvette, France

Translated by
W. M. BROOKES, University of Southampton
D. RAND, University of Warwick

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Table of Contents

FOREWORD TO ENGUSU TRANSLATION.......................9

PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION ......................... 11

CHAPTER I A DYNAMIC THEORY OF MORPHOGENESIS


1.1 The word: morphogenesis ........................... 13
1.2 Description of the model ........................... 17
1.3 Experimental control .................... ....... ... 21
1.4 Correspondence between Waddingtoo and Thorn ............ 26

CHAPTER 2 MATHEMATICS
2.1 Basic notions: a recapitulation ........................ 39
2.2 Some references from differential topology: differentiable
mappings; differentiable manifolds ..................... 40
2.3 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 Structural stability: dynamical systems and dlfferential
maps . ......................................... 50
2.5 Gradient blfurcatlons and singular points of functions ........ 53
2.6 Hamiltonian systems .............................. 57

CHAPTER 3 THE THEORY OF THE UNIVERSAL UNFOLDING


3.1 The universal unfolding of the germ of a function ........... 59
3.2 Stratified spaces and morphisms: topological theory ......... 77

CHAPTER 4 CATASTROPHE THEORY


4. 1 The systemic approach ...................... ... .... 85
4.2 Characteristics of a system .......................... 86
4.3 The notion of catastrophe: the o rdinary meaning and
the meaning according to catastrophe theory .••.........•. 88
4.4 Morphogenesis and catastrophe theory .................. 90
6 Table of Contents

4.5 Stable asymptotic regimes: the elementary theory ........... 91


4.6 The non-elementary case . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

CHAPTERS ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHE THEORY


S .I Catastrophes of confllct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
S .2 Catastrophes of bifurcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....... 96
S.3 The parabolic umbilic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
S .4 The umbilics and the morphology of the breaking
of waves ..................................... l 02

CHAPTER 6 APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF


CATASTROPHE THEORY
6.1 Applications of the fust kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lOS
6.2 The limits of catastrophe theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I06

CHAPTER 7 THE CONTROVERSY


7.I Mathematics and scientific theorising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.2 The aims of science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5
7.3 The quantitative aspect of catastrophe theory ............. 121
7.4 The purely qualitative models: analogy and natural
language ........................ ... . ... ...... 123

CHAPTER 8 FROM PHYSICS TO BIOLOGY


8.1 Space, science and magic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.2 Physiological space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
8.3 Magic and space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
8.4 Magic and locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8.5 Magic and geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
8.6 Science and magic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.7 Towards a new description of space? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

CHAPTER 9 BIOLOGY
9.1 Expla.irung space forms: reductionism v. PJa10nism ......... 139
9.2 The notion of archetype In biology and its modem
successors .................................... 153

CHAPTER I 0 SEMANTICS AND LINGUISTICS


10.1 The role of topology In semantic analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
10.2 Topology and meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

CHAPTER 11 TOPOLOGY AND LINGUISTICS


11.1 Linguistics ns semiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
11 .2 Universnls of language ................ .. .......... 194
Table of Contents 7

113 Meaning for a spatio-temporal process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195


11.4 Elementary catastrophes and archetypalmorphologies ....... 198
115 Algebraic description of singulariti.es and their notable
sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .. . 200
11.6 Semantic and syntactic interpretation of interaction
morphologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 203
11 .7 A more refined analysis of the meaning of an atomic
sentence .......... ........................... 208
11.8 Sentences describing states .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 209
11 .9 Conclusion ......... .. ... ...... ...... ... .... ... 211

CHAPTER 12 LANGUAGE AND CATASTROPHES


12.1 Syntactic structures and grammatical categories . . . . . . . . . . . 214
12.2 The syntactic structure of elementary sentences . . . . . . . . . . . 215
12.3 Catastrophe theory and the notion of object. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
12.4 Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
12.5 Theory of grammatical functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

CHAPTER 13 ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NATURAL LANGUAGES:


AN ESSAY ON PHYCHOLINGUlSTIC INTERPRETATION
13.1 Universals of language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
J3.2 The dynamic model and semantic depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
13 3 Typo logies of elementary sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
13.4 Adjectives, genitives and affiXes: adjuncts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
13 5 The adjective ..... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
J 3 .6 General conclusion on the inversion rule in the
typology of free adjuncts ... ... . . . . . . . . . ... ... . . ... 259
13.7 A speculation on the evolution of languages ....... . ... . .. 260

CHAPTER 14 SEMIOTICS
14.1 From icon to symbol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
14.2 Genesis of the image .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 262
14.3 Death of the image: physical pregnaoce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
14.4 Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 267
145 Symbolism in man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 269
14.6 Localisation and meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
14.7 From animal to man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

CHAPTER I 5 A SEMANTIC CHAMELEON : INFORMATION


15.1 The ambigui ty of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 277
I 5.2 The notion of information .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
J 53 Information, meaning and form . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .... 282
8 Table of Contents

CHAPTER 16 LOGOS PHOENIX


16.1 Universal language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 287
16.2 Mathematics: a universal language? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
163 Natura11anguage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ...... 290
16.4 The universal need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
16.5 The categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

CHAPTER 17 TO THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN POWER: GAMES


• 17 .I T o understand or to act? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
17 .2 The systemic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... .... 297
17 3 The hermeneutic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
17.4 llermeneutics and the theory of games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 I
17.5 Pregnnnc:e of conflict ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
17.6 The antluopology of games ......................... 303
17.7 Skill and games ............................ ..... 304
17.8 Science and games . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Foreword to the English translation

The English language reader knows Catastrophe Theory principally through the
books of Zeeman, Poston and Stewart, and Gillmore (see below). All these
works, particularly the last two, are inclined to give C. T. a utilitarian aspect.
Reading the present collection of papers, he will be struck by a palpably differ-
ent viewpoint, at once more speculative and philosophical, and hence, less
preoccupied with pragmatic results. The reader will consequently be in a position
to ask himself whether the considerations offered here are susceptible of experi-
mental verification, or even whether they are rrue. I must admit that the prob lem
of trutht has not concerned me directly. ] am, however, convinced of one point:
as weD as the truth of a theory ,or of a model, one must also consider its interest. If
we are to believe Karl Popper, PSYchoanalysis is not 'falsifiable ', and hence must
be placed outside science. And yet psychoanalysis offers infinitely more interest
than many scientific th.eories whose truth is indisputably assured. lt is in ll1is
spirit that T offer here these models, not so much as testable hypotheses or as
experimentally controllable models but as a stimulus to the in1agination which
leads to the exercise of ihough.t and tllus an increase in our understanding of the
world and of man.
The papers translated here date from 1967 to 1981. Many of them might
weD be revised in the light of our present perspective. It is for this reason that
each is preceded by a short introduclion which sets tllcm in the contex t of
contemporary problematics, such as I conceive this to be.
lt is my aim and my hope that my readers might find, in discovering these
models, even a small part of the pleasure thutl felt myself in conceiving them.

Rem) Thorn

tAs in the celebrated dialogue between Jesus and Pontius Pilnte (John 18:38) Is it not
necessary to repeat with the tuner: 'What is truth?', 'Ti est/a All!theill• •• ?'
, 10 Foreword to the English translation

REFERENCES
E. C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory, Addison-Wesley, 1977.
T . Poston and l. Stewart, Catastrophe Theory and irs ApplicatiOIIS, Pitrnan, 1978.
R. Gillmore, Catanrophe 17teory for Sciemists afld £ngifleers, Wiley, 1981.

,
,

Preface to the French edition


The collection of papers Modeles Mathematiques de la Morphogenese No. 887,


Collection 10- 18, being out of print, Christian Bourgois offered to reprint this
collection in a standard edition. The possibility has led me to re-arrange and
alter the contents of the collection. I have incorporated more recent articles,
in particular those bearing on Unguistics and Semiotics. Further, 1 have sub-
stantially altered the dldactic section concerning the mathematics of Catastrophe
Theory. This section had suffered in the previous collect '.on from a rather hasty
improvisation which I hope J have, at least partially, remedied. So, where I have
retained a paper from the earlier collection 1 have written a short introduction
placing the paper in persepctive within the development of the theory, and the
controversies which it has roused. I believe that the changes make the present
collection into a more coherent presentation, as well as giving the reader, I hope,
a more complete and pe[haps more useful, representation of what has become
of Catastrophe Theory.
R.T.

TRANSLATORS' NOTE

The translation is of the second edition of Modi!les Mathema.Tiques de laMorplto-


genese, Christian Bourgois, Paris, 1980, with updatings by the author and a
section in Chapter 9, 'Explllining space forms: reduclionsim v. Platonism' which
replaces 'Biology and stn1cturalism' which originally appeared in English in
Waddington, C. H. (ed.), Towards a Theoretical Biology, IV, University of
Edinburgh, 19.
The translators wish to thank Mrs. K. Yolland, without whose herculean
efforts in producing a first rough translation, the project would never have left
tlte ground. They also wish to thank all those concerned for their forbearance
during the production of the work.
W. M. B., D. R.
,

CHAPTER I

A dynamic theory of morphogenesis t


Wrlrten In 1966, this paper ca11 be comidered as the germinal source paper of
catastrophe theory. The ideas lmroduced here a little rapidly will be repeated
and explalntd in Qwpcers 2 and 4 We ·will observe chat the notion of 'chreod ',
v.-fth wlllch we are manifoldly concerned here, lws hardly, been accepted illlo
usoge. Without doubt the definition of the word was too IYigUe for the concept
to lend itself to a fomwl COIIStrucrlon. in most cases we Clln substitute for it
the more precise technical notion of 'morphogenetic field'. 111e exchange of
co"espondence between myself and C. 11. Wadding ton who in this period has
given a 1•ery favourable reception to my Ideas, and to whom I owe a great deal -
is wlmess to the too well-known dlfftcultles which hinder rlre dialogue between
biologist and mathematician. The biologist rarely sees the necessity for a rigorous
definition of the concepts he uses, ond considers the tiiOthemarician demanch s
for precision as a rhetoric without imeresr. It is neceSS111')1 to say that here, we
rome up against a key problem of C. T.: how to define o 'stoble o:;ymprotic
l'fglf/11!' of o dy110mic. 1J1is concept, fundamental to our modelling, has still not
rece1vtd a sarisfoctory mathematiCill definition in the general Cllse. On this point
see paragraph 4.6 in Chapter 4.

1.1 THE WORD: MORPHOGENESIS


Accordintt to some purists, the French term 'Morphogenese· is used only to
der.lgnate the appearance of new organic forms in the course of Evolution; in
English the word 'Morphogenesis' is more widely used, since il designates, among
other things, the development of the adult organism from the embryo. However,
some Anglo.Saxon authors set 'Morphogenesis' in opposition to 'Pattern forma·
tion'. 'Morphogenesis' would then be used only of those processes (such ns
gastrulntion or neurulation in the amphibian embryo) accompanied by spatial

tl ust published in c. n. Waddin[tlOn (Fd.), To...,rds D ThtOrrtirlll Biology/, Edinbul&h


LN•,nlly Preu, 1968.
14 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. 1
,
movements of a global nature. 'Panern formation' would be reserved for
developmental processes of a static type , Uke the formation of bones or the
growth of hair or feathers on the skin. This distinction may seem somewhat
arbitrary and of doubrful interest. Here we shall employ the term 'Morphogenesis'
as its etymology indicates, in the widest sense, to denote any process creating
(or destroying) forms. We shall concern ourselves neither with llte nature (material
or otherwise) of the substrale of the forms considered, nor with tlte nature of
tlte forces which cause tltese changes.

1.1.1 Origin and field of application of the theory


The theory proposed here stems from the coming together of two sources. On
the one hand, there are my own researches in differential topology and analysis
on the problem called structural stability: for example, given a 'form' geometri·
cally deftned, by tlte graph of a function F(x), one anempts to find whetlter this
function is 'structurally stable·, that is, whether when the function F is altered
by a sufl'iciently small amount, the altered function G = F + 6 F still has the
same form (topologically) as the initial function F. On the other hand, there are
writings in Embryology, in particular, the work of C. H. Waddington whose ideas
of 'chreod' and 'epigenetic landscape' seem tO be precisely adapted to the
abstract schema that I h.nd met in my theory of the structural stability of functions
and differentiable mappings. I am implying that this theory is of an extremely
abstract and general natUre and the field to which !t applies extends well beyond
Embryology, or even Biology.
ln fact, I know of applications in Geometrical Optics, in Hydrodynamics
and the Dynamics of Gases (stable singularities of 'wave fronts' and 'shock
waves'). In a manner which is no doubt more speculative, but nevertlteless
useful, the notion of 'morphogenetic field' may be identified on the physiological
level with the physiologist's notion of functional field. In the special case of
nervous activity in Man , a 'word' may be considered as just such a field in the
space of neurone activities, and the study of 'stable' associations of words
extends to a geometrical theory of language, of 'meaning'.

1.1 .2 Independence of the substrate


The essence of our theory, which is that a certain understanding of mo rphogene-
tic processes is possible without having knowledge of the properties peculiar to
tlte substrates of the forms, or of the nature of the forces at work , may seem
difficult to accept, especially on the part of experimenters used to working at
the coal face, and continually struggling with a reality resistant to their efforts.
The idea however Js not new and may be found, fol'!llulated almost expliciUy,
in the classic treatise of D'Arcy Thompson, On Growth and Form. The ideas
of this great visionary were too far ahead of their time to be accepted; often
expressed in an over-naive geometrical marmer, tltey furtlter more lacked the
Sec. !.1] The Word: Morphogenesis 15

dynamical and mathematical justifications that recent research alone will be able
to provide. To illustrate this relative independence of morphogenesis with regard
to our knowledge of the substrate, I will offer the two following examples.
(1) Let us consider first a frog's egg, fertilised, which we allow to develop in
optinlUm conditions. By consulting works on Embryology, we shall be in
a position (barring accidents) to predict with a great measure of precision
all the changes to be undergone by this organism, and the whole morphology
of its development.
(2) Let us consider on the other hand , a cliff laid bare at a specified date (t 0 )
by a landslide. Let us suppose that we know the geological nature of the
cliff and the whole micro-climate subsequent to the landslide (winds, rain,
temperatures, etc.). Can one foresee the form that the cliff will ultimately
take under the action of the agents of erosion?
In case {2), our knowledge of the substrate and the forces at work is excellent;
nevertheless, it would be a very clever geomorphologist indeed who could
predict with any precision the shape into which the cliff will ultimately be
carved by erosion. In the first case, the possibilities of our predictions being
correct are very great and yet our knowledge of the substrate and of the morph·
ological mechanisms (with the exception of a few biochemical generalities on the
synthesis of proteins) could hardly be more sketchy. In morphology, therefore,
there is only a very small correlation between the possibility of our prediction
on the one hand and our knowledge of the substrate on the other.
The objection will be made that 1 have compared things which are not
comparable, setting on the same level a biological process and one from inanimate
nature. In fact, this comparison wiU serve to underline an important point of
whlch few people are aware: that the phenomenon of morphogenesis in inanimate
nature is less well known, and quite as little understood as morphogenesis in
living things. The latter has attracted the attention of biologists for centuries
but on the contrary, in Physical Chemistry morphology has been more or less
permanently scorned by the academics. For instance, a typical and important
problem is that of the geometrical diStnoution of a substance between two
phases. Now, on this question, very little is known, for example, to my knowledge
there exists no theory to explain the dendritic growth of crystals. The disda.in
of physical chemists for this type of question is easily explained. 1t is that here
we are concerned with extremely unstable phenomena, difficult to reproduce
and resistant to mathematisation. Indeed the essentiality of any forn1 of any
morphology has to be expressed by a discontinuity with the properties of its
surround.ings. Now, nothing makes a mathematician more ill at ease than a
discontinuity, because any usable quantitative model is based on the use of
functions which are analytic and hence continuous. lf you want to know w.b.a t
happens when you throw a stone into a pond, it is infmitely better to do the
experiment and fllm it than to try to formulate a theory about it: the ftnest
16 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I

, specialist$ in the Navier-Stokes equation would certainly be Incapable of


telling you more about it. I! ls important that th.ese gaps be filled; but it would
not be surprising If biologlcal morphogenesis, better know, slower and more
strictly controlled, were to help us understand some of the fleeting and ephemeral
phenomena of inanimate morphogenesis.

1.1.3 Determinism
In principle, there are two types of mechanical model: the classic determinist
model and the quantum model, fundamentally indeterminate, whose determinism
can only be expressed statistically. lt is normally considered tltat phenomena on
the sub-atomic scale fall into the category of quantum models (and are thus
indeterminate), whilst macroscopic phenomena come into the category of
classical models and are therefore subject to a rigorous determinism. This booklsh
view of things is, I believe, fundamentally wrong. I shall not discuss indetcrminis·
tic quantum theory here, but at the macroscopic level, numerous phenomena
present a certain type of instability, due to the fact that initial symmetry dis-
appears. Thus a homogeneous disc allowed to fall freely through the air from a
horizontal position will fall in a spiral. If one takes a cylindrical bath, full of
water, and drains it tluouglt a central plug-hole, the liquid will drain with a rotary
movement the sense of which is a priori unknown and unpredictable. ln all cases
of this type, minute variations in initial conditions may lead to very great
variations to subsequent development. In all these cases it is quite possible to
postulate that the phenomenon Is determined, but this is properly speaking a
metaphysical position, impossible to verify experimentally. If we are only going
to be happy with experimentally controllab le properties, we shall be led to
replace the unverifiable hypothesis of determinsim by the empirically verifiable
property of 'structural stability': a process {P) is structurally stable if a small
variation In Initial conditions leads to a process (P') isomorphic to (P) (ln the
sense that a small transformation in space·lime, an E-homeomorphism in geometry,
will bring the process (F') back to the process (P)). This leads us quite naturally
to Waddlngton's notion of 'chreod', and of 'morphogenetic field' in general. A
morphogenetic field on an open set of space-time resides in the speciflcutlon of
a 'uruversal model' from which the given process IS copied. By this fact such a
process is structurally stable. There is therefore no mystery in the notion of
morphogenetic field; this notion s.imply expresses the fact that n process happens
in conformity with a model given a priori, and in a structurally stable manner. In
every natural process, one !lr$t tries to ISOlate those areas \\here the process is
structurally stable. the 'chreods' of the process; islets of determinism separated
by zones where the process is indetemtinate or mucturally unstable. By Intro-
ducing dynamic models one then tries to break down each chreod into elementary
catastrophes, and then to bring the organisatioi' of these elementary chreods
back to a stable global form by the action of an implicit singularity of the
dynamics, the 'organising centre'. As to the organisation of the separate chreods
Sec. 1.2] Description of the Model 17

amongst themselves the problem is more complex, since in principle it is indeter·


minate. Of all the possible configUrations of different chreods, some are more
stable than others. These will be the ones most charged with 'meaning'. This
dtfflcult problem is very like that of deciphering a message 1n an unknown
language. We shall now describe our dynamic model.

1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL


We shall start from the biochemical lnterpretatlont of cellular differentiation.
Let us consider a container in which have been placed k chemical substances
s., s 2, ••• .Sk. Jn concentrations c 1, c1 , ••• , Ck, respectively. As a result of
chemical reactions which take place between these substances, the concentrations
Ct vary according to a diffcrcntiBl law which we shall write (J) dcf!dr = x1
(c1 , ••• , Ck)· We shall not try to establish precisely the functions X; with the
help of the laws of chemical kinetics (mass action etc.). The only fact that will
tnterest us is the following: the equations {I) define, in the k-dimensional
euclidean space Rk with coordinates (c 1, •••• , CA;), a vector field X with corn·
ponents X,. The development of the mixture will be described by the displacement
of the representative point c1(r) along a trajectory of the differential system
defined by system (I). As a general rule, the system will evolve towards a unique
limit state c1°. Nevertheless cases are possible where several linut points may
exist. We may, on occasion, obtain a closed uajectory as lunit state, or even
more complicated figures, such as a surface, or, with a larger number of dimensions,
a manifold. The connected set of these limit points will be caUcd an ·auractor'
of Ihe system (I). Given such an at tractor (A), the set of the trajectories of the
fleld which tend toward A form a domain of the space Rk which is called the
basm of attractor A. When system (I) admits several disjoint attractors, these
auractors are in competition. In some simple cases, the basins relnttve to different
auracwrs are separated by 'hypersurfaces' of the 'crest line' type regularly
embedded in the space.lo more complicated, but nevertheless structurally stable,
ca;es (resistant to small penurbations} the basins relative to two atuactors (A 1 ),
(A 1 ) can penetrate each other in a manner which Is topologically very complicated.
In this case, the choice of fmal development, toward (A 1 ) or (A 2 ) is in praclice
indetemlinate and one can scarcely evaluate statistically the respcclive probabili·
ties of each outcome even by measuring the local density of each basin. ll is
permissible in this case. to speak of a situation of 'struggle', of'conflict', between
the two attractors.

tThls Idea of Interpreting cellulnr differentiation in terms of a '1l.llbte metabolic regime'. I.e.
en onractor or blochcmlc kinetics. Is often auributcd to Dclbruck and S:dlard. In het. it
wu stated in Its local form. which is the only correct one. in C. U. Waddin8ton,/nrroductlon
to .lfodun G•n•ticl I 940.
18 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I

That being so, we now 'localise' the preceding construction; if (x) designates
a system of coordinates in the domain U, the seat of our process, the concen·
trations Cf will be a function of the coordinates (x, r) and will satisfy in principle,
a system of partial differential equations of the form:

oc
- i (x, t)j = X1 (c;. x, t) + K l::..c; /:;: Lap lace operator
or

where the term K t;cl expresses the equalisation effect of the diffusion . ln fact,
in all that follows, we shall assume this term to be small with respect to Xt and
we shall treat it as a perturbation of Xt. [f the vector field X is structurally
stable (a t least in the neighbourhood of the autractor controlling the local
regime), it has no qualitative effect on lhe development. At all points x of U is
lhus found an associated vector field on Rk, otherwise called a dynamical system.
The properties of such a field of vectors for all x of U constitute what will be
called a ·field of local dynamics' on U. We will defme an atlractor of the local
dynamic, for all points x where the local dynamic has already reached a 'limit
state'. This atlractor, being structurally stable, rules over an open set of nei&h·
bouring points of x. The open set U is thus partitioned into domains U;, associated
with attractors A;. These domains are separated by shock wave surfaces, which
form what we call the set of catastrophe points of the process. The properties
of this set constitu te the morphology of the process.
It is in practice impossible, without a more precise hypothesis, to specify
the position of the shock waves separating the domains of diverse attractors.
Even in the theoretically simplest cases, hydrodynamlcs in particular, this
prob lem has only partial solutions. Nevertheless, if one is interested, not in the
quantitative development, bu t only in the qualitative (topological) structure of
the separating surfaces, the problem becomes more accessible. Stipulating
'MaxweU's convention', a hypolhesis of general character, which expresses in
some way the equality of 'local potentials' relative to each attractor on both
sides of the separatrix, it is possible to show that separating surfaces present
only a small number of stable singularities, and always the same ones. at least,
in the case where the local dynamic is a dynamic o f gradient, X= grad V. For
this case, I have drawn up a complete list of these singularities, which are the
'elementary ca tastrophes' on space-lime R 4 • ln fact these singularities become
apparent when the local dynamic X = grad V is itself in a ·critical" situation,
for example when an attractor A is destroyed or divides itself into several
attractors (a p henomenon which H. Poincarc has called 'bifurcation'). We ean
form a picture of each of the singularities of the potential V which presents
itself in a structurally stab le manner on R 4 , and give the algebraic model corre·
spending to the surfaces of the catastrophe. For guidance, the list is as follows :
Sec. 1.2] Description ofthe Model 19

1.2.1 List of elementary catastrophes


(i) Tile [old. Destruction of an attractor, and capture by an attractor of
lesser potential.
(ii) 11re cmp. Bifurcation of an attractor into two disconnected attractors.
This generates in hydrodynamics what is called the Ricmann-Hugoniot
catastrophe (formation of a free-edged shock wave).
(tii) 11re swallowtaiL A 'wave front' surface cuts out a furrow of which the
base is the edge of a shock wave. The blastopore in the gastruJation of
amphibians provides a probable example in embryology.
(iv) 11re butterfly. This singularity of the sixth order in V is interpreted by
exfoliation, the ·swelling' of a free-edged shock wave.
(v) 71re hyperbolic umbilic. A matter of the singularity presented by the
crest of a wave as it breaks.
(vi) 11re ellipric wnbilic or the hair. This singularity presents itself as the
extremity of a spike, a kind of triangular-based tapering pyramid.
(vii) The parabclfc umbilic. Transition between elliptic and hyperbolic umbilic;
it is manifest In the form of a mushroom frequently shown by a jet break-
ing.

These last three singuladties are associated wiU1 the singuladties of potential V
of a more complicated type (those of 'eo-rank' 2). They lead in hydrodynamics
to the morphology of the breaking of waves; in Biology, very probably, they
direct the organogenesis of the processes of captures (phagocytes in Unicellulars)
and of sexuality (formation and emission of gametes).
In all these cases, the geometric schema is as follows: at a point (x, r) of U,
the local dynamic presents a singularity of a given algebraic type (s). The follow-
ing property of differential analysis is then applied: all deformations of the
critical dynamic (s) correspond to a point of euclidean space W, associated with
the singularity (s), this space which parametrises all the possible deformations
(up to a local homeomorphism) of the singular dynamic (s), constitutes what I
call the 'universal unfolding' of the singularity (s); the fmal development of the
process from an initial situation where the local dynamic is in a critical state (s)
in (X 0 ) is then qualitatively defmed by a mapping F 1 of U in W, the growth
wave; the fmal catastrophes are then defined by the intersection of F 1(U) with
a universal catastrophe set associated with the singularity (s) in (W). We thus
find a mathematical justification for the idea of 'epigenetic landscape·, suggested
20 years ago by Waddington.
rn carrying this model to the extreme, we could say that the adult organism
is only a portion of the 'universal unfolding' of the germinal dynamic that rules
the egg. The 'elementary catastrophes' of which a list has been given, correspond
to the singularities of the dynamic of codimenslon 4. The associated space W
20 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I

is of a dimension less than 4. These are the only singularities, associated with the
dynamics of gradient, which can occur in a stable manner in our tin1e-space.
They are also found in inanimate nature as weU as in living beings.
But H is clear that they would not be sufficient to account for all the
development of a living being; a primary problem rests in the stable configuration
presented by 'chreods', a priori independent of each other. We can sometimes
explain this association by the existence of a singularity, an ·organising centre',
of codimension greater than 4, which is not dealt with by the growth wave
F1;U-+ W. But then such a development would already require the setting in
motion of homeostatlc mechanisms which maintain the 'wave' F1 in a weU-
defined region of (W). 1n fact, it is indeed this which represents the developmen t
of the embryo: there, as in an epigenetic primitive, one only finds singularities
of the 'elementary catastrophe· type. The more refined organogeneses, which
like those of the eye or the bones, require a certain metric control, only appear
much later.
In adcUtion, the singularities associated with the dynamics of gradient are
of a very simple type , and it is certain that, even in inanimate nature, one can
have local dynamics which present 'recurrence' (closed or 'almost closed' trajec-
tories). Unfortunately, the mathematical study of 'bifurcations' presented by
these multi-dimensional anractors, and the topological nature of the ctuastrophes
that result has hardly been attempted (and is in any case extremely difficult).
But one thing is certain: where the catastrophes associated wiU1 the dynamics
of gradient are defmed by sets of a polyhedral type the catastrophes associated
with the diminution of dinlension of an attractor (due to the phenomenon of
resonance, for example), lea<l in general to catastrophe sets of a considerable
topological complexity, of the type wiU1 arborescent or dendritic form. So we
see that the dynamic origin common to the dendritic forms observed in inaninlate
nature (solidification: growtlt of crystals) and in living nature (trees; blood
circulation; the 'classification schemas' observed in the organisation of memory)
demands the same treatment. Generally speaking, the appearance of a new
'phase' in an initially homogeneous milieu leads to an appearance of this kind,
which we call a ·generalised catastrophe'. Every process in which there is a
rupture of an initial symmetry is thereby, structurally unstable, and leads 10 a
generalised catastrophe. Such processes cannot be formalised; bul it must be
noted, that even if the process itself is structurally unstable, its fmal outcome
may be well determined.
Thi.s explains that life uses, as a matter of course, generalised catastrophes
in Embryology, (compare the gastrulation of amphibians following ordinary
catastrophes, to the gastrulation of birds or mammals, a generalised catastrophe).
The death of a Jiving being is shown by the fact that the dynamic of its local
metabolism passes from a recurrent configuration to a gradient configuration
and that is, typically, a generalised catastrophe.
Sec.I.J) E>.perimcntal Control 21

I J EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL
We will not pursue the description of our mode l further since it would require
a considerable technical development with little to be gained In the clarification
of the essential. I will tackle the question which is obviously on everybody's
tips. Are these models susceptible to experimental control? I must, at least
for the moment, reply in the negative.
In fact, where (P) is the natural process bemg studied, two cases are possible.
(I) (P) structurally stable and wholly contained in n 'chreod'. ln this case
IS
(P) allows a qualitative model given once and for all and it is difficult to
see what further experience could bring other than a confirmation of the
structural stability of the chrcod. Of course one can try to study the interior
of the chreod. By separating it into 'elementary catastrophes' and then by
relating the configuration of the elementary catastrophes to the action of
an 'organising centre' (eventually exterior to the support of the chreod), we
can strive to analyse the dynamic process which ensures the stability of it.
But this analysis is often arbitrary; it often leads to several models between
wluch we can only choose for reasons of economy or because of mathematical
elegance. Besides, catastrophe theory is not sufl1ciently advanced to allow
the const ruction of a quantitative model: the only case known is that of the
elementary catastrophe defined by the growth of a shock wave in Fluid
Dynamics. This single example demonstrates the difficulties of the problem.
(2) (P) structurally unstable, and contains several chreods (for example two
IS
chreods (C1 ). (C2 ) separated by zones of instability or indeterminacy). In
this case, we could in principle, relate the indeterminacy to the effect of a
generalised catastrophe, not formalisable in itself. The only hope of extract·
LDS o model from it is to make it statistical. We wiU have to consider, not
only a single process, but o whole ensemble of processes on which we wiU
make a statistical artefact of the morphological characteristics. This is the
method followed in Quantitative Biology. But here still, the theory of
generalised catastrophes is not sufnciently advanced to allow the construction
of a model. I think, per~nally, that what is usually understood as quantum
mechanics is in this view, only a statistical artefact of Hamiltonian catastro·
phes.

In face of the fact of our inability to control our model by experiment, strictly
empirical minds, foUowing Bacon, will be templed to reJect it as vain speculation.
In terms of standard sclentiOc Ideology 1 can only agree with lhem. But In the
long term, lt seems to me that there are two reasons which should prompt
scholars to give the model some credit:
(I) l11e fltSt is that each experimenter works within a given specialised field. we
accept as given a priori these divisions, tlus taxonomy of the experience of
22 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I

phenomena in the great disciplines: Physics, Chemistry, Blology .... Now


whence comes this division of experience, if not from a decomposition of
our perceptive field into apparently disjoint 'chreods'? lt is clearly pointless
to set quantitative models, considering these as the only scientific and useful
ones, in opposition to our qualitative model, because every quantitative
model presupposes a qualitative division of reality, that is, the preliminary
isolation of n 'system· considered as stable and experimentally reproducible.
Slatistical models themselves presuppose the definition of 'sets' of stable
and reproducible processes. All scholars use this decomposition which our
perceptive apparatus yields us almost unconsciously in spite of whJlt they
may say. just as Monsieur Jourdain wrote prose withou t knowing it. Would
it not be interesting in these conditions to refer back the question of this
decomposition, and to integrate it within the framework of a general and
abstract theory, rather than accepting it blindly as an irreducible fact of
we.?
'"

(2) The second reason is that the ultimate aim of science Is not to amass
undJfferentiated emplricaJ data, but to organise this data in a more or less
formaJJsed structure, wruch subsumes and explains it. To this end, we must
have ideas a priori on the manner in which these things come about , we
must have models. Up till the present, the construction of models in Science
bJls been maJnJy a question of chance, of the 'lucky guess' . But the time will
come when the construction itself of models will become, if not a science.
at least an art. My endeavour, which consists of trying to describe the
dynamic models compatible with an empirically given morphology, is a first
step In the construc tion of this ·General Theory of Models' tlut will have to
be built one day.
I will add, with customary phllosophical solicitude, that our model offers interest-
ing perspectives on mentaJ processes, and on the mechanism of knowing itself. In
effect, from tltis point of view, 01u psychic life is none other than a sequence of
catastropl1es between at tractors of the dynamic constituted by the stationary
activities of our neurones. The intrinsic dynamic of our thought is not then
fundamentally diiTerent from the dynamic acting on the outside world. We can
say that the modelled structures of exterior forces can, by coupling, be constituted
in the very interior of our mind; this is precisely the act of knowing.
In the same range of ideas, it will be shown how our model enables us to
contemplate afresh an old problem , that of biologicaJ fmaJJty.

13 .I Finality in biology
lt is currently accepted thJlt there is no 'living state of mauer'; life cannot be
indefinitely divided; the cell constitutes, as is well known, the irreducible unit
of living matte.r. We are then led to make a global structure of life, expressed by
the simultaneous presence of elementary sub-systems in one coherent and stable
Sec. 1.3) Experimental Cont rol 23

spatial and biochemical conf~guratron. This configuration wlU have to possess


the property of structural stability, and play the role of an 'organising centre·
with respect to the different sub-chreods which govern the development of the
elementary systems. Thus it is legitimate to say, following the vitalist point of
view (after Driesch), that all mlcrophenomena interior to the living being have
a place m conformity with the 'plan' or with the global 'programme'. But it Is
no less correct to claim that the development of all these systems is effected
solely under the action of a local determinism, in principle reducible to physiCO·
chcrrucal forces. Thus, the 'vitalist' pomt of view and the 'reduclionist' point of
view are not at all incompatible (and of the two points of view, contrary to
appearance, it is the reductlonist point of view which Is 'metaphysical', because
1t requires a reduction to Physico-chemistry which Is not established experi·
mentally).
I beUeve in the correctness of the fma.list affltiTiations in biology. lt is true
to say, as Voltaire stated in his time, that our eyes are made to see, and our legs
for walking. What sense can one make of this kind of SUitement? Only a dynamic
analysis of embryonic development enables one, I think. to give the precise
meaning of these sentences. In an eminently speculative manner, I venture to
present such an analysis here.
The fundamental idea of our model is given that all cellular specialisation is
characterised by a stable regime of the local metabolism , that is to say, by an
attractor A of the biochemical kinetics acting tangentially at the point under
consideration, that the functional significance of the corresponding tissue
becomes expressed in the geometric or topological structure of this at tractor A .
We will give examples to be more explicit. But first of all we must defme a
notion: the global control form of a living being. An animal, for example, is
distinguished by its global stability; submitted to a shock, to a stimulus (s), it
will reply by a reflex (r) which will have the effect in principle, of annulling the
penurbations caused by the stimulus (s). Now the stimuli, owing to the so le
fact that they emanate from the ambient space, form a multidimensional geo·
metric continuum (W). The origin (0) of this euclidean space (W) will indicate
the non-excited state of rest of the animal. Given that there Is a continuous
infinity of stimuli, there exists on the other hand, only a finite number of
cortecung reflexes {ri) (in princrplc). This means that if the animal is submitted
to a stimulus (s), the point representative of its state maps into a point (s) of (W)
and then returns to (0), but it returns there using a well defined curve, characte-
ristic of the correcting reflex r(s). The space (W) of the stimulus is thus panllloned
Into 'basins of attraction' associated with each of the reflexes 'I· It is this con-
figuration that we wlU name 'the global control form • of the animal under
consideration.
Let us now consider an egg of the species in question. Before fertilisation,
the metabolism is weak, and IS characterised by an attractor of small dimension
(v0 ), but the fertilisation sets rn motion a large number of cycles of reactions,
24 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch.l

the release of a great number of degrees of freedom, in such a way that the
dimension of the attractor (v0 ) increases and becomes a 'manifold' (V) of a
sufficiently large dimension. This is the phenomenon of 'silent catastrophe' ,
without immediate morphogenetic effect, but which is expressed in Embryology
by 'gain in competence' . Our fundamental hypothesis is as follows: on the
ectoderm of the you ng gastrula, this attractor (V) is not itself fixed, but under·
goes numerous fluctuations, between the states (s) of large din1ension and the
states (r) of lesser dimension. In other words, the topology of the functional
space of the states (s) and the states (r) into which they become degraded, is
such as to give effect to a model of the global conrrol form of the species, in
particular by the mapping (s) ... r(s). This being so, this form is too complex
to be stable: certain cells speci:lllse in losing the states (s) and keeping only the
states (r). Jt is at first the endoderm (wh.ich only conserves the states (r) relative
to alimentary reflexes); then the mesoderm, which only conserves the states (r)
relative to the reflexes of movement and of biochemical control. Some other
cells, on the contrary, lose the states (r ) in order to conserve only the states (s):
these are the nerve cells. Indeed, the nerve cells having lost the capacity to
regulate their metabolism, conserve the trace of all that happens to them, a very
precious quality for the fu ture organ of memory. (In fact, it is well known that
regulation takes place but in a catastrophic and undifferentiated manner, by the
discharge of a nervous inlpulse). Other cells (those of the epidermis) develop by
ageing towards an attractor situated midway between (s) and (r), and lose their
competence. The attractor (M) of the mesoderm contains the group of euclldean
displacemems (D). Through one subsequent degeneration, certain cells lose this
group completely. they will become the bone cells (osteoblasts). In other cases,
the degeneration will be less complete, and the attractor will contain a one·
parameter subgroup of the group (D). They will become the muscular cells
(myoblasts). The geometry of this degeneration, transposed into a chreod of
a metric character, describes the formation of the bones and muscles which are
attached to them. The foonalion of the sensory organs is very sintilar. The field
(S) decomposes into a direct product of fields (S.), {S0 ), (S1), etc. visual, auditory,
tactile .. . , and each of these fields imposes a definite form on a preferred zone
of neural tissue . In the case of the visual field (Sv) for exantple the group (D) of
displaccments operates equivariantly in (S,,). A subsequent degeneration leads to
the formation of a metrically con trolled 'chreod' which is the ocular globe. The
action of the group (D) is manifest by the presence of mesenchyme ln this
chreod which will lead to the forma tion of the choriode and the sclerotic, to
which will be attached the three pairs of muscles which ·symbolise' decomposition
into three one-parameter sub-groups of the domain of (D) which act on (S).
This action of th.e group (D) is found again , acting in a compensatory manner.
in the field of the stationary neurone activities on which the field {Sv) approxi·
mately reconstitutes itself, once tbe organogenesis of the brain is complete.
There is in th.is, a general fact : a regular field (s-> r(s)) undergoes in the
Sec. 1.3 I EKperimental Control 2S

course of organogenesis a whole series of decompositions, of catastrophes, due


to the formation of partial organs; but finally, the field reconstitutes itself as
a global form of nervous activity. Thus, for exan1ple, an alimentary reflex (r)
puts Into action:
(I) a stimulus; the sight of a prey {p);
(2) a motor field (r): to seize the prey, to bring it to the mouth. to eat it;
(3) a visceral field, directtng the motor and glandular activiues of the digestive
tube.
I consider it probable that such a field already exists tn the fonn of preferential
geometric transformations s - r(s) In the metabolism of the ectoderm of a
young gastrula. Then it localises itself In a more significant manner In the endO·
derm, but stlU existing sporadically in other tissues. When the moment for the
formation of the mouth and teeth comes, such informallon lS Induced by contact
of the endoderm with the ectoderm and the mesenchyme issuing from the
'neural crests'. The field (F) tS then recomtituted by resonance in the competent
tissues tn contact with the endoderm, where it wiU produce the mouth and the
teeth . The 'chreod· of organogenesis appears thus as the startmg line ['arete'],
the 'free edge· of the physiological 'shock wave' which deftnes the starting of the
activity of the field (F). This concept explains, to a certain degree, the formation
of the TCtnrd·Triton Chimeras in the classic experiment of Spemann, where the
grafted ectodem1 ofTriton leads to the formation of the mouth of the host with
his own genetic resources. There is certainly a crude isomorphism between 'control
forms' of animal species, even those at a distance in phytogenesis, because the
constraints imposed by control, the homeostasis of animals, are by and large the
same for all , and are compensated by the same functions. It is in the detail of
the catastrophes of the organogenesis that these ftelds will produce variable and
different structures according to the species. The reconshtution, in the form of
nervous activities canalised in 'chreods', of functional fields, decomposed by
the catastrophes of the organogenesis, can appear as a mysterious process inspired
by vitalist considerations. I have set out, however, an abstract dynamic sehema
which can account for it, at least in a theoretical form. There exists thus, between
the brain and the gonad, a cenain functional homology: the brain (more usually
the nervous system) reconstitutes, under the form of stable nervous activities,
the primmve functional fields: In the gonad is reconstituted In each gamete, the
·organising centre· of the global dynamic of the species, t.he bpecific ·control
form'. ( In fact, with the blocking of the metabolism which occurs at the end of
the gametogenesis, the global form 'crystallises' itself In some way in macro.
molecu lar structures from which the biochemical 'oscUiutlon' wlU be able to
reconstitute the whole form after fertilisation.)
it is superfluous to emphasis the hypothetical charcter of this presentation
of the global dynamic of an animal. My only ambition is to furnish here an
acceptable conceptual framework in order to explain an obscure and complex
question.
26 A dynamic theory of morpbog~oesis (Cb. 1

1.3.2 Conclusion
The synthesis thus glimpsed of the 'vitalist' and 'mechanist' thoughts in Biology
will not be developed without a deep modification of our conceptions of the
inanimate world. Ln Biology (and particularly in Molecular Biology) we employ
without too many apparent scruples, anthropomorphic words such as: informa·
lion, code, message, programme. In pure Physical Chemistry, the use of these
words would be considered as a manifestatJon of a raving anthropomorphism.
Our model attributes all morphogenesis to a conflict, to a struggle between two
or several ·auractors'. It thus appears as a return to the ideas (2500 years old!)
of the leading Pre.SOCratics, Anaximander and Heraclltus. These thinkers have
been taxed with 'primitive confusionism' because they made use of words of
humart or social origin, such as 'confllct' and 'injustice', to explain appearances
in the physical world. According to us such criticism is false because they IUJd
had this profoundly apposite intuition: the dynamic situations governing the
evolution of natural phenomena are fundamentally the same as those that
govern the evoluuon of man and socteties and thus the use of anthropomorphic
words in Physics is thoroughly justified. In so far as one makes use of 'conflict',
a term expressing a weU-defmed geometric situatJon m a dynamic system, there
is no objection to making use of this term to describe rapidly and qualitatively,
any given dynamic situation. Let us 'geometrise' in the same way the words
'information', message·, 'planning' (as we try to do in our model) and all objec·
tions to the use of these words will fall. Modern Biology makes natural selection
the exclusive principle, the deus ex machina, of all biological explanation. The
only fault in this is to treat the individual (or species) as an irreducible functional
entity. In reality the stability of the individual, or the species, relies Itself on
competition between 'fields', between 'archetypes' of a more elementary charac·
ter, from which struggle emerges the geometric configuration, structurally stable,
which assures control, the homeostasis of the metabolism and the stabUlty of
reproduction. It is by analysing these underlying and more deeply hidden
structures, !hot we reach a better understanding of the mechanisms which
determine the morphogenesis of the individual and the evolution of the spec1es.
The 'struggle' takes place. not only between individuals and species, but also at
every point of the individual organism. Let us recall the words of lleraclitus.
it is necessary to kno111 tlrat conflict is Wliversal, tlrat justice is a struggle, 1111d
that everything llli/1 develop according to struggle and necessity.

1.4 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN WADDINGTON AND THOM


I. Waddi11gton to Thom.
Edinburgh, 2.5 Janwry 1967.
. . . There is one pomt in your MS want to comment on - at first sight a
personal one, but actually tt is not qutte trivtal. You refer on page 7 to 'l'mter·
Sec. 1.4) Correspondence between Waddi:ngton and Thorn 27

pr~tntion biochimque (due :i Delbruck et Szilard) de la difterenhation cellulane'.


I know that this interpretation in terms of 'alternative steady states' - ls
usually attributed to them. Delbnick in 1949, I thlnk, and Szilard a bit later.
But actuaUy I had stated Ute main point as early as 1939, but I did so (a) in a
few sentences in a textbook, Introduction of Modem Genetics, and people are
not ready to admit that there can be new ideas in textbooks, and (b) I got it
right, and spoke of alternatives between tinle-extended chrcods (t:tough I did
not yet call them that), whereas Delbnlc;k and Slilard had the simpler and
basically madequate idea in the context of development, of an alteiDJidve
between steady states. I should therefore like you to add my name on this page,
writing 'due 11 Waddington, DelbrUck et Szilard)'. You refer to the subject again
on page 18, and there the situation is more dlfficult. You write ' ... toute
sp6ciallsatlon ceUulaire etant - seton l'idee de Delbriick et Szilard - caracterisec
par un regime stable du metabolisme, c'est-3-dire un attracteur A de la dynamique
biochimique locale .. .' Now the unsophisticated biologist will interpret 'regime
suble' to mean an unchanging reginle, a steady state. But, of cowse, your
model does not require anything so limiting. l wonder If you could rewrite this
sentence to indicate that the 'regime stable du metabolisme' may be changing in
ndefined way with time?

2. Thorn to Waddlngron (translated from th.e French).


Bures, 27 January 1967.
. . . I come now to the question of the reference to DelbrOck and Szilard;
I admit that I do not know at all where to fmd this reference and so I have
simply to follow what is said m ail the articles on this subject. Have they really
believed, as you state, that a cellular dlfferentiation Is to be attributed to a
defmitive choice between two 'stable reginles' defined in abstracto, and indefmi·
tely fixed? lt is possible particularly if their knowledge In biology was not very
weU developed. They were, however, physicists to whom the distinction between
the local state and the global state should have been familiar. But in any case
that is a purely academic question 1f you had made the same point before them.
I therefore propose, on page 7, Une 7 of my MS to suppress the parenthesis '(due
to Delbruck and Szilard)' and to mtroduce a footnote along the foUowing llnes:
The idea of interpreting ceUular diffemtiation in terms of "a stable regime of
the metaboUsm", i.e. of an attractor of the biochemical kinetics, is often attributed
to Delbnlck and Szilard. In fact it was stated - under its local form, which is the
only correct one- in C. H. Waddington (Introduction to Modern Genetics)'.
On page 17 the simplest thlng io do is to suppress the reference to DelbrOck
and Sz.ilard and add k>azl after metabolism.
Your point (b) brings to mind a question that seems a priori quite important.
You are the author of the word 'chreod' and you therefore have the right to defme
its sense; now l have been using it, and, I believe, in a sense which is much more
28 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I

general lhan yours. I have the impress1on that, for you, chreod can be identified
with 'developmental pathway' 111 t.he sense that a chteod will be associated 10 an
allractor of the local biochemical kinetics. lt would have no sense, in that case,
10 consider chteods In which several allractors might be in competition. After
there had been a 'switching point' (bifurcation, in my tenninology) there would
be nothing left of the chreod, properly speaking. Further, since the organogenesis
of the greater part of the organism requires the interaction of tissues of different
types (for example an epithelium nod a mesenchyme) controlled by different
attractors, the fonnation of such an organ such as the kidney, for example,
would never be described by a single chreod.
Personally, I have a tendency 10 employ chteod as a synonym for ·support
of a morphogenetic field', without restricting the number of attractors in corn·
petition or the morphology of the domains which they control within this
support. I should be glad if you would tell me if you approve of this use of the
word chreod. lf not,l'U have 10 gtve it up and use only the term ·morphogenetic
field'.

3. Waddingron to 'n10m.
Edinbt1rglz, 4 February 1967.
Thanks for your letter of J anuary 27th. J thJnk your suggestions about how
to deal with the Delbruck- Szilard references are probably quite all right. I
confess, however, that I am not very sure of the distinction you are making
between 'eta! local' and 'etat global'. The dJstinction 1 want to make Is between
a reginne (fiux equilbrium) which remams unchanging throughout a period of
time and a reginne which ls,at any moment,stable. but which changes progressively
as time passes. Thus when you suggest that your sentence on page 18 should
read •... rtgime stable du mhabolisme local', I feell should like to say something
like ' ... regime stable m a is evoluant du metabolisme local'. But my grasp of
French is very weak, and this may not be necessary.
J am sending you Xeroxes of Delbnlck's remarks which are the source of
the reference to him. I am not sure where the S1.ilard reference is to be found .
I also send you a Xero.x of the pages in my Inrroducrion. You wiU see from the
boltom of page 181 that I knew I was trying to talk topology but had not the
technical tralnJng to do so (see pp. 169- 196).
About the meaning of 'chreod'. I think your expanded use of its absolutely
justified; indeed, I would have enlaJged it in a slmilar way myself, except that I
have always been trying to get the basic idea across 10 an audience of bioi08J,Il$
who could hardly understand even the simplest applications of it .I have, however
written about the ectoderm of an amphlbian gastrula being switched mto the
alternative chteods of epidermal, neural, or mesodermal dJfferentiation; and 1111
obvious that within each of these 'gross chteods' there are a number of sub·
Stc. 1.4) Correspondence between Waddington and Thorn 29

chreods - within the mesodermal, for instance, there will later be switching into
muscular. mesenchymal, glandular - epithelial, and so on; and that there will be
interactions between the regions of tissue which have taken one chreod with
ihose which have taken others. I think my usage has therfore implied that a
chreod such as 'the mesodermal' may at a later stage in time come to include a
nwnber of d1fferent (and imeracting) attractors (such as those for muscle,
dermiS, connechve tissue, et c). What I am not sure of is whether, at the time of
a catastrophe which brings about a bifurcation into chreods A and B (neural
and mesodermal, let us say), there can in any sense already be more than one
mractor included with each of the chreods A and B - or do these contain only
one attracior at the time, which either is inherently unstable so that it
gives rise later to two or more attractors, or is unstable with respect to influences
impinging on it from geographically other parts of the system, which induce
ihe appearance of new chreod,?

A'lNI:.X A TO LEJ 1ER 3.From Unites biologiquesdouees decontinuitegenetique


(CKR.S., Paris, 1949), p. 33. [Translated from the French.]
M. Delbrnck: Ln his discussion of the phenomena observed by Sonneborn and
himself, M. Be ale proposes to consider these phenomena as resulting from proper-
ties of a population of plasmagencs the reproduction of which wUJ be favourably
selected or inhlbi1ed by the surrounding conditions.
I do not mtend to dispute this concept, but I should like to draw attention
to cenatn general properties of 'stable now' systems, propenies which we must
take Into consideration before postulating the existence of biological unities
endowed with genetic continuity In any panicular case or in all cases where the
genetic continuity of a function is observed.
The argument I should llke to develop is as follows: numerous stable flow
sysrems are capable of several dlfferellt equilibria in identical conditions. They
am pa5S from one stable state to afiOther under the influence of transitory per-
rurbations.
ThLs general proposition may be illustrated by a simple model. Ln Fig. I
the letters A~o A 1 , 8 1 , 8 1 , represent the different enzymes contained in a cell,
represented by the closed curve. The letters a 1 and b 1 represent substances in
the surrounding milieu. Under the inOuence of the enzymes A 1 artd B1 respec-
tively, these substances are transformed into metabolic intennediaries, a1 and
b1 . These in their turn are the substrates of enzymes A1 and B1 which transform
them Into waste products a3 und b3 . In constartt conditions the cell rapidly
allains a stable s1ate characterised by a certain constant concentration of the
Intermediate products a1 and b2 • In this model there is only one stable State
determined by the conditions of the surroundings and the enzymatic properties
of the cell.
30 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I

A1 A2
0) )t"
I
92 03

' /
';,
bl
}L
/
' 'b2 b3

B1

l'lg. l

Let us now add the hypothesis that there exht mutual interactions between
the two series of enzymatic reactions. Let us specify this hypothesis by supposing
that the metabolical product a2 exercises on the catalytic reaction rate of enzyme
8 1 , an influence such that for all large concentrations of a, , this reaction be
inhibited .t Similarly we suppose an action of the metabolic product b 2 on the
enzyme A 1 • These interactions are expressed in the diagram by dotted arrows.
With this new model. it is again true that in constant conditions, the cell will
all am a state of stable flow. But now there are three possible equilibria for the
same conditions of the surroundings, two stable and one unstable. Let us consider
for example. the conditions defined by the equality of concentration of sub·
stances a 1 and b 1 • The fiow equilibrium which will be discovered will depend on
tlle order in which the substances have been introduced into the surroundings.
Following each case, the equilibrium will be characterised by
(a) a large amount of 3'j, and little of b 2 , if a1 has been Introduced ftrst ; this
equilibrium is stable and we will call it state (a);
(b) little of a2 , a large amount of b1 if b 1 has been introduced ftrst ; this equlh·
brium is equally stable; we will call it state (b);
(c) low and equal concentration of 3'j and b, if both substances were Introduced
together in equal quantities; there is flow equilibrium but it is unstable and
one m whlcb weak perturbations provoke the passage from state (a) to
state (b).
The passage from state (a) to state (b) could be provoked by strong transitory
perturbations. For example, if the initial state is (a), a momentaneous interrup-
tion of the inhlbition of B 1 by a 2 will provoke a passage from stage (a) to state
(b).

tSuch a p<Operty could be due to • reversible dlmerisation of a, , only 1he dimer lnblbitil!l
the reaction of 81 •
Sec. 1.4 J Correspondence between Waddington and Thorn 31

These results would be obtained due to a variety oflnterventions: temporary


treatment by anti-~ serum; temporary change of temperature such that the
activity of enzyme A 1 is selectively retarded; temporary transfer to a surround-
Ings deprived of the substanc a 1 •
Summing up, our cell model Is capable of existing ln two functionally
different states of stable Dow, without this implying any change whatever In
the properues of the genes, plasmagcncs, enzymes or any other structural units.
The passages from one state to another can be provoked by transitory modifica-
tions In the conditions of the surroundings.
Models of this type can be modtfied in an infinity of ways to account for
the large number of different flow equllibria no matter with what degree of
stability they arc endowed. The passages from one to another will be, following
the particular cases, reversible or irreversible as in the phenomena of differentia-
tion, and for the explanation of which we similarly Invoke, without concrete
proof, the existence of plasmagcnes.
I do not pretend to propose here a theory of phenomena described by
Sonncborn and Beale. I wish simply to Insist on the fact that, In the cases of flux
equilibrium systems (but not systems in equilibrium) various explanations of
this kind can be envisaged which are not at all unlikely nor even improbable,
from a general point of view. The proposition presented above is not new and
numerous biologists hold this notion more or less clearly by implication. I
believe that tb.is simple model helps to crystallise the idea and makes it more
precise.

A"NfX B TO LETTER 3. From C. If. Waddington, An Introduction of Modern


Genetics (Alien and Unwin, London, 1939), pp. 180- 4.
3. Time-effect and dose-effect curves.
In the examples mentioned In the last section we have attempted to describe
the course of the developmental reactions by which a certain substance is
produced. We might summarize the reactions in a given case by plotting the
quantity of substance present against the time. The curve which would be
obtained might be called the lime-effect curve of the gene under investigauon.
We shall m this section try to generalize this idea so as to make the time-effect
curve of a gene summarize all the mformation which we have about the develop-
mental action of the gene.
In the first place, we must inquire into the relations between the time-effect
curve and the dose-effect curves of the same gene. The dose-effect curves which
were discussed earlier (p. 163) were obtained by plotting the dose of the gene
against the fmal effect produced in the adult organisms. From a developmental
point of view, the fmal effect of a gene in the adult must either be asymptote to
the tunc-effect curve, when development slows off gradually as maturity is
32 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I

attained, or in some animals it may be an end·value reached when development


is suddenly brought to an end by a metamorphosis. in either case, the end·value
of the timc~ffect curve is the same as the value plotted for that gene on the
dose-effect curve. If we have a set of aUclomorphs, the dose~ffect curve is in
fact merely a summary of the end-values of the separate tirne~ffect curves.
The importance of this point is that lt shows that certain conclusions about
dose-effect curves also apply to time-effect curves. For instance, we have rather
little detailed infonnation about the dependence of the time-effect curves on the
genotypic milieu, although Ford and Huxley have desenoed the effect of some
modifying factors on the time-effect curve of pigment fonnation in the eyes of
Gammarus and a few other cases are known. But we have much more evidence
from dosage compensation, cases like that of shaven, etc., which shows that the
dosage curves are dependent not solely on the particular gene under Investigation,
but rather on the balance between that gene and the whole of the rest of the
genotype. We can now see that this effect of the genotypic milieu on the dosage
curve must be a result of its effect on the time-e[fect curve, and we can thus gi\'e
a much stronger baSis to the important conclusion that the time-effect curve is a
function of the whole genotype.
The simplest type of time-effect curve is that in which we summarize certaln
developmental processes which are directly observable, such as the deposition of
pigment in l11o eyes of Gammarus or the skins of Lymantria caterpillars.llut the
investigations on eye pigments in Drosophila, for instance, clearly show that the
observable process Is only the fmal reactJon in a whole series of changes whtch
lead from the gene to the pigment. We can, ideally, expand the idea of the lllne·
effect curves to cover not only the progress of the fmal observable process !Jut
also that of the earlier processes, about whtch we usually know very much less.
For instance, if a pigment is formed from a precursor we can not only plot•
curve showing the speed of formation of pigment , but we can include an earlier
curve which gives the rate of formation of the precursor.
Jf we attempted to formulate thls in a strict way, we should iind that for

AA
Ao
~
u
w
....
u..
00

w 0

o oo Ao AA
T IM E D 0 SE

r.,.2 - The relulon between time~ffeet and dose-effect cur,...


Sec. 1.4) Correspondence between Waddington and Thorn 33

every new substance wJ1ose concentration we wished to plot we should have


to introduce a new dimension of space, and this soon becomes rather alarming
to non-mathematicians who are not used to creating universes to their own
specificiations. But even without any complication of multi-dimensional space,
it is very easy to grasp the essential points which emerge when lhe time-effect
curves are generalized in this way.
ln the first place, we find cases in wltich the effects produced differ merely
in quantity and vary continuously over a certain range; lhen all lhat we can
deduce about the time-effect curves Is lhat the rates of the process concerned
can vary continuously, so that different quantities of the end-product are pro-
duced when development ceases. Perhaps more important are the cases in which
there are several fairly sharply demarcated and alternative development processes,
which can only be represented by a system of branching lines. For instance, we
have seen lhat in Drosophila there is n period of development when the normal
vermilion substance is essential for normal eye pigmentation. If vermilion sub-
stance is absent. the pigment-forming substances will change so as to form
vermilion pigment; if vermilion substance is present, they change so as to pro-
duce normal pigmentation, but come to another branching point where the
presence or absence of cinnabar substance decides in which dlrection they w!U
proceed. In such a case we have a mixture of reacting substances, say two or
three enzymes and some substrates and at a branching point there are two
alternative possible ways in which the mixture can change, according as the
vermilion substance is present or not ; for instance, the vermilion substance might
inluoit the most active enzyme and allow a less active one to work. We do not in
fact know any of the details about the processes involved; all we know is that we
are dealing with a system with alternative possible ways of changing.
If we want to consider rhe whole set of reactions concerned in a develop·
mental process such as pigment formation , we therefore have to replace the
single time-effect curve by a branching system of lines which symbolizes all the
possible ways of development controlled by different genes. Moreover, we have
to remember that each branch curve is .affected not only by lhe gene whose
branch it is but by lhe whole genotype. We can include this point if we symbolize
the developmental reactions not by branching llnes on a plane but by branching
valleys on a surface. The line followed by the process, i.e. the actual time-effect
curve, is now the bottom of a valley, and we can think of the sides of the valley
as symbollzing all the other genes which co-operate to ftx the course of the time-
effect curve; some of these genes will belong to o ne side of the valley tending to
push the curve in one direction, while others will belong to the other side and
will have an antagonistic effect. One might roughly say that all these genes
correspond to the geological strucuue which moulds the form of the valley.
Genes like vermilion which l1ave their main effect at certain branching points are
like intrusive masses which can divert the course of the development.al processes
dow a side valley_
34 A dynamic: theory of morphogenesis [Cb. I

This oltempl to symboli.te the developmental reactions may seem unduly


picturesque and too abstract to be of much value. Its abstractness, however,
must be blamed on the fact that we know so little about the actual processes
concerned. The two imponant, but abstract, facts which are expressed in visual
fonn by the valley model are, fustly, that the course of any developmental
process is determined by many genes, and secondly that these genes often
define alternative courses along which the reactions may go.

w ild

cinnabar
' ' ....
' ....
mahogany

- -- - - vermilion
-- - ~

carmine

~~---------------------------------claret
rig. 3 Diagram o r the dew:lopment processes or pigment formation in the eye!
or Drosophila . The developmental process moves Crom left to right nlon~ the
branching tracks. The points marked CA, V, and QV, >ymbollzc the alternatives
dependent on whether the claret, vermilion, and clnnabSJ substances are produced.
There mun be very many more tracks "''hlch "• 01nnot yet fit into the picture.
Thus it is known that carmine has no, or little, vermilion substance, and maho&any
little cuu'labar substMce , but we do not yet know whether the de>elopmcnul
proeeucs in flies homozyaous for these genes branch orr from the norm..r track
before the vermilion and cinnabar forks, or are sccon<bry branches, as indicated
by the dotted lines.

This same scheme may be used to describe the development of chracters


which are not simple substances. For instance, a similar history of successht
reactions has been invoked to explain the developmental effects of the Bar gect
in Drosophila which has been worked out in some detail by StUdying the effect
of temperature on the number of facets fanned in the eye. Unfortunately, ~t
only see the end result 'frozen' by the occurrence of metamorphosis. lt is found
that there is only a certain period during development Oust before the facets
actually appear) during which temperature changes affect the number of faceu
fanned In Bar flies. The interpretation suggested 1s that during early development
Sec. 1.4] Correspondence between Waddington and Thorn 35

a facet-forming 'substance' is formed a.nd lhat lhe Bar gene sets going reactions
which break down this substance; then a third set of processes determine that
facet formation shall actually begin, and a number of facets are formed propor-
tional to the amount of substance still present. The temperature effects, which
only occur when the Bar gene is present, presumably affect the breakdown
process for which Bar is responsible. In this example the end-product which is
the 'effect' in the time-effect curve is not a single substance like a pigment, but
is a relatively complicated tissue, the eye facets. The facet-forming substance,
however, may be a single chemical compound, since Ephrussi has recently shown
tlut the number of facets formed in Bar eyes may be increased by the injection
of suitable extracts from normal pupae. We know nothing about the mechanism
of action of the substance; it might either increase some son ofinductivestimulus
£O facet formation or lower the threshold of reaction to such a stimulus. The
substance is probably related in some way to the vermilion substance, and may
be identical with it; it is known that Bar inhibits the formation of vermilion
substance in the rest of the body.
In considering development from an embryological point of view we can, as
with Bar, not yet express the characters in which we nre interested in _terms of
quantities of definite substances, but must t:Uk instead of histological types such
:u neu ral tissue, eye facets, etc. But experimental embryology leads to the
formulation of exactly the same kind of system of alternative possibilities as we
1\ave had to develop to describe the genetical results. For instance, the ectoderm
of the amphibian gastrula has two alternative methods of change open to it; it
may become epidermis, or, if the evocator is added to it, it may become neural
ttssue. The case is exacdy parallel to that of the pigment system in Drosophila
at one of its branch points. Both the methods of approach to the study of
development fomJUiate the main problems in lhe same kind of way, and we may
1\ope that genellcs nod embryology can collaborate in finding the answers.
We must now consider certain genetical problems in the ilght of the scheme
of thought which has just been developed.

4. Tlzom ro Waddingto11.
Bures, 20 February I 967.
Many thanks for your letter of February 4th, and the enclosed texts of
Oelbnick and yourself; both are , I believe, of fundamental importance for
the history of ideas about cellular differentiation. But I must confess that I have
not been able to grasp the difference you seem to make between DelbrUck's
'flux equilibria' and your own 'chreods or developmental pathways'. You seem
10 imply that in Delbrilck's model, some alternative has been taken which, at
least for some time, determines the metaboli~ into a fixed steady state. I do
not think that Delbrilck himself would have accepted this interpretat ion; first
there is the distinction made by Delbrtlck: 'dans le cas des systemes en equilibre
36 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I

de nux (mais non des syst~mes en equttibre).. .' (hne 8 from the bouom, page
171 ). This seems to mean that 'flux equilibria' may move to some e>.tent, whJJe
simple equlllbrla do not. But, of course, the terminology is rather obscure.
Moreover, remember that tills discussion took place about 'plasmagenes' or
cytoplasmic heredity. Now, how could this so.c;alled .steady state survive the
tremendous metabolic changes undergone by any ceU in mitosis, sporulation, or
gametogenesis?
When Delbrl.lck exhibits Ws local model with substrates a 1 , b 1 , a2 , b1 ,
enzymes A1 , B1 , A2 , 8 2 , etc., quite clearly he does not claim to describe the
whole metabolism of the ceD. His only hope is 10 specify a subsystem (S) of
metabolites one might reasonably consider as independent - or at least weakly
coupled - to the remaining part (R) of the metabolism, involving reactions with
other substances than that of the system (S). The 'stable solutions', the 'attrac·
tors' of the subsystem (S) - provided they are structurally stable - wW stay
qualitatively the same or vary very httle for a relatively long period of tune.
(Note that th is observation applies to all models in biochemistry, llke the regula·
lion models a la Jacob-Monod.) But the remaining part (R) of the metabolism
may ttself vary in large amounts, producing very large phenotypic effects.
Eventually this large variation may, through a weak coupling with (S), cause the
destruction by catastrophe of the given altractor in (S), destroyil1g the validity
of the model.
'ow, in your 'chreods' or developmental pathways, the only conceivable
way of ensuring the stability, the 'canalization' of the chreod is to assoctate to
the chreod a subsystem (S) of the DelbrUck type. Thu is in fact what you express
ut the bottom of page 174 of your text when you refer to the sides of the
valley as defrned by the action of antagonistic genes (or sets of genes). Now, we
have to take into account the fact that the coordinates of this local split factor
(S) of the metabolism may not be, as in Delbruck's model, concentrations of
metabolites, but very complicated functions of them (so that a simple biochemical
interpretation of (S) will be difficult to explicate). Moreover, there may be, at il
given time, several such split factors (S 1 ), {S1 ), ••• , each provided with a certalO
set of attractors; this will give the most likely interpretation of the notion of
'homologous chreods' in embryology. Finally, I do not think that there is a
fundamental difference between Delbnlck's model and yours, except that yours
is more general. The main merit of Delbnlck, in that matter, is to have put tlus
idea in a more specialized form, more easily acceptable to standard biochembts
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that such expressions 11.1
·nux equilibria', 'local stable regime', 'steady state', etc., can be made precise
only through the use of a geometric model - even if it is not explicit. In lhe
correction you suggest in my text; 'regime stable, mals evoluant,du metabolisme
local', I would like to say: 'un attracteur de la cin~tique biochirnique tangente au
point considere'. This would be the only correct statement, but who, arnons
blolog.ists, could understand such a language?
Sec. 1.4) Comspondence between Waddington and Thorn 37

As I am not sure to know :ill your work, may I ask you to give me lhe
references you would consider best for:
I. The word chreod.
!. The epigenetic landscape.
3 The concept of homeorhesis as opposed to homeostasis.
\!any thanks in advance .

.5 Waddington to Thom.
Edinburgh, 23 February 1967.
Many thanks for your teller. You ask: what difference do I see between
what Delbruck was saying. and what 1 had said. Now I admit I may have mis·
understood Delbriick, but what I understood him to say was as follows. He
drew an enclosed space, into which there flowed certain things (labelled a1 , b 1 )
and out of which there came certain other things (a 3 , b3 ). Inside the space was
his switch mechanism. When he spoke of 'systemes en equilibre de flux (mais
non des systemes en equilibrc)' m the last paragraph of his remarks, I took him
to mean, by the ftrst phrase, 'systems which are in equilibrium even though
material is continually passing into and out of them, i.e. are in steady states', in
contrast to the second phrase, which J took to mean 'systems in equilibrium
with no nux through them' . This is, I think, the usual way in which the terms
'flux equUibnum' are interpreted in English. Now in both these phrases lhe
meaning of 'equilibrium' whether 'flux' or not would normally be that the
concentrations of the substance inSJde the box remained constant. You ask
how could they, throughout such profound changes as ceU division, etc.? I
mould point out that the Delbrtlck model was proposed as an altenwtive to
the postulation of genetically continuous 'plasmagenes', and was specificaUy
designed to account for the transmission of an unchanging character through
many ccU generations. lt was implied, I think, that lhe turmoil of cell division
was a transtcnt fluctuation m some system only loosely coupled with the character·
preserving system he was describing.
This is, I think, the way m which most biologists have interpreted DelbrUck,
e.g. Jacob and Monod , 'Genetic Repression and Allosteric Inhibition, in Cyto-
differentiation and Macromolecular Synthesis, 21st Grwoth Symposium, Acad.
Press, 1963, on page 53, wrote 'Conservation implies differential functional
activity of nucleotide sequences, resulting, for instance, from the establishment
of steady state systems capable of clonal perpetuation,as pointed out by DelbrUck
(1949)'.
My point is that progressive differentiation is nor clonal propagation.
So we come to the difference between Delbrtlck's system - as I interpret
tt and mine. In his system the cha~cter of the cell which is In one of its altem-
altve states remains constant in time the conceot~tions of substances are in
38 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I I

·nux-equilibrium· in the sense that there is 'homeostasis'. In my picture the


alternative states of the ceU are between homeorhelic ·equilibria', in any one of
which the concentrations of substances do not remain constant, but change
along defmed lime-extended traj ectorles.
'Who said it first?' is, of course, a pretty trivial question; but 'Who said it
right?' is more important. I should claim that Dclbruck in 1949 was talking
about the alternatives of driving round and round the Place de la Concorde, or
round and round the EtoUe; and that this is only a degenerate case ofwhatl had
been talking about In 1940, which is the alternative of taldng the bus from the
A~rogare des lnvalides to the Aeroport Orly or the Mroport Le Bourget.
The only way to eliminate this difference between Delbrilck and myself
would be if you are so 'pure' a mathematician that you acknowledge no differ·
ence between a dimension devoted to a material variable, such as concentration,
and one devoted to time. But this is a level of abstractness at which mathematics
loses touch with the real-world problems of biologists.
If you want to give references to my discussions of these concepts, they
should be:
(i) The word Ch reod Strategy of the Genes (Alien and Unwin: London
1957), P. 32.
(li) The Epigenetic Landscape Organisers and Genes (Cambridge University
Press: 1940), and Strategy of the Genes.
(ill) Homeorhesis Strategy of the Genes, was the first place where l proposed
the word - the concept, as I have tried to show you, was implicit in the
Introduction to Modem Genetics of 1939 (Alien and Unwin: London)
and the Organisers and Genes of 1940.
CHAPTER 2

Mathematics

2.1 BASIC NOTIONS: A RECAPITULATION


In Chapter I we considered (p. 00) a chemical system (s) comprising n chemical
substances s 1 , sl , s 3 • • • , s,, in concentrations (c., cl. c 3 ... , c11 ). Ln order to
describe the state of the system it is reasonable to use a geometrical language.
Forge tting, for a moment, the underlying chemistry, a state of (s) will be charac-
terised by the n real numbers c 1 , c 2 , c3 • • • , c,, which define a point (c) in
n-dimensional euclldean space (called R") with co-ordinates c 1, cl , . .. , c,.
The physically realisable states of (s) constitute a domain (D) of the space
R"+ (the concen trations are necessarily positive).
The 11 substances contained in (s) interact through a certain number of
chemical reactions. ln writing for each of these reactions the kinetic equation
(given for example, but not necessarily, by the law of mass action), we obtain,
in securing these balances for each component, an expression for the derivative
de·
_:_as a function of the concentrations (cj):
dt
de;
(E) - = X; (cf)
dt

The equations (E) define on the domain (D) of states of (s) a vector field with
components X 1 , X 2 , •• • , X,. (E) is an 'autonomous' differential system, and,
when the functions X1 are sufficiently regular (for instance given continuous
partial derivatives of order one or two), we can, locally, integrate this system.
That is to say we can deduce the laws of growth of the form Cf(l) = I!; (t; c0 ) , c/
deftning the initial concentrations of the substances Si at the instant t = 0.
Tbe initial constant cl being fixed, the functions c; = h; (r;;c0 ). define in
our domaln (D) , a differentiable curve, the trajectory issuing from the initial
point (c0 ). We have here the most general schema in scientific determinism; that
whlclt Laplace has so eloquently described in his Essai plzilosphique sur les
40 Mathematics [Ch. 2

probabilires (1814). ln this formulation of a differential system, which is also


that of Dynamics (and, if one thinks of it, of all Dynamics), there are entities of
two kinds:
(I) the space called 'phase space' which is the 'field of possible states' for the
system be considered;
(2) the temporal development of the system, described by trajectories h(r)
startmg from all possible initial poisitions.
The study of these spaces is the aim of Differential Topology; the study of
the traJectones the aim of Dynamics.

2.2 SOME REFERENCES FROM DIFFERENTIAL TOPOLOGY:


DIFFERENTIABLE MAPPINGS; DIFFERENTIABLE MANIFOLDS
Let there be p differentiable functions of n variables x 1 , x 1 , ••• .Xn: g 1 (xj),
g 2 (xf), ... ,gp(XJ); let y 1 ,Y2, ... •Yp be the p coordinates of a p-<llmensJOnal
Euclidean space Y. The formulasy, = g1 (x 1 ,x1 , ••• ,x,.) associate to each point
(x) of the space X with coordinates x,x 1 , ••• ,x11 a point y of Y. The rule G
which associates the point y to x is called a 'differenUable mapping': X Is the
'source space', Y the 'targe t space' of this mapping. G is said to be m times
d!fferentlablc, or of class C"' if any functiongi has continuous partial derivatives
In Xf up to and Includ ing order m. The differentiable mappings of class C"' form
a category: if we have three Euclidean spaces X, Y, Z and two mappings:
I· G Go F
X-+ Y, Y-+ Z then the composite mapping X Z, defined by

Zk = gk (!,(xi))
is also of class cm.
2.2.1 Local mappings: germs and jets
A mappmg F from a part of a space X on to a space Y is called loCtii at 0 eX
if there eXJslS a neighbourhood U of 0 m X on which F is defmed. Suppodn&
then 0' to be the mtage F(O) in Y; If V is a neighbourhood of 0' in Y which
contains the unage F(U), we shall denote this situation by writing:
1-"
(U; 0) ... (V; 0')

Let there be F and G, two local mappings on 0:


r
(U; 0) ... (V; O')

G
(U'. 0)- (V,O')
Sec. 2.2) Some References from Differential Topology: 41

If there exists a neighbourhood W contained in the intersection U n Cl on


which F and G have the same value in V, we shall say that F and G have the same
germ on 0. A germ is thus defined by a point of origin, and a local mapping
from this point. If two inftnitely differentiable functions have the same germ at
0 e R" , their Tnylor expansions at 0 are identicaL

Jets of order r
Let there be two local mappings F, G on 0 from X c R" on to Y C RP defined
for local coordinates (xi) in X, (yi) in Y by the equations:

F:YJ = [j (x;),O = [j (0)

G.y l ~ Kj(x;), 0 = Kj(O)

a<w)
If the functions fj, Ki are of class C', and if the partial derivatives fj,
ax<w)
a<w>
a:xf.wJKi (w is a monomial inx1, lwt = deg w <O; r ) have equal values at 0 , we say

that F and G are equivalent on 0 to the 111 order. Such an equ ivalence class
between local mappings from R" on to R" is called a jet of order r from R" on
to R". Such a jet, uniquely defined by the values of the partial derivatives
atwJ
( )fi is a point in a vector space with coordinates eeL). We denote this
ilx w

by l'(n, p) . The point 0 of R" is called the source of the jet, the image 0 ' eR"
is called tbe target.

2.2.2 Composition of germs and jets


F G
When we have a sequence of cliffermiable mappings X-+ Y-> Z w!lh 0' = F(O),
0" = G(O'), the germ of the composite mapping G o F on 0 depends only on
the germs of F and C on 0 and 0' respectively. In the same way, the rrh order
jet of G o F on 0 is determined by tJ1e rrh order jet ofF on 0 , and the rrh order
jet of G oo 0' . This follows from the fact that a partial derivative of order k of
the composite function g(Jj(x;)) is a polynomial in partial derivatives of Jj and
of,; of order <: k.
A jet z E f (n, p) clearly dcfmes, by ignoring derivatives of higher order
than r - k , a Jet of order r - k . There is thus a 'forgetful' canonical mapping
p: j (n, p) -+ J r - k (n, p) .
42 Mathematics (Ch. 2

The diagram
(m)
J' (n, p) X J' (n, q) J' (n, q)
p~ p~ p~

(m)
f - k (n, p) X J' A(p,q) J'-k(n, q)

where the mappmg (m) is defmed by the composition, is commutative. (The


vertical arrows p are the restrictions.)

Examples offen
TANGENT VECTORS
When n = I, a jet ofJ 1 (1, p) is interpreted as an equivalence class (of order one)
of germs of curves starting from the origin 0' of R.l'. Such an equivalence class is
caJled a tangent vector on 0' to RP. These vectors form a vector space on R of
dimension p.

COVF.CTORS
When p ~ I, for any n, a jet of J 1 (n , 1) is interpreted as the linear part of the
Taylor expansion of a functlon J, IR'' _. R . This is a covector , the scalar
product of n vector and a covector being the mapping (m) associated with
s J'
the composite mapping R ... R'' -+ R.
Vectors, in this formulation, should be considered as 'curve germs', and not
as line segments, as one is taught at an elementary level ....
Where U is an open set of R", with co-ordinates (x 1 ,x,, ... ,x11 ), we can
constder the totahty of tangent \'ectors at points x e U, as a large topological
space of dimension 2n, with coordinates (x;,a1), a, forming the components of
the velocity of the germ representing the vector. Tbis space is caJled the tangent
bundle of domam U, written as T.(u). We will give a more precise definition
later.
There exists a 'canontcal proJection' p of the fibre T.(U) on U def'med by
p(x/ ,Df) =(xi) E U. A sectwn of the fibre is a mappings: U- T.(U) such that
p os= identity.ln thiS case, s associates to every point u e U a vector (s(u))
tangent at that pomt. We recognise here a 'vector field' on U. In the same Wl}
we shall defme the covector space r• (U) on U. A section s' of r• (ll)- {.;
associates to every point u E U a covector at that point, which we can write
classicaJly as a linear co mbination of differentials with coordinates r a1 dx1
I
where the ats are differentiable functions of (x;). We recognise in expressions
such as l: a;(x)dxJthose which are usuaJly called differential forms.
I
Sec. 2.2] Some References from Differential Topology: 43

2.2.3. Behaviour of vectors and covectors in a mapping


Let F:X-+ Y be a mapping of an open set of R11 into an open set of RP. By the
h F
composition r-+ X-+ Y,l = (0, I) we can associate to every tangent vector of X
at x defmed by the curve 11 , the Image curve F o 11 at each point y = F(x ).
Whence we have a linear mapping of tangent vectors at x in X into the tangent
vectors at y in Y. Locally, this linear mapping symbolised asj 1 (F) is defined by
the matrix of first order partial derivatives o!j/ox1; the rank of this matrix in
:c is the rank of the mapping Fin x.
Inversely, consider a differential form given on Y, s': Y-+ T(Y); for every
vector A on X, the fonnula <A, c> = <t F(A), s'(F(x))> defines a differential
form c on X, where we note that c = F (s') (the fonn induced on s' by For
'pull back of s' by F'). This 'induction' composes with the mappings but in the
reverse sense (contravariant functor, in modern, non-<:lassical, terminology):
F G
If we have a sequence of mappings X-+ Y -+ Z , and if a Is a differential
form on Z , then

F•(G •(a))=(G o F ) • (a)

Application: Differential of a function


On the real axis deftned by the real variable u, there is a canonical differential
form 1 defined as follows: the scalar product< t t > of a vector ~ by t is the
algebraic scalar measure of~ on the u axis.
f
Suppose X-+ R a smooth function Q.e. C"' ,m> I) taking its values on the
real axis of the variable u ; we put df= f (t), where 1 is the canonical form on R
defined above.
We can consider the name of the variable (u) of this axis us a symbol of the
identity mapping
u
R -+ R

l
Then we can replace t by du , whence/(u • (t)) = (du) . From this is immediately
deduced the invariance of the differential umler a mapping: when we have a
sequence of mappings
F g
X-+Y-+R

then
. .
d(g o F) = F o g (du)=F"' (dg).

2.2.4 Invertible mappings: a theorem of implicit functions


Suppose F:X-+ Y, where X and Y are open sets of n .dimensiona! euclidean
spaces. Let us suppose F{O) = 0' if at 0; the Jacob ian of partial derivatives
44 Mathematics [Ch. 2

iilyj/ilx;i has a non-7eoo determinant (the mapping F is of rank n on 0), then


there exists a local mapping g of an open set V of Y surrounding 0' such that
g F =identity.
Every such mapping FX - Y. where F is SUIJective (onto), of rank u at
every point, of class C"' and such that the inverse image F-1 (y) from every
pomt of y Is umquc, defmes a homeomorphism of X on Y of class C"'.
Further, this homeomorphism has an mversc G:Y- X, also of class cm. We
then say that F •s a diffeomorphism. X and Y are then diffeomorphs. The
study of these 'differentiable' spaces and their invariants under the action of
diffeomorphisms is the object of Differential Topology.

2.2.5 Embedded Manifolds


Suppose F; R" • Rn+k is an injective (into) cm mapping whose Jacobian of
partial derivatives has rank 11 at each point on the target space. The image set
F( R") is then coiled an imbedded n.<Jirnension sub-mani fold in Rn+k (or altern·
atively an imbedded sub-manifold of eo-dimension k ). The sub·mllnifold is
embedded If F maps Rn homeomorphically onto the sub-manifo ld.
Examples: the parabola in the Oxy plane, defined by x = t ,y = 12 is an
embedded curve (of eo-d imension one). The cubic dellned by x = I -11 ,
y = r(l - 11 ) is not embedded , because the two values 1 = +l ,t =-I both give
the origin: the curve hus u double (X)inr ut lite origin.
Let us consider now In the space R''+k with coordinates {y 1 , ••• ,J111 +A)
the k rela tions F, ( ... )~ ...) = F1 ( • • ·Yi ...) = ... = Fk(·. ·Yi· . .).Let us suppose
F(O) = 0 and that at 0 the mntrix of partial derivatives iilFt/ilyti has rank k.
Thus there exists In this matrix a sub-matrix of rank k with a non-zero determin·
ant. Let us suppose that this is defined by the last k variablesyn + l·Yn+l • ... ,
>'n+k. If we introduce the variables Uf = FJ<Y), we see that the uansformauon
(y,,y,, · · · .)'n+ l• · • · •>'n+k)-+ {y 1 ,y1 , . • . ,yn; u 1 , u 1 , ••• , uk) is invertible
and is thus a diffeomorphism (a change of curvilinear coordinates, in lhe older
terminology). By this transformation the subset of Rn+k defmed by F 1 = F 1
= ... = F,~: 0 is transformed near 0 mto a linear manifold defmed by u 1 = u1
= ... = UA = 0. lt is clear that we are concerned here with the neighbourhood
of an n.<Jirnension embedded manifold. paramclrised by the coordinatesy1 ,y,
.... Yn.

DEFINITION
An n-<limension di{{erentillble manifold V is a space which can be represented
locally as a closed subset of the euclidean spaceR"+k, so that at every pomt x or
lhis set there exists a local representation or V by a system of k equatiolll
F 1 = F 2 = ... = Fk = 0 where the differe ntials dFt,i = I, . .. , k are linearly
independent in x.
Sec. 2.2] Some References from Differential Topology: 45

lt follows from this definition that at each point x of V, we can find a 'local
chart' in which V is a linear manifold o f dimension 11 and of eo-dimension k. In
general there are many such charts. rn the common part of two such charts we
pass from one map to the other by a change of coordinates, h 21 •

EXAMPLE
In the Oxy pla.n e, the curve with equation x 2 + y 2 = J (circle) is embedded.
Take the coordina tes y as local coordinates, except at point x = O,y = + I and
x = O,y =-I, where we will take x.
The manifolds of dimension zero are points, those of dimension one, curves
and those of dimension two, surfaces. The manifolds of dimension three are
parametrised by the usual R 3 space .... The sphere S 3 , defined in R 4 (x 1 , x 2 ,
x 3 ,x.) by the e~uation x1 + x~ + x~ + x~ = I is a three-dimensiona l manifold.
In the R"+ space, we cnll every 11-dimensional space defined locally by a
single equation F(x 1, ... ,x2 , ... ,x;, ... ,x11 ) = 0, a hypersurface.
A differentiable manifold can be compact. This is the case when it can be
embedded in a Euclidean space as a bounded set (i.e. of fmite size). The circle
is a one-dimensional compact manifold; the straight real line R is non-compact
(but it Is paracompac1,a denumerable union of comracts). Besides these manifolds,
we consider also manifolds with boundary: M"+ is a manifold with boundary
Jl', Jl" being a manifold, when the complement M"+l -V" is a manifold
of dimension (n + l}= the i11terior of M. At each point v of V', there is a neigh·
bourhood U c R11 + (local chart) such that the intersection M n U Is defined by
the inequality Xn+! ;;;. 0 (half space of Rn+l).
A non-compact paracompact manifold may be, but is not necessarily,
diffeomorphic to the interior of a compact manifold with boundary.
In practice, we defme a differentiable structure of an 11-manifold M by an
atllls, that is, a system of charts U;, open sets of R11 , with connecting diffeomor·
pllisms hjk on the intersection U; n Uk . Thanks to these local maps we can
deftne the notion of a differentiable mapping of a source manifold S into a
target manifold 0. In the same way we will be able to define the tangent space
T.(M) to the manifold M as the union of T.(Us) with the connection h;k
extended to the tangent vectors. Similarly for the covector cotangent space
r• (M): a sections of the canonical projection r• (M)~ M is a differential form.
46 Mathematics [Ch. 2

2.2.6 Regular point. Critical point of a mapping


Let F be a mapping from the source manifold X" uno the target mamfold )11'.
At every point x of X, the rank of the mappingJ 1 (F) is an integers.;;; inf(n, p);
the differences n -s, p -s are, respectively, the eo-rank at the souFCe and the
co·rank or the target.
A regular point of X is a poin t where the least of the eo-ranks 11 - s, p - s is
zero. Every point which is not regular is called a sit~gular point (also called a
critical point). The set C of critical points of F is a closed set of X if F is a
closed set of X (if F is analytic (resp. polynomial), C is an analytic set (resp.
algebraic)). The Image set F(X) is said to be the set of singular values. Every
point of Y which does not belong to F(C) is said to be a regular value of F.

REGULAR VALUE THEOREM


Let F be a mapping from M" into yn-k (X, Y beine differentiable manifolds).
Let y be a regular value of F. Then the pre·image HI' = F- 1 (y) is an embedded
submnnifold of M.
Proof· it is sufncient to write for a poim w f W the local equations
YJ F = 0 which defme W.
The importance of llus theorem stems from a relatively deep theorem:

SARD's THEOREM
For a C'' mapping F from M" Into Y" k, m > k, the set of singular values
F(C) is of (n- k) measure zero. {This is to say that when a point is chosen 'at
random' in Y, this point is most likely to be a regular value.)

2 .2.7 Swjective and proper differentiable mappings


If the mapping F· !tf' ....r•-k is proper (the pre-imnge of very compact subset
K of Y IS compact in M ) and if every point of ltf' IS regular, then the mapping
F is a fib ration.
This is to say that every point y of Y possesses a neighbourhood V such
that c-•(V) be diffeomorphic to the product V X W, the mapping F being then
the projection on the first factor V (property of 'local triviality'). W is called the
fibre of this fibration. For example the projection of a product of manifold$
M X P on a factor is always a fibration. By construction the projection of the
tangent bundle r.(M) on M is a fib ration.

2.2.8 Transversality and general position


Let V' -q be a manifold embedded m R". of eo-dimension q. At every point'
of V, the vector space T.(V) of vectors tangent to V forms a linear subspace of
dimension n -q , of the vector space T.(R") tangent to R" at v. We can con·
sequcn tly form the quotien t space: T,.( R11 )/T,.(V),themznsverse vector space to
Vat V.
Sec. 2.2] Some References from Differential Topology: 47

Suppose f is a differentiable mapping of a differentiable manifold xm


1nto
R". We will say that f is a transversal to V. when for every point x of X"' for
which lhe image y = f(x) is in V, the tangent mapping j tf is such that, in lhe
sequence of homomorphlsms

Tx(X)~
1,1 T1• ( R11 ) ...
"
T_,. ( R11 }/Ty(V)
tbe cumpoSJtc mapping ;>. · j 1f is suljective. This is to say that when at y we
have for V a local coordinate system such that V is defined by u 1 = ul = ... =
uq = 0 about Y (with the dutlinearly independent in y), then lhe transversality
byptll.hesis implies thar at x. r.he functions Uf o f have independent differentials.
Consequently the pre-image / 1 (V) is locally at x, a submarufold W of co-dimen·
sion q. And further /~ 1 (V)= W is globally a sub manifold of X , of eo-dimension
q. The importance of the tral1Sversal1ty property is seen in the rwo following
results:
When /:X- R" ::> 1'11 - q is transversal to vn-q every mapping/ sufficiently
near iO f ( in the Cm topology, m> q, defined by the difference of the partial
derivatives D/- DJ' of order E:;; m) is equally transversal on V.
Each mapping f can be approximated in the cmtopology by a mapping g
transverse to V. In other words the transversal mappings form a dense open set
in the function space L(X;R'') of mappings f:X-> R" endowed by the cm
topology. As we say, the transversality property for a mapping is generic.
In another co nnection it is easily shown that, in all one-parameter families
of mappings, / 1 :(X)-+ R" where each ft is transversal on V, the pre-images
Jll1 = fi 1 (V) are all diffeomorphic (by a global diffeomorphlsm h1 :X-+ X, so
long as X is compact). Thus the transversallty entails the topological stability o f
the pre-images. All these properties were well known to the older Italian geome-
ters at the beginning of l11e century, who often used r.he mer.hod 'della piccolo
variazione' in order to simplify a configuration.

2.2.9 Tnmsversality in jet spaces


The critical sets C of mapping fare defined, to the first order, by annulling
minors of a given rank of lhe matrices of partial derivatives oyjox. This defines in
the coefficient space of the matrix (i.e. the jet space / 1 (n, p)), a certain algebraic
sub-space l:, whlch we can decompose according to the rank of the matrix, into
smooth manifolds (strata), as we shall show in Chapter 3. We thus show that the
property of transversality to l: is also generic for the derived mappingsj 1 f: R 11
... / 1 (11, p ). Thls allows us to calculate the generic eo-dimension of the c ritical
sets of given rank for a mapping f: R 11 -+ RP. We show lhat r.his generic eo·
din1ension. for the set of points of strict ranks, is equal to the product (n - s) X
(p -s): Co-rank of the source X Co·rank of the target. Further, r.he same trans·
versality theory. suitably expressed, allows us to define the generic singularities
of the critical sets.
48 Mathematics (Ch. 2

2.3 DYNAMJCS
2.3.1 Dynamieol Systems: Asymptotic States, At tractors
Definition 1: A dynamical system (M, X) is a differentiable action of the group
of real numbers R on a marufold M,thatts, a differentiable mapping~: R X M -+ M
such that for all t tn R, the rnapp111g ~~ :x-+ «t. x) is a diffeomorphism and for
all t to t 1 tn R and m tn M ~0. m)= m , 4>1, (~1 , (m)) = 91, +r, (m). The manifold
M is called the phau space. By differentiation such an action deftnes a vector
field X on M via the following equalJty:

d
4>(t, m)= X(m)
dJ t•O

Conversely, by local integration a vector field X on M determines a 'germ' of an


action of R on M . If M is compact it determlnes a global action.
If me M we call the set of images {4>1(m)},.R the orbit of m.
Definition 2: Let g be an orbit of the system. An w-limit point of g is a
point which lies in the closure of the set {4>1 (m)}1 > T where m is any point in
g. The set of w-limit points of g, denoted w(g), is a closed invariant set of trajea·
tories.
Definition 3: Two trajectories g. g' are said to be asymptotic if w(g) = w(g').
Two points m, m' of M arc said to be asymptotically equivalent if their trajcc·
tories are asymp totic.
This defines an equivalence relation between the points of M . l n a certain
sense the aim of qualitative dynamics is to make precise the topological nature
of this equivalence relation. In certain cases this relation is 'almost everywhere'
open: to each asymptotic state there corresponds an open subset of M. its 'basin'
In those parts of M where these basms exist, one can say that one is in a situation
of detenninism, the final state is stable with respect to small perturbations of the
data. ln the other cases these equtvalence cl.asses are inextricably confused: we
are then in an tndeterminate SJtuatton. Thus the mixture of determinism and
indeterminsim discussed in Chapter J, para. 2.1 tS already realised in the Classtcal
Dynamic model when IllS mterpreted 'asymptolically'.

Defintion 4: An attractor of the field X on M is an invariant subset A ofJif


satisfying the following two conditons:
(i) Almost all orbits in A are dense in A.
(ii) There exists a fundamental system of neighbourhoods U; of A in M such
that (a) all tmjectories of a point u e U1 possess A as w-limil set; (b) if a
point u e U; is such that cx(u) (limit for t-+ - oo) meets A then u lies In A
• itself.

Sec. 2.3] Dynamics 49

2.3.2 Examples
(a) Polnr artrocror
In this case A Is reduced to a single point (a). This point a is an at tractor if all
the eigenvalues of the matrix of the linear part of X in A (denoted j 1 (X) (a),
called the one·jet of X at (a)) have negative real parts. Such a point attractor
is then called 'generic' (or hyperbolic). In fact the field around a is locally
structurally stable, in the sense that for every field X' near enough to X (in the
C1 ·topology) there are neighbourhoods U of a and V ofa' and ahomeomorphism
II:U-+ V such that h(a) =a' and h sends every orbit of X in U onto an orbit of
x'.
(b) Closed trajectory
Let c be such a trajectory, homeomorphic to a circle S1 . Let H be a germ of a
hypersurface transverse to c at a point q of c. The trajectory through a point m
of H cuts H again for the first time in m'. The Poincan!·Fioquet mappingh:H-+ H
defined by h:m-+ m' is a germ of diffeomorphism for which q is a fixed point.
lf the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix j 1 {lz) (q) have modulus less than one
then the closed orbit is a generic (hyperbolic) artractor. Then for all fields X'
near enought to X, there will exist a closed trajectory c' in a neighbourhood
of c, and a homeomorphism g which sends a neighbourhood of c onto a neigh·
bourhood of c' and such that the image under g of an orbit of X is an orbit of
x' (structural stability property).
So far as the topology of attractors is concerned these two examp les are the
simplest bUI there are others which are far more complicated. R. Wllliams and
M. Shub have given examples of attractors with very complex topological natures.
The description and classification of attractors which are locally structurally
stable, in a weakened sense that is specified below, is without doubt one of the
major problems of contemporary Qualitative Dynamics.
Recent work has been carried out on the structure of these so-called 'strange'
allractors, in which the topological nature can be specified only in particular
cases, S\tch as the systems referred to as Smale's 'Axiom A' for which there exists
a decomposition of the tangent fibre r.(M) into a 'contracting' component, an
expanding component and the trajectory. For these it is possible to show the
existence of invariant measures on the attractor which extend over the basin and
for which there is a true thermodynamics. But the general nature of these
attractors is as yet little understood, and we do not know how they behave in their
'bifurcations'. ln this regard we can make the following observations:

DEFINITION
If the only attractor of X isM itself we say that X is ergodlc on M.

DEFrNITI ON: LIAPUNOV FUNCTION


Let (M, X) be a dynamical system. A Llapwwv [w1ction defined on an open
50 Mathematics [Ch. 2

subset U of ft1 IS a reaJ.valued function F:U- R which is mcreasing on ea.ch


trajectory of X and such that dF = 0 at the pomts where X= 0. A Uapunov
function can be global (U = M), or local (U n proper subset ofM).ln which case
we suppose that it is proper (i.e. K compact implies F- 1 (K) compact).
If A is an attractor in M there exists, by virtue of the hypotheses of Defini.
uon 4, an open neighbourhood U of A such that 91(U) is an open subset of U.
If we suppose that U possesses a smooth boundary W we can assume that the
sets 91 ( W) are the level mamfolds of a proper Uapunov function F.
Now if A u contained in the tube F =a, for every field X' near enough to
X we have the tollowtng property: X' enters into the tube and thus there exist
one or mu re auractor~ of X Situated in the tube. We see ln this way that a small
penurba1ion ut the flelr.l cannot cause an allrnctor such as A to explode. On the
other hand the attractor can undergo an 'implosion' into one or more sub·
attractors, in general, of smaller dimension. But because of thls loss of dimension,
thu cascade ol implosions must temtinate.
Vel} frequently, these implosions are themselves very unstable. Let us
consider this situation tor a linear family of linear fields on a torus 'fl (X,)' taken
mod. 1). Let dy = k. dx be the equation of the field. When k is rauonal, all
the trajectories are closed, and there is structural instability. The field may
degenerate ln tu a field consisting of a finite number of attractrng and repelhng
closed traJectories (Murse SmoJe field). But if k Is changed, then fork Irrational,
we have 3 field where all the trajectories are everywhere dense, topologically
equivalent to a linear field. This suggests that the only 'useful' definition of an
attractor would have to take into account, not only the given attractor, but all
the neighbourmg dttractors. In which case we could only hope, by a process of
averaging, to define natistical objectS (for eXlUllple, invariant measures) whlch
characterise this family . . .. We touch here the essential problematic of catastrophe
theory, known as 'structural stability'.

2.4 STRUCTURAL STABIUTY: DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS AND


DIFFERENTIAL MAPS
2.4.1 Structural stability
We say that a dynamical system defined by a vector field X on a manifold M" . is
structurall)' sTable, when, for every field X' sufficiently close to X there eXlSls a
homeomorphism lr>, of M on to 1tself, which transforms every trajectory of X
Into a trajectory of (M, X').
In other words, the rotaJ decomposttion of M into orbits does not chaJll-e.
within the appropriate topology, when we perturb X to X'.
In order to ha\e 3 sufficiently flexible definition it is necessary to forgo, on
the one hand. having a global diffeomorphism (M, X) 4 (m, X'), and on tht
other that the acuon of ume commutes wtth respect to the homeomorphism h.
Sec.2.4j Structural Stabilit y: 51

Trus defmition was proposed in 1935 by the Russian mathematicians Andro·


nov and Pontijagin. They clearly offered something of both theoretical and
practical value. Nevertheless progress on the question has been slow. The first
notable result was the proof by M. Peixoto that on a compact oriented surface,
5tructurally stable fields are dense. Later we will show that gradient fields, or
'gradient-like' fields, are almost always structurally stable. This is a property
which we can extend to systems referred to as Morse- Smale. Lntterly the
structurally stable property has been established for certain fiefds of an 'ergodlc
and mixing' character. But S. Smale's demonstration of the existence of a
\CCtor field (M", X) on a four.Oimensional manlfold M" which cannot be approxi-
mated by any structurally nab le field, demonstrates the limits of the applicability
of this 1dea: geometrically too fine to serve usefully where a 'coarse' classification
of systems might be needed.
In the face of this theoretical difficulty, which has not yet been surmounted,
it is reasonable to return to simpler situations and to discuss gradient dynamics.

2.4.2 Gradient systems


A Rienumnian metric on a manlfold !tl' is that given at every point m of M by
a positive deftnite quadratic form on the tangent vector space Tm(M), classically
wrluen ds = E A;f (x) dx1 dx;. lt is easily shown that on every manifold !tf'
there eltlst Riemannian met.rics, for eltamplc, that induced from the standard
Euclldean metric by an embedding M-+ Rn+k .
Such n metric on T.(Mn) allows us to defme a sealar product between
tangent vectors (indicated < >), and m like marmer an isomorphism between
vectors and covectors: Tm. {!tf)?! Tm •(!tf).
Let V be a smooth real·valued function on M (potential). To V we shall
ussoclate a vector field, the gradient of V, by the formula:

(grad V, X) = d V(X) for every tangent vector X £ Tm (M).

On every trajectory of grad J7, the function V is monotonlcaUy increasmg.


1t follows that in a compact manifold, the w-limit set of every trajectory is
composed of singular points of V, points where the differential d V is zero.
The study of the asymptotic behaviour of a gradient dynamic thus leads
again to those singular points of the potential V, which ure the equilibrium
points of the system.
We thus have to construct the theory of singular points of functions, and to
study the behaviour of gradient fields in the neighbourhood of singular points.

2.4.3. Generic critical point of a function


Let us denote by (a 1,a1 ,a3 , ••• ,an) the coordinates in the covector space
J 1(n, I). A critical point x is a point where th~ derived map J' f sends the tangent
lector space into zero. If a1 = a[{OXf, x is critical (singular) when a;(x) = 0 .
52 Mathematics (Ch. 2

According to the transversability lemma stated above , we can always fmd an


approximation g off such that the mapping x _,.a, = ogfox; is transversal to the
origin.
ff this condition is satisfied, every critical point is isolated. In such a point
the Taylor expansion of g is of the form g(x) = g(O) + quadratic form Eq bq
X;Xf + .... terms of higher order > 2, where the rank of the quadratic form
Q(z) is equal ton. In other words the determina{\t of the partial second deriva·
tives (or Hessian)H = lo 2 gjax, oxtiY is non-.~:ero.
We have thus established this: every real smooth function can be approxi·
mated by a function all of whose critical points have non-zero Hessian. These we
call non-degenerate.
A function such asg(x), in wbich alllhe critical points are non-degenerate is
called a Morse function - or generic.
As an exercise, we can show simply the 'structu.ral stability' of the parabolic
potential well defined by the potential function V= x 2 • in only one variable x .
We note that V'(x) = 2x, V"(x) = 2. Let us defme a neighbourhood W of the
function V in the function space of class ~ by the following conditions: For
every g e W, IV" -g"l < 1 on the segment/= [ - 1, + 1J and IV' - g'l < 1 on J.
We can thus see that g'(-1)~-1 . g'(+l)~ 1. Thus the function g', being
continuous, becomes zero at least once on J; and it becomes zero only once , for
if it allowed two zeros (or multiple zero),g" becomes uro on J, contrary to the
condition g" > 1 imposed on the functions of W.

2.4.4 The gradient in the neighbourhood of a non-degenerate critieal point


Let Q(x) = 'Eij b1;x;x; be the non-degenerate quadratic form of the Taylor
expansion of Vat the point 0 under consideration.
We suppose that the Rlemannian metric is the standatd Euclidean metric;
then the gradient field has linear components at 0 defined by the partial deriva·
tives 3Qf3x;. This linear field is defined by a symmetric matrix that we can
diagonalise. There will be k negative eigenvalues, n-k positive. The eigenvectOI1
corresponding to the negative eigenvalues defme a k-dimensional plane, Lk;
those associated to the positive eigenvalues define an (n - k)-dimensional corn·
plementary plane P11 _k. T he set of trajectories of grad V wbich finish at 0 fonn
a differentiably embedded k-<:ell, having Lk as a tangent plane. Similarly the
trajectories of grad V whjch leave the origin 0 form a (n- k)-<:ell tangent in 0
to Pn -k . This is the pattern of trajectories linked with the neighbourhood of a
singular point called 'hyperbolic'. The integer k is called the index of the critical
point 0.
lf the manifold M'' is compact and if V is a Morse function on M", every
gradient trajectory of V leaves the critical point 0 and goes towards another
critical poim 0;: in associating to every point m of M the end point of !.he
gradient trajectory passing throu&IJ. m, we decompose the manifold M' into
differentiably embedded cells, each k-<:ell having as centre a critical point of
Sec. 2.5 ] Gradient Bifurcations and Singular points of Functions 53

index k. With the help o f this cellular subdivision of M", we can calculate the
topological invariants {homology, homotopy) of M . Tnversely, the presence of
every topological feature of M is manifested by the presence of critical points.
Here we have the principle referred to as Morse Theory.
We caJJ the gradient cells which finish at or start from a critical point of
index k, ·stable cells' or 'unstable cells' respectively: We show that in order that
a gradient field be structurally stable, it is necessary and sufficient that all its
critical points be non-degenerate, and that the stable and unstable cells associated
to these critical points intersect transversally.

Example: Lines of slope on a geographical map


If we move down any line of slope, we fmish at a point of minimum height; the
ground is thus partitioned into basins, lines of slope starting from points of the
same basin always finish at the same minimum height. Two neighbouring basins
are separated by a 'separatrix curve', in general constituted of arcs of stable
curves associated with saddles and terminating at summits (of maximum height).

Example of a non·s"uctura/ly stable gradient field


Let us embed the torus 'r in the three-dimensional space Oxyz in such a manner
that T Is a figure of revolution about Oy. Then the function z has four critical
points on 'fJ: a minimum , two saddle-points {situated at the highest and lowest
points of the inside circle of the torus). Then the stable cell starting from the
hlghest saddle-point falls exactly on the lowest saddle-point: transversatity requires
that it avoids it. A small perturbation of the embedding wiU have the effect of
taking this separatrix to the minimum of z.

2.5 GRADIENT BIFURCATIONS AND SINGULAR POINTS OF FUNCI'IONS


We now consider dynamical systems (M, X; c) depending differentiably on
parameters c. We shall say that (c0 ) is a ' regula r' value of the multidimensional
parame ter c, if the differential system (M, X, c0 ) is structurally stable. If c0 is
regular, for aU values c' sufficiently close to c 0 , the s}'l>tem (M, X : c') is topologi-
cally equivalent to (M, X: c0 ).
A non-regular value of c will be caJJed a 'bifurcation value' for the family
(M, X; c). For such a value c" of the parameter there exist parameter values c,
arbitrarily close to c", such that the corresponding systems (M, X; c) and (M, X: c")
have different topological type. A central problem of bifurcation theory is to
establish the topological nature of the set {B) of bifurcation values in the space
(C) of parameters (c) for 'nearly aU' families (M, X; c). In the 'good cases', C is
a closed set without interior point and it has a structure deftned locally by
algebraic or semi-algebraic models. On the other hand, we know that, in general,
it is possible that (B) be locally everywhere dense. The example of the linear
field ayfox= k on the torus T 2 o(fers a simple case of this pathology, since
54 Mathematics [Ch. 2

there every value of k is a bifurcation value· k is the rotation number of the


field, and hence known to be topological invariant ....
Let us study first the most simple case of the bifurcation of gradients with
re)pect to a fl}(ed Rlemannian metric. 1t is then sufficient to have a family of
potentials V(x; c) depending differenuably on the multtdimensional parameter c.
The topological type of a gradient on a manifold can vary for two kinds of
reason: euher the potential has critical points of a non·generlc type (aliasdegener.
ate): or the mtersection of the stable and unstable cells (where this takes place m
the case of degeneration of the critical points) are not trunsverse. If we are con.
cerned solely with asymptotic states of the dynamic, we shall confme our study
to the variation of the maxima of V(x; c) as a function of c, without concerning
ourselves with possible variations in the position of the basins, in relation one to
the other. A preliminary problem is thus to study local bifurcations about a
singular 'degenerate' point of the potential. Th.is demands a systematic study of
the singularities of real·valued functions. Let us now look at some examples
which though simple, are of fundamental importance to catastrophe theory.

(i) The fold


V xl/3. This is, after the parabolic weU V = xl, the simplest singularity.
Consider a deformation of this function V(x; c) with V(x; 0) "'x3 /3.
The set of critical points of this family In the space (R X c) defined by the
coordinates (x; c) will be given by the equation

Let us apply the preparation theorem to this formal series in (x; c1 ), writing it
as the product of a non·zero function at (O;O)with the distinguished polynomial

(xl- 2o(c)x + b(c)) = (x - a)l + b -al.

Now, we can effect transbuons depending on c on the variable x, in putting for


example:

X(c) =X - a(c) X(O) = x.

Then the critical set of this family is defined In the auxiliary plane (X: b) by tht
parabola (P).

X 2 = b', where we have put b' = - b +a,


Sec. 2.5] Gradient Bifurcations and Singular points of Functions 55

'Ne see that this region is obtained as the pre-image of the parabo la (P) by the
auxiliary mapping:

X=x - a b'=-b + a 2 •

If this auxiliary map is itself transversal toP in a neighbourhood of 0 , then


we know the topological type of the pre-irnage, due to the topological stability
of transversal intersections. In other words the parabola {P) forms a universal
model of the generic bifurcations of the germ V= x 3 /3. Now this condition of
transversality is satisfied as soon as the linear component in c (for x = 0) of
a Vf 3x in the Taylor expansion of V(x: c). is not zero: for example , in the case
of the deformation V= x 3 /3 + ux. Intuitively such a family gives all the types
of curves that it is possible to obtain from the smooth deforma.t ion of V= x 3 /3:
the curve without a critical point (u positive); the curve with two bumps, for
examp le, V=x 3 - 3x (u ncgative)(Fig. 2.1).

v~ x 3

Fig. 2.J

We will say that the family V= x3 /3 + ux constitutes a Wliversal ur~[olding


of the germ x 3 /3. We shall see in Chapter 3 a rigorous definiton of this notion.
But we shall note here the essential fact that the singularity of the potential
V in x detumlnes the type of its proper bifurcations, in particular those which
Me structurally stable.

\ti) The cusp


Htre we take the singularity that comes immediately after x 3 , namely V = x 4 /4.
The same procedure as above carried out on a deformation V(x: c) to
Y{x; 0) = x 4 /4 shows that the set of critical points arises after possible translation
56 Mathematics [Ch. 2

(4)
x'
(O) V ,. 4

(1)

(6)

(2 )

(3) (7 )
Fig. 2.2
Sec. 2.6] Hamiltonian Systems 57

on x (depending on c) from a universal set defined by the polynomial (F) x' +


wc + v (the term in x' disappears by the translation onx). The critical set in (x; c)
is the pre-image of the surface (F) by a smooth map u = /(c), v = g(c) which,
generically, is transversal to the projection of the surface (F) on the plane Ouv.
But this projection has for apparent contour the discriminant of the equation
xl + wc + v, namely 4u 3 + 27v2 = 0, the equation of a cusp (Q). The universal
unfolding is thus the family V= x" /4 + uxl/2 + v. Vfe obtain a decomposition
of the plane Ouv corresponding to the different topological types of the function
V (a 'stratification', as we shall call it later); it is the cusp {Q) which defines this
stratification.
Here again, the algebra.ic type of the singularity of the potential detemtines
the kinds of stable bifurcations of this singularity. Thus we have the cusps, the
most simple models in catastrophe theory ... (Fig. 2.2).

2.6 HAMILTONIAN SYSTEMS


A Hamiltonian system is defined by a real-valued function H, the Hamiltonian
on a symplectic manifold M 211 , that is a manifold of even dimension together
with n closed two form a of maximal rank (locally a= I: (rfl 1 1\ rJP t)). We obtain
a vector field X from the Hamiltonian by the equation: i{X) .Ja = dH (HamiHon -
Jacobi equation). Locally, this is just the equation given by dptfdt = -aHfaqf,
dqi/dl = aHfap;.
The field X admits the Hamiltonian Has a first integral and leaves the form
a invariant (thus also Its nth exterior power, the Liouville measure). TL follows
that in a hypersurface of constant energy, H = const., the field X cannot admit
altractors. A Hamiltonian dynamic is time reversib le. Now it is doubtful whether
one can have a phenomenology at all without a certain irreversibility of lime; in
order for anything to occur it Is necessary that the future situation be preferable
to the present situation. This excludes a dynamic where the orientation of time
CJln be reversed. (This is why the conoectiol\ of a purely Hamiltonian theory,
such as Quantum Mechanics, with the phenomenology of the real world demands
an 'ad hoc· postulate, the theory of measuremem, which confers the right of
veto on the experimenter, even with regard to the laws of dynan1ics.)
Neverthe less, there exist in Hamiltonian systems certain invariant closed
subsets endowed with structural stability vis-0-vis Hamiltonian perturbations,
which we can consider as 'vague attractors'. This is the case, for example, with a
central closed t·rajectory {studied by Kolmogoroff, Moser ... etc.). In this case
the Poincare Floquet diffeomorphism is a symplectic diffeomorphism. lt
follows that its eigenvalues partition themselves into 'quadruples' of the form
().,l,). -I ,"~ -I) or into pairs (p,~) with IJ.II = l , and we can only pass from one
conf~guration to another by a collision of pairs of roots on the unit circle. ln the
second case the Poincare diffeomorphism is 'central', tangent to a rotation. We
58 Mathematics [Ch. 2)

can deduce the existence of a subset of trajectories of non-zero measure which


spiral around the closed trajectory without diverging. All these trajectories
manifestly define the 'same' thermodynamic state as the critical closed trajectory
and there is no ergodicity of the global system.

Exompk: Htumonlc oscillator


If M2" = (;", H = 1: Pl + q;1 , z; = qi +Jpf, the hypersurfacesH = const. are
then spheres of dimension 2n- 1. All the trajectories are circles which define , in
S1 n - l , the Hop{ ftbrarfon over the complex projective space CP(11 - 1). This is
obviously a hlghly non-generic situation. Nevertheless, as Arnold has shown, a
first integral of a Hamlhonian system possesses a certain structural stability of a
statistical form. lt Is this which explains why certain invariants such as kinetic
moments have a sense, In spite of the fact that the symmetries which give rise
to them are only approximations .... By reasonofthcirincompatibllitywlth the
Irreversibility of phenomena, only exceptionally wiU we eaU upon llamUtonian
dynamics In what follows.

I
CHAPTER3

The theory of the universal unfolding

Ozapter 3 is of a very technical nawre. It is addressed to those readers who


de.sire to delve a little into the mysteries of the theory of universal unfolding
and singularities of dif/erelltiable mappings. It CO/I be omitted without much
harm by other readers . . . .

3.1 THE UNIVERSAL UNFOLDING OF THE GERM OF A FUNCTION


The existence of a 'stratification' of the function space L(M, ~)of real-valued
functions on a manifold M such as that which is involved in the bifurcation of
minima as in Chapter 2 , rests, in the last analysis, on a theory , that of the universal
unfolding of a germ of a mapping. This theory h.as attained a deHnitive mathe-
matical form. We can distinguish:
I . An algebraic theory , successful in the case of functions and also for germs of
mappings Q. Mather). We present here the essential ideas of the theory for
functions.
2. A more general topological theory which rests upon the notion of a 'flat
stratified map' . A complete resolution of this theory has been proposed (J.
Mather, LTS [7 ]).
3. Finally, we have a theory of universal unfoldings o f group actions . These
occur in physics in the theory of symmetry-breaking. We will not discuss this
here.
3.1.1 Algebrajc Theory
Definition I. Let f:(~" , 0) -+ (R"' , 0) be a germ of a differentiable map. (Here ,
as in all that follows, differentiable means of class c-.) An unfolding of the
germ[ consists of a mapping

F :( ~~~ , 0) X (U, 0 ) ... ~P X (U, 0 )

p \
(U, O)
I p·
60 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

(V is a neighbourhood of 0 in Rk) which is compatible with the foliations of


source and target defined by the projections p and p'. and such that

Fl {(Rn,O) X {O}}= I

Definition 2. Let F be an unfolding as above, (V, 0') be another parameter space


(of some dimension) and g:(V, O') -+ (V, O) be a differentiable map. We call the
unfolding G defined by the following commutative diagram the unfolding
induced f rom F by g (or pull-back ofF by g).

(R" , 0) X (V, 0 ') fi R" X (V, 0')


\ I
(V, O')

id g 1 id g
(V,O)
I \
(Rn , 0) X (V, O) -p RP X (V, 0)

Definition 3. Equivalence of two un[o!dings. Given two unfoldings F and G of


the genn [ , with parameter spaces (U. 0) and (V, 0') respectively, we say that
these unfoldings are equivalent (isomorphic) if there exist local diffeomorphisms

H:(R\0) X (V,O)-+(R" ,O) X (V,O)


and

H': RP X (V, 0) ... RP X (V, 0')

of the fonn H(x , u) = (h 11 (x), k(u)), H'(y, u) = (J1 11 (y), k(u)) where k:(U, 0)-
(V, 0') is a local diffeomorphism for which the following diagram commutes:

(R" X O)X (V,O) 4 RI' X (V,O)


"'-..J
(V, O)

(V,O)
/
( Rn,O)X (V,O') '
G RP X (V,O')
Sec. 3.1} The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Function 61

The aim of me theory is to show mat, if the genn f satisfies a certain algebraic
condition of finiteness (which is almost always realised in the case of functions,
i.e. when p = 1), then there exists an unfolding F ofI that one can call verso/ in
the sense that all other unfoldings off are equivalent to an unfolding induced
from F by a suitable (C"') mapping of the parameter space of F. We also aim to
show that two versal unfoldings of minimal dimension are equivalent, in which
case we have defmed a Wliversol
. unfolding, at least up to equivalence.

3.1.2 The Infinitesimal Form of the Preceding Definitions


Suppose !hat f:N -+ P is a differentiable mapping of a manifold P. A path of
mappings [ 1 is a mapping 'F:N X /-+ P X I which is compatible with the pro·
jections of N X I and P X I onto I (it is an 'unfolding' in the above sense).
Suppose that f i(N, 0) =f. We can define the tangent vector to the path Fin the
function space L(N, P): to each point x of N, F associates a pathlr(x) inP, the
origin of which is y = f(x): the tangent vector dft/dr is thus deftned by specify-
ing at each point x inN, a tangent vector to P at the pointy = f(x). Consider the
bundles TN and TP of tangent vectors to N and P respectively and let Tf be the
bundle over N induced from TPby the mapping/. We have the derived mappings:

TN I • • Tf I • TP

\!I N
I
p

By definition, an infinitesimal deformation off is a tangent vector to a path of


mappings such as/1 ; it is thus a section of the bundle Tf _,.N.
Some of the infinitesimal deformations off are induced by infinitesimal
diffeomorphisms of the source N and of the target P. I f, for example, 111 is a
one·parameter family of diffeomorphisms of N with ho = idN , the formula g, =
fog/ defines an infinitesimal deformation off; if X is !he vector field on N
defined by the derivative dltr/dt, X is a section of the bundle TN _,. N, and by
dennition of f. = / 1 (f) the associated infinitesimal deformation of f. c = dgtfdr
is given by

c = f,.(X)

Similarly, an infinitesimal dlffeomorphism of the target P is defmed by a


vector field Y on P and the defromation induced by composition with I is the
.r-l
section c' = (Y).
62 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

Defmition 4. A mapping f:N .... P is said to be infinitesimally stable if every


infmitesimal deformation of /is of the formf.(X) + f• - l (Y). where X and Y
are respectively vector fields on Nand P.
ln other words , if f is infinitesimally stable, the effect of an infmilesimal
deformation c off can be compensated by suiiable infmilesimal diffeomorphisms
of the source and the target.
If we can' realise the correspondence c - (X, Y) with sufficient continuity
(with regard to differentiable families of sections c) on an open subset Win the
function space, then by integration of the vector fields X and Y we can show
(1. Mather) that all 'very small' ftnlte deformations of fin W can be obtained as
the effect of suitable diffeomorphisms Jz and lt' of N and P respectively. (This
implies tbal an infinitesimally stable germ is stable).
The essential tool in lhis proof is the preparation theorem which we now
present. First we give some necessary definitions.

Definition S. infinitesimal De[omwtion ofan Unfolding. Suppose that

(N, 0) X (U, 0) ... (P, 0) X (U, 0)

is an unfolding F wilh parameters (U, 0). An infmitesimal deformation ofF is


the derivative at r = 0 of a one-parameter deformation F1 of F which projects
onto a deformation ir of the parameter space;

F
NXUXJ~PXUXI

!
UXJ--+ UXJ
l
/rX idr

lt is thus a section of the bundle TF over N X U induced from T(P X U) by


F. lt is of the fom1

Y(x.fu(x), u) + U (u)

where U denotes a vector field on the paran1eter space U (U = cJi,/dr). Amongst


the deformations of an unfolding are those which are generated by onc-paramew
equivalences of the form

Fe == H; o F o H1
where H1 and Et, are diffeomorphisms of N X U and P X U which project onto
the san1e diffeomorphism of U:
Sec. 3.1) The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Function 63

HI
NX UXI NX UXI

l
UX I ·
/1 X id 1
1
UXJ

P X U X I - - P X UX/
H'I

Definition 6. An unfold1ng is infinitesimally stable if every infinitesimal deforma-


tion of the unfolding is induced by an infinitesimal equivalence.
Equivalently, we can say that every section of the bundle TF in the diagram

TNXTU ... TF-+TPXTU

NXU
!/ l
PXU
~u~
can be written in the form

3/u(x) = F. (Xu) + F • (Yu)

where X11 is of theform X(x, u) + U(u) and Yu is of the fonn Y(F(x, u)) + U(u).

3.1.3 The Classical Preparation Theorem


Firstly, consider the classical preparation theorem: if f{z) is a holomorphic
funcLion on a neighbourhood U of the origin in (: and if P(z) is a polynomlal
of degree k all of whose roots are in U, then there exists a function Q(z) holo-
morphlc on U, and a polynomial R(z) of degree k- 1 such that:

f{z) = P(z) Q(z) + R(z)


Tltis division rule can be interpreted geometrically as follows: in the space
H(U) of holomorphlc functions on U (together with the Fn~chet topology, for
example), the ideal of holomorphlc functions generated by the polynomlal P(z)
is of eo-dimension k. In fact , if P(z) has distinct roots c 1 , ••• , Ck then a function f
Is a muJtiple of P(z) if and only iff{c 1)= f{cz) = ... =/(eA.-)= 0, which amounts to
64 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

annihilating k independent linear forms on H(lf). If there are multiple roots the
argument is the same except for the additon, for a root c of orders, of the s
independent conditions :f(c) = f (c)= .. . = j<s- 1) (c) = 0. Generally, the remain·
der

n-·l
R(z) = . E a/
]=0

is just the Lagrange interpljlation polynomial defmed byR(cj)=f(c1), andR(s)(c1)


= fl>(cj) for all s strictly less than the multiplicity of the root CJ· The vector
space of polynomials

thus appears as a complement R to the ideal l(P) in H(lf), and the division rule
expresses the fact that each vector in H(u) is the sum of a vector in J(P) and a
vector in the complement R.
Suppose now that P(z) has the fom1

where the uis are sufficiently small that every root of P11 is in U. Then the space
R of polynomials of degree k - J which is complementary to the ideai/{P0 ) = l
is also a complement to each of the ideals l(P11 ) for u sufficiently near to zero.
Thus there exists a projection Pu depending upon u , such that

f(z) = P11 (z) Q(z, u) + Pu(/)

The projection is defined by the l.agrange interpolation polynomial. Th~


fundamental fact expressed in the Weierstrass-Ruckert preparation theorem 11
that the coefficients a;(u) of the polynomial Pu(/) are holomorphic functions of
u (at least in some neighbourhood of 11 = 0). Classically, this fact is proved using
Cauchy's formula. We can naively convince ourselves of the continuity of tht
a(u) in the simplest case, where two roots c and c' take identical values (which
we can take equal to zero). After subtraction and division of the remainder·
polynomial R(z) by the irrelevant terms, the problem is reduced to that of
considering the linear function

!{c)- f(c')
z
c'f(c) -c{(c')
+ _:....:._::....___:_.:......:.. 'i
c - c'
,
c - c I
Sec. 3.1] The Universal Unfolding of the Ge.n n of a Function 65

But the two functions in the numerator are zero on the diagonal c - c' = 0
which is a smooth submanifold. They are therefore multiples of (c - c'), the
quotient being holomorphlc in both cases and symmetric in c-c' (thus even in
the co-ordinate le - c'[ oormal to the stratum), It therefore follows that the
coefficients a;(u) are holomorphic on the eo-dimension-one strata of the dis-
criminant variety of the polynomlal P(u) and consequently are so everywhere
(i.e. on the strata of larger codimension) by Harlog's Theorem.
Continuity ofpu extends to functionsofseveral variables. If U is a neighbour·
hood of the origin in C"(z~o . . . ,Zn) and g1{z;) is a system of 11 holomorphic functions
on U such that the ideal of the Kl defines 0 with mulitplicity k (this
means that for almost all sufficiently small (3 the system g;(z;) = {3 defmes k isolate
near to 0) . Then (for the same reasons as those given above), the ideal l(g;)
generated by the Ki is of eo-dimension k in the space H(U) of holomorphic
functions on U. If we consider the algebra q [z; Jl of formal power series, the
ideal generated by the g; in C[(z; J contains a power of the maximal ideal, and
the quotient algebra C[[z;) ]/f(g;) is of dimension k. Let b., . .. , bk be a system
of polynomials which form a basis for this quotient algebra. Then the complex
vector space R generated by the b 1 , • • • , bk is a complementary subspace to the
ideal I(gi) in H(U) . Thus there exists a projection p sending H(U) onto R and
such that for nil f eH( U)

[ - p(J) =0 mod(g" . . . ,g,)


Suppose now that we slightly perturb the ideal/(g;); for example , by setting

gf = Ki + 1: Ujl!}
I
where the lt} are holomorphic and the UJS are so small that the ideal of g;s only
has k zeros in U. Then the space R remains a complement to the ideals of the
gis and we have a projection f-. Pu(J) into R which is holomorphic in u. We
observe that if we introduce the u as new coordinates, the algebra of formal
power series C[[z, u IJ divided by the ideal (g/, u) is a free-module of finite type
on the generators b 1 , b1, ... , bk.

3.1.4 The Differentiable Preparation Theorem


Consider now a polynomial ~) with real coefficients and let l(P) denote the
ideal generated by Pin the algebra & o f functions on~. We see immediately that
the co·dimen&ion of I(P) in & depends upon the number of real roots of P(x) .
For example, the ideal generated by (x2 - 1) is of eo-dimension two while that
which Is generated by (x 2 + 1) is of eo-dimension ~ero because every C"' function
is a multiple in & of the nowhere zero function (x 2 + 1). For a generic poly-
nomial of degree k,
66 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

P(x) = xk + 1: rtpl,
/~k- 1

the ideal l(P) i& of maximum codimension (equal to k) when all the roots are
real; it has strictly smullerco-dimensicm when some roots are imaginary conjugates.
The projection Pu is defined by the Lagrange interpolation polynomial on the
set of u where all the roots are real. The Differentiable Preparation Theorem
asserts that it is possible to extend this projection, dlfferentlably in u, to all of a
neighbourhood of the origin in the space u.
This theorem is a profound result which has roused the interest of the finest
analysts. After the first proof of B. Malr.range (Seminaire Cnrtan, 1961 [5]),
came that of J. Mather; next another due to S. Lojasiewicz [3) and also one of
L. Nirenberg, TPD [9]. We restrict ourselves here to presenting an idea of the
nature of the difficulties encountered.
We return to the example given in the preceding section of the interpolation
polynomial for two roots c and c':

[(c)- fCc') c' f(c) - cf(c')


X +
c-c• cI - c

After division this takes the form ft (c, c') X + f, (c, c') where ft and /2 are
symmetric. It is then a question of establishing that / 1 and / 2 are c- funclions
of the elementary symmetric functions s = c + c' and p =cc'. This is covered by
the 'Differeniiable Newton's Theorem' proved by G. Giaeser [I) before the
Preparation Theorem, and which, as the proof due to Lojasiewicz shows, Is
practically equivalent.
An essential tool of the proof is the complex extension of a C'" function:
we embed ~ in C both for the source and the target. By the Whitney Extension
Theorem, we can show that every C"' function f; 1R -+ ~ can be extended to a
function F: C -+ C, so that the jet of the real part IR C C coincides with that of
f, and such that F(x - iy} = F(x + iy}. Clearly, F cannot satisfy the Cauchy-
Riemann equations in a neighbourhood of the real axis y = 0 iff is not analytk.
Thus, if we define the remainder Pu(/) by the Lagrange interpolation polynomial
applied to the extension F, we must expect to have some discontinuilies on th~
strata of complex multiple roots since a quotient oftheformF(c)- F(c')/(c-c')
does noi have a limit us c and c' tend towards the same value. To escape this we
may make a suitable adjustment in a tubular neighbourhood of the strata ul
multiple roots (Malgrange's method), or choose an explicit extension given by tht
Fourier transform (Mather's method), so that U1e discontinuities compellS.ltl
lhemselves if we act simultaneously on the conjugate points ....
The theorem generalises to functions of several variables in the foUowing
way , which we shall need: let f:(R~ . 0)-+ (IRj! , O) be a germ of a differentiable
mapping. Assume that this mapping is of finite type, i.e. the quotient of !M
Sec.J I j The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Functjon 67

algebra of formal po\\-er series R[ [x1Jl on Rn, divided by the ideal generated by
they, f (taken formaUy) is an R·algebra of finite dimension having for a basis
k generators b 1, b1 , •• • , bk (polynomials inx). Let

F: (J~n, O) X (U, 0)-+ Rn X (U. 0)

be an unfolding of f. Then, as we said above. the quotient algebra R [(x. u) )/


(n o F) is, in the formal power series, a free module of which b 1 , ••• , bk are
generators. The Preparation Theorem then asserts that the algebra & (x, u) of
ilifferenriable germs on (Rn, 0) X (U, 0) divided by tire ideal generated by tire
)'; oF is a free &(u) - module having b 1 , b1 , • •• , bk for genenztors (cf. J. C.
Tougeron (14), p. 192).
From this foUows the existence of a projection Pu which sends every germ
f(x. u) onto a linear combination of the form I: a;(u)bl such that
I

f(x, u) =Pu(f) mod(yJ o F(x, u))

The existence of this projection defmes, in short, the remainder of the


division off by the ideal (y/ oF). lt as necessary to consider the 'quotient' of
the division, i.e. we are concerned with an ideal and not with a single polynomial.

3.1.5 A Theorem on Linear Systems Which Depend Upon Parame ters


Consider a linear system of the form.

(S) 'EJ,{c)x; = c;(r)


where the coefficients a/ and CJ are differentiable functions of the muliidimen-
sional poramter 1 c: T. We suppose that for aU values of r. the vector c;(t) is in
the linear mapping defined by the matrix oj(t): for all c, there exists at least one
•·ector x1(t) which is a solution of the system (S). Can we prove that there exists
a global solutionx/(r), differentiable in t?
Classically, we are able to show the existence of such a solution provtded
the rank of the matrices a1(r) is independem of r, so that the kernels of the
mappings a1 , each having the same dimension, define a vector bundle over the
parameter space T. But there exists another more general case that we can solve.
In the space M of matrices (a}), lies the subspace F of matrices whose rank
Is less than the maximum possible value. This space F can be stratified by the
rank. Since the stiata are the orbits of group actions (the automorphisms of the
1ource and target vector spaces). the way in which they meet each other has
exceUent properties, at least locally. Any vector field X defined on a stratum A
ntends to a vector field X defined on the ambient space, which is tangent to
tho~ strata in the star of A (cf. J. Martinet [6) ).
68 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

If the system (S) is defined by a mappingg:T-+ M which associates to each


r in T the matrix a}(t). the theorem is: lf the mapping g:T-+ M Is trall$~ersal on
the manifold F of singular matrices, then there exists a global solution Xi(r)
differentiable in't.
This theorem was oroved by Malgrange and Mather. Here we consider the
case where aj is a square matrix of size 11 x 11.
After multiplication by the adjoints Af, the system is reduced to a diagona-
lised system:

Ea} A~ Xf = Cj A{ = B;(t)

TI1e function Bt(t) is zero on the manifold t::.1 defined by t::.(t) = O.lt thus suffices
to show that we can divide B;(t) by t::.(t).

DefinfTion 7. A real-valued function A(x) is said to have the zero property if


every function f(x) which is zero on A - J (O) is a multiple of A(x) In the algebra
of differentiable functions.
With the aid of the 'spectral theorem' of Whitney , we can prove that a poly-
nomial P(x) has the zero propeny if it is locally irreducible and if the set of
*
reguhlr poillls (wlzere dP 0) is dense in A - 1 (Ot CL Malgrange {ID.) [S J.
But the polynomial t::.(a;), considered as a polynomial on the space M of
matrices has these two properties. It is irreducible; in fact, after complexificatlon,
the set of smooth points oft::. = 0 is connected, because two matrices of rank
(n - I) can be deformed Into each other by coordinate changes in the source
and target. Moreover, the set of regular points of the real variety t::. = 0 is dense
because every singular matrix can be approximated by a matrix of rank (n- 1).
lt thus remains to show that since t::.(t/;) has the zeros' properties, so does
the induced function t::. o g if g is transverse to t::. = 0. If we suppose, as we
always can, lhatg is an embeddlnglntoM, it suffices to show that every function/
defmed on the image ofg and zero on t::. n {Image ofg) extends locally to a function
F, zero on t::. - 1 (0). To construct F, given [, we can use a vector field X trans-
verse to the inlage of If and tangem to the stratification of t::. -a (0); such a field
exists as has been stated above. Then the division F = t::. · Q is restricted 10
g.

3.1.6 Critical Points of Functions


We now apply this theorem on transversal linear systems to our situation con·
ceming critical points of functions.
Suppose that !(xi) is the germ at the origin of Rn of an algebraically isokmd
singular point. By this we mean thallhe quotient algebra R ( (xil J/(Ideal generat1d
by the fx;) is of ftnite dimension. Suppose that l, b 1 , b 2 , ••• , bk is a basis of

this ~-algebra. consisting of polynomials. Then we have this:
Sec. 3.1] The Universal Unfolding of the Genn of a Function 69
71zeorem 1. The expression:

F(x, u) = f(x) t

Is a universal unfolding of the germ f(x).


first consider a defonnation, i.e. an unfolding of dimension one: f{x, t);
suppose that, up to a value 10 > 0, we can defme a functiong;t-+ UJ and diffeo·
morphisms 111, 11; of the source and the target (h; being the translationy-+ y + a(t)
such that:

f(x, 1) = F(h1(x), g(t)) + a(t)

=hi (F(ht(x), g(t)))

By differentiating this relation with respect to 1 we obtain:

M dh! , ~
- (x, 1) = :E Fx 1(h1(x),g(t)) - (x) + F11 g (t) + -
dr 1 dt de

The function df/dt(x, t) is defined by the deformation. Let us effect on its


,,
argument the change of variables x 4 x'; with I fixed at 10 we set

A (x') = df/dt(hi~ (x})

To apply the preparation theorem, we consider the auxiJjary mapping

G :( R11 , 0) X (IRk, 0) .... (R" , 0) X (Rk, 0)


(w. x) (y. 11)

defined by

y; = -
oF
-
of
+ ~ u· ob;
cOX{ ox; /=0 I ibt

This mapping G is of ftnite type because on the formal power series, R [ [x Jl I


Jifx1) is a R-vector space with basis 1, b 1 , b 2 , ••• , bko and ~ ( [x, u1/J(F; ;) is a
free ~[(u)] -module, which has the same elements I, b 1 , b2 , • • • , bk for a basis.
70 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch.3
li thus follows that every function A (x, u;) can be written :

A(x, u) = ~ F';1 Q; + p11 (A)


I

where the 'remainder' Pu(A) can be written

p 11 (A(x, u))= !a;(u)b;(x) + c(A) (u)


where c(A) is the scalar coefficient of the basis element I .
Thus the linear system
~ F'i1Q;(x, u) = A(x) - p,(A)
I

consider as a linear system in the unknowns Qf, with (x, u) as parameters, is n


transverse linear system. ln fact , the map (x, u)-> (F~, u), which is none other
than our mapping G, is transversal to the manifolds of null linear mappings
defined by F'i1 = 0. (To see this it suffices to note that If the Taylor series of
f begins with a term of third degree (which is, of course, the only interesting
case), then the bJscontain the coordinate functionsx 1 ,x 1 , . . . ,xn. In particular, it
follows that the subset of (x, 11) satisfying F'i1 = 0 is a smooth submanifold of
dimension k.
From the transverse nature of this linear system we deduce the existence' of
operators Q;(A), depending continuously upon A, with values in (x, u) and such
that

A(x) = " ~~ Q(A) (x,u) + Pu(A)


l:
I= I

Given this we return to our function A(x') defined in terms of df/dt and the
transformation 11(1 • This is written as follows

A(x',u) = ~ F~. Q;(A) (x', u) + a0 (u) + ~ a;(u)bf(x')


I= l . 1 /= 1

Since x' = ll,(x) we have finally to solve the ordinary differential equations which
define 111 and g 1 :

dhr/dt = Q;(A(x, g)) (11 1(x), g1(u))

dgr/dt = a1{A(x, g))


1
da/ dl = a 0 fA(x. g))(t) c
Sec.3.1 I The Universal Uofoldinc of the Germ of a Function 71

By integrating these equations we C\ln reconstruct h 1(x),g1(x) and the trans·


lauon a(u) which acts on the target space.
When the parameter space T is multidimensional, we are led to consider a
family of deforma tions ! 1 depending upon new parameters~ ; we then utilise the
same preparation theorem where we have added the parameters 11 to the parameters
u, to carry out the integration.

l'IIIIJU~SS of the Unil'ersai Unfoldlnl


Ltmm11. Suppose (i) that F(x, u) = f(x) + :E u1 b1(x) is the universal unfolding of
the rerm f(x) and (li) that there exists an endomorphism ~ of(U, 0) into itself
(u1- ~(v1 )), such tlwtthe unfolding G Induced by~ is itself 'versa/'. Then~ is a
/oCQ/ diffeomorphism and

G(x; v) = /{x) + l: k 1(vj) bt(x)


j

Suppose that the mappmg t/1 is not of maximum rank k at 0, then in the
quotient algebra,

~ [(x; v)] /Ideal (oG/oxt)


I
at least one direction of the space of the bts is not in the image of j fat 0. If
Jlt) is deformed along this direction we cannot express the derivative as a linear •
tombinat.ion of the ~v) b1. Thus G cannot be a versa I unfolding.
tr two unfoldings with parameters U and V are 'versal' and of the same
d1111enslon k then they are eqwvalent. In fact, if this is the case there exists
mappmgs s:U -+ V, t: V -+ U which induce upon U, resp. V, the unfoldings
equtvalent to the unfolding initially given on U, resp. V. We can apply the pre·
ceding lemma to the composed mappings 1 o s, s o t to show that s and t are
local diffeomorphisms.

3.1.7 The Rtsidual Singularity


In the preceding paragraph we postulated that the Taylor series ofl(x) in 0 began
"lth terms of degree three or higher. If this is not the case the Taylor series
et~ntamsa quadratic form q(x) of rank 0 < k <: n.

Definition 8. A local fib ration p :Jt" -> Jt"-111 Is sald to be adapted to the
~trm /{x),lf the restriction off to the leaf F0 = p - 1 (p(O)) has the origin as a
non-dtgenerate quadratic critical point.
lt is clear that the maximum dimension of such an adapted fibration is equal
10 the rank k of the quadratic form q(x). Henceforth. all of the fibrations we
ooruider are of maximal dimension.
72 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

1f f(x) has 0 as a non-degenerate critical point on the leaf p - 1 (O) (p(O) = 0)


then f has a non-degenerate critical point near 0 on each nearby leaf p-1 (a)
wltere a is small. This follows from the implicit function theorem. The set of
these critical points is the solution of the system of equations artax = 0 (where
p(x, y) = y) which has maximal rank and hence is a submanlfold w•-k of
dimension (n - k), transverse to the fibration.
ft follows from the theorem of M. Morse on non-degenerate critical points
that we can make a coordinate transformation x ..,. x' (depending differentiably
on y) , such that if c(y) denotes the critical point,

then we have
f(x , y) = q(x) + f(c{y))

The function g(y) = f(c(y)) is called the residual singulariry of f(x); the
Taylor series of g{y) begins with a term of order three; if it was not thus one
could add to q(x) a quadratic term tn a linear function (yf) which is independent
of x, and the form q(x) would not be rank k , but (k + 1).
We now show that the residual singularity is well-defined up to equivalence.
Consider another foliation adapted to the singularity f(x): it is given by a
system of equations of the form

Yi - IIJ (Xi)= COnSl.

It therefore is associated to a new submanlfold w'. locus of the critical


points of the restriction off to the leaves y - ll(x) = const. Consequently,
Jll' is defmed by the system of equations 0 = ar;ax. where f(x) = x 2 + g(y) and
where we substitute y as a function of x by Yl' = ll;(x) = const. The equation can
then be written
ag oh;
(W')-2x= : E - · -
1 ag; ax
and the new residual singularity is defmed by

g. (y) = l{c. {y)) = g(y) +


1
- (ag oh
:E - ·-
1
)

4 i ily ax

Consequently, we pass from g(y) to the new residual singularity w which


has been added a function
Sec. 3.1] The Uniftrlll Unfolding of the Gum of • Function 73

"hich, when we substitute x in the functiony and solve (W') for x, is an element
of the square of the ideal of the partial derivatives agjay. But we have the following
theorem due to J. C. Tougeron [14] (p. 57, Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 2. Let f(x;) be a function such that

f{O) = /'{0) = ('(0) = 0

lftht square of the ideal J generated on (x) by tire fx; contains G(x), then there
aim a local diffeomorplrism h:x-. x, such that !(x) + G(x) = !(h(x)).
i'rr>of. Consider the deformationf(x) + rG(x). Since the ideal J1 of partial deriva-
tives off+ tG is independent oft, we can express the infinitesimal deformation
d'dt (/ +tG) = G off+ tG in the form

3
G(x) = ~ - (/ + rG) X;(x, t)
1 3x;

The deformation is thus compensated by an infmitesimnl deformation of the


10urce (defined by the Xt); by integration with respect to t we obtain the
rtsult of Theorem 2.
1t follows from the notion of the residual singularity that two germs !(x).
/ 1(x), which have the same residual singularity, have the same universal unfold-
q, and differ onJy by quadratic terms which are unimportant for the topological
r~~ture of the singularity.
These singularities thus have two important numerical invariants: the
ro-r1111k (n - k), which is the number of variables involved in the residual singu-
larity, and the eo-dimension, which corresponds to the dimension of the universal
unfolding.

3.1.8 Singul.arities of cCHlimension less than four


In the space Q{n) of quadratic forms in n variables, the quadratic forms of
ro-rank p form a submanifold of eo-dimension p(p + I )/2, the number of
rocfOclents of a quadratic form m p variables. it therefore follows that if there
1re at most four degrees of freedom, at our disposal, we will only be able to
1calise in a stable manner (transversal) only those critical points of eo-rank one or
two, those of eo-rank three being of eo-dimension six. On this basis, the list of
lllljlular points of eo-dimension four or less is as follows:

I. CH1111k One lf x is the corresponding interval variable we will have these


qular points:
74 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

Singularity eo-dimension Unfolding Name

V=xl 0
V= x 3 1 x 3 +ux Fold
V=x 4 2 x 4 + uxl + vx Cusp
V=x 5 3 x 5 + ux 3 + vx 1 + wx Swallowtail
V=x6 4 x 6 + ti.X4 + vx3 + wx 1 +IX Butterfly

2. Co-rank Two TI1e Taylor series ot f(:x) srarts w1th J cubt.: 1urm H(.r. l' 1 in the
two variables (x,y). The linear pencil H...-(x,y) + kHy(x.y) o.ldines :lll hl\'l'lution of
the projective line, which in general is non degenerate.
Firstly, suppose that the double points of this involution are distinct and
real, for example x = O,y = 0 ; then H = x 3 + y 3 • Tills singularity, of which the
uruversal unfolding is

V = x3 + y3 + wxy - ux - vy.

is called the hyperbolic umbilic.


If the double pointS of the Involution are distinct and Imaginary conjugates
(for example, the cyclic points: xl + yl = 0) the corresponding cubic form is

H = x3 - 3xy1

because x 1 - y 2 + kxy has double pointsx2 + y 1 (since the two pohlts x 1 -i


and xy are rectangular). This is the e/lipric wnbilic.
Finally, suppose that the double points coUapsc to the poim x = 0: that il
to say that the involution has the fixed point x = 0 . Titen we se1 H., = !xy and
Hy = x 1 , from which H = x 1 y . But for the function x 2 y, I he origin is not an
isolated point. To isolate the singular poin t it is necessary to add to Ha term uf
degree four which is no t divisible by x, for example:

V= xly + y 4
We can show that two such fourth degree terms wbtch are nut divisible by x
lead to equivalent singularities (T. Lu (4] ).
The transition between elliptic umbilic and hyperbolic umbilic is caUed thl
parabolic umbilic.
We will st udy the catastrophes corresponding to these singularities (element·
tuy catastrophes) in the next chapter.
Sec.3.1] The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Function 75

3.1.9. The stratification of the function space


If M is a compact differentiable manifold we denote by L(M) the space of real·
ft!ued c- functions on M.
We say that a function is of finite singular type (/.s.t. in the terminology of
I. Mather), if it has no more than a fmite number of singular points each of
which is algebraically isolated.
The f.s.t. functions form an open and dense subset of L(M) the complement
,f which is of infinite eo-dimension. Moreover, this set Is endowed with a
llratlfication. To see this we define an equivalence relation between germs of
algebraically isolated functions: Two germs g, g' are said to be 'equisingular' if
each of them Is ln the universal unfolding of the other. Then we have the follow-
Ing .

Proposition 1. The set o[germs which are equisingu/ar with a given gem1 g [om u
a fmooth submani[old in the universal unfolding ofg.
ln the product Rn X U which Is the global space of the universal unfolding
,ff(x). we consider the algebraic subset A of critical points(inx)ofthe following
functions:

F(x, u ) = f(x) + 2: Ujbj(x).


I

(We can, in fact, suppose that /(x) is a polynomial, since the ideal of fx 1 contains
a power of the maximal ideal m , say ms; then, by a change of coordinates we can
remove all the terms of degree> 2s tn the Taylor series, using Theorem 2).
From the definition of the un iversal unfold ing, every point a has a neighbour·
hood in Rn X U which Is a 'versa!' unfolding of the germ of F(x, u(a)) at the
point a. But every algebraic subset such as A can be stratified in such a manner
that two points of the same strata have 'isomorphic' neighbourhoods under a
bomeomorphism compatible with the stratification. It is said that an algebraic
IUbset defines a 11wrphology of finite type when the 'elemen tary chreods' are
p1en by the local algebraic models M , ,M 2 , ••• • M~.-, each model corresponding
10 a stratum. We have a relation of inclusion between these morphogenetic
fields: M1 c M1, if and only if the stratum Xj of centre M! contains the stratum
Xt of centre Mt in its closure; we can only have MJ C M1and M1C M; if M1 and
M1 are identical (this will only be so because if M1 C Mf, then dim X1 <;;dim Xf).
Thus if g' is contained in the uruvcrsal unfolding of g in U, then there exists a
Dtighbourhood about the corresponding point of Rn X U, which is a versa!
unfolding of g' Because of dunenston, thts neighbourhood Is also universal so
that the local model of the set A at g' is a submodel of the model defmed by A
it 0 But we also have the reciprocal rei:Hlon, the model of g Is a submodel of
thlt of g' . Thus g and g' are in the same stratum. On the other hand, we can
llppose that the local models M1 have been defined to take account of the position
76 The theory of the unh-ersat unfolding [Ch. 3

of the struta of A with respect to the projection Rn X lfl 4 U : q is asswned to


be of maximum rank on each stratum (i.e. a local immersion). Thus the stratum
of genns equisingular to fare projected into the space U by an immersion, thus
a local embedding. The stratification of the sem1-algebraic set q(A ) C U then serves
to define a local stratification of the function space L in a neighbourhood of the
genn f. In fact, to each function g of a neighbourhood off in L we can associate
an equivalent germ F o u(x), where the locatdlffeomorphlsm u oT Uis a continuous
function of g, u = k(g). The mapping k : W -> U thus defined, is oifferentiable,
suJjective and of maximal rank. We thus obtain a stratification, the reciprocal
image under k of the minimal stratification of U containing q(A) as a stratified
subset. Since all f .s.t. functions have only a ftnile number of critical points, we
obtain a firute number of local stratifications of ftnite eo-dimension passing
through each such function (stratifications which, by reason of their deftnltion, do
coincide in the intersection of two local charts of L). We complete this stratlficatian
by considering multiple critical values;if c is a critical point of equistngularity type
g, and c' another of type g' , the functions whlch possess both c and c' form a
Stratum X,~·· the intersection of Xg and Xg•.Jn X,~ · , we intiOdUce as substratum
the subset Y C X1 .1 • of functions f such that./{c) = f{c'). Similarly for multiple
critical values of arbitrary multiplicity (the non-degenerate critical pomu must
not be forgotten in constructing thls stratification). Thus we complete the
stratificat ion of L . (it clearly remains to show lhnt thls last construction effectively
gives rise to a stratifteation; this is proved by using the 'multi-jets' of Mather).
Remark 1. The notion of eqwsingularity proposed here is finer than that which
is usuatty considered in Algebraic Geometry: in fact , along with the local topo-
logical properties of the gem1 11 introduces those of its universal unfolding.
Remark 2. We could consider Introducing in the space Rn X U, the algebraic
stratification defmed by the dimension of the quotient ~-algebra ~ [ [x]J /ideal
ifx;) at each critical point. This stratification Is probably less ftne than tlut
deftned by A: for example, we can conjecture that the set of points (x, u) whm
this algebra has a given rank , is a smooth subma.nifold, but that the umon of these
smooth submanlfolds does not satisfy the conditions (A, B) of Whltney.
The group Diff V" of diffeomorphisms of the source and the group of
diffeomorphlsms of lh.e target R act on the space L(V, R). This action is corn·
patible wilh the stratification defmed above. On all the strata of codlmension
< 7, the group acts transitively. But from the quadratic singularity V = x4 - y'
onwards, there appear contmuous mvariants, the moduli (for example, tht
cross-ratio of four lines). One such stratum is of eo-dimension 7. {1l1is is for the
singularities of eo-rank two; for the singularities of eo-rank three a cubic cune
with equation x 3 + y 3 + z3 = 0 has itself a FOjective invariant, the Weierstms
invariant. One such stratum is also of eo-dimension 7 .)
In the situation in which we are interested, where th~ !>ase space 1s at moQ
four-dimensional, all the strata which meet transversally have differentiable loal
Sec. 3.2] Stratified Spaces and Morphisrns: Topological Theory 77

trlvialisations under the action of the group. (A vector field on a stratum can be
embedded in the ambient space in a manner compatible with the stratification.)
11 thus follows that the mappings which. in a chrcod, define the catastrophe set
liS the prc·image of a standard semi-algebraic subset can always be assumed to be
globally differentiable.

3.1 .1 0 Universal unfolding of a mapping germ


Consider the germ of a mapping

where Y/ o f = /j(x;). Let M§ be the free R [ [xill·module with p generators.


The Jacobian mapping at 0 defines a linear mapping of the free Rl [x; j j ·module
X;(x) Into Mf If the image of this mapping is of finite eo-dimension we can
generalise the preceding theory to the case of germs of mappings. Clearly, this
oonditlon of finite eo-dimension IS no longer realised 'almost always', 3S was the
case for functions. It follows that the algebraic theory of universal unfoldings is
too demanding and it has to be replaced by a topofogiCtlf theory of the universal
unfolding.

3.2 STRATIFIED SPACES AND MORPfDSMS: TOPOLOGICAL THEORY


3.2.1 Stratified Sets
If V tS a manifold of dimension n - q embedded in R" . we know that almost
all dtfferentiable mappings

f: Rk .... R"
are transversa l ro V and that the pre·imagc W(j) = } 1 (V) Is then a submanifold
of eo-dimension q in Rk. Moreover, If g is a mapping sufficiently close to fin the
C1·topology then the pre·lmage submanlfolds W(f) and W(g} are isotopic under
w isotopy of R"' compatible with a deformation F1 off mto g. The same
property is true, almost immediately. if instead of a sub manifold V, we consider
a system of submanifolds in general position or. more generally a manifold with
oomm diffcrentiably embedded in R" .
The basic idea of the theory of stratified sets is to establish an analogous
properly for nny subset A of R" which is a compact semi·lllgebraic or semi·
analytic set. We try to encapsulate the set A in a one·parameter family of regular
neighbourhoods T,(A) which for r small are diffeomorphic to manifolds with
oomcrs. With a suitable defutiuon of trariSversalny, if f:Rk ~ R'' is transversal
to A./Is transversal to all the manifolds with t."'rners T,(A) for sufficiently small
r We then have an isotopy theorem for those mappings F1:R X Rk -> R" X R
78 The theory of the unh•ersal unfolding (Ch. 3

which are Lr:msverse to T,(A ). The only difficulty, admittedly an important


one, is to show that lhese isotopies can be fitted together into an isotopy of
the pre·image F(1 (A) when r tends to zero.
To construct !.his family T,(A) of tubular neighbourhoods we decompose
A into a finite union of embedded submanifolds x,,lhe strata of A, ~uch that,
if Xt is In the closure of Xj, the properties (A, B) of Wh.itney hold at Cllch point
x 0 of Xt· If Ty(Xj) denotes the tangent space to Xf aty then for every sequence
y,ln Xf converging to Xo and all sequences Xt converging to x 0 ,

llm
X f.)'(- X,
-
Angle (X;)';, T.yt(Xj)) = 0

The existence of such a decomposition for affine analytic sets has been proved
by Wh.itney, and for semi-analytic sets by LoJasiewicz. Such a decomposition,
whic!!_ we henceforth_ call a 1tratificatlon, possesses the frontier property· if
X n Y -#.then X c Yand dtm X< dim Y.
Denote this situation by X < Y (X incident to Y). A chain of strata is a
sequence X., X 1 , • • • , Xk such that Xt < x,. I· A central property of stratified
sets Is this: we can defme for each stratum X a family of tubular neighbourhoods
(in the usual sense of Differential Geometry) T,(X) such that the boundaries of
the tubes T,(X;) of a chain of strata Xt cut each other transversally.
Then we can form the family of global tubular neighbourhoods of the set
A by taking the union of these tubes (taking radU r of the form r = e' , where s
is the dimension of the stratum X).
In Thorn (EMS) [11] there is a sufficiently complete version, good but
difficult to read. of the theory of stratified sets. J . Mather has since given a
complete version (TS) [7] . There exists a purely formal theory of stratified
sets Thorn (SMA) [10] , (LM) [13]: the mcidence schema of the sets is given and
considered as an ordered graph, to each chain (c) of strata are associated a mam·
fold.M(c) with boundary and corners (the maximum 'eo-dimension' of the corners
is the length of the chain, i.e. the number of strata contained in the chain). Jf c'
is a sub-<:hain of c there is a surjection kc(c' of the manifold M(c) onto the
manifold M(c') which is a differentiable fibration with well-defined local models
on the corners of the boundaries of the source of a target. We then impose
obvious conditions of transversality upon these suljections. The global stratified
set E can thus be obtained as the disjoint union of these M(c) with the identinca·
tions defmed by the sutjections.

3.2.2 Projection of a stratified set. Stratified morpbisms


If the notion of stratified set can now be considered as definitively established,
this is not the case for the general notion of 'stratified morphism'. Firstly,consider
the problem of the projection under a linear mappingp: R"+k- f?n ofastratif~ed
set A embedded in Rn+k .
Sec. 3.2] Stratified Spaces and Morphisms: Topological Theory 79

Suppose that after a refmement of the stratification of A , the projection p


is of constant rank o n each stratum. Then the image X' = p(X) of each stratum
X of A ls immersed in the target space IRn . lt is easy to see that the property (A)
for the incidence of two strata X and Y of A implies the same property for their
projections X' and y' . It is not the same for property (B) which demands a
special hypothesis. Finally, it is natural to require that the intersections between
the manifolds (X') (and their self-intersections) are in general position. We thus
introduce strata Y' in the projection A ' = p(A) of which we must take pre-.U:~age
under p In the strata of A . We find a situation where one can legitimately call the
projection p of the set A onto its image A, a 'stratified morphlsm'. One property
of such a morphism Is the property of 'local triviality' on each stratum of th.e
a
target; the pre-image A n p - 1 (X') of a stratum X' of the target is fibre space
over X' where the fibre is a stratified set. (This follows from the property of
transversal sections of a stratified set which was discussed above.)
But the notion thus obtained is not sufficiently precise. We might hope to
proceed as follows: if A is stratified in ~n, B is stratified in IV then A X B is
stratified in ~n X ~P and the projection q: A X B ... B provides a local model
for a stratified morphlsm. But this gives a situation which is much too <igid , since
even the projection of angle COc' onto its bisectri'C cannot be locally stratified
in that sense.
Thus, lf locally we accept a model of this type (projection of a product onto
a factor), it is necessary to accept the possibility of collapsing certain strata of the
fibre-factor when moving ·the base point in the base factor to the boundary of a
stratum.
In the formal theory of stratified sets, the space obtained from a stratified
set A by collapsing in a point a closed stratified subset K ofA , say A fK, is equally a
stratified set. ln the most general manner we can define a stratified set A onto a
set B by a local model condition deftned on a product (or on local connected
components defined by a corner) as shown below (para. 3.2.3).
Finally, it is U1is construction which serves to define an important class of
stratified morphisms, the soft morphlsm or morphlsm without rupture.

3.2.3 Soft Morphisms


Suppose that A is stratified in ~n +k , p: ~n +k -+ ~n, A ' = p(A) the image of A
stratified as well. U p/A is a soft morphlsm, i t is possible to associate to each
stratum X of A a tube T(X) obtained in the following ways: consider the image
X' of X in A' ,let T(X') be a tube for X' in ~n ; then we can ftnd a 'vertical' tube
V(X), a neighbourhood of X in the saturation p-I (p(X)) , such that T(X) is the
'dirtct sum' of V(X) and of a tube induced from T(X') by p. Moreover, these
tubes are subject to the conditons of transversaJ intersection for the strata of a
chain. To each chain c of A is associated .a chain of A', its projection. To a
manifold with corners M(c') we find associated a pre-irnage under p which is the
local product of M(c') , with a stratification defmed by the manifolds with corners
80 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

of the kernel Rk of p. When we pass from a cham c' to a subchain c" we have a
mapping of the corresponding kernels Rk - Ker p which is expressed by a surjec·
tion of the strata of Ker(c') onto the strataofKer(c").The identification mapping
thus defined is therefore of the type of those obtained by collapsing to a stratum
one of Its tubular neighbourhoods. A precise defmition can only be given using
the local models. In particular it thus follows that in the attaching map of a
'flag' of Y on X, X< Y , the restrictions to the kernels ky x: Ker piX- Ker plY
are surjective.
The fundamental property of these morphis!m is expressed in the 'second'
isotopy theorem: If A'!. B!.. R is such that p and t o pare sofl morphisms, and
a and bare two pointsofthe same stratum of R. then the corresponding morphlsms
of sections A~ ... 8 11 and Ab - Bb are of the same topological type.
'Generic' differentiable mappings are soft morphisms. On this subJect see
my article (LM) [13].

3.2.4 Stratification of the space G of germs of holomorphic mappings


Let f:(N, 0)- (P, 0 1) be a germ of a holomorphic mapping of(:'! into C'. Denott
by S(/) the critical set of the germ f. If the Jet/(/) at the origin is not contained
in a certain subset K of r(!'. p) of infinite eo-dimension, then the morphlsm
/1S(/) onto its images' is a fmite morphism. Moreover, Grauert's theorem implies
that the set s' is an analytic set at the point 0 1 of P. Denote the subset of G
consisting of those germs whose jets at 0 are not in K by G 1 • Then the same
property holds for .each g e G1 at each point x eN sufficiently close to 0, so
that one has tlus result. the global mappings Fl(N X G 1 ) ~ P X G1 defined by
(x, g) ~ (g(x), g) is also a finite analytic morphism on a neighbourhood of
(OX {G 1 }) !'I S(F). Moreover. the image of FlS(F) is analytic in a neighbourhood
of 0 1 X G 1 in P X G1 • The sets S(F) and F(S(F) can therefore be stratified in 1
neighbourhood of 0 X G, resp. 0 1 X G 1 • Since the morphism is finite, we can
also 'stratify' FIn" a manner which makes lt a soft morpbism. The fact that tht
space G is of onftnite dimension does not prevent us applying Grauen 's theoren
to F, nor does it prevent us from locally stratifying a finite analytic morplus:n
on its critical set.
For the real construction we have the same properties as for this compltx
construction except that here S(F) and F(S(F)) have semi-analytic suatirtcatioll
at the origin.
Moreover, ln both cases, locally on 0 1 X G,. F is a soft stratified morphitr.l
After forming the intersections and self-Intersections of the image strata. 1t
have to take their pre-image under Fin the domain. The strata thus Introduced
are of two types: (a) those which consist of regular points of N X G1• in wlu±
case the eo-rank ofF is n - p and the kernel Ker F depends diffemtiably up-
the regular point x EN X G1, (b) those where the critical strata t~re mapped ontJ
Sec. 3.2) Stratified Spaces and Morphisms: Topological Theory 81

their image in P X G1 by a local diffeomorphism. But the boundary strata are


also critical and the condition on krx :Ker plY-+ Ker piX follows immediately.
H remains to be shown that the stratification of G1 thus deftoed is in fact,
if one restricts to strata of finite eo-dimension in G1 , a stratification of the jet
space .f(n, p). Ln other words: if g is a germ in G 1 which belongs to a stratum
of ftoite eo-dimension, then every germ g 1 which has a sufficiently high order
of contact with g is in this stratum. In (EMS) (11] I presented a scheme for
proving this theorem (that announced in my Theorem 4 of LTP 112] ). J . Matller
has since given a proof based on·a different principle.
The principal properties which are utilised are the following:

I. A genera/isatio11 of Boardman Symbol theory


This utilises Lemma 4A.l of (EMS) [11] which, however, is incorrectly formu·
lated. The correct statement is this :
Suppose V is a submanifoid of J'(n, p), such that the eo-rank at 0 in the
source of the canonical projection into!' (n, p) is strictly less than n·(co.<Jim V).
Let
p;J'+ 1 (n, p) ~J'(n, p)

denote the canonical projection. Then there exists a true submanifold s. V (the
'symbol' of V) such that every jet z e p- 1 (V)- s. V has the following property:
if I is a local realisation of z then i'l is transverse to V at 0 and , moreover, the
local restriction of 1 to the manifold i'ifr 1 (V) is of maxima.! rank (a local
embedding).

2. A lemma on the set of limiting positions along a section of an analytic


set by a differentiable manifold (Lemma 4A.3 of (EMS) [11]
Let A be a germ of an analytic set at 0 jn Rn and /be a local embedding of rank
(R*, 0) Into (Rn, 0). Suppose that f is transverse to the set A 1 ofsmooth points
of A and is analytic at 0 . Then the set of limiting positions, for x e /\Rk) U A,
of intersections of tangent planes Txff) n Tx(A 1) for x ..... 0, is a semi-algebraic
subset oft he Grassmanlan K which only depends on the (sufficiently high order)
jet of f.
This lemma serves to show that for the sets deftned by derivation from local
germ I the properties (A) and (B) of Whitney are in fact deftoed by the jet of
{; because these properties are deftoed by the limit set of the tangent planes at
smooth points.

3. A Lemma 011 the stabilisarion of self-intersections


lf V is, as always, a germ of a manifold defined by derivation from an analytic
germ f. the self-intersection of the image /\V) in the target is a semi-analytic
subset. Thus the topological types (if f Is an Immersion) is entirely deftoed by
the jet of1 (as equations and local inequalities).
82 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3

By induction on the Increasing dimension of the critical strata of S(/), the


lemmas allow us to show the image strata only depending on the jet of f. Let
us fust show this for the Strata of minimal dimension X; = D;(f), where D; is a
certain system of differential operators defmed on a submanifold of the jet
space r(n, p) of maximum eo-dimension. The image !{X;) is then a local
immersion: we stabilise the self-intersection f(Xt) n f{Xt), and also its singulari-
ties, if it has them. Suppose that T(/) is a system of generators of the ideal
associated to !{X;); from U:mma 3 above the jet of T(J) only depends upon the
jet of f. When this self-intersection is the only (complex) singularity of the image
!(X,), a system of generators (g) of the ideal of !{X;) in tbe target satisfies a
Lojasiewicz inequallt y near 0

(e) :Eig;l2 + :EIJ(g,)l2 > C IT(f)f ,a> 0

Tilere the J(g;) are the Jacobians obtained from the equations of D;(f) by
repeated application of the preparation theorem and elimination of the coordin·
ates of the source. That is to say that the jet of g depends only on the jet off.
Thus if we have an inequality of type (e) for[, we then have the same
inequali ty for all germs [ 1 such that[-/1 is soft at 0 to a sufficiently high order.
By induction the same inequali ty holds for all images of the critical strata
Xj = D1(f), at the price of including as the second member of (e) a system of
generators for the image of the symbol of Dj (if these are nor already contained
in the self-intersection).
This reasoning allows us to stabilise the Images of critical strata: an argument
analogous to U:mma 3 (but sin1pler)allows us to stabilise the saturates/1(f(D;(I)))
of crit ical strata, and thus their transversal intersections.
For a complete proof see C. G. Gibson er al. [2].

3.2.5 Universal Unfolding of a Germ


Suppose that f Is a germ belonging to a stratum of the space of germs G1 of
finite eo-dimension q; the 'universal unfolding' of [is the glo bal mapping

defined by a germ of the manifold Rq which is transverse to the stratum off at/.
Two universal unfoldings off are isomorphic as stratified morphisms, il1t
isomorphism being compatible with a stratified homeomorphism of the parametet
space Rq. Two germs S of G 1 belonging to the same suatum have isomorphic
unfoldings (in the above sense). In particular, we can talk about the universal
unfolding of a jet, provided that the jet defines a stratum of G, of fmite oo- l
dimension.
Sec. 3.2] Stratified Spaces and Morphisms: Topological Theory 83

Remark 1. If a germ f belongs to G1 i.e. is such that f is a fmite morphism on


S(f), we know, from J. Mather (LTS) [7]. that it is possible to find ak·parameter
family F: Rn X Rk -+ RP X Rk , which is structurally stable in the sense of
differentiable equivalence. This point constitutes the starting point of J. Mather's
proof of the density of structurally stable mappings. But such a map F is not
stable vis~·vis diffeomorphlsms whlch commute with the projection onto the
parameter space Rk. It does not constitute a 'universal unfolding' in our sense
(at least in general). Thus the map f: R 2 -+ R2 in G 1 defined by X = r, Y=y
is included in the globally stable family X= x 3 + we, Y = u, U = u. Thls last
map is not the universal unfolding off, whlch does not exist (at least in so far as
it is a family of finite dimension).
Remark 2. The germs belonging to lWOdifferent strata sI. s2 of G l have the
latlle stratified topological type; these germs then have different universal
unfoldings. An example of this phenomenon has been constructed by F. Plum,
Bdancon and Speder.

REFERENCES
[I] Glaeser, G., Fonctions composees differentiables, Ann. of Matll., 77, I,
1963, pp. 193- 209.
[2] Gibson, C. G., er al., Topological stability of smooth mappings, Springer
Lecture Notes 552, Berlin, 1976.
[3] Lojasiewicz, S., Whilney fields and Malgrange- Mather preparation theorem,
Uverpool Singularities Symposium, August 1970, Springer Lecture Notes
192, pp.106- 115 .
[4] Lu, Y. C., Sufficiency of jets in !''(2, I) via decompositon,Jnventiones
Mach., 10,1970, pp.119- 127.
[5] Malgrange, B. (1. D.), Une remarque sur les ideaux de fonctions different!·
abies, lnventiones Matlt., 9, 4, 1970, pp. 279- 283.
(6] Martinet, J ., These, Les singularites des formes differentielles (Ann. lnstitut
Pourier,l970).
(7] Mather, J . (LTS), Lectures on topological stability. Harvard University 1970.
(8] Malher, J . (SSM), Stability on c!"' mappings {1-VJ) (Pub!. Math. IHES,
en particulier).
(9] Nirenberg, L. (TPD), A proof of the Malgrange preparation theorem.
Liverpool SinguJarities Symposium, August 1970, Springer Lecture Notes
192, pp. 97-105.
[10) Thorn, R. (SMA), La structure locale des morphlsmes analytiques. Congres
International de Nice, 1970.
[11] Thorn, R. (EMS), Ensembles at morphlsmes stratifies, Bull. Amer. Matll.
Soci., ?S, 2,1969, pp. 240- 284.
84 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3]

[12] Thom, R. {LTP) Local topological properties of differentiable mappings


differential analysis, Bombay Colloquium, 1974.
[13] Thorn, R. {l.M), Stratifted sets and morphlsmes: local models , Uverpool
Singularities Symposium. Springer Lecture Notes 192, pp. 153-64.
(14) Tougeron, 1. C., ldearlx de fonctiom differenti1lbles, Springer Verlag,
Berlin, J 972.
CHAPTER4

Catastrophe theory

What is catastrophe theory? it is 110t easy to reply to tire questio11. 011 the o11e
ha11d, we ore hard put ro see a clear disti11crion between catastrophe theory 011d
earlier work on the applications of bi/urcatiOII theory and, on the other, the
principal procagonisu of this theory (refe"ed to as C. T. for convenience), that
is Orristopher Zeeman and myself. have palpably divergent views on the content
and ultimate aims of the theory. Taking the fmt point fvst: quite basic well
established classical problems CDIJ be considered os relevant to C. T. The work of
Euler on the buckling of beo11u w11s already part of catastrophe theory! On the
second point, it is importam to point out that Zeeman is responsible for the
plvase 'catastrophe thi!Ory: In my book, Structural Stability and Morphogensis.
I i11troduced 110 11l()re than the temli110/ogy 'poims of catastrophe·. By not
hesitating to place tiJfs theory in the framework of o 'systems theory' Zeei'1Uln
has cxmsiderobly enlarged the possible field of applications of C. T. lt is tills
systemic approach which will be adopted here. Notwillrstonding this my poillf of
view remains sufjiciemly different from that of Zeei'1Uln, in the sense that the
methodological aim of C. T. is for Zee11Uln oriented towards the pTIICtical and to
concrete results while for me it is more theoretical and speculative. There is 110
doubt that these differences, which spring from the individual points of view of
the authors, carry with them something of the di$llgreemellfs on the very nature
ofC. T.

4.1 THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH


'General systems theory' is devoted essentially to the activity of deftning what a
system is and hardly gets beyond this. I think that it Is necessary to approach
this question naively ~ a system in which we are interested is necessarily located
in space time, and to specify the system Is to establish the domain of spa.c e-time
it occupies. We shall propose the following :
De{milion 1: A system u the content of a domain (D) of space- time.
Recalling that a domnln of Euclidean space is a connected open set; we reject as
'system' any union of distinct objects. For example, a sei of knife, fork and
86 Catastrophe theory [Ch. 4

spoon constituting a set place at table, is not a system according to this definition.
ln the majority of cases. the domain (D) (or its cut in space at any instant) is not
simply connected, but contractable, in fact, topologicaUy a ball.
Such will be the case if (D) is the contents of a paraUeleptped box. The
boundary of the domain (D) constitutes lhe outer face of the sytcm. If we wish
to have a system whose development will be rigorously 'autonomous',indepedent
of that of the rest of the universe, it would be necessary to render the outer
face impenneable to aU physical mfluences (the flow of matter and energy in
all their fonns) emanating from the outside world, or coming from the domain
(D) itself. Such a system would effectively be the ideal black box. lt would,
however, be unobservable.
This ideal complete isolation can clearly not be attained (nothing is tmpenneable
to gravitation, for exantple). Furthermore, If we study a system, it is in order to
be able to say something about it. It is hence necessary that we can observe
something and hence to extract from the data that which we can describe . This
simple fact shows that it is illusory to wish to separate our system from the rest
of the world . The outer face will hence aUow the passage of inflows and out·
flows of which we try to keep as accurate an account as possible. There is
nothing to prevent the suggestion that the outer face of our domain (D) is purely
fictional, providing that we can assure a satisfactory control of the flows which
cross it.
In the end, we will be able to suppose thatlhe inflows are, at least partially,
at the discretion of lhe experimenter and that at least some of the out flows will
be measurable by the observer. So we arnve fmally at the definition of a system
as an entity susceptible of 'dialogue' with the experimente r, who gives it 'inputs'
and to whJch the entity responds by 'outputs'. Hence the second defmition:
Definition 2 of a sys1em
A system Is an entity in which every input u e U responds by an outpu1 ye Y.
llere we will suppose that input and output are defined respectively by real
parameters· the input u by k real numbers (u 1, u1, .. . , Ilk), the output y by m
real numbers (y., Yl· . .. , Ym ). Input and output are then Eucl!dean vector
.spaces U and Y of dimensions k and m respectively.
If lime Is taken as discrete, having integer values, the sequence 11(11) o f
inputs with the oorresponding sequence y(n) of outputs constitute a ltisrory o(
the system. lt will be convenien t to represent these two sequences jointly as one
de numerable sequence (u(n ). y(n)) of points (u. y) in the product space U X Y.
In oontinuous time we would have a trajectory-curve in U X Y.

4.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF A SYSTEM


ln a system with discrete time , let us consider for a given history u(t).y(t). the
measure, wluch to every open set Wof U X Y associates the 'asymptotic denstty'
of the points (u(n),y(n)) In W:
,
Sec. 4.2) Characteristics of a System 87
1
11 ( W) = lim/,\ _..., N " cardinality {n: (u(n ), y(n)) f lil, 0 -.; 11 40; N}

Sufficiently often, this limit Ill llllts the integral over 111 ul' ~ measure jl(ll. ")
over U X Y. which usually pos$esses some re~tulanty proper11e>. w1d whtch is
often independent of the htstOI) under ~:onstderauon and 1hus uf all .tnlenor
histories of the system If such a measure e'ms m L X Y \\e \\ill c:ill it the
characrerlsric of the system.
In certain particularly simple systems. the characterisu.: i~ \lngular. It has
LIS support \:Cntred on certain submamfolds of the sp1ce 1.: X Y. The following •
cases are of such u nature·

(A} Case of unique response associated IO a given input 11


To every value u of U corresponds a ~A-eU defined output y whatever has been the
antenor htstory of the system. In thiscaseylsa 'function' ofu onl} :tl1e character·
istic is centred on the graph of the mapping 11 4 v. !This mapping G could be
differentiable. analytic, etc.) We are concerned here with S)Stems without
'internal state nor memory'. which only follow a ftxed law, a 'code' transforming
an input into un output.

(8) Systems 'offinite type'


For these systems, to a given input u in U corresponds nnl} a finite number of
outputS. Here again the characteristic is centred on a set K of U X Y such that,
in the projection i: U X Y- U (input) the pre·tmage r• (u) C K is a fmite set for
all u.
When the correspondence rule is sufficiently regular (differentiable} K is
composed of acertain number (at mon denumerable) of submanifolds Wof U X Y.
all of dLmension equal to the dimension k of U.

(C) General systems


To an mput u in U can correspond an infinlt} of outputs y of Y (according 10
the anterior history of the system).ln order to define the ·memory' of the syst~m
we introduce ·rudden· ~-ariables called 'inrrmall·oriah/es · or ·srare •·arillhles'. We
shaU designate them s: s,. s1. · · · ,s,. CO\ering a Euc\idean space uf laJtl~ dunen·
sion N. We are thus required to reconSiruct the rule giving the histories of the
system by a differential system of the fonn

dsfdr = F(s. u) y =Gts:u)


We have here clearly a very difficult problem for ~A-h.lch \\e do not know
whether there is a solution, or in 1he me where there is, a solution giving a
minimal model (for the dimension N of the nate space). What is done Is to
consider the given statistics (for example. the characteristic, if 11 exists) as a
base for a deterministic hermeneutlc. it is the general philosophy of the systemic
approach to start with the 'histories' of the system, or Its characteristi~. and try
88 Catastrophe theory [Ch. 4

to reconstruct, in imagination, the internal mechanisms of the system. Such a


philosophy goes against the experimental method, whkh , in the fa.ce of a black
box, starts to break open the box to see what is inside. A process of ruthless
efficiency, but which does not always produce consistent results, nor is it
easily interpreted .... (Reflect, for example, on the theoretical difficulties of
neurophysiology in the face of the anatomy of the brain ....) Even worse the
procedure has the inconvenience, occasionally disastrous, of irreversibly destroy·
ing the system being studied.
In view of the difficulty of the general problem it Is not unprofitable to
investigate whether the given system is not of the simple type A or B, eventually
perturbed by a "lloise' which mere ly cloaks the singular characteristics of the
reduced system in a tubular neighbouthood appropriate to the perturbations of
the 'noise' (and we shall not question whether it makes sense that this 'noise' is
probablliStic or dete.rministlc). To this end, the first task is to examine closely
the morphology of the characteristic, trying to piece together the geometrical
elements which appear in differentiable systems: folds, sharp corners, cusps,
demanding to be investigated .... Clearly it is difficult to visualise a cloud of
points, or a probability distribution. in a space of higher dimension than three.
A standard technique then consists in projecting the cloud onto 2-dimensional
planes, which arc then varied. Clearly many o f these are needed, since the two·
planes in Euclidean space of dimension n form a space (a Grassmannian) of
dimension 2(n- 2). The interpretation procedure indicated bere goes against
the Gaussian mythology which governs classical data analysis, which, alas, calls
for ready·made recipes on whlch computers are programmed (a search for the
principal axes of a cloud of points). We will do well to familiarise ourselves with
the practice of this interpretation in simple cases, of low dimension,Jeaving until
later U1e approach to situation of higher dimension ....
We go on to give precise examples of 'catastrophes' in these simple cases.

43 THE NOTION OF CATASTROPHE: THE ORDINARY MEANING AND


THE MEANING ACCORDING TO CATASTROPHE THEORY
Let us consider the cases where dim.U = dim.Y = I, and wbere the characteristic
(f') is a closed convex curve in the U X Y plane. Let us suppose this curve to be
given by an equation F(u. y) = 0 with F differentiable, and let tr.(U X Y) ..... U be
the canonical. lf we have chosen a value 110 in the projection n(r}, then y can
take one of the two, possibly coincident, roots of the equation

F(uo,Y) = 0.

Let us suppose that the system replies with the value Yo on the higher
branch. If at the poim (u0 , y 0 ) this root is simple, that is to say the partial
derivative aF{ay (u 0 ,y0 ) =fo 0 at this point, then by applying the implicit function

Sec. 43) The Notion of Catastrophe: 89

theorem we can solve F(u0 ,y) locally by y = op(u), withy0 = op(u0 ).1t is reasonable
to allow that if we vary the input u m a neighbourhood of u 0 , then y varies with
respect to a neighbourhood ) u 0 - 17, u 0 + 11 [ according to the rule y = 'P(u):
this is by continuity of the 'internal states' of the system.

y Yo

a· u


Fig. 4 .I

lt is imponant then to determine the points of r where Lhe implicit function


theorem no longer applies. There arc two pointsa ,b where rhasa tangent parallel
toy. (For then grad F with components Fx. Fy has a zero y-component, whence
aFfay = 0 at these points.) We shall mdlcate by a', b' the projection of a, b by
11, n(n) is the segment [a' b'] of U. If we make u change from u 0 , such Lhat the
point (u, op(u)) is not a orb we can continue to malntain'P(u), but after having
attained the value b' , If we push 11 beyond b' there no longer exists a possible
response of the system. The system is thus destroyed giving place Irreversibly to
another system. We have here a catastrophe in the ordinary meaning such as
when we push the pressure of u boiler beyond its maximum resistance level.
Clearly in this case we cannot give all values to the control variable (u). This is
clearly a common situation in practice. The majority of control variables can
only take bounded values: an infinite value of a flux can only destroy the system.
Let us consider now the case where the characteristic (r) has the appearance
of an S-shaped curve (Fig. 4 .2).
Again in this case we have two points w1th venical tangents a, b: the critical
poims as we shall see later.
let US take a value Uo in the interval] a' , b' (,and let US SUppose that the
Value Yo corresponding to Lhe input u0 is such Lhat the point (u 0 ,y 0 ) is situated
on the lower brunch of the cut'Ye. In tlus case if we make u increase from u0 ,
such that u < b', we will be able to follow by continuity the local solution
defined by y- op(u). If now we push u beyond the value b' the system is no longer
necessarily destroyed, the internal state can jump sharply on to Lhe higher
branch to the point (b'. b 1 ) and from there continue to grow on the higi1er
branch. Tlus sharp JUmp which permits the system to subsist when it would

90 Catastrophe theory [Ch. 4

normally cease to exist we shall call 'a catastrophe (under the meaning according
to C. T)'. The 'catastrophe' Is thus a 'survival manoeuvre' of a system called on
to leave its normal characteristic state. lt is thus that the benign appearance of
the 'catastrophes' of C. T . are manifest.
Once on the higher branch (y 1), in making u moving from b' towards a', it
will stay on the higher branch as far as a, from which it will return to a 1 by a
catastrophe on to the lower branch.
Tlus example shows again that access to the Intermediate part of the S.shape
is more difficult than to the lower and higher branches. Moreover, only these
latter can be described according to the hysteresis cycle described above.

'

• a' Uo b

Fig. 4 .2

4.4 MORPHOGENESIS AND CATASTROPHE 1HEORY


Let us suppose that on a domain (D) of space- time R• there are a family of
processes dependent on a certain number of control parameters (u). We shaD
consider that around uch point x of (D), the local processes susceptible of
unfoldlng about x can be simulated by the behaviour of a system (Mt) in which
the inputs are the control parameters (11) on the one hand and the spatia-temporal
coordinates of x on the other. The outputs will be all tlte local observables on x.
MetaphoricaJJy. the system (Mx) can be regarded as a black box, but a black box
"itlt ·window: the colour of the window being then the output of (Mx)- The
domam (D) ts then the support of a Aeld of coloured boxes, in fact a truly
pictorial tableau. Where there is a jump in the output, a catastrophe , we shall
have a discontinuity In the properties of tlte medium. hence the creation of a
'form' nslng up on the continuous background.

Sec. 4.5] Stllble Asymptotic Regimes: 91

Classically, we have the hypothesis that for all inputs (u),lhe local systems are
systems of finite type (B), and that their characteristic is a differentiable submanl·
fold of (U = R4 ) X Y. We shaD say that for the process (u) a point xis regular
If at this point the outputg(u, x) = y is a dlfferentlable function of (u, x). Where
there Is a jump from one sheet of the characteristic to another, there is a
'catllstrophe' which will be immediately apparent as a carrier form of the dls·
contsnuity of the observables. For example, let us suppose that (Mx) offers two
possible responses a red window or a blue window. The catastrophe set (K) of
the process will be thus a surface (shock wave) separating the 'red' regime from
the 'blue' regime. The form provides for the confltct between the two stable
regimes which partition the substrate space (D).

PhiloSJOphical remark (This means, according to Paul Vah!ry, that we could


dispense with making it.) Given a being, or obJeCt, we classically distinguish
tts existence, its Da·sein, the fact that the being occupies a certain part of space
time, and Its essence,l\Jat is to say the totality of Its appearances, of its qualities.
The materialist attitude, traditional in science, conslsts of saying that existence
precedes essence (in fact , existence implies essence). The C. T. model of morpho·
genesis goes agamst this axiom, because it presupposes that, to a certain extent,
existence is determined by essence, the set of all the qualities of being. We may
see here a resurgence of the Aristotelian scheme ofhylomorphism: matter aspiring
to form. This underlying idealism explains to a large extent the reservations found
amongst biologistS when faced with the C. T. embryology models, for instance.

4.5 STABLE ASYMPTOTIC REGIMES: TBE ELEMENTARY THEORY


We can ask ourse lves whether a generaJ system, the growth of whJch is defined
by a differential system (S, s) in the state space S. may nevenheless present a
characteristic. Let us ftx the input u e U. If aJmost every traJectory in S tends
towards an attractor. and if there Is a fmite number of such auractors AJ in S
presenting stable characteristics expressed by the presence of an invariant measure
IJ supported by the attractor, then asymptotically, to the input u there correS·
sponds only a finite number of outputsy1{u) defmed by the integral

I
Y;(u) = Af C(y; u) d~; (A1)
IJ(AJ)

The system will therefore nave a characteristic, and it will be of a finite


kind. If the invariant measure ~(A,{u)) depend differentiably on the control
variables u, we will be in the situation of a differentiable system of type ( B).
This case occurs when the dynamic on S·is a gradlem dynamic:

ds/dJ ... - grad V (s; u)


92 Catastrophe I heory (Ch. 4

where the function V IS proper. The attractors are thus the minima of the
potential V(s). If the function V(s) is generic, these minima are isolated points
which , in general, depend dlfferentiably upon the variables u. This case is the
one we call elementary catastrophe theory (E.C.T). This model offers the
advantage of leading to a complete mathematical theory (see Chapter 5). Further,
we can deftne a catastrophe theory Gumping from one minimum to another)
with the help of appropriate conventions.

r.tax-o·s con'l'elltion
lt prescribes that at all pomts u of U the dominant regime is that which corre-
sponds to the lowest minlminJUm.
The catastrophe set (K) is thus the set of u for which the function V(s: u)
attains its absolute minima in two points at least (or in a unique degenerate
minimum). Here again the hypotheses of transversallty (of 'genericity') allows
the description of the generic (stable) singular! ties of the catastrophe set. For
example if U is a plane, the only singul.arities are- the simple line, the point at
which the line stops and the triple point.

Perfect delay convention


If the input u varies slowly as a function of time, the dominant regimeA(u(t))
stays dominant so long as the attractor A (u) is not destroyed by bifurcation.
In the case of elementary catastrophe theory (E.C.T.) this perfect delay
leads to the following description of the catastrophe set (K): we form, in the
product S X U the manifold deftned as the zero-set of the differential aV/3s
(with respect to s: u being held constant). We retain in this submartifold only
those sheets which correspond to the minima of V; the edge of these sheets
then projects into U according to the set K. Here again the genericity hypotheses
allows us to specify the generic singularities of K.

4.6 THE NON-ELEMENTARY CASE


Save in the case of E.C.T. (whi.c h reduces to the study of the singularities of
real functions), no general bifurcation theory exists for att.ractors of greater
dimension than two . The known examples (the attractors of Henon. Lorenz etc.)
giVe evidence of the great Internal complexity of these attractors whose topological
type we do not know how to characterise. By way of conjecture, J shall propo.e
the following point of view.
An atl!actor can cease to be structurally stable for two kinds of reJ~sons:
Either as a consequence of an absence of stability of transversality between stable
manifolds (Internal to the attractor). This is an unstable property, but can
nevertheless appear on a set which is everywhere dense in the parameter space.
This absence of stability does not lead to an implosion (loss of dimension), and
does not appear to affect the ergodlc character of the majority of the trajectories.

Sec. 4.6] The Non-Elementary Case 93

Or because, for a certain value of the parameter, the attractor allows a first
integral. For example the family of linear fields dy = k.dx on the torus T2 has
the property that for every rational value of k, the corresponding field, for
which all trajectories are closed, allows a fibration q:'J'l -+ S 1 as frrst integral.
This is the unstable situation, which ca.n be stabilised by lifting to T 2 a field Z
on S 1 near to zero. but which is itself stable (for example a gradient field). There
is then an implosion of the twO dimensional attractor tl into a finite number of
attracting fibres of one dimension (called a Morse-Smale field). We conjecture
here that every attractor implosion takes place more or less according to the
preceding model. It is known from Milnor and Thurston 's 'kneading coefficient'
that this is what occurs for endomorphisms of 1t into ~t.
I.n the neighbourhood of every attractor A of a field X in a manifold M
there is a Liapunov function wJ:ich is positive and decreasing along the trajectories
and va.nisbi.ng on A. Let L = a be a level variety of the function L where a is
positive and small. The field X enters the tube L .;;;; a in every point of L = a .
Thus every field Y sufficiently close to X in the C0 topology will also enter the
tube L .;;;; a, and Y will have one or more atlractors. (The attractor may implode,
but not explode.) Let us then suppose that the field X depending on the control
parameters u , be similarly perturbed by a 'noise' Z of which we shall have a
deterministic model. Z is parametrised by a compact manifold Ill. Then at every
point m of the tube L.;; a. the mapping W .!4 T111 (M) is o f modulus< E I X(<P(w))l
(we suppose that X is nowhere zero in L .;;; a). it follows that no trajectory of
the perturbed field X+ Z can leave the tube L, even if Z varies in Ill. Further we
ca.n admit that the mapping W .!4 Tm (M) is suljective on the ball of radius
eiX(V'(w))l. We suppose then that in the variation of X as a function of u, we can
'theoretically' create first integral fields, leading to a possible implosion of the
at tractor. Between two implosive sub-attractors we will have then a threshold
hypersurface, invariant under X(u 0 ) or in any case making with X(u) an angle
less than e/4. In these conditions t11e noise Z allows the thresho ld hypersurface
to be overcome, and as a consequence the basins of the two sub-attractors
become mixed ....
The integration of the Geld X(u) + Z(w) allows us, though integrating over
W, to define a measure m(x; y) which is the density in y of the images h1(x)
Under the action of Lhe field X(u) + Z(w), and tbis at the end of a sufficiently
long, but fiXed, time T. We seek a density c(x; y) invariant under convolution
With the transformation h1 , t E [0, Tj .

c(x; z) = f c(x;y) ;n(y; z) dy


yfi..

We are led to look for the fiXed point of a positive linear transformation on
the densities c(x: y) (x fixed and arbitrary). Following the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, such a density exists and is, in general, unique. Such a density has its
94 Catastrophe theory [Ch. 4]

interior support in L on what we wiU eaU the srochasric attractor A. This measure
will allow us to calculate every observable y through the integral on the attractor
A. it is necessary only to assure ourselves that in the attractor almost any
trajectory is dense, and that it is not split in two or more disjoint components.
The transitivity of the noise across the threshold hypersurfaces assures that it is
certainly the case.
Finally, the intuitive idea to which is it is necessary to hold fast is the
following: it is not so much the nttrnctor itself which is important but the
hypersurfaces which encapsulate it; the sub-attractors into which the attractor
may implode bY bifurcation wiU be able to form a new mixture as a consequence
of a noise sufficiently strong to sweep away the thresholds between the sub·
nttractors, but not strong enough to leave the given encapsulating hypersurface.

CHAPTERS

Elementary catastrophe theory

In this chapur Wl! shall considl!r a field of local dynamics dl!/ined as the gradient
of a potential. The term elementary catastrophe is used to designate every COli·
flier situation berween local regimes, minima of tire potential which can occur in
a stable manner on 4-diml!nsional space-rime.
By an ab~JM of fanguagl!, we shall sometiml!s use tire name catastrophe {or
the morphology that it makes appear.
We distinguish two types of catastrophe: catastrophes of conflict, and
catastrophes of bifurcation.

5. 1 CATASTROPHES OF CONFUCT
Here it is a question of determining the topological type X of the shock wave
surface which separate the different domains where the competing attractors
rule.
In order to resolve this problem we must adopt a rule such as the so-called
'Maxwell's Convention': at a given point x of the support, the regime which
rules Is that corresponding to the lowest minimum. Such a rule makes it easy to
determine the configurations of the catastrophe set engendered by these conflicts.
In a general manner let there be a system of 11 + !linear forms Lo, L11 ••• , Ln
deftned on ~n, which are in general position. Thls means that every subsystem
of n forms is a basis for the dual of ~n. The domain of each attractor Is defined
by the Inequalities Lt > Lfo I =F j. On ~n th.ese domains constitute the barycentrlc
subdivision of the n-simplex. (For example, for n = 2 we have the triple point
Y; on ~ 1 , the quadruple point ... etc.)
It is this rule that constitutes the deep motivation for Gibb 's Phase Rule· at
n point of ~" there are at most 11 +I local regimes in a state of local equllibrium. In
a later chapter, I have given a proof of tltis rule in the more general case of
catastrophes of bifurcation (Chapter 12, p. 225).
96 Elementary catastrophe theory [Ch. 5

5.2 CATASTROPHES OF BIFURCATION


Our concern here is with situations where there is conflict between at tractors, at
least one of which ceases to be structurally stable. These situations correspond to
the presence of a minimum which ceases to be non-degenerate. To describe the
morphology of the catastrophe set associated to them we unfold this singularity
on a universal unfolding space U. If we accept that such conflicts are governed
by Maxwell's convention we are led to define ln the space U the universal
catastrophe set K which is associllted to lhe singularity. rt consists of those
points u t: U such that lhe corresponding unfolding p(x; u) attains its absolute
minimum at more than one polnt x. For every concrete realisation of the catas-
trophes, defined by a 'growth wave' F: ~~ -> U, the catastrophe realised morpho·
logically is the pre-image F -I (K).

5.2.1
The simplest catastrophes of bifurcation are given by the potentials V = x 4
(cusp), V= x 6 (butterfly) and V= x 8 each of eo-rank one and V= (x4 + y 4 )
(double cusp) of eo-rank two .
Only the first two are generic on a space of dimension 4 . On the other hand,
the last. although non-generic. seems to play a part in linguistics because it
makes possible the description of the conflict of four regimes; of four 'actants'.
We shall see later an illustration ln a neighbourhood of the parabolic umbilic,
which is 'incident' to this singularity.

5 .2.2 Singularities of eo-rank one


Every singulanty of eo-rank I is of the form V = :1, and this has eo-dimension
k - 2. The table of these stable singular!ties on R 4 , (k <e;; 6) is as follows:

Generic plane
Name Singulari Iy Universal unfolding section

Minimum V = x1 V= x 2

Fold V=x3 V == x 3 + ux

Crease

Sec. 5 .2) Catastrophes of Bifurcation 97

Swallowtail V= x 5 +ux3
+ vx2 + wx

Butterfly V=x6 + ux4


+ vx3 + wx 2
+ tx

The Maxwell set corresponding to each singularity has been put on the
diagram. For example, for V = x 6 , lhe butterfly, the Maxwell set is a plane
shock wave exfoliated by a triple edge along its boundary. If V= x" the plane
curve section defmed by the discriminant of lhe polynomial Vx possesses k- 3
cusp points. For example, for the butterly V= x 6 , k = 6 and there are three
cusps.
The catasrrophes of eo-rank one play a considerable role in our conceptual
organisation of reality. The Riemann- Hugoniot catastrophe is al the base of the
catastrophes of capture and emission. The 'butterfly' is the organising centre of
the actantial schema: Source - Message - Receiver in communication. On the
other hand, the slngularities of odd degree are only seen in connection with the
hypothesis of perfect delay. They are li.nked to the transient states (start-finish)
or unfinished (e.g. 'to fail' for V=x 5 ).

S .23 singularities of eo-rank two: Umbilics


Let x and y be the two internal variables. The function V(x, y) begins then wilh
a term Q(x, y) of the third degree. The real projective classification of cubic
forms Q(x, y) is:
(a) the cubic form Q(x, y) has three real roots;
(b) Lhe cubic form Q(x, y) has one real root and two conjugate imaginary roots;
(c) Q(x,y) has a double root and a single root;
(d) Q(x, y) has a triple root.
Case (a) corresponds to the elliptic umblllc, Case (b) LO the hyperbolic umbilic
and Case (c), of coctimension 3 + I, to the parabolic umbilic. Case (d) of CO·
dimension 3 + 2 = 5, does not appear generically.

98 Elementary catastrophe theory [Ch. 5

The corresponding canonical forms are:

(a) V= x 3 - 3y2 + w(x 2 + y 2 ) - ux -vy (Elliptic umbilic)

(b) V = x 3 + y l. + wxy - ux- vy (Hyperbolic umbilic)

(c) V = x 2 y + y~ /4 + sx 2 + wy 2 - ux -~ry~ (Parabolic umbilic)

In all lhese cases we have used lhe quotient R[[x, y] )I(Vx. Vy) as a base for
defining the universal unfolding. ll should be noted that in order to stabilise
V= x 2y lhe form (c) is unique. olher stabilisations being equivalent. The elliptic
and hyperbolic umbilics are relatively weU known. The discriminant for the
elliptic umbilic is, in the plane Ouvw, a tapered double cone whose section is a
hypocycloid wllh three cusps. One may see here the organising singularity of
those means or instruments involving 'points'.
For lhe hyperbolic umbilic, the sequence of plane sections (for w increasing)
of the discriminant manifold has the appearance shown in Fig. 5.1.

F~&. S.l

The shaded interior is the domain of a minimum (with the perfect delay conven-
tion). This succession describes qualitatively the breaking of a wave. The middle
section, consisting of two cusps, corresponds to the limiting angle observed on a
wave at the moment it breaks.

5.3 THE PARABOLIC UMBlUC


The parabolic umbilic being of eo-dimension 4 , is the most difficult to describe.
I owe to A. Chenciner a very detailed study of lhe discriminant manifold, the
principal results of which will be reproduced below; in addition, God win and
Poston & Woodcock have made computer studies, certain of which have been
published. The work of these authors has allowed me to correct errors which
appear in the first French edition of Strucwrol Srability and Morphogenesis.
The equation for universal unfolding is

V= xly + y 4 {4 + sx2 + 11~ -ux- vy


2

and itS stationary pomts are g~ven by Vx = Vy - 0:


Sec. 53) The Parabolic Umbilic 99

u = 2xy + 2sx = 2x(y + s)

v= x1 +y 3 + 2wy.
This defines a family of mappings, parametrlsed by (w, -s), of the plane Oxy
into the plane Ouv . The critical curve of such a mapping is defmed by:

2(y + s) 2x
=0
2x 3y 1
+ 2w
giving = (y + s) (3y 2 + 2w).
The manifold thus defmed has an image Z In Ouws. To define the topo·
logical type of Z In the neighbourhood of the origin we cut Z with a sphere of
radius sufficiently small that the topological type of the Intersection with
every sphere of smaller radius Is the same. Now we delete from this sphere the
'polar regions' corresponding to u = v= O,retaining only a tubular neighbourhood
of the equator w = x = 0. Draw this equatorial circle io the plane Osw. Then one
can mark a sequence of sixteen points on it, numbered 1, 2, . . . , 16, each
corresponding to a topological type for the discriminant curve io Ouv; that is
the section In Z by the plane nonnal to the equator at the particular point.
Figure 5.2 gives the sequence of sixteen kinds of corresponding curve.

lw

1--------:;-::--::;~~~==-------t-+
14
Beak to beak
Up / 2 - ' ,
' 3 , '""" ', 13
~
I
I
Umbllic / /4 I Axial conteC1
5
Hyperbolic - _ \ 11
6 I 10 Elliptic umblllc
\
I
I

Fig. 5.2

100 Elementary catastrophe theory [Ch.S

Qualitatively, at (1) (see Fig. 5.3) there is a curve having a cusp pointing
downward; then , at (2), a new point appears at the origin, where the lip formation
begins; this grows (3), pierces the cusp (4), and crosses it (5) to form the 'phallic'
mushroom curve characteristic of the parabolic umbilic. Next, at (6). the cusp
meets the lower branch of the lip in a hyperbolic umbilic, and then the two
branches cross (7) to form a curvilinear triangle piercing laterally a convex
curve. The triangle shrinks , first touching the curve (8) and then shrinking
inside it (9) to form a hypocycloid with three cusps, and finally vanishes, in an
elliptic urnbilic {I 0), reappearing immediately with the same orientation (11 ).
Then its lower cusp meets the curve (12) and pierces it (13); at ( 14) the curve
and the upper edge of the triangle touch in a beak-to-beak singularity which
separates (15), producing two symmetric swallow-tails which are reabsorbed in
the curve (16) to lead to the original configuration.

1 . 2

5
FJ&. 5.3 (continued next page)

Sec. 5.3] The Parabolic Umbilic 101

6 7

8 9 10

11 12 13

rill. 5.3 (eonunu"d n<>xt p:qe)


102 Elementary catastrophe theory [Ch. 5

14 15

16

F~. 5.3

5.4 THE UMBILICS AND THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE BREAKING


OF WAVES
We have seen that the hyperbolic umbilic was the model for the breaking of the
crest of a wave. lt is not unreasonable to consider the elliptic umbilie as the
organising centre of aU the pointed organs and instruments of biology and t.ech·
nology (although the triangular section, in the hypocycloid of three cusps is
but rarely manifest for reasons to which we will return). The parabolic umbillc
marks the collision of this point with a surface, which it ends by splitting along
the length of the latcnli edge of the hypocyeloidal section. In a certain sense,
1he sword is an instrumental realisation of the transition: elliptic ... hyperbolic
(as with the bayone1): the weapon a !tacks the surface of the adversary through
the point; it then spilLS along the length of nn edge, thus manifesting a 'breaking'

Sec. 5 .4] The Umbilics and the Morphology of the Breaking of Waves 103

of a hyperbolic kind. ln hydrodynamics the elliptic umbllic is the model of the


liquid jet, but the existence of surface tension prohibits the appearance of
stable cusped ridges on the surface of a liquid. Thus Ute elliptic umbilic is a
forbidden singularity for a liquid surface. ln the majority of cases a degeneration
of the singularity is produced leading to a jet, roughly constituted with rotational
symmetry. From this appears, after a hyperbolic singularity has cleared, Ute
meridian of a mushroom form, with the formation of a drop breaking off the
extremity of the jet. We shall refer again to forbidden singularities in the next
chapter.


CHAPTER 6

Applications and limitations


of catastrophe theory

The app/ic:ations of C. T. divide into two totally distinct c:ategories. 11re fust
cotiCems "rigorous' applic:ations of the theory. The application ofprecise quanti·
tative laws provides the model to which one con apply formal catastrophe theory
(physics and mechanics). When using C. T. in thiscasethereisaquick ·qualitaJive'
interpretation of the global belwviour of soiutiom, and of their sfngularities.
Properly used in these circumstances a precise quantitative calculation is then
possible in principle, and as a consequence the model has predictive CXJpacities.
On the other hand, models of the second kind (used in biology and the
socwl sciences) :start from an empirical morphology which is a matter ofinterpre-
tation. One consm1cts thus a field of dl/ferentiJJI systems on a comrol space,
and one endeavours to make the observed morphology coincide 11-'ith the catas·
trophe set of the model. In general, these dif[erenrlal systems are only defined
up to an approximate smooth equivalence, and as a comequence quantitative
prediction is IIOt possible. Their imerest is in providing a global view of the
situation, interpreted in terms of conflicts of regimes. They also allow an analo·
go us classification of the dynamic which Is supposedly generating the experimental
morphology.
The concern of these qualitative models is thus essentiJJI/y hermeneutic,
imerpretative. One CXJn say, apropos of the:se two kinds of model, that the first
is a hard-edged theorisation, while those of the second are 'soft' theory.
As a general rule, the scientific community has accepted wlthow too many
reservations applications of the first kind. On the o ther hand, it is with great
difficulty that it sees the virtue of tire second kind of application. Orristopher
Zeeman :S book Catastrophe Theory (Addison Wesley) is a veritable :storehouse
of all kinds of models of both kinds. 11re more rece/11 book ofStewart and Poston
Catastrophe Theory and its Applications (Pimran) confines itself to models of
the {ust rype.
In a work like rills one, I shall limit myself to giving a list ofapplications of
the fust type. As one can see in tile following chapters, I am convinced tlrat rhe
essenrfal originality of C. T. and its furure fruitfulness lies in 'applicarions ' of
the serorrd kind. So all tire last part of tire book will be devored ro models of
a hemreneuric kind.

[Sec. 6. 1] AppUcations of the Fir5t Kind 105

6.1 APPUCATIONS OF THE FIRST KIND


6.1.1 l...agrangjao formalism (non-convex)
We look here for the trajectories .x(r) in a EucUdean space ~", which minimise
an integral of the fonn /(/) = f)C)C•• /(x, A) dr subject to the boundary conditions
.x(ro) = Xo ,x(r 1 ) = X 1 , where x 0, x 1 are given points in ~n .
We form the fibre (bundle) of co·vecto rs (x, p) on ~11 , and on this space
r· (~")(the cotangent bundle) construct the 'Lagrangian':
L (x. p; .t) = f(x, .t) - (p, .t)

where(., .) denotes the scalar product.


We then consider (x, p) as control coordinates, .t as a state variable and we
manimise L for (x. p) fL'ted. By an application of Maxwell's convention, the
catastrophe set in T' (~") appears when one value of .t minimising L jumps to
another. An explicit description of solutions in the case n = I can be found in
the works of lvar Ekeland.

6.1.2 Caustics and Lagrangian manifolds


In the cotangent bundle 7" (~" ), we say that a manifold Ill' Is L/1grrnlgia11 if
the restriction to W of the fundamemal 2-form t dx11\ dp, is zero. At a point x
of W where W is transversal to the fibres of the canonical fib ration 1r: T(~n)_., ~~~ .
rr (x, p) = x , there exists a local function S(x) (the action), such that W is locally
defined by p, = asrax,. Where this condition of transversality is not fulfilled, it
is useful to take the coordinates {p) as local coordinates on. Ill, and say that
Ix;d,71 is closed on Ill. We thus define a family of functions G(p, x) depending
6n the coordinates (x) of the base point. We ca n then show that generically for
dimension n < I J, this family of func tions is in fact induced from the universal
unfolding of the central singularity G(p; x0 ) (and this in spite of the fact that
the family G(x, p) has a priori a special form, the dependence on x being Uncar).
It is the Moscow school of V. I. Amol'd which has established the essential results
on thls matter. These projections of Lagranglan manifolds, which appear as
caustics in geometrical optics, play a large role In physical theory where the
quantification by the method of 'oscillating integrals' (W. B. K. method), and
the saddle-point meUtod lead to a calculus of critical exponents linked to the
algebraic nature of the central singularity G(p: 0). This theme Is now the sub-
Ject of a considerable literature (Maslow, Hormander, Malgrange, etc. amongst
mathematicians, and M. Berry. J. Nye for the physical study of caustics).

6.1.3 The Riemann equation


The shock tines of u1 = f(u))C in one dimension. are defmed by an elementary
catastrophe type of formalism. Starting the inulal data we construct on the
plane (x. r) an auxiliary function (potential) which we minimise by MaxweU's
convention {theorem t.lue to Peter Lux).
106 Appllcations and limitations of catastrophe theory [Ch. 6

6.1.4 Applied mechanics


Bifurcation theory is involved in the study of !he equilibrium of numerous
systems. We can often apply the schemata of E. C. T. as in Zeeman's celebrated
'catastrophe machine', or in Koiter's law concerning the sensitivity of critical
charge to variations. Sometimes it is necessary to particularise the theory (on
!hat matter, see Thompson and Hunt, A General 17zecry of Elastic Stability,
Wiley).

6.1.5 Tbe theory of phase transitions


Classical mean field theory or Landau theory leads directly to the formalism of
E. C. T. We know that this theory is quantitatively untrue (due to the spurious
critical exponents it .provides, as in Van der Waal's model), but it remains
qualitatively correct (from !he point of view of the topologi.cal structure of phase
diagrams).

61.6 Matltematical economics


The classical Walras- Pareto model of pure exchange economy leads immediately,
by the maximisation of !he utility functions of economic agents, to the forma-
lism of E. C. T. We can deduce it from results on the generic nature of 'MaxweU'
sets where the demand function has discontinuous derivatives (of order one).
The school of G. Debreu has used !he techniques of genericity extensively to
describe the equilibrium sets of an economy.

6.2 1B.E UMITS OF CATASTROPHE THEORY


The schema given by the lheory of elementary catastrophes suffers from severe
limitations which compromise its possible applications. We \vill distinguish:
(J) Objections of a mathematical character inspired by the present state of
qualitative dynamics.
(2) Problems posed by the temporal evolution of a catastrophe.
(3) The problem of the spatia-temporal aggregation of catastrophes.
(4) Questions raised by the application of the theory to specific concrete
problems.

6.2.1 Objections of a mathematical cltaracter


Let M be the manifold of the internal states of !he process. We suppose that M is
compact and let D(M) denote the space of vector fields on M. One can hardly
hope to have a reasonable theory unless the field X which defines the local
dynamic has only a finite number of attractors which can enter into competition.
We could then hope that 'almost all' fields X have this property. But Sheldon
Newhouse has shown that tltere can exist an open substrate in D(M) in which the
fields X which possess an infinity of attractors are dense. Also we do not know

Sec. 6.2] The Umits of Catastrophe Theory 107

whether 'almoSt all' attractors are structurally stable from the point of view of
their local topology in the ambient space. The poss.lbility of having a reasonable
theory of morphogenesis based on an arbitrary dynamic X appears very limited ....
Without doubt there is no great ilifference between a gradient dynamic
and a dynamic allowing a Liapunov function. We know that in the neighbourhood
of every attractor, the field has a Uapunov function but the singula.rities of such
a Liapunov function are not those that the theory of universal unfoldmg of the
critical points of functions predicts. We find here J. Guckenheimer's objection
that the universal unfolding of a gradient field in the set of 'gradient like' fields,
is In general larger than the universal unfoldlng of the initial potential function.
In fact. for a general dynamic Takens's counter-examples have shown that there are
jets of vector fields not stabilisable by addition of terms of higher order; indeed
the theory of universal unfolding loses all validity in this case. Thus the theory
leads very rapidly to the appearance of 'generalised catastrophes', and therefore
n complicated morphology; ramlfied sets, Cantor sets. Such a morphology,
however, cannot be excluded, because th.ere are very likely to be some. Accord·
ing to some authors, empirical manifestations are exemplified by the circulation
of the blood in animals and the 'cantorian' structure of gusts of turbulence in
fluid dynamics. See also B. Mandelbrot: Fracrals: Form, Orance and Dimension,
W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1977.
lastly, let us add that Hamiltonian dynamics have no attractors (because of
the conservation of Uouville measure); consequently we can scarcely see how we
can adapt the schema to the case of local Hamiltonian dynamics. That is perhaps
why quantum mechanics does not present a morphology, strictly speaking.
However, one should not exaggerate the importance of these reservations.
Very probably the only processes that one can consider empirically as determined,
the only problems weU posed, are ruled by a principle of optlrmsation - or at
the very leaSt an extremal principle. This fact is particularly noticeable in the
Hamllton-Jacob1 theory of equations. 1t has, in effect. been shown that the
local theory of singularities of lagrangian projections (i.e. projections of a
Lagranglan submanifold of the cotangen t bundle of a manifold onto the manifold)
identifies with elementary catastrophe theory provided the dimension n < ll,
according to V. I. Arnol'd. The only difference with the general case is that
when certain of the internal variables have a direct interpretataon as derivatives
of a section of the cotangent bundle with respect to the coordinates of the base,
this leads to restriclions on the nature of possible slngularilies, restrictions which
make generic singularlties wh.ich are not normally so.
This phenomenon is also met with in the case of singularities satisfying the
conditions of symmetry which will be considered in paragraph 6.2.4.

6.2.2 The temporal evolution of a catastrophe


Let us suppose that a natural process takes place in an open subset U of R' . and
that at a given instant th.is process, being regulated by an elementary catastrophe,

108 Applications and limitations of catastrophe theory [Ch.6

admits for uruversal unfolding. a space W containing a universal catastrophe set


K (like that defined by MaxweD's convention). Then the morphological state of
the process is defmed by a mapping C: U X T- W, the growth wove.
In the most general hypothesis, the mapptng C is differentiable and trans·
versa I to the catastrophe set K. Thus the observed catastrophe set is none other
than the counter-image c- 1 (K) in U. Because of this hypothesis of uansversality
the empirical morphology does not vary with a slight perturbation of the initial
conditions, whence the characteristic of 'morphogenetic field' and of 'clueod'
for the observed process. But this requires that at the start of the process, the
mapping G: (U, 0) -+ W is an immersion, in other words that the coordinate
functions 1111 on W have an image c•(w;) of maximum rank on U. We can say
that the milieu U must be initially polorised by these induced functions.
Such a hypothesis is not necessarily realised. Very frequently the milieu
U can be considered as homogeneous and in this case, in principle. the mapping
G(U; 0) would be onto a single point. In fact after a little while this mapping
'unfolds'; it becomes generic. But then, in this case, one is dealing with a new
type of singularity. singularities of a composed mapping of the form V(x , g(u)).
u e U. At least at the onset of catastrophe, the Singularity should be unfolded m
the set of those functions which aUows the same type of factorisation.
For example, in the case of embryology the egg is frequently 'homogeneous',
at least In relation to a certain symmetry group. From the 'unfolding' of this
function G, the generic singularity obtained is n 'fold' characterised by an equa-
tion of form w = y?; then the generating potential is even in y. In the Unear
unfolding with respect toy, as v.y, we obtained a symmetric evolution with
respect to v = 0. There is externalisation of an internal zymmetry. This is a
natural interpretation for the origin of the bilateral symmetry in vertebrates.
So then an insufficiently polarised state can create singularities more complex
than those one would nonnaDy expect. What of the evolution strictly referred to
as the growth wave?
1t is clear that we cannot give a priori any rule relative to this evolution. We
can nevertheless consider the general situation, where a 'horizontal' field If has
been defined on the product M X W of the internal space M with ihe unfolding
W. By projection on W we then obtain a piecewise differential vector field whose
dlscontinuities will be on the strata of lhe catast rophe set K . (Cf. the notion of
'reduced field'.) Certainly there is no question of making a total classification of
the configurations that these reduced fields can present. We may always wonder
if there exists, among the horizontal fields If, fields linked canonically to the
primitive catastrophe. Elsewhere I have shown how, in allowing that the corn·
ponent H comes to life in a manner which deadens the effect of the primitive
dynamic, we are indeed led to take the gradient of V with respect to a hyperbolic
metric of the fonn dx1 - k 2 du 2 • If we degenerate this metric (k infinite) we can
obtain, as the limit of the att ractors, the cycles of hysteresis given on the primitive
metric by the convention of 'perfect delay' llere there is at leaSt the embryo of

Sec. 6.2] The Limits of catastrophe Theory 109

a theory defining 'universal evolution' of catastrophes. that is to say vector


fields on the total space M X W defined by a single initial catastrophe. The
preceding example, of great importance in biology ('metabolic stabilisation' of
the mesoderm), seems to indicate that ii involves a mechanism of great generality
that could also explain the appearance of hyperbolic me tries in physics. It seems
clear in any case, that this is the only means of reaching as economical a morpho·
logical explanation as possible, since we do not wish to introduce a new potential
on the space W.

6.2.3 Spatio-temporal aggregation of catastrophc.s


lt is possible to say the elementary catastrophes simply provide the basic rnorpho·
logical features of space-time. In this sense, they have a role analogous to the
rour elementary operations of arithmetic, which, acting on the discontinuous
system of natural integers. allow the elaboration of algebra and the axiomatic
production of formal systems. Though similar, the difference is that the associat-
ing of catastrophes does not rely, as in the theory of formal systems, on the auto-
ma tic iteration of certain operations but on an intrinsic combinatoric given by
the dynamic interpretation.
If we confine ourselves simply to the plane of elementary catastrophes
defmed by a gradient dynamic, an obvious generalisation is suggested. lf we
consider an isolated singular point of the potential of eo-dimension q > 4, we
can describe the evaluation of a growth wave in "/,as an R 4 immersed in the
space W of the universal unfolding, transversal to the catastrophe set K. The
pull-back to R• of the catastrophe set K defines an aggregation of elementary
catastrophes, which will have the property of structural stability. I have applied
this idea in the chapter on the spatia-temporal origin of syntactical structures
(see Chapter lO).lf we forgo the strict formalism of gradient dynamics, introduc-
ing attracting cycles of the reduced field, we can give a nice interpretation of
some mysteries of biological morphology. For example, the problem of the
'chicken and the egg' is explained very simply by the evolution of a cyclic
growth wave in a universal unfolding of dimension 4. (The concentration at
the organising centre of the metabolism, realised in the course of gametogenesis,
is then an unfolding at the lower scale of cytoplasmic organisation ... an unfold·
ing which will extend itself to an unfolding on the scale of the organ in the
course of embryonic development). Obviously such an explanation is not corn·
Plete: it requires the introduction of an ad hoc created 'arrest potential'. But the
problem of the succession of catastrophes is of such complexity, even in physical
theories like hydrodynamics and the theory of phrase transitions, that we cannot
avoid such speculating. lt seems probable that a more refined theory ought to
introduce quantitative considerations which could require a form of integration
in function spaces of infinite dimension. The quantum theory of fields may give
an example of it,ln a situation which is globally, relatively not well understood.
110 Applications and limitations of catastrophe theory [Ch. 6

6.2.4 Catastrophe theory and its appUcations. Symmetries - forbidden


singularities
Catastrophe theory may be reproached for being an abstract schema independent
of physical reality. lt is in itself purely qualitative and it simultaneously ignores
considerations of scale and the quantitative laws of classical physics. However,
these two objections are rather contradictory.
Every quantitative model involving physical magnitudes must be independent
of the units, which serve to measure the magnitudes. Consequently, the
phenomenon considered must be invariant with reference to the dilations of
space- time. But the majority of phenomena considered at our scale do not
allow this invariance: the homothetic image of an ant is not an elephant. ln
consequence, only those phenomena linked to the geometry of space- time can
be the object of a quantitative model; such is the case with the important laws
of classical physics (gravitation, electromagnetism). There is, even then, the
condition that the phenomena do not go below a scale smaller than 10-30 cm.
If then it is not necessary to have a strictly quantitative model, we can
nevertl1eless endeavour to take account of the known properties of the material
substrata. In this respect, a very important notion is that of phase. A phase is
defined by a pseudo-group of local equivalences r, of which G is the isotropy
group. ll is then natural to accept that the Lie group G operates, non-trivially,
on the space M of internal states. The local potential V must be invariant under
tltis action, and all its unfoldings the same. One can also simultaneously 'unfold'
the action of group G. This can make a subgroup G' of G appear (break of
symmetry). We can then expect that the surface Umiting the phases of pseudo·
groups r, r' has generic singularities whose nature is uniquely defmed by the
pair r, r' of the pseudo·groups of symmetry in conflict. Such a theory has to be
created in its entirety ..
fn the same order of ideas, there will be a place to take account of Lbe
phenomena of surface tension in liquids. As has been said, this phenomenon
forbids the presence of the elliptic umbilic on the surface of the liquid. On the
other hand the phenomenon can create local symmetries due to U1e condition
of minimal area. Thus a liquid jet will have a tendency to be rotationally symmelric
about its axis. Consequently, in hydrodynamics the elliptic umbilic is replaced
by a hyperbolic umbilic defined by a function of the type V(Z; r), where r is
the distance to the axis of rotation. In the same way the equations of conserva-
tion in a liquid forbid certain discontlnuities of the field of speeds along a shock
wave, for example, those which create a cavity in the liquid. There appears in its
place a discontinuity where the two speed vectors are tangent to the shock
surface ('slip discontinuity'). Now it can be said that two vector fields having a
common invariant manifold defmes a singularity of infmite eo-dimension in the
function space of pairs of fields. We should not be surprised if certain constraints
(due to the symmetries or to differential conditions) render generic singularlties
of infmite eo-dimension, that a normal theory will reject as absolutely improbable.

Sec. 61) The Umits of Catastrophe Theory lll

6.2.5 By way of conclusion


1t is also necessary to point out the often repeated objection that catastrophe
theory not being susceptible to experimental control, consequently has no
scientific Interest.
To that we ftrst reply that the choice between two models of catastrophe
theory can sometimes be settled by experiment; but it is necessary, first , to
com:ei~e these models before submitting them to experimentation. (Here is
posed, moreover, the thorny problem of the uniqueness of models in catastrophe
theory: if one has two models, M, M in competition, can one always find a
model M" that covers both?)
On the general plane of the philosophy of science lt would be well to return
to the following general principle. What is important in u model is not its accord
with experiment but, on the contrary, Its 'ontological range' , in which it states
the manner In which the phenomena take place and in whlch it describes their
underlying mechanisms. in fact , being given any empirical morphology, it is
always possible to exhibit a quantitative model containing sufficient arbitrary
parameters, whlch account for the experiment to a given approximation. If we
require a good model these arbitrary parameters must be reduced to the necessary
maximum; this is a particular case of the problem of the 'reduction of the
arbitrary' in the description, a task that catastrophe theory, by the dynamic
interpretation that it offers, is to a certain extent tackling with efficiency. To
describe well, it is necessary to understand. The age of the miracles of quantum
mechanics of the years 1925-J 930 seems, alas, to be over ....
CHAPTER 7

The controversy

The history of the development of C. T. can be described quite shortly. My


book, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, the mt.muscript of which hod been
sent to the publisher in 1968, was only able to be published at the end of 1972,
owing to a variety of difficulties. Bur a certain number of copies had circulated
underground during these years. In particular, C. Zeeman, and his school at
Warwick Universiiy, became enthusiastic about the contents, and started to
develop a~tastraphe models in a wide variety of fields. At the International
Congress of mathematicians at Vancouver, in 1974, C. Zeeman produce a very
remarkable communication on this theme, which resulted shortly aftenvards in
an avalanche of pOpularisation by the media quite exceptional fora mathematical
theory. Hostile reactions mode their appearm1ce one or lhll years later: the
article in Science. 'Le roi est nu' by Gi11a Bari Kolata, follo""'td by rhe 'devascat·
ing · criticism of H. Sussmatm and R. Zahler in SyntMse. After a number of
papers for and against. the co11troversy appears to have died down. A 'corn·
promise' seemed to be imposed in the scieniiftc community: the 'rigorous
applications' in rhe fields of mech011ics and physics was accepted but on the
contrary. the 'soft· models of biology and the huma11 scie11ces were regarded
with grave smpicion. lr is necessary ro say that atehe time of rhegreat emhusiasm
of the year 1974, the supporters of the theory (myself included, to a certain
degree} had no clear Idea of the limits of its applicability. In fact, we have here
a particular a~se of a more general question: where are tire limits of the applica·
biliry of mathematics to science? lt is tiOt too easy to give a precise answer ro
the question. and the following paper published in Scientia. offers my painc of
view on the matter.

7.I MATHEMATICS AND SCIENTIFIC THEORISING


There is no question that it would be premature to assess the impact of what we
call catastrophe theory on the development ot science. Even though, in the area
of practical applications the contribution of this would turn out to be disappoint·
ing, one point is quite certain: catastrophe theory has given exlsting science an

[Sec. 7 .I ] Mathematics and Scient ific Theorising 113

attack of conscience; it has compelled a clear examination of its methods and


techniques. With catastrophe theory one can see mathematics being introduced
into disciplines, such as those of biology and the human sciences, which have
hardly been aware of its use. Now, so far the introduction of a mathematical
technique into a science has been considered as an important step, for it
signifies the appearance of rigour, of conceptual or numerical exactitude, and, as
a consequence, a considerable extension of the possibiUties for action. ln this
case, unjustified hopes were raised abou t the potential value of the theory;hopes
which appeared to be justified by the publication of models such as those of
Zeeman In the human sclences (for example, the model of the eruption of riots
in prisons) [I]. The appearance of severe criticisms [2] with respect to C. T.
put a quick end to this euphoria. Scientific opinion appeaTed somewhat disorien·
tated by this polemic, the sharpness of which resulted more from journalistic
inflation than from a real conflict. There is little doubt tltat the main criticism
of the pragmatic inadequacy of C. T. models has been in essence, well founded.
However, it is unlikely that such criticism will develop, because, if it is pursued, it
will lead to the setback of a good pan of contemporary scientific prod\Jctivity ....
The core of the opponents to C. T. arc recruited, for the moment, from the
ranks of applied mathematicians. There is a growing fear that the most valid of
the objections which have been raised against C. T. models (I refer in particular
to that of illusory quantificalion - spurious quantisation) can be turned against
their own products. 1f C. T. has had no other result thaJl to revive such a debate
on the methodology on the use of mathematics in science, that alone suffices
to juStify its existence.

7 .1 .1 The role of mathematics in the sciences today


If there is a field of science where ma thematics is properly applied, it is most
clearly physics. Moreover, is it not a characteristic of fundamental physics that
the major classical laws (gravitation, electromagnetism, ....) make possible the
construction of models having a numerical exactitude (10-10 in the better
cases) which defies imagination. E. Wigner has been able to speak of the
unreasonable accuracy of these laws. We shall come back late r to interpretations
which may explain this situation. But, meanwhile, as soon as we leave the
relatively straightforward fields where these laws can be applied without
confusion, the situation degenerates rapidly. The excellent beginning made by
quantum mechanics with the hydrogen atom peters out slowly in the sands
of approximations in as much as we move towards more complex situations
(not forgetting the mysteries of strong interactions, which are resistant to all
quantification). In macroscopic physics (physics of solid bodies, fluid mechanics)
many of the empirical laws have no explicit mathematical form. as in thenno·
dynamics where lhe equation of state of a real Ouid F(p, a•: T) = 0 cannot
be mathematically expressed. This decline in the efCiciency of mathematical
algorithms, accelerates when we go in to chemistry. The interactions between
114 The eo ntroversy [Ch. 7

two molecules of any degree of complexity, evades precise mathematical


description. Only in kinetic chemistry is a differential system as description
occasionally possible, but the coefficients f~guring in this system (the constants
of the Law of Mass Action) arc subJeCt to variations which affect greatly the
exactness of description. In biology, if we make exceptions of the theory of
population and of formal genetics, the use of mathematics is confined to mode lUng
a few local situations (transmission of nerve impulses, blood flow in the arteries,
etc.) of slight theoretical interest and of limited practical value. In physiology,
ethology, psychology and social sciences mathematics appears but little o.nd
usually In the form of statistical devices whose legitimacy is suspect. A single
exception is mathematical economics with Walras- Pareto's model of free
exchange economies which leads to interesting theoretical problems, but whose
application to the real economy remains rather doubtful. Let us add for corn·
pleteness, some uses of graph theory in anthropology and in sociology, and we
will have virtua!Jy completed our tour of the applications of mathematics in
science [3 I .
The relatively rapid degeneration in the possible uses of mathematics when
one moves from physics to biology is certainly known amongst specialists, but
there Is a reluctance to reveal it to the public at large. There are, I believe, three
reasons for that connected to the sociology of science itself:
(a) Being given that the great pragmatic success of mechanics and fundamental
physics has given immense prestige to these sciences, it is important that
less precise disciplines, with fewer achievements, may also benefit from
ihe some prestige. Thus the difficulties and imprecisions with which these
disciplines are afflicted, will never publicly be mentioned.
(b) As far as internal practice goes, these difficulties and imprecisions are
turned to good advantage, because the techniques of approximating mathe-
matlsation make possible the burgeoning of considerable 'scientific' produc·
rion. Every anempt at quantitative modelling no matter how shallow or
poorly based, can give rise to scientific publication.
(c) To all that add the influence of the computer industry. Every laboratory, no
matter bow modest, must have iu computer. How is it that the desire for
profitabillty from investment operates even in conditions where a priori any
quantification of the problem Is lnconceivable7 The informatics industry
has clearly every interest in making believe that no part of the real world
can evade quo.ntitative modelling ....
In defence of the practitioners so anacked o.nd whose good faith can hardly be
doubted, at least m the great majority of cases, it is necessary to observe the
following. the loss of efficacy in mathematical formalism in science is not
abrupt. Starting from pure situations In fundamental physics where the major
constituting laws apply and are the only ones to apply, it is not long before
mixed slluations are met, where these laws are present, but are no longer sufficient

Sec. 7 .2) The Aims of Science 115

to determine entirely the evolution of the system in time. It is necessary to


include at this point ad hoc hypotheses drawn in general from statistical con·
sideratlons and from empricial laws in which approximate expressions are used.
Applied mechanics and fluid mechanics swarm with examples of this kind. In
the table outlined below, we have omitted the well known case where an exact
mathematical model of the system can be set out, but for which, because of its
complexity, or its dimension, it is impossible to have an effective solution. The
ll·body problem, for example, There, clearly, the computer may be very useful.
But such cases are relatively rare. As a genral rule, more errors arise from the
theory (or the lack of it) that governs the building of a model, than the approxi·
mations coming out of a numerical treatment of the system. Finally, it is in this
grey area which separates the precise region of fundamental physical laws fiom
the odd-jobbery of statistical interpretations and empirical mathematics, that
the future of applying quantitative mathematics in science has to be ascertained.
Catastrophe theory, on the other hand, suggests that there could exist
another use of mathematics in science which will not be quantitative but uniquely
qualitative.
Thus we are led to the following questions:
(a) For what reason should we prefer a quantitative model to a qualitative
model?
(b) ln the particular case of C. T. models can we hope to strengthen the qualita·
tive use in a quantitative manner?
(c) What can we expect from a purely qualitative model?
In order to attempt to reply to the first question (a), it is appropriate to refer
to a very general problem: what are the aims of science?

7.2 THE AIMS OF SCIENCE

If it is legitimate to consider the totality of scientific activities as a continuum,


it is reasonable to suggest that such a continuum has so to speak, two poles.
One pole represents pure knowledge: at this point, the fundamental aim of
science is to understand reality. The other pole concerns action: according to this
point of view the aim of science is to act effectively on reality. A short·sighted
epistemology will be tempted to object to having two poles, because, for effective
action, it is always necessary to 'understand'. I challenge this standpoint: it is
possible that one understands a situation very well indeed, but that there is
nothing one can do to act on it (example: the situation of a man being in his
house when it is unexpectedly flooded, taking refuge on the roof, and seeing
the flood rise and submerge him). Conversely, one can occasionally act effectively
on the real world without understanding the reasons for such effectiveness. It
could be said, almost without exaggeration, that all contemporary medicine is
116 The controversy [Ch. 7

evidence for it, for the cases are very rare where the mode of action of a medi·
cament has received a satisfactory explanation at the 'fundamental' level, that is.
In terms of molecular biology.
Different methodologjes are found corresponding ro these two opposed
visions of science. 'Action' aims essentilllly to resolve local problems, whereas
'understanding' seeks th.e universal, hence the global . .By an apparent paradox.
local problems require non-local means for their solution, whereas intelligjbility
requires the reduction of the global phenomena to typical local situations, the
pregnant character of which renders them immediately comprehensible. ln
effect, in an action , there is always an aim beyond the phenomenon, since one
is always searching to make possible that which does not occur spontaneously.
To break the constraints of space- time: such is the ultimate aim of man ; to
exploit all modes of non-local action which can be easily controlled. !t is this
which compels the human being to make his journeys, develop his transport
and establish his communications. In the biological sense, he will seek, as far as
possible, to survive, that is to say to extend the duration of life beyond its
natural limits for either the individual or the species. Conversely, for that medila·
tion which is pure thought, intelligibility requires a reduction of the phenomenon
to its immediately comprehensible components (for example, collision of atoms
in ancient atomic theories). I have explained elsewhere [4] how the greatest
scientific successes In history (Newtonian gravitation, electromagmetism after
Maxwell, quantum mechanics) have been non·locallheories, so that subsequent
theoretical effort was needed to make them local (successfully for the first two,
but with little success for the latter).
To sum up, the totality of human scientific effort (and in one sense, philo·
sophic effort) will be represented in its relations with locality by the foUowing
table:

Local Non·local

Understanding Yes No
Action No Yes

Basically the human mind only understands non-locality in the form of the
predicate (linguistically, by the adjective). A colour, for example is not referred
to any specific place in space. All effort towards Intelligibility has been to
reduce the qualities (secondaries) to those primary qualities which are spalio·
temporal coordinates (in a word, replacing the adjective by the verb). This
process is clearly not being achieved at the present time, and as we shall see,
C. T. models are moving in this direction.
Now, this bipolarity In the scientific field Is reflected in the manner in
which m.athematics is used In science. We have seen that the 'action' pole demands

Sec. 7.2] The Aims of Science 117

an extension of the data, for all action aims to extend our innuence. This is to
say that there is a need above all to have methods of propagation which allow
the extension of local knowledge obtained on a domain D of the substrate space,
w a greater domain D'. There exists, in mathematics, a procedure which allows
such an extension, and it is in practice the only one which enables it to be done
in a canonical manner. I refer to analytic continlllllion which allows development
of a germ of an analytic function (defmed by a Taylor series at a point) to all the
domain of existence (holomorphic domain) of this function. This is to say that
pragmatically efficient mathematical models, permitting prediction, involve
the analyticity of the functions involved, together with their solutions of evolu·
tion in time. This requires as a consequence that the substrate space on whlch
one works is provided with a natural analytic structure.
On the other hand , we have seen that inteWgibitity, requires the focusing
of non-local onto a local structure. There exists a mathematical entity which
fits well enough th.is requirement and that is the notion of sfnlularity. Let us
g~ve a typical example : tbe conical point , vertex of the cone of revolution with
equation z 2 = x 2 + y 2 in three-dimensional Euclidean space relative to a tdhedral
rectangular coordinate system Oxyz. In effect, this singular point may be con-
sidered as arising from a smooth surface when a continuous mapping 41 takes the
meridian circle x 2 + y 2 = =
I, z 0 of the cylinder with equation x 2 + y 2 = I
into the origin (Fig. 7 .1). Jt Is a general fact that a singulari ty can always be
considered as arising from a regular space E by the collapsing of a point of a
global figure embedded in this space£. Jt IS hence not surprising that C. T. in the
'elementary' form of fields of gradient dynamics, makes regular use of the
notion of singularity (of a function).
There is no doubt that Rutherford's famous saying 'Qualitative is nothing
but poor quantitative' is a sadly faithful reflection of the scientific ideology
which was inf1uent.ial at the end of the nineteenth century. But there was some
truth in it at least; if a model needed to be pragmatically eff1clent, then, necessarily,
tlus model must contain a quantitative component permitting the spatia-temporal
localisation of the phenomena which it describes. A purely qualitative prediction,
which is not pinned down to time or place, is of little practical interest. I can
predict, with all oenainty that every political regime , in whatever society, will
ultimately break down. If I am incapable of saying when (even with some
imprecision), my prediction will be only a triviality. When seismologists tell
us: the town of Bale will be destroyed by an earthquake' their statement does
no t disturb the people of Bale when there is no specified period in time for the
implementation of their prediction. This is to say that in the pragmatic sense,
the only models to be considered are those which permit the spatio·temporal
IO<:alisation of phenomena. They are hence necessarily quantitative at least as
far as th1s localisation is concerned. We are thus led to the following conclusions:
for a model to lead to useful predic tive possibility, and , consequently of action,
it is necessary that this model be quilntitative, that it be defined by analytical

118 Tht controversy [Ch. 7

mathematical notions on a substrate space which is Itself analytic. Such is the


case, clearly, of models provided in basic physics. It is of some interest to under·
stand the reason for this.

,---- ............
"
, ''
0

.... -------... .......

l'lg. 7.1

The substrate spaces introduced into the models of our sciences are of two
types. Firstly, there is the space-time of everyday IJfe, on our own scale. In the
sense that all phenomena are , in the last analysis, perceived by our senses, it is
fair to say that space time is the ultimate substrate to which aU the others
must be reduced by explJctt mathematical constructions.
Secondly, there are abstract spaces, the definition of which cartnot be
immediately related to space-time. Statistical frequency spaces which measure
the frequency with which a phenomenon of a specific nature appears, are of this
kind. ln a scientific theory, the notion of phenomenon cart clearly take on a

Sec. 7.2) The Aims of Science 119

mediate character: thus, a hump on an empirical curve can be considered as a


'phenomenon', though in such a case the substrate has an interpretation which
can be very far from space- time.
Does space-time itself have a natural analytic structure? Yes, if the traditional
view of physics is adopted, which makes space- time a homogeneous space with a
continuous Lie group of equivalence (Euclldean, Galilean, Lorentz groups). Of
course, on the scale of astronomy no one can believe that this identifteation
holds. lt has no more than a local validity, expressed in the notorious exactitude
of God11iven physical laws. In fact, the a.nalytic character of these fundamental
laws relies on a most subtle mechanism : basic physical entities (mauer, radiation,
elementary panicles) can be considered as breaking the global symmetry of
space time, since they are manifest though the local presence of accidental
features which disrupt the homogeneity of empty space. A new substrate is then
introduced, an 'internal' variable, which is a statistical frequency axis for the
appearance of such and such type of accidental fearure (in quantum mechanics,
as a consequence of the presence of the phase, these axes are complex). A
complex bundle is thus defmed In space-time, and a state of the universe is
represented by a section of this bundle. The views of two observers (associated
to two different frames of reference) then differ by a representation (linear) of
the group of displacements of the frames of reference ln this section space
(which, ln the present case, Is a Hllbert space). Every problem of communication
between observers and of evolution In time is reduced to the determination of
this representation. Why is this representation analytic? Because, if we ignore
the behaviour at infinity, we can reduce it to a representation of a compact
group. which is analytic (Peter Weyl theorem). This requirement of an asymptotic
stationary state expresses to some extent, the fact that the accidental features
which break the symmetry cannot amplify themselves without limit, their
proliferation remains controlled, and carmot put at risk the existence of space-
time itself. Fundamental laws thus express the 'regulation' of space-time
with respect to accidents which affect it. We can tbink for example of Lavoisier's
principle, which states that the total mass remains invariant ln the course of a
chemical reaction. At the level of quantum theory, however, we can hold that
space-time is preserved only in atremis (and in a statistical form only). This
explains the almost complete absence of spatial morphology in quantum phenom·
ena (see Chapter 8). On the scale of astronomy, the notion of the singularity
appears In full force. In the description, albeit highly speculative, of black holes,
we are forced to the conclusion that as soon as our familiar space lime disappears,
so does also the physics we know.
Hence, In fundamental physics, the internal spaces which it Is appropriate to
introduce In order to describe physical entities can be directly tied to space-
time, or to its group of equlvalences, by defined mathematical construction.
Nothing more is needed in order to explain major fundamental laws and their
analytic character.

120 The controversy [Ch. 7

Let us now cxlllTline other means by wh.ich empirical phenomena could be


endowed with a natural analytic structure. In terms of the global regulation of
space - time, we can envisage focal qualitative regulations wh.ich give birth
to ryplcal major forms (of animate or inanimate nature) classified under
recognisable (or identifiable) individual forms. There is no longer here a continu·
ous group of Invariance, because two specimens of the form are not necessarily
metrically equal (for exlllTlple: two dogs). We are thus justified in considering the
space of statistical frequencies of the appearance (or the presence) of the form.
11Us formalism has already appeared in chemistry. where the laws of chemical
equilibrium are based on the morphological regulanty of those combinatorial
processes between molecules which constitute chemical reactions. The models
that are abstracted only satisfy conditions analytically when it can be shown
that the kinetic constants k figuring in the law of mass action depend on the
concentrations; a dependence wh.ich does not allow the use of 'a priori'.
The same formalism (that known as the compartmemal model) applies
in biology both to the theory of populalions and to formal genetics. But the
constants affecting the frequency of interactions (like predation, for exlllTlple)
e\•ade evaluation, particularly analytically. What results from th.is is that we can
only study simplistic models, extremely ill-adapted to represent the evolution
of a real ecological system. lt is likely that, in th.is kmd of study, we are hardly
able even to draw qualitative conclusions about the nature of the asymptotic
states (points of equilibrium, limit cycles, strange attractors, etc.).
All traditional statistics is based on the use of standard distributions (Gauss,
Poisson ...) whjch are analytic on a statistical frequency axis. There results 311
iz priori' confidence in the naturalness of analytic structure defined by the
frequency (n) of these axes. Now it is necessary to see that the conditions of
application of the central-limit Utcorem wh.ich leads to a Gaussian distribution
are extremely restricting: additlvity and independence of individual probabilities
is often difficult to ~erify. Physicists have rediscovered how fragile Gaussian
hypotheses are in many fluctuation phenomena (such as the twinkling of the
stars). I give here another reason to put into doubt ·a priori' hypotheses of
analyticity:
Let us suppose that an event (e) can happen with a multiplicity (m,), being
generated by a deterministic mechanism defmed as follows: the initial conditions
of the process are parametrised by the points of a Euclidean space e = R": and
thl'l event (e) happens with multiplicity (m;) when the point representing the
initial cond itions is in an open set B; with smooth boundary 68; = 11;, a regular
hypersurface in E (and also analytic, If required}. All the domains B; are disjoint.
Let us now suppose that the preparation of the event (e) depends on control
variables (u) € U, such that. to every value of (u), corresponds an open set Pu
with smooth boundary containing the initial conditions for (e). The open set
P11 depends analytically on (u) (for example, by translation in£). Then to every
u of U can be associated the sequence of real positive numbers

Sec. 7 .3) The Quantitative Aspect of Catastrophe Theory 121

The numbers !lt(u) express (to a near normalisation) the probabilities of


obtaJning event (e) with a multiplicity (m;). The analyticity hypotheses which
are ordinarily made in such circumstances, will lead us·to believe that there exists
an analytic functionfl:x;u) dependinganalyticaJJy on u, such that J.l;(u) = ftm;; u).
Now there exists in the control space U a subset K such that, for u e K
the boundaries Pu and Bt are tangents. If this contact takes place genericaliy,
we see immediately that on a common normal boundary, J.lt(u) varies irregularly
with respect to the contact value u0 , as a rational power

p;(u) = C(u - uo)a

valid on one side of the singularity and which carries with it a discontinuity of a
derivative of Pt(u). This excludes the possibility of a global analytic dependence
of [on u.
It is clearly possible to object to the detennin.istic character of this example.
In regularising by convolution the boundaries of the open setsPu andB; we will
clearly be able to restore the analycity of ).lf(U). But then the function willr
totaliy change in character (notably from the point of view of its moments). Can
we believe, however, in the present state of qualitative dynamics, that there exists
a difference in nature between deterministic dynamical systems and stochastic
systems? A stochastic system is one, where clarification of deteuninism is
avoided, replacing such a hypothesis by statistical hypotheses on the noise,
which are in general very difficult to justify . . ..
Finally, we shall draw the following conclusion from this study: the scientific
domain in which we may construct certain quantitative models, allowing
prediction and, as a consequence, action, is more constrained than is generaliy
thought. There is a little halo round fundamental physics, but its frontiers
become more imprecise, the more statistical considerations come into play.

73 THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF CATASTROPHE THEORY


We approach now question (b): can C. T. models be strengthened to the point
of being quantitative, and hence promote prediction?
We know the great hopes raised by catastrophe theory since its disclosure.
We were going to be able to model discontinuous phenomena by explicit equa·
tions! Disenchanunent has been rapid. Models of the elementary theory (E. C. T.)
are essentially local by reason of them being based on the notion of local singu·
larity. We know that in these models, the observable morphology In a substrate
space S is obtained through sending by a mapping g, the spaceS into a universa.l
unfolding U of the singularity. In the classical theory, the morphism g is limited

122 The controversy [Ch. 7

by genericity hypotheses (maximum rank at 0, transversality in the universal


catastrophe set K in U). Every question involving the extracting of a model
with predictive possibility, is one of controlling, if one can, the morphism g.
There is, a priori, no reason why this morphlsm should be analytic, in
connection with the supposed natural structures of S and U. Shall we say that
we can always approach g by an analytic morphisrn g in 0? Let us observe at
the outset that lt can be illegitimate to approach g, since the process is subject
to constraints (syrnmetries, initial degenerate conditions) which have not been
accounted for in the model. But even if we can make this approximation
the problem remains of knowing in what topology it Is made. For, if we are
satisfied with a topology c!, K finite, there is practically no control on the
holomorphic domain of the approximating morphism g. We can thus confirm
that without a supplementary hypothesis providing a more detailed knowledge
of the modelled system, it is impossible to extract a model from E. C. T. with
the possibility of quantitative prediction. And so, I approve the criticisms of
Siissrnan and Zab.ler with regard to these models.
That being said, I do not think that it is necessary to refuse ~ priori' to
catastrophe models that which we accord without thinking to the usual techniques
of approximation. For example, the possibility of interpolating a continuous
function by a polynomial. The 'fit' that Zeeman has established on certain of
these models must be judged in this spirit. it does not imply certainty, but it can
have real signifying value. The model constructed by Kossak [61 of the denatur·
ing of a protein is (I am assured by the author) quantitatively very exact. Certain
situations with intrinsic regularity of the phenomenon may permit good numerical
agreement, but of this we can not be sure, 'i1 priori'.
Another method of controlling the morphism g will consist of accepting
that it exists in the unfolding space U of dynamics (D) canonically associated to
the catastrophe. This allows us to define the temporal evolution of catastrophes.
Further, such a construction allows us to make a generative theory of C. T.,
where the catastrophes self-engender each other, in the manner of words in a
formal system, This extension of the theory has very great interest, both for
theory and for practice. It will allow us to counter an objection in principle
made to the model by Siissmann, to the introduction of a fictitious continuity
where in reality there is effective discontinuity (in the model of a dog's aggression:
a dog attacks or does not attack, there is no possible transition between these
two behaviours). This objection undoubted.ly reflects reality. But in a model
with dynamic (D) in the unfolding, we can account for il. This dynamic renders
taboo, makes inaccessible, certain regions of the space U (very often, a neighbour·
hood of the organising centre, as in the model of the chicken and the egg); or the
dynamic could lead to crossing certain bifurcation curves in certain weU defined
points (a chreod of capture, for instance). The problem of constructing these
'natural' dynamics on !he unfolding U is still largely open. We do not know
either, whel.her it is necessary to start from concrete examples provided by appli·

Sec. 7 .4] The Purely Qualitative Models: 123

cations, or on the other hand to exploit as much as possible the intrinsic potential
of the mathematics. r have defined for example, certain natural dynamics in U
with the help of a hyperbolic metric on the product by U of the space states. In
the same spirit, we will note that the Hamiltonian dynamics associated to
potential polynomials in E. C. T. lead, with an appropriate linear dynamic in U,
to some of Painleve's transoendental functions.
It seems to be true in aD cases that the sole means of making C. T. pragmatically
effective is in the referring of the unfolding U (built on its dynamics) towards the
substrate S. Thus the catastrophe will deftne a spatial propagation In the support
space S. Such will be the case when we can generalise an existing situation in the
unfolding of slngularities of projections of Lagrangian manifolds (wave fronts) in
Hamilton- Jacobi theory. There then exists in U a differential form oc with values
in the tangent space to the substrate (here the space has configuration with
coordinates Q/), called dq, such that the integral f oc along a trajectory r of s
.,
restores the corresponding spatial displacement in S. This spatiAl propagation,
relatively well controlled in its metric state, will be able to play the role of the
non-existing analytic continuation. Furthermore if it existed these trajectories
of s jommg a stratum of unfolding associated to the singularity SJ> could explain
why the catastrophe &f can spatially generate the catastrophe Sj at a later
date. We could thus broach the problem of the artlculatlon of catastrophes
between themselves , a problem whlch has much biological interest (especially in
embryology). lt is appropriate here to preserve the notion that C. T. ls still
in its infancy. Only a systematic appeal to experimental material, coupled
With an open use of known or created analytical tools, will allow us to progress
in thls obscure, but essential. field of the 'dynamic synthesis' of catastrophes.
With the lack of such progress then C. T. may meet the abortive fate of cyber·
netlcs....

7.4 THE PURELY QUALITATIVE MODELS: ANALOGY AND NATURAL


LANGUAGE
Even If the models of the elementary theory (E. C. T.) lead to no quantitative
foresight, they nevertheless have a real value. In effect, they sometimes allow a
qualitative prediction: if we can identify such and such a path in the unfolding
U, we will obtain such and such a morphological transformation. Further, the
simple fact of having a theory permitting a classification of analogous situations
Is, on the phllosophical plane, not a negligible acquisition. For the notion of
analogy, even if it Is rejected as suspect by neo·positive epistemology, plays no
less a fundamental heuristic role m science. 1t is hence important to rehabilitate
the Idea away from this ostracism, and what better way to do thls, than by a
mathematical formalisation?

124 The controversy [Ch. 7

Yet, the purely analogical usage of C. T. raises a clear objection: if. through
these 'catastJ:ophe' models we can geometrise the analogy, what have we gained
in this modelling in relation to immediate intuition linked to the natural language
or to a meaningful word? Do we nol risk making a gratuitous mathematisation
for its own sake, eventually becoming otiose? Certainly the danger is real, and
the reading of certain 'applications' of catastrophes conf1tm its imminence.
I think that in this field. there is no general reply and that it is all a question
of the context. Very often, the geometrisation promotes a global view while the
inherent fragmentation of verbal conceptualisation permits only a limited grasp.
And the analogies can be more or less banal, more or less surprising; since the
properly striking effect that we observe in certain poetic metaphors, could be
justified, if all the analogies were obvious. It is why these qualitative models
can neither be appreciated nor judged as anything but subjective. In the end
it is the intellectual satisfaction of the feeling for the model which is the ultimate
criterion of itS validity. This return to an evaluation of stylistic character,
quasi-literary or aesthetic, will no doubt be severely criticised by 'orthodox'
scientists. There will be no lack of them saying that these models 'are not
science'. Doubtless they have reason for their point of view, but it would be
highly presumptuous to believe that there exists a defined strict and clear
frontier between science and non-science.
The global attempt to geomelrise thought holds nevertheless, an immense
theoretical interest, and for the following reason. Concepts are used in a number
of scientific disciplines, the meanirlg of which are not clear and cannot be
formalised. ln biology, for instance, concepts are met such as: complexity,
order, disorder, orga.nisation, information (genetic), message, code, ... , etc.,
which all specify a certain non-local property of the field of study. lt can be
asked whether these concepts, after the style of a number of philosophical
concepts, can be univocally rranslated into all the languages of the world, and
legitimately carry a scientific label. The day will soon come when a systematic
critique of these questionable conceptual tools will become necessary. lf it is
desired to pursue with respect to these concepts a form of Hilbert programme,
similarly reductive, eliminating dependence on sense, then the geometrisation
stage by C. T. may appear as a very vital intermediary. Thus semantic intuitions
with its immediately subjective character, is replaced by geometric intuition,
which spatlalises its object, and distances it from the thinking subject.
C. T., in that it is basically a local theory, eliminates tlte non-local, trans-
spatial, quasi-magical character of these notions. There is nothing to prevent us
supposing that we will be equally able, in the light of the preceding paragraph, to
endow C. T. with generatlvity, with propagating properties. lt will thus be able
to provide a .model of deduction as in the ax:iomatics of a formal system. But
the non-local propagating properties are strictly controlled. Taking the preceding
metaphor, it will be noticed that the axioms of a fom1al system in general allow

Sec.7.4J The Purely Qualitative Models: 125

the replacement of a long expression by a shon, more simple expressiont. They


play the role of a non-local action in the topology of a free mono id engendered
by symbols.
This programme, which recalls Leibniz's universal characteristic, is clearly
only scarcely begun. At the very most, with E. C. T . and the linguistic extensions
(actantial schemata) to which we can associate a formalisation (relative) of the
syntactical situations of elementary sentences. But the lexical field, the semantic
organisation of a dictionary, still remains a 'terra ig11ota'. There we have the
problem of what I have called the 'logof, that is to say, those algebraico-geo-
metrical nructures which stabilise every concept in the mental activities space.
We find here, in a particularly acute form, the problem of dynamic synthesis
dealt with above. How do we gcometrise the major grammatical categories? Is
the role of double articulatlon, present both in biology (genotype-organism)
and in linguistics (phoneme - sentence, indispensable to the stabilisation of the
logon
Faced with the enormity of this programme. we can feel a legitimate anxiety:
is it worth the effon to follow this path? To that 1 reply that the 'catastrophe'
models are already providing intuitions which ordinary language can only provide
with difficulty. ln effect, verbalised thoughts have a tendency to harden con-
cepts, linked as they are to a fiXed word of a vocabulary; they conceal their
intrinsic variability behind a screen of auxiliaries and grammatical functlons.
C. T. permits a logic of conti11uity, where we consider the concept 'variables'
Fu, where the parameter u varies in the control space U. When u describes a
path (uv) in U, it is possible that the concept Fu transforms itself continuosly
in to a concept G,., the kinship of which with Fu wl11 not appear immediately,
because in normal thoughts there IS a threshold, a 'taboo' separating u from v
in the control space U. C. T. hence offers the possibility (extended) of trans-
gressing the identity principle (even if it only clearly involves trangressions in
well controlled situations). We know, without doubt, the typical example of
these transgressions. lt is the principle (fundamental In animal embryology,
according to me): 'The hungry predator is its prey'. This principle, we recall,
Issues from the model of the crease applied to predation (Fig. 7 .2): the predator
P, after spatial capture of its prey (p) (at a point K on the bifurcation curve)
falls into a sleep symbolised by the semicircle M (state of tnd•stmction between
subject and object); on awakening, the predator reappears as its prey (P). lt will
only be recreated as predator after the catastrophe of perception (at J), when it
perceives the exterior prey (p) and puts it to flight.
I would like to indicate here a curious and slightly disturbing, implication of
this model. When the predator (P) has recognised an exterior prey (p ), there
exJsts between (P) and (p) a klnd of symbolic identlfication, which can be
tnterpreted as the creation in space- time of a handle (in the topological sense)

to~»c~e that m P'neul.ln a formal syl!ern !he oxioms are amcrll11rlon lilwr.

126 The controversy [Ch. 7

identifying (P) and (p) (Fig. 7.3). From this fact the topology of the space takes
on an 'excited" form, and tends by Itself, through physico-chemical regulation, to
return to normal. This retum to normal can be effected in two ways: normally,
by the spatial capture of the prey by the predator (this corresponds to the
creation in space-time of a critical point of Index one, which destroys the
handle) {Fig. 7 .4); or the handle is destroyed by a critical point of index three,
interior to the full handle (Fig. 7.5) and there is a return to the situation anterior
to the perception ea t.astrophet . fM)

(Pp)
Fig. 7.2

space

(p)

I
(P)
Fig. 7.3 -Symbolic handle betv.een predator Cl') and prey (p ).
hn olher words: !he predator loses sl&ht of the prey. The fl~t of !he prey cm be effectively
ipati&l or on !he other hand 'imaginary': the =• where lhe prey camoull~s itself In the
natunal environment in order to avoid bein& se"n by the predator.

Sec. 7 .4) The Purely Qualitative Models: 127

----- ',

(p)

(PJ
Fig. 7.4 - Destruction of the handle by Lhe capture of the prey (p) by the
predator (P).

(PJ

(PJ
Fig. 7.5 - Destruction of the handle by the flight of the prey (P).

Thus, this imaginatively idealistic model justifies the behaviourist thesis according
to which the capture of the prey by the predator (or the flight of the p rey) are
mechanisms of physico-chemical regulation, imposed by the topological regula·
lion of space- time! Subjectivity will appear then as an actantiallocalisation of
an excited state of the universe, the choice of a return to normal. lt will be
linked to the dichotomous situation of conflict between reality and the imaginary,
between repose and tension. However, in the designation of 'excited' there
remains as a subjective connotation: the mark of the imaginary. This is a case of
threshold stabilisation. It is with tWs, passably Bergsonian, observation that I
Wish to end this study.

128 The controversy [Ch. 7]

REFERENCES
[1] ZeeiiWl, E. G. Catastrophe Theory, Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1978.
[2] Siissman, H. J. and Zahler, R. S. Catastrophe theory: mathematics misused,
in The Sciences (October, 1977), 17 , No. 6 The New York Academy of
Sciences).
[3] Thorn, R., Role et limites de la matht!matisation en Sciences, in La Pensee
(October, 1977), pp. 36-42 (an article from which I have reproduced a
few lines).
[4] Thorn, R., Espace, Science et Magic, in Circe (1978), No. 89, pp. 605-617
(Les BeUes Lettres, Paris), (see Chapter 8).
[5]1>elattre, P, L 'evolution des systemes moleculaires. Maloine, Paris, 1971.
[6] Kossak, J. J. and Benham, C. J ., Denaturation: An Example ofa Catastrophe,
Proc. Nat. A cad. Sci. USA, 71, (1974), 1977-1981.
[7] Thorn, R., L 'evolution tempore/le des catastrophes, Publication of the
Mathematical Institute of tbe University of Utrecht. 1973.
[8] Thorn, R.,Structural Stability and Morphogeltesis, Benjamin, 1975.

CHAPTER S

From physics to biology

The presem paper· Space, Science and Magict is a response to o11e o[ the major
objections made to C. T.: If the pri11ciple of structural srabiliry truly applies to
scie11ce, from whe11ce come the major continuous quonritorive lows: Homilronum
forma lism in mechanics, quantum meclronics, which ore expressed by 11011·
structurally stable differential systems? I suggest here the ideo that space-rime
loses its ontological validity 011 the :rubquantum SCille, to the profit of more
basic e11tities with 'explosive' ciiiUtlcten. lt clearly remains to complete this
programme by on explicit formalism . ..
I

8.1 SPACE, SCIENCE AND MAGIC


8.1.1 Space-time According to Mach or Einstein
Tlte representation of space-time that modern science suggests to us is not with-
out serious difflcu ltics, at least at the theoretical level. Without doub t, despite
objections from orthodox physicists, we deal with quantum mechanics through
tricks which work. Indeed, beyond the fact that these tricks do not work every·
where with the same efficacy (for, if one is proud of the fact that one can
calculate the seventh decimal place of the 'Lamb shift' or of g-2, one is very
discreet on a number of questions certainly more basic and much less clearly
understood).t lt is Important to see that in ten11s of philosophically questioning
the relations between the general body of space time and physical objects,
matter and radlation, we are always faced with a basic dilemma:either,according
to d1e thesis of Ernst Mach. space-time cannot be dissociated from material
beings or particles which fill it and in a certain sense, constitute it; or, on the
Other hand, (this could be Einstein's thesis of which general relativity is, we must
not forget, an absolute theory), matter and radiation are 'disorders', singu-

t A tr~rulotion h;U recentl) appeared 1n A'~w J.anr;u11KtS in Scil'ntific £1'0/taion, Nijmcesse


nud!es In de F'tlorophle von de Natuur on haar wekendraven No. 2 (Unlvcrslry of Nijmegen,
Nclherlonds).
tFor •~ample, the ""blhry of lhe prolon, the dlflerence an mass bet\\ecn proton and
neutron,the instabWty and 1hc man ot the muon. etc.

130 From physics to biology (Ch. 8

larites of space- time, itself the only materia prima, an indifferent ether.
Between these two kinds of models, quantum theory offers little possibUJty of
choice, for it adopts both points of view, which it superimposes in a rather
redundant manner. Starting from a particular conception, di.scontlnulties In
space, it associates to it the transformation reference group, the continuous Ue
group which regenerates Euclidcan (or Minkowski) space-time as a homo-
geneous svacc. Two distinct observers can always compare the results of their
observations thanks to a transformation (linear) which depends only on the
relative positions and velocities of these observers (considered as macroscopic
entitles, in fact, solid bodies). Thus, we arc dealing with a sufficiently badly
defined 'internal' space (a HUbert space), in which the transfoonation reference
group acts by representation. The localisation of the particular phenomenon
Itself can only be obtained by a fluke (for example, in identifying the Uilbert
space with the square function space summable on a domain of the space, and
interpreting the module of this function as the probability of the presence of the
phenomenon at thi.s point). There is, it seems to me, a cenain incoherence in
affirming (as in the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics)
that a phenomenon cannot be dissociated from the perceptive act of a human
observer, on the one hand, and on the other, that the two observations of two
distinct observers are always equivalent by a linear equivalence and thus perfectly
comparable. Of course, this Last equivalence will only be recognised as valid
statisticaliy, but then that imposes statistical laws (rarely made explicit b1 the
literature) describing how the same phenomenon can be perceived by different
observers.
Einstein's thesis has an evident advantage over that of Mach (to the eyes of
a philosopher, if not of a physicist!): it is possible to imagine space empty of all
matter and of all radiation. On the other hand, it is difficult (if not impossible)
to conceive how non-extended elements of nature in themselves wiU be able to
engender , to consistute the continuous space which we intuitively know. How-
ever, it is not necessary to conceal that the numerous and diverse historical
attempts (de BrogUe, llei.senberg, etc.) to interpret elementary particles as
slngularities of a field def'med on all space did all fail. The interest being taken
at the present time in the theory of solltons, and which is motivated by the
same underlying ambition, does not appear to me to be able to go beyond the
dimension one as a dimension of space, and that i.s for the following reasons. In
every conceivable theory of slngularities, these must appear as 'hypersurfaces'
(of eo-dimension one) In the space under consideration (we can think of, for
example, the shock waves in fluid dynamics). Now elementary particles, In so
far as they are detectable, appear as points (curves in space-time) and hence
as geometric entitles with eo-dimension tlvee.t The only valid analogy wlU be
tlf Heuenberg'• unczrt.alnly pnnc:lple Is accepted, aparticle has no uajeccory srnsu stricto:
thtrt are then SUtceuf\'e localis,111oDS which conJ1hU1e the lin&uJarity (which IJ 1hUS Of
co.<Jlmen$Kin four, once h Is made or points).

Sec. 8.2] Physiological Space 131

that associating an elementary particle to a defect in an ordered medium


(such as the defect of a nematlc for which the disinclination curves are of
eo-dimension two). This requires the presence at every point of the milieu,
of a ·polarisation' (vector or tensor), the physical interpretation of which Is
very difficult, because it is not detectable directly. Moreover, defects acting
as singularitles in a field have in general a stratified structure. They decompose
intO strata of decreasing dimension (regular singularities, singular! ties of slngu-
larlties, etc.) and no observations in the case of elementary particles, have ever
produced evidence of such a structure. The progressive destruction of the concept
of form, the absence of all observable (not even detectable) morphology, con·
stitutes one of the most formidable dilemmas in the quantum world. This has
enabled us to justify the statement according to which even the concept space-
tune loses all sense on the scale of the quantum.
These difficulties, which are very difficult to imagine, clearly will only be
of little interest to professional physicists. The Ideas that l recommend here are
hence addressed to those, a few may still survive, for whom the situation carmot
reasonably be tolerated. 1 suggest that returning to the notion of space such as
that which provides for the physiology of animals on the one hand, and the
anthropology of 'primitive' human society on the other, can constitute for us
helpful models for trying to imagine lhe quantum world.
\

8.2 PHYSIOLOCICALSPACE
It is now usual to accept that the essential function of the central nervous
system, m the animal, is to p rovide a local map of the spatial field surrounding
the organism; the field from which sensory activity provides biologically pregnant
bnages (for example, prey, predators, sexual partner,e tc). which, once recognised,
determine motor behaviour (pursuit of prey, filgbt from a predator, etc.).
Now these motor behaviours are structured. in a discrete manner, in 'fields',or
m 'chreods', according to C. H. Waddiogton's terminology. We can think for
example of a step as an elementary field of walking in humans. Each 'field' Is
defined by a well-defmed trajectory in the interior of a local map which is
associated with it. To each of these maps is associated a kind of 'local con·
seiousness'. We have no evidence that an animal has, in general, a pennaneot
sense of its own body Jocallsed at the centre of the local map, netther conse·
quemly, a 'continuous' subjectivity, even in a state of vigilance. But it can
arrive at a very efficient memory representation of its territory, by aggregating
the maps one with another to assist the indices of the natural senses (sigot,
lrnell etc.). According to the physiological state of the animal, it may be more
sensuive to certain indices than to others, in a manner which ensures that Its
spatial representation can be distorted to accommodate spec!Oc organic needs.
Of course. these dlstortions can only exceptionally affect the local map contain·
lng the organism as a whole, because the fidelity (geometrical, mechanical,
132 From physics to biology [Ch. 8

physical, etc.) of this map is a condition sine qua non of the efficiency of motor
displacements. But a certain plasticity remains possible (and probable) on the
global ierritorial scale.
If, we now pass from animals to man, we will find initially a not very
different situation. The territory of a human collective is, In general, divided into
sub-territories each having particular economic or cultural purposes. 1t is the role
of the traditional great myths to specify, most often through describing the
voyage of a founding ancestor, the spatial concatenation of these sub-domains,
each identified with a specific sacred centre. If, through social necessity, the
representation of the territorial collective is fixed, there is no doubt that this is
not the case at the level of individual consciousness. lt is here that we see inter·
venlng the quasi-universal phenomenon of magic.

8.3 MAGIC AND SPACE


The name of Levy-Bruhl remains, In France, linked to the thesis that primitive
man accepted the possibility of 'participation', that is to say accepted that it
was possible that two spatially disjoint beings could constitute the same being.
For example, a sorcerer may be at one and the same time a man sleeping in a hut
and a tiger hunting in the jungle some distance away. Later anthropologists
(beginning with Duikheim) have had a tendency to belittle the importance of
Levy-Bruhl's thesis. Their principal argument is linguistic: it is possible to
atrribute improperly to the copula is a consubstantial meaning, where, in the
mind of the speakers, it is only a matter of simple predication. When the
Bororo say that it is an arara, that is no more surprising than to say 'the sky is
blue', since the arara is one of the totems of the Bororo society. l t is clearly
impossible to discuss this problem here in detail. Let us say simply that the
foregoing 'linguistic' argument does not seem able to account for soundly
attested cases, where participation implies a so11111tic identification between
the participants. In the preceding example of the sorcerer-tiger if the tiger
is wounded by hunters in the jungle, then the man-scorcerer in his hut, will
reveal a wound in the homologous place on his body. A belief of this kind
justifies the statement that the man-sorcerer, and the tiger have their 'local
somatic maps' identified, and this in spite of the fact that these maps relate
to being separated by several kilometres. From this viewpoint, it can be said
that the act of magic is characterised essentially by an 'action at a distance'
which can be interpreted as a modification of the usual topology of space-
time. In other words, the linking up between local maps wblch deftne the
usual space will not be fixed, but could be modified at the pleasure, at the
will certain men (magic.ians or sorcerers), and this thanks to the use of specific
procedures (magical rites, sacrifices, etc.). Further, the topology of the space
will cease to be the same for all the perceptual experiences of an observer
can themselves be affected by magical action.

Sec. 8.4] Magic and Locality 133

This conc~ption of a flexible and individual space- time, which will cease
to be a universal frame valid for all men. clearly conflicts head on with the
basic postulate of all modem science that there exists a unversal space-time
vabd and isomorphic for all. lt is without doubt this essential difference that
Levy-Bruhi had wished to signify in speaking of 'pre.Joglcal mentality' -
unhappy words, for logic has in principle, nothing to do with the representation
of space.
1t was perhaps inevitable that, in our conceptual organisation of reality
(the organisation of our semantic universe), the independence and fixedness
of tllis universal base which is space was not recognised as a posteriori. In effect,
the purely geometric, indefmite extension of space conflicts with the presence
of local morphological accidents of which many have a pregnant, even alienating,
character. The Isomorphism between these pregnant forms , although spatially
distant, can be easily interpreted as a contact in a topology other than the usual
topology, and which can enter into conflict with this latter. The writer Gilbert
Simondon has given a striking description of magical thought.
L'univers magique est structure scion la plus primitive et la plus pn!gnante
des organisations: celle de la reticulation du monde en lieux privllegies. Un
lieu privilegie, un lieu qui a un pouvoir, c'est celui qui draine en lui toute
la force et l'efftcace du domaine qu'illimlte; 11 r6sume et contienr la force
d'une masse compacte de reaUttl; il la resume et la gouverne comme un
lieu eleve gouveme et domlnc une basse contn!e. Le monde magique est
fait ainsi d'un reseau de Iieux et de choscs qui ont un pouvoir et qui
sont rattaches aux autres choscs et autres lieux qui ont aussi un pouvoir
r ... J.PJ
(Translation. The magical universe is structured according to the most prim!·
tive and the most pregnant of organisations: that of the reticulation of the
world into privileged places and into privileged times. A privileged place, a
place which has a power, is one which draws in full the force and efficacy
from the domain which it governs; it concentrates and contains the force
from a compact mass of reality, it organises it and controls it as a piece of
high ground govelllli and dominates a lower region. The magical world Is
made thus from a net of places and things which have a power and wh1ch
are tied to other places and other things which also have a power [...]
W.M. B.)

8.4 MAGIC AND LOCALITY


Now, this view of a primitively reticulated universe leaves intact the dilemma
Of Finstein's and Mach's theses Introduced earlier: is the global structure of
Space produced by an invariant aggregation of domains generated by (or associated
With) local accidents (Mach's thesis), or on the other hand, (Einstein's thesis).

134 From physics to biology [Ch. 8

are accidents pure "epiphenomena', manifestations of a local tension of the


mdifferent ether which is the substrate of all things? lf Mach's thesis is related
to the 'magical' view of the universe, which underlines the formal and qualitative
identity of local accidents to the detriment of their spatial isolation, that of
Einstein, by his exacting requirement for locality, appears as the 'scientific'
attitude par excellence. However strong had, initially, been the temptation to
explain the analogy by nn action at a distance of a magical nature, the spatio·
temporal constraints of our macroscopic universe are so evident that they cannot
be rejected. Even in magic. the demands for locality appear quite soon: for If a
magic formula can have an effect on a distant object, it has, a fortiori. even more
effect on a nearer object. in one of his classic memoires on the Trobriand
Islanders, Mallnowski reports, not without irony, that the Christians, who
attract divine favour to their harvests by prayers said in a chapel, distant from
the fields, could appear as the 'prelogicals of Uvy·Bruhl' to their nonconverted
fellows, who practice a logical magic out of formulations and rites executed on
the very ground where seeds are germinating. However, the invariance of space
appears Implicitly in the const.l tution of grammar of spoken language: the
distinction 'noun-adjective' (the importance of which is recognised by the
majority of linguists) reflects the fundamentally asymmetric character of the
copula is: though we can say: 'The sky Is blue', we do not say: 'The blue Is
sky'.

8.5 MAGIC AND GEOMETRY


Thus we have the fact that 'the blue' is an entity of an abstract nature, ontologi·
cally different from an extended object such as 'the sky'. It is easy to see what
gave birth to this break in the primitive maglc net and to the constitut mg of the
space of geometry. Rectilinear propagation, imposed by the global economy
of displacement, has been the essential factor. ln walking, each step is usually
taken In the same direction as the preceding one.lt is only in abnormal clrcum·
stances that this relation between directions Is broken (we are reminded of the
definition of the Brownian movement as a drunken sailor's walk). To this add
the effect of the existence of language and of the conceptual thought which it
subtends: to the extent that pregnant forms have received names, they lose
their alienating character (see Chapter 14). The essential step in the construction
of Euclldean space, has been the possibility of the division of a motor field; and
here we come up against an evident physiological impossibility. Greek geometry
resolved this problem of the division of a segment into equal segments by the
discovery of Thale's Theorem: equidistant parallel lines cut two secants in
propontonal segments. Acre is openly demonstrated a remarlcable synthesis
between a constructive procedure of motor ongin (the putting end to end of n
equal segments on an oblique auxiliary line AP) followed by an obviously
sensory procedure, 'visual' (the linear prOJection of the segment AP composed of

Sec. 8.5) Magic and Geometry 135

n equal pans on to the given segment AB). (It is no accident that this construc·
tion of exceptional phllosophicaJ Interest has been eliminated from teaching
by the champions of 'modern mathematics'.)

A B
n= 4
The possibility of the indefinite division of space became clearer after the
juStification of a countable infinity. There is no doubt that this is the significance
of the Eleatic paradox of Achilles and the tonoise, in which a fmite segment
appeared as the infmite sum of segments of decreasing length. Let us observe,
however, that the mere existence of the quantum world is a challenge to the
invariance by dilatation of the physical world, sinceobjectsoftheorder 10- 13 cm,
for example, have very different propenies from macroscopic objects.
As a consequence, Greek geometry became the supreme example of the
scientific approach, replacing a non-local operation (for example, taking the
Intersection of two lines in a plane} by a verbal description, the formal analysis
of which became the demonstration that it was vinua!Jy autonomous, that is,
able to be rendered independent of the non-local Intuitive approaches which
described it. In this sense it can be nated that In replacing non-local spatial
intuition of the plane (or of space) by a formal discourse in literary symbols
empty of sense, the axiomatic approach realises this localisation of the trans·
local which is characteristic of science.
But, well before the appearance of Greek geometry, men had become
extremely conscious of the relatively inflexible constraints imposed by geometry
and mechanics in our ambient space. If space- time had been a fluctuating and
plastic entity deformable ad libitum, there would have been no need for those
5peciaJ gifts, the talents of the magician, to reveal the distonions. The fact that
SUch a distonion required speciaJ..Ist Intervention did show that even the 'averll8e
man' was fully conscious of the exceptional character ,lndeed properly miraculous,

136 From physics to biology (Ch. 8

of these actions at a distance. ln modem terms, it could be said that there was
established the concept of a relatively stable and regular space-time in its ground
state. but which exceptionally takes deviant , 'excited', forms.ln order to realise
these excited forms, it is necessary to breathe into the space a supplementary
'energy', or a 'negentropy' which will channel a multitude of local nuctuations
in a prescribed manner. Such was the aim of rituals and magical procedures,
which frequently involved the sacrifice of living animals. 1t is as if the brutal
destruction of a living organism could free a certain quantity of 'negentropy'
which the officiant will be able to use in order to realise the desired distortions
of space-time.
We can see here how little the conceptual body of magic differs basically,
from that of our science. Do we not know in the theory of the hydrogen atom
for example, that the energy level of a stationary state of the electron is measured
by the topologi.cal complexity of the cloud which this electron makes round the
nucleus? In the same way, certain quantum theorists such as Wheeler, tried to
interpret quantum invariants in terms of the topology of space- time. And, in
General Relativity, the energy density of the uruverse is interpreted as a geometric
curvature.

8.6 SCIENCE AND MAG IC


Nevertheless, the problem of the historical relations between science and magic
is not simple. Here again, Durkheim sets himself against Uvy-Bruhl. He has
st.ated, not without reason, that in the language of numerous primitive societies
are found abstract concepts such as Mana (Polynesia), Orenda (Sioux), etc.,
expressing the fact that a domain of space possesses a power, with virtues of a
sacred character. I n these concepts, Durkheim sees the forebears of modem
concepts of force or of energy. There is thus no major discontinuity between
primitive magical thoughts and modern scientific though 1. lt seems to me
nevertheless that there are two essential differences between science and magic.
First as a social function: magic aims to resolve individual and local problems;
science is preoccupied with timeless and uruversal truths. As a consequence,
science has ·stabilised • space- time as a universal receptacle of all experience.
From this point of view, Greek geometry and Galilean 'epistemological revolu·
!ion' marked decisive steps. Science opposes magic by its insistence on locality
and by denying action at a distance.
It is perhaps this last point which merits most comn1ent.lf we ask ourselves
what are the most brilliant scientific achievements of all time, two theories
spring immediately to mind: Newtooian gravitation and quantum mechanics.
Now, what is striking, is that these two theories are non-local. It is clear that
Newton's law of attraction F= Kmm'/r 1 offers an example of magic, but o magic
whose manifestations are strictly controlled. The ~me for quantum mechanics.
When one tries to formulate it classically in terms of hidden parameters, actions

Sec. 8.7] Toward5 a New Description of Space? 137

at a distance at a speed greater than that of light are necessarily Introduced


(Bell's theorem). The major practical successes of science have always been
linked to the exploitation of apparently non-local actions. Electromagnetism
offers a striking example: the Coulombian Interaction between two electric
charges, the action of a magnet on a current, are apparently actions at a distance.
With his General Relativity theory, Einstein has been able to 'render' gravitation
'local'; Maxwell, with his equations, has localised electromagnetism. And further,
in the-popular view, when the modern sci.entlst is seen as a magician, ills because
he knows how to control satellites and transmlt messages instantaneously on
Hertzian waves. On the other hand,localising theories, in spite of their theoretical
interest, have hardly any practical applications themselves (for example, one can
think of General Relativity). In Science there is, from this point of view, a
certain antinomy between 'practice' and 'theory'. When science allows a practice,
it is by the control of apparently 'magical' non-local elements. The explanation
by local contact, when it eliminates all appearance of magic, does not itself
introduce new possibilities of action. Catastrophe theory, anti-magic par excell·
ence, pushes the principle of locality to the extreme: this is without doubt why
it hardly offers new practical possibilities.

8.7 TOWARDS A NEW DESCRIPTION OF SPACE?


In his description of tlte world of magic, G. Sintondon presented space-tlnte as
given, the universal substrate of a reticulation deftned by "key-points'. But we
can ask ourselves whether the retlculotions could not be the first data. The
global construction of space time would then be effected by a process of con·
catenatiOn that starts with spaces generated by blowing-up processes associated
with centcal points. I would gladly see the fundamental archetype of the notion
of space, the Urbild of spatiality, in the image of an organising centre point,
which in a star like ramillcation subtends completely an associated space. It is
striking to see, in any case, that this Image appears both In the big bang model
accepted In cosmology and in the basic schema of quantum mechanics where a
Particle localised at lhe origin spreads itself as a wave (in Schrodinger's non-
relativistic equation) which immediately occupies all space. The same is found
In pure mathematics, in algebraic topology, where the majority of spaces that
are considered are built from a point-base, frequently ltnked to all the points of
the space by continuous paths as in J. P. Sec re's fibre-bundle theory. We can
think also of the 'starred vault' used In algebraic geometry. Perhaps at the base
of this archetype Is to be found the intage of some biological behaviour. an
embryo which develops and, once 1t is mature, explores all its environment in
order to deposit the egg which will perpetuate it; or again an alternation of
motor fields and sensory explorations, as in the behaviour of a predator in pursuit
of a prey However, that being so, it is conce1ved in the quantum schema that
the usual space-lime will appear as no more than a quotient (without doubt

138 From physics to biology (Ch. 8]

fluctuating) between spaces of high dimension lilt associated to the blowing-up


of a point particle, the concatenati.o n between spaces 11/1 being defined, generated
by a new localisation of the particle, itself defmed in the older space Ill by a
local optimisation procedure.t If such is the case, it would be necessary to
renounce universal space- time, which would be no more than a fonn of wishful
thlnking, but, with the impossibility of comparison between the views of two
individual observers, all possibility of consensus between scholars would
vanish . . . . It may be that the quantum schema marks the extreme limit of a
properly 'regulated' view communicable to the world , and that all efforts to
go beyond destroy the very possibility of science.

REFERENCE
fl] Simondon, G., Du mode d'existence des objets techniques, Paris, Aubier,
1969,p. 164.

t in such a picture of the world the pa.ulng of time will be fundamentally irrevmslble, by
reason of the continual bursting of panicles. The formal reversibility of quantum mechanics,
its llamUtonian character, are thw linked to the number of particles and to special nurncrico.J
properties of the opllmlsation principle which determines a new localisation as a function
of the older one.

CHAPTER 9

Biology

1\vo papers aregiven here, bearing on 'Theoretical Biololf)l '. The f'vstls a dls,ussion
of 'space forms' in an abstract sense, with applictztions to mitosis, while the
second is more concrete, the comparative embryololf)l of insects Olld verrebrrztes.
Tire problematic thus broached is completely Ignored in modem bfololf)l, and
while certain o[ these views appear highly specuhltive. they are nevertheless
extremely suggenive. Rt:aden -...1shing to find a more mathematicol model of
embryology could refer to my article 'A global dynamicol scheme [or ~ertebrate
embryololf)l' (A. A. A. S., /971, Some Mathematical Questions in Biology),
Lectures on Mathematics ill Life Sciences, edited by the American Mathematicol
Society, Providence, 1973. pp. 3 45.

9.1 EXPLAINING SPACE FORMS: REDUCTIONISM v. PLATONISMt


9.1.1 Generalities abou t fonn
A space form can always be considered as a figure drawn on a background
(its 'substrate space '). Here of course the substrate space will be usual Euctidean
space (or one of its subspaces, like the plane surface of a blackboard). The
distinction between figure and ground amounts to a well-known notion of
General Topology: a figure is a closed sub space of the substrate space, that is,
for any point x which does not belong to the figure F, there exists an e > 0, such
that any poult y whose distance from xis less then e, does not belong to F.
A form (F) has in general many possible spatial representatives in a given
ground space E. lf (FJ) and (F,) are two such representatives, (FJ) and (F,)
Will be said to be equivalent mod (F), where (F) is an equivalence relation
between closed seu of E. A fundamental problem, present in all morphological
dtsciplines (Biology, Geology, etc.), is to try, for every focrn (F) which appears
eltperimentally, to elucidate the mathematical nature of the corresponding
equivalence relation. This Is a difficult task, for which standard mathematical

tTran!latlon of a lecture alven at a meeting of EMBO, Hir~chbom, Germany, 1977.


140 Biology (Ch. 9

tools are found to be insufficient. The equivalence re lation (F) Is in general


weaker than straighlforward metric equivalence, but also much stronger than
s.imple topological equivalence (homeomorphism). For quhe generally, this
homeomorplusm has to satisfy metric requirements which are diflicult to make
explicit. (Think for mstance, about the problem of Biometrics: findmg numerical
criteria allowing the recognation of tile species from a simple organ, like a bone
for instance.)
We shall not dwell here on 1he se difficulties; let us suppose that we have
been able 10 characterise with sufficient accuracy the equivalence relation (F)
defining an experimental form (F).
The following task, In a glven morphological discipline, is a taxonomic one:
classify all stable morphological features appearing in the field. By 'stable', 1
mean here what mathematicians would call 'structurally stable', that is, features
which resist small perturbations of the initial conditions (or, which have regulative
properties, in biological terminology). Embryologlsts of the beginning of the
twentieth century (Boveri, Child) introduced, for that purpose, the concept of
a 'morphogenetic field'. Unfortunately, they were not careful enough 10 dis-
tinguish between the descripthe function of the concept. and us supposed
explicative properties. As a descriptive tool, the concept of morphogenetic
field is a perfectly legitimate scientific concept (in fact, much more acceptable
than so me now in use by biologists, like 'genetic information', for instance).
However, it can only acquire explicative power within the framework of a theo-
retical model, which permits an explanation for the connection of a given field
with nearby fields. As a consequence of not mak.mg this methodological ills-
tinction, the concept of morphogenetic field became associated with 'vitalist'
connotations, as in Driesch's entelechy, and it feU into disrepute (at least,
among orthodox molecular biologists; some researchers still use it in Develop-
mental Biology, often quite successfully).

9 .1 .2 The notion of morphogenetic: field and platonistic: theories


The idea that forms are not arbitrary , but are predetermined by their internal or
external constraints is among the oldest in biological thanking (the theory of
'archetypes' of eighteenth-century natural philosophy, for instance). Whereas
these philosophers conceived the totality of forms as incarnations in the real
world of 'Platonic ideas' (Boethe's Urbilder), fundamental theoretical progress
was made with D'Arcy Thompson's book: On Growth and Form. Here, the
predetemuned, Platonic character of the form is a.ssociated with ru stability, or
to its ability to solve an oplirnlsation process. The topological, and sometimes
the metric, properties of the form can be given a direct explanation through a
local mathema tical modelling. In Catastrophe Theory a further step towards
abStraction is taken: we try to explain the observed form as the result of a
conflict of local dynamics interacting in the substrate space. As an example,
let us take the more restricted Elementary Catastrophe Theory. Let (u) denote

Sec. 9.1] Explaining Space Forms: 141

n poin t in substrate space. We suppose that the local dynamic around any point
v E U is a gradien t dynamics defmed on a space X (x1 , X2o ••• , x 11 ), the 'internal
parameter' space, which describes the local sta te of the medium in U. The totality
of all possible local dynamics is then defined by a diffe rential system dx/dt =-
grad V(:~:; u ) on the product space X X U. We then write the conditon for local
(thermodynamical) equilibrium for such a local dynamic. At the point v e U,
the point x eX has to be a minimizing point for the potential V (x: v). If this
minimizing point Xm is non-degenerately quadratic, then the equilibrium point
-~m is a local smooth function of v {by the implicit function lheorem) By
definition, all points of U where the local dynamic is at such a stable minimising
point, xm(U), form a 'phase' in U. The mathematical theory of structural
stability can teU us now which configurations of 'phase diagrams' are stable. In
that case, the 'Platonic' origin of such patterns of phase contacts entails no
mystery, nor any metaphysical depth ....
Of course, tne conditions for applicability of Elementary Catastrophe
Theory are severely restricted (few dynamics are gradient dynamics). But tl1ere
are ways of taking care of more complicated situations, like lhe existence of
more complicated attractors than simple points, or the presence of dynamical
symmetries in the internal space. Even in tllese more complex situations, the
eonilict between phases always tends to be directed (at least qualitatively) by
patterns of the elementary theory, conveniently modified along some higher
singularities.
Jt should be clear, nevertheless, that general Catastrophe Theoy is not a
closed math ematical theory (as opposed to the elementary theory). The problem
of expressing cormections between neighbouring 'fields', in particular, is almost
entirely open.

9 .1.3 The reductionist approach


The Platonic viewpoint, in morphologi.cal disciplines, is still poorly understood.
Hence most people, and this is commonly true in Geology as weU as Biology
prefer the 'reductionist' approach, in which one attempts 10 reconstruct a
comp lex space form out of simp le elements. Clearly one can see what one is
doing! lt is the purpose of this section to show that tile 'Platonic' approach is
in fact unavoidab le, even when treating assembly models {at least insofar as the
number of elements is fairly large). As an inescapable conclusion, we shall see
how the feeling of security given by the reductionist approach is in fact
illusory....

(a) Spontaneous ~f{.qs~mbly models


We start here with a system of solids {F;), which we suppose for simplicity all to
be congruent. We assume tllat between two such solids F;, Fj, there is a force
dermed by a potential V(F/, Fj) which is of finite range, becoming infinite
wben the two elements meet in space {hard core hypothesis).
142 Biology [Ch.9

Given n such elements in a box B {for instance, a sphere of radtus r), we


form the space (G) of dimension 311 consistmg of aU the positions of the F1 ln
(B), avoiding interpenetration of two elements. At every point of this space G,
the total potential energy is computed as V(g) l: V(F;, Fj)· The equilibrium
positions of this system (stable assemblies) will be given by those positions (g)
which minimize the total energy V(g).
Now, let the radius r of the box B vary. For some {discrete) values of r , the
topology of the space G may vary (packingeffect),but,if 11 is fiXed, for sufficlentJy
larger, the topology of the space (G) becomes stauonary, and also the number
of minimising points (g). Such asymptotic mintmn may be called dilute phases
of the assembly (they are independent of 11 and r). (By opposition, those minima
found in the packing spectrum may be called 'condensed' phases).
it often happens that, due to the invariance of lhe dynamics under Euctidean
transformation, every minimum g of V(g) Is degenerate. V reaches its minimum
along some subvariety We G. Any configuration real.ising a minimum of V has to
be a local. minimum, hence the corresponding pattern will be a mixtureofplrases.
Conflicts between such phases will be spatially governed by rules of the catastro-
phe theory type (possibly modified to take into account the degeneracies of the
minima). 'Phases' may themselves have defects (like defects in liquid crystals).
lf such defects are stable, they are given by the 'Kieeman- Toulouse principle'
I!) , hence, 'Platonically'. Of course, in any concrete case, such a description
may be tremendously complex: a good theory of crystal growth, for instance,
does not exist. .. . But that is no reason to cast doubt on the preceding con·
ceptual. framework .
(b) Assembly with program
We deal here with elements (e;) which may vary in shape, in poSition. or even in
numbers (cell division in Biology). Given the positions t£(1) at t, the position at
time (t + I) is given as follows . each element e; senses its environment, then
chooses its next motion (or change) according to an Inner program, as a function
of its environment; and so on, inductively. The main difficulty with the program
hypothesis lies in its indetermi.nacy. Whatever form Is observed can be generated
by a properly devised program. Such models are of interest only if the inner
programs of the elements show some uniformity. and intrinsic simplicity. Even
there, we might ask. where is the program? How did it come into existence?
What compels the element to follow the program? .... All the questions that
are traditionally answered in the case of the living cell by the ritual appeal to
DNA.
If we wan t to get away from the verbal metaphor of 'the program', we
have to appeal to the framework of automata theory. Each element has a space
of internal states S; the input Is the environment/; the output U is lhe change of
the element. ~ow we have to defUle the rules:
,P 1 I X S-S (Internal. change of state)
~I X S-+ U (external transform! ion of the element).

Sec. 9.1) Explaining Space Forms: 143

If we suppose that S,/, U are smooth spaces (manifolds), and that the above
rnaps 1/1., 1/1 2 are also smooth, then, if, to any Input, there corresponds only a
finite number of possible outputs, we ate precisely In the situation of Elementary
Cat.ast:rOphe Theory, applied to the element itself ... .
Moreover, practically all forms in Biology Involving a large number of
elements have regulative properties (ate structurally stable). Any discrete model
defined by discrete counting of cells. of mitoses, . . . etc., is bound to fail when
co nfronted with regulation experln1ents. lt is only when the process involves an
obviously discrete type of evolution (like the ftrst synchronic mJtoses of the
blastula) that such models may be valid. To account for globally regulated forms,
it seems that only the following hypothesis may suffice: each element has, in Its
own internal spaceS, a model of the whole figure (W) to be constructed. Then
each element (cell) senses Its own position inside the already existing spatial
configuration (W 1 ), (through a mechanism of positional information, following
Wolpert) and compares it to the ideal position defined by an internal evolution
on S. Let D(t) be the discrepancy between these two positions. Then each cell
c will tend towards minimising this discrepancy (t), either by moving in W1 , or
by ch.anging its internal state. Such an evolution then will affect the internal
dynamics of nearby cells, which will tend to fill the empty places. As a result
the global form (W) will be very rapidly constructed. and in a very stable manner.
If such a view is correct, then all the difficulties of the structure of the
whole ate to be found in the element itself, which cannot be 'simpler' than the
total whole. (After all, in Biology, germinal cells are totipotent.) Hence the main
Interest of the reductionist approach (constructing a complex whole from simple
parts) breaks down. Some neurophysiologists hoped to unravel the functioning
of the central nervous system by studying some Invertebrates (Umnula) whose
neural system consisted only of a few neurons. They found (to their dismay, 1
suppose) that these animals had a sensorimotor behaviour by no means sub·
stantially simpler than the one observed ln animals with hundreds of thousands
of neurons . . . .
Of course. I realise that the standard reductionist attitude in Biology does
not take cells as primitive elements but molecules. But then the models become
unmanageable owing to the huge number of elements. Even so, it is not obvious
that some privileged molecules (the so-called biological molecules: DNA,
enzymes . .) may not have an Internal space of chemical interactions which, at
least partially, simulates the global shape and behaviour of the whole: dupUca·
lion of DNA, for Instance, simulates tile duplication of the cell. On a strict
methodological viewpoint, lt would be absurdly dogmatic to require that in any
modelling of biological processes, the biologist should always get back to mole·
cutes, even physicins do not do that! Would hydrodynamlclsts be forbidden the
use of Navier-Stokes equations because these equations cannot be given any
reasonable molecular uplanation?

144 Biology [Ch. 9

9 .1 .4 An example of 'Platonic' modelling: the origin of genetic material


To explain the function of genetic material, reference is usually made to
Weismann's classical distinction between Soma and Germen. If this distinction
IIIllkes sense for Metazoa, it has no obvious meaning for Unicellulars. The aim of
this model is to show that, as a result of the spatial dupllcation of n cell, with
some extra postulate of 'positional Information' type. then the existence of a
metabollc singularity inside any living cell is necessary. This singularity is charac·
terised by a "fixed point property' (in\'ariance of the local metabolism) and
also its duplicating behaviour prior to any other point of the cell. Moreover,
the duplication process is modelled in!o temporal phases: a long contlnuous
preparation for mitosis, and a fast 'catastrophic' process for cell division itself.
Let us examine first the goemery of duplication of a (three-dimensional)
cell. lf we add time as a fourth coordinate to the three space coordinates we
get in 4-dimenSi.onal space-time a ftgure (P) which we may idenlify with the
four-dimensional analogue of the inside of a pair of pants (Fig. 1). There is. in
particular, a critical time-value tc for which space separation between cells does

c, I
. -·-····.
c,

occur. As in the ordinary theory of critical points of a function , there Is associa·


ted to the singular potnt J of the sptittmg boundary, a two-dimensional 'stable
cell' r oft-gradient lines, emanatmg from an equatorial circle on the boundary.
This is the well known 'equatorial plate' in eukaryotic mitosis (later real.ised as a
wall between daughter cells (Fig. 2(a))). Let u. now add to this picture the
'positiofllll infom~atfon' postulate. lt can be stated as foUows: every pomt of the

Sec. 9.1] Explaining Space Forms: 145

cell 'knows where it is' in the cell. In a less metaphoric language: if we could
analyse (with sufficient accuracy and ingenuity) the nature of the local metabolism
around each point of a cell, then we could get local functions which would be
global coordinates in the cell. A remark apropos this postulate: whereas it
contradicts the simple-minded view of the cell as an 'enzyme bag' (a view which
apparently has been silently abandoned by molecular biologists in the last
decade), it does not entail by itself, any vitalist connotation. For, if we take a
mass of fluid moving inside a container C. then for almost any such flow in C, it
is possible to derive out of the study of the flow at a point in C (for instance
knowing sufficiently many space derivatives of the now) functions which may
be extended to global coordinates in C.

•\I;
"r:~~
Vt~
/ ••:

'•
"' ( c,

r (a) (b) J

Fig. 2

Let us consider our cell at the beginning of interphase (at a fiXed time 10 in
early C 1 -phase of the mitotic cycle). Denote by M the space of all possible
local metabolisms in the cell (considered as a smooth infinite dimensional space).
lf to any point of our cell Cat the time 1, we associate its Local metabolism and
its position in space - tinte we obtain in this manner (positional information
postulate) an embedding p of C1 into M X R 4 • The intage p(C0 ) is a three-
dimensional oeU which we can take as a reference cell for all subsequent times in
interphase, but the p mapping has to break down at the critical lime tc, time of
splitting. The restriction of p to the boundary i!C0 of the cell C0 has for image
in M a two-sphere S 01 , which can be provided with an orientation.
After duplication, C gives birth to two daughter cells C., c;. Owing to the
symmetry of the splitting process with respect to the equatorial plate, it is
natural to assume that if we provide the boundaries cl> a ac,
with orientations
compatible with the global orientation of the 'pants' P (i!P = C- C 1 - C 2 ), then
the embeddings p, (i!C1 ), p 2 (i!C2 ) into S 02 = oC0 are of opposite signs. The
situation can be described as follows: Form the product M X ~4 of the space M
of metabolic states with space- time, let 11:M X ~4 -+ J{4 , q : M X R~ -+M be
the canonical projections. So the map p embeds the pants (P) in M X J{ 4 and the
space M has huge dimensionality, we may suppose the composed map q o p
looks like Fig. 3 (n four-dimensional pretzel surface.) We consider here mitosis
as a periodic process In M . The metabolic state of the daughter cells C., C1 is
identical (in principle) to Co. Hence the need to identify after some time T

146 Biology [Ch. 9

p( C 11

Qop(C 1 l

p c,
Fig. 3

(generation time) the maps PT(C1 ), PT (C2 ) with p 0 (C0 ). This occurs through
diffeomorphisms

which play the same role as Poincare-Floquet homeomorphlsms along a closed


trajectory (cf. Chap. 23.2). In many situations, these homeomorphisms belong
to a fmite subgroup of S0(3): such space transformations describe experimentally
how the equatorial plate of a mitosis in a daughter-cell is disposed with respect
to the plate of the parent-cell. lt is sometimes possible to give simple rules, in a
growing tissue, fixing this sequence of orientations. (Cf. the work of Raven on
blastulae, of Undenmayer (2] on growing filamentary algae . ...)
In the case where these homeomorphisms leave invariant the positive
orientation of the cells (C1 ) , (C2 ), then the 'pants model' can be reduced for
convenience to a two-dimensional model (well known to topologists): the
Dunce Hat (A), defmed by a triangle abc where sides ab, ac, cb are identified
with their orientaLions. (y/e assume here that the two exua dimensions play
Sec. 9.1) Explaining Space Forms: 147

Dl'"ce Hat

Fig. 4

the trivial role of 'suspension coordinates'.) Hence there exists a projection


P-+ /:;, being a map of me taboUc states of the cell C 1 onto the space /:; considered
as a geometric mitotic program. A cell Uke C0 {at t 0 ) has for image by pin!:;, a
curvilinear sector inside the triangle acb where G is the barycenrre of abc (Fig. 5);
the boundary p (3C0 ) is mapped (Unearly) on the side ab; the image p(Co) is
limited in aGb by a critical smooth curve (-y~) which has a counter·image in
C0 , a critical ourve (-y0 ). 'This critical curve is a segment attached to the boundary
ac = SO of the cell at some point (a = b). We see in it the possible metabolic
states of the ONA-genome of the cell.
Le t us consider first the case of a plant cell wllich divides by the building of
an 'equatorial' plane (septum) inside the cell. We may consider the foonation of
tills septum as the growth of an annular ring which shrinks its central hole to
the critical point J (see Fig. 2(a)). When this point is reached, then the connexion
between the cells is broken. This Is the critical point J oft and in the 6 model
Its image of p will be the vertex (c). We have p(aC0 ) = (ab), p(ilC1 ) = ac,
P(aC2 ) =be. The two-dimensional stable cell r of the critical point J of the time
function in R3 restricted to p(P} has for image by p in 6 the segment Cc. On
tills segment the command of the program is: 'Build a 'cellulosic wall". Now the
mitotic cycle is realised when the image p 1(C) sweeps up the mitotic program 6
from ab to ax + cb. For the boundary, the image p(aC1) is most conveniently
described by a piecewise linear motion with center c leaving the vertices a, b
fixed and lifting linearly the middle point J.lo of ab (Fig. 5). Then we see that
When the image p(aCt) reaches the barycentre G, growth starts along an equatorial
ring of the wall. The corresponding figure in R3 is as Fig. 2(a).
At the end of mitosis proper we are in the situation of Fig. 6. The boundary
breaks at c into two components and shortly afterwards, the boundary p(ilC1 )
aG + Gc for (C1 ) collapses on the side ac {Fig. 7).

148 Biology [Ch. 9


c c

X)( " 'IC~

..... "•
.. ~" "• "

a
....."., --
If -----· ----
-- ---
"'v..
b a
Interphase Metaphase

Fig. S Fig. 6
c

a End of mitosis

+ + + + + + Critical value line (Fold)


- - - - - - Boundary line

Fig. 7

In animal ceUs the command associated to segment Gc is: 'constrict the


equatorial plate with tubulin filaments'. After the anaphasic splitting of the
chromosomes, the segment Gc orders for the boundary: ·constrict the cortex
along the equatorial plate'. The intrinsic geometry is the same as before ...
{Fig. 2{b )).
In the upward motion of p(3C1) drawn in Fig. 6, the critical curve ("Y1) also
goes up above it. We have to imagine that segment Gc is extended down along a
segment NG where the command is: 'Duplicate DNA' .... Theo the curve {"Y)

Sec. 9.11 Expla ining Space Forms: 149

suffers (prior to the boundary iJC) along the segment NG, the same kind of
transformation as described earlier for iJC1 along Gc (Figs. 8, 9 , 10). For -y,
runn ing along the segment NG. 11 is the S-period of duplication of the mitotic
cycle (Fig. 8(a) (b)). One has to look at the duplication of the chromosome as
the Insertion of a ·palindromlc' thread on both sides of NG (Fig. 9(a)-(c)).

e c

_.., " "


....,.... ,.:;_
N

X
~~~· ,._ •
xJt _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - .,..,.

a b a Beginning of Si)hase
Early lnlerpllase
(8) (b)

• Si>hase
(c)
b

Fig. 8

When the extreme middle point NG n p('y) reaches G, then the splining catastro·
phe occurs, and the critical curve breaks in two parts, repelled by an unstable
(cell) mechanism at G (mecllanlsm of the mitotic spind le for animal cells (ana·
phase)). Once this separation has occurred {Fig. 9(c)- l O(a)) (in 1tt 1l)(Fig. 9(c)),
then the boundary p(iJC) may go upward along Gc (Fig. lO{a) (c)).
ISO Biology [Ch. 9
c c

G
X '<
.. +
... ....,.
~

~ ~N
J( X "" ,..

X---
.1!t- '
------
)(
,x "
-- ..._. ')l.
- _ ..
a b
Lale prophase
~>:! Jt!ase lbl
(aJ

+
..
+

--
'~---~
-
a b
Pro· merepllase
(C )

ln the full mitotic cycle, 0 < t < r, the image of the boundary line p(ilC1)
has to cross over the critical value line -y'(t) in the space A: for instance, in the
division C0 -+ Ct. if we start from vertex a, the critical value line ·/ is initially
above and to the left of the boundary line (Fig. 8(a)-(b)) and at the end of
mitosis in C1 , -y'(t) is to the right and below p(ilC1) (Fig. IO(d)). In a simplistic
semi·linear model, this passing over occurs at metaphase (Fig. 6), where both
lines p(ilC1) and -y'(t) coincide with the sides aG + Gb. This leads to a highly
degenerate map, which in fact has a biological interpretation; namely the very
peculiar state of the metabolism at metaphase: vanishing of any metabolic
activity, fibering (along the fibers of the projection p) of the cell by the tubilin
ftlaments of the mitotic spindle. If we want to make this degenerate situation
Sec.9.1] Explaining Space Forms: ISI

.I
/
/
/
/

l.lelaphase
(a)

\
G......_ \ ,
l( \
N ~ \
I( '
~ \
".. \
~

a Tllopllate
Daughter cel l s i n aatly
Interphase (C)
(d )

,.. - - - -.. Fol d line (p I"' )) + ++ -+- cri Ileal value


line for lhe map p

Fig. 10

generic by a small deformation (unfolding), then we have take Into account the
following facts :
(I) generically the fold line p(oCt) meets the critical value line ·! = p(-nr)) at
a point ll(r) of the type shown In Fig. I J, where ·r' cannot be eJctended beyond
the Intersection point v(t). This has been represented In Fig. 11 where the
Critical line r ' is progressively destroyed by the upward motion of the contact
point v(r) between ·/ and acl · this is Interpreted as the reduction of activity
states of the genome and the spatial condensation of the nucleic material.

152 Biology [Ch. 9


p(l)
k ,.r-+-O'ilical value line (Fold line) p( p( 11
.X
><x __ - - Boundary line p(c1 C1)
x "!--,...... v (l )
7
/
/
/
/
/
I
Fig. 11

(ii) in a full model, the boundary line p(3Ct) ha.s to be doubled (plane projec·
don of an annular nng, if the source is taken to be of dimension 2). The second
lower boundary curve undergoes at the end of prophase an inflexion which
creates a new component ·l' of the critical curve, oriented, as a fold, In the
reverse direction of the original r'. This leads to the situation shown in Fig. 12
as a tentative description of the available domain for the genetic material In
early anaphase. Perhaps the full counrerimage p - 1 (3C1) could be interpreted as
the nuclear envelope, which in eukaryotic mitoSIS is destroyed and somewhat
mysteriously reappears at telophase (as the extension of the new component r ''
of r).

~
, - -/ G

I + "f/
,..,.'~"'>
x1 "'

--
)C .K.,.,... I ""'
..t
x/" 1 r
-- 7
,... I' '" ...... I
I ,-/ I
,,
I /I /
" I /
/ I I "'/
/
/ I I .........,
/ I -- /
_, ,
/
--~~ ....-"'
/ . ~-
/ -~~ I
a /- I
1
f" J 1 Confinement zone
1 I nucleic omterlal
/1 1/ In metaphaSe
I /'
Fig. 12
/ I
I I
/
/

Sec. 9.2) The Notion of Archetype in Biology 153

In prokaryotic celli, the scheme is believed to be simpler, but in fact it is


more mysterious (what about the mechanism which separates the two threads of
DNA?). Moreover the DNA duplicating mechanism is not so strictly coupled
to cell duplication as it is in eukaryotic cells. This model Is somewhat more
complicated, but not incompatible with the one l gave in my book [3] where
the genome is the boundary of a single membrane.
These models have obviously a very tentative character. Much remains to
be understood about 11Utosis.

9.2 THE NOTION OF ARCHETYPE IN BIOLOGY AND ITS MODERN


SUCCESSE>RS
9 .2.1 lnuoduction
If we consider the collection of problems taken on by biology. it is easily seen
that they are on the one hand, problems posed by practice, in essence, those posed
by clinical med.iclne, the control of epidemics and parasites and the selection
of species and varieties useful to man. On the other hand , there are enormous
theoretical problems like the origin of life or of evolution. Now in the large
majority of cases, the scientiflc activity of biologists Is devoted neither to one nor
to the other of these [WO classes. Classical biology, and even modern molecular
biology, are essentially descriptive disciplines. They undertake the recording
in some way, of all poss.ible forms of living being, including their anatomy and
physiology, and this at every conceivable level or organisa tion, from molecules
to organisms and even to the ecological community. This means that biology
responds to no particular problem unless it is to the need of the human mind
to have as exhaustive an mventory as possible of the collection of phenomena
that it can perceive. To that it may be objected tb.at Biology, after the descrip·
lion of the infinite variety of mechanism and fonus listed, tries to give an
explanation. Clearly, the ideal explanatory schema will be reductionist: to
express every molecular arrangement in living beings as the solution of a gigantic
differentlnl system describing the movements and interactions of the constituent
molecules. Now, in hoping that all can be reduced to a molecular state taken as
base level the reductioniSt approach becomes impracticable. Not only(ashasofien
been repeated} by reason of the immense numbers of molecules to consider (of
the order of 1023 ), but also, that which is less known but no less obvious, because
any interaction between two molecules, at all complex, evades all mathematical
formalisation. Since this is the case we are free to dwell on the possibility of
tackling the problem at a higher leve l of organisation. l t Is this which tempts,
occasionally with some success, physiology. There are, for example, acceptable
mathematical models of certain local phenomena like the propagation of a nerve·
impulse, or the circulation of blood in the aorta. But then we are faced with the
problem of integrating pieces of local knowledge thus acquired into a coherent
picture of the global dynamic of the organism, explairung its fundamental
154 Biology [Ch. 9

properties of re~lation and reproduction. The biologist then has no further


prospect than to invoke a general theory of regulation, cybernetics. The sadness
is that this theory, presented as a progranune by its creator Norbert Wiener , has
never been capable of expressing more than trivialities on feedback. There do
not exist any cybernetic theorems. Furthermore, the purely technological
approach of cybernetics leaves untouched the mystery of the genesis of the l.iving
being and of Its development to the embryonic stage and to youth. The 'cyber-
neticists' will invoke here V on Neumann's theory of self-reproducing automata;
but this very incomplete theory raises very grave difficulties as soon as we
wish to move from an abstract sehematism to a material realisation in space- time.
(In this connection it is well to observe that this theory was found in Von
Neumann's papers after his death, and that he himself did not publish them
during his life time.)
There is no need to hide the fact that the problem of the integration of
local mechanisms into a global structure is the central problem of biology;
morphogenesis, to my eyes, is the proper study of theoretical biology.
ln order to tackle this question, catastrophe theory proposes a reasonably
new methodology. Before embarking on an exposition of the method linked to
a geometrical representation of regulation mechanisms, it is not out of place to
offer some words on a preliminary issue, that of hierarchical levels of organisation.

9.2 .2 Hierarchical levels of organisation


Starting with an empirically given morphology, the formal defmition of its organi-
sation levels is itself quite a problem. To my mind only topological notions are
likely to bring any precision to this question. We can state in principle that the
elements of given levels of organisation are topological baJis (cells). The unity
and identity of an object are in effect linked , in immediate intuition, to the
connexity of the domain of space-time which it occupies: break a piece of
chalk in two, this makes two pieces of chalk. . .. ln other words, th.e spatial
supports of the elements are in general of a contracted character (for example,
every living being is topologicaJiy a ball). The two paradigmatic morphologies in
science, the knowledge of the morphology of living being and that of language,
satisfy this rule . Further, both reveal a very interesting phenomenon; if the
elements are arranged according to their level of order or inclusion, we have, for
example:
for linguistics: phoneme, syllable, word, phrase, sentence, narrative.
for biology: molecules, molecular arrangements, cytoplasmic
organelles, cells, tissue, organ, organism,
population, ecological community.
Now. it happens that, in these hierarchies, certain pairs of consecutive
levels present a much better specified organisation than other pairs, which are
much more loose. For example, in linguistics the pair: 'phoneme-syllable' Is the

Sec. 9.2] The Notion of Archetype in Biology 155


subject matter of phonology, the branch of linguistics which describes what the
sequences of phonemes are which may constitute a syllable. Pairs such as 'syllable-
word' or 'sentence-narrative' are not subject in the same way to any strict rule
having universal characterisation. ln biology, the couples: 'organelle-cell' and
'organ-organism' are relatively well structured; the other couples are in general
little or not at all specified.
The description 'well strucrured' referring to a couple,introduces in general
the notion of structure: the higher element decomposes into elements of a lower
order according to a well defined schema, which Is often usually foreseeable
a priori. To return to the example of phonology, a syllable is a time interval,
geometrically symbolised by a segment. The points at the beginning and end of
the segment will be realised by phonemes of a very short catastrophic nature
(gutturals, dentals,) which are the consonants C. The centre part of the syllable
with a permanent stationary character requires a vowe.l V. From the base schema
for a syllable CVC, we will be able to complicate it to CcVcC, where c designates
an element intermediate between vowel and consonant,like the liquid consonants
(1, r) or the sibilants (s). The existence of this decomposition structure leads
certain linguists to include in the same 'organisation level' the higher and the
lower composing element, with the postulate that all organisation levels (in the
integrated sense) present a decomposition structure: 'element-compound'
(kernel-compound), which produces the subject matter of syntax, in some ways
like an algebra. For example, the pale 'phrase-sentence' presents for a simple
sentence like: 'The cat catches the mouse', the explicit decomposition by the
generative structure tree shown in Fig. 13. Here again we have a contracted
structure (a tree in graph theory).lt will be noticed that compound sentences are
linked by conjunctions such as: and, or, .. . thllt . .. , that is to say by elements
(words) of a lower hierarchical level to that of the phrase. In the same way, in
many languages, certain 'grammatical functions' (i.e. abstract elements specify-
ing the structure of the compound element) possess markers (like the 's' of the

s
/~ VP
NP

V/ ~NP(O)
Art N !""'
Arl N

! I
The
I I mouse

Fig. 13

156 BiolQ&y [Ch. 9

plural) which belong totally to the first level, that of the phoneme. Thus it is
possible to have a certain projection of the structure of the higher integrated
level onto certain 'coded' elements of the lower level.
Biological morphology reveals similar phenomena. The best structured pau,
say, 'organ- organism', can be described equally by a tree structure revealed
by embryologicaJ development (it is Waddington's 'epigenetic field'): Fig. 14.

Meloderm

Muacles
1\ Bone lntesllne

I
Ner\I(IUS

!
l
tlasue
Skin Blood

l I
Fig. 14

But here an essential difference appears from the linguistic examples quoted.
While linguistic morphology is unidimensional (as Saussure says, the linearity of
the signifler), the living being is a ball of three dimensions. A tree can thus not
describe on its own the spatial arrangements of different tissues and organs in
the organism.

9.2.3 The problem of the general plan of the organism


lt is a natural idea that this spatial anangement be subject to a priori constraints.
In fact the idea emerged quite early in history. Let us return to what may be
considered as the golden age of biology its 'pre.Socratlc' era - where, in the
years 1800 to 1830, can be counted the names of Coethe, of Lamarek, of
Cuvler and of CeoiTroy Saint-Hllllire. In this period the problem of the general
plan of the organism was a real one. Later biology has abandoned this problem.
Under the inOuence, first of Darwin's theory, which has in fact produced no
more than a purely verbal solution (invoking chance), later, of Pasteur (micro·
biology) and Mendel (genetics), the interest of biologists is localised on the
lower level structures (cells, then molecules), yielding to a reductionist trend,
the explanatory power of which Is, I believe, illusory, at least in as much as the
major constraints acting at the organism level have not been explained.
In 1830, the celebrated controversy between Cuvier and Ceoffroy Saint·
Hilllire took place at the Academy of Sciences in Paris. a controversy in which

Sec. 9.2j The Notion of Archetype in Bioloay 157

the ageing Goethe took a great deal of lmerest.t The theme Is weD-known.
While Geoffroy Saint·Hilaire had, with the aid of a purely geometrical principle,
the con!lectivity pri11ciple (we would now say 'topological'), identified one with
anotJter organs of different 11nlmals, and had claimed thus to open up a unique
plan of organisation valid for all anlmals, Cuvier had only accepted as valid
the basic correlations on a functional homology. This relative priority of the
geometry (localisation) of the function still remains today one of the major
problems posed in theoretical btology. Many contemporaires, seduced by the
boldness of Geffroy Saint·Hilaire's ideas, saw in Cuvter's detailed objection the
work of a specialist who could not see the wood for the trees. Much later, on the
other hand , the ideas of Geoffroy Saint·Hilaire were rejected as prescientific
fantasies, i.n particular ltis assimUalion of the Insect as a 'Vertebrate which goes
on its back'. The idea of a unique plan of organisation for all animals has been
duly rejected; however, more than a score of fundamental plans for the animal
organism can be counted. Thus the Idea of a general plan of the organism retains
tts validity, even though it is necessary to reject the uniqueness of such a plan.l
shall show later how catastrophe theory permits us to envisage the fundamental
difference wltich separates the organisation of an insect (arthropod) from that of
a vertebrate.
The general schema of organisation of an organism can be considered , in the
first instance, as an 'archetype'. But it is lmportant to point out that , since
GoeUte and the Naturphilosophen, there has been a tendency to designate by the
term archetype, the primordial image (Urbild} of an organ or of a collection of
organs. Consequently there has been a bias towards favouring relatively concrete
structures, complete in themselves, endowed with an inunediate, fi.Jlalist character,
like paw, wing, leaf, ....
Tltis tendency to invoke the archetype for very elaborate and concrete uses
culminates in Jungian psychoanalysis, where the archetypes are treated as
individuals endowed with subjectivity, with a psycltism which is hardly inferior
in complexity to the human spirit Itself. It is clear that, if we wish to reinstate
the notion of archetype to a scientific status, we must first defme it in simple

t( ..•J u 2 dour /830, fHU"lnrent 4 Welmar les nouMUu desjoumttl liroludonarin de


iullkt a Paris Eckmruznn, en tliTivant ~ jour·llt chez Goerhe, en ltall tout boulnent. 'Eh
bltn: /ul dlt en l'accu~llant Gotthe. 'que pmsa·vous de et vand tvtntnHintl Le •olcmt
G {aft Irrupt/on; tour trt tin {lamme, n dhonnais, t/ ne sagll p/us d'un dtbat a hub·c:lor',
'C'trt en effet ', repondir Eckermann, 'u11e terrible histoire que la rtrolurion qui vimr de
ren~~<'rur Charles X: ma/s da111 lt1 circomrancer que nou1 SQPOns er avec un re/ mlnllttrt,
/lOuva/t on nepos s'arrendre 6 cc qui tout cela finitrair par /'apulsion do la famlUe royalel'
'I/ me semble que nou1 ne nous enrendortf pas du tout, mon ami,' rlpllque GoerJte. 'Je
ne PIITie pas de ces g•ns·ID, it r'Dgit pour mol de tour tJUtre cho~. Je ptrk du dtbat entre
Cuvier et Gff)f[roy Saint·llilaire, dlbar If important pour 14~elence, et qui vltnt d~clDter en
Pleine A.CQddmle. LD chou esr d 'une trls h1111tt importance et 110us ne »urlez I'<>UI {Dirt une
Idle de er que f'lproul'tli 11 la nouvelle du /9 Jullkt. (Extran des ConversatioiU avec
Eckermann. quoted by Cann, T ., LD ••• et l'oeuvre d'Etienne GtO!froy Safnt·Frdtrlrt, Paris,
P. U. ~ ., 1962, p. 212).

158 Biology (Ch. 9

situations, that is to say, in abstract ones. lt IS vital, to this end, to return to


Aristotle's basic observation, according to which, 10 embryological development,
the structures develop from the abstract to the concrete. That is to say in the
embryological tree, each branch defines a cellular specialisation, that is, a stable
regime of the metaboUsm, which leads to a spatio·temporal behaviour, itself
stable and controlled. This stable directional character of the growth of tissue
corresponds to what Waddtngton has called a cllreod. The partition In the
course of time of undtfferentiated tissue into its diverse cellular speciahsattons,
when they are stable and controlled, can be de:;cnbed by a 'morpholog~cal
field'. ln so far as it 1s only m such a field that the spatial distribution of corre·
spondmg cellular speciahsations are seen, it ls legitimate to consider such a
field as an 'archetype', having itself a very simple nature. Catastrophe theory
(often) allows us to interpret this field as guiding, governing a conflict between
stable regimes of the metabolism, that is between 'chreods'.
We can now describe the methodology of Catastrophe Theory in biology.
In the face of every stable re8Jme, of every stable 'behaviour', we are driven
to determine the mechanisms which ensure the nabihty, the regulation of the
corresponding 'chreod'. lt should be understood that Catastrophe Theory does
not claim to resolve the general problem of regulation, which Cybernetics has
come up against (is there. in any case, a unique solution to this problem, as
V'.tSt as it is badly forn1Ulated?). But a method of attack is offered, which rcUcs
on the mathematical notion of 'successive approximations'. Being given a stable
entity to Study, it is modelled o priori by a dynamical system in the neighbour-
hood of a stable equilibrium, for el<lllllple a material point on the bottom of a
quadratic potential well (Fig. IS(a)). The soundness of this model is conftrmed
by studying, for example, the return of the system to equilibrium after a shmulus.
when a curve of the damped sinusoidal type should be found (Fig. 15(b)).

( a) (b) (e)

-
(d)
ffl8. IS
Sec. 9.2) The Notion of Archetype in Biology 159

If this phenomenon does not appear and in particular if the regulauon has
instead released a compensating reflex, there "'ill appear In the curve of return
to equalibrium, a discontinuity in the derivative corresponding to the precipita·
uon of the reflex (Fig. 1S(c)). In this case the situation will be modelled by a
'cliff.Uke' regulation, found by folding as an overhang the walls of the primitive
potentia l well (Fig. IS(d)). A more refined analysis, implying a study of the
return to equilibrium after a multi-dimensional stimulus. will lead to the compli·
eating of the Ogure of regulation later on. But in addition to the analysis of the
restonng of equilibrium, there is need to account {before all other considerations)
for the genesis of the system, of ats origin and of the morphology and its Inter·
actions and conflicts with the other regimes which border it. If for example.
our regime splits itself in two by bifurcation, this transformation will be modelled
by the passage from a single potential well V= x~ /4 + x 1 /2 to a potential well
divided into two (Fig. I S(e)) V= x 4 /4 - x 2 /2,t.hrough the unstable singularity
V= x~ /4. (This is the first approach eventually suscepllble to being very corn·
plicated.)
When 'We wish to account for a complex morphology. we will seek to model
local features by the singularities of the potential V, chosen in a manner to
minimlse the arbitrariness after the fashion for example. of ensuring a certain
contlnuity of potentials in spite of a very varied morphology. Here, there is no
technique given a priori, and this explains why catastrophe theory requires
delicacy in its use . In biology, we shall be able to appeal,ln the choice of these
potentials, to those matters of character which are slmulataneously funcuonal
and ftoal.tst. And it is here that we rediscover tbe Cuvier- Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's
'connectiVity principle'; but Cuvier's functional correlates are to be interpreted
as connections in the space of metabolic states, hence in fact by a cenain con·
tinuity of relatively local potentials, as internal parameters which specify the
local states of the metabolism (in my terminology 'internal variables'). In this
view. it is legit imate to associate a functional 'significance' to every sequence
of potcntlals (defined by a descending path of the tree-graph). This comes
back to postulating a spatial continuity, a geometric connection, but on an
'tnternal' space endowed wtth a metabol.tc or semantic interpretation. I propose
to give an example of an interpretation of this type in comparing the embry·
ology of vertebrates to that of msects.

9.2.4 Comparative embryology of vertebrates and insects


h ts known that the majority of animals present a 'triploblastic' embryology.
The development Is effected from three basic foUations : ectoderm- mesoderrn-
~ndoderm. lt is tempting to identify this ternary structure of embryology (whlch
IS found particularly in vertebrates) with the ternary structure of the standard
tran sattve sentence: SVO (subject, verb. object) as in the sentence. 'The cat eats
the mouse'. The fact that rnesoderms build bones and muscles completes its
identification with the grammatical category of verbs. On the other hand , a
160 Biology (Ch. 9

certain ambiguity prevails in connection with the correspondence between


subject-object and ectodem1-endoderm. As is shown by the example of the
sentence: 'The cat eats the mouse' , we must, in assimilating every action to a
predation, make the endoderm the subject, for in the end it is Lhe intestinal
mucous membrane, of endodermic origin, which assimilates the prey after
digestion. The assimilation: object (prey) - ectoderm, is justified on the ground
that the ectoderm, with the process of neuralation, creates nervous tissue. Now
the nervous system, in vertebrates, is an organ which simulates the states of the
external world and which contains, in the form of engrams. the fom1s of the
preys. (This is the reason for the maxim: 'The hungry predator is its prey'.
See 7 .4.)
The comparison of the embryologies of vertebrates and of insects reveals
some striking differences: there is practically no endoderm in the insects. While
every vertebrate morphology originates dorsally (blastopore, or primitive line),
it is ventral in the case of insects. Tile ternary structure of the syntax SVO must
be identified in insects as: ectoderm-mesoderm-vitellus (at the start of the
embryology); in fact the embryo directly encapsulates the vitellus to the interior
of its digestive tube once this has been formed (in certain Lepidoptera, even, the
young caterpillar devours with its mouth the remains of the external vitellus).
There is no neuralalion in the insect, only invagination of the neuroblasts of
ectodermic origin by the ventral wall. The internal sinlUiation of the external
world is thus reduced to a suict minimum.
How may these differences be Interpreted? The naturalist Serres, in about
1840, claimed that th.e embryo of the vertebrates, because of its greater size,
must have more vitellinic reserves than the Insect. and that thus the reserves ,
of the dorsal in the case of insects, had become under the effect of gravity ,
ventral in the vertebrates. It is. I believe, reasonable to see in this difference a
change In strategy in the matter of its regulation of life. While the insect locks
itself In its carapace (of ectodermic origin, with no mesodermic component)
through a denial of the external world, a kind of Maginot line complex, the
vertebrate exhibits proof of a totaUy different philosophy of life. It devotes
the majority of its peripheral tissue (ectodermic, the nervous lissue) to the
simulation of the external world , thus demonstrating a greater availability.
The surface form of the vertebrate, its skin, has a mesodermic component
(the derm). The skin is thus a fluctuating frontier and with ceaseless regenera·
tion devotes itself to the conflict of the organism with the external world.
Nevertheless, at the level of the head, the digestive tube ceases to exist and
thus the role of subject is taken on by the ectoderm only. Thus there is locally
a rewm to the situa1ion like that of the insect (at the end of its development):

verb . . ... . . .. • .... . . . . . ... .ectoderm and mesoderm


subject ....•. . ... . . . ... . . . . Jlervous tissue (sense organs)
object ........•.. . . . ....... .external world

Sec. 9.2) The Notion of Archetype in Biology 161

Thus the cranial box is surrounded by a bony shell. an exoskeleton, like


the carapace of insects. This change subject-object in the cephalisation is
without doubt not unconnected with the decussation of the medullary nerve
bundles in the bulb of the medulla .
I think this shows that the major plan for the organisation of animals
corresponds to the major options of the regulation of life which must, in an
essential manner, allow an animal to be other than itself: it is the constraint
of primitive alienation. In the insect, tltis constraint only comes into play in
the last place, and it is limited to a strict minimum. On the contrary, in the
verteb rate it is immediately present and reaches its maximum in man, for
consciousness is always conscious, not as an ego, that truly pltilosophicalillusion,
but as an exterior object, localised in space and time.

9.2.5 Scientific explanation and mathematics


In the method proposed here , we see that the requirements of intellectua l
economy play an essential role ; as 1 have explained elsewhere (4], scient ific
explanation is essentiaUy the reduction of the arbitrariness of the description.
This definition can be criticised for its subjective character. Magical or mystical
explanation also allo w reduction of U1e arbitrary of an empirical description.
Tltis objection is well founded, but it is equally valid for aU explanatio ns based
on the use of non-formalised concepts. It is a fact Ulat the language of modern
biology is riddled with words such as: order, disorder, complexity. information,
code, message . ... All these concepts have the common characteristic o f defining
spatio-temporal correlations of long standing. they are 'trans-spatial' concepts.
acco rding to the terminology of R. Ruyer. From this fact they can hardly be
distinguished from actions ofmagical character ,like action at a distance. Scientific
thought, if it wishes to become rigorous, that is to say demonstrative and forma-
lisable, will have necessarily to purge itself of these ambiguous concepts. It will
have to resort to formalisation, that is to say to a thought wltich rests uniquely
on the local aggregation of forms. lt will be necessary for it to exorcise space
and distance and it will have to be done with tools, the validity of which is
recognised by all. Now the mathematician deploys, in order to go from the
local to the global an infallible notion: analy1icity. A genn of an analytic fun ction
specifies (by analytic extension) the function in all its domain of existence.
To move from the global to the local, the mathematician deploys another
notion, that of singularity. In effect, a singularity at a point is none other than
a global figure which is collapsed at this point (for eXJJmple, if a meridian circle
r of a cylinder is concentrated at a point 0, we obtain the vertex of a cone)
(Fig. 16).
lt is by the alterna te use of these two techniques, as in Catastrophe T heory.
that we may hope to come to a dynamic synthesis of complex global situations.
And what discipline other than mathemat ics wiU be able to provide the appro-
Priate tools? From this view. the concept will have no more than a heuristic

162 Biology (Ch. 9)

role and will take place, uke the combinatorics of Leibniz.. as a pure gnme of
forms ....

I
..- ·-·.
./

.... --- ..........

'
F~. 16

REFERENCES
[I) B. C. Goodwin, Temporal Organisation ill Cells: A Dynamic Theory of
Cellular Control processes, Academic Press, :-lew Yotk.
(2] Lindenmayer A., Growth functions of cell populallons with lineage control,
in Biomathematics and Cell Ki11etics. eds. A. S. VaUeron and P. M. Mac
Donald , Elscvier ~orth·Holland B10medicall'ress. 1978, pp. 117 131.
(3] Thom, Re ne, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, Benjamin, 1975 .
[4) Thorn, R, La Unguistique, discipline morphologique exemplaire, Critique,
March 1974, p. 255.
CHAPTER 10

Semantics and linguistics

This chapter is composed of tWO differelll texts. n1e first gives the general
methodowgical reasons by which any theory of linguistic activity with any clllim
to depth caTUJot do without geometric continuity (tluis relatiVIsing allthelogicist
endtallOurs whid1 flourish amongst the Modems). The secofld, 'Topology and
meaning·. introduces rhe ·archetypal morphology' of verbal processes; which we
wlfl find developed in greater derail in Chapter 12. n1is SI!Ction also poses the
problematic of 'logo/': a noTion on which I must acceptrhar scarcely any progress
has been made since. •..

10.1 THE ROLE OF TOPOLOGY IN SEM ANTIC ANALYS1St


Semllntics, as has often been remarked, runs head on into a problematic dilemma.
When we wish to describe meaning, with what instrument Clll1 we expect to
effect such a description? 11 is difficult to imagine that ordinary language -
possibly promoted to the role of metalanguage - can suffice. In fact. ordinary
language uses with unconscious ease a confusion of levels between language and
metalanguage, so th:!t the dangers of c~rculanty. oftautologies, even of paradoxes,
lie Virtually unavoidable in tlus approach. There is also the ever-present possi-
bihty of gJVing the signified a formal description, of the type employed in the
fonnal systems of axiomatic mathematics or of algonthm1c logic. If such a
reduction were possible, we could expect to dcfrne a canonical procedure
allowing us to associate to the 'deep' structure of semantics, the syntactical
'surface· structure which correspo nds 10 ii us signif1er. Properly speaking. such a

-- -------------------------
l lnttrn..Uonal SympoSIUm on ScmaniJCS, Urbino, July 1971.

164 Semantics and linguistics (Ch. 10

functor will not be univocal but will nevenheless be relatively well defined. In
fact the possibilities of paraphrasing a text, that is to define all the 'synonymous'
expressions of a given text. are relatively limited in number. On the theoretical
level, this is perhaps one of the essential contributions of transformational
grammar.
Moreover, this hope of reaching a formalisation of the signified is the only
one available to us , because, very probably, there is no other conceivable solution,
given the present state of the technical means of communication between human
beings. But what seems to me probable is that, for this purpose, the notion of
formal system will have to be considerab ly modlfied. The alterations that it
will be necessary to make to the notion are heavy with philosophical implications.
Perhaps they will necessitate a radical revision of a common attitude with
respect to formalisation, an attitude entirely pervaded with 'wishful thinking' ,
if not idolatry pure and simple.
Akeady, at the level of 'surface' syntactical structures the adequacy of the
usual formal systems for the description of a corpus is severely limited~ lt is a
paltry subterfuge to lay. as Cbomsky does. the responsibility for the inadequacies
of the formal model on the inability of 'performance' to assume the generative
capacities of a tireless 'competence'. Ln what way does this convince us that
certain of these Inadequacies are not formaJJsable, not able to be described by
laws? On the other hand, the possibility that a language may generate an infinity
of sentences is much nea1er to the open character of vocabulary , rich in all the
possibilities of the semantic universe, than to the variety of syntacticaJ con~
structions, which is ·quickly exhausted, at least in their main outll.nes. it is this
self~limitation of the generative capacities of syntax which requires explanation.
Undue favour has been shown to mathematicians in their belief that the
generative quality of a formal stuctUie, justified by its form alone, must be
admitted a priori, and requires no explanation. From where comes the structure?
Tf by a veritable hypostasis, we allow that a structUie takes root on a substrate
by reason of its true form, how does it sometimes occur that, wishing to extra-
polate its domain, the efficacy of the model decreases, and its validity disappears?
And how do we approach the problem of the diachrony of those 'sudden catas·
trophes' which see a structure eliminated to make way for a completely different
other one. Let us recall the well known fact that there is not, in ordinary language,
a strict frontier between grammatical expressions and those which are not
grammatical, no more than between agrarnmaticallty and semantic unacceptability.
For all these reasons it seems necessary to re-introduce the continuity that
formalism has driven out. We could do it first in a rather vague and statistical
manner. For example, in the free mono id F generated by the alphabet x,, ... •xk ,
we could attach to each word Wof Fa reaJ number p(JV) between zero and one ,
which measures its acceptability. p( IV) = 0 will signify that W is excluded,
p(W) = I that it is well constructed. In a formal system, tbe function p(W) is
restricted so that the set p-• (I} of well constructed words can be generated by
Sec. 10.1 I The Role of Topology in Semantic Analysis 165

a finite number of axioms. But we could well conceive that p(W) was a function
not only of the Internal structure of Ill on Xf, but also of the context. or of the
en,ironment. In order to defme p/ 111 we can expect to give rules of an analyttc
or dtfferential nature, rules wluch will show a decreasing of the action of the
environment when we withdraw from W in the context. 1t would be a very
mteresting problem. by the way. to know if there exist functions p of this type
extending known formal systems. (cf. the recent theory of 'fuzzy sets'.)
But that will not suffice to tackle the problem of changing, of diachrony.
In thiS last case n seems inevitable that we endow the substrate with neutral
('indifferendes' dynamic properties (as with the ether in Maxwclllan physics),
and to make it the basis of a pennanent dynamic process, of which the formal
structure will only be the observable morphology which manifests the mean
'thermodynamic' state. The apparent formal dynamical structure will be hardly
more than the tip of the iceberg, which reveals the presence of a mass of sub·
merged ice nine limes greater than the visible part.
if lhe need to introduce, behind an apparently rigid structure, 'hidden'
parameters of a kinetic nature whlch explain (and sometimes measure) its
stabWty, has hardly been discussed, then the problem exists of building a coherent
theory for this kind of situation. 1t is not topology ttself, but an tntimate assocl·
at ion of topology with dynamics (understood m the most general sense as the
science of the actions of time on the states of a system) which can give it to us.
It is the qualitative theory of differential systems, the theory of 'Structural
Stability'. which alone seems able to ghre us a bne of attack m this kind of
problem. The theory of morphogenesis, or further, catastrophe theory. with
wluch I am concerned seems to be the most promising development in this
regard.
In Chapter 11, I have tried to show how Unguistic patterning of a spatiO·
temporal process can be explained by the theory of structural stabWty. If we
assume that a nuclear senrenoe Is essentially the statement ofa conflict between
local regimes (linguistically, between acronts) which. dispute a domain of space
tune of 4 dimensions IR4 , then the number of morphologles (In the sense of
topological equivalence) of these interactions is relatively small (roughly 16
archetypal morphologies}. Each of these morphologies defines what Whorf has
called a ·cryptotype' of verbal action, which allows us to anticipate a fmer
semantic classification of verbs than the purely syntactical one given by Tesniere's
notion of valency.
In thls model the spatia-temporal interactions, having a physiological or
biological nature, will play the role of universal patron for the interactlons
between actants of a nuclear sentenoe. There is Unle doubt, however, that the
semantic universe is infinitely richer and more varied. It is tempting, in con·
fonnity with the general methodology of science, to depict the semantic universe
as a morphology of whlcl:t the substrate would be a Euclldean space of a very
&reat number of dimensions, N (for example, the space of the activation stales

166 Semantics and linguistics (Ch. 10

of the neurons, tf we adopt the materialist point of view which identifies a


mental state with the corresponding cerebal state). The activily of language
needs to project this morphology, defined on a space of N dimensions onto a
space of dimension I (time). The theory of the origin of syntactical structun:s
discussed earlier reverts to supposing that this ptOJCCUon of R"' onto R decom·
poses via an mtennediate stage, in a space of dimension 4.
It is this local spatia-temporal realisation that will defme the syntacucaJ
structure of the nuclear sentence, which wiU only be a unidemensional pro-
jection of it. The geometry of this projection q: R4 -+ R defines moreover
the typology of the language.
We can go a little funher in this direction. lt is no doubt inevilllble that a
view of semantics hinting at globaJ coherence leads to an ontology. I think,
personaJJy , that such an extension should not be reJected a priori, if it can
supply us with valuable intuition on the nature of the concept and the semantic
interactions between concepts. Leaving aside the idea that a material system,
physical object or tiving being owes its stability to the fact that its dynamic
organisation is 'structurally stable', this organisation Is described by an algebraic
topological structure that one can sometimes make explicit. In Section I0.2 I
have proposed to caJJ this algebraic-topological structure the 'logos' of the
sy,stem. As the stability of Ufe is due to the setting in motion of alternative paths
of relatively independent physiological functions, so each logos having some
complexity must be considered as a bundJe of sub·logoi which are teleologicaJJy
subordinate to it. There 111e clearly some irreducibly simple logoi. These are
those which are expressed by the 'elementary catastrophes' on our space- time
(like to be, to end, to unite,to separate). They an: effected by verbs or grammatical
auxiliaries. The general proposal that we can make in semantics is that nn approxi-
mate isomorphism exists between the logos of a material being E, and the logos
of the corresponding concept C(E) considered as a spatial form on the Euclidean
space of psychic activities. The operation of 'abstraction' is expressed by the
isolating of a sub-logos, at one and the same time as E and as C(E). In this view
of things we explain fairly easily the efficacy of language to descnbe the world.
The semantic interactions between concepts C(E), C(E') an: the reflections in
the semantic universe of the physical or biological interactions of the beings
(E), (E). Possibly In thls view will be seen an unseemly resurgence of the mlUennial
dreams of the analogic relation between microcosm and macrocosm. But, after
aJJ, can there be another solution to the problem of the adequacy of language to
reality?

10.2 TOPOLOGY AND MEANING


'The Lord whose oracle is at De/phoi neither uttus nor hides his meaning, but
shows it by a sign· - Heraclitus. The problem of meaning has returned to the
forefront of philosophical enquiry. Extremely tively in early Greek thought, one

Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 167

thinks of the Logos of Heraclltus, and of the themes of the Sophists and Plato's
Cratylus, it has reappeared after an apparenllyt long eclipse as one of the major
themes of contemporary thought. There is a pressure to establish, under the
name of Semanucs, or of Semiology, as an autonomous discipline, a general
theory of meaning, and of the correspondence 'signified - signifier' (signi/it
signl{llmt) common to any system of communication. But, up to the present,
this effort has been confined to the so-called 'human' sciences. The 'puie'
scientists, physicists, biologists, and even linguists of formalist inclinatioos,
seem to steer clear of such attempts which, In their eyes, are clouded by a
suspect subjectlvism. Will the notion of meaning remain inaccessible to objective
analysis? Corrupted from the start by its psychological origin, should it be
proscribed for all lime from scientific eyes?

10.2.1 lnformation and meaning


We could see In the recent development of Information theory, evidence of a
new orientation of scientists wilh regard to meaning. Without any doubt this
would be a premature conclusion. The Shannon- Weaver theory of Information is
concerned essentially with technical ends. It is concerned with the traosmiS$ion of
a prescribed message from a source to a receiver, by a channel of given characteris·
tics. in lhe most economical and reliable manner. This theory is completely
indifferent to the a.ctual meaning. lt does not depend upon it, nor could it even
define it. ln our alphabetical system the two words Enter and Leave have the
same length. hence the same amount of information. Who would presume to
pretend that they have the same meaning? In spite of this fundamental defect,
the theory of Information has had two considerable merits. In iden tifying
Information with negentropy, it has made precise the thermodynamic constraints
which bear on all communication. Further, it has drawn the attention of mathe·
matlcians to the geometric and functional aspects of the problem of coding,
regarded as a correspondence of a very general nature between function spaces.
Arising out of the needs of an electronic technology there has thus been shown
the possibility of building a theory with the character of a 'statistical morphology',
completely independent of the physical substrate that gave birlh to it.

t~'hy have the pre·Soc:ratiC$ from Heradhus to Plato left us, from the down of phnosophical
lhouJiht, so many views of such peat depth? 1t is tempting to think that at that time the
mind was stDJ In quasi-direct contact with reality, verbal and grammatical structures were
not Interposed :u a distorting screen between the thou(!ht and the world . With the lllrival of
the Sophists, Euclidean Geometry and the logic of Aristotle intulti~ thouJht gave way to
lnstrumenw thou(!ht , direct vision to the technique o f proof. Now,the mo•ll!f spirit of111/
loxtr11/ lmplietJrlon is the Ion rn rn{ormarional ~nttllt 'SottateS Is mortal' t•oche$ us teu
th;an 'Socrate$ 11 a man·. So it wu fated that the problem of meanlng faded before that of
the ruucture of deduction. The foci that the formal sy11ems of mathematics escaped thiJ
degradation of 'neaentropy' has been un i1111sion - In this respect an IUuslon from which
modern thought Is 11ill suffeJina: formaiiJ:ition. Jn Itself dbjolnt from •n intelligible content,
canno t be • sour<% of knowledge.

168 ~man tics and lingtilitics (Ch. 10

10.2.2 Biology and meaning


Clearly, it ls In Biology, the science nearest to man, that one would expect to see
the reappearance of the notion of meaning. lt has appeared, but in two very
different circumstances. On the one hand, foUowing Gestalt theory, it is found
in the theory of perception. Here names like those of the physiOlogists Goldstein
[1] and UexkuU [2), bear witness, in domains otherwise distinct, to the effort
made to reconstitute the significant features of animal or human behaviour.
These attempts, often characterised by a subtle and profound analysis, have
nonetheless been judged tainted with an unacceptable finalist form of verbal
description. They cannot easily be given an interpretation linked to the physio-
logical and physio-chemical substrate, and hence tl1ey remain cut off from the
experimental domain.
The recent progress in Genetics and Molecular Biology has suggested the
second occasion for reintroducing meaning in Biology. lt has been found that
the chromosomic DNA molecules play a determining role in the appearance
of mutations, and that the genetic inheriumce of the organism (more precisely,
its genotype) has, by a more or less justified extrapolation, been identified with
the ·word' constituted by the linear sequence of the nucleotides in the DNA
chain. The discovery of the ·genetic code· has allowed us to understand how this
determines the structure of biologically functional molecules, the proteins. That
a mechanism of alphabetic chnructer, simulator of the most elaborate mechanisms
of human writing, can manifest itself so naturally in biochemical reactions is
indeed astonishing. Without hesitation we can say that this discovery constitutes
the major shock to scientific thought since Quantum Mechanics during the years
1925 30. But its actual success has placed Molecular Biology in an epistemo-
logically uncomfortable position. Fundamentally materialist, it considers that
the structure of living beings is no more than a molecular arrangement. How
then do we explain in the same terms of molecular interaction, the stability of
an organism, already vast with respect to its own scale, such as a bacterial body,
and, a [orrforl, that of a Metazoa Wee a flea, or an elephant? From this point of
view there is a great contrast between the materialist requuements of the starting
point and the outrageously antbropomorpblc language (molecular messengers,
coding and decoding of information, enzymatlc demiurgy) that the description
of the Jiving dynamic ('la dynamlque vitale') necessitates. This internal contra·
diction hardly impinges on many specialists, imbued as they are with their
technical triumphs. Others believed that they would ftnd a solution in the theory
of information, even though il is obvious that it was not made for that. In a few
year's time we shall look back in amusement at those writings in which biologists
are astonished that the buman gene contains hardly more than a thousand times
more infom1ation thuo that of the humble coliform bacillus and thatll contains
much less t11an those of a triton or a grain of corn .... As if the distribution of
nucleotides In a DNA chain were equally pro~able! As tf the maintenance and
duplication of nucleic material d•d not require the presence of a cytoplastic

Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 169

milieu to which it is strictly and specifiCally adapted! In this connection only


one hypothesis seems plausible: on account of the constraints that the global
viability of the system imposes, the DNA chain must organise itself in relatively
autonomous and stable segments, the 'significant' segments. Furihermore these
can present a hierarchy of functional subordinates, just as a language splits up
intO sentences, words and letters. The 'genetic code' barely corresponds to the
most elementary level, that of the letters in a word: the 'level offlfstarticulation'
o( the linguists. The gene is constituted in the course of evolution by a combina·
tion of significant segments (implying reduplication, permutations, topological
separations, etc.) which simulate the combination of the global regulation
structures of the organism by way of progressive complexiAcalion. Of course, in
actuality such a theory can only be sketched out roughly. But ihis shows how
necessary it is to have at ones disposal a theory which re-establishes the link,
missing until now. between the global dynamic and ihe local morphology .Is not
such a discipline which tdes to specify ihe connection between a global dynamic
situauon, (the "signified'), and ihe local morphology in which it appears (ihe
"signifier'). precisely a 'semiology'?

10.23 Objectivity and meaning


Here we will raise the well-known fom1alist objection: if the "signifier' appears
In the form of a phenomenologically describable morphology which is often
reproducible by experience, then, by contrast, the "signified' is only accessible
by introspection, and has only a purely subjective existence. In this respect, is
not to speak of meaning in situations where no conscious or thinking receiver
ex1sts, as we propose to do, an intolerable abuse of language? To that we reply:
(a) Whatever one does, all science leads to man as the ultimate receiver; in ihis
sense mll scientific disciplines must be the bearer of meaning for man, who learns
and uses it. This requirement is In fact automatically satisfied: an uninte!Uglble
theory if H should be presented - is automatically eliminated.
(b) As a consequence, can we not agree that the factors of phenomenologjcal
Invariance, which create In the observer the feeling of meaning, come from real
properties of the objects of the external' world and the objective presence of
formal entities linked to those objects, which we call 'bearers of meaning'? The
poets knew this and have said it long before the scientists:
La nature est un temple ou de vivants piliers
Laissant parfois sortir de confuses paroles.
a
L11omme y passe travers des forets de symboles
Qui l'observent avec des regards farniliers.

(c) If we accept point (b). and 11 IS difficult to disregard it so much is it con-


cerned with one of the most primmve charactenstics of the mind. it becomes
Incumbent on us to know how to gauge and judge these s~&rufying structures.
170 Semantics and linguistics [Cb. 10

All history teaches us that a major source of error has been the Insuperable
power of the mind to hypostatise these structures and to establish them as
objective entities endowed with power and effect. We can think, for example,
of the figurative interpretation of the constellations which led to astrology and
all its vagaries.
What control should we set against this aU powerful tendency of the mind?
There is, in our eyes, but one possibility: lO create a theory of meaning whose
nature is such rhar the act itself of knowing is a consequence of the theory. in
other words, when an appearnnce appears to us a bearer of mearung, we will
know why and to what formal factor~ to attribute it. Provisionally neglecting
the subjective aspect of meaning, we wW strive to proVJde a model of objective
character having a geometric and dynamic nature. We shall find tills model In
the mechanical idea of rt'SOfltlTICe.

10.2.4 The Notion of Resonance in Dynamics


The notion of resonance only arises in an expticitly mathematical fashion in a
very special case. that of a linear oscillator subjected to an impulse with a
frequency equal to the natural frequency of the oscillator. Nevertheless, th.e
dynamic phenomenon evoked by the word resomnce has a more general scope.
We will try to present it as an essenllally qualitative notion, by limiting the
mathematical concepts and techniques to a maximum.
Consider two identical tuning-forks D and D' , and suppose that D is vibrnting.
If we bring D close to D'. then D' starts to vibrate by resonance with D. Pan of
the kinetic energy of D is thus transferred to tbe tunmg fork D', which vibrates
synchronically with D. Fundamentally, that is the schema typical of aJl reson·
anee: at the start we are given two completely independent dynamical systems
Sand S' which both present stable dynamic regimes Rand R'. The two systems
are brought closer together so that they can interact freely. In genernJ the
composite system th~ obtained becomes unstable, for instead of having the
simple topological product S X S' of the two systems, with the product regime
R X R', in general, there will be degenerntion towards a common, more stable
regime, tbe regime of resoflllnce. Each of the syStems Sand S' loses its individu·
ality and there will only be a mixed system which. in practice, is indecomposable.
A sunple but typ1caJ example takes as dynamical systems S, S' two circles
C, C' of unit radius with coordinates x and y respectively. On C we are given a
constant vector field of length X= a and on C' a constant field of length Y = b.
Then on the torus product C X C (see App. I 0.2 13 (1)) we have a constant
field of slope bfa. Such a field is topologically unstable. lf bfa is urntional
perturbations can transform this relat1on into a nearby rational number pfq
and the field of slope pfq degenerates lnto a field exWbiting isolated closed
trajectories which arc attracting and which capture the evolution of the com-
posed system. If pfq is not a simple rotional, the closed curve of slope pfq ls

Sec. 10.2] Topology and Meaning 171

very long: it v.-eaves the torus C X C' m such a way that the new evolution is
barely distinguishable, thermodynamically speaking, from the initial evolution:
we say that we are dealing with a blurred resonance. On the other hand,ifp/q = I
or Is a simple rational, the att ractor will be very short so that the evolution will
be very different from the non-coupled evolution and show strongly the synchro-
nous character of the evolution obtained. We then have o very stable sharp
resonan«. This example shows at what point the effect of a resonance can be
varied .In some ClUeS we are concerned with a blurred resonance, fairly unstable and
fluctuatmg, whlch has only a weak effect upon the autonomy ofthe two systems.
In others, on the contrary, each system irre•'Ocably loses its independence by
gaining a unique dynarruc entity, the resonant system. And there exists a quasi·
•'Ontinuo us range of resonance between the two types. In the case of the two
cucles C, C', the sharp resonance is only possible if the rational pfq of th e periods
is equal to I or a simple rational (see App. 10.2.13 (2)).
We consider that this notion involves a phenomenon of a very general
character: two dynamical systems S, S' cannot exchange energy by resonance
unless they present vibratory modes having common qualitative traits.
We can also make the following point: for a global energy Ewe can accept
that the vibratory characteristics of the system S are entirely defined by the
speclncation, In some auxiliary Euchdean space R 4 , of a form T(E), the spectre
of the syste m, whlch is a funct ion of E. When two systems S and S' emer into
interaction, there is an identification of the two associated spaces R 4 : the
possibiluy of the two systems integnumg by resonance depends upon how nearly
the two 'spectres' T(E) and T(E') can be superimposed. The resonance will be
sharp tf, for a pair of values £, E' such that E + t:' = h, where h is the tota l
energy of two systems. the two 'spectres' can be exactly superimposed. ln
pantcular. we can superimpose the two 'spectres' exactly for

E= E' = lt/2

and this will give a very sharp peak to the resonance. We thlnk we can see here
the origin of coding in the phenomena of transmission. As all interaction rests,
in the last analysis, upon a phenomenon of resonance it is impor tant if one
Wishes this operation to be rehable and to involve the least possible 'noise',tbat
the resonances used should be very stable and sharp. Tlus requires the use of
isomorphic devices in the source and the receiver, and a repetitive morphology
or Ute message (see App. 10.2.13 ( 4)).
l:quaUy, the mathematical schema sketched above explains the well-known
and well-founded character of the analogy of the phenomenon of the resonance
associated with the metric correspondence between two figures, like the key
Whose indentations are adapted to those of the lock. In the same way, in structural
linguistics, the valency of a verb, in Tesniere's sense, and also, In Chemistry, the
Valency of an atom [3) has been compared to a hook carried by the 'nucleus.

172 Semantics and linguistics (Ch. 10

10.2.5 Resonance and meaning


If we examine which are the shortest messages of ordinary conversation which
bear an autonomous meaning, we observe that orders expressed by the second-
person singular imperatives take first place (immediately after interjections such
as: cltmm, Heavens, whose essentially affective content hardly needs to be
fo rmalised). Furthermore, it is the imperative which provides the unmarked
form of the verb (die, clue, fae, [er. ... ) - at least in classical languages. Animal
cries can themselves be considered as imperatives. in fact when an order such as:
U>me! Take! .. . etc. is addressed to us, it is very difficult for us not to carry out
the order thus intimated. The well known game 'Simon says . .. .'t relies on this
automatic obedience response. lt is then legitimate LO say tbat to 'understand'
an order is to execute lt, at least virtually, because the stan of execution can
always be repressed. Certainly an analysis from hindsight (a posterion~ can
imply that the mind understands the order, and then carries it out; but this
is an analytic interpretation of a unitary process which may not be justiiied.:j:
If we consider the totality of our cerebral activities as a dynamical system
(according to C. Zeeman 's model (4]), we are led to suppose that to each motor
field codified as a verb there corresponds a true mode, an attractor A of the cerebal
dynamic. Upon hearing the order the cerebral dynan1ic suffers a specific stimulus
s, which sends it into an unstable state of excitation. This state then evolves
towards stability through its capture by the attractor A, whose excitation
generates the motor execution of the order by coupling to the motor neurones.
Though we may feel this interpretation to be tinged with rather a simplistic
behaviourism, it does nonetheless remain valid in more complex situations. li
a person who is speaking to you addresses a sentence to you, and you wish to
show that you have understood, you will say 'Now, I've got it', so signifying that
your mental state has reached a kind of limiting stable state, and will not move
from it, even if the person who is speaking to you repeats his sentence. "To
understand' is in some way to render oneself immune to the stimulus formed
by the perception of the message, it is to adopt the right attitude in relation to
the situation that has been revealed.
When, under the effect of a message, the mental dynamic does not present
an attractor which captures it in a secure fashion , then the message has little
meaning. As the comparison of the phenomenon of understanding 'vith dynamic
resonance plainly shows, the absence of meaning of a text is never total; it is
ulways formed by resonances more or less blurred, more or less fluctuating, but
which cannot hold the mind. The frequent occurrence of this indecision in

tIn lhi! game one gives the player a series of simple orden such ns: lift the right ann, tap
the lefl leg •• . etc., of which certain ace preceded by saying 'Simon says'. Only the lnst must
be carried out. The player iJ faulted if be obeys the others.
tlf. lhiougb ill-will towards the person addressing us we do not wish to obey the order
which has been addressed to us and we prefer to apP<l<JI dlsuacted : "'"' hear the ordCJ
but we do no t undenlllnd it.
Sec. 10.2] Topology and MeJ~ning 173

certain poetic texts allows the mind to be more sensiuve to the true feeling,
through the phonetics of the text, which is habitually repressed by the attraction
of the sense in ordlnary language. It is not impossible that a message, initially
of little significance. becomes more and more so by repetition, tluough a phenomc·
non of memory. or by a facilitation analogous to the susceptibility observed in
the condition of anaphylaxia.
In the case of simple orders like: Come, Give. etc.. the motor tield which
define the execution of the order pre~xists in the structure of our motor activities.
It is found to be coupled by education to the phoneuc recognition of the corre-
sponding word. In the case of more complex sentences, it is very possible that
the understanding of the text entails the formation of a stable regime which
bas never been excited in the past history of the individual. Thus we foun new
tdeas in understanding sentences we have never heard before. In this case the
resulting resonance does pot exist as a consequence of a pre~x.istent oscillator of
the neural dynamic; it takes form directly by resonance from the oscillations
aroused by the inteliection of words.
Thus we are lead to postulate that 'meaning' expresses the possibility of a
system under the influence of ex ternal perturbations adopting corrector regimes
which nuliify the effect of the perturbations. This interpretation w1U be further
generalised in order to make it more objective.

10.2.6 The logos of a form or of a system


At the beginning of his Ethics, Spino~a asserts that every being tends to persevere
in his own being. TWs statement, which one may view mainly as a truism, never-
theless deserves reflection: in that a being, an object of whatever nature can
have access to ex.istence. to be recognised as existing, classified by a word in
our Welranscllauung, it is necessary that this being be endowed with a minimum
of stability on the human scale. There is no doubt, thanks to our means of
investigation, that this scale is enormous and grows bigger every day. In space it
ranges from the diameter of the Universe to the radius of the proton (I o-•• cm);
in tune, from the age of the Universe (1010 years?) to the duration of the
'resonances' experienced in the coUislons of particles in the large accelerators
(IO -23 s)_ Then let us observe that every being can be considered as a certam
form. a local feature on a substrate space /;',which is not necessari.ly our usual
space- time but whlch can be an abstract space whose coordinates have the
qualitative chara.cter of 'semantic axes'. The stability of all being is then, from
this pomt of view, the stability of a spatial form. for which we will seek a
dynamic interpretation.
We can give a precise enough Idea of the models used without going into the
details of the rather difficult technical mathematics. The idea has an illustrious
forebear, namely the myth of Plato's cave: we only ever see the projection of
things on a nat screen, the wall of the cave. and never the things themselves.lf E
1$ the substrate space, that is the screen space upon which the form F , which Is

174 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

to be interpreted, appears, we shall introduce 'hidden parameters' ,supplementary


coordinates subtending an 'internal space'/, It is in the product space EX I that
the dynamic process proper takes place, the slngularltles of which give rise to
the form F by projection on to E.
We shall explain our model through the simple example of a linear oscillator.
Let m be a material point on an axis Oq whose movement is defined by a
force of attraction proportional to its dinance from 0 .
(1) q" = w 2q
The axis Oq is our substrate space E; it will also be called an external
space. Now introduce. as internal space/, an axis Dp and identify the internal
coordinate wp with the velocity q' = dq/ dr of th.e point m. Then, in the plane
Opq, the second order differential equation (I) is identified with the first order
differential system
p ' = wq q ' = - wp
whose trajectories ore the circlesH(p, q) = p 2 + q 2 = r 2 , centred at the origin.
If we perturb this system slightly, for Instance, by applying exterior forces
or by modifying the force of attraction .. . etc., but without introducing friction,
staying within the interior of the conservative systems, the penurbed system will
be characterised by n new function H 1 (p. q) near to H(p, q). Now a classical
theorem (5) tells us that the function H 1 will also possess a quadratic minimum
near to 0, asH did. Consequently the qualitative aspect of the new system,
described by a family of concentric closed curves, will be similar at all points to
that of the original system. ln the end it is the algebraic nature of the singularity
H=pl +ql

which assures the uniqueness and the stability of this vibratory phenomenon,
amongst the incessant perturbations from the surrounding universe.
Here we fmd HeracUtus again. Physics, as we know it, offersusa vision of the
world quite compatible with rravro:pEt, universal change ('le mobiUsme ). The Unl·
verse is nothing more than a brew of electrons, protons, photons ... , etc.,all beings,
of ill-<leftned properties, in perpetual interaction. !low can this brew settle
down, on our scale, into a relatively stable and coherent form far from the
quantum-mechanistic chaos that the theory suggests? Although certain physicists
maintain that U1e order of our world is the inescapable consequence of elementary
disorder, they are still far from being able to furnish us with a satisfactory
explanation of the stability of common objects and their qualitative properties.
(How could they, Indeed, when even the foundations of their theory are so
insecure?) In this regard , I think that a cenaln reversal of point of view is necessary.
It is an illusion to wish to explain the stability of a form by the interactions
of the most elementary beings Into which it can be decomposed. As for our
linear oscillator above, the stability of a form, as of a whirlpool in the Heraclitean

Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 175

flow of universal change restsdeftnltively upon a structure of algebraic-geometric


cllarocter, (like the quadratic singularity, H = p 2 + q 1 ), endowed with the
property of structural stability with respect to the incessant perrurbations affect·
mg it. ll is this algebraic-geometric entity tllat 1 propose, recalling Heraclitus, to
call the lbgos of the form.
Tile mathematical description of algebraic-geometric structures capable of
serving as "logoi' to spatial forms is an immense programme, of which mathe-
maticians, and few amongst tllose, llave written but the first few pages. The
theory of structural stability in Qualilative Dynamics dates only from the last
ten years, and the concepts and basic methods are far from clear. Nevertheless,
this embryonic theory already offers perspectives of considerable epistemological
interest, of a SYnthesis between the most diverse scientific domains. l propose
here to give an idea of these perspectives.
First, I am going to describe, in very anthropomorphic language, certain
important facts related to logoi. In general, within tile substrate space£, a logos
llas a contagious property with respect to tile form which it deitnes. For example.
the ·quadratic logos' of the linear oscillator shows this contagious property in
!he weD-known phenomenon of propagation of waves m an elastic medium.
Also when several logoi are defmed on the same substrate, they eventually
enter into oonflict (and here we find Heraclitus again); but, quite often, the conflict
between these different logoi organises Itself spatially foUowing a structurally
stable configuration, itself govemed by a hierarchically superior logos. Thi.s
phenomenon whi.ch can be described and explained algebraically can be styled
as a 'catastrophe'. I have been able (6] to draw up a list of these catastrophes
(called elementary) which appear amongst 'quadratic logoi' on our four dimen·
sional space-tbne. The logos of the caustrophe is deimed by a singularity of a
potential which is more degenerate than one of the second degree, and the
catastrophe wrfolds this singularity on the substrate space. We can interpret in
this way the morphology of the breaking of waves in Hydrodynamics, and
certain phenomena of biological morpllology (in Embryology, for example).
Also, these catastrophes define eleme11tary graphs of interaction between the
different logoi considered as independent actants. We will Interpret these graphs
to terms of structural linguistics (see table on pp. 176-7).
Besides the catastrophe interactions between logoi on the same subsuate
E, we can deime the notion of the topological product of two logoi of different
SUbstrates.lf the form F 1 is deitned on the substrate £ 1 by the logos ). 1 , and
F, defined on £ 2 by the logos ). 2 , then the form product F 1 X F2 is defined
on £, X £ 2 by the logos product ). 1 X ).2 • We say that o logos of form F Is
indecomposable, if it is bnpossible to consider it as the product of two logol
defmed on the subspace factors of a decomposition of tile substrate. Although,
in general, a logos of a form F is indecomposable, very frequently one can
decompose it locally into a product of two sub-logoi, but this decomposition is
not valid globally.
• -
176 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

Name of Organising Universal Distinguished


singularity oentre unfolding sections

Simple Minimum V = x1 V = x1

The Fold V = x3 V=x3 +ux


= ~

The Cusp r, V
(Rlemann ~
V = x• V = x 4 + ux 2 + vx
-Hugoniot
catastrophe) I -r, I'

The
V= x 5 V=x 5 +ux 3 T~
Swallowtail + vx 2 + wx
- I

*~
The 6 V = x 6 + ux4
V= x
Butterfly + vx3 + wx2 + tx

V = x 3 +y 3
0\~ .A
The V = x3 + y' +
Hyperbolic wx3 - ux - vy

The
V=x3 -3xy 2 +
Elliptic
Umbilic
V=x' - 3xy 2
1~(x 2 + y 2) - ux- ~ ~<1
r,

V=x 2 y + y 4
~fJ~ V
The -t-

Parnbo!Jc 1Vx1 + ry1 - ux - ~


4
Umbi!Jc V = x 2y +y

Sec. I 0.2] Topology and Meaning 177


I

Elemental'}' Spatial Temporal interpretation (Verbs)


graphs of interpretation Destructive Constructive
interactions {substantives) sense sense

To be, object To be, to endure

. -- The boundaJ'}'
The end
The end- to
finish
The beginning
- to begin

To capture To engender
Tt I A fault To change- To become
T2
' (Geology) To break To unite
To snap
I

A crack To tear To stitch


T
- A corner To cleave

To peel off To give


- A pocket
To exfoliate To receive
A flake To empty a pocket
To fill a pocket

The crest (of a To break (a


wave) wave) To recover
A vault To coUapse

A needle To r111
To prick
~~ A pike
To penetrate
(a hole)
A hair To destroy

To break (for a I
jet)
To eject To bind
:z~ A jet (of water)
A mushroom
A mouth
To throw
To pierce
To cut
To open
To close
(the mouth)
To pinch
To take
178 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

Two fomJS F 1 on J:: 1 , F1 on E, are said to be isologou.rj" if their logo! are


the same, i.e. are described by the same algebraic-topological structure. The
isology of two forms 1s revealed morphologically by the isomorphism of their
behaviour in the catastrophes in which they are involved. (This reminds us of
exchange criteria in linguistics.) Notice besides, that one can have partial
isologies, locally between non-isologous logol, in such a way that the cri terion of
exchance is difficult to applyt. ln other respects, the question of understanding
the internal algebraic strucrure of the logos Is posed. This is a complex problem,
as will be seen in the foUowing examples.

10.2.7 The logo! of living beings


lt is obviously unreasonable to claim thal living beings are isologous: the logos of
an animal Is not that of a plant, the logos of man differs from that of a dog.
Neverthele$S, the logoa of living beings have certain elements in common, which
manifest themselves through the quasi-universality of certain functions and
certain morphologies (sexual reproduction, for example). A primary distinction
stands out between, on the one hand, the logos of the species, which determines
a structure of space-time, namely the global form constituted by the evolution
of an arumal of age a, to the forming of one of his descendants up to age a. and
on the other. the logos of the organism at a given instant which is a cross-section
in time. Roughly speaking, we can suy that the logos Ls of the species is the
product of the logos Lo of the organism with the logos of an oscillator of
circular trajectory. This product is not a direct product, but a 'twisted' product,
which involves the evolution of a wave of the organic form in the substrate
space, a growth wave which describes the embryonic development, the maturity,
the gametogenesis (formation of sex ceUs), and the evolution of the gametes
until fertilisation. Henceforth, we shall be concerned with the logos Lo of an
animal organism. The substrate space E can, as a first approximation, be regarded
as the usual space ~ 3 • Tile total domain to be envisaged is a 'territory' T, in
general much larger than the organism Itself. As far as the metabolic structure is
concerned, the organism Is traversed by a permanent current of matter, of
energy, of 'meaning'. This allows us to define a general gradient in the organism.
the cephalo-caudal (the animal- vegetative axis in Embryology). ln general, an
organism enters into interaction with the other !Jvmg bemgs which are in its
territory T. The competition for space is one of the most primitive biological
forms of interaction. This competition then takes the typical forms of elementary
catastrophes: catastrophes or capture, of giving, of excision .... The cephalic
zone of the animal specialises as a support for the catastrophes of reception and
ingestion. £t is ringed by an ·ergative' £One, bearer of orgarJS and functional

tWo proJIOSe 1sologous': the UJe of !be adjective homolopou•" nlrcady widespread.
*An Dllology in the usual sense of the term - should be oonsidered a; an Incomplete
iso)OJY .
Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 179

fields wWch prepare the catastrophes of struggle and capture. The caudall.one is
the seat of the catastrophes of excretion, and also of all the catastrophes of
diminution and destruction of the animal. The preservation of the animal Is
assured by the regulatory devices (depending upon the genetic ancestry) wWch
constitute a geometric figure of some magnitude, called the f~gure of regulation.
This Is a particular unfolding of the logos Lo. We can regard the internal space I
of the logos Lo as a phase space of a dynamical system S which will descnbe the
instantaneous internal metabolic state of the otganisrn.
In the state of unexcited rest of the animal, this systemS can be represented
as the system defined by a billiard ball rolling inside a potential well with a
sufficiently flat and indecisive internal geography. Let us submit the animnl to
a stimulus s; then by resonance, the systemS stabilises itself; it hollows a local
minimum q in the landscape, which captures the systemS; the excitation of this
true mode brings about the execution of a reflex and a corrector of the stimulus.
Once the stimulus is corrected, and the excitation extinguished, the system S
returns to its initinl fluctuating state, and this leads to the cessation of the reflex
r. One can say that when the stimulus s has released the corrector reflex r by
resonance, the animal has 'understood • the stimulus. This mechanism of resonance
only exists in principle for the catastrophes of capture and of ingestion favourable
to the organism; the unfavourable catastrophes, where the animal is attacked by
a predator, will sometimes be the Object of reflexes of defence or flight. The
formation of the resonance is accompanied by a spatial morphology to which it
Is specifically associated (see App. 10.2.13(3)).
Among animals of more advanced type, there exists in the system S a
subsystem S' consisting of nervous activities. The essential object of S' is to
furnish a simulated copy of the exterior space T of the interesting objects which
are found there (prey, predatOrs) and of the position of the body in relation to
these objects. On this account, the large functional fields associated to essential
biological functions (sleeping, eating, ... etc.) very quickly have mental repre·
sentaUons, because they affect the Image of the body in S'. Such a system,
effecting a better copy of exterior conditions, obviously allows for a better
adapted response of the reflexes than the elementary behavioural automatism:
'stunulus..., response' in the simpler animals. From this theory we shall retain the
importance attached to sptitial representation, and to rparial comperirion as
primitive forms of mental activity. All this preamble is necessary for the under·
standing of the fundamental structure of the logos of a living being.

10.2.8 The origin of language


We have seen that the mental image of the body comes very quicldy to be
associated with the main physiological regulatory functions. lt is not out of the
question that certain important features of the animal ldngdom, such as predators
and the I! prey, would acqUIIe almost simultaneously, a structurally Stable neuro·
logical image. We could say that such an image had the status of a concept. if a
180 Semantics and linguistics (Ch. 10

corresponding word existed. A cat certainly has a spatial and olfactory Image of
the mouse, endowed with structural stability and a logos partially isologous to
the logos of the mouse itself. For the cat clearly has an implicit knowledge of
the mouse's fiight reflexes, and perhaps also other physiologica.J reflexes less
immediately unportant to him. it IS hence reasonable to think that the primary
autonomous structures of psychic actiVIty have had a logos isologous to the self
itself: the logos of living beings. Consequently the logos of living beings has
served as a universal pattern for the constitution of 'concepts'. But the stabillty
of the logos itself rests upon the possibillty of adopting corrector regimes in a stable
manner, and of executing regulator reflexes. Thus, as a corollary, the con-
stitution of concepts needs the existence of catastrophes of regulation.
It is not necessary to see m this assertion the consequence that a concept
possesses a vitalist character. In fact every dynamic structure which presents a
very strong structural stability necessarily involves correcting discontinuities,
that is catastrophes of regulation. This a profound fact of qunliunive dynamics,
to which the logos of living being is necessarily accommodated.
However that may be, one can still accept that a concept of a particularly
concrete nature has a logos very similar to that of a lower animal. it has a
substrate space £ of dimension less than or equal to 3, a territory, a cephalic-
caudal gradientt Its structural stability is assured by the catastrophes of regulation
whose support is essentially in the ergative zone of this fictitious and stylised
organism. lt has also a caudal zone where the catastrophes of diminution and
death take root.
It will be noted that this description only applies to m actant of a very
concrete nature, a living being for example. Later on we will describe abstract
logoi such as the iogoi of the acts of speech. Indeed, in my opinion, the interaction
of logoi, which is explained in syntax with the help of grammatica.J categories,
draws its origin from schemas of spatial interaction linked to elementary catastro·
phes.
I 0.2.9 The elementary struct ure of ~ntences
Lf we judge by the language of anunals, our language seems to have a two-fold
origin; on the one hand it serves for the ritualisation of a certain number of
genetically derived functional biological fields. Thus, the bird sings to mark out
his territory and to attract a mate. On the oU1er hand, with animals living In
groups, it serves essentially to warn the group of a danger perceived by an
individual {alarm cry) or of any new happening judged important for the security
of the individual or the social group. 1t is reasonable enough to consider that
human language is derived rather from the second type of message, the need to
inform others of a change in the surrounding milieu, of a phenomenological
'catastrophe'.

tObJetve tluot the p~positions 'in front' and 'behind' c::lJl be u~ in front of the most
ab$tnct nounJ.
Sec. 10.2] Topology and Meaning 18 I

But, from the moment when we wished to specify the nature of the catastro·
phe perceived, it was natural that the structure of the sentence should reflect
the dynamic structure of the exterior catastrophe - or, at least, reflect the
dynamic Interpretation that the perception has provided. The part played by
subjectivity in the organisation of perceptive experience i.s often considerably
less than one believes. Take for example the sentence: 'The day ends'. This is of
the type: ... which we relate to the logos of the fold', like all the
catastrophes descnbing the end of a being. Science tells us that this particular
fold effectively exists as a curve of contact of the terrestrial sphere with the
cylinder of solar rays surrounding the Earth. The 'catastrophe' of 'the end of the
day' is the crossing of this curve fold from the lit hemisphere to the darkened.
Also, here we can see the contagious property of the logos in full play. Given
the extent to which mechanisms, very sensitive to exterior happenings, were
formed In the mind, it was inevltnble that the discontinuous changes in our view
of the world would be organised according to the dynamic sehemas appropriate
to the regime conflicts· on the space R3 • The following table, obtained by
assoctatmg an elementary interact ton graph to each type of sentence, seems to
reveal this .
Example:
( 1) Sentences of type: express a state.
Example: /r is raining.
(2) Sentences of type: or f - -
Examplc: The day ends.
This type expresses the start or end of a bemg: the verb is grammatically
neuter (uni-valent in Tesniere's sense (3]).
(3) Type: Subject-Verb-Object

apple
Eve
----------~--------------
or

Fig. I

Here we are concerned with a classical type of transitive sentence. The


subject is the actant which survives the catstrophe and triumphs over it. The
object, in general, suffers the catstrophe and is, to some extent abused, if
mdeed it does not perish completely.
Example; Eve f!lllS the apple.
Of course, a transitive verb does not always express the capture or

182 Semantics and linguistics (Ch. 10

acquisition of the object; bur to create and to destroy are standard tran-
sitive actions in which the structural form has taken over, or has captu red
the structure of the actions of a less simplistic geometry.
(4) Catastrophe of lhegift type: Tesniere's trivalent verbs.
Example: Eve gives an apple to Adam.

Eve

• Adam
l'lg. 2

(5) Catastrophes of excision type.


This concerns a quadrivalent schema of struggle: the actant subjectS, with
the help of an instrument I, effects a cleavage of the object 0 into two
parts, E, P, of which one can be captured by S .
Example: He extoned my money with his re110fver.
He cut off his heod with a blow of hts sword.

1t will be noticed lhat this schema of interaction, linked to the parabolic


umbilic (in our terminology), is also lhat of sexual reproduction. Do we
not say that the wife gives a child to her husband?
(6) Another plane section of the same singularity (elliptic umbillc) leads to a
diagram of the actants represented by the following graph:

0------------------~--------------

E --------~----------------------

Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 183

Here, again , we have four act ants: an emitter E, a destinator (destinataire)t


D, a messenger M, and a message m. On the arrival of the messenger M,the
emitter E splits, and emits the actant m which is captured by the messenger
M in a me tastable 'linked state· (M, m). This complex system goes towards
the destinator 0 where the approach provokes the disassociation of the
complex (M , m); the 'message' m is captured by D and the liberated messen-
ger M moves off.
There exist quite clear grammatical realisations of this schema, for
example 'Peter sends John a letter by post'. There also exist numerous
realisations of it in biological morphology: in many cases, the function of
the message is to 'inform ' the destinator, that is to say, to precipitate his
logos into a new stationary state, a new form. In more extreme cases the
message can have as its goal to 'capture' , or to destroy, the destinator. This
is the case if the message is a projectile, the messenger M then being a
fuearm, for instance.

All these examples raise the following question: of all the actantial schemas
predicted by algebraic theory, only certain of them are realised in biological
morphology , or In the syntax of a simple sentence. In the light of what criteria
is that 'choice' made?
11 must be noted that, in this respect, our algebraic theory gives actants
a 'quadratic logos' , that is to say the crudest algebraic structure which ensures
stability . 1t is clear that in concrete cases where the logos of the act ants is more
complex, only those configurations from the theory which are compatible with
the structure internal to each logos could occur. Hence, only certain types of
catastrophic configurations have taken on the status of archetypes. In tills
respect, syntactic structures form a set wbich is even more restricted than the
biological actantial structures. For example, a certain section of the swallowtail
singularity leads to the graph of Fig. 5 which can be analysed thus: a stable
regime is doomed to disappear, but before perishing it leaps, by a kind of deatll
spasm , into a metastable regime which will fare no better. lt can be imagined
that in so far as grammatical categories give clear evidence of a vitalist origin, this
schema could not be incorporated in the figure of regulation of a concept. Is not
our own death properly incomprehensible to us?

Flg. 5

tTranaiJitors note: 'lkstilllltatre' has no simple corresponding word in £ng1Wt 'receiver' or


'acceptor• appeo.r too piWive.

184 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

I 0.2.1 0 The dynamic interpretation of the meaning of a sentence


We are now going to try to specify the dynamics of the formation of the meaning
of a sentence. The central element is the verb; the verb from the outset provides
an intera.c uon space U (of dimension at most three) as weU as spectral figures
Qs, Qo •... , Qo associated to the subject, object, and indirect object, according
to the vll.lency of the verb. The subject, in so far as it is a concept, has Its own
interaction space V, a.s weU as spectral figures Q(v) which are functions of its
state of internal excitation; similarly for the object. For every identification h of
V with U there is associated an entropy of interaction (in the sense of Appendix
10.2.13 (3))ofthe formS(v, h). lf,in the spectrum of regulation of the subject, there
exists a corrector mode whose spectral figure Q(v) identifies sufnciently exactly
with Qo for a given position h there will be a sharp resonance which will
manifest itself as the feeling of understanding. For verbs describing spatial
movements, one can represent the spectral figures Q by certain subgroups or
domains of the group of displacements. lt is not impossible that even abstract
verbs such as: ·to think' ('to weigh up~. 'to judge' ... etc.have a spatial spectral
f~gure.
From thls we form the idea of the role of cases or prepositions in grammar.
ln order to avoid ambiguity of resonances, therefore of meanings, it is vital that
the interaction of the conceptS evoked by words should lead as quickly as
possible to a maximum of entropy in order to avoid wasteful fumbllngs or even
errors. This result is achieved by specifying for each noun an appropriate excita-
tion which limits its spectrum of regulation: the nominative (ergative) excites
aU the ergatlve zone; the accusative (ObJect} excites the caudal zone; the dative,
the cephalic zone of reception. The interpretation of the genitive is the most
difficult.In the expression 'Y's X', the concept Y, marked, is excited in B genera-
lised manner into a state Y', to the point of overflowing beyond Its 'natural
meaning'; it then enters into contact with X in its interaction space, according to
a certain common regulation catastrophe which is itself excited; then Y' returns
to its natural meaning Y by the diminution of the excitation. The resonance
does not disconnect, and it leads to a new resonance complex which behaves like
a noun.
If these ideas arc accurate, they would have to impose a certain universality
of grammaucal categories; in panicular the 'logos' of verbs is hierarchically
superior to that of nouns since it organises the confltcts of the latter and hence
the distinction verb-noun would have to have a universal character.

10.2.11 Abstract logoi


ln the same manner as regulation, homeostasis of a living being is assured by a
system of relauvely gross physiological functions (respiration. feed!ng, excretion,
etc.), so the 'logos' of a concrete concept can be factorised locally, as a product
of logos factors, to a more simple figure of regu lation. The concepts thus described
have a relatively open figure of regulation in certain directions of the substrate

Sec. 10.2] Topology and Meaning 185

space; these are 'abstract' concepts. In extreme cases, such as the word 'end' or
the word 'gift' for example, the spectre of regulation of the concept no longer
acts as a single verbal catastrophe in which one of the actants is singled out.
lt is a matter for some consideration whether, in thecouneoftheprehbtoric:
formation of language, concrete words preceded the abstract or vice versa. It
seems fairly clear that abstraction was born from the need to reduce to the state of
a word o concrete concept pre-existing as a stable autonomous structure of the
psyche (as in the idea of the mouse in the eat's psyche). We have seen that the
ngure of regulation of a concept is a sort of stylised animal. Now let us imagine
that following an invasion of the cerebral ncld by the genetic field, tills stylised
animal is also competent to reproduce and is fined with a gonad (genital gland).
In cenain conditions of excitation, the concept will make a 'gamete', a bearer of
the 'logos' of the concept. This gamete is none other than the 'word' uttered by
the speaker. In the mind of the bearer, the word, true seed of the concept,
gemtinates, and bursts out: the 'logos' of the concept unfolds and reconstitutes
the figure of regulation of the concept and thus its meaning.
Just as in gametogenesis, the reduction to zero of the metabolism of the
gametocytes brings about the condensation of the nucleic: material in linearly
ordered genes, so the passage of the idea to the word by reconstitution of the
'organising centre' of the logos necessitates the successive formation of dynamic
st ructures, transient and codified, which serve by successive bifurcations in a
ramified structure in the form of a tree, to evoke - to excite - the functional
motor f~eld corresponding to the word. Perhaps one could identify these transient
hypothetic structures to the c/Qssemes ('c/Qssemes} of the semanticists, (we may
occasionally attach an abstract noun to them, but this is without doubt, only an
approXIDlat ion). There remain traces of these c/assemes in diagrammatic writing
like that of the Chinese. In the origins of our Western languages there was
probably also a bi-univocal correspondence between semantic classemes and
phonetic letters (or syllables); but the phonetic system has rapidly shown itself
too poor to accommodate all the 'classemes', and the two systems have rapidly
diverged. Perhaps it is not completely Utopian to try to reconstitute (in terms of
general functionalllelds of the Uvlng being) the classematic value of the primitive
letters.

I0.2.12 Co nclusion
The invasion of the cerebral by the genetic, which is at the origin of (so rightly
named) oonceptual thought. u another aspect of the analogy between organ and
too l raised by Bergson. Our dynamic mode ls lead to n presentation of organo-
genesis in the course of evolution that one may schematise thus: every physio-
logical function corresponds to a 'catastrophic' regulation of the metabolism, a
veritable physiological 'shock wave'; the organogeneSIS is a sort of retroactive
smoothing of this shock wave, which gives finality to the organ, because its
186 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

functioning averts the physiological catastrophe (as breathing in the lungs


averts asphyxia).
Homo faber appeared, when a11 the functions of defence againSt exterior
aggresstons had been transferred from the genetic plane to the cerebral plane.
This permitted an enormous acceleration of the process of evolution. But how
does one explain, in the framework of a determinist theory, a 'retroactive
smoothing·, that Is to say the possibility for a deed to have an influence on its
antecedents? (This is the epistemological problem of biolglcal finality.) If we
consider that the logos of a biological space defines a continuous f~gure of
space- time, it is normal to think that the continous variations of this f~gure in
the course of evolution will be effected m conformity with a variational principle
excluding discontinuities, the corners of this figure ; but the smoothing thus
operated can be effected in the sense of the paSt as well as of the future.
This schema can be applled to the formation of new words: since a word is
used frequently with a meaning different from Its original meaning, there results
a tension on certain internal boundaries of the fJgUie of regulation of the concept,
tensions which could very well shatter it. The concept protects itself by giving
birth to a new word which channels its meaning. The formation of neologisms is
thus an illustration of the not easily refutable Lamarcldan principle: the function
creates the organ.lt also illuStrates the enormous acceleration of the evolutionary
processes which facilitate the transfer from the genetic to the cerebral.
On the general problem of relations between language and the world, our
models bring some precision.lf our language offers us a relatively correct descrip·
tion of the world, it is, in an impllcit and structural form, both Physics and
Biology: Physics because the structure of every elementary sentence is isomorphic
(isologous) to that of the most general phenomenologlclll discontlnuities in space
time; Biology because every concept of concrete character is isologous to a llving
being, an animal.
But pedlaps the most interesting contribution of our theory consists m the
notion of 'logos' of a form. We know for example, that there exists no acceptable
defmtion of life, as such. I shall be tempted to say that that wluch separates a
living structure from an Inert structure is a topological propeny of their f~gures
of regulation, of their Jogoi. By an apparently circular defmition, l would say
that which characterises life is the attachment to life. Certain forms are relatively
indifferent to their own disappearance; these are inert forms. Others, on the
contrary, defend their existence by cunning and cleverness, human qualities of
which lt is not perhaps Ulusory to find combinatorial definitions; these are
living forms. Finally, even in the domain of Physics, lt does not seem to me
impossible that the concept of logos can not be of service. JUSt as two forms are
isologous if they are impllcated In isomorphic catastrophes, m the same way
formalist linguists define the meaning of a word as the usage of this word, that is
to say the system of its interactions with other words in SJgllificant sentences. So
the physicists of the so-called Boots"ap school claim that a particle is wholly
defined by the network of Interactions In which lt participates.

Sec. I 0.2] Topology and Meaning 187

J0.2.13 Appendices
(I) Product of two spaces
Let A be a metric space: to each pair a, b of points of A is associated a positive
real number d(a, b) the distance from a to b. Thls function dissymmetric in a
and b, zero if and only if a = b and satisfies the triangle inequality: d(a, b).;;;
d(a, c)+ d(c, b).
Let A and B be two metric spacesrespectively provided with metricsd(a.,a2 ),
d'(b.,b~). Equip the product setA X 8 with a metricD,forexamplethatdefined
by Pythagoras Theorem
Dl(a 1 X b~.a 2 X b 2 ) = d 2 (a 1,a 2 ) + d'2 (b 1 ,b2 )
The product setA X B thus becomes a metric space whlch we call the product
space of A and 8.
Example: Let us be given the plane defmed by axes Oxy, the two segments
A and B defined respectively by 0 <x < l,y = 0 and x = 0, 0 <y < I (provided
with th.e metric defined by EuciJdean distance). We can then represent the
product A X B by the square 0 <; x .;;; 1, 0 <; y <; 1, where the usual Euclidean
distance is taken as a metric.
y
11------,

a c

1 •

A
Fig. 6
Suppose that in the segment A we Identify th.e origin x = 0 with the end
x = I ; we then obtain a circle A' (equipped with an induced metric). (This
first theorem of topology eau be traced back to Heraclitus: on the circle the
origin and end are but one.) Similarly Jet 8 ' be the circle obtained by identifying
the origin and end of the segment B. Then let us form the product A' X 8'; we
can define it directly from the square C, where we identify the points (p, p'),
(m, m') which correspond by a unit translation parallel to Ox or Oy.
y
p
l
a 'II
I
m ---r----- m

c
:
p A
Fig. 7 "
!88 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

The space thus obtained which is the product of two circles, is a compact surface, a
torus. In fact we can bijecuvely map the interior of the square C onto the
surface of a ring of revolution where we have marked a meridian A ' and a parallel
B'.

y
y :I
/' ......
''
''
- a... - '\
'\
''
8
'
Xa1 X
'' \ ____Y•O
_t Y•l
t
y.. o ''
' •, ________ - - - - - - __ JI

Fig. 8

(2) Product of two circultu osciJJarors


Suppose we are given a vector field X of length X = a on the circle A ; on B a
field Y of length Y = b. We can consider the set of these two systems as a single
dynamical system on the torus product A' X B' given by the field (X, Y) with
component (a, b). The trajectories of this field in the square Care the lines of
slope b/a. If b/a Is Irrational no trajectory is closed and , in addition, every
trajectory is everywhere dense in the torus; that is to say passes through the
neighbourhoods of every point of the torus. ( For a proof see: Ergodic Problems
of ClassiCJll Mechanics, V. I. Amold and A. Avez, Benjarnin, 1967, p.18.) Other-
wise if bfa Is rational, bfa = pfq, p, q intergers, every trajectory closes after
having made q trips round parallel to B and p times round the meridian A .
These two types of vector field on the torus are structurally unstable. We
can show (M. Peixoto 'SrructUTal stability on 2~imensional manifolds', Topology,
Sec. 10.2] Topology and Meaning 189

1962), that each neighbouring stable field has the following structure: it
consists of a finite number of closed attracting trajectories which all have the
same ·rotation number' pfq ; these trajectories are separated by an equal number
of closed repelling trajectories again with the same 'rotation number' pfq. Every
othe r (non-closed) trajectory spirals from a repelling closed trajectory towards
an attracting trajectory. See Fig. 9 where we have but one attracting trajectory
r and one repelling r'.

/
// .... -- ------
/

r
Fig. 9 -A sharp resona.noe p = q = l.

In the initial non-coupled situation of the two oscillators A and B, the


motion on the torus is ergodic, i.e. the probability of the presence of the repre-
sentative point in a domain D of the torus in the course of a fairly long interval
of time is proportional to the area of U1e domain D. After the degeneration of
the field into a stable situation, this is no longer true; because, if the domain D
does not meet the attracting trajectory towards which the representative point
of the system tends, the probability of the presence corresponding to D is zero.
So, the formation of a resonance destroys the ergodicity of the initial system
and profoundly modifies its thermodynamic characteristics. But this modification
can be more or less pronounced. When the 'rotation number' pfq is simple the
attractor is very short and then there is sharp resonance, whi.c h is very stable. A
neighbourhood of the limit curve r only covers a very small portion of the torus.
Also we are a long way from the initial ergodlc situation. U on the contrary pfq is
not simple (related by large integers only}, the limit curve is very long and by a
residue of the linear property of the initial system the limit curve tends to
Partition the torus in a very uniform manner, very 'equitable'. Also a neighbollr·
hood of this curve can cover almost all the torus and the properry of ergodlcity
Will remain true for all but a llttle of the domain D. Then we have a 'blurred
resonance' (Fig. 10 on the square C).

190 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10

-- - 1 X

Fig.JO - A blurred I'CSOllllllcep = 2,q "' S.

(3) Let us sum up here in terms of classical dynamics. Let us suppose that our
two systems S and s' are conservative hamiltonian system with phase spaces M
and ~( respectively with Hamiltonians Hand I(. The evolution In M is described
by a vector field X in M deduced from H with the aid of the Hamllton-J acobl
equations P = aHfaq, Q :: - aHjap, and the field X leaves invariant the hyper·
surfaces of constant energy, H = E, and also the volume defmed by the Uouville
measure m these hypersurfaces. This being so, suppose that besides the energy
our systems S, S' admit as first Integrals (at least approximately) a vectoriaJ
quantity taking Its value in a vector space V (such as the kinetic moment, for
example), in such a way that •he interaction between SandS' Is constrained to
satisfy the relation: E + E' = constant (conservation of energy) and V+ V' =
constant. Agree for the moment that In the hypersurfaces H = E, H = E' the
Uouville measure is ergodic. The relation V+ V'= constant allows the identifi-
cation of these two spaces V and V', whlch we make In mapping V' onto V. The
hypersurfaoe H = E projects itself onto V by the canonical projection 11: M- V.
To ea.ch open subset W of V associate the Liouville measure of the counter-image
11-1 (11-? n {H = £}. This allows us to define on V a density function of E that
we denote by JJ(E):
m( W, E)= f p(v) dv
V
v e V. We can then define an 'entropy of interaction'S by the formula
S(E, £') = f p(v; £). p(v; £') dv
V
The greater thls function is, the greater the possibilities of interaction
between the two systems. If there exists a value E such that S(£, h - E) is

Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 191

maximised (maximally sharp) then the composed system S, S' evolves towards
this value which will constitute the energy of resonance between these two
systems. It is clear that there can be several maxima in such a way that there can
be competition between final resonances. The choice of the system is then, in
principle, determined by its initial position.
( 4) I would not wish to leave this schema without again pointing out an impor-
tant phenomenon: we ,have assumed that the Liouville measures are ergodic.
But such a hypothesis is not all established; in particular, it is very possible
that the hypersurface of energy H = £ 0 consists, for example, of two connected
components which join together in a saddle point for H = E 1 >Eo .In this case,
if the energy of resonance is close to the threshold E 1 we can expect coarse
phenomena characterised by a discontinuity of th.e entropy of interaction. Then
we say that we are deallng with a 'catastrophic resonance'. It will be manifested
by a harsh discontinuity of the behaviour of one of the systems (S, for example)
which will have an important and well-defined morphological effect in the inter·
action space V. This phenomenon plays, according to our schema, a fundamental
role in biological morphogenesis, and probably also in the verbal coding of
meaning.
Let us note a further generalisation of the schema: suppose that the position
of system S in relation to system S' can be parametrised by the points of a
topological space G. At every point g e G t.llere corresponds an identification of
V with V' that we designate by g: V-+ V'. Then the entropy of interactionS will
also depend on g by the formula

S(E, g)= J JJ(v). JJ 1 (g. v) dv


V

Here again the evolution, possibly violent, of the system towards a sharp
resonance can entrain a rapid variation of g in G with important morphological
effects.

REFERENCES
[lj Goldstein, K.,Der Aufbau des Organismus, La Haye,Jijoff, 1934.
[2) Uexkull, J. V., 1Morie de la signification, Paris, Gonthier, 1956.
[3) Tesniere, L., Elements de symaxe structurale, Paris, Klincksleck, 1965.
[4) Zeeman, E. C., Topology o[ the Brain, Mathematics and Computer Science
in Biology and Medicine, Medical Research Council, 1965.
[5] This follows from a theorem of Marston Morse, see M. Morse,17re Calculus
of Variations in the Large, American Matllematlcal Society, Colloquium
Publications, Vol. 18. New York 1934.
[6) This theory is developed in the author's book: Structural Stability and
Morphogenesis, Benjamin, New York, First English Edjtlon, 1975.

CHAPTER 11

Topology and linguistics

ln thiJ cluzpto 17l4tters concemirlg the archerypal morphologies auocioted with


verbs are dmlt with in more deUiil.

11.1 UNGUJSTICS AS SEMIOLOGY


In this paper I propose to indicate some possible applications of topology to
linguistics. Here at Geneva, in a Colloquium dedicated to Georges de Rh am 's
work on topology, you will alow me to evoke the memorY of Ferdinand de
Saussure whose celebrated 'Cours de Linguistique' given at Geneva at the beginning
of the centurY marked what is generally regarded as the birth of linguistics as
an autonomous science.
One of Ferdinand de Saussure's principal contributions llas been his analysis
of language as a system of 'signs'. According to a classic defmition but perhaps
ignored by mathematicians, Saussure sees In the 'sign • the association of two
elements:

(I) a ·signifier' ('signifiant'), that Is to say a morphological process, in sound if


it is to do with the spoken word , spatial and linear if it is to do With writing.
(2) a 'signified' ('signifie'), what we usually call the sense or the 'meaning'
('signification') of the written or spoken expression.
It is In the association between these two elements that Saussure sees the essential
function of language , the 'semiological' function as he called it.
Of these two elements, only the 'signifier' is susceptible to an objective
description, experimentally reproducible . Indeed all written texts can be con·
sidered as a 'word' of the free monoid generated by a fmite number of elements
(the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, with the addition of various punctuation
marks) and, if certain difficulties of analysis are disregarded, it is the same thing
for a spoken chain. This can be thought of as a sequence of a fmite number of
irreducible elements referred to as 'phonemes'.

t h r,.et from F=ysln Topolory. dedicated to C Rham, Springer.


(Sec. 11.1) Linguistics as Semiology 193

In contrast, the 'stgnified' is only accessible by introspection in so far as n is


a psychological reality. This raises a considerable difficulty for establishing a
theory. lt would be good to make use of the Saussurcan schema: Signified-+
Signifier, to explain the structure of language. There is an immediate feeling
from psychological experience that it is the 'signified' which determines the
·signifier'. It is because we wish to express such or such an idea, describe thls or
that fact we are led to formulate the appropriate sentence. The possibility of
explaining the form of the expression from its meaning has been discredited by
Saussure 's classic affirmation of the dogma of the 'arbitrariness of the sign'.
Supported by the fact of evident differences between languagesSaussure postulates
that nothing in the form of the expression connects it to its sense, to its content.
Where the Frenchman says, '13erger', the Engltshman says, 'Shepherd' and we do
not see why either of these words ts more appropriate to describe the common
idea that they express. If the dogma of the arbitrariness of the sign were to be
accepted exactly according to the letter then all attempts to explain linguistic
form rationally would be in vain. We find however, that modem linguistics has
re-examined the Saussurean dogma, varied it, and in many cases dispensed with
it.
lt is an attractive idea to attribute to the 'signified' a hypothetical morphology
(M) which leads to considering the transformation: Signified -+ Signifier, as a
function which maps the morphology (M) into the morphology of the language
(L), as we know, at least in certain cases, how to deal with the correspondence
between morphotog~es. lt is. for example, the aim of the theory of 'coding' in
the theory of informal ion. This ls the dinsction taken by the 'semanticists', who,
such as Hjelmslev, have striven to impose a structure on the 'signified'. For lack
of sufficient mathematical knowledge, the semanticists has always failed to notice
that a morphology (M) could have for support a multi-dimensional space of
dimension much higher than one of four. The consequent reduction results in
feeble descriptions depending only on the logical analysis of the language. This
implies that as these descriptions can only be made tn ordinary language, they
can hardly escape the 'closweoftlre linguistic universe' manifest in the tautologies
and verbalism which confront the reader of contemporary treatises on semantics.
Faced with these difficulties one 'formalist' school nas undertaken in linguistics
SOmething like Hilbert 's programme for the formalisation of mathematics. This
school (Bioomfield, 1-larris) claims that a correct study of language can and
should be undertaken independently of all references to meaning. A given
language is treated as a formal system in which there is an obligation to specify
the axioms which define 'well formed' expressions. This atulUde has led to
recent developments in the theories of formal languages, which are, in fact,
purely mathematical theories allled to non-commutative algebra, to groups and
to free monoids. In the end this approach appears likely to be more fruitful on
the mathematical plane than on the linguistic plane. In fact, a total formalisation
of naturalianguages seems a priori Impossible for the following reasons:
194 Topology and linguistics (Ch. 11

(a) If a simultaneous formal.isation of the given language and of the metalanguage


of explanation of the theory was possible, the paradoxes which prohibit a
global formalisation of arithmetic would inevitably appear. The sentence
'The sen tence that I am now writing is not well formed ', would be con·
tradictory.
(b) Even without requiring a simultaneous formalisalion of the metalanguage,
all formalisation of natural languages necessarily contains nesting axioms
wluch increase the length of weD formed expressions. For example If 'A'
is a weU formed expression then the expression 'I say that A' is also weU
formed. Now, in a formal system of Standard type, no restriction exists as
to the possibility of using the axiom as often os one wishes. This leads to
regarding as 'well formed', expressions of nny length whatsoever. But even
among the most extravagant authors, like Proust, there is an upper bound
to the length of sentences. Any attempt tO explain linguistic form must
necessarily involve a dynamic, genetic aspect, which, for a given sentence,
takes account of the totality of the syntactical operations which permlt its
genesis, in so far as neurophysiological processes support it, and which
assure the grammatical correctness of it. But the totality of these processes
is subject to mnemonical or psychophysiological constraints which limit the
nwnber and relative disposition of the processes. In other words, it is as if
an axiom becomes weary once it has been used.
(c) Lastly, even the notion of the expression 'well formed' in a natural language
is not a sharp and absolute characteristic. There exists in practice a continu·
ous gradation of agrammalicality or of semantic unacceptabWty. h wlll be
noted besides that cvP.ry strict frontier between agranunaticality and semantic
unacceptability is necessarily arbitrary.
In spite of the predictable obstacles to attempts at formalisation, the actual
formal theories (generative grammar and transformational grammar) have, as
well as their obvious mathemallcal interest, l\n undoubted value nt the level of
Ute 'local' description of linguistic forms. These have revealed in particular, nnd
thls in spire of the Saussurean dogma of the arbitrariness of the sign, tlte quasi·
universality of certain fonnal mechanisms tltat arc found amongst all human
languages. We are thus confronted with the problem of Universals of language, a
problem rejected some years ago as Utopian but nevertheless Studl.cd again
recently following the appearance of formal theories.

11.2 UNIVERSALS OF LANGUAGE


lie re will be stated, in perhaps too precise a form, and by lhis fact, formaJ iy
inexact, certain Universals of language that we can consider as fundamental.
I. Every text breaks up into sentences endowed separately with an autono·
mous meaning. Every sentence breaks up into words and each word breaks up
into syUables. themselves broken up into letters (phonemes) ('double articula-
llon}.

Sec. 11.3] Meaning for • Spatio-Temporal l'l"ocess 195

2. If we consider a sentence S, we can, with the help of uansformations,


in principle formalisable, transform it into a series of sentences called atomic,
which are themselves non-decomposable by this procedure. Every atomic sentence
involves a word, or syntagma, essential to the meaning of the sentence, that we
call the verb; and it contains only one.
Notes·
(a} The transformations give rise to the breakdown of sentences comprising
subordinates into so many independent propositions. For eXlllDple '1 have
seen the teacher who came yesterday' can be transformed into 'A teacher
came yesterday, 1 have seen him'.
(b) What we call here the 'verb' is not necessarily the 'grammatical verb'. For
example, in an attributive phrase like 'This cat is white', the verb in our
sense is constituted of the block 'is white', the syntagm formed by the
predicative adjective 'white' coupled with 'is'.
Let T1 be a text in a language L1 , and suppose it to be translated into a text
T1 of a language ~. Let us effect the breakdown of T 1 and T1 into atomic
phrases (j1 , fb respectively. We have then the principle of isomorphism.

1'1-inciple of isomorphism
There exists between the sets Q~, ~ a bi-unique correspondence which pre·
serves the meaning and which is, almost, compatible with the order: if the
ith atomic proposition ofT 1 is mapped into jth ofT1 , we have 1/- i I < 4.
We shall not dwell at length discussing the validlly of these Universals,
which most linguists would undoubtedly reject. There are those who, not
without reason, underline the arbitrary character of the notion of an atomic
sentence. Thus the Latin, Moriturl te salutam, requires, in English, two atomic
sentences. But the validity of our assumptions cartnot be denied at least as
hypotheses for practical work, notably in Iranslating. We do not insist, however,
that in the correspondence r/.-+ ~ the verbs correspond with each other in
meaning. Thus in English 'lt Is raining' is translated into Polish by an expression
of the type: 1'he rain falls'. There is then no equivalence of sense between 'to
rau,- and 'to fall· .

11.3 MEANING FOR A SPATIO- TEMPORALPROCESS


let us return to Saussure's schema:
Signified --> Signiner
llow does the morphology (M) of the signified become apparent? Even leaving
aside the metaphysical problem of consciousness and subjccriviry, we can assert
that a psychic process is uruvocally defined by the totality of 1he physiological
Processes which accompanies it (a materialist would say which oonstirutes it).

196 Topology and linguistics [Ch. 11

But, thanks to C. Zeeman's model [1], we have at our disposal a very general
mathematical representation of neuro-physiological processes. The space of the
states of neuronic excitation is a cube In of enormous dimensions. The evolution
therein of the psychic state is described by a vector Oeh.l X varying slowly with
time. An 'instantaneous psychic state', an 'idea', is described by a structurally
stable ·anractor' A of X, which exists isomorphically by itself for a short period
of tin1e. After a sufficiently large variation of the field, the attractor A is destroyed
by 'bifurcation' and gives way to a new atlractor which captures it. .. etc..
Thus we can hope to have a geomel!ic model of a succession of Ideas in
the ·nux of consciousness', associated with the philosophy of introspection.
Furthermore it will be noted that the use of such a differential model is not in
any way subordinate to n materialistic metaphysics (although suggested by it).
The meaning of an idea is then entirely defmed by the Internal topology of the
structurally stable attractor A, as well as by its position in the cube I".
But amongst all the PSYchic activities of man, there is one of prime impor·
tance: it is that wluch consists of organising the senses (sight, hearing and feeling)
into a representation of surrounding space including the body as a privileged
space, whose spatial integrity must be respected to the maximum. Such a repre·
sentation of exterior space is tn no way bound to the faculty oflanguage and it
exists wtth more or less OdeUty and precision for all arumals and even in a
certain sense for plant life. In the morphology (M) of the signifled there exists a
sub-morphology (E) describing faithfully the spatio-temporal processes that we
can perceive in the neighbourhood of our organism. Certain \\ell-intentioned
people will be able to question the fidelny of our spatial representation, or on
the conl!ary, invoke Kant to afftrm that we are projecting onto the external
reality of coneeptua.l frame a categorial which is genetically innate. At the
tinle when a man is sent to the moon, it is difficult to claim that the space of
Newtonian mechanics is no more than a form given a priori, of our sellSl"bility.
We can assert ai the very most that genetically we have at our disposal cerebal
mechanisms that simulate, with a very good approximation in most practical
situations met wtth in ordindary life, the 'rtal' laws of Mechanics.
Whatever idea one has of the origin of language in man, it is almost imposs·
ible to doub t that the social life of a primitive human group needed an exchange
of information between its members. Amongst the themes of communication
required for the 5afety of the individual or the social group, the presence of
danger in the vicinity certatnly constituted an intmediate need for communi·
cation (in fact social groups of animals also make use of a.la:rm cries). It is thus
reasonable to affirm that the description of spatio-temporal processes taking
place in the neighbourhood constituted one of the first functions of language.
To clarify the nature of the comspondence: Signified -+ Signifier, we will
make a restriction. To start with we will only consider texts and discourses
describing spario-rempora/ processes. This procedure has the great advantage of
breaking the closure of the linguistic universe ; in fact a spatia-temporal process

Sec.l1.3) Meaning for a Spatio- Temporal Process 197

can be described objectively, for example, by ftlming h, or again, by the use of


local Cartesian co-ordinates 0, x, y, z, t. Let us harden up this description.
To describe a morphological process we will use the idealisation presented in
my book Structural Stability and Morphogenesis [2). Let U be the domain of
space time, the seat of the process under consideration. We say that a point m
of U is regular, if the process has the same qualitative appearance in all points
m' of U near enough to m. The regular points form an open subset of which the
dosed complement K constitutes the catstropbe set of the process. At each
mstant t, the set of regular points divides into a certain number of connected
components V;. In a linguistically described process, there exists at most a
finite number of such connected components which can be identified individuaUy
in t.he description. These privileged domains constitute what are called, in
Structural Unguistics (Tesniere (3)), the octonrs of the process.
As a quasi-general rule the topological type of the domain V,{t) of an actant
is a ball 8 3 (sometimes 8 2 or I, and, rarely, a soUd torus or annulus). A
process is characterised by the fact that in course of time certain actants come
to interact. This requires, c.f. the axiom of locality m Physics, that their respec-
tive domams enter into contact according to a zone of catastroplle points that
we will suppose to be connected. If, at every timet, each of the actants V,(t) is
contracted to a point, and if n band of interaction between v, and V; is symboUsed
by a common vector of the branches Vt(t) and VJ(t) , the whole topology of the
process wi.U be able to be symbolised by a graph, the graph ofinteraction of the
process. The basic idea that we will suggest is as follows. If a spatio-temporal
process is described by an uomic sentence P, the graph of interaction of this
process comes in one of the 16 types ofgraph listed below. In other words there
exists an upper bound to the topological complexity of the processes that one
can describe with the aid of an atomic sentence. In addition, very frequently,
but not universally, the topological type of the inrerocrion determines the
symacticol structure of the sentence wlticlr describes it.
The principal assertion, according to which the topology of a process described
by an elementary sentence, is one of the 'archetypal' morphologies described
below, must nevertheless admit a limitation. There exist verbs caUed iterative
which indicate the indefinite repetition of an action. Similarly there is a bi3lc
Process, the period, with is repeated by paraDe I translation in time. This is wllat
IS involved 111 the reduction to an archetypal form. We will discuss this question
later on in more detail in COMection with the notion of 'aspect' of verbs.
Should we be pressed without guiding principles, to draw up a list of mor·
Phologies implied by atomic sentences, we would be confronted with an almost
impossible task. The guiding principles will be provided for us by the dynamic
theory of morphogenesis discussed in my book [2 J • We shall assert that every
'exterior' fact can be described as an 'elementary catastrophe· defmed by a
OOnllict of regimes in space time R4 • It is reasonable to assert, o priori, that a
language which cannot express 'generic discontinuities' of the phenomena on
198 Topology and linguistics [Ch. 11

~~ is of little use. In other respects we can show that, in every coupling between
IWo dynamic systems (M, X), (M , X') presenting first integrals M ... P, M'-+ P' ,
and which are expressed by an identification between P and P' Oike the relation
E + E' = constant, for energy), every 'catastrophe' defined on P by a local poten-
tial V admitting a singularity of the type given (S) will give on P' a singularity of
a like type (S), if the system (A() has a weak potential before the potential of
Interaction. But that is exactly the situanon with regard to the sensory organs in
onlmals, which ore always in a situation of 'threshold', ready to be triggered
under the effect of an external stimulus, even of weak Intensity. That is to say
that these are precisely the structurally stable catastrophes which ore a priori the
best fitted to survive in the coupling: Reality .. Mind, denned by perception. ln
other words. the 'catastrophes' present a contagious character, and, when they
find, by coupling, a competent substrate they implant themselves, thereby exciting
a singularity isomorphic to themselves.

11 .4 ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHES AND ARCHETYPAL


MORPBOLOGIES
Let us recall the essential nature of the construction. Let U be the substrate
space which is the seat of the morphologjcal process under conSJderation: we
associate with it, as a fibre, an internal space X, that we shall suppose Euclldean
with internal coordinates x,. At every point u E U, we associate a potential
function V(x; u) and the local dynamic is defined by the gradient Y = gradx
V(x; u) in the fibre Xu. The minima of V(x;u) constitute stable regimes on Xu.
In order to decide which prevails, one can, as a first ~pprox:imatlon, apply the
following rule (MaxweU's convention): at every point u e U. the stable reglme
wh.ich prevails is that which corresponds to the absolute minimum of the function
V(x; u) on Xu. The set of points u e U, where the absolute minimum of V is
reached in at leaSt IWO points constitutes the 'catstrophic' set of the process; the
set of shock wave surfaces which separates the domains of different stable
regimes. If, gjven u = 0, x = 0, the potential V(x) presents a certain type of
singular point, isolated in the algebraic sense, then the local evolution of the
process can be obtained as induced by a mapp111gg: U-+ W, where W constitutes
a universal space for the deformations of V, the 'universal Ull/olding' of the
singularity. Every isolated singularity of V admits two Important numerical
invariants,
(a) The internal dimension of the singularity, which Is the minimum number of
internal variables of the space X , intervening other than under the form
Exf, a non~egenerate quadratic form.
(b) The eo-dimension of the singulariry, which is the dimension W of the
universal unfolding: it is also the minlmum number of parameters that it is
necessary to add to the source and to the target to make the singularity
stable.
Sec. 11.4) Elementary CataStrophes and Archet)'p81 Morphologies 199

For the only weU known gradient singularities we can show thotlf a eo-dimension
not greater than 4 is required, then the internal dimension Is I or 2. There are
four stable singularities of internal dimension I: the [old. the cwp, the ~'Illlow·
tail and the bunerfly: there are three of dimension 2; the three umbilics; elliptic,
hypt!Tbolic, fJf.lTtlbobc.
First we will consider the universal unfolding of these singularities and the
catastrophe sets which are defined by Maxwell's convention. We shaU identify
each stnblc domain as an actant, and will thus obtain a graph of Interaction. This
study will only be made for singularities of internal dimension I; the complex
catastrophe set of the umbilic is unknown to me. h is weU known that the
morphology thus obtained depends, in pnnciple, on the direction chosen for the
time axis in the universal unfolding W1 • We will point out the various topological
types that can be obtained by varying the direction.
Following thls we shall show the graphs dertned by noteworthy plane sections
of the universal unfolding (of dimension I or 2): we tl:tus obtain rmaUy aU the
morphologies which are associated with the natural physical processes. Thus we
find the morphology of capture and the morphology of giving, which we can
consider as fundamental .
In n second stage, renouncing MaxweU's convention, we take a plane section
of dimension I (a straight line) of the universal unfolding W, and associate it
wilh its counter·image in the set Vx1 = 0 of the space X of Internal variables.
Tl:tus are deftned the so-called 'biological' graphs, because they account for the
most delicate manner of interaction between living beings. The action of an
animate being on an inanimate object can be considered s!mllarly.
This lime the straight lines must be taken in the universal unfolding of the
umbilics, if one wishes to obtain a non-trivial spatial morphology because the
actants are well ordered for dim X = I. (Always with the exception of the
morphology of capture associated with the section 1211 of the cusp (see 11 .5,
A (ih')).
What justification can we give for thls procedure? It must be obserYed that
in all animals there is an Internal psychic process E isomorphic to the space that
surrounds it. Mechanisms of spatial regulation dermed on E, genetically innate,
ensure the integrity of the spatial form of the organslm. It comes to the same
thing as saying that, for an animal, the surrounding space is at least partiaUy an

lllternal space; the living being acts in the substrate in such a way as to ensure,
if it can, the spatial integrity of its organic form. There exists from this point
of View a real affinity between liviD& beings and solid bodies, which also maintain
their spatial integrity as well as they are able. ln this we can see the origin of
skeletons (external in Insects, internal in vertebrates). It is also the reason for
Which the mechanics of solids is infinitely better known to us than the mechanic$
or fluids.
We could also question the choice of linear sections of universal unfolding.
1 thtnJc that in this connection linear sections provide the most typically irrevers-

200 Topology and linguistics [Ch. 11

ible, and the simplest, processes. If we impose on the Interaction a condition of


reversibility (as for the elastic collision of two elementary particles) it will be
necessary to use parabolic sections to describe their morphology. In the same
manner, we note that the section 23r, 236 (see I 1.6.1.5) which give rise to
catastrophes of excision and synthesis require, if we wish to have two actants
to infinity, a certain incurvation.
'Physical' morphologies are shown by the Latin alphabet and 'biological'
morphologies by Greek characters.
As has been said, two morphologies are fundamental (at least in English).
Firstly, the morphology of capture 12P. This provides the prototype of simple
transitive sentences: Subject-Verb Object. .The subject is the actant which
survives the catastroplle and is tile victor; the object is thus captured (or emitted)
(for example: Eve eats the apple), and, secondly, the morphology 14 of givmg.

11.5 ALGEBRAJC DESCRIPTION OF SINGU LARITIES AND THEIR


NOT ABLE SECI'IONS

A. SinguJarities of internal dimension one


(i) Simple minimum (00) V = x 2 • This singularity being stable, is its own
universal unfolding, and the associated morphology can be symbolised by a
continuous ray: - - - - --

(ii) 17re fold ( ll) V= x 3 , for which the universal unfolding is

V=x3 +ux

On the u ·axis one has the morphology of a half.Jine as domain of the stable
attractor: - -- - --4 ...
u<;O

(iii) Whrmey sOJsp, ( 12) V= x 4 /4 of which the universal unfolding is

V= x 4
/4 + ux2 /2 + vx.
In the (u, v)- plane of external coordinates, the apparent contour of the
cusp is defined by the semi-cubical parabola 4u 3 + 27v2 = 0 . The applica·
tlon of "MaxweU's convention' leads to the formation of a shock·wave line
I$$Uing from the origin which separates the domains of the two competing
stable regimes. Whence the "physical' morphologtes.
Sec. I 1.5] Algebraic Description of Slngul.arities 201

The notable sections are •


12
u = negative constant ( l1a)
and

P = non-zero constant {12/J).
I la)

(iv) The $Wtll/oWtail ( 13). V= r /S with universal unfolding:


V=x 5 /S + wr/3+ vx 1 /2+ ux.
In the (u, v. w)- space of external coordinates, a section of the surface in
the plane w = -kl

has the appearance shown.

By application of Maxwell's convention, we have a shock wave starting at a


cusp point and ending In a neighbourhood of the double point; the associated
physical morphology is of type:

/ or _../'
~ IJ b ) -

A noteworthy section is the straight line, 13~.

(v) The Butterfly V= x 6 /6 whose universal unfolding is the polynomial:


V= x 6 /6 + rx4 /4 + wx 3 /3 + vx 2 /2 + ux.
A section of the survace dete rmlned by a plane of the form
I = -11 2 , U =COOS!,

leads to a diagram of type: - c ...


J
thus to a physical morphology of type:

the morphology of giving.


I
In o plane section of the form
r = w = const.
202 Topolo&Y and linguistics [Ch. I 1

it ls possible to obtain the same morphology of 'giving' as associated with a


curved section of the type shown In the figure:

(V!J Umbflics The parabolic umbilic is defined by the singularity V= x 2y in


the two internal variables (x, y). Unstable, this singularity can be stabilised
by the addition of terms of fourth order, as

V = x 2 y+ l/4(x4 +y4 )

We can consider tl1e elliptic deformation ofthls umbilic defined for example,
by

We associate to this umbilic its universal unfolding defined by

V = x 2 y -y 3 /3 + wy 2 /2 - we - vy + (x4 +y 4 )/4
y

(a)

elliptic umbilic (EU)


We extract from this family the two plane sections w = h 2 and w = -lz1 • h
small. In these two cases, the apparent contours In the plane Ouv of
external variables are homeomorph.ic: the elliptic umbilic (see Fig. EU)
unfolds itself uno a three~usped hypercycloid having a cusp at the origin.
For w negative, the new regime associated with the interior of the curvilinear
triangle dcitned by the hypcrcycloid J/ 3 is a minimum, thus stable; for w
positive it is a maximum, and thus unstable. The chosen sections are the
curves (a:), (If) which cut H 3 in the neighbourhood of one of its sides. In
this case the side normal to the aJtls Ov.
Sec. 11.6) Semantic and Syntaclic Interpretation 203

(vii) Hyperbolic umbllic. lt is defined by

V=x 2 y+y 3 f3.


The universal unfolding is

V=x1 y + y 3 /3 + wy 2 /2 - ux - vy
and we then add, as before the stabilising terms of fourth order such asy4 /4.
(vili) Singulariries 'of transition: lt remains to describe the singularities obtained
when a pair of cusps is born or annihllated.

There an: two: the lip singularity: ~


which gives rise to a physical morphology: -<>-
(which we also meet again as the internal morphology associated to the
section 13r).

The singularity beak- to- beak which gives rise to

' 11,1
the physical singularity: --~-"-"'\..,--- and the two sections 131i,i31i' give rise to

two types of internal morphology:

Reflection Refraction
~ I.J.\
........

11 . 6 SEMANTIC AND SYNTACTIC INTERPRETATION OF INTERACTION


MORPHOLOGIES
11 .6.I We consider questions of sentences expressi.na a stale
In syntax, the simplest way of representing a state 00, is to use an impersonal
verb (the 0-valence of Teslliere [3]). 11 rains. Very frequently however, we
employ either a neutral verb (univalent): Peter sleeps, Peter is thirsty, using the
connectives to be and to have: 111e room Is warm. We will <fucuss the status of
these connectives later.

11 .6.1 .1 The fold. (I la)


The associated morphology Is ... (end of a being) or Its opposite llb
(birth of a being). . . . In syntax th.is morphology is expressed by a
neutral (univalent) verb. The day ends, Peter dies.

204 Topology and linguistics [Ch. I I

11.6.1.2 Thtcusp. ( 12)


The physical morphologies I 2a, 12b respectively express semantically the ideas
reunite and separate. The 'biological' morphology of capture possessed by the
graph I 2r is fundamental : the actant subject S captures spatially the actant
object 0 . Example: The cot aztches the mouse.
By reversing the arrow of time, we have the morphology of emission 12r:

John throws a stone:

The morphology I1Jl of capture is the archetypal morphology for the


classic tranSitive sentence: Subject Verb- Obect. Of course a transitive verb
does not always express the creation or destruction of the object. But try to frnd
an example of an active sentence Subject- Verb Object where the act ant Object
survives the Subject while the latter perishes In the action: I an1 unaware of one
in French! ('Le bois nourrit le feu'?) (Trans: The wood feeds the fire.)

I 1.6.1 3 The swallowtail (13)


The physical singularities 13a, I 3b have some little interest for us: ( 13b) is the
emission of an actant that perishes: spit, spark. As a matter of physical morph·
ology, the singularity section through 13a Is Interpreted as a regime condemned
to disappear, but, which before perishing jumps to a mctastable regime which
also disappears ('a gasp of agony'). This morphology Is at the base of the seman·
tic fonn expressed by the adverb 'presque', and the auXJliary 'faillir' in French.
As regards the internal biological morphology, it can be represented by the
graph (13a) that we can interpret as a morphology of suicide: the subject Jays
hold of an instrument which, capturing him, destroys him.
s

11.6.1.4 The butrerfly (I 4)


The only new morphology associated with the butterfly is the morphology of
gift. It is the classic morphology of the system: Source-Message Receiver.

~/m
In synlax, it is expressed by the trivalent verbs ofTesniere: Donner, dire, montrer
(to give, to tell, to show: something to someone). A verb of movement like
'aller' (to go') is also susceptible to Lbis morphology: in the sentence: I go from
Paris ro Rome, 'Paris ' and 'Rome ' are the actants.

Sec. I J .6] Semantic and Syntactic Interpretation 205

1 I .6 .1.5 The Um billcs


Associated with section 230<, 23fj of (Ell), there are the following morphologies:

23a w negative: The Messenger.

To start with there are tluee actants, the subject S, the object 0 , the messenger
M. M comes towards S, on contact with M the actaot S splits and emlts an actant
(m) which finds itself captured by the actaot M in a bound metastable (M, m):
this complex system goes towilrds D; on contact with D, the actaot m leaves the
messenger M and is captured by D; the messenger M is free and moves off.
Examples: Peter sends John a letter by post. James goes from Paris to Strasbourg
by train.
On a strictly dynamic plane, this morphology is the outcome of the morpho·
logy of gift ( 14). The presence of a messenger as instrument, hereby expresses
the difficulty in realising the connection between S and D (due to distance or
the difficulty of terrain).
These difficulties are overcome because of the global involvement expressed
by the communication. The involvement need only be that of U1e subject S, as
for instance, when it is a question of sending a projectile over to D to destroy it,
the messenger M then being a fi.rearm. In this last case, in the conflict between
the 'message' m and the destination D, it is the first that prevails .. .. 2313 w
positive: The grasping ('La prelze.tiSiOII '), (cf. Note ll .9. J p. 21 J).
To start with there are three actants: a subjectS, an ln.s trument l , an object
0 (in fact the instrument I is an emanation from lh.e subjectS). I approaclles 0,
and forms with it a metastable complex (1- 0); then this complex approaches
S, forming a triangul.a r chain S- 0-1; by collision of the central unstable regime
J.l with the saddle>., this chain opens between 0 and I and S captures 0.

Example (in French):


J ean met son chapeau (Sllr sa tete).

206 Topology and linguistics [Ch. 11

(Trans.: 'John put on his hat' or 'John puts his bat on' or 'John puts his hat on
his head'.)

23-y Catastrophe of synthesis


T

0
(23yl
s
There are three actants to start with; the subjectS, the object 0, the target
T. An instrument 1 issued from S goes towards 0, forms with it a me tastable
complex I -+ 0 stabilised by joining with the target T. Example: Perer ties his
a
goat to the rree with a ro~. ('Pierre attache sa chevre l'arbre avec une corde'.)
All the verbs of the semantic form 'tie' or 'bind' (F. 'tier~ arise frome this
morphology. We can also connect with it verbs of the type ·compare· (F.
'comparer~. The comparison between two objects is a klod of qualitative conflict
between these objects, artificially provoked.

236 Catastrophe of excision


Here there are again two nctants: the subject S and the object 0. The subjectS
emits an instrument J which goes to attack the object 0 and to provoke its
splitting into (0) + (m), the actant (m) being captured by I. Very frequently,
but not always, the complex lm returns towardsS which captures(m)

I ~
s
This morphology is that of sexual reproduction: S is the father, I the male
gamete, 0 the mother. It is clear that the catastrophe of excision is the source of
a plentiful morphogenesis in Biology. The majority of animals cut their prey
In to pieces before swallowing it.lnSYOtax it is also weU represented.HecUT of!his
n
head with a blow of his sword (F. lul a coupe la tete d 'un coup de sabre),JoJm
extorted money from me with his revob·u. (F. Jean m a extorque de /'arge11t
avec so11 revolver.) Cw. slice, tear, extract, exca~-ate, pierce, (F. WUPI'f', 11an·
cher, arracher. exrraire, creuser, pucer) arise from this morphology.

Si11gu/arities of Transition
The graph of type L3-y (The Lip) is the same type as for reflexive morphologjcs.

Sec. 11.6} Semantic and Syntactic Interpretation 207


Peter waves his arms (F. Pierre agite le bras). Since it is the only one our arche-
typal morphologies which is reversible, it is also the only one that can be repeated
and require the need for an iterative suffix.
Cf. Vibrate, bakmce,fidget .... (F. Vibrer, balancer, remuer... .)
The singularity 131i (Rejlecrion) contains all the verbs of the type repel
(F. repousser).

The singularity 136 (Refraction) all those of the type cross over (F. traverser).

11 .6.2 Observation o n the grammatical subject of a sentence


As a fairly general rule tire subject is tire actant which survives to the first
catastrophe of tire process, symbolised by tire just vertex met in descending the
time axis. Exceptions: in the morphology I la, the subject can only perish; in the
morphology l4a, of gift, the subject ls, in general, the donor: it can exceptionally
be the one receiving (F. 'destinataire') (cf. to receive something from someone).
ln the 'biological' morphologies 23r and 236 the subject emjts an instrument
which causes the desired catastrophe to the object. This is clearly the basis of
organogenesis in Biology. The function of an organ is to realise situations of
shock, of conflict in a specialised zone sufficiently distant from the vit al organs
of the organism (Examples: the hands of a man, the claws of a crab). There are
some verbs like defend and protect (F. 'dl!fendre' , 'prou!ger'), where the gramma-
tical subject is the instrument, the semantic subject being the grammatical
object.

11.6.3 The maximum number of actants in an atomic sentence


1t follows from our list of archetypal morphologies that every atomic sentence
comprises four actants at most: a subject, an object, an indirect object (F.
'un destinataire') an instrument. This rule appears sufficiently well supported in
French. Possib le exception: the verb to share between (F. partager (entre))
whlch requires at least two indirect objects (F. 'deux destlnataires').ln a sentence
like Jolrn carries on tlte truck two tons of fruic from Roscoff to Paris (F. 'Jean
a
transporte en camion deux tonnes de fruits de Roscoff Paris') , we could see
five actants. In fact in the process considered, J ohn is spatially inseparable from
the truck. ff we wish to dissociate the truck as subject, it would be necessary to
use the causative 'John arranged to carry ... (F. 'Jean fait transporter...) which
as we have known since Tesnlere, augments the number of actants.
We can furthermore wonder if in a number of cases the complement of
manner is not an equivalent of the instrument. Compare: John splits the log

208 To pology and linguistics [Ch. 11

with his axe (F. Jean [end la bGche avec $11 hache) and John splits the log with
force (F. Jean fend la Bilche avec force). Seen in this way the 'force', the kinetic
energy transmitted to a mobile object, is likened to an actant, the message - the
messenger being the instrument. The verb to hit (F .{rapper) for example, is then
susceptible to the morphology 23a.
The limitation to four of the number of actants in anatomic sentence fmds
ultimate justification in Gibbs phase rule, which limits the number of phases,
that is, of stable regimes, which can be in equilibrium at a point of three-dimen-
sional Euclidean space to four (cf. Conclusion 11.9).

11.7 A MORE REFINED ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF AN ATOMJC


SENTENCE
The signified content of an atomic proposition describing a spatlo-temporal
process involves other elements besides the typology of spatial Interaction. Ln
this regard, the following schema is proposed.
I. The meaning comprises a kernel (nucleus), which is the central part of it .
I bis kernel is described by one of the archetypal morphologies, or exceptionally,
by an extracted submorphology (for example, a branch of the graph).
2. Around the kernel, a 'halo' said to be 'the presupposed' (F. prtsuppose),
comprising a morphology deduced from the nuclear archetypal morphology by
symmetry or spatia-temporal translation. The operations to carry out in order to
divide the nucleus to obtain the presupposed are defmed by affiXes. Thus the
prefiX re in French indicates a symmetry with regard tot= 10 • Compare 'le
11iens d'Amerique', 'Je reviens d'Amerique'; m the same vein 'donner' and
'redonner '; 'vendre ', 'revendre '. (TrartS.: In Enghsh the use of prefix ·re' does
not correspond exactly but the principle is preserved: 'entry', 're-entry'; 'sell',
're-sell'.)
Many verbs of movement: vibrate, balance, wave (F. vibrer, balancer, agiter,)
imply, even without affiX, the iteration of the morphology which they describe.
3. The localisers (Jakobson [4] : shifters ('embrayeurs')). The description of a
spatia-temporal process is of little inteiest, if the space domain where the
process is taking place is not localised with respect to the space time referential
common to both the speaker and the hearer. Every sentence thus contains
'localisers' which enable one to specify, at least qualitatively, the space domain
of the process in the referential common to the speaker- hearer couple.
Localisers usually include:
(I) Adverbs of time and place: here. theie , yesterday ... (F. ici, hi, bier ...).
(2) Tenses of verbs (past, presem, future).
(3) Articles, personal and demonstrative pronouns which connect the actants
of a sentence P to the actants of previous sentences.
For example, in English, the dermitc article the before a noun implies that the
actant designated by the noun has already ap!'Cared as an actant In a previous
Sec. 11.8) Sentences Describin& States 209

sentence. If it is a question of an actant newly appearing in the universe of


discourse, it will be preceded by the indefmite article a or an. Example: 'Our
cat has caught a mouse'.
The requirements of each language in the matter of localisers are very varied.
Usually we will make a precise locali5ation in the first sentence, and will refra.in
from doing so again. The localisation then develops with each sentence by
spatio-temporal continuity from the preceding one. Certain elements like the
tenses of verbs, can be either repeated or omitted (for example, the use of the
IIIJ"arive present to describe a past process). in many languages, notably African
and American Indian, the speaker is required to indicate tmplicitJy the source of
the mformation he is giving. For example, if he has himself seen the process he
Is describing, or if he is reponing the words of a third person.ln that case, there
is clearly a particularly demanding form of localisation which is not an intrinsic
constituent of the meaning. This should not be confused with the 'locatlve',
which is a loealiser with the spatio-temporal actants of the process.
In the sentences: '/am going from Paris to Rome', 'There iJ some ham fn
the refrigerator', Paru, Rome and refrigerator are the actants.

11.8 SENTENCES DESCRIBING STATES


If our theory seems to have given a good account of the syntax of sentences
which describe spatial processes, it seems by contrast unable to explain sentences
describing states: 'The sky Is blue', 'Peter is thirsty'.lf it is true, as Wittgenstein
has said, that the world Is a world of facts and not of thmgs, we can believe that
the type of sentence describing states is a later acqwsition of language.
According to our point of vtew, the distinction between noun and verb is
common to all languages. A verb describes in principle a spatio-temporal process
with an archetypal morphology. A noun describes an aclant, being a domain of
R4 • Of course, the meaning of the verb contains more than the archetypal
morpho logy with which it Is associated. 1t contains particularly, restrictions as
to the control capacity of the different actants (animate, inanimate), tlte form
of which it sometimes specifies with more or less freedom. Every verb gives
btrth to an abstract noun of action; such an abstract noun like finish, gift..• (F.
/in, don . ..) has no spatio-temporal realisation; but 11 asserts a spatial realisation
as actant in an abstract space, a space of co-ordinate w which will serve to
re-constitute the 'organising centre', the generating singularity of the morphology
associated with the verb.
In order to explain the formation of stan·c sentences, we must return to a
point brieOy mentioned previously: the aspect of the verb. In certain cases, the
meaning localises itself, not on the global process, but on one of the branches of
the archetypal morphology. The mteraction node Itself then passes into the halo
of presupposition. A typical verb In this connection is the verb 'to have· in
Engllsh. After a morphology 120, the object is captured by the subject. But two

210 Topology and linguistics (Ch. 11

cases are possible; either the object is entirely destroyed and assimilated by the
subject (For example: The cat etJtS the mouse) of the object continues to exist in
the manner of a vassal satellite of the subject. The system Subject-Object
constitutes a metastable 'bound state'. This occurs if, after the capture of the
object, the subject (animate) adds it to its range of possessions. To have, as it were,
to hold (Latin: habere), can be cons.idered as the perfective of the verb 'to
take'. lt is also the inceptive of the verbs to give and eo emir. This explains why
the verb 'to have' is in English and French the auxiliary of the past tense of
transitive verbs; also in French by means of a suffLxial form, it is that of the
future. Ln this analysis, the verb to have contains two elements of meaning;
on the one hand, it is a perfective of 'to take' , 'to capture', and on the other
hand it explains implicitly the incomplete character, theoretically reversible,
of the catastrophe. It all takes place as if the vertex of the graph of interaction
12~ found itself partially de-stabilised and that one part of the localised attractor
being initially at this point, flowed along the length of the branch which leaves
it in the direction of positive t. In French and in the majority of western Languages
which include a verb •to have' , it is the perfective aspect of 'to take' which
dominates the inceptive aspect of 'to give' and 'to emit'. I understand that in
Eskimo it is the reverse.
It remains for us to speak of the verb 'to be' as it occurs in the attributive
sentence: the sky is blue. This requires us to make a theory of the adjective. An
adjective describing a sensory quality can be considered as an actant in a space of
internal coordinates describing such types of sensory qualities. For example,
'red' describes a certain domain in colour impressions in lhtee-dimensional
space. The control mechanism of these actants is much simpler than that of the
nouns. Ln fact they are not compelled like living beings or solid bodies to a strict
spatial regulation and the frontiers of their basins are Imprecise and indeterminate.
Where does the red stop or the orange begin? Their control does not require
complex internal mechanisms as is the case for animate beings; a simple gradient
of potential can suffice.
To describe the dynamic of formation of an attributive sentence like 'the
sky is blue ', we will proceed as follows: the sky is represented as a spatial form F
in the product of a space R (mental representative of the exterior space) by the
three-dimensio11al space C of colour. This form is projected on the space C by
'excitation', coupling with a specific exicter (that which is expressed by the
genitive: 'colour of'); the projection p(F) is then situated in the 'basin' of the
'blue' attractor B; this at tractor excited by the re-absorption of the image p(F)
leads to the utterance of the syntagma 'is blue'. In the mind of the hearer. the
sound of the syntagma 'is blue' has the effect of exciting form F on to the space
C localising it in the cylinder p-I (B) where B is the blue basin in the colour
space C. ln doing this, it fixes the (virtual) configuration ofF in the Immediate
memory, although the global excitation is re-absorbed. It will be noted from
this point of view that the predication of a quality on a subject is always con-

Sec. I J.9] Conclusion 211

ceived, in principle, as reversible. If the proposition 'the sky is blue' contains


important Information, it is that, too often in our climate, the sky in grey. From
the point of view of a qualitative dynamic, we can consider that in the attributive
sentence the sky is blue, the excitation issued from the system, 'the sky' passes
over the actant oscillator blue. We can then associate it with the morphology of
emission 12-y: 'the sky 'emits' blue' is the dynamic equivalent of 'th.e sky is
blue'. On the contrary the syntagma Tire blue sky where blue is an epithet, can
be considered as the actant which arises from a catastrophe of ·capture': the sky
has taken on blue, so it possesses blue. This interpretati.o n shows clea1ly the
profound analogy between adjective and verb, whlch in certain languages
(Japanese), is expressed morphologically.

11.9 CONCLUSION
The restriction we imposed on our atomic sentences only to describe a spatia-
temporal process, cannot be considered as excessive. Indeed we can wonder
whether, as Zeeman's model suggests, every psychic process is not a dynamic
process in a multi-dimensional space of high dimension. By adding 'internal
co-ordinates' to certain actants, there is in practice no expression for which
one cannot find a spatial interpretation. Thus a verb of feeling such as to fear,
to hope, expresses that an actant subject admits in internal co-ordinates, a
morphology of the future, which is accepted with repulsion or anra~tion . ...
This clearly supposes, that an a1clletypal morphology in a substrate space W can
play the part of an acl8Dt in another morphology of substrate U. This is the
phenomenon, known since Tesniere, by the name of ' translation'. It allows
the transformation of any verb into a noun by the infinitive form and any
sentence into a noun by the words: T11e fact that . .•• We can interpret this
process geomelrically as the concentration in one poin t (the organising centre
of the singulaiity) of ea.ch archetypal morphology. This is the origin of all the
nesting axioms introduced into formal languages. This procedure cannot be
employed many times ( 4 or 5 at most) without loss of intelligibility. Reverting
to Zeeman's model, we can assert, for evident functional reasons, that the
dynamics of our mentnl activities admit a fairly large number of first integrals
(approximately at least): the representation of external space, sensory qualities...
We can then form ideas of dynamic attractor structures associated to structurally
stable singularilies of co<limenslon N much higher than 4 . But if we wish to
'ex.press' this idea, we are obliged 'to unfold' this singularity, to make it a series
of local sections of dimension 4 at most, by a kind of local spatia-temporal
realisation. This leads to representation of all thought by graphs of interaction,
in which the vertices ("les somrnets') can embed themselves locally in archetypal
morphologies, and where certain actants can explode into second31Y morphologies
(like the bubbles in strip cartoons). We can ask ourselves whence comes so
speL;al a structure of formulated thought. We must see in it, probably, a conse-
quence of the three.<Jimensionality of lhe space in which we Uve.ln order that a

212 Topology and linguistics [Ch. 11

set can be perceived in a global form, a 'Gestalt', it is necessary that the different
elements a1 do not cease to exist individually in the global perceptive field. Now
this requires that their dynamic neuro-physiological representatives have spatially
disjoint supports, but nevertheless haVIng a point in common where the local
equilibrium between the systems Is manifest. According to Gibb's phase rule,
there can thus be at most four independent systems in equilibrium (susceptible
to being constructed genetically in embryology by a system of ·gradients' in
competition). Every genetically hereditary structure, recognised as global, contains
at most four elements. We will notice that in this way, in French and English
at least, a syllable comprises rarely more than four phonemes, a word more than
four syllables, and a sentence more than four actants! I will not dare to eleva te
this speculation to be universal for all languages, but I do not believe it less true
that the "double articulation' of language draws its origin from this spatial
COOS! rain t .

11.9.1 Note
As C. Zeeman pointed out to me, In order to obtain the graphs of excision and
liaison which make four actants intervene, it must necessarily invoh·e the inter·
vention of the "double cusp' singularity, with the equation V= x 4 + y•, and of
(topological) codimension equal to seven. Furthermore, it will be noticed that
all our archetypal morphologies (with the exception of 'messenger' defined by
the trajectory la I in the unfolding (I O) of the elliptic umbllic) can be obtained
by combination between two bifurcations of type r. The one in the form ~ .
associated with a subject, describes the emission of an instrument I by the subject.
The second in the form r<=. describes the splitting or the synthesis of the
object. (There can be identification between a partial object and the instrument
I, as in the morphology of gift.) Certain verbs have a morphology in which the
subject appears at the end as the victim of a catastrophe of capture. These verbs
of a non-ergative type are frequently represented in classical European languages
by verbs of the middle voice.

REFERENCES
[1) Zeeman. C., "Topology of the brain' Mathematics and Computer Scien~
in Biology and Mtdicine. Medical Research Council, 1965.
[2) Thorn, R., StTUctural Stability and Morphogenesis. W. A. Benjamln, 1975.
[3] Tesni6re, L., Elements de synra:ce structurale. Paris, Klincksieck, 1965.
[4] Jakobsoo, R., ESSDis de Linguistique Genuale, Clutp. lX, p . 176. Paris,
Editions de Minuit, 1963.

Sec. 11 .9] Conclusion 213

List of archetypal morphologies

00 Being

I la Fmish llb Start ···..--

Ila Unite
>- 12b Separate

12oc Become

0
126 Capture 0
s \ 12-y Emit s(
13a Fail l3o' Suicide s \\

13-y Wave [_ ~
13.5 Push \) 13.5' Cross over _....;\..:...._"\~-

14a Give

23o' Send 231l Take

23-y Bind 0 236 Cut I

s s

CBAPTER I2

Language and catastrophiest

We rerum here to a more explicit mathematical modelling. The earlier versfon of


this text concem ed problems of general dyt~amfcs 'decomposition of potentials.
Gibbs phase rule) in the E. C. T. model. The problem of the predicative sentence,
considered in the last paragraph is considered in another perrpective in the
paper: The double dimension In universal grammer, Les Lettres Modernes,
Volume 89, 1978, pp. 78-96, Paris.

12.1 SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES AND GRAMMATlCALCATEGORIES


The text T of a language L, whether it concerns a written or spoken text, splits
into separate segments - by signs of punctuation (such as full stops} in the
first instance, and by silences (pauses for breath} in the second. These are
sentences. In addition there are usually smaller segments, the words (marked by
a tonic accent in most languages). Then one finds even smaller groups, the
syllables, then the irreducible units which are the letters of writ ten language and
the phot~emu of the spoken language.
This hierarchical division of the linguistic morphology (sentence- word-
syllable-letter) seems to be universal, i.e. is found in all the world's languages.
There is no question that linguists disputes the precise definition of 'the word'
and in many instances one Is not sure whether certain affixes should be joined
to a word or treated as independent elements. For example, in the Portuguese
'depois de deixar -11/ ·, should 'deixar·la• be considered as one or two words? We
will not enter into these difficulties here, nor will we concern ourselves with
the lower elements of the hierarchy, letters and syllables. The significance of
those is practically never independent of the context. By contrast. the higher
elements, words and sentences, can be, at least as a first approximation. supports
of an intrinsic meaning, largely independent of rhe conrex t of the particular

t Paper publiVIed in ProceedifllS of tht &hill Symposf11m for dy111lmii:IJI f)·mms, 1972,
Academic Pren, New York.


[Sec. 12.2] The syntactic Structure of Elementary Sentences 215

circumstances of !he expression. We will interest ourselves in lhe breaking down


of a sentence into words, !he object of which is usually called syntax.
Experience shows !hat a semence is in general complex, and !hat it can be
split into 'elementary' sentences. ln classical languages two types of association
are distinguishable, the ronjunction and the subordinate clause, although a strict
criterion between these two types is difficult to establish. We wiU eaU an elemen-
tary sentence a sentence which is not dissociated by conjunction or subordination
into smaller sentences. There exists a relatively simple property which defines an
elementary sen tence. That is the presence In every elementary sentence of one
word, and only one word, defmed classically as the 'verb'. This word is indispens-
able and cannot be suppressed without profoundly affecting !he meaning of the
sentence and its grammatical correctness. Thus If a sentence is reduced to a
single word,this word is necessarily the verb (usually in the imperative: Come!).

REMARK: 11 Is a very conuoversial question in general linguistics to ascertain


whether 1t is possible to distinguish, in !he case of all languages, a class of words
playing !he role of a verb, with !he help of morphological testS only. One of the
surest tests defines the verb as the word that bears the mark of time (past,
future). But to repudiate this teSt, linguists argue from certain exotic languages,
like Nootka, where it seems that the nouns are conjugated. We will return later
to the dlstincllon: 'noun- verb', whlch seems to us to have an indisputably
semantic basis.

12.2 TRE SYNTACTIC STRUCTURE OF ELEMENTARY SENTENCES


A deeper analysis of the system of the elementary sentence reveals in addition to
the verb, a fundamental class of words: !he noum. In the sentence 'Peter sleeps',
the word Peter designates a weU-<Ieftned individual having for the speaker at the
moment of enunciation a weU-<Ieftned spatial locaJJsation. The second word
sleeps u the verb which describes a certain physlologlcal activity (or rather
non-activity) by the Individual Peter, who Is caJJed the subject of the sentence.
The subject can be replaced by another block of words a.s in 'The etzt sleeps'. We
can say that In syntax, the block the cat equals a proper noun like Peter , in the
sense that it can be substituted without affecting, if nollhe meaning, at least the
grammatical correctness of the sentence. We can, I believe, with falr certainty
defme nouns as the words which, possibly completed by auxiliary words such as
articles and demonstratives, can be substituted for proper nouns.
Then, lf we exclude sentences of !he inventory kind such as: 'In the refrigera-
tor there are eggs, ham, sausage, milk, coffee ... etc.' which are more of the
conjunction type. we establish that the number of nouns appearing ln an elemen-
tary sentence is not very high, four or five at most.lt was an important discovery
of formal or Structural linguistics to show that !he organisation of an elemeota.ry
sentence can be portrayed by a graph, in fact, a tree, explaining lhe necessary
216 l.anguagf and catastrophies [Cb. 12

rdatlons between verbs and nouns In order that a sentence should be grammatically
correct.

sentence
/
Peter hits Paul NP VP
~ '\
V 0
1 ~ ~
Peter hits Paul
sentence
/"\.
NP VP
/\
The cat catches the mouse-
II V NP(o)
I '\

T

The cat
N
I T N(o)
I +
catches the mou5<

lt appears that only a few types of trees are necessary to account for the
structures of elementary sentences which are simply statements. The French
Unguist L. Tesniere chuacterised these structures by a natural number less
than three which he called the 'valence' of the verb.

ExAMPLES:
Zf!TO ~'0/ent lt rains (no subject)
uni~'Ole11t Peter sleeps (a subject- no object
complement)
divalellt Peter beats Paul (subject and direct obJect)
trivalent Eve gives an apple to Ad am (subject, object, Indirect
object)
The possibility of constructing all elementary sentences as a tree gave rise to
great hopes. The formal school (Bioomfield , Harrls) ha.d the quasi-Hilbertian
ambition to reach a complete formalisation of the rules of syntax founded only
on morphological criteria, independent of the meaning. Unfortunately, it became
necessary to abandon lh.is approach In the face of the difficulties which mounted
up.
We quickly see that certain sentences have an aberrant structure. instances
are Interrogative sentence which aim at obtalntng Information and not at trans-
mitllng lt, or, subordinate clauses, which oc::caSJonall)' have a different typology
from the main sentence. lt became the task of N. Cbomsky's transformational
grammar to try to plug the gaps. An active formal transformation on the tree of
Sec. 122] The syncactic Structure of Ele.m entary Sentences 217

the sentence is associated with these aberrant structures and the tree is trans-
formed m to a 'normal' tree. It is a matter of 'trees' being projected on the axls
of time, and it is not easy to define these transformations, nor to state reasons
for them which do not appear as so many ad hoc rules. In their desire to secure
formal universality, some linguists recognise but one fundamental graph, that of
the dichotornic division A (triple·point graph) and reconstruct all the graphs
of common practice through the ad hoc composition of these elementary triple
points. Obviously we can always do this, but the multipUcity and arbitrariness
of the transformation rules remove much of the benefit of this reduction.
One of the essential difficulties met with in structural linguistics rests in
the non-canonical character of an elementary sentence considered as a tree. In
particular, we distinguish classically two types of nouns in a sentence: the
'actants' and the 'circumstants'. WltUe 'subject', 'direct object', 'indirect object',
are undoubtedly actants, we transfer the complements of instrument or of
manner, like those of time and place, to being clrcumstants.
Personally, I should be tempted to employ semantic criteria in this distinc·
tion. ln the sentence 'Peter cuts the cord with his knife', the knife, by its decisive
role in the process, seems to me an actant, perhaps a second one, but still an
actant. ln the sentence 'Peter cuts the cord with for~ ·. it is more reasonable to
see in 'force', a clrcumstant, a qualitative locaUser of actlon.lf one adopted this
poin t of view there would only exJst two types of nouns in an elementary
sente nce , the act ants which would combine together in a weii.<Jefmed type of
tree and the localisers which place the action in space time or in certain spaces
with semantic qualities. Only the localisers attached to actants are grammatically
mdispensable; those attached to verbal global action can be dispensed with. In
the fundamental operation of localisation of action, we rarely make use of nouns
but rather of adverbs and anaphorlc words like pronouns wltich refer to actants
which have already appeared in earlier sentences.
It is necessary from the outset to make one important remark: the signifying
characteristic of a sentence is quite independent of the spai.lo-temporal localisa·
lion, either of the process described or of the enunciation Itself.
We can say that the group of dlsplacements operates in the semantic universe
m a manner compatible with the meaning. (It is understood that a spatia-temporal
translation effected on a sentence can affect its veracity or its usefulness: but
there we leave linguistics proper to enter into logic or psycholinguistics.) From
this one can infer the relative Independence of spatlo·temporal localisers in the
structure of the sentence.
While the high hopes of formal linguistics have been dashed, it actually
only prevents the possibility of the giving of elementary sentences the structure
of a tree centred on the verb, appearing to be a universal truth of linguistics. The
old problem is thus revived, that of the universality of grammatical categories,
such I$ verb, noun, adjective and adverb, borrowed traditionally from Latin
grammar.

218 Language and catastrophies (Ch. 12

Historically, the first linguists were the missionaires who, In the eighteenth
century, applied themselves to translating the Bible Into the most exotic languages.
In order to do this they had to know the grammar of a language, and they wrote
it most naively and naturally in the model of Latin grammar.It is a fact that one
still finds old English gramma rs where the rose 1s declined: Nom. the rose;
Ace. the rose: Gen. - of the rose; Oat. - to the rose, ... etc. Linguists of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries make fun of this naivety. However, it must
be noted that this way of proceeding leads to aberrations which are more formal
than real. I t has never in fact , prevented missionaries from accomplishing their
task of translating the relatively difficult texts of Holy Scripture into the most
diverse languages.
We shall now sustain the thes1softhe universality of fundamental grammatical
categories, such as verb , noun , adjective, adverb, with the aid of models of
topological dynamics. This is describing in the most intrinsic manner possible
the structural characteristics proper to each of these functions, considered as
a structurally stable element In a dynamic model of the language.

12.3 CATASTROPHE THEORY AND THE NOTION OF OBJECT


12.3.1 Inadequacy of classical dynamics
ll is proposed In the next two sections to give the fundamental qualltatlve facts
needed for a theory of language founded on qualitative dynamics. lt wiU be
shown why and in what way the model of classical dynamics is inadequate for
attaclcing this kind of question.
The main difficulty arises from the representation of 'objectS'. In the
classical model. the states of system are described by the pointS of a phase
space M (ln general, a differentiable manifold), and its evolution defined by a
vector field (Oow) X on M . This presupposes that one knows a priori aU the
poss.ible states of the system. But therein lies a demand which it is in practice
impossible to satisfy as soon os we treat linguistically described objects, like
living bemgs, for ex.ample. The models of classical dynamics arose historically
in the study of solid bodies in interaction or in contact (holonomic constraints),
or by action at a distance (the nobody problem). But all things cons1dered, these
are very special cases. Already, the study of Ouid or plastic objects requires the
introduction of manifolds M of inOnlte dimension for which the field X becomes
very difficult to handle (a fortiori, to integrate). In addition classical dynamics
postulates the existence of a Strict local determinism when. in reality , ordinary
'objects' are always subject to forces of a probabilishc nature which are repre·
sented by perturbations of Ocld X and which are in general unknown and
difficult to estimate. In classical dynamics it is accepted that a perturbation
affecting the object can affect its dynamic, but not Its phase space, the topology
of which must remain invariant and which cannot vary without the system
ceasing tO exist. Perhaps that IS the beauty of topology... .

Sec. 12.3] Catastrophe Theory and the Notion of Object 219

It appears perhaps more natural to suppose that the space M can vary ,
together with the dynamic without which the object would cease to exist. In
short, classical dynamics is never concerned with lhe genesis of the objects nor
with their end. (In the classic case of a system of solid bodies in contact, the
preparation of the system 1s given in ordinary language, thus it is not actually
a process of mechanics properly speaking.)

12.3 .2 The persiste nce of objects


Another difficulty of the classical model is that it accounts only with difficulty
for the stable existence of independent ObJeCts (a fact amply verified in common
experience). ln effect, two independent systems (M., X 1 ), (M1 , X1 ) can be
considered as a single system (M1 X M1 , X 1 + X2) which IS 'split'. But in the
space of the dynamics on M 1 X M 1 , the set of split dynamics (or those topo·
logically equivalent to a split dynamic) , is in general nowhere dense; it is only if
these dynamics are of gradient type (and generic, Kupka- Smale) that one can
expect a split dynamic to be stable. Otherwise, since each of the systems presents
closed trajectories, there are in the tori, products, 'resonaoces' which remove the
split character of the dynamic.

RI:.MARK I: The preceding property will be untrue for time discrete dynamics
(diffeomorphisms); in fact, the product of two Anosov diffeomorphlsms is an
Anosov diffeomorphism, split and structurally stable. The impossibility of
maintaining two recurrent systems m a state of dynamic ind.ependence thus
appears as a consequence of the continuous character of time.

RI:.\1ARK 2: Smale has given an example of a product (M, X) X (N, Y) such that
X is of gradient type, Y recw:rent and structurally stable and such that the
product (M X N, X + Y) is not structurally stable. But I do not know if that
affects the split chAracter of lhe product.

Ri.MARK 3: The quantum mechanics model avoids the first objection made to
the classical model. There is no well-defmed phase space for a quantum system.
The llllbert space of the states is a kind of 'hold-all' in which it is very doubtful
that all the points are effectively physically realisable (the principle of superposi·
llon of the States is not in general accompanied by any experimental procedure
to allow addition). Also, wilh the operators for creation and annihilation in field
theo ry , we have a formalism for the origm and the end of systems.
On the other hand, it does not avoid some objections to the unstable
character of split systems. In general, the state of a system is only split asympto·
llcally (1 = ± '"') in order to describe the particles entering and leaving a collision.
If we accept that the state is split for 1 = - oo by reason of the preparation of
the synem, it is difficult to see why this remains true, nearly always, fort =+ oo.

220 Language and catastrophies [Ch. 12

12.3.3 Germ d ynam:ics


In order not to prejudge the total space of the states of an object, it will be
assumed that these states can be parametrised by the points of an open subset U
of a Euclidean space. The dynamic X will not be defmed on all of U, but only in
the vicinity of a closed subset of U stable for X, at a point of origin. Ln another
connection, one cannot but feel that, when an object comes into existence (or,
on the contrary, disappears), the dynamic which represents this can hardly be
a complicated one. If, as the poett said, 'the universe is only a fault in the purity
of non-being!', we must think that objects when they come to birth,(or perish)
are the simplest generic deformations of the void, of nothingness.
The complexity of an object will be measured by the number of the elemen-
tary bifurcations that it is necessary for its dynamic to cross to create this object
or destroy it.
This idea, perhaps a little metaphysical, leads us to study the most simple
germ dynamics systematicaJly. For a point dynamic one thus obtains the generic
linear deformation of the null dynamic, that is to say the singular hyperbolic
point.lf we restrict the dynamic to be a gradient dynamic, we obtain a quadratic
potential and in the same way a germ of a Hamiltonian dynamic is represented
by a Hamiltonian quadratic.

REMARK : The notion of a germ dynamic raises interesting mathematical questions.


For example for a gradient dynamic at an isoiated singular point, th.ere is always
a decomposition of the form. V(x, y) = Q(x) + H(y), where Q(x) is a non-
degenerate quadratic, and H(y) a potential corresponding to the Taylor series
starling at order 3 or more. This decomposition is not unique, but two such
decompositions are isomorphic (this follows from Mather's theory of the stability
of differentiable mappings). For a totaJly degeneTate potential of the second
order, we may conjecture whether or not two decompositions of the form
V= V 1 (x 1 ) + . _.. + Vk(xk), are necessarily isomorphic since each one of the
terms VJ(xJ) is 'irreducible', that is to say, cannot be split. In the complex case
a result of Sebastiani and Thorn seems to support the conjecture [ J] .

Cascade of DytUJmiCIII Systems


Given two dynamical systems (M, X), (N, Y) we say that (M, X) is an extension
of (N, Y), if there exists a suljective mapping p:M-+ N, of maximum rank,
dim M;;. dim N and such that p(X) = Y.
When studying a dynamical system (M, X), it is important to know whether
it is an extension of a system (P, Y) of lower dimension. The notion is equaJly
valid for point germ dynamics. We will observe that if (U, X) is a gradient
dynamic which projects itself onto a gradient dynamic (V, Y) (both point
dynamics) then this extension splits. It is the same for Hamiltonian dynamics.

tP- Vlll6ry: 'Le Serpent'.


Sec. 123) Catastrophe Theory and the Notion of Object 221

On the other hand, for general dynamics, we very probably have non·trivial
extensions. (For example, by a series of Hopf bifurcations, defming the fibres
as non·trivial circles.)
We will observe besides, that even in the case of the quadratic potential
there is a natural hierarchy of the terms given by the modulus of the real part
of the corresponding eigenvalue.lt is more reasonable to regard the fast oscillator
as defining the fibre, the slow oscillator defining the base dynamic.

Symmetries
To restrict the study to germ dynamics at a point is an excessive constraint. We
know from experience that, quite often, natural syrnmetries present a certain
stability. There will thus be occasion to study systematically the germ dynamic
invaria nt under a certain action of a Lie group in tite support space and in a like
manner, their bifurcations and thcu unfoldlngs, if they occur. A particular case
of synunetry is that where one takes the group of aU the diffeomorphisms, the
only invariant dynamic is then the null dynamic. The notion of extension on the
nuU dynamic leads then to the classic notion of Fust integrals. If (M, X) is an
extenston of (N, 0), then the fibration M-+ N is a system of fust Integrals for
(M. X). The problem of the stllbillty of SYTfllnetries, or that of their breaking, is
one of the most obscure in general dynamics.
In what follows we shall remark only upon the following fact: if two
Hamiltonian systems (M, X), (M, X') are both invariant under the action of a
Lie group G, and if the coupling between these two systems is G·invariant, then
we obtain for the first integrals defmed by the dual Lie algebra for each of these
systems, a vectorial identification defmed by addition (for example, the theorem
of the kmetic moment for systems of spherical or axial symmelries). Such a
situation occurs frequently for systems whose evolution is ruled by physical
laws, and which all observe spatial synunetry (the Galilean group or the Lorentz
group). Then, very frequenily, in the interaction of two systems provided by
first integrals, these spaces are identified vectorially. This generalises the theorem
of conservation of energy E = E1 + £ 2 in the Hamiltonian coupling of two
conservative systems.

123.4 Catastrophe theory: a presentation


Given a dynamical system (M, X) and a space 8 ; we will say that the system
(M, X) tS extended over 8 , if the following condition is satisfied: to every subset
U C 8 there is associated a system (Mu, X u) such that if V c U then (Mu, X u)
is an extension of (Mv. Xv). These extensions clearly satisfy transitivity con·
dttions. If, to each point b of 8, we associate the ind uctivc limit of the (Mu. X u),
for the U-+ b, we define the fibre dynamic above b, to be (Mb, Xb). Then
(M, X) is immersed canonically in the product II b(Mb. X b).
A dynamic state of the extended system is defined by a sections: b-. (Mb ,Xb),
or less precisely by the asymptotic state (fort=+ oo), denoted S, of this section
222 l.anguag~ and catastrophi~s [Ch. 12

in the nbre dynamic. These can be dynamic states which do not arise from the
global dynamic state of the inilial system (!.1, X). In general, the sections, or its
limit s , presents discontinuities, the set of which constitut~s the catastrophe set
K in8
The section s, dermed at each point b of 8, dermes on 8 a morphology, of
which K is the catastrophe set. We osswne that the qualitative properties of the
space 8 at the point b are entirely dermed by the asymptotic state of the local
dynamic defined by the sections.
The dynamical systems extended on a space always ensure that we have
some systems giving rise to a phenomenology on a support space: there is thus
an operation of localisation.
Usually, the support space B JS a metric space (for the morphologles of the
experimental sciences, it is the usual space- time). We consider that 1f the open
set U is the disjoint union of two open sets V. W far distant from each other
in 8, the local dynamic on U, (Mu . Xu) is very close to the split dynamic
(Mv, Xv) X (Mw, Xw). conforming to the axiom o[ locality of quantum
physics which excludes all action at a distance.

123.5 Asymptotic states (attractors) and germ dynamics


A local asymptotic state defined by the section s, is an auractor of the fibre
dynamic. But an altractor admits a local Liapunov function for the trajectories
that it attracts. We can then measure the internal stability of an attractor by
oonsidenng the germ dynamics defined in its neighbourhood, wh1ch are germ
dynam1cs of gradtent type. lt is apparent that, except in the case of the point
attractor, this germ dynamic is not a point dynamlc and the topology of the
attractor mtervenes in Its definition. llowever, there are good reasons to believe
that the bifurcations undergone by attractors when they cease to be structurally
stable can be described by'the corresponding bifurcation of the germ dynamic,
in the form of a point germ dynamic under constraints of invariance under a
certain action, or representation of a Lie group. If that is the case, we would
be able to explain the origin of natural symmetrics. Here let us recall that
so-(:aJ)ed elementary catastrophe theory is given by the bifurcation of potent:ials
on the space R 4 , without any constraints of symmetty. lt thus corresponds to
the case where the local limit states are descn'bed by point attractors.
The notion of a dynamical system extended on n support space B does not
appear to have been introduced explicitly in the literature (the classical theory
of fields in quantum mechanics, where a field is defined by a oontinuous family
on the space of linear oscillators is an implicit manifestation). In several earlier
papers, I have called a system extended on 8 a metabolic field on 8 . The space B
cannot be oonsidered as a system of first integra ls of the initial dynamic (M, X).
It is, by oonstructlon, a system of first integrals for the dynamic 'bundle',
F = ll (Mb. Xb); the product of the fibre dynamics. But we have seen that
Sec. 12.3) Catastrophe Theory and the Notion of Object 223

the true dynamics !0, that which gives the sections ,effectively reallsed in practice,
is intermediate between

(M, X) -and F: (M, X) ::J ~ ::J F .

A priori, nothing prevents the fibre-space M b from varying the b. Later on


1ve wiU propose an example (the model of the verb in linguistics) where the
space 8 itself is variable (as a function of a dynamic to which it belongs).

12.3 .6 Coupling of two extended dynamical systems. Interaction of two


morphologies. Competent coupling and contagion of catastrophes
Su ppose we have two dynamical systems (M 1• X 1 ), (M 2 , X2 ) extended on two
euclidean spaces 8 1, 8 2 of the same dimension. Let us suppose, t" fix our ideas,
that X., X 1 are gradient fields defmed respectively by the potentials V, (x, ),
fl2 (x 2 ), where x 1, x 2 res,ectively denote the local coordinates in the fibre over
8 1, 8 2 • The product (M 1 X M 2 , X 1 + X1 ) is a system extended on s. X 8, . If
the dynamic X 2 is null, !hen the morphology of this product system is only the
su~ension of the morphology defmed by M , on B, by the factor 8,. Let us
suppose that we introduce a potential of interaction V11 between the two
systems; a very strong potential which leads to iden tifying the two fibre spaces
(x, ) , (x 2 ) which are assumed to be of the same dimension; for example,

Vll(x,,xl) =k(x1 - x 1) 2.
In considering the product system M 1 X M 2 as extended on B~, we have on
the fibre the dynamic defmed by

X' = grad V12 (x 1, x 2 ) + grad V1 (x 1 ) + X2

(this last null). We will obtain a minimum of the potential X' at a point where

- 2(x 1 - x 2 )+ X 2 =0

2(x I - x,) + aV ,/ax I = 0.

If X 2 1s supposed nuU, such a minimum is situated on the diagonal x 1 = x 2 and


we consider on 8 2 the morphology defined by the potentia l V1(x 2 ) = v.
(x, ).
If in addition the interaction is localised on the diagonal ofB 1 X 8 2 which defines
the identifu:ation between 8 1 and 8 2 (compare above with identification of
first integrals defmed by physical laws in general) then , we obtain on B 2 a true
copy (by the identification B 1 ill 8 2 ) of the morphology defined by M 1 on 8 1 •
We say in this case that the system (M2 , X 1 : 8 2 ) is competent with respect to
the system (M a. X 1 ; 8 1) . This last system is called an inductor morphology, the
morphology on 8 2 being the induced morphology.

224 Language and catastrophies [Ch. 12

ExAMPLE: The reflected image in a mirror. The morphology (M" X 1 ; 8 1 ) is


that defined by the source-objects on the usual Euclldean space B 1; 8 2 is the
same space identified by reflection with respect to the mirror plane H. The
identification x 1 = x 2 expresses the equality of the incident light flux and of
the reflected flux, the potentlaJ V1 defmes a form , a GestaJt In the space of
luminous lntensitles according to a given direction. Here the proper dynamic X 2
reflected on the luminous f.eld is effectively null: so one expresses the homo·
geneous character of the mirror H by perfect reflection.
What happens if we aJJow the existence of a proper dynamic X2 , not null,
but, together with its derivatives, weak ( on.M2 )? We can aJways solve the equation
-2(x 1 - x 2 ) + X 1 (x2 ) = 0, for x 1 , and if the derivatjves of X 2 are sufficiently
smaJJ, the solution x 1 = g(x2 ; b 2 ) wiU nevertheless defme a diffeomorphism on
U1e fibres. We will then have for V the same singularity as V 1 for x 1 , which
should in principle define the same morphology; but the addition of the term
X, in X' can affect the morphology obtained. If thU last is structuraJJy stable
and if X 2 (and 1ts derivatives) are sufficienlly weak, the onJy effect is to deform
Ute induced morphology by a e- homeomorphlsm. But if the initial morphology
was structurally unstable, we will have reduction to Ute stable forms for the
induced morphology. Thus there are certain types of morphology (those defmed
in a structuraJJy stable manner) which behave m a very resilient manner in the
couplings between extended systems. These morphologies - that we can style
pregtranrt in a mathematlcaJ Uteory of symbolism - are associated with the
stable catasuophes on the Euclidean space of the dimension being considered
(equaJ to dim B 1).1f such a morphology is present on 8 1 , it tends to induce on
8 1 an isomorphic morphology. This is the principle of contagion of catasrroplres.
In certain cases the system M 2 ... 8 2 is plastic, i.e. endowed wilh memory.
Thls is the situation {descnbed by Plato in the Theaetetus) of the piece of wax
which receives the imprint of a solid body. The existence of a memory on 8 2
amounts to saying th.at at each moment only one tempo raJ section of 8 2 enters
into interaction wiUt the inductor system, the other sections being bearers of
memory morphologies. The coupling presented by the mind facing exterior
reality is at lhe same time oompet~nt and plastic. lt Is competent because for
an animaJ, the evaJuation of distances and the interpretations of forms, are.
very often, of vital importance. When it is a question of capturing prey, or
escaping from a predator, an error of judgement can lead to a setback, or to
death. Also metric competence is assured by a refined sensory apparatus ustn&
to the full the 'unreasonable exactness of physical laws' (according to Wigner)~
an apparatus like the eye depends on a perfect simulation of opticaJ laws.
Also, it is legitimate to assert, and Utis in spite of philosophers who never cease
to pronounce on the errors of our senses or the 'defonnation • Utat our senses

tTronJ!lnors note: The use of lhe word 'pr4nante'to describe such o morphology can only
bo Uarulated Into "pregnant'. 11 Is linked with the Gestalt phenomenon of 'prognanz', the
tendency to complelcneu ond permanence of form.

Sec. 12.3) Catastrophe Theory and the Notio n of Object 225


bring to reahty('1),that the essenlial funclion of the sensory apparatus (in anunal
or man) Is to furnish as faithful a copy as possible (even metrically) of the
universe that surrounds him. 1t is this constantly present copy which constitutes
the 'conscience', the ·subjectivity' of the individual. The plastic character manifests
1tself by the stock of perceptions or memories capable of bemg recalled in case
of need. However, the degradation of perceptions or memories (including the
fmal degradation of memories progressively forgotten) poses important and
dlfficuh problems. Accordmg to a recent theory of Slum, the perception of a
form would be matched by its degradation to a stylised skeleton (the 'cut locus'
of the form to be precise). lt will be the significant features ('les accidents
pregnonts~ of this process of degradation (the singularltles of the 'cut locus')
which will serve as stable elements In the constitution of visual memories: they
will form some kind of alphabet. Such a theory has an evident affinity with the
idea of contagiOus catastrophes, of pregnance.
The singularitles of the morphologies defmed by the contagion of catastrophes
are necessarily relatively simple in their localtopology.ln particular,they satisfy
'G1bbs' phase rule', which says that on a space of dimension n , at most (n + I)
local regunes can be in Stable equilibrium (see Appendix, secuon 12.3.7). It must
not be concluded from this that, in the constitution of symbols utilised by man,
Utere only appear pregnant slngularities. Thls is false ond can doubtless be
explained thus: a structurally stable singularity cannot, on a competent milieu,
give rise to anything but itself. But In human (or animal) symbolism, a message
is formally dtfferent from its tenor or Its meaning. It can provoke In the recipient
complex and subtle behaviour; whence the necessity for the message to be in a
~late of morphological instabtlity which stabilises itself in the recipient in
a locally stable network of behaviour But, sensory communication, highly
precise and ·competent' as one has seen above. allows the transfer of these very
unstable forms and their reception. In the theory of language presented here, we
shall see that the configurations associated with the majority of grammatical
functions are structuraliy unstable.

12.3.7 Appendix: Gibb·s phase rule and catastrophe theory


Here we adopt the hypothests where the fibre dynamtcs are aJi point gradient
dynamics as in MaxweU's convention.
There are then three types of catastrophe points:
(a) The points of conflict, where k of the non-degenerate absolute mminta of
the potential function ore of equal value. Such points form a stratum of
eo-dimension k - I because we obtain k - I independent equations in
writing
V(c 1 ) = V(c1 ) = ... = V(c1) = ... = V(ck)
(b) The pomts of bifurartion. where the unique absolute mlmma c is degenerate;
(c) The )nix~· pomrs. intersections of conflict strata and bifurcation strata.

226 L.anguagt and catastrophlts (Ch. 12

l t is propoStd to show that a stratum of eo-dimension kIn the univerrol catastrophe


space is adherent to at most (k + I) regular components (open strata of eo-
dimension zero) on each of which rules a non-degenerate absolute minimum.
It suffices, for each stratum Z, to consider the Stt of the corresponding
absolute minama which defme it. Each of these minima CJ defmes by its type, a
stratum ZJ· T:ake a value a, and consider the set of the potentials V(x), such that
V(cf) =a. This defmes a submanifold of eo-dimension one in z,, because the
mapping z, ...R defined by V(cf) Is clearly su~ective of maximum nank. But in
Z, the set defined by

V(c 1) = V(c2) - ... V(Cj) = ... V(c.d = a

is also a sub-manifold Z11 of eo-dimension one m Z; also Za is the trans~ersal


interStction of the Zj(a), becauSt each of the conditions V(Cj) = a divides the
space (x) into diSJOint portions. lt follows that:

codim Z(a) = codim ZJ(a)

codim Z +I = r., codlm :!J + I.


Let CJ be the number of local llUJli.ma (neighbours of mj) which can rule In the
neighbourhood of Zj· If one can establish that codim Zj >m, - I, it wiU foUow
that codim Z > m - I, since the number m of the local minima that one can
obtain is the sum of the mi.
Then 11 suffices to establish Gibbs' rule for the bifurcation strata of the type
(ZJ). But, to each isolated critical point (whose quotielll algebraR((xj))/ V.• ,, if
the critical poant is at the origin is at the origln,ls of finite dimension r) Mother's
theory attaches a 'universal unfolding' of dimension r - I. This number is then
the eo-dimension of the corresponding stratum Zt (for dimensions less than 6;
beyond this one can only assert that the eo-dimension of Z; is at most r I ,
which is of no mterest In the present problem). The number r (called Mibwr's
number) has a simple interpretation. it is the maximum number of non-degener-
ate critical pomts that one can obtain by local defo rmation of V (at least an the
complex field). But amongst the r points so revealed, there are at most r/ 2. + I
which can be minima; in fuct Morse theory tcUs us that, if m 0 is the number of
minima, and m1 is the number of saddlesofindex one, then we have the inequality
m a ;;>m 0 • From this it foUows tJ1at (if the dimension 11 is< 6).

codtmZ1 =r - l , mt< (r/2 ) -r l , [r/2) integral part


m;< [(codtm Zi + 1)/2) + I.

But for codlm z, > 3, we have (codim Zt + 1)/2)) < ZJ which extabllshes tlte
property. For eo-dimensions 2 nnd 3 we may have equality. For eo-dimension
one, the topology Imposes m - 2
Sec. 12.4] Regulation 227

Clearly it would be interesting to free ourselves from the hypothesis n < 6,


dictated by the divergence in high dimensions of the differentiable and topological
theories of the stability of differentiable mappings.

12.4 REGULATION
DEFINITION: An object A is called a regulated system if its states can be parame·
trised by the points of a domain U of a Euclidean space, which is relatively
compact. In general the frontier of U consists of hypersurfaces H; in R", such
that when the representative point u of the state leaves U. crossing one of theH;,
the object A ceases to exist. If one subjects the object A to a stimulus of non-
excessive amplitude, the representative point leaves the interior zone of U to
approach the edge. lt is then subjected to a corrective force given by a vector
field X; transverse to H; re~ntering U.

12.4.1 Figure of Regulation


Every object, in so far as it is stable (and every object is stable for otherwise we
could not be aware of its existence), is necessarily in one form or another, a
regulated system. In a previous article (Chapter 10) I proposed to call th7 form
constituted by the domain U and the diverse correcting mechanisms defining !.he
fields X;, U1e logos of an object. Here, we speak more humbly of the figure of
regulation.
lt follows from this description that llie evolution of a regulated system is
not necessarily determinist. The corrector fields X; are, in general. only defmed
in a neighbourhood of the edge of U. In the internal zone of U, the movement
of the representative point 11 is largely indeterminate (or it can be, more or less).
The typical example of a regulated sysiem is given by a particle in a potential
basin. Evidently, in such a case, the system is determinist. The hypersurfaces
(H;) are then stable manifolds derived from the saddles which limit the basin;
they form a locally polyhedral conf~g~~ration (always witlJ cuspoid singuJarities),
with cusps defined In the generic situation by equations of the form y = Ax".
tnal we mbet for the lines of gradients in n maximum. More generally, the
domain of existence U of an object can involve more llian one minimum. An
example is where the potential V(x) is defined by a sort of crater whose wall is
relatively steep towards the interior, but whose centre comprises shallow basins
separated by slightly raised saddles. We can also have on the internal wall of the
crate r, kinds of suspended lakes defining excited states of the system. In such a
situation an exterior perturbation, weak enough not to project the representative
POint beyond the Gamov crest of the cratert, will however, be able to alter the
lnterior basin or de ta.c h it from a suspended lake ....
Regulation by a differentiable dynamic system, theoretically the simplest,
nevertheless presents a serious drawback. We know !.hat in general there is only

tcr. ~he Camov crater <>fa nucleus in atomic physics.


228 Language and catastrophies [Ch. 12

structural slability of a dynamical system with regard to C penurbations, r > I


and not CO perturbalions (simply continuous). (a fortiori, vis a vis shocks). To
arrange for a regulation to cover discontinutl!es, ll is necessary that the corrector
mechanisms themselves be discontinuous.
A prime example is given by potential wells w1th vertical walls (hence
reflectmg). But, very frequently, as in the case of biology, the regulation IS
effected by a chJ'f.Jike wall, in accordance with the mechanism descnbed below.
Le t us suppose, for example, that U is o segment -A o;;;x <A of lhe axis Ox
and there is in lhe plane Oxy o curve V(x) which Is multi·vaJued m V in the
intervals -A <; x <; -B and A > x > B· it suffices that V(x) be a curve of the
third degree in y, of local form x = y 3 -ay. Of the three rootS of V above the
band 8 <; x <; A . the exterior two define stable states; the middle root describes
on unstable state, most often unobservoble.
To the 'excited state', with higher value V, corresponds a very strong field X
into the interval. On the other hand, on the lesser branch the 'honzontal' field
X is null or weakly directed towards the exterior. Clearly such a device can
ensure on excellent regulation. When the representa tive point, under the effect
of exterior perturbations has passed the point x = B, the field X has a tendency
to draw it even further towards the extenor: thus it reaches the point x = A,
where a catastrophe occurs. the point changes its value m V and JUmps on to the
upper branch of the curve. The restoring fie id X then acts and causes the repre-
sentative pomt to move back towards .'f =B. where, by a new catastrophe, the
point returns to the initial low value of V. (Fig. 1).

·A ·8 0 B A

n~. 1
Sec. 12.4] Regulation 229

o•

Flj! 2

1t shou ld be understood that this is only a symbolic example. Witl1 more


than one variable, one can have many figures of regulation. For ex3.1llple we
=
can have the cliff on an annulus b .;;; r o around the orgin 0 (Fig. 2). Equally
one can have a figure consisting of the interior of a triangle limited by three
straight lutes D. D'. D". On D there is a transition of slates 1 - 2, on 0 ' 2- 3,
on 0" 3 - I. For a suitable choice of corresponding fields X 1 , X,, X 1 (fig. 3)
we can have an allracting circle. And this is only one case of an infinite number
of other possibilities.

(3

0 12 3)

Fig. 3

230 Language and catastroplties (Ch. 12

TI1e resuh is that it is not easy to detennine the figure of regulation of an


ObJect empirically. Very often experience is msufficient to detennine this figure .
To overcome this, it is good stlategy to call upon considerations of mathematical
stmphclly and above all, to constderations drawn from the genesis of the system.

12.4.2 Genetics of figures of regulation


In conformlty with the philosophy set out in the preceding chapter, it is reasonable
to assert that when an object creates itself (or destroys itself) it is always with
the simplest of dynamics: a quadratic potential or Hamiltonian. lt is only
afterwards that more complicated systems of regulation will appear. Le t us
explain here by what mechanism this happens.

'P/Ilsrl'c ' drformorlon of o portnriol wr/1


lmagme that a potentiaJ welly = V(x) Is realised in a moveable material like
sand. Then, if a particle m is animated by a kinetic energy corresponding to its
height y = 11 , the presence of the particle will be able to exercise an eroding
inOuence on the support material, in such a way that the proffie of the potential
well will vary. As the density of the presence of m is infinite with respect to the
points o such that V(o) = h (as one sees easily by projecting the trajectory circle
in the plane (x, x') on Ox), the erosion will be particularly intense in these
extreme points.
The profile of the potential well will then present the following evolution:
the unique minimum x = 0 sub-divides into two extreme minima separated at
x = 0 by a very rounded summit. If IJ1is evolution is continued we will be able
to see an overhang appear, a cllff in the curve y = V(x) (Fig. 4).

Mathematically, we can say that IJ1e curve y = V(x) behllves like a wave
surface on the space Oxy: the curve is given b) S(x. y: r) = constant, where S
is the solution of a Hamilton- Jacobi equation of the fonn

iJS/ ilt + H(x, y, iJS/ilx, iJS/ ily) - 0.


Sec. I 2.4] Regulation 231

We will not worry about being explicit about the Hamiltonian H necessary for
this evolution. We will merely assert that during, and at the end of this evolution,
the projection of the hypersurfaces S(x, y, r) = constant onto the x-axis has
only generic smgularilies associated with the wave surfaces. This type of evolution
can be defmed for any number of parametersx. In dimension two, the gastruJa-
tlon of amphibians demonstrates morphologically the formation of this cliff
on an annulus round the vegetative pole of the egg (with the complication that
the intennediate lining, the mesoderm, is not slow in stabilismg itself starting
from the dorsal meridian).
We conoetve that by a succession of folds of the hypersurface y = V(x~. we
cwt create by projection all the catastrophe hypersurfaces in the X·space on which
the reo{'ntraot corrector fields are triggered or terminated. We can even repeat
this process for the correcting dynamic itself. which is often of a discontinuous
type.

12.4.3 Catastrophes involving octants


The assumption that the ftgure of regulation arises from succesive folds of a
quadratic potential, allows us to generate a large number of figures of regulation.
However, the case of living being poses other problems: here it is a question of
figu res of regulation being able to reproduce themselves. In this connection there
exists, for anintals, a fundamental corrective catastrophe, predation, by which
the animal feeds itself. and tlus satisfies its permanent needs in chemical energy.
But, m tlus catastrophe, the prey is an indispensable element much akin to the
animal itself. So there appears the fundamental fact that a corrective catastrophe
requires the presence of an exterior being, an acranr. lt is the same for coupling
in sexual reproduction.
But, m an elementary cataStrophe. we have at each point of the base space, a
conflict of actants, each of these actantS being defmed by a minimum of local
potennal. In llus theory, one of the minima prevails over the others (the lowest
minimum, if tl1c Ma;~well convention is adopted). By a natural generalisation, we
can assert that all the actants live by dividing the fibre space of 'Internal variables'.
Gi~en a path c in tlte base space B, we can associate with it a graph of interaction
between actanu by the following convention: every minimum is represented for
each point b of the path c, by a point of a branch of the graph. A vertex of the
&raph corresponds to a bifurcation point where one of the minima becomes
unstable. We then indicate by a special line (for ex301ple, a dotted line) whlch
are the minima that capture the basin of the one that is becoming unstable. So
each path c which cuts the bifurcauon set transversally in B gives rise to a fmite
&raph of interaction (see Chapter I 0).
Thls sets out a very general means of represeming geometrically the most
frequent types of spatial interaction between actnnts, particularly those which
appear in biological regulation.

232 Language and catastrophles (Ch. 12

EXAMPLE: Let us suppose that we wish to express algebraically the semantic


content of the word 'capture', of the verb 'to capture'. We proceed as foUows:
consider the potential singularity V = x 4 /4 of which the universal unfolding
is V= x" /4 + ux /2 + vx. The bifurcation set In the base space (u, v), is the
2

cusp 4« 3 + 27v1 = 0. (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5

The vertical u = -k,cuts the parabola at the pointJ, u = -k, v= -{4k 3 /27)1f1.
If this straight line is traversed in the direction v decreasing, this point J is the
point "'here the catastrophe capture of the metastable minimum by the loweSt
stable minimum O<:curs (there is destruction by amalgamation wilh another
mmimum (Fig. 6(a)) . In prwciple. all the processes described by such a 'programme'
correspond to a homotopy class of paths ( transversa.ls on the bifu.rcation set) In
Ute universal unfolding of a suitably chosen catastrophe. Thus we set out a
powerful algorithm for Lranscribing ideas of spatial behaviour into a geometric
fonn.

12.4.4 Genesis of the programme


Now we can endeavour to establish the genesis of such a representall\'e path.ln
the above example we replace the straight lme u = -k by a circle centred at 0
wltich cuts the cusp transversally; this circle C being oriented in the positive
sense {Fig. 6(b)). We note once again the point J' wh.ere the circle C cuts the
lower branch of the cusp and imposes a null (or very weakly positive) field of
existence at the point J'. Thus the representative point remains for a long time
in the neighbourhood of J'. giving considerable importance to the process of
capture. Then, we can make the ctrcle C vanish by shrinking it back to the origtll
(the organising centre of the catastrophe). Inversely, one can create the circle C
Sec. 12.4] Regulation 233

V( X)

a.

V(K) al poont J

b.

0 u

by making lhc point 0 (supposed amacting) undergo the Hopf bufurcation in


the plane Ouw. We can accept m semantics. contrary to what happens in biology.
that the creation and destruction of a meaning are revemble processes, each
the m verse of thl! other.

234 Language and catastrophie$ [Ch. 12

We show further an interesting phenomenon: the catastrophe of emission


will be represented by the point K where C meets the higher branch of the
blfurcauon cusp. So, we fmd a geometnc JUstification of the Saussurean axiom
according to which no meaning is isolated but that every meanmg integrates
itself as an element in a common semantic field. This constitutes a graph of
interaction situated above the fading circle. Also thls graph illustrates an impor·
tant, but disturbing at first sight, phenomenon: that of the confusion ofactams
(Fig. 7). For example. for the circle C of capture, it can be established, after
having made the cycle around 0, thnt the predator becomes its prey, which sounds
rather difftcull.ln the semantic field of the couple: father-son, the son becomes
father, which is nonnal after a generation.

Prey

K Predator J"

I ig. 7

Tills phenomenon of confusion of the actants is inevitable in the process


of creahon (or destructton) of a verbal meaning. However, it is semantically very
undestrable. Possibly it is the origin of magical thought or the 'participation'
characteristic of priJmtive thought. It has only been elimmated gradually (prob·
ably by a tighter control of the smgularity associated with the pomt.f of inter·
section with the bifurcation set) from the point when the development of
geometric thought with respect to the global representation of space imposed
upon the mind the axiom that rhe same Object cannot be simultaJteously in two
differe/11 positiom in space.
To relUm 10 biological regulation, we can show that the corrective catas·
trophe 'programme' is an essen tia l constituent of genetic inheritance, and that it
controls all animal embryology. The catastrophe materialises morphogenetically
tn the embryo before materialising functionally in the adult. For example.
neuralation is the absorption by the animal of a symbolic prey which wUl
become its nervous system, thus justifying the statement that the predator is
tndeed Its prey. Without doubt the same is true in semantics: every concept
has a figure of regulation, and, in the creation of a concept. thls ftgure forms
itself in the style of a true embryology, in which the controlling schema is given
by the generalised corrective catastrophes whtch intervene in the stabihty of the
con~-ept.

Sec. 12.4] Regulation 235

12.4 .5 Weak regulation points


In the majority of cases (notably in highly centralised organisms) the corrector
mechanisms intervene according to the principle of all or norhing. In lWs case it
is Impossible for the system to respond to two different 'corrector reflexes'
simultaneously. The result of this is that the figure of regulation necessarily
presents llll!llk points; these are peripheral points situated on the separatrices
between two basins of corrector reflexes. On these points the system hesitates
(like Buridan 's ass between two piles of hay) over the choice of corrector reflex,
and this can have fatal consequences. We can see other solutions: where the
external stimulus is a local matter, a policy of decentralisation could be adopted,
leaving the task of replying to the stimulus to the local regulator agents. Ln
principle, this wlll allow a response to two different and simultaneous stimuli.
But then, the risk is run of the co rrector reflexes, which are not spatially pro·
grarnmed, accidentally occupying - by collision - the same region of space and
th us destroying their corrector effect. Through topological constraints there arc
necessarily weak points of regulation In every case. However, in biology and
sociology, the figure of regulation Is cons tanlly modifying itself to plug these
gaps: the figure tries to reinforce these weak points by surrounding them by
protective repelling barriers (like 'STOP' signals at a road junction). Similarly, in
the theory of language, the possibility of ambiguity is a permanent factor of
change.

12.4 .6 Language and social form s


In considering animal social groups, we can note that, in principle, there are two
principal types of socia l form :
(I) The military society: the social body is spatially a ball ; each individual
occupies a defmed position therein and governs his movement so that the
global form remains invariant. There exists a positive function which is null
on the boundary called aurlrority. The mdlviduals organise themselves
according to the trajectories of the authority gradient, and each one patterns
his movement on that of his hierarchical superior. There exists. in general
(for reasons of stability) a unique maximum of the authority fu nction; this
will be the chief, whose movement leads that of the social body.
(2} The fluid society, like a cloud of mosquitoes: there each individual moves
randomly, until he sees all his fellows in the same half space. He then
modifies his movement catastrophically, in order to re·cnter the social
body.
In a military type society, the social stability is assured, in principle, by the
Imitation of the movement of the hterarchical superior. Here it IS a question of
a slow mechanism where the cons1raints of vital competition ca11 impose rapid
manoeuvres on the group. Also the chief ca nnot see everything and has need of
special informers stationed at the front of the group, who convey to hlm useful

236 Language and catastrophies (Ch. 12

informauon on the environment. The mvenuon of a sonorous language able to


communicate infonnalion and to 1ssue directions to the members of Lhe group.
has enabled a much more rap1d execution of mdispenS3ble manoeuvres. By this
means (it 1s not the only mot1vat1on for language), one can see in the acquiSII!On
or lhis function n considerable amelioration of the stability of a social group.
lf language has been substituted for imitation, we should note that the
lauer continues to play an tmportant role 1n our societies at pre-~erbnl levels
(cf. fa~hion). In addition, imitation certainly plays a primary pan in the language
learning of a child of 1 to 3 years.

I 2.5 THEORY OF GRAMMATICAL FUNcnONS


125.1 General comments on th e semantic structure associated with a word
Tite me.1rung of a word can be considered as an oscillator. a regulated system in
the sense of Section 12.3, of the neural dynam1c. Such n system forms n kind of
indispensable channel between two types of physical activities: the sensory or
affeellve activity on the one hand which dnves us to S3Y something. and the
motor aclivity on the other hand: because every word is finally, nt the stage of
emission. a muscu lar motor field (a chreod m Waddington's sense) affecllng the
muscles of the thorax, the glottis, the vocal chords, and the mouth.t The 'entry"
aspect:): can be constdered to be an embryology of semantic form. Once this is
constituted in Its fullness, it att.ains the stage of sexual maturity. ln a special
£one of the figure of regulation, the analogue of the gonad in living bemgs. it
develops a fom1 which, by progressive simplification, returns to the organising
cenlre of the structure,like gametes in living things. The energy expended In the
fading of this local oscillator serves to disengage the mu~ular motor field These
two pro~esses. constitution and destruction of the semantic form can be con·
sldered ,to a flfst approximation, as inverse, one to the other. After emission of a
word, the semantic fom1 becomes unMable and breaks up (perhaps it remains for
a while in the unmediate memory, like a sterile souvenir after the style of an
aged in dividual having become incapable of procreation).
Thus, there are two elements for consideration in a semantic fom1· on
the one hand, the structure of the figure of regulation ('till' logos) as a
geometric figure, and, on the other hand, the semantic nature of the substrate
space on which the figure of regulation is defined. Unfortunately there does not
existS any theory (even mcomplete) of the organisation of the semantic utuverse
in relatively diSJOmt 'semantic fields'. We can, however, remark that at the
foundation. as the deepest substraLc, there is of necesslly the usual space-time
(or. more exactly, the local representations which we make intuitively for

tWe are not speaking here of U1e direct motor meaning of certain words ~ucb as ihc '"'rbs
of mo,-emcnt in the lmperati,e.
*Tarublor"t I\Oit "L"aspecl "'cnu.!e"'" rdcrs IO the 00\\ tbroup.h lhe channcltnsrigatinJ tb<
production ol word

Sec. 12.5] Theory of Grammatical Functions 237

ou!'l>elves). Then on this space become grafted spaces with ~ccondary properllcs,
such as the space of colour impressions; or the absuact spaces deduced from
the Eudidean spa'e by tJ1e operatiOns of differentiation (such as speed. force );
or the spaces of qualities affecting human achviues {boldness, caution, . . .
etc.).
We establish the following very general phenomenon: the deeper the sub·
mate of a semantic form, that IS. the nearer 11 approaches physical space. the
more complicated is its figure of regulauon. On the other hand. if the subsuate
space is of ab~tract defimuon. the figure of regulation IS, m general. simple.
Whence the possibilit} of arranging the main grammatical types of words accord·
ing to the maximal semantic dep th of their substrate. In gcncrul, grammar offer~
canonical proc~es for transformmg an element of category X into an element
of category Y without affectnig the meamng (at most, tts operative use tn a
>cntence). Such a transformation of X mto Y 1S only possJble 1f Y is a deeper
category than X. If, in practlce. there 1S no constraint wi th respect to the nature
of lhe mechanisms of regulation the figure of Y. it will assimilate the constraints
of ~irnplicity imposed on the regulation of the figure of X wtthout difficulty
Having said this, let us pass on to the de~aiption of the 'logoi' of the main
grammatical categories m the order of decreasmg semantic profundlly.

TilL NOUN : We ore concerned here with a perfectly stable figure of regulation.
I he substratc space is arbitrary and the mechanism or regulation can be arbitrarily
1:omplicated. In general, there IS mtervenhon by cliiT·like corrector catastrophes
an !.I catastrophe~ of a b1ologicaltype mvolvmg other aclantS.t
The proper noun, by defimtion, mvolvcs 1ts own spatio·temporal locahsa·
t1un. The common now1 is not generally localised on space time.
1 he form of regulation Involves a genests (embryology) and an inverse
proc•'SS (gametogenesis) which leads to the elllJSSJon of the word.

nn AD.IECTtvr:. In this instance, we have a relatively stable ligure of regulation.


but the mechanis ms of regulation are stm ple (t hey do no t in ge neral intervene
with tlte catastrophes as actants) and the substr:ue space ts a sematic field of
qualities. Owm[t 10 the simplicit} of the figure of regulation. the embryology of
this form (and tts emission) is relauvely rap1d.

1)11 VERB: ln general the verb must be represented as a trajec tory in the univer·
~:1 1 unfolding of a spatiaJ catastrophe together wi th a pomt of arrest. or
a zone
marked by a slowmg down of the dynamiC, when the trajectory transversaUy
llllcrsects the b1furcation set whKh produces In the internal space, the semanllc
expression of the catastrophe. The mechanism of embryology and of emission of

tih~ n<>un, bo""'cr, prossess..s un inlcn>e metaboli<m ltncrally cndo,.ed with o ccnoin
lndctermmi>m.

238 lAnguage and catastrophies [Ch. 12

fonn has been explained earlier (Section 12.3): the trajectory becomes circular
and vanishes at the origin. But once this circle vanishes the genn potential at the
ongm is no longer stable; it becomes structurally stable again on leavmg the
origin along a well·defined trajectory. This leads to the formation of a maximum
number of aetants in the internal space. These actants then pass by means of
local attractors (case markers) which specify their function in Ule ca tastrophe,
that is, their postUon in the graph of in teracuo n of the verbal morphology.
We see lhat there are two sources of semantic instability in the verb: the
first ss associated with the structurally unstable cha racter of the point of arrest
J' on the programme trajectory. The second is due to the indefinite character
of the actants whicb intervene in the process.

TilE ADVERBS: We are concerned here with a fairly vaguely defi ned category.
It seems there are roughly two types of adverbs. On U1c one hand ther!l are
general adverbs, like the intensive (very and the quantitarives (much, few,
too much, enough). These adverbs arc expressed by singularities or well-defined
zones in certain very general types of figures of regulation in one dimension. Por
example, the pair: 'enougll' - 'too much', can be described by a potential
crater:

Enough Too much

Then on Lhe other hand there are adverbs associated with adjectives. These
are essentially qualitative localisations of verbal processes. Try to recall the
adverbs of place and Lime which arc true spatio·temporallocalisers.
lL remains to explain how these categories function. Two types of process
must be considered: verbal production and verbal reception.

12 .S .2 Theory of verbal production


Every theory of verbal production (psycholinguistic) necessarily raises the
philosophical problem of knowing whether a pre-verbal thought cldsts of which
the language would be only the external manifestation. If it is unquestionable
that our thought occurs most often as ao interior monologue. that is, In effect.

Sec. 12.5] Theory of Grammatical Functions 239

repressed talk, it no less remams 1rue that ways of non·verbal thought exist in
man which he shares with animals. Amongst these pnmary acllvities, the sensory
representation of the world about us Is fundamentaL In my opinion, it is from
tlus that the fundamental mechanisms of language anse.
As seen at the end of Section 12.3, thanks to language, a speaker L can
describe to a llitener A, a spatiO·tcmporul process that L sees, but that A cannot
see (an mdasperuable mechanism in the effecth-e regulation of the social group).
1t as asserted that the hypothetical 'deep structure' of the hnguasts as constituted
essenllall} m our sensory representation of the external world, barely elaborated
by perception. On the other hand the surface structure will consist ofautomatisms
of language properly so called. They constitute a stratum of spaces superficially
coupled to the 'deep structure', nnd historically. in evolution, they arise through
a process or permanent exfoliation, as does our skin, consisting as it does of
strata of cells secreted b; the deep derm which, by hardemng, rise towards the
ex tenor where they disintegrate.
Now let us suppose that we wish to describe a spaliO·tcmporul process that
we are observmg. At each mstant t, the state of the process IS stored m the
immediate memory, where tt dismtegrates linle by httie into obhvion. But on
each temporal band of width t ~o maintained in memory, we ISolated the local
features with pregnant character: topological singularities of interaction between
uctams. Each of these local features rouses by resonance a verbal schema of the
~a me archetypal morphology (according to the terminology of Chapter I 1). This
dearly supposes a certain elaboration by perception of the rough visual data.
The identification with the archetypal morphology presupposes a checlong of
the con tacts between actants whach in this case are balls an space. lt will then be
necessar> to eliminate the accidental coincidence m the visual field. This happens
percep tively through a constant monitoring from the third dimension.
This Identification of the phenomenology with the configuration associated
wath the archetypal verbal processes, occurs as the result of competition between
diffeJent types of graphs. This eventually leads, after several parametrlscd
transformations (homeomorphlsms) by the adverbs, to a better superposition of
the morphologles, offering an 'entropy' maximum for the resonance thus defmed
(see Section 123.7) and consequen1ly the verbal oscillator extracts energy from
the dynamic (local memor;) associated WJth the deep structure. lt follows from
tlus transfer of energy thal the point of arrest .t disappears on the trajectory
programme, and the circle C is traversed with a uniform speed until 1t vanishes at
the organising centre 0 of the configuration. Then the associated unstable
potenlial evolves towards a stuble situation by the reappearance of mllllma of
the process type; hence tb.e actantS. Each of these quadratic actants proceed
by means of a well defined attractor in the illternal space which fixes its traJectory
(at leas1 at the start); thas wlll be the case mmker in languages I hat are declined.
Be)ide~ ahas. 1he vani~hang of circle Cat 0 has led to the muscu13r excitalion of
the motor field of the word, the verb. Usually, th1s emission JS repressed, or
240 Language and catastrophies [Ch. 12

rather retarded, because very few languages have a topology where the first
word of the phrase IS the verb (Arabic?).
Intuitively, we can say that excitation of the verbal osciUator led to llS
explos1on in a bundle of actants, which become 1dentiUed With the correspond·
ing actnnts of the deep structure (taken on a central section of the configurauon)
Each of these superficial actants begins to complicate itself: its figure of regula·
tlon undergoes an 'embryology' which tends LO facilitate to the maxtmum the
exchange of energy with the deep actnnt to which lt attad1es and toward which
it tends. When the superficial actant has reached a structure sufficie ntly isomorphic
to the deep actant, its embryology stops, and by transfer of energy from the deep
actant. the superficial actant forms a 'gamete': a cycle varushes to the organising
centre of the structure, and the energy of tlili O)ciUator excites the motor field
of the corresponding noun. This takes place for each of the actams ISSUing from
the destruction of the verbal node. Each of these nouns thus emitted receives the
case marker m the configuration of the verb with which 1t is topologically bound.
The order in which these nouns are em1tted depends essentially on the typology
of the language.
If the deep actant is a human individual, it does not need to be localised,
because the localisation is given by the proper noun. In the case of a common
noun, the situation is more complex, because the actant needs a spatio·temporal
localisation which allows the hearer to identify ii. That process is called 'de !xis':
the superficial actaot A flrst crosses the shock wave by which the Euclidean
space exfoliates the semantic spaces. This shock wave separa tes In rwo: the
actant A emits a dummy actant D whose trajectory is situated in the mental
space E representing Euclidean space. Now this space adheres to the space M of
the muscular motor fields which move our body. those which act in this space).
The actant D crosses anew the shock wa,·e wluch separates the space represented
by the muscular space M. lt sptits uself then as D' + D". D' inasmuch as the
muscular field is the emission of a demonstrative adjective such as 'this' etc .•
while D" induces a state of indeterminacy m the motor fields of the arm, allow·
ing it to take all possible directions in space. 1t is then that the real object 0,
which, as the thing perceived, is the deep actant B corresponding to A, which
will remove this indeterminacy. The finger, the extremity of the arm, tries to
reach the object 0, to minimise the distance between itself and the object:
'this hat'. So, the act of showing Is only the prolongation of the muscular
intention and, in real space, of the abstract process of attraction of the superficial
act ant by the deep actant.
When the deep actant has alread)' appeared in the world of discourse the
act of showing is muscularly repressed 110d one is content to emit a superficial
dummy actant. the defmite article, which expresses that the actant pre-exists
in the discourse. Finally, if one IS concerned w11h a recently arrived actanl,
which the speaker is unable to indicate wllh a fL,ger. he wiU use the indefinite
article.
Sec. 12.S] Theory of Grammatical Functions 241

In this model of the emission of a sentence, the graph of the generative


(structural) grammar is the unage of a process of bursting which effectively
occurs in the mind. Of course, the attraction of the superficial actant by rhe
deep actant. which leads to the control of the growth of the f~gure of regulation
of the superficial actant, is a mysterious process. To understand it, it will be
necessary to have at one's disposal a semantics of the noun, a true 'rerra incognito'.
12.5.3 Mechanism of linguistic reception
Suppose that the speaker emits a sentence of the type SVO: subJect-verb ObJect,
n very frequent typology in transitive sentences. When the word S is recognised
and understood by the hearer, there follows an excitation of tlle corresponding
figure of regulation E(S). .U the word V is recognised there follows a construction
of the correspondjng f~gure programme In the universal unfolding of a spatial
catastrophe. If the grouping SV makes sense, that means Utat the catastrophe
V belongs to tlle system of catastrophes of regulation of the concept E(S). There
follows a resonance which causes the subJeCt S to enter the configuration associa-
ted with the morphology of V. Likewise the object 0 will come to take its place
in tlte conf~guration and so the construction of tlle meaning of the sentence will
be achieved. If, also, the actants have been able to be local.ised and linked to the
anterior actants, t11e morphology thus deftned by the graph of the sentence wiU

be able to hnk itself to the morphology employed in the previous discourse and
so penetrate into the deep structure. We see tllat tn thls way, the process of
lmguislic reception b infinitely easier than the process of em~ion. This is not
surprW1lg as emission is an analysis, while reception IS a synthesis, of meaning.
Thermodynamically to separate the constituents of a compound is always more
difficult than to reconstitute the compound.
The more intractable character of emission appears clearly in aphasic troubles:
aphasia of reception (according to Wermcke) is nearly always accompanied by
severe troubles of emission Oargonophasia, logorrhea) while the aphasia of
emjssioo (anarthria) is, in practice, compatible with complete understanding.
The model given here of the figure of regulation of the verb may allow us to
give an Interpretation of this fact. If we want the dynamic on circle C correctly
to present a pomt of arrest (J'), it will be necessary to give the corresponding
point just enough energy to cross a potential threshold locahsed at./. If we do
not give it sufficient energy, the archetypal morphology will not be realised
long enough to al low the resonance to establish Itself. and the emission will
not be able to take place anarthria. On the other hand. if there is too much
energy, the archetype morphology is realised too neetingly, there is 'confusion
of actants', and the parasite morpholog1es (linked by the 'association of ideas·
in the same semantic field) will be able to excite the oscillator and lead to the
emission of a different word. This will be a case of Wcrnicke 's aphasia.
12.5.4 Possible applications or the proposed lingui'ilic model
Let us point out the principal upplicationo possible.
242 Language and catastrophin (Ch. 12
Declension theory: Our archetypal morphologies explain the existence of case
markers for the following cases: nominative (ergative), accusative, dative, instru·
mental, coruitative. The only really delicate case to mterpret is the genillve. This
is because the genitive corresponds to the semantic destruction of the concept,
of which only one element, most often the spatio·temporal localisation, is
preserved. Example: 'Poufs dog': there is no longer anything human in thJs
expression, all that remains semantically of the individual Pouf is his spatio-
temporal localisation. The genitive is thus an operation which diSSOciates the
ftgure of regulation from the concept, In order to extract from it the susceptible
elements serving the determinism of the governed noun (see Chapter J 3).

Theory of the aspect of verbs: We can Interpret aspect as a local deformation of


the singularity at the point of arrest J' on the circle C. Pushed towards positive
time, the arrest will show the morphology resultmg from the catastrophe, and
no t the catastrophe itself. tnence the perfective aspect. We can also Interpret the
imperative by a stabilisation towards the future of the point (J') (decomposed
Into a minimum J 0 and a maximum J 1 ) while the subject identifies Itself to the
bearer (clearly, the second person of the unperative). Thus we would explain the
semantically stable character of the imperative (Fig. 8).

J, - - - - -- - - - -

------------------------------------------------T•me
Fl;!. 8

Theory of the predicatil•e se111e11ce (the verb 'to be')· In an auributive pruase like
'The sky Is blue' we must consider the unfolding of the Riemann ll ugoniot
catnSilophe. The explosion of the verb liberates two superficial actants. 1n
general. one becomes a noun. attracted by a deep actant, and the other. becoming
an adjective, remains at a more superficial leveL But these actants are abandoned
in order to speak for themselves: the verb to be is thus a sort of semantic nothing·
ness. The equivalent of the zero stratum in the bifurcation space of the functions.
The realisation of such a stratum of mfinhe eo-dimension is not available in
every language. lt will be noted that the adjective epithet. 'the blue sky· can be
Sec. 12.5) Theory of Grammatical Functions 243
interpreted a.s the datum of an attractmg pomt S on the circle C of the verb
ro be (for exan1ple, the point situated on the axis of symmetry of the cusp
4u~ + 27v 2 = 0. v = O,u = k 2 ). At the emis~ion of the SYntagma.rhe blue sky,
th•s point is drawn towards the origin which leads to the dissociation of two
actants, without the emission of verb tcJ be (Fig. 9).

This pattern again furnishes a good example of the confusion of actan ts.
In 'the sky is bh1e ', the sky transfornts itself continually Into blue as the circle
C as gone round.

REFERENCE
( 1J Sebastiani, ~1 and Thorn. R .• Un resu/Jat sur la monodromie, lnvenr. Matlr,
August,l971.

CHAPTER 13

On the typology of natural languages: An


essay on psycholinguistic interpretationt

The considerations pres~:nted here nm lrl!fld-on into tire total Sl:l!pticism of


professiOIWI linguists; nevertheless, I cominue to hold these fundamemal beliefs.
A better formulotion of the 'senwmic complexity' of a concept will be found
in rlre paper "The double dimension of umversal grammar' referred to at the head
of Chaprcr 12.

13.1 UNlVERSALS OF LANGUAGE


The present article is a commentary on the article,J.ll. Greenbcrg ( 1968). ·some
universals of gratnmar'. from which we take the notation. We mall endeavour
to systematise the very nch content of thJS article with the help of a theory of
linguisuc communication. This theory rests on o geometric {dynamic) model
of meaning. Cf. Chapter 12. Of course, we can speculate how such a model can
represent the totality of the psycho or neuro·physiological processes, brought
into play in the activity of speech, but that is a qucsllon we will leave for the
time being lt has simply seemed to us that the use of the model has led to new
pointS of view on the typology of languages, points of view for which specialists
wUl have to appreciate the truly linguistic interest.

13 .1.1 Emission and Recept ion ••


Let (C) be the signified content of a sentence (S) whtch the speaker ts go10g to
address to the hearer. Whatever representation that one makes of (C). we must
accept that (C) is constituted in a particular way, u unique being, a globally
conceived form in the mind . In order to be transmitted to others this form must
fust undergo a process of analysis, of disassocmtion, which reduces it to a ftDite
set of elements X; transmissible separately in so many words or morphemes
Perce1ved by the hearer, the series of ~·ords (X;) evokes a tram of elementary

tGros, M., Halle, M., Sci1Uuenb<:rger, M.. L 'twalyu fomJtllt ties /angues llOturollts, Mou1on,
1973
[Sec. 13.1] Universals of Language 245
oscillatory figures, out of which there is a combmation. a synthesis, wh1ch
reconstitutes the fonn lC) in the mind of the hearer b)' resonance. Consequently,
all bnguistic communication mvolves two types of different operGtiOns. the one
inver:;e to the other with regard to their results. There IS an operation of analysis,
reducing the fom1 (C) of the meaning to a set of elements x,, separately trans-
missible because coded. Also there is an operation of sylllhesis reconstituting
in the hearer the fonn (C) from the elements emanating from the operauon of
Jnalysis effected by the speaker. Now it is far from being e\"ident that the orders
of the elements X1 most favourable to the accomplishment of these two types
of operations arc the same. It is an assumption of our model that m fac1 these
orders are inverse, In such a way that there arc fundamentally. two typologies a
t} pology of emiss1on and a typology of recepuon, in principle the one being
mverse to the oU1er.

13. 1.2 The chemical analogy


In order to give an idea of the operation of analysis, let us borrow a metaphor
from Physical Chemistry. When a chemist \\.ishes to separate a compound mto
its constituent parts. the sJmplest procedure is to 'heat" the substance; the
constiruents then escape from the crucible in order of decreasing volatility; the
least stable substances, the more volatile. evaporate first. At the end of the
opera tion, only the most stable residue, the leuM easily melted, will be found nt
the bottom of the crucible. ln this analogy what will be the homologue of the
·,·olatiliry' of a component? A priori a ·word' \\.Ill be so much less volatile, and
thus so much more semanticall) dense, insofar as its meaning leaves a trace in
the mind, a more permanent image We will then start by considering concrete '
concepts a.s more 'dense' thru1 abstract ones. Later we shall assess ·semantic
denslry' relative to the traditional grammatical categories, such as Noun, AdJective.
Verb, etc.
Once freed from the operat1on of analysis,.the different elements X, will
have to recombme u1 order to reconstitute the initial compound (C). Here, m
principle, llie operation is easier, ~mce it is achieved by a dirnmu tion of free
energy, an increase of entropy.t In chemical thennodynamics, there is theoreti·
cally, uniq ueness of the fmal equiUbrium state. of such a fonn that the order U\
which the (X,) are brought mto relation does not influence the nature of the
fmal compound. However. the speed with which the equilibrium IS attained can
depend, largely. on the order followed in lhe partial synthesis between the (XI).
If. 111 particular. by mishap, two (XI) are pu t into contact whose combination
&Ives an insoluble precipitate in the global mixture, the obtaming of n final
equilibrium could be deferred :..I most indeflrutely. Unguistically. this is interpreted
~ an tll·starred ordering of tJ1e (XI) can give rise to partial meanings mcompatible
With the global meaning (C). There is not even umqueness of the final state,
- --------
t Sc.: lhe re!cn:nco in 12.5 .J to Wernicke't "'MOIY aphaila .

246 On the typology of natural languages: (Ch. 13

since certain sen tcnces are ambiguous, contrary to what happens in a closed
chemical system.

13.1.3 The Dynamic Model


Here, we compare the signified content (C) of a sentence (S) with a classical
dynamic system, to which we wiU give the following intuitive representation. Let
(F) be a surface of the three-dimensional space Oxyz with the equationz = f(x,y).
Let us suppose that a panicle of mass m moves without friction on this surface.
We shaU accept that (F) has, by and large, the appearance of a volcano with a
complicated internal geography and the particle m has a kinetic energy lz, which
does not aUow it to clear the lip of the cliff. In this way , it remains imprisoned
in the interior of the potential well bounded by tllis bp. Then we aUow the
content (C) of (S) to be represented by the movement of m corresponding to a
potential energy defined by the base liJ1e z = z 0 • In the phase space with co-
ordinates (x. y, z, x ', y', z') the point m moves on a hypersurface of a constant
energy: x'2 + / 2 + z'2 + gz = gz 0 • I f the curve of level z = z0 has a connected
interior, this hypersurface is ilself connected, and we will suppose the movement
o f m is ergodic in litis hypersurface ( this so as to symbolise the global character
of the meaning). ll is accep ted then tha t the process of analysis of the form (C)
can be interpreted as the progressive annihilation of the oscillator m, by progressive
diminution of its energy. When the maximum value z 0 of the point m diminishes
with its potential energy z 0 , the qualitative nature of the dynamic system
certainly varies when the energy hypersurface changes its topological type. This
will occur when z moves through a critica l value c of the fu nction[. If we are
only interested in the decomposition of the energy hypersurfnce into connected
components, two types of change can appear:

(i) The critical value c corresponds to a saddle point of the function f . ln thts
case a connected component of the curve of level z = c. can after passing
through t he saddle, give rise to two connected components.
(ii) The critical value c corresponds to a mi11imum p.ln lllis case, when z tends
towards c, a small connected component of the line of the level z disappears
at p. li in this variation of z to z0 , a connected component of the energy
hypersurface Is identified at a point , we obtnin finally n graph whose vertex
(S) of maximum value corresponds to (C), with the vertices being associated
to the minima of the ternlinal points of the branches of the graph. We accept
that this graph is identified with the !Tee defined by the generative gramm(JJ'
for the sentence (S) with content (C). To the minima PI off correspond the
terminal elemeJtts (X/), the 'words' of the spoken sentence. To a sadd le q
corresponds a point where a branch spills dichotomously into two branches;
linguislicaUy, this is interpreted as t he fracture of a meaning into two
incomplete meanings, which become disjoint and independent, like the
annihilation of a resonance between two systems.


Sec. 13 .1] Universa1s of Language 247

This model thus postulates that general ive grammar Lrees have not only a
formal existence but describe an Important part of the topology of the mental
neurophysiological process associated with the emtsston (and reception) of a
sentence. Tius modelts mspired by an analogous model describing embryological
development (the hydraulic model o f the epigenetic landscape) (see R. Thorn ,
Structural stability and 11wrphogeneJiS, Benjamin , 1975, p. 216}. In this analogy .
the emission of a sentence is homologous to gametogenesis. The reception of the
same sentence corresponds to the excitation of the oscillator, to the flooding of
the epigenetic 'volcano' and so to the development of the embryo.
We wiU accept, as a first approximation, that the geography of the potential
well (F) of equation z = f(x, y) is a linguistic and semantic invariant associated
to (S). common to all speakers of the language under consideration. In order to
reconstruct this figure (F) from the words (Xt), the surest means is to sweep out
the potential well (F) according to z increasmg. Afterwards, it will be necessary
to arrange the X1 in the inverse order to that in which they appeared ln the
operation of analysis. (Each mimmum p; off corresponds to a 'vanishing oscilla·
tor' defined by the word Xt) .
This model cal ls for the following conmtents:

( I) In general, the receptive order of the Xt (defined by z increasing), m verse of


the 'emissive' order (defmed by z decreasing) is not the only order compatible
with the reconstitution of the meaning (C). As we saw earlier in the chemical
analogy, the operat1on of synthesis is fundamentally easier than the operation
of analysis, and it follows t11at it allows u greater tolerance in the order of
the words. The inverse order of the order of emission is then netther the
only possible order, nor perhaps the best, but it is a sure means of recon·
stitutiog the content (C) of the signified.

(2) T he model, such as the one presented here does not allow for the taking
into account of the facts of ambiguity. This overly static model should in
fact be replaced by a less naive 'metabolic' model. What is ln fact happening
is as if the local geography of the potenrial well depends on the state of
excitation of the ocillator. For example, let us suppose that the basins
associated to two minima P~o p 1 be separated by two different saddles.
When z grows, the union of two basins above the saddle is illterpreted as the
establishment of a resonance between two oscillators -independent up till
then and thence as the mental formation of partialmeanlng. When the two
SOiddles separating the two basms are perceptibly of equal height , there can
be indeterminacy in the choice of the saddle which will be reached fust.
This leads to a semantic ambigulty.lo fact this ambiguity could be removed ,
either by the order in which the words X 1 , X 1 , corresponding to p 1 , p,. are
emitted, or by factors m the context o f the situation. The amb1gu11ies of
which modem theoreticians have made great play. remain in ordinary
248 On the typology of natural languages: (Ch. 13

language a rare,even an exceptional, phenomenon. Nearly all the theoretically


possible amblguhles are in fact removed by the situational context of the
sentence. This is tO say, once again, that the geography of our potential
well (F) is not a formal given of the single sequence of the words X;. but
that delicate characteristics like the relntive height of two saddles, can
depend on factors external to the sentence. A rigorous theory of this kind
of phenomena, namely the competition of resonance be tween interacting
dynamic systems, has yet to be created.

13.2 T HE DYNAMIC MODEL AND SEMANTIC DEPTH

ln the dynamic model considered in the preceding paragraph, each word X;


corresponds to a secondary potential well included in the 'volcano' whlch
defines the foon (C) of (S). We begin by saying as a first approximation that
the 'volatility' of a word X1 is the opposite of the depth oflhe associated potenUaJ
well, of lis 'semantic density'. How then is the relative semantic denshy of the
traditional granunatlcal categories such as: noun, adjective, verb ...etc.. evaluated?
There are two approaches to this question; one, semantic, postulates that there
exists a certain Isomorphism between the mental mechanisms whlch ensure the
stabilJty of a concept Q, and the physical and materia l mechanisms which ensure
the stability of the actual object K represented by Q; the other, formal and
structural, considers the possibility of universally transforming one grammatical
category into another
In the semantic approach the depth of the potential well associated to a
concept Q represents, by nnd lnrge, the time taken by the mentalmecharusm of
analysis to reduce tl1is concept to the representative sign. h follows that the
more ·complex' a concept 1s, the more its stability needs regulator mechanisms,
the greater 1s its ·semantic density'. If it is fairly clear that a noun wh1cb repre·
sents n substance, nn actual object, defines the most stable and least volatile of
the grnmmntlcal categories. it is far from being true that all nouns are of com·
parable semantic density. The supreme prize is handed to anlmnte being, and
most likely to man. An anunalto live mu~t periodically resort to a whole spectrUm
of activtties. cat, sleep, mo1-e, ... etc. To these fundamental physiological activities
are added (for man) mental acttvilles almost as indispens:~ble to the meaning of
being human: speak, think, believe, . .. etc., whlch constitute a form of regulation
which superimposes itself at the beginning and on the presupposed. So. the verb
is necc~ry to the stability of the noun. the geometric mechanisms which
ensure the stabiilty of the ~erb are thus Implicitly contained in those wluch
ensure the stability of the noun. Consequently, the semantic density of the verb
is, in principle, inferior to that of the noun. The verb, In principle, describes u
·process', an eminently 1ransient activity of a slibject, the mental m1age of which

Sec. 13.2) Tbe Dynamic Model and Semantic Depth 249


requires, in order to become stabilised, a permanent effort of the mind. Certainly,
this image can be readily evoked; but the stability of this image can no longer
rest, as can rhat of the noun, on the efficacy of regulator mechanisms symbolised
by the concepts of an auxiliary category. lt must then be that the verb has in
itself. in the very geometry of the action it defrnes, the reasons for its stabiUry.
So verbs of movement such as chrow, shakl!. fall. roll, ... etc.. find the reasons
for their stability in Mechanics and Physics. Would there be a verb 'to fall' in a
world where there wus no gravitation? So the stability of tlle verb can, in principle,
be expressed by a geometrico·algebraic structure. relatively simple and quick to
reconstitute.
The adjective is intermediate in density between noun and verb. it shares
with the noun its mvariant character, independent of time. An adjective of
colou r, such as red for example dennes a certain domain in three-dimensional
space of the impression of colou r The regulation of this domain is not as strict
as that of a solid body. Its frontiers are unprecise and nucruating: where does
the red stop, and the orange begin? lt foUows t11at a relatively simple algebraic
structure like a gradient of potential, is sufficient to assure its stability. The
semantic density of the adjective is tnen. in itself. hardly superior to that of the
verb, but it carries on a semantic field. a space of tangible qualities. which repre·
seots a deeper layer than the space time which supports the verb.
The adverb, an operator which modulates the action of the verb or the
inte nsity of the adjective, has also a regulatory structure very near to the algebraic
(particularly the quanti!iers: very, much, onollgfl, ... etc.); and as it acts on the
verb. its support should be considered as less profound, more superficial.
Coming fmaUy to the wide range of grammatical auxiliaries; pronouns,
affixes, suffices, ... etc., we could certainly grade them In semantic density, if
need be. Let us compare as an example the demonstrative (laun ille), and the
French article le which derives from it. The demonstrative is a 'dcictic', which,
by an appropriate gesture, serves to place the object of which one is speaking in
context~ In normal usage the definite article I!! serves to rec:nll that the noun
wh.Jch it precedes has already appeared as on actant in a previous sentence. h Is
then a sort of vague deichc the object of wluch Is the universe of discourse at
the moment il is emfued. We have a yet more superficial layer, nea.rcr to the
formalised verb than to the intuitive content onf the signified. At the most
SUperficial !~vel of language, we frnd that logician's paradise, copulas such as
or, and, not, ... etc., the usage of which being nearly always formalisable . They
correspond to explicil algebraic structures which act on the verbal material in a
way 'almost' independent of the sigmfied content.
We will be able to cor.firm t11is semantic analysis by the other approach
Which rests on the structural rule wluch states: if an element of category A can
be canonicaUy transformed Into an element of category B. !hen B ls more dense
than A So the verb can be cannonicully transformed to an adjective (partlctple) or
a noun (inflniuve form of the verb) but the inverse transformations 'oun - Verb,

250 On the typology of naturallangiUlges: (Ch. 13

Adjective-> Verb are in general not defined. In the same way the adjective can
be nouned but the noun cannot be adjectivisedt.
Of course, it would not be necessary to assnnilate semantic density to a
quanutative parameter that one could try to measure. In the interior of the same
category different elementS can be of very different densiues, because of qualita·
tive differences. So an abstract noun of action (such as dance from to dance,
race from ro race) is hardly more dense than the verb from which it derives. The
more abstract the noun becomes, the less dense it is semantically. A noun such
as: end, edge, ... has no other semantic density than that defined by the mequaliry
x;;. 0 on its spatio-temporal content. Intermediate between the anlmates and the
abstracts are the mantmate beings. the solid bodies in parucular Their regulation
is of an exclusively spatial nature and only the verbs of movement are applicable
to them.

133 TYPOLOCIES OF ELEMENTARY SENTENCES


Let us consider a simple transitive sentence of the SVO t)-pe: Subject- Verb
Object: the cat eaiS the mouse. How do we arrange these different elements in
increasing semantic depth? The verb, we have seen is the most 'volatile'. Of the
rwo noun actants: Subject, ObJect, it is the object which is the least stable, the
least semantically dense. In fact, in the process described by the verb, it is not
rare that the object perishes entirely 10 the action, while the subject always
survives in the process: Eve eats the apple. llts pracllcally impossible to ftnd an
example of a transitive ph.rase SVO in which the subject perishes in the action
while the object survl\'es. That is to say that, at least In the local 'landscape'
assoctated with the action, the object 0 is less stable, less 'profound' than the
~'Ubject.
The result of this analysis is that the normal order of emission of the con·
stituents in the dynamic process of dissociating the meaning {M) of the sentence
SVO, is: VOS. On the other hand, the normal order of the constituents needed
in the reception process will be the inverse order: SOV. Consultation of Green·
berg 's table ( 1966) allows us to ascertain the following: whereas the typology SOV
is sufficiemly plentifully represented (Greenberg's Type Ill : Japanese, Turkish,
Basque, etc.) the pure emissive typology vas does not exist in practice.
Why is the pure emissive typology VOS not represented? The reason Is
easily perceived: after having understood V, the mind must maintain in view. by
a sustained effort, the actantial schema linked to the verb. Now, the verb has a

tAccor~ tu Tesni~re (1965) the 'gemtht' precisdy dlec:ts lh• in•·erse tr.msbtk>n of •
noun Into QJ1 adjective. ll is, a.s is wcU known, unc of the more criticisable puml ofTesnihe'>
S)'Siem. This antrrprclatlun howevet, does contain some uuth: thus as 15 explained in
§ 13 4.3, the ,.:nitl•e rtl<cu • scmantoe destruction of a concept, which replace. tlili con·
cepl by • !oel ot leu scm•ntocally dense concepts.
Sec. 13.3J Typologles of Elementary Sentences 251
stronger afftnity to the subject than to the object as is shown frequently by
'ellipsis of the object • (tfle cat eats) while there is never ellipsis of the subject.
Once given, the couple VO has the effect of precipitating in the mind the forma·
tion of a resonance which blocks the ultimate formation of the fundamental
resonance VS. Doubtless the use of Oexlonal ending (suffixes) (accusative for
0) allows, in pnnctple, this inconvenience to be avoided. Even in this case, the
maintenance of the object 0 at a ·semanlic potential' raised above the yawning
chasm created by the absence of the subjectS. unposes upon the mind a particularly
painful task. On the other hand, the transfer of the order of emission VOS to the
order of reception SOV, requires in languages of type Ill , a certain mnemonic
effort from the speaker. lt is here that we must bring into play a fundamental
factor in the dynamics of communication. As a general rule, the Interest that the
speaker has in being understood by the hearer exceeds the interest the hearer has
in understanding the speaker. To be convinced of this, it suffices in sorting through
one's daily mail to assess the proportion of diverse demands: publicity, in'oices,
requests for off-prints, manuscripts to read, ... etc., 111 comparison to the majl
which is really welcome or useful. Besides, the very process of communication is
initiated by the SPeaker: Is fecit, cui prodest. The result is that the bulk of the
task of reconciliation between the typology of emission and the typology of
reception wiLl be undertaken by the speaker.t Whence theprinciple ofdominance:
there is always dominance of the typology of recepiion over the typology of
emission.
In fact, a typology of pure emission does not exist. On the other hand,
mixed typologies do exist, and constitute 1n fact the large majority of languages.
By successively sliding the subjects to the beglnning of the sentence in the
emissh-e typology VOS, we obtain Greenberg's types: I.VSO and 11 SVO.
In type I, the hearer must from the start, evoke and keep present the
rather unstable forrn of the verb V; but this form is rapidly stabilised by its
resonance with the subject S, and the 'hole' left by the object subsists alone, to
be filled at the end of the sentence. Typology ll is even less demanding on the
hearer because the verb form can lean on the subject already given. lt rematns
suspended for a short time as a consequence of the absence of object 0 , but thJs
is rapidly filled. Indeed, it is difficult to say of the two typologies SVO or SOV,
which is the easier for the hearer.
As the typology of pure emission does not exist, we will call, by an abuse of
language, the mixed typologies of type I and fl emissive typologles, reserving the
term recepuve typology to type Ill only.

t n.u clominl.nce of the typology or rec:epuon o•cr the typology or cmi$Slon cloes not
cuntraclict the mt<m<nt disc..-cl in Noto I I§ 13.1.2), acc:orcling to whtch, receptk>n
b thermoclyruomocall) cuter than emi«oon. Wtth respect to the considerable energy required
I<>r the <l!X'fUtlon ofanalyslng the oontent to be sianlfiecl,lhe mnemonico.l effort ofre:ur:onglng
"'Ords (rom the cnussive urd<r to lhe receptive <>r~or Is ne&llilble.

252 On the typology of nalurallanguages: [Ch. 13

13.4 ADJECTIVES, GENITIVES AND AFFIXES: ADJ UNCfS


The elements S, V, 0 constitute hardly more than the skeleton of the elemental
sentence. As a general rule a sentence possesses a more complex structure due to
the presence of elements which are not structurally indispensable· the 'adjuncts:
There is good reason to distinguish two types of adjuncts: some of them are
bound structurally and semantically to the core verb of the sentence: these nrc
the bound adjuncts.
On the other hand, other adjuncts relate structurally and semantically to the
noun actants (or circumstants) of the sentence. These are the free adju11cts.
Subordinate clauses, in the traditional sense, should nlso be considered as free
adjuncts. But cpithetal adjectives and genitives constitute essential types of free
adjuncts inside the sentence.

13.4.1 Typology of the Adjuncts


An adjunct bears an element of autonomous meantng susceptible to the same
theory as a nuclear sentence. As a first approXJmation. it will be accepted that
Litis element Is susceptible to the description: 'SubjeCt Predicate' of logic, or
'topic-comment' in !locket's terminology (Greenberg, J966).1t is clear in these
conditions that the Subject, the 'topic', has a greater semantic density than the
Predicate, the 'comment'. lt follows, that the emiss1ve typology is Predicate
Subject, while the receptive typology is Subject-Predicate. Ln applying this rule
to adjuncts that are auributive adjectives (A). gertitives (G) and the pro· and
post-positions governing a noun, leads to the following table:

Emissive typology Receptive typology

Object of verb vo ov
Adjective AN NA
Gerutive GN NG

Pre· Post·

It might be to start with, that a language treats its adjuncts according to the
same typology as U1e nuclear sentence. Greenberg's table (1966) reveals to us
that this is not so: in typology l,the onJy coherent case is the Milpa Alta NahuatJ:
in typology 11, the Scandinavian languages; in receptive typology Ill there is no
example. This shows us that a powerful phenomenon IS present, wbich has the
effec t of rende1ing simultaneously in n language, both emisslve and receptive
typologies. The principk of the typology of adjuncts can be stated thus:
As a general rnk, tire bound adjuncts have a typology cvlrerenr wlrh rhe topolog)'
of tire Verb Object core, the free adjuncts have the opposite rypology.
Sec. 13.4] Adj«!ctives, Genitives and Affuces: Adjuncts 253

This rule leads to two main types of languages:

Emissive type Receptive type

VO QV
NA AN
NG GN
Pre- Post·

This time these two types cover the majority of the languages m Greenberg's
list { 1966). There are indeed exceptions. of which the best known are those of
the Germanic languages: emiss1ve typology in English and German, probably
preserved from an earlier recepuve stuge, has order AN, and, in respect of
receptive typology, Basque-rype languages have the order NA.
The global classiOcation of langu~ges into cmisslve and receptive types
evidently bears on the notions of centrifugal and cen"ipeta/languages ( L Tesnil~re,
1965. 32 33). but if this author was aware of the universal (or nearly) character
of the fact of mitigation between the two typologies, he has not found an
explanation.
ow we will endeavour to motiralt the princ1ple of reversal of the typology
of free adjuncts, exemplifying by illustrations as we go along.

13.4.2 Typological co herence of bound adjuncts


The core verb B of an elementary sentence comprises in genera l other actants
besides the subject S and the direct objeCt 0: thus trivalent verbs (Tesniere.
1965. 32, 33) of the type: giPe, st1y, show. comprise in addition an indirect
object D. A glance at the corresponding actanlial schema:

shows that the object 0 Is a short-lived act ant, since, emitted by the subject, it is
captured by the indirect object D. In order of decreasing 'volatility', r.he analysis
gives the order VODS as order of emission. The pure receptive order will then be
SDQy, which is the order that one generally Onds in Latin and in subordinates
in German. The most frequent milted order is SVDO: for example, In German,
Ill the principal sentence. Das Ki11d gab sfener Mutter eine11 kuss {17te child gives
his mother a kiss). It would be interesting to investigate this typology statistically.
In general, the core verb can comprise stiU more actants. for example a
'messenger' or an ·mstrument'. 1t Is reasonable to accept that from the typological

254 On the typology of natural languages: [Ch. 13

point of view, these secondary actants share the fate of the direct object 0; on
the other hand, the subject S as m general attached directly to the verb, with a
special status.
Having said this, it is advisable to specify what is, in English for example a
preposition. The essential function of a preposition is to wcalise all or pan of
the actantial verbal schema ut relation to certain actants taken as reference
points. In general, a preposition affectS the noun much less than it controls the
verbnl action. In tbe sentence. Jolm walks in from of the church, 'the church'
Is hardly affected by the process. A preposition Q governing a complement J
must then be considered as an operator whach localises the verbal action of the
verb V with relation to the actant J. Semantically and so structurally, the opera-
tor Q Inserts Itself between tlte core verb V and the actant J . In the emissive
typology. the natural order is thus VQJ, and in the receptive typology JQV .
From thence comes the coherence of the order VO with the prepositions, and o f
OV with the post-positions.
Unfortunately the situation cannot remain so simple; as always In linguistics,
the distinction between 'bound adjuncts' and 'free adjuncts' can be the object of
a quasi~ntinuous gradation of intermediaries. In the sentence: John walks by
the top of the ~'illage, we can consider 'of the vil/t)ge ·,either as a bound adjunct,
joined to the verb \valks' by the prepositional phrase by the top of, or as a
free adjunct of the noun actant, the top, a genitive. We could easily find situa-
tions where the prepositional phrase acquires a more and more independent
status as a group. Compare in French Jean a ete nommi general a la tete dr
l'armce, Jean a lance u11 vase a la tete de Pie"e. In order that a language may
coin new prepositions from nouns which empty themselves of their semantic
content, it is necessary that the typology of the genitive allows it. That is to say
that. the languages of typology - VO Pre (cmissives) must present the order
NG, and languages of type m; OV Post, the order G:-o. But this makes clear a
very complex phenomenon: the semamic reversal of the genitive, whJch we will
now study.

13,4.3 Study of the Genitive: Semanric reversal


s
Let us consider a possessive genitive such as: John dog. (le chien de Jean 1. lt
is clear that the specific: dog ('le cllien') constitutes the 'Subject' or 'topic'; the
genitive Jolm 's ('de Jean') the predicate, the 'conUllent'. ln fact. John's dog
('le clrien de JNn ') is effectively, a dog. The result is that all one can know of
U1e human aspect of the indavidual finally dasappears 111 the mental image of the
s
compound: John dog ('le clrien de Jean'), with the exception of the single
fact that J ohn is the master of the dog. Tlus in principle aUows me to localise
t1us dog. That 1s the general situation: in a genitive of form Y's X (X de Y), the
concept Y undergoes a kind of semantic destruction which abolishes nearly all
the signified content in order to preserve of it. only a verbal or spatio-temponl
link with X. Dynamically, we can interpret the effect of the postposition ·s ('la
Sec. 13.4) Adjectives, Genitives and Affixes: Adjuncts 155

prepositioll de) thus: on hearing the word Y, the signified figure IYI of Y is
built up again in the mind, by combmahon of resonanoes from elementary
oscillators and codes S; (the scmes ("semes') of the scmanllcists). Once this
resonance n S, - IY l•s formed, the effect of the postposition ·s ('preposition de)
is to confer on it an excitation which tends to destroy it, by an inverse return to
the situation of the product IYI- ns,. h is then that one of the scmes S; enters
uno resonance with a seme S of X, a 'catastrophe of regulation' of the figure lX I
of the concept X. This resonance, if it is sufficiently sharp, has the effect of
sucking up all the energy of the other oscillators S; of Y , which hinders the
fom1ation of the form IYI in the mind of the hearer. At the same time the
fonnation of resonance localises the space support of form IX I in relation to the
space suJ)port of form IY I.
Let us try to illustrate what might appear as an excessively complicated
description. One of the clearest effects of the genitive is to spread the spatio-
temporal localisation of Y from Y towards X.
The deftnlte article le, let us recall applies in French, in normal non-gnomic
use, to an actant previously loe31ised in an earlier sentence. Thence one can
only with difficulty say: the X of a Y: le chien d'wt bergcr = Un chien de berger.t
In principle, the order NG, topic-comment, is a receptive order; so a
genitive IS normal if the semantic depth of the specified X exceeds that of the
specifier Y. Such is the case with genitives of quality (un homme de grand
caractbe), of matter (un che~YII de bois). But, strangely enough, there is a
number of abnormal and moreover 'well formed' genitives where the specified
X has a semantic depth much weaker than the specifier: the e11d of the road; the
top of the tree. And as in intermediate cases: le trou de la serrure: la tete de
Pierre.
In an expression like: the wp of rhe rree, the 'topic" is obviously rhe rree,
the ·comment': rhe top o{. F11rthermore it is so in Latin where the rop of rhe
tree is translated by summa arbor. Here the specified: the top of amounts to an
abstract geometric structure of insignificant semantic thtckness, which plays the
role of operator, of localiser. in the support space of the fonn IY ithe rree,
which essentially retains its semantic content. However, this association will not
Work without precautions when applied to n semantically very heavy being like
a man. It makes the top of rhe man (summus vir?) unacceptable. The semantic
structure of the concept man Is too complex to be wholly absorbed by the
operator the rop of. We say on the other hand, the rop of the body, because
the body is essentially o spatial object which we have semantically deprived of its
Psychism. On the other hand, we can say: the end of the man when the end of

tTian!lator ·s note. The dlfferenl genitive cons!IUction in English seems to domoruu:ne B


clifferent typot<>&Y. The word slrtepdolf iJ a nonnal translation or rh/ut de bergu and this
"Yens a ditferent typolollY P''en 1r shephrrd :r dofl" would be less conventionally aCC)eptable
lnd "llu: dOl o/11 sll~plterd' hardly ever. but 'sheepdog' goes further In losin11 the act lUll Y
llltosether

256 On the typology of natural languages: [Ch. 13

the body is essentially a 5patial Object which we have 5emantically deprived of its
subject to the law of time (which penetrates the psychism like the organism)
whereas the body is always conceived in a spatial and Instantaneous (the linguists
would say synchronic) manner and never m ttS temporal evolution. We see
mcidentaUy what a powerfu.l means of semantic invesligation, the study of the
acceptabOity of genitives gives.
Let us turn now to the 5emantically balanced genitives: la tete de Pierre,
le 1rou de la sernue. Here it is difficul! to say which is the topic and which the
comment. In translation, one ma) have to rever5e the attribution: Subject
Predicate. For example, Latin: Ccmumella mated/cri can be translated Into
French as: Une Inftue blessante. Sometimes, it can have a conjunction in one
language and predication in another: spectator et test is: un rbnoin ocu/aire,
ratio et faculras: un ralenr oratoire, ... etc.t
In the ·two.subject sentence' in Japanese, such as: Nippon wa yama ga oi
(there art! many moumains in Japan} the 5emantic relation between the two
subjects, that followed by wa, and that followed by ga, Is practically that of a
balanced genitive.
lt would not be necessary however to conclude from this, that in a balanced
gcniti~-e. the order of the elements is arbitrary. In fact I do not know of an
example y. here the two expresstons: X of Y and Y of X have the same 5en5e
even if the verbal bond is lhe same In both cases: the clinics doctor; (le medecm
de la clinique); tire doctor 's clinic: (la cllnlqtle du ml!decin}. The asymmetry
factor in the relation bet\\>een X and Y is the localisation factor (spatio-temporal
or more abstract in a 5emantic space) which Is always ordered.
This fundamentally assyrnetrlcal character of the genitive explains that the
structure Y's X (X de Y) has been able to subsist, m E.ngllsh and French m
situations as srn~antically aberrant as: tlte tree top (le haut de l'arbre). Latin.
which is In the main of receptive typology (SOV, GN) has nevertheless the
discordance of making U5e of prepositions (in addition to those stuck on post·
positions wltich are the ending of the ca5es). This explains perhaps that Latin
has not pushed as far as French the imbalance of the gennive obtained by
emptymg N of its semantic content. Because one would then obtain post·
positions (Dei gr11ria) and not prepositions.
Thts mevttable phenomenon of the 5emantic reversal of the genitives explams
why, by contmuous deformation of a bound adjunct into a free adjunct. the
prepositions accord with the order NG, and the post·positions with GN. This
then impo5es on the syntax in the use of free adjuncts. a typology opposed to
that of the typology of the core verb.
13.4.4 The Subject-Object relation in a genitive
A difficult problem remains: does there exist a universal relation between the

tThese examples quut~-d b) Tuni~r~ ( 1965) are e~tracu frum Riemann and C,oc,t7.cr's
Grummolrt.• lat fnt
Sec. 13.4] Adjectjves, Genitives and Affixes: Adjuncts 257

direction of specifying Y -+ X of the genitive X of Y and the subject object


distmction in the implicit verb bond whtch links Y to X? Let us return to the
two examples of genitive types again. A man of great character =A ma11 "'"o has
great clll11rlcter, le chien de Paul •le chien qu'a Paul.t There are, in these two
examples, reversal or the relation Subject {)bjecl.
In the ·subjecllve· genluve· the fear of the enemy, we can see equally, the
fear which experiences the enemy. or the fear that grips the enemy. In this case,
to decide which is the subject :llld whtch the object appears quite arbitrary.t
However, the following reasoning a pnori, could be sustained: 111 the genitive
Y's X (X de Y) it is, in principle, Y wblch 'specifies· X: but what is ·specifying'?
Semantically, to specify X is to revert to locahslng the signified figure of X in a
suilllblc semantic space. But. in the classical transitive sentence SVO, the cat
catches the mouse, the transitive verb nearly always comprises a topology of
capture of the object by the subject; but what Is a capture, if not a partlcularly
brutal form of localisation of the object?
Thts analogy would then lead us to see in Y the subject of the implicit verb
bond linking X to Y in rs X (X de Y). How Is the reverse order then possible?
To see this more clearly, we must re tu m to a dynamic model of the concept.
With respect to the dynamic system, the concept X has a space of configura-
tion which is a product of the form F X U. F is the space of interior variables.
the support space of the spatial form (f) which defmes the signif1cd content of
X. Certain thresholds, wbjch limit (f) by being so many hypersurfaoe borders of
U), cannot be crossed without destToying the meaning: on the contrary U is a
space of external parameters which can v:uy ad libitum withom changmg the
stabihry of (f) at all. (In dynamicaJ terms the fib ration F X U .... U constitutes a
>ystem of first imegrals of the system. at least approximately). For example, for
an ordinary object. global space-time ft4 , with th.e Galilean group as invariant
group, is aJl externul spaoe, whereas the local domain in which the object is
defrned as a spatial form, the 'territory' for an animate being, is an rnternal
Space For semanttcally complex beings, like man. there is besides a who le
hlerarchy of internal spaces fibred, the one on the other.
let Y now be another concept. G ns internal space, V Its externaJ space.ln
the expression rs X (X de Y), the marked concept Y undergoes an excitatlon
Wblch has the effect of temporarily destroying the resonances which define the
Signified form (g) of Y. Thereby certain spaces, factors of the intemaJ space G
are Liberated and can couple with certain factors of the internal space (f) of F.
This mteractlon depends for its intensity on the localisa tion of (f) In the space
U. Consequently (f) willlocilise Itself In U in a way to promote this interaction
to the maximum. This resonance will ·suck up' all the energy remaming in lhe

tTnnsJalor's note; In Fnglhh the rc¥trsal " present In llte fll'>l eumple but not m llte
"'Cond. Paul"t dog= the dO$ which P•ul has.
tiron<lutor't note: In Fngtbh the two forms {tar of tlte tnem)' and tile enemy s{MT u<u>lly
carry this diJUncuon.

258 On the typology of oatura.llanguages: (Ch. 13

other factors of (G). Thus the semantic destruction of Y is assured, (g) finding
itself reduced to a mixed interaction quotient of the product (g) X (f) of which
V is external space. To sum up. in the interaction Y's X (X de Y), X operates
in the internal space of Y, where it reduces the significance of Y to a resonance
quotient of the complex X X Y; on the other hand, Y operates in Lhe external
space of X, where Y localises the signified form of X. FoUowing the scheme
(the semantic space) under considerabon, we will be able to make X the subject
and Y the object of the implicit bond linking X to Y, or reciprocaUy. This
reciprocal character of the relauon Subject-Object, particularly sensiuve in the
case of a transient reversible Interaction. between X and Y, ls at the he an of the
semanticism expressed by the middle voice in lndo-European {the Latin depon·
ents: lrascor ·anger grips me'). Cf. GuiUaume, 1964, 138 9; Benveniste, 1950,
168.

13.5 THE ADJECTIVE


The theory of the noun- ndjecuve phrase NA is very similar to that of the genitive
NG. There are however, important differences; in concept, the signified figure
(a) of an adjective A is a certain form in an internal space 1 of sensory or mental
qualities (for example the three-dimensional space of impreSSIOns of colour). In
the coupling NA, the Internal space of A identifies with an internal space U of
N. and by resonance, A localises the signified figUre (j) ofF in the image of (a)
by the identification 1- U. Tlus may not be possible (the blue frog?). Contrary
to that which takes place for lhe genitive NG, there is no semantic destruction
of A and the coupling does not in practice affect the internal figure (a) of A.
(ln Ute case of colours we can however obtain an interaction on A whtch leads
to the formation of 'shades': sky..IJiue, leaf-green). So the localiser effect takes
place almost solely in the direction A • N.lf we wished to express by an explicit
verb bond, the coupling between N and A, we will be led to make A the subJeCt,
and N the object of the interaction. But very often the phrase NA is semanticaUy
equivalem tO a verb phrase SV, where N is subject: Peter sleeps= Peter is asleep.
It has been necessary for the sake of Lhe cause, to create a perfectly reversible
transitive verb, where subject and object are Interchangeable. The verb to be is
obviously the only conceivable verb which can satisty this strange condition.
The use of the copula to be in attributive sentences: the sky is blue, restores
to the adjective less of Lhe character of a verb and more of that of the noun. In
French, the typology of the attributive sentence; Le ciel tsr bleu, identifies with
the typology SVO of the transitive sentence. As a consequence of the locall)'
dominant character of the emissive typology VO, the eplthetal noun-adjective
phrase, which is a free adjunct, takes the opposlle receptive, typology NA.
Certain languages (Russian, Japanese) do not make use of the copula to be m the
allributive sentence. The corresponding typology is then SV: receptive; the
eplthetal adjective then adopts the opposite typology AN: emissive.
Sec. 13.6) General Conclusion on the Invusion Rule 259

13.6 GENERAL CONCLUSION ON THE INVERSION RULE IN THE


TYPOLOGY OF FREE ADJUNCfS
Free adjuncts are in principle independent of the core verb, the organising centre of
the sentence. In addition, obviously for the genitive NG, less obviously for the
epithetal adjeCtive NA, they require an implicit verb bond which compe tes
with the central verb. This competition can have noxious ef fects. It can, by
creating ambigUities, disorganise the global meaning of the sentence. 1t is import·
ant then that the adjuncts are systematically perceived as adjuncts, Inferior In
stablllty to the central verb. One of the best means of achieving thls is to confer
upon them a typology opposed to that of the nuclear sentence. In fact, as,
for example, the interrogative transformation shows, (Vient-ils?: VS), the
inversion of the typologies de-stabilises a sentence by producing on the hearer
a shock effect. From this point of view, the inversion of the typology of free
adjuncts is a kind of tribute the free adjunct pays to the central verb as a sign
of bondage. I believe il could be shown that the inversion rule of the typology
of adjuncts has the effect of lncreasiog the semantic stability of a sentence,
In dlmlnishlng the possibility of the appearance of ambiguities. Let us compare,
for example, the two typologies (VO; AN) and VO; NA). Let us supp<ise that the
direct object 0 accepts an epithetal adjective A. In the Orst case, we will have:
SVAO; in the second: SVOA. Now, the combination OA comprises an implicit
verb core that we will note as v intercalated between 0 and A. This leads to the
structures: SVAvO and SVOvA respectively. In the first case, the adjective A
is wedged between two thresholds which, if it crosses them under the effect of
exterior (sltuational) perturbations, will lead to Its capture, either by V (ambigu-
ity), or by v (correct). In the second case, il Is the noun, 0 which ftnds itself
between the two thresholds. Now, we have seen that the semantic depth of an
adjective is, in general, inferior to that of a noun. We must then accept that the
structure SVOA Is more stable, semantically, then SVAO. The celebrated
ambiguity of Chomsky and Miller ( 1968, 5): T11ey are flying planes, where A is
here a participle whlch may be captured by V, is an illustration of this fact due
to the discordance of the typology AN with VO.
In languages with strongly structured sentences, like German, the inversion
rule in the typology of adjuncts appears in subordinate clauses, where we have
the receptive typology SOV, in opposition to the typology SVO of the maln
sentences.
It remains to make a systematic study of numerous exceptions to our
principles. There is reason to consider fust, delay effects. Certain transformations
of nuclear typology have not yet had lime to show their effect at the level of
adjuncts. The case of English Is typical. 1t possesses an ancient typology GN
(Saxon genitive) and a more recent opposite NG. Finnish which has a system
of extended declensions with SVO, is probably the same case. The case of
Basque which takes the typology NA in spite of t11e receptive type SOV, perhaps
points to a d1fferent explanauoo: the adjective here Is perhaps felt as linked to a

260 On the typology of natural languages: (Ch. 13}

core of such nature, that tt hardly enters into competition with the central
verb. The general rule of dominance of the receptive typology c:.n then operate
for its adjuncts.
.•
13.7 A SPECULATlON ON THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGES
U I was asked to offer on the basis of the two principles given here, a general
vision of the diachronic evolution of languages, I should be tempted to say:
syntactical structures are, like our money, in a state of permanent inflation. The
nuclear sentence, with a taste for precision, tends to burden itself witJt bound
adjuncts and to capture neighbouring sentences by reducing them to the status
of free adjunctS. This process of syntactical overloading is pursued until the
moment when the semantic unity of the central sentence breaks down under
the number and weight of the adjuncts. These, having become independent,
organise themselves into nuclear sentences, inheriting their older adjunct typology.
This leads to a periodic conception of the evolution of languages, demarcated by
a dislocating release phenomena. A long period of syntactical enrichment is
followed by a relatively shon period, in catastrophe, where the central sentence
breaks up into its adjuncts and where the inversion of the typologies is produced.
This period of syntactical rupture clearly leads to a proliferation of anapboric
elements (personal and demonstrative pronouns), destined to re·establish the
continuity of the actants across this syntactical explosion. Later, in the long
period of condensation, where the nuclear sentence becomes heavy and is
enriched by adjuncts by the capture of neighbouring sentences, these anaphoric
elements, having bcomce useless, persist fomtaUy as affixes bonded to verbs and
adjectives. Thus the phenomenon of retzcrion, of syntactical agreement, could be
explatned.
The period during which languages have been observed (only about 3,000
years and involving very few languages) is so brief that it obviously allows little
more than speculation.

CHAYTER14

Semiotics

111e paper 'De !Yc(me au symbole 't is the Fvst represemin.g my imerest in
semiotics. fn a more recem paper ('L 'espace et les signes ') I have re-worked the
'spatio-temporal' interpretation ofPeirce sc/assifiaztion: icons, indices, symbols.
111/s article, which appeared in Semiotica is un[orrunately not included in this
collection.
f belitn't!, nevertheless. that the thoughts on iccmicity presented here are
valr1able.

14.1 FROM ICON TO SYMBOL


Usually we sec in symbolic activity, In conceptual thought, the supreme achieve·
ment of human capacities Many philosophers attribute it to the existence of a
·racultas signatrix' with which only man could be equipped, and which would be
absent in animals. llowever, we shall see that, when we analyse symbolism into
lis elementary mechanisms, we do not find any which do not figure either in
inanimate matter, or in the humblest forms of life. The appearance of language
m primitive man is perhaps not the abrupt discontinuity we are so eager to
imagine. There is indeed a great change in the passage from animal into man;
but as we shall try to show in Section I4.7, thls change is probably due less to a
catastrophic structural innovation in the cerebral organisation than to a modifi-
cation m the stages of individual development, associated with the presence of a
social milieu which at the same hme protects and educates the newly-born.
Any discussion of symbolism must start from the classification of signs, so
sintple and so profound, which has been left to us by Charles Sanders Peirce. Let
us recall that, according to Peirce, there are three types of signs:
( l) Images or icons, which are graphic representations, more or less faithful to
the object.
(2) fndices. these are beings or ObJeCts linked to the symbolised object and
necessary to its existence, for example, smoke Is an i11dex of fire.

t Appeated in Olhlers lnrernarlon•ux dr SymboUtm, 22 23. I 973, pp. SS I06.


262 Semiotics [Ch. 14

(3) Symbols: these concern an arbitrary form, the relation to the signified object
of which, arises from a social convenuon of limited validity in space and
time. For example, a word is a symbol because its phonetic form has no
intrinsic relation to that of the object signified ('arbitrariness of sign·,
accordmg to Saussure).
Philosophers have a tendency to look upon the first category of signs, the icons
(or images) as of a banal nature and of liitlc Interest for the theory of symbolism.
1t is reasonable to believe that they are wrong and that a delicate analysis of the
dynamic process Involved in the production of the Images (the ·copy') poses
problems of a fundamental nature which are at the very heart of the relation:
signified .. stgnifier ( 'slgnifie ""signifiant'), wltich characterises the symbol In its
complete form.

14.2 GENESIS OF TH.E IMAGE


In many circumstances images appear naturally: the shadow of a man on the
ground, his image reflected in water, the imprint of a foot in the sand, are some
simple examples of image forms which are not endowed, except in special
circumstances, with symbolic value. It is nonetheless important to analyse the
nature of the physical processes which come into play in these examples.
The first remark is that the image A' and its model A arc necessarily of
forms exte11ded in space. We can only speak of 'isomorphism', of identity of
forms if we have dermed an equivalence group operating on the forms of a
space, in other words a •geometry'. More prec•sely,let us suppose that the model
A is defined in an open set U of Euclldean space (and the image A' in an open
set u). Then the correspondence A ~A' is induced by a geometric transforms·
rion r : U ~ (/, which in the most perfect case is a metric congruence (in the
cases of the mirror image and of the imprint) or an affine projection (in the case
of the shadow).
We note that neither of the two aspects U, (/ can be said 10 be subordinate
10 the other; the correspondence, at least in the first case is reversible. This
correspondence is induced by a physical process of interaction, a 'couplmg'
which is expressed by the metric equality <1>: U-+ (/. In the case of the mirror
image, or the shadow, the element of interaction is light, the propagation of
which is perfeclly reversible (invariant under a change of direction of the arrow
of time) . The very regular character of this correspondence is explained in the
last analysis by what the physicist Wigner calls 'the unreasonable exactitude'
of physical laws.
Technically therefore, ifS and s' are two Hamiltonian dynamical syStems
having a Ue group Gas a symmetry group and if we couple them by a Hamiltonian
interaction Itself G·invariant, then these systems have rtrst integrals (at least
local) in the Ue group algebra La. ln this coupling these first integrals (kinetic
moments) combine vectorially{X +X'= const), so as to allow the Identification
Sec. 14.2) Genesis of the Image 263
of the space U relative to S as Cl is relative to S'. There is nevertheless in the
formauon of the image a fundamental Irreversibility, even If the physical laws
brought into play are reversible. In order that a shadow may form, the model
must be illuminated by a luminous source approximating to a point. The light
ISSlllng from the source fust touches the model then outlines the shadow. lt is
the same in the formation of the mirror image, the object has to be illuminated
and the reflecting surface perfectly flat. Narcissus leaning over his fountain can
only see the ob;ect of his passion, when lit by the rays of Apollo, and m the
perfect liquid !hell brought about by the earth's attraction.
In these light dependent examples, the image has no permanence, it disappears
if the model disappears (or the solar source). With the imprint of a hand in the
sand, we meet a frelh phenomenon; the 'plasticity' of the receiver system. This
last system allows a great number of forms of equUibrium as it Is inadequately
controUed. The unage is formed by an irreversible stimulus which changes the
fom1 of equilibrium of the receiver system by inculcating the imprint of the
form of the model~ here the inlage becomes memory. In order that the imprint
materialises the receiver system has to posses very special dynamic properties:
o Hamiltonian dynarnJc aUowing many first integrals linked to a symmetry group
and the possibility of irreversible temporary interaction. We shall designate this
very special dynamic state with the word ·competence'.lf the shadow is thrown
not on to an insensitive screen but on to a sensitive photographic plate, the
image will be able to be fiXed for all time, thanks to the competence of the system.
With a plastic receiver system, we can see the possibility that images are
formed as stable as their model, or even more so, like the dinosaurs' eggs near
Aix-en·Provence which are only recogmsed by their imprint on the rocks. This
IS a state which is attained by the dynamic of life. A living being V makes at
some distance from itself a living being V', which is isomorphic to ltim,aod which
will soon supplant hinl. The plastic aspect of the local dynamics is doubtless a
characteristic of the original metabolism (in the 'prinlordllll ooze~. The organism
V proceeds by sending localised stimuli (the gametes) which germinate, that is
to say explode in a controlled manner in their neighbourhood. The controlled
character of this local explosion is already apparent in the case of photographic
emulsion on a sensitive plate. lt appears even more clearly in the embryological
development which leads to a structure isomorphic to the parent organism but
with a certain time- space translation. At the molecular level this mechanism
is manifest in the replication of DNA, o fragment of which goes to make, as its
IDlprint, a dual fragment. Here the competent dynamic is the set of the cytoplas-
mic rnilleux containing precursors, enzymes, chemical energy, ... etc.
Going to the other end of the scale of life, how shall we characterise percep-
tion if not as the modification of a competent dynamic under the sensory aspect
of external reality? Already Plato In the Theaetetus has compared the impression
that perceived objects make on us to the imprint of a solid on wa)c We note that
here the competent system (for example, retina, visual cortex, etc.) recovers at

264 Semiotics [Ch. 14

each instant the pristine virginity indispensable to a total and permanent com-
petence. However, a certain plrnlclty exists since the sensations perceived are
stored in the memory.
To sum up, the formation of images from a model appears as a manifestation
of the umversal dynamic having irreversible character. There is a self-ramifying
of the model into an image isomorphic to itself. But very often thls process
utilises an interaction of reversible character. lt is there that the dynamic of
symbolism is so clearly exemplified. The thermodynamic wavers constantly
between two pointS of view: the conservative point of view which is manifest in
the presence of Hamiltonian dynamics, that is by the conservation of energy
(the first principle); and the Heraclitean notion of the irreversible flow of time,
which expresses itself as increase of entropy (the second principle). ReconciUa-
tion of these two points of view has only been possible by introducing the
creator and the first snap of his fingers (the big bang of ten thousand million
year ago ...). In the mteractlon "signifled-slgnifler', it is clear that, borne along
by the universal flux, the signifled generates the signifler in an uninterrupted
burgeoning ramification. But the slgnifler regenerates the signified each time
that we interpret the sign. And as Is shown by the example of biological forms, for
the signifier (the descendant)to become the signified (the parent) again, tbe
time-lapse of a generation ts sufficient.
It is through the subtle balance between two morphologles, through the
simultaneous demands of reversibility and irrevcrslbillly, that the dynamic of
symbolism carries withm Itself (and th1s in a local and concentrated form) all
the contradictions of the 5cientific vision of the world. And that Is the very
image of llfe.

14.3 DEATH OF THE IMAGE: PHYSICAL PREGNANCE


We have seen in the interactions between extended systems that through the
'unreasonable' exactitude of the laws of physics an exact copy, complete in
every metric detail, can be made from an ObJect taken as model. What will
happen If we disturb slightly, by small random perturbations, the working of th is
perfect in1itation. The Image becomes deformed, confused and fuuy. But, in
this distortion certain morphological features resist the noise of the Interaction
better than others: these are structurally stable forms, the physically pregnantt
fonns. So, under such pcrturbations the foan has a tendency to break up into
locally stable elements, where the more fragile global connections give way more
easily. The nm stage of this process does not however necessarily lead to a
non-recognisable form. On the contrary, frequent!) enough, the perturbation
results m a 'stylisation' of form which does not hinder lls recognnlon. In fact,
to ·stylise" a form is to reduce it to us fundaJTiental organising features which
wou ld only hove the effect of making it appear more striking.
tSee note on p , 224.
Sec. 14.3) Death of the Image: Physical Ptegnance 265
Given a plastic form, separated from Its mould and subject to persistent
erosion in time, then 1t can only follow 1ts proper path of disassociation, a
ramifying proliferating decomposition. Such a form is degraded more and more
by the proliferation of local random accidents and it soon ceases to be recognis·
able. Here I may refer to the photographic experiments of Clnlre Lejeunc, who
has made the degradation by sunlight treatment of photographic images a
wonderful tool of artistic investigation [I] .
In biological forms we are concerned with ageing. the vital form severed
from its geneuc model can only sink by being overloaded with pointless accidents.
That a theory of the pregnance of forms be possible was the essential dogma of
the Gestalt theory of psychology, a theory which W. Kohler [2] defended with
courage and lucidity. The modern ideas of qualitative dynamics (catastrophe
theory, structural stabiUty) can provide a JUstification for this 1dea, which h:lS
been missmg up to now. But perhaps the mistake of Gestalt tl1eory was not to
distinguish between two closely allied notions. Firstly, physical preg11ance of a
form meaning to have the capacity to wnhstand communication noise, and
secondly, 'biological' pregnance defined :lS the capacity of a form to evoke other
important biological forms and thus to be easily recognised and cl:lSsified in the
field (perceptive or semantic) of enquiry.
We might accept that a biologically pregnant form is necessarily physica!Jy
pregnant. lt is true in general, at least locally. But it should not be concluded,
as I once thought. that a theory of symbolism could be built on the physical
pregnance of the form of the message alone. The truth 1s that the form of a SJgn
cannot (at least historically) be dissociated from Its motivation. A physically
pregnant detail cannot be Significant by itself; in fact, 1t IS a consequence of the
theory of structural stabiUty that such a detail is u kind of irreducible 'atom' In
the transmission of forms. it can thus only generate itself. On the other hand,
the sigmfying characteristic of a form is always linked to Its morphological
instabiUty, a fact which allows it by transmission, to generate, by unfolding, a
complex of more simple forms.
One of the factors which makes the distinction between physical ond bio·
logical pregnance so fine is the following. biological pregnance is linked to the
evocatio n of organs typical of living beings. For an animal, the recognition both
of prey and predators is a fundamental necessity: whence a preferential sensitivity
for the perceptive apparatus appropria te to these typical forms. Now, the form
of an organ is always more or less d1ctaied b) its funcuonal eff1ciency and only
the forms defined by the 'catastrophic' schema which characterises their function
have the chance to materialise organically. But the functional efficiency of a
mechanism ca!Jed into play In space time is itself governed by the demands of a
structural stabtlity having a dynamically physical character. 1t follows from this
that the btologtcaJ forms are to a large extent subject to tbc constramt of a
phys1cal pregnance of the same origin, in principle, as the need for stability tn
communication by spatial coupling. At the very most, the organic release of

266 Semiotics [Ch. 14

evolution allows the appearance of forms, more rcfmed, more subtle, more
global, metrically charactcrlsuc, and by this fact, charged with more meaning.
The difference lies In the fact that the biological form suggests an 'action',
whereas the stable physical form only suggests Itself.
To illustrate these considerations, let us take the example of the symbolism
of the arrow. The mark • suggests, In our society, the direction of right to left.
Is this to do with a social convention or, on the other hand, is it an intrinsic
effect linked to the very fonn of the figure? I incline to favour the second
hypothesis. According to a theory of perception due to Harry Slum, every
perception of an object Implies an Immediate and implicit search for a better
manual grasp of the object. Now if one tries to grasp the two branches of the
arrow, the 'fictitious' fingers that will try can only slide towards the left, in a
vain search for n position of stable hold. This could be a biological explanation
of the symbolised direction. We can also consider (as remarked by Guy Hirseh)
that a mobile arrow in a fluid milieu will meet less resistance to its movement
UJ its 'normal' direction than in the opposite direction: because the 'wings' of
lhe arrow model the contours of the wake, when a stick is pushed along the
surface of a liquid along its axis. But lhe contour of a wake conf~rms certam
properties characteristic of unstable forms, according to Blum's theory. llere
then is coincidence (by no means accidental) of biological pregnance and of
physical pregnance.
Moreover we know that animals themselves are subject to certain 'classical'
optical illusions, which seems to suggest that we arc touching here on mecharusms
of a very elementary nature, infra-psychic, If we can say that!
Perhaps one of the most striking experimental proofs of the e.ldstence of
'archetypal' forms bes UJ tile existence in animal psychology of 'supranonnal
re leasers'. Thus, in a fledgling, newly hatched, the reflex to open its beak can be
more effectively released by the sight of an artificial beak of a red colour and
pyramidal form (the 'archetypal' beak) than by the biologically normal form of
the beak of one of its parents. We might possibly think that the determination and
theoretical explanation of these 'archetypal' fonns will disclose the secret of
human symbolism. The response to this is, I believe, as follows: it is correct that
these forms are going to play an important role in the ex teroal morphology of
the sign, in the 'How' of symbolic activity. But it does not explain the 'Why' of
the symbol, its initial motivation. As we shall see further on, the source of
symbolism is to be found in the complex mechanisms of the regulation of living
organisms and of society. We could, I believe, defend the following idea: the
more a message is 'disinterested', the less strong is the affective thrust that
generated it, the more lt Is subject to the demand of physical prcgnance, the
more it reveals the formal structure of the archetypal origin. On the other hand,
if the message is 'interested', If it responds to a biological or immediately urgent
sociological necessity, it IS then very unstable morphologically. Its 'excited'
strength convolutes 1tself locally sometimes to the pomt of defying all formalism;
Sec. 14.4) lnclices 267
every rule of good imemal organisation. The misuse, so often, of rules of syntax
in exclamations, orders, lnteljections and in poetry is a striking example of it.
We can in effect accept that the rules of syntax in natural languages are the
temporal transcription of archerypal morphologies in space-time, as they owe
their origin to the need to preserve physical pregnancc.

14.4 INDICES
When we consider a being (a) as defined by a noun (A) of a natural language, we
shall be able to observe the following fact: in order that the being (a) exists with
the same meaning, it must be the seat of recurrent acllvJties whlch are essential
either to its physical permanence or to the spatlo·temporal realisation of its
meaning. For example, an animal, must, in order to subsist, be committed to a
$pCCtrum of physiologi.cal activities: move, eat, dnnk. breathe, etc. An inanimate
object itself participates In a series of movements that we normally expect as a
consequence of the function of the object: a broom sweeps, a car moves, a stone
falls, the fire bums, etc. So to each noun is attached in a canonical manner, a
'spectrum' of verbs' whlch specify the activities Indispensable to the reallsation
of the meaning. But each verb itself describes an 'archetypal' morphology where
beings other than the given being intervene. For example, to eat requires a prey,
or a food, to drink requires a liquid taken as a drink, and In consequence a
receptacle containing the liquid . . . the fire, during burning, emlts smoke, etc.
Every bemg intervening in such a morphology, and whlch linguistleally is described
by either the direct or indirect object of the verb wiU be called an index (a) of
the being (a). fn classical languages, the relation between a being (a) and its
index (a) is usually expressed by the genitive: a of a. For example, the smoke of
the fife, the beak of the duck. the tail of the squirrel. Or, alternatively in English:
a's a as in 'the fire's smoke', 'the duck's beak', 'the squirrel's tail'.
As every verbal morphology describes a process of interaction where th.e
actaots enter into contact, the result is that the index Is always an actaot which
Is, or has been, In contact with its object, lf it is not actually part of it. (In
passing I add that in general the index i5 not in place of the actant subject in a
verbal ~tasuophc; there exiSt precise morphological criteria for the topology of
interaction which enables us In many cases to specify what the actant subject is.)
Very often, we replace a being by one of its Indices, an act whlch confers on the
laner a symbolic value. In language, th.is procedure is at the root of many tropes
(metonymy in partlculllf: taking the part for the whole).
But it is important to see clellfly that in the pair (a, a) of a being and one of
its indices, the index (a) has no value or symbolic function in itself. lt will only
be so
(I) if the being (o) is itself an index of an actant (b) taken as subject of reference,
and if the catastrophe linking (a) to (b) is of great importance (blologicaJJy
or semanticaJJy) for (b);

268 Semiotics [Ch. 14

(2) if the being (b) comes accidentally into relation with (er), the verbal catas·
trophe which makes (ex) an aclant in a catastrophe of (b) is not itself indis-
pensable to the semantic stability of (b). (In other words (ex) is not in
itself an 'index' of(b).)
Example 1. (a) is a gazelle; (b) a tiger. The cnlastrophe a ... b is predation
and of great biological importance for (b). The index (ex) of (a) could be the
tracks of the gazelle on the ground, or a dropping. In this case the catastrophe,
ex - a, would be a standard catastrophe of emission. If the tiger accidentally
perceives the index (a), il will be apparent that he will be deeply affected, so
that ll is legitimate to say that (ex) is for him a gazelle 'symbol'. The 'rejected'
becomes the 'projected'.
Fxample 2. (a) Is a drink, tt mtght be of wine for example, (er) the bottle
that contains it, (b) an in"eterate drinker. Here the catastrophes arc obvious;
note that the empty bottle still has a symbolic value for (b) but not quite so
obviously as a full bottle.
Pavlov's well known experiments show that o fulse index (o<') can have a
symbolic value for an animate being (b). For that to be it is sufficient that the
catastrophe a ... b is biologically important, such as predation (er being the true
index). Then er'- a need be no more than a simple spatio·temporal contiguity
(the sound of a bell at the arrival of a meal). 1t will be seen by some that this
hypostatsls of spatio-temporal contiguity to causality is the index of animals'
typical inferiority wtth respect to man. This would be to forget that according
to the empiricism of Hume, or modem elementary particle Physics, it is in
practice nu possible to dissociate causahty and spalio-temporal contiguity.
Finally, we can see In these humble, but real, manifestations of the symbolic
function, a kind of smoothness in a catastrophe which has considerab le biological,
or semantlc, importance. That (b) accidentally comes to meet (c:t) is of little
importance in itself, but if (b) knows that (a) is semantically or biologically
linked to (a), which is an indispensable index of (b), then (c:t) has a tendency to
become itself also an 'index' of (b), as if the relation (a)- (b) acquires through
the existence of the intermediary (a) an Intrinsic importance. This comes about
as if the relation: (c:t) Is an index of (a), becomes on order relation.
This analysis shows that symbolic activity is, in its origin, linked in an
essential manner to btological control systems: or more exactly, as said by
older thinkers who were not afraid of words, to biological finality (rmaliu!':
ultimate purpose). IL is so in two ways: on the one hand, it is an extension of
the efficacy of complex control mechanlsms (an extension of the basin of
catastrophes favourable to (b) and a duninution of the unfavourable ones): on
the other hand, lt postulates the possibility of the actant (b) simulating in its
own appropriate state of being (psychlsm), the relation linking (a) to its index
(er): thus being a form of intelligence. The fact that Initially, as in the Pavlovian
schema, this stimulaiion is no more than a simple association, does not stop us

Sec. 14.5] Symbolism in Man 269


from oonstdering that we have here the rust tremors ln the plastic and competent
dynamic: of the psycllism of (b) of an external spatio-temporalliaison interpreted
not without reason, as causal If the canine race in order to survive, had had to
pass a great number of generations 10 the l'avlovian laboratories, it would no
doubt have firushed by reacting different!} ....
In every case the experimental signal (a'), thanks to a kind of apprenticeship,
manages to play the same role as a true index. We can thus see here and now a
'symbol', stnce the lntimate relation between the morphology of (a') and that of
(a) is arbitrary, and their association has only been established by virtue of an
experimenta l procedure of an artifical nature. The relation a' ... a is acquired by
(b) as the outcome of a process of apprenticeship, that is to say a sequence
of events, where the wiU of individuals other than the subject intervenes; a
'social' effect. Hence, from the beginning, the situation is not fundamentally
different from that of language. We wiU note that for every way in which the
apprenticeship succeeds, 11 1s necessary to 'reinforce' the effect by bringing
major biological regimes into play. food, sexuality. Only these fundamental
'catastrophes' of biological finality have the power to generate the symbol 10
animals. This no longer holds true in man, where the smoothness property, this
transitivity of the Index, spreads, even to objects, and to concepts which are
biologically indifferent.

14.5 SYMBOUSM IN MAN


In rnan. as in animals, symboHc activity originates ln the need for regulation,
homeostasis in the Jiving organism and similarly, stability in the social body.
As far as organised systems are concerned, the organism (or the society) re-
establishes Its equilibrium after an external stimulus by the intervention of
'reflexes'. That is to say, in terms of the space of the states of the system, there
are certain privileged and attracting trajectories (the 'chreods' of C. H. Wad <ling-
IOn). Each of these at tractors has a basin just as each water course has its own
bllSill. However, the control of such a system (organic and social) is never perfect;
there exist, as a consequence of constraints of topological nature, weak points
ln this 'figure of regulation' . For example the thresholds which ore the border-line
between the basins of two reflexes. At these points the organism hesitates as to
the reflex it must use. In addition there may even be in the space of the states
exceptional points, where 11 catastophe disadvantageous to the organism but of
limi ted scope, may release itself. Finally the figure of regulation is bounded
by catastrophes of lethal and irreversible effect: death. Every biological (or
sociological) development consistS of a system which exploits to the full Its
ftgure of regulation, in such a way that in a given environment, catastrophes
favourable to the orgunisrn see their basins augmented, and the unfavourab le
catastrophes have their basins diminished . This extension of the basins is prO·
duced through affectlvity (p:un or pleasure) and through symbolism Consequently,

270 Semiotics [Ch. 14

we see inunediately that there will be two types of signs: attractor signs, aimed
at increasing the efficacy of favourable catastrophes and repelling signs(inhibitors)
aimed at the prevention of unfavourable catastrophes.
Thus from its very genesis any symbol has an imperative characteristic, a
characteristic which remains largely unconscious, linked to a feehng of trust
and to the onginal hypostasis of the symbol which will be expl3.111ed below.
There equally we find the syntactical and semantic autonomy of the verb taken
in the imperative(/!).
Thls being accepted, it remains, and here an principle is the very aim of
'semiology', to cxpbin how the teleological ('f"malisce) motivation of the Sign
can generate Its true morphology, its rules of Internal structure. lt is possible
m this regard to give a rule, at once simple and of wide generality: the principle
of the inverse path. Properly speaking this principle does not determine the true
form of the sign (icon, index or symbol): but it determines its spatlo-temporal
localisation. It must not be forgotten that above all signs are forms In space
time, and that consequently theu spauo-temporal localisation is one of the ftrst
factors to consider.
To state this principle some vocabulary of differential topology wiU be
necessary. Given a domain of Euclid can space of n dimensions, let U be the
space of states of a system. Very frequently, the set of ·catastrophe· points
(In the usual sense) of the system which lead to n local or total destruction
of the system form a space of dimension (n - k), n sub-manifold ofco-dimension
k. The appearance of unfavourable or dangerous catastrophes in the development
is necessarily rebtively rare, without whlch fact homeoStasis could not be
preserved.
We express this fact by saying that these catastrophe points form a sub·
manifold J of fmite eo-dimension: it is a matter of rare, but not exceptional,
facts. Then we consider the set r, of the trajectories bordering on J. This set
of Initial anterior positions to the catastrophe, forms a sort of cone r1. In the
same way the set of the possible outcomes of the catastrophe forms a cone of
trajectories r 0 • Furthermore, in general, the fmal states of the catastrophe
constitute a well-defmed subset W0 , compact in the space U (which explains the
well-known adage: For good or Ill, things always work out in the end). An
important fact is the indeterminacy in practice of ihe catastrophe. A very smaU
variation of these initial conditions can bring about a very great variation of the
effects, as Is the case In the neighbourhood of a threshold, of a critical point.
For example. ihe collision at a crossroads referred to in Chapter I 5. Let us
suppose two roads cut each other at right angles in a point 0 of the plane. We
take as axes Ox, 0y of the plane the directions of the two roads. Suppose that
two vehicles nre moving on these two roads each with a coordinate (x, speed x')
and (y, speedy'). There will be a collision if at the tnitial instant to we have
x'0 /x0 = y'0 fy 0 • The equation x'oJio - x 0 y'0 = 0 then represents the cone r,
of entry into the catastrophe.
Sec. 14.5) Symbolism In Man 271

The exit cone r 0 cannot be simply described because the trajectory of a


vehicle after collision cannot be easily calculated. But the set W0 of the fmal
states will be intuitively weU-represented by the set of scattered wrecks In the
neighbourhood of 0 after a set of collisions. This being so we consider the set
r; + r 0 as immersed Ill the set of trajectories tangent to the catastrophe. This
global dynamic aUows us to transform in a continuous manner, a neighbourhood
1; of the base Wt into a neighbourhood r 0 of W0 (see Fig. I). Suppose h: 11 .... To
to be this transformation.

'To
Flg.l

Furthermore, the catastrophe at the origin 0 involves, in general. morpho·


logical changes, often irreversible, for the actants that are involved. There are in
consequence, indices, octants either issued from the catastrophe, or implicated
in its preparation. The principle of the inverse path states:
In order to forestaU an unfavourable catastrophe, we consider an index era,
issued from the catastrophe; final states arc then found in a neighboUihood of
the manifold Wo.

272 Semiotics [Ch. 14

We thus bring back this actant by the inverse tr:msfonnation

into a neighbourhood of the initial slates where it is realised 'lconically". To


favour n beneficial catastrophe we realise iconically :m actant Implicated in the
preparation of the catastrophe, equally in the neighbourhood of 'Tf.

Example 1: The road sign 'Danger' 1s frequently represented, m France, by a


death's head: this involves an aesthetic euphemism for the lethol consequence of
the catastrophe. The usual Danger sign (an exclamation mark) is a stylisation of
an unstable situation, like that of a needle resung on a point.
EXIImp/e 2: The sign 'Restaurant' on the motorways Is represented by a place
setting. In this case it is obviously to do with a preparatory index to the catastrophe
of ingestion, localised on the access road to the restaurant.
EX11mple 3: Sometimes 'Mdo not even have representation by an index but :t
simple 'potential barrier' with a discouraging effect. For example if there was a
hole in the road a light 'symbolic' barrier would be placed some yards in front
of the hole where vehicles could see It.
In each of these cases. the catastrophe participates m the semantic universe
of the users; the authority which installs IJ1e signal is aunlng to encourage the
simulation in the mind of the users, of a more severe catastrophe than the
somewhat vague and general one which is normally present. It is in terms of this
calculated expectation that the warning signal is localised. A catastrophe can
have numerous actanrs, as many anterior as posterior. Also the choice of the
representing index is fairly arbitrary. We will be guided simply by the more or
less pregnant (physically and biologically) character of the chosen figure. lt IS in
this arbitrariness that we can see the origin of the Saussurean arbllrariness of the
sign.

14.6 LOCALISATION AND MEANING


The number of fundamental catastrophes enher to avoid or to provoke, an the
control of the organism of society, is relatively limited. Also we can be sausfied
with a 11nlte code of signals aiming at forestalling or encouraging these catas·
trophe~. But then we are led very quickly to make the distinchon between the
intrinsic meaning of the sign (the type of catastrophe evoked) and its spatio·
temporal localisation, which is the domain of space time where the sign exerts
its imperative effect (or sometimes ·performauve' acco;lling, to the terminology
of the Oxford School). In order that lhe effect of the sign is fully reahsed, its
localisation must be 'reasonable' that is to say governed by the principle of the
inverse path. What would be the use of a ·sTOP' sign in the middle of a field
of beetroot?
Sec. 14. 7) From Animal to Man 273
1t foUows from th.is analysis that symbolic activity, if it is to be effective,
rests necess:~rily on a mental simulation of the catastiophe to avoid (or to
provoke). We have seen that such a simulation is sketchily present already in an
arumal subject to a Pavlovian type regime . One of Ute typical aspects of human
psychism is the 'open' character o f the catastrophes forestalled by symbolism.
Although social organls;~tion shields man from the danger of immediate biological
catastrophes (such as hunger, war, etc.), the mental dynamic is compeUed to
forestaU the rarer and more exceptional catastrophes (of higher eo-dimension,
according to the above geometric terminology). Th.is necessitates a descnption
by longer and more articulated symbols m so far as we can similarly describe the
rare catastrophe as the 'accidental collision • (geometrically, the transverse
mtersecuon) of the more ordmary catastrophes.
So we have the language, the possibility of a relatively precise description,
at least qualitatively of the spatio·temporal processes of ourenvironment. lnsofar
as the symbol is long, each of its elements loses in imperative value and gains in
descnptive power: in fact the imperative characteristic can be associated only
with the global symbol, and is necessaJIIy dUuted with each partial symbol.
Language thus takes the role of a sensory relay. It allows the speaker A to
describe to the hearer B what he sees. l:.ven if B cannot himself see the event
descnbed, he can imagme it from the account that A has given. So the possibility
of simulation of the psychism, originally developing only on the catastrophes
of biolog~cal regulation, has ended by el\lension to all the phenomena of the
macroscopic world. Thts permits u more and more faithful simulation of exterior
phenomena by tlte mind . How has such a leap been effected?

14.7 FROM ANIMAL TO MAN


Of the evolutionary mechanisms which have given rise to the appearance of man
we can scarcely conjecture, but 11 IS perhaps possible to give a more precise
description of thiS radical change. For that we must understand animal psychism
from 'inside'. I believe that on three essential points animal psychism is dis·
tinguished from human psychism.

14.7 .l Alienation by things


We may propose that the psychic life of an animal is constantly subject to certam
automatisms (certain 'chreods') linked to the perception of biologically important
object, such as prey and predator). In fact , an analysis of the mechanisms
brought into play in Embryology leads us to think that. In a manner which Is
only JUSt symbolic, the hun&ry predator 'is" his prey, he tdentifies physically
Wtlh 11. It is only when he secs a real prey. (externally), that tbe catastrophe of
perception materialises He becomes himself again JU$1 as the motor process of
capture uf the prey ts released. From this point of vtow the primitive symbolism
linked to predation [$ easily explained, therefore if the predator (B) is identified

274 Semiotics [Ch. 14

with prey (A), we can easily see that an index of (A) is ipso facto an index of B
without the intervention of the property of transitivity of the relation: index of.
(Indeed this can be true even at the level of organic morphology: when an animal
such as the lamprey has the tip of its tongue like a worm, :llld uses it as bait to
aurae! small fiShes which are itS prey, we can say that in this case the bait is a
morphological mdex of the predator.)

14.7 .2 Discont inuity of subjectivity


Owing to the enthralment (French: 'fascination') exercised by objects, the 'ego'
of the animal is not a permanent entity. The ·ego' re-estabUshes itself only on
the initiation of the gross reflexes and perhaps in the sausfaction of mstincts. In
particular, the animal has not, in general, a permanent consciousness of its
body insofar as it is a preferential domain of space. (On the other hand, a
permanent internal simulation of the mechanical state of the body i.s indispensable
to the efficacy of movements.) On this basis, the distinction 'subject-object'
does not exist for an animal in any permanent manner.
In animals, the internal representation of space does not have Euclidean
space as image. The space is a union of distinct maps. each associated with a
well defmcd 'ego' and assigned to a wcU defined motor or physiologtcal behaviour
(territories for hllllling, for sleeping, for mating, for nesting, etc.) and they pass
fxom one map to :lllother by weU.<Jefmed spatial references (visual or olfactory).
(of course in certain animals like migratory birds, some of these maps can be
very extensive; but it is no less certain that each of these maps is centred on a
weU deimed point of physiological vocation.)
fn man, these three characters ha~-e developed as follows:

(J) The enthralment of things has become merged into human psychism. Very
probably, symbolic activity und the appearance of language have played an
essentia.l role in this development. Man is freed from the enthralment of
thtngs by giving them names. Human psychism did tlllfold in some way· the
primitive representation of space, half-conseious, unfolds itself, and creates
one or more spaces of the same type: the semantic spaces, where the 'actants'
are installed · the concepts. The control of these actants in their true semantic
space is accomplished by mech:llllsms of a 'renex' type, analogous to the
control of tJ1e organism itself. By an unfolding pushed more towards the
surface, automatisms of language are created. These are kinds of universal
actants which intervene in the control of concepts.
(2) Thus freed from the enthralment of things, the ego has been able to constitute
itself in a permanent manner by taking as support the representation of the
true body In space.
{3) Human psychism is capable of integrating the primitive functlonu l maps
the one with the other, in order to constitute the global representation
of the geometry of space. (For example, the notion of an infinite straight
Sec. 14. 7] From Animal to Man 275

line is made clear by the indermitely repeated operation of the measure of a


length: to place a ruler at the end point of a length, is the rermed and free
fom1 of the associating of two maps.)

Of the original alienations there remains only a certain feeling of the sacred
attached to certatn objects (taboos, fetiches, etc.).
A long lime after the global mental reconstruction of space, man became
capable of perceiving that the foundation of the identity of things is their
spatial localisation: 'Two things occupyrng simultaneously two dlsjoint domains
could not be identical'. This postulation took a long time to establish itself and
'primitive' (or magic) thought, participation (in the sense of Levy.Bruhl), represents
the last connection with primitive alienation. From this postulate, of which
modern man is hardly conscious, we shall easily deduce that since the identity of
a thing has its principle in its spatial localisation, all ontology, all sertumtics
rtectssari(v depends on a study of space - geometric or topofogical.
We know that the period of the first three years is critical in a child's
development. If the child does not hear his parents (or those around him) speak·
ing during this period, the acquiring oflanguage and intellectual deviopment will
be irremediably compromised. The relative immaturity of the newborn human
enables him to keep the primitive representation of space very plastic and
flexible for a long time. The major motor schemata form only slowly, with the
beginnings of language. l t 1s quite reasonable to consider that, according to the
law of recapitulation, the child passes through a period of primitive alienation
where certain beings and objects exercise a total enthralment of him. The
presence of external verbal stimuli linked to the appearance of these beings plays
an fnductor role (In the embryological sense) in this competent structure, that is
the prinlltlve spatial field. These forms nnd their true space from primitive
space, by unfolding, by finding support in the auditory and articulatory schema
of the corresponding word, wblch frees the subject from their enthralment.
Then, the same schema of unfolding, of branching out, continues for semantic
spaces, leading eventually to the formation of the semantic space of the adult.
For a newborn animal forced to move about while very young, such an immaturity
of the primitive spatial field is impossible: motor activities structure and harden
it before: the inductor effect of a hypothetical exterior language can come into
play.
Freed from the tyranny of IJ1ese alienating forms, the space in human
psych ism can become the open framework for Geometry and for Mechanics. The
group of spatio-temporal translations then operates in semantic space and so
human language allows the description of a distant process (in space and lime)
and frees the mind from the tyranny of the 'here and now' to which the animal
remains subject.
Perhaps in this, life is only pushing one of its fundamental mechanisms to
the limit. As soon as it makes an egg, a living organism mitiates the prOJect of

276 Semiotics [Ch. 14]

colonising space and time and it is subjected to the 'here and now'. The essential
function of the human intellect, to simulate the laws and structures of the
external world is hardly more than the extension or the making clear, of this
primitive design.
Perhaps it is not absurd to see in the most elaborate acts of human psychism,
for example, in mnthcmaUcnl discovery, a direct extension of this mechanism of
symbolic creation. Indeed, while exploring a new theory, while juggling with this
new material, the mathematician someumes sees an expression, or a relation,
turning up again and again with an embarrassing insistence. He will then be
tempted to introduce a new symbol to condense this expression Into a single
form ond so continue the work on a new basis. This sin1ple procedure may some·
times lead to success. More often he will be struck by the Idea of new expressions
to condense, new figures to construct and name through suspecting a priori their
properties. To introduce a new symbol, that is, injecting a new letter on to the
paper, promotes a kind of tearing away, wit.h the establishing of a new semantic
field which will be the support of the new actant and so free the mental move-
ment from the obsesslonal presences which impede it.
We know that around 18 months, the ne11. ly born child begins ltis babbling;
he becomes aware of artjcuJatory possibilities and, so the specialists say, in this
period forms phonemes of all tbe languages of the world. The parents answer hint
in their own language, and soon after the baby produces only the phonemes of
this language, the vocabulary and syntax of which he will master some months
later. I would willingly see in the mathematician a perpetual newbom baby who
babbles before nature. Only those who know to liSten to the response of Mother
Nature will come later to open a dialogue with her and to master a new language.
The others will only babble and buu. 111 the votd, bombinans in vacua. And
where, you may ask, will the mathematician be able to hear Nature's response?
The voice of reality is in the significance of the symbol.

REFERENCES
[I] C. Lejeune, Pictu res taken form Memaire de rien (ed. Le Corcuer, Brussels,
1972), obtained 111 the rust place from photographs of plantS.
[2] W. Kohler, See any source book for Gestalt Psychology (for instance, Katz.
D., Cesrall Psychology, 1951, Methuen, London).
CHAPTER IS

A semantic chameleon: Information

17tis is a quari-structural exercise in the c:/assifying of different uses of the


ubiquitoi4S word: infomwtion. This method of investigation seems altogether
adequate, and /have 110 doubt that we shall be able to apply it to other concqm
'with complete success·.

15.1 THE AMBIGUITY OF INFORMATION


When Unesco invited me to present a paper on the theory of rnformation,t I
accepted firstly with the intention of expressing in it all the doubts which arise
in respect of the inteUecrual honesty, and perhaps in many cases, JUSt plain
honesty, of certain recent uses of the word information. But after refeclion, I
found that the semantic slipperiness to which the term informationt lends
itself is not fuUy explained by the self-interested motives of certain users.
Certainly these motives exist and they are often not honourable; but since they
only concern a minority of individuals, there remains to be explained how a
majority of the members of the Ungul.slic community can accept such distortions
of sense which are manifestly in opposition to their own interests. So we have a
very interesting problem In semantics for which I propose a solut ion inspired by
my own ideas on the archetypal morpohologies 3SSOCi.nted with elementary
catastrophes (see Chapter I 1). In the first section I give a morphological (struc-
tural?) type of analysis of the common notion of information. I explain the
occurrence of dtverse uses of the word, in particular the judicial,JOumahstic and
publicity senses, and then its scientific or technical uses, for example, in the
theory of information and in Biology. In the second part I discuss the relation
between information and meaning and the extent to which the extant theory of
information is of minimal help and I try to show in which direction a true

tWrltt~n at the nquesr of J. d'Ormesson for a Uncsco colloquium, Venice, Ma} 1973.
+Trarulator's note h is relevant that there an: limits to the poSSibility of tramlauna &om
the French 'une Information' and 'des Informations' into the EngJJsh 'n piece oflnformotion',
'the information', 1111d 'lnfornutlon'. The vt:f) theoretical exploration which is the subject
uf this chapter aprlies to the wu<S of uarubtion conl2in«<ln tbe.e necemry lnfehcities

278 A sema.n t ic chameleon: Information (Ch. l 5

theory of Information could be formed. One which , midway between semantics


and semiology and being a true thermodynamic of forms, would compel us to
consider a genuinely morphological analysis of the forms of messages.

15.2 THE NOTION OF INFORMATION


I 5.2.1 Structural analysis of t be notion of information
Let us examine, first of all a typical situation in which information is brought
into play. A traveller, let us say Peter, ftnds himself in an unknown town. He
wishes to reach the home of a friend whose address he knows (the street. and
the number in the street), but. unable to fmd the street on his own , he stops a
passer·by, let us say John, and asks him to tell him the way. John , if he is polite
and if he knows the required street, tells Peter how to reach it from the place
where they are at that moment. Furnished with these particulars, with this
'information', Peter sets out on his way. lf the particulars are correct and given
with sufficient detail, Peter will have no difficulty in reaching the address
required .
The total schema of this process involves two subjects, two actants in
linguistic terminology, the seekert Peter, whom we will symbolise by (X), and
the giver John , symbolised by (Y). In attempting to carry out an action, (X)
meets a difficulty: something he does not know, a gap In the picture that he has
of the situation, prevents him from acting. The giver (Y) is able to fill the gap,
which he does in general of his own accord by responding to (X)'s request. This
is in fact a typical schema of social help , comparable, mutatis mutandis, to the
gift made by the worker bee of a scrap of food accumulated in his food sac in
response to the caress of a hungry neighbour. Then let us form, according to the
procedure explained In Chapter 11, the total graph G of the interaction between
(X) and (Y). Let us recall that in this diagrammatic representation of a process,
the branches of the graph represen 1 the actanh or their messages, and the
vertices of the graph symbolise the emission or reception of a message by an
actant.

desired
act•on
lt
/
/
/
x~--~--------------~--~-----
Graph 1

tTransluor's note: The dtscussion ~More on the morphology of actants auociated with N1l
paniclpanu Indicated by the author as,. dentllldeur' and "le donneur"ls better understood
if we Ullllslate these two very directly as 'seeker· and ·~tVIlr'. 11 I! clear that the author,
deaUna with the increased complexiry when two actants ore lnvolved,ls concerned to keep
the comple>dty to the neoessary maximum.
Sec.l5.2] The Notion of Information 279
We caJIDOl fall to be struck by the relative complex.lty of this graph. It is
much more complex than the elementary morphologtes described in Chapter 11,
p. 000. We notice that the graph shows a marked actant {1), the message of the
giver to the seeker. lt is on this actant that, strictly speaking, the meaning of the
term •information' focuses; the rest of the graph constitutes a kind of ambience
of presupposition which surrounds the nucleus formed by the transmission of
the message (0 from (Y) towards (X). lr Is this complexity which expkzins the
semantic imtability of the word 'information': incapable of perceiving in its
totality a process so complex, the rttind has a tendency to reject in a fog of
increasing density, all or part of the ambience of presupposition, in order to
focus the vision on to the essential· the transmission: giver .1. seeker. The distor-
tions of sense that we shall point out are gomg to depend in an essential manner
on that part of the presupposed which finds itself annihilated.
We know in fact that in an interaction process descnlled by a verb, the
corresponding interaction graph is extemely simple (one of the 16 archetypal
morphologles of A (Chapter 11, Section 11.5)). The result is that these morph·
ologies exercise a power of attractJon in the simplification of the presupposed.
Already, the use of the verb 'to inform' in English ('informer' in French) marks
a quasi-d.isappearance of the seeker of the information, even that of the demand
itself. Very frequently, one informs someone of a situation which is dlsagreeable
or disadvantageous to him. it goes without saying that the use of the word
•information' in the sense of the act of informing (as a verb noun), is not involved
in the uses studled below. lt is imponant to note this.

15.2.2 The sense obtained by progr~ elimination of the seeker.


Judicial sense
The fust way of effacing the seeker is to make a collective entity of him, a
social group with which the speaker is identlOed as a member. This Is what
occurs in the judicial use of the terrn information (lodging or laying an Informa-
tion). In this case there is an obliteration of the indlrect object (X) which is
natural since indirect object and seeker are one and the same. The meaning
sometimes centres on the giver (Y), to the extent of making it the subJect of a
true ·catastrophe of excision'; the particulars are drawn from (Y)'s being by
violent means: threat or torture. Such can be the case of information in the police
sense, or espionage. Here again Information has a useful role in the stability or
'regulation' of the social group, that is, in Its defence.

Y----------~~~~~--------~--­
socially
desirable
Ktion
\I
I

""
Graph 2

280 A semantic chameleon: Information [Ch. I 5

15.2.3 Information l.n the journalistic sense


Here the social regulation function of information weakens; there Is no longer
'demand' in the strict sense. Jean d'Ormesson observed that the JOUrnalist, in
fact , creates the demand (or supposes it to exist). Tlus involves a very great
variety in the semantic content of the information.

V----------~~~~----------------
,.
'"
I
/
/

Graph 3

15.2.4 Information in the sense of the techniques of publicity and advertising


The misuse this time becomes flagrant. The information is imposed upon the
indirect object (X) who has not requested it and its content Is notoriously more
advantageous to the giver (Y) than to the destinator (X). The total graph is

V--------------~~--------~----~
action ;'"'
profitable 1
10 V '/
I
I

"
X ----------------------~--~'------
"
Graph 4
This limited list demonstrates some of the common non-technical uses of the
word information. We pass now to the scientific uses.

15.2.5 Information in the sense of Slulnnon- Weaver information theory


As is well known, tnformation theory in the technical sense of the term. is
actually a tl1eory of communication. All the presupposed of graph C (Graph 1)
is obliterated to preserve no more than the graph: Source- Message- Receiver.
More precisely we appeal to the existence of a channel of communication C; so it
is rather the graph (g) of the messenger that must be considered. The theory's
objective is to compare the morphology of the message received with that of the
message emitted (the effect of noise on the signal).
v__

X----~~~-=~----~~~----~~-­
Graph S The mtogge i• effected through the eh1nnel. C
Sec. IS. 2) The Notion of Information 281
In the second part we will discuss the probabilistic sense of the word infor-
mation and its relation to the thermodynamic notion of negentropy.

15.2.6 Uses of the term 'information ' in Biology


Here we are concerned essentially with the 'genetic' information of a living
species such as one ftnds in the central dogma of Warson-Crick: 'the genetic
information of a living being is coded in the nucleotide composition of its
DNA'. .P
Two interpretations can be proposed. The first regards the egg as a message
emitted by the parent donor (Y); the receiver is then the embryo issued from the
egg itself; hence we must In this case consider that the message becomes its own
receiver. This way of looking at it IS difficult to sustam.
The second intcrpnitation has been defended by some information theorists
in Biology, such as Dancoff and Quastler.t 11 regards the living organism as the
giver (X) of information, the indirect object (Y) is the observer himself. More
precisely, we will consider every natural morphology as a message emitted by a
fictitious source (X) directed to the scientist (Y) who is the seeker. So an old
tdea is resuscitated: God speaks to use through the appearance of the world, it
behoves us to interpret his language. Of course, this way of looking at it raises
grave ontological problems. If we wish to see more than a poetic metaphor in it,
we are led to ask if a special place can stUI be assigned to semiology. If each
physical or natural form is a message from God, why wish to reserve a special
place for human messages? Also, in all these examples, the ultimate purpose
('finalite') of the process does not appear obvious, apart from emphasising the
interest man has in understanding what he sees.
In the example (quoted by M. Carreras in his intervention) 'Information
furnished by X-rays after passing through the patient's body', there is ambiguity
neither in the giver (the body of the patient) nor in the seeker receiver (the
observer, nor in the global ultimate purpose ('fmallte') of the process (diagnostic
interpretation). The only ambiguity concerns the content signified by the word
information, which for my part I would reduce to the form of the message
received on the sens1tised plate and Interpreted by the observer.
To sum up, there is, underlying the idea of information the existence of a
seeker for whom it is profitable to learn this information, together with a giver,
who gives, of his own free will in general, the information to the seeker. ln all
uses of the word where one is unable to identify the four elements: seeker,

iln oth<r "'0tdJ, Information theor} tn Its classical form or. theory or inforrmtlon rrnns·
mission, can be appUcd to biological systems in considering thal there exists a uansmission
of information between the O~JaniJm and the ob~rver following lbc method of D:uu:orr and
Quanler u ,..• hue indocated on CMptet S: but In thu uansmiuiun we must consider each
order~ element 01 urpanic body (moeromolecules, O'lanelles, cells, orga.nisms) os the
output of u communlcauon path, the Input of which we hove no need to specify. 11. Atlan.
L "()rpniJzzt/qn blol~qu~ et!Jithtorie de l'informlltion p. 255, HermaM. Parts. CTranslatlon
by prcttnt tnnsLuor .)

282 A semantic chameleon: Information [Clt. I 5

request, giver, advantage accruing to the seeker through knowledge of the


information, one must suspect a certain dishonesty In the use of the word. This
Is certainly so in the case of the uses where there has been no request and where
the information has little or no interest for the recipient. What publlcity agent
has a clear conscience In pretending that he only offers to the public a piece of
information. The meaning of lhe word is thus inadmissibly distorted: in propaga·
ting the faith (de propaganda fide) at least the Church is aware of its aims and
proclaims them.
tn scientific usages, particularly in Biology, where either the seeker or the giver
(source) is obscured, the dishonesty, ifdishonesty there be, is only of an intellectual
kind. The use of the word Information, in the case of 'genetic inJom1ation' gives
evidence of the following psychological situation. In the immensely complex
unfolding of the morphogenetic processes in embryology Molecul.ar Biology has
revealed an important mechanism, lhe SYnthesis of proteins. The natural tendency
of the specialist is to say that this stage is the essential one, and that other stages are
no more than the simple consequences of it. The word information, in such a
situation, serves obviously to disguise the aJmosHotal ignorance in wh1ch we
fmd ourselves specifying these olher allegedly subordinate mechanisms, while
allowing through the connotation of intentionality In the word Information, an
implicit guarantee of the ultimate purpose('fmalit6') which underlies all biological
Utoughl. l nformation, in this sense, is a disguised form of causality.

15.3 INFORMATION, MEANING AND FORM


In all ambiguous uses of the word information, one must first ask the question:
what is lhe nature of the content signified by this piece of informati.on? After all,
a piece of information is always conveyed by a mesS3ge, and a message must
have a meaning. But, as the above analysis has shown, we cannot reduce a
piece of infom1atlon to the content signified. This would deny all the Intentional
presupposition attached to the word. In this sense, information is tlte meaning
plus the intentionality which gives it birth and enables it to spread. In this
connection we cou.ld invoke etymology and assert that all information has for
aim (or for function) the transforming of the receiver into a well-defined state or
form. Such is, m general, the motivation of aU communication: mostly the
communication is initiated by the sender in his own interest. lt is specially
apparent in the case of a command uttered in the imperative. There Is nothing
more 'informing' in the Aristotelian sense, than a command. Nevertheless, in no
case Is a command a piece of information - first of all, because the command Is
given in the interP.st of the speaker and is not in response to any request of the
receiver; secondly, because the content signified by a piece of infom1ation
always transcends the ·here and now', whereas a command is necessarily always
subJect to the 'here and now'. In the most typical situation, that for example
descn'bed at the beginning of the first part (Peter asks John for directions), the
Sec. 15.3] Information, Meaning and Form 283

content signifJed by the information is a spatial localisation. Space time localisa·


tlons are typical informations: when does the train for Rome leave? The train
for Rome leaves from the Gare de Lyons at 21.13. it is always a question of
localising an event distant in space or time, with respect to the 'here and now'.
Of course, there is no question of giving a complete description of all the
contents signified by n piece of Information: that would need all Semantics.
In principle, a piece of information can be given verbally. But in the term
'genetic Information' or in 'information afforded by X·rays', (M. Carreras's
example) the content signified is must too complex to be expressed verbally. In
i.ruth it is a matter of a form (metabolic or geometric) of a geometric entity. We
would be better adVIsed in many of these cases {at least at the level of intellectual
honesty) to replace 'information' by 'form'.
We could argue against this point of view on the grounds that Shannon
Weaver's classical theory of information allows a positive number to be attached
to a message, Its 'information'. But it is imponant to understand that such
quantification of the information is completely Independent of the content
signified by tbe message. 1t rests on the implicit hypothesis that the message
appears as if it has been drawn from a lottery of equlprobablc events(for example
as if the message had been tapped out by a monkey typist). This is to saytbat
Shannon's theory, as a consequence of using a physical channel as a model for
commurtication, is, in practice, powerless to specify anything about the form of a
message of wbicb one would know a priori, the meaning. To pretend, as is done
in Biology, that it is applicable to all natural morphologles comes down to
accepting the implicit postulate that all natural morphologies emanate from a
game of dice and that one is in a position to specify with which die God plays
with us. The same objection holds for the probabilist defmition of information
and its identification with negentropy {the opposite of thermodynamic entropy).
These thermodynamical notions offer little of interest other than for closed
systems where the morphologies of emission and reception of a communication
are excluded. Funher, at the macroscopic level, of the morphology of messages,
the thermodynamic equivalent of each spatial form is in general unknown (and
not even defmed ... ) .
In reality, the dream of 'mformalion theory' has been to establish an
algorithm capable of evaluating both the complexity of a system and at the same
time its degree of organisation, with respect to the divergence tt shows from a
'totally disordered' structure. Such an algorithm only exists for morphologies of
dimension I: flllite series of leuers taken from a finite alphabet. For natural
multidimensional morphologics, such an algorithm does not exist and even the
concepts of complexity, order. organisation and disorder are not defmed.
Thu problem is clearly of crucial importance for semiology, the theory of
signs. How could semiology set itself up as a science if it is not capable of
defming its ObJect? !low, in the SCI of natural and artificial forms do we recognise
those which are signs, those which could have been (or still are) carriers of

284 A semantic chameleon: Information [Ch. 15

information? Here we will recall the embarrassment of ihe palaeontologists


confronted with the first presumed evidence of human industry: did these
splintered flints owe their foon to the hand of Man, or to the action of geological
forces? To this question we can offer a preliminary basis for an answer. In the
morphology of a message there is always an element of dynamic Instability
which, In principle, renders it less probable, than a naturally created fom1. The
imprint of a finger on the sand, the tracing of a stylet on clay, are so many
naturally fragile matks of man's deliberate acts. On being perceived these unstable
structures return to a nonnal stability, and in so doing they generate mentally
the content signified by the message.llere we fmd again the probabiUstic deftoitlon
of Information: let us recall that by definition, when an event of probability p
materialises, 0 .;;; p < I , our 'information' increases by a quantity 1, where
I = - k log p. Now if we know that a fact has materialised, it is because we have
perceived the final state of the process which defines the event. But what purpose
does the notion of probability finally serve? It serves to give us a certain control
In a situation of dynamic instabillty, that is of practical lnderterminism. The
relation I = - k log p, where axiomatically minded formalists see nothing but
a way of defining Information from probability, in fact conceals a very profound
relation of a topologico-dynamic nature. ll is a relation which links the rarity of
initial conditions of an unstable process to the topological complexity of the
resulting situation (or of the set of resulting positions of the stabllisation of
initial instability). This formula expresses the relation between the Initial
instablllty of some stochastic event, and the geometric complexity of the set
of all situations which may arise after stabilisation of the lnstabiUty.lt is In this
way that information is linked to an 'obscure' kind of causality. So, when a
pencil rests vertically on its point 0, we can say that this position 'codes' the
set of consequent stable positions, namely, a circle, centre 0 of radius I, the
length of pencil. Now In pure dynamical situations, the improbable character
of a 'catstrophic' event is, In general, discrete, because it is often linked to the
accidental collision of two or more strmgs of Independent events. Example: the
coUlslon of two motor-cats at a four cross-roads. If the two roads intersect at
right angles, let us signify by Ox, Oy, U1e axis of the two roads, by (x0 • a) the
abscissa and Initial speed of the fust vehicle, by (y0 , b) the ordinate and the
speed of the second.Supposlng the vehtcles to be points, there will be a collision, if
the relallon Xo = ~ holds. Such a relation deftnes a hypersurface Wof dimension
a b
3, of co.Qlrnension I, In the four-dimensiona.l space of initial conditions, with
coordinates (x0 , y 0 , a, b). A triple collision would need two equations and so
would defme a manifold of eo-dimension 2. But if the vehicles have a positive
width 2u, there will be Impact if the initial conditions are found In a (tubular)
neighbourhood of the manifold W of radius u. U this mattifold is of eo-dimension
q the total volume of the domain of the Initial conditions leading to the catas-
trophe Is of the form Ktfl .
Sec. 15.31 Info rmation, Meaning and Form 285

Thus lhis integer q measures the rarity of the catastrophe, and in the simuJ.
taneous realisation of two such independent catastrophes, the eo-dimensions (of
two manifolds which intersect transversally in the product) add together like
the loganlhms of probabilities. Now, we know in mathematics that in a catastrophe
governed by a potential function at a single isolated point, there is an equality
between the eo-dimension of the singularity and the topological complexity of
the stabtlised function resulting from this catastrophet.
Thence results the equality (in this 'pure' situation) between the maximum
topological complexity of the form born of the catastrophe and a multiple of
the logarithm of the volume of the domain of the initial conditions leading to
the catastrophe. Becoming a little speculative, we can perhaps describe the
mental behaviour of an observer taldng note of the development of a fact. At the
start there is the ignorance or the observer; an ignorance he wishes to dispel.
With respect to his mental state this amounts to saying that the mental
dynamic is unstable like the significant point at the summit of a potential crest,
whlch can fall to one side or the other, and which symbolises the choice to be
made. The mind then projects this dynamic instability, in an imaginative manner,
onto reality. This amounts to saying that the mind interprets its actual ignorance
as a return of the real to a primitive indefiniteness (which can moreover be
present even if the event, due to talcc place, has not already talcen place, when
the die is still immobile at the bottom of the dice box ...). Whether the event
effectively takes place (the die Is thrown), whether the mind talces note of the
state of the fact through a better observation (for example, by the contribution
of information by others), the psychologccal result is the same. There Is resolution
of instability, passage from the virtual to the actual, and a formation In the mind
of a permanent form (the choice is made), of which the true morphology is
bounded above in complexity by the improbability of the Initial event. Let us
make no mistake, the very notion of information implies the possibility for each
of us, be he near or far from the event, to ·comprehend' it; that Is to say to
reconstitute its genesis mentally. 1t is also to say that lhis notion implicitly
harbours the old idea of the analogy of microcosm with macrocosm, of the
possibility for the mind to simulate the facts of the real world.
Thls notion also implies the possibility of the mind developing algorithms,
models of very general dynamic situations, which malce possible a certain predic·
tion of the facts (the upper bound of the complexity of the resulting morphology).

t We are concerned here wllh the following rheorcm : Let /()cf) be a function havina• point
of sin~;ularlry belated ar the oraln . Tkn the quotlenr algebra of the algebra for the formal
•equenoes In 0, [(/ Rx/)J, by the ideal J of the partial derivatl~ ff, 1$ on alj:ebn of fmite
dimension q . This number (\lilnor's number) can be considered as the cu-<limcnsion of the
&ingularity (in formal or analytic theory). Thls number q 11 alto the muunum number of
non-degcnerare a:ltlcal pomts pre5ented by a oUtblc deformation of the gorm/()cf). Now this
number or critical points can be taken as a measure of the topolot~•cal complexity of the
cerm of the function er Olaptcr 3.

286 A semantic chameleon: Information [Ch. 15)

In fnct, the 'pure' Situation described earlier in this mathematical analogy is only
rarely realised in practice. So the problem arises as to whether this type of
situation can be generalised; of whether we can create in some way a thermo-
dynamics of form, which would generalise to open local situations, some of the
concepts developed in classical thermodynamics. Only the future will tell of such
a scientific Utopia ....
lt is no exaggeration to suggest that at the very heart of the sense of the
word mformation there is the belief (at the same time magical and rational) in
the provision o[ [omt. lt Is an area where the power of the form is evident; it is
that of mental and spiritual activities. Give an order and the next man will obey
you; in the field of thought, formal deduction takes place, as everyone knows,
vi [ofml1e. By contrast in the physical world, the concept of provision of form
arouses very serious reserves. lt Is clear that to realise a physical event there are
constraints to respect of spatio-tempora.l, energetic and physico-chemical natures;
and that it is not possible to effect such a realisation through a single formal
invocation by itself alone. But once these constral.n ts have been repsected, it is
no less clear that the geometric form by itself alone, can have considerable
influence upon the realisation of a physical event. Such Is the case in Physics.
For example, a lens concentrating the sun's rays in its focus, can agnitcinflamm-
able material; a good illustration of the power of the geometric form of
lhe dlopter. ln Biology, the power of the form Is still more martlfest, for
example in animal organogenesis: the form of an organ lherein is very often,
dictated by its mechanical or metabolic efficacy. To determine the cases where
this provision of form can be shown In a natura.! milleu should be the chief aim
of this thermdoynamlc of forms which we wish to develop. To forget lhe con·
slralnts, spatial, energetic and physico-chemical, which must be respected in
order that an analogy of forms may be realised, is truly to flounder In magic, or
rather In delirious thought. I very much fear that the extensive use of the term
'information' in biology, as in the expression 'genetic informati.o n', is accompanied
by little indication, on the part of those who use it (being, as the majority of
molecular biologists arc, resolutely materialistic and reductionist) of an awareness
of the implicit appeal to that ancient and deep magic, which,perpetually invoking
the power of form, does not cease to condition our language and our thought.
CHAPTERI6

Logos Phoenix

A conTribution to an issue of rite ;ournol: Critique, on the myth of universal


languqge. The attempt is made to show that if myth there is. it is a myth ~try
df[ficult to !.:ill.

16.1 UNNERSAL LANGUAGE


Why talk of the myth of universal language? Ln the present age there certainly
exists at least one universal language. l t is science. In order to avert the too
obvious criticisms, we shall restrict ourselves to sciences caUed exact. l n avoldil\g
the 'ideological' contamination so often found in the human sciences, we deal
with a body of assertions, the truth of which is scarcely in doubt and the prag.
matic efficacy of which is an undoubted guarantee of their validity. There is no
doubt that contempornry epistemology lays consldernble stress on the transitory,
local, relative nature of many scientific assertions. T heories become obsolete,
certainly, but description remains, and, to the extent that such description
holds, its universal validity appears inescapable, linked as it is to the regularity,
to the stability of the physical universe where we live.
lt is very likely that the obJection will be raised that facts so described are
not always presented in a very coherent manner; that there is no concern to
spealc in a consistent language, in the Saussurean sense of 'la langue'. Rather is
there a vast logorrhoeic effusion, of more or less interesting content; a rhapsodic
enumeration which, by its very breadth and exuberan t prolixity, risks sinking
rapidly into insignificance. The whole collection lacks a syntax which will
organise and, possibly, generate it. And yet, for one pan at least {in mechanics
and physics) a syntax exists, and it is mathematlcs which provides it.

16.2 MATHEMATICS: A UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE?


We have effeclively an mathema1ics the ideal candidate to embody a universal

288 Logos Phoenix [Ch. 16

language: with its virtually pure syntax, it generates meaning U1rough its own
constructions. We can experience anew the dream of Leibniz: to find the answer
to any question, let us go to the blackboard and calculate.... In the genesis of
the Leibnizian dream, probably not sufficient recognition has been g~ven to the
important part played by Newtonian mechanics. There we had a situation where,
effectively, every question, at least theoretically, could be resolved by calculation.
Certain people are of the belief that the formal logic arising from the work
of Boole in the nineteenth cenrury offers a realisation of a universal language.
This is a most profound error for this example Itself demonstrates why the
Leibnltian dream attempts the impossible. Logic, in constituting itself as a
formal language wiU1 absolute rigour, breaks its links with the real world .lndefmite
iteration of its operations creates illusory objects as can be seen in Cantor's
theory of the transfmites. To wish to maintain in language an unfettered genera-
tivity, formal expressions lose all contact with that which they signify, in fact,
lose all sense [I]. 1 have explained this state of things with a maxim, in which
may be seen an unusual form of the ·complementary' principle d.e ar to quantum
mechanics, 'All which is rigorous is insignificant' [2).
A universal language, if it is to be more than a game, must necessarily be
significant and consequently there will be exceptions to the principle. But can there
actually be such exceptions to principle? Is it possible to have rigour and meaning
at one and the same time? In particular, must mathematics itself be accused of
meaninglessness? The professional mathematician left in me finds it difficult
to accept that mathematics is only a gratuitous const ruction bereft of all connec-
tion with the real world. There is, after all, the 'miracle' of physical laws, the
'unreasonable accuracy' of mathematics in describing the physical world, accord-
ing to E. Wigner's apposite expression. But then, how do we explain that mathe·
matics can represent reality?
The reply, I believe, is given to us through the intuition of continuity.
lndeftnite Iteration can occasionally lead to an IDlmediately graspable object like
the act of infinity. l t is from here,lthink, that we find an interpretation approp-
riate to the Elcatic paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. The paradox allows a
1 I I I
concrete sense to be given to the infinite sum - + + + ... + - + ... as the
2 4 8 2n
actual dutance at which Achilles overtakes the TortOise. Geometric continuity
also offers the possibility of giving a meaning to eollties requl.ring an infinity
of operations (Like giving a real number all its decimals). 1t happens that this
miracle of geometric intuition is compounded with another micraclc, that of the
physical laws, which 11 extends, and hence produces the quantitative science of
mechan1cs and of physics. At the level of geometric space on the macroscopic
scale of our human environment, there IS a quast-perfect equivalence between
our geometrico-mechnn!cal intuition and the effective motion of objects, governed
by classical laws of dyn11111ics. This is not a miracle , for any excessive imbalance
in our intuition leads mevitably to the revelation of latent inhibitors. guaranteeing
Sec. 16.2) Mathematics: A Universal Language? 289

our survivoJ.t With the introduction of an underlying continuous substrate. the


significant, non-trivial, character of many mathematical theorems may be revealed.
Let us consider, as claimmg exemplification, two classical theorems of the
differential calculus
(a) The theorem of implicit functions. If a function Jtx, y ) of two variablesx. y
has continuous panial derivatives in x, y up to lhe order r in a domain D of lhe
plane, and if at a point (x0 , y 0 ) in D, we have:
f(xo.Yo) = 0, [y(Xo,Yo) ,P 0
there exists a local function y = g(x) r-times continually differentiable around
x = x 0 such that f(x. g(x)) = 0.
(b) Tay/Qr's Series: If a function f(x) of the real variable x has in the interval
a < x < b. continuous derivatives up to the order m , then in the neighbourhood
of every point x 0 of the interval f(x) can be written:

~ -xo) { ~ -xor
f(x)=f(xo)+(x-xe)((xa)+ ... + . J 1>(xo)+ ... +Am(x) .;___..;;,;._
1! m!

where the function Am(x) can be estimated above by the norm of the derivative
rm.
It Is typical that ln these two theorems, aglobal,and non-specific, knowledge
of the functionf(f(x, y) in the ftrst case;f(x) in the second} is exchanged for a
more specific local knowledge about the point x 0 • Apparently, Information has
been lost and one has struck a bad bargain. In fact, we have here the most funda·
mental two theorems of analysis, whose immense productivity is weU known. It
is the introduction of the opposition: local- global, which gives these theorems
their force, and in the end provides all their meaning. 1t will be possible for
example to reconstitute the global behaviour of the set of zeros f(x, y ) = 0, in
the first case, by an iterative application of the local theorem, possibly changing
the direction of proJection there in order lo avoid' points where/>'= 0.
The theorems in mathematics wblcb are expressed m the existential form:
'In the interval [ab] there exists x such that ... ·,are countless. This is because
mathematics has en tered a world which has retreated to a semantic disengage·
rnent created by the automatisation of algebraic operations [3).

tln f:act.the lav.s of Calilellft mechunoct (or NeWionian} are not rcaUy visible In the bandlil\j\
of Objects at our normal sc•le. Immediate technoto,teal needs led rather to th~ struggle 10
O\'eu:omc friction, and hence the Atlsto•clian law F : k V (force is proportlonallo •"doclty).
There is no doubt that the more nptd movement of •niltcry shell< brought 10 consciousnes.s
the phenomena of inertia, ond later the taw F =m.,. (force is propomonalto accelention).
Sucl! a bw, in the reneralisation "hoc:b laplace and liamilton mode, has the supplementary
advant"ie of altowtl\ll lln intersub;ecth"r d•><:riptlon of the stotes of motton, that is lo say
offerins a permanent seometricnl framework for the descnption of motion allowing the
re't'rsibibty of the arrov. of ttm•.

290 Logos Phoenix [Ch. 16

16.3 NATURAL LANGUAGE


If now we think of mathematics in terms of ordinary language, we will reveal a
very analogous situation. The school of generative grammarians believed in the
possibility of endowing syntax with indefinite generative properties, that is to
say, permitting grarrunar to generate sentences comprising an inflllite number of
nested subordinate clauses. This is, c.learly, a pure fiction; genuine concrete
activity ('perform.ance ') curbs the generative power of 'competence', in such a
way that every iterative procedure brings itself to an end after a small number
of operations (four or five at th.e most). Failing to be able to embark on an infrnlte
construction of the geometric continuum, the underlying algebraic mechanism
to the syntactic constructions quickly aborts. In the generative grarrunar tree
which describes how a grammatically correct sentence is structured, the terminal
symbols are soon reached, and so the referents of the terminal symbols, accord-
ing to their extended forms, are localised in space-time by demonstratlves
('deictiques') (or by proper nouns, which carry their meaning with their spatio-
temporal localisations). The predicates themselves, verb and adjective, are spatial
in an intrinsic manner (or metonymical: for example, the adjective in general is
susceptible to gradation). Here is, I think, a conclusion from which it is difficult
to escape: meaning is always connected with the attributing to a formal o rdered
expression of a locality of a spatial nature. There will also be, in every meaningful
message, a discontinuous component linked with the generating mechanisms of
the language , to the symbols, and a continuous component, a substrate in which
the discontinuous component carves out a place. Messages of the type: Demon-
suative-noun; 'There is Dad', while characterising the acquisition of language
by the young chlld, are in fact paradigmatic of all bearers of sense....
A very fashionable theory current in Paris states: 'There is nothing signified,
there is only signifying'. All signs refer to other signs, in an auto-referential
cascade of meanings. There is, no questioning the validity of this formulation;
but it remains an incomplete description of meaning. lt neglects the spatial
localisation support in which all meaning eventually dies. Only this ultimate
localJsing permits us to escape an inflnite regress which condemns us to the
elimination of what Is meant.

16.4 THE UNIVERSAL NEED


While the Lebnizian dream is dead and buried, without any hope of resurrection,
the myth of a universal language stays with us. ltis manifest through a universal
need, appearing In the most diverse forms, and within which the hidden bonds
are difficult to perceive when one has not analysed, as I had to do, the actual
epistemological malaise. The problem presents an 'objective', scientific aspect;
and a more anthropocentric, more philosophical, aspect, seen as a subjective
question. On the objective approach r allude to the growing importance attached
Sec. 16.4] The Universal Need 291

to interwsciplmarity, to the prestige in which the 'systemic approach', the


'general theory or systems'. is held. All enlightened scientifiC opinion knows very
well that behind thJs general theory of systems there is nothing other than
banalities on the notion of system; and insofar as tltis concerns cybernetics, it is
also known 'that there is not a single theorem in cybernetics'. And yet these
phantom disciplines organise congresses, have specialist journals, have established
Instit utes of their own. !-low do we explain this paradox? The reply, I believe, is
quite easy. the contemporary scientific spirit feels deeply as an irrepressible
urge, the necessity to understand the internal resilience of the stability of things.
There Is a need for o 'general' theory of control, of regulation, which will allow
the grasp111g of the analogies which govern the stabilisation processes of natural
or artificial systems. Only such a theory will perrnJt an interdisciplinary dialogue
different from the courteous and social confrontauons to which we are actually
restricted. As the observer P. Delattre has put in his report (4). every genuine
interdisciplinarity occurs through the buDding of a common language which ean
express the diverse theoretical means in use in the most varied disciplines. Mathe·
matics, in its traditional quantitative form, can play this role only in that small
corner of reality (Mechanics and Physics) immediately dependent on the geometry
of space- time. The 'systemic' approach offers itself for the building ol= such a
language with a more general aim, simultaneously both precise and flexible. Are
we reassured by this? For this to happen we require a more flexible mathematics,
less 'generative' and more qua!Jtntive (this becumes a rough sketch of catastrophe
theory). Besides this will we be able to eiTect a rapprochement in their theorisa-
tion, between pure and hard-edged disciplines (Mechanics and basic Physics) and
the 'softer' disciplines. !-low will we be able to conceive the building of such a
language?
Regulation, in living beings, sometimes presents (in those more easily
observable aspects) an automaton-like ngidity. I make allusion here to the
stimulus- response schema. Now it is important to see that such a mechanism
already presents a continuous component and a discontinuous one. In effect , a
stimulus, from the fact that its source is In the space exterior to the organism,
depends in general on continuous pararne ters (for example, the direction of a
luminous excitation). The regulating reflex, on the other hand is in general
highly ritualised. l t is a 'motor freld' provided with internal stability, and which,
in general, suffers little variation. From this it appears that the stimulus- response
schema may be (by and large) modeUed by the decomposition of a continuous
space into anractor basins, the d1viding of a substrate space by conflicting
mechanisms which create frontiers in this space. We have seen that man'ssymbolic
activity, language, Is a process of the same type, but this time of an endogenic
Origin,
It happens that every attempt to create such a common interdisciplinary
language comes about by as powerful an analysis as possible of the mechanisms
of description. of the sorting out of rea!Jty, which is already the task of ordinary

292 Logos Phoenix [Ch. 16

language. ll is here lhat we fmd the subjective approach to our problematic. lt is


manifest in. a double programme:
(a) to revive the attempt to create a universal grammar;
(b) to revive the problem (forgotten since Kant) of defming the 'categories of
human mind'.
The problem of universal grammar is one of the major themes of the theory of
linguistics, and certainly is a question of essential importance for this discipline.
Nevertheless, few linguists dare venture into this minefield. Withou t doubt there
Is a need for a naivete; a certain freshness in thinking. ll can be reasonably
thought that the major grammatical categories that we know in the lndo-European
languages which are familiar to us: noun- verb- adjective- adverb . . . , have a
universal validity, and that in every language will be found these homologous
distinctions. Bu.t these distinctions can exist only in use, and not in the morph·
ology. As a consequence every attempt to build a theory on the morphologically
visible distinctions has run into difficulties. Nevertheless, generative grammar
has proposed for syntactic organisation, tree schemas, the universal validity of
which is accepted by many linguists. Since Greenberg's work [5] on the typology
of languages (for example the orde r of elements in a transitive sentence: subject-
verb-object) very useful ncar-universals have become known. The anxiety about
universal grammar is far from being ended, and the resistance by fo.rmalist
grammarians promises further numerous controversies in this field [6].
Grammar works essentially with the discontinuous component of language
activity, through the dynamic which operates the division of a continuous
substrate into individual domains each designed for one word. lt can be seen
that for this dynamic of scission, the specific nature of the substrales matters
very little. In my view I see it as the manifestation of geometrico-topological
entities independent of the substrate, and which,ln biology, is similarly manifest
in the form of the major regulation schemas like predation or sexual relatedness.
It is the formal universality of these schemas of scission which allows us to give
meaning to the statement: 'There is nothing signified, there is only signifying'.
But the simple theory of predication requires an extending of this point of view.
The distinction between noun and adjective c<>nstrains us to differentiate the
substrales. The noun, when it designates an object extended in space, requires
space-time as substrate (or possibly its mental image, the 'representative' space).
An adjective, like blue, for example, requires the considering of a space of
qualities (in this case the three-dimensional space of colour impressions). Here
there is the matter of a 'semantic' space quite distinct from the usual Euclidean
space in which it is embedded at 'base level' (every colour is realised in the
extended world). In other words, while the syntax IS tied to the discontinuous
component of language, it no less calls into play the continuous substrates which
are the ultimate supports of what is signified. The nature, the classification of
independent substrates necessary for the unfolding of grammatical functions,
Sec. 16.5} The Ca tego lies 293

thus necessarily intJoduces our second problematic !hat of the 'categories of


human mind'. The elucidation of the hierarchy of substratcs necessary 10 the
stability of concepts necessarily touches on the elucidation of the semantics
which it is impossible to separate from the syntactical.

16.5 THE CATEGORIES


Let us now start on the philosophical aspect of the problem. 1t is curious to
recognise that thts huge complex of questions known under the name of'categories
of human mind' ['catt!gories de !'esprit humain'j has apparently disappeared
from philosphical dtscourse since Kant.t Aristotle was reproached, probably
unjustly it would seem to him, for having drawn up his table of categories from
Greek grammar. Philosophy was reproached for allowing itself to be inOuenccd
by grammar; and grammarians are in a blue funk about philosophy (7, 8}. Only
a synthetic view, which attempts to go back to the communal source of the
organisation of lhe world and to the individual imagining the world, has any
chance of leading anywhere. And it is once again a theory of regulation
which can provide the approach. In effect, it is observed that the classical tables
of philosophical categories correspond to major types of questions, of question-
mgs which can be formulated in the language. Now the questions which we
address to our interlocutor are not gratuitous, lh.ey aim at providing us with
mformation necessary for our survival and for effective action. In other words.
the cutting into continuous reality effected by the queStion (or lhe meaningful
message we get in reply) allows us a better adaptation to the regulating reaction.
Different types of question correspond to a many different types of regulating
mechanism. These different 'substrates' carved out by the regulation are, in the
first place, space-time, the base space, the universal substrate; then come the
'excited' state spaces, which allow the triggering of reOexes, and which constitute
so many semantic spaces (spaces of qualities), spaces (semantic fields) different
from ordinary space (but which are fibred on it, in mathematical terms). lt
remains to understand the organisation of semantic spaces, the one with the
other, and this will, probably, only be done by a description of the individual
ontogenesis, a process during which the semantic spa.ces 'unfold' themselves into
the base space in successive strata.... It is clearly a vast programme which will
lead to the elucidation not only of syntax, but of semantics as well.
While lhe regulating mechanisms of a concept (in so far as it is a stable
organisation of mental activity) are postulated to be models (or a homomorphic
image) of the regulating mechanisms of the thing which refers to the concept, it
is conceivable that language ca'l offer a (relatively) faithful image of the inter-
action process (dynamical or biological) between natural beings. Language offers

t AfterI<Jint, only the profoundly origin<~ I mind which dro>-e C. S. Pelrce seemed to I.Jik• on
the problem of unl•er$41J.

294 Logos Phoenix [Ch. 16

a mirror of the world. not by a miracle of pre-established harmony, but, as a


consequence of an innate construction. The capacity manifested by the higher
primates to acquire quasi-spontaneously, in the sign language whlch they can be
taught, a mastery of U1e syntactical mechanisms of our language (the most
gross and hence the most basic) has greatly surprised the Uteoreticians, who have
seen in the syntactical organisation of our languages a specifically human charac·
teristic. For those who think like me that the most basic syntactical mechamsms
are simulated copies (deftned on an abstract space) of the major regulatmg
biological funct1ons (predation, sexual awareness), the matter is less surprismg....
Should this programme be launched, it will lead to the building of a kind
of abstract language quiie different from all that have been proposed up to now.
Neilher formal axiomatic system (lacking generativity), nor descriptive theory,
or model, in the usual meaning of the term, it will be first a catalogue of all
possible constructions of stable entities (the kJgoi, as l have called them else·
where (see Chapter I0)). This catalogue will certainly possess an internal structure,
for, by spatial association of Stable elements 10 interaction, more complex
stable global structures can be formed. The logot can thus construct themselves,
self-engender one with another, through progressive complexification, each
meanwhile being described by a continuous dynamical entity satisfying the
property of 'structural stabUlty' (in tile mathematical sense). But that will only
give us the universe of possibles. lt would be necessary consequently to specify
the universe of beings, that is to say, to state the foonal criteria, if possible,
allowing the characterising of those of the structures which are effectively
realised in the real world. First will nave to be deftned the natural forms (logoi),
then those of living beings, and, finally, those of thinking beings, like man.
Amongst the conditions which must satisfy these last structures, will be noted
'double entering': it is necessary to enter into the internal structure a copy, more
or less faithful and complete, of the environment, and the natural laws which
operate there. Here is posed the enigmatic question, por excellence: the world as
we know it, does it arise from an a priori determinism or is its state necessarily
left to chance? Nothmg obliges science to take pan in this debate; even if one
!cartS to the second point of view, it is no less evident that it is not tota.l chance.
for our world is more cosmos than chaos. lt remains thus to specify the maJor
directions between which, at some moment in time, evolution (phylogenehc
or temporal) has to choose, and we will work little by little to restrict the field of
our ignorance to whlch we give the name chance. In this vision of universal
language, all will not be given nor be played beforehand.
I do not conceal the extremely adventurous, even Utopia-like nature of this
vision; but if science is to be saved from extreme lnstrumentalism, from the
experimental inflation from whlch it presently suffers, and which threatens. at a
more or less late date, its social status, it will be necessary to inject a little
concern for theoretical unification wnieh it has lost in the last few decades. A
umversaHst programme of the preceding kind IS perfectly justified from this
Sec. 16.5] Th~ Categories 295

point of view. lt is not perhaps 'universal language', bur it Is a new resurrection


(perhaps a little more modest} of the eternal myth.

REFERENCES
(1] Thorn, R., Les mathematiques modernes: une erreur pedagogique et philo-
sophique?, /0-18,848, pp. 57- 88.
(2) Thorn, R., La science malgre tout, Organum, vol. XVll, ~;·ncyclopocdia
Universalis, L 'homme et son savoir, pp. 5 11.
[3) On this notion of semantic disengagemeni,see the article 'Lesmathematiques
modemes .. .'(Ref. [I]).
(4] Delanre, P., Report io C.N.R.S.,A.T.P .,Analyscdessystemes, 1978.
[5) Greenbeig, J. Ji., Some Universals of Grammar in Universals of Language,
M.I .T . Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 73- 113.
[6) See on this point, EntretJen sur les catastrophes, in Omicar, No. 16, 1978,
pp. 73-109.
(7) Benviniste, E., Categories de pensee et categories de languc , Les Etudes
Philosoph~ques, 4, 1958.
(8 ] Vuillemin, J ., De la /ogiquea la tMohJgie, Nouvelle Bibliotheque Scientiflque,
pp. 75- 80.
CB..o\PTER 17

To the frontiers of human power: Games

An account of a conference held at the Pompidou Celftre in the series: 'Le


jardin des sciences·. A rransltltion of this text has appeared in the American
joumal Substance. The systemic approach and tire theory of games are here
brought together in a productive manner.

17.1 TO UNDERSTAND OR TO ACT?


To understand the world, to act in the world, such are undoubtedly the aims of
science. It could be thought, in the first place, that these two aims are Indissolubly
linked. For in order to act, is it not necessary to have from the beginning a
thorough knowledge of the situation, and Inversely is not action Indispensable
to approach a thorough understanding of these phenomena? Such would no
doubt, be the case if the famous saying adequalio rei et inrellectus dear to
St. Thomas, always held In our world. But the universe in its immensity, and
our weakness of spirit are far from offering us always so perfect an accord. There
is no lack of examples of situations which we understand perfectly, but where
there is nevertheless a total incapacity to act (see again the example quoted in
Chapter 7 of man on the roof of his house as the floods rise). Conversely, that
there are situations where there is the power to act effectively but with no
understanding of the reasons, we can say, almost without exaggeration that all
medicine (past and present) is proof. Thus the clinical properties of aspirin have
been known and exploited for a long lime while a theory at the molecular level,
however uncertain, has only been proposed quite recemly.
All these circumstances, where there is flagrant inequality, in one sense or
the other, between our possibilities of acting, on the one hand, and ou r capacities
of representation on the other, are sources in man of an 'unhappy conscience';
for man does not attain a ·happy conscience', the full and entire realisation of
his personality, except in reasonable activity where the purpose and efficiency
are clearly apparent to him. The question of man 's abilities touches. as a con-
sequence, on the ethlcal. It Is this which Epictetus recognises when, at the
(Sec. 17.2) The Systemic Approach 297

beginning of his !Inchiridian, he invites us to make a distinction in our affairs,


between those whJch depend on us (ta eph emin) and those which do not (ta
ouk eph emln). For we can only be held responsible for those where we can act
in full knowledge of the cause; and where we cannot so act, it remains only for
us to put on a brave face against bad fortune, and accept stoically the verdict of
fate.
This view of U1ings is clearly very simplistic, for the world teems with
situations, where clearly we can intervene, but without a great deal of knowledge
of the effect of intervention. Such Is evident in relalions between people: who
has never had the experience where an apology, given in good faith to put right
an offence against someone, has backfued and made the situation worse. Even
with regard to ourselves it is often difficult for us to predict the effect of any
particular decisioal on our future behaviour.
These ambiguous situations are not at all confmed to socio-psychological
relations. They are found, just as frequently, in the natural sciences and it is
for thls reason that we have been led to create, in systems theory, the concept
of the 'black box·.

17.2 THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH


Such a system is contained in a box with opaque walls, and we can only know
the system through its explicit interaction with the external world realised by
the inputs and outputs of the system. it will henceforth be assumed that to
specify an input, is to be given a point u of a Euclid can space U of k dimensions
(a system of k real numbers, for example, electrical mteractions}. In the same
way, the output will be a point y of a Euclidean space Y of p dimensions. We
can in principle, fiX arbitrarily a value u of the input (it Is obviously the only
theoretical way to act on the system). The system (s) then responds with an
output y. Changing the value of u leads, in general, to changing the value ofy.
But it is impossible for us, m the majority of cases, to predict with certamty
the nature of the variation in the output. Ordinarily, there exists in space Y a
gain function G: Y - R whJch explains the increase that an observer can expect
in a value of Y. It will be a matter therefore of varyang the input u to u + t.u
in a way which makes the galn G(y +Ay) n maximum.
The area of influence of man in nature is thus not limited by the abrupt wall
which is suggested by the formulation of Eplctetus, but rather by a wide and
fluctuating band, a string of biDck boxes, the inputs of which we can modify,
but the outputs of which are not unmediately predictable. This 'no man's land'
frontier of human action is the domain of the gambler.
ChaUenging the fatalism of the moralist, the gambler Is he who, in the face
of no matter what situation, thinks that rllere is always wmething he am do. The
attitude of the gambler can scarcely be taxed as irrational, for , as we shaU see
later, If humanity has acquired the power whJc:h it deploys today, il is, without
298 To the frontiers of human power: Games [Ch. 17

doubt, because it has successfully gambled with the environment. There is little
to be gained from fatalism except, perhaps, a 'death in the faith'.ln an incomple-
tely understood situa(jon, any applied strategy, involves risk. Here appears the
moral side of gaming, notably the point of view of responsibility. Should those
who believe they are doing it for the best but who take an action which triggers
a catastrophe, suffer sanctions for their stupidity or their bad luck?
This points to the prknordial interest in techniques of estimating risks.
An exploratory strategy, initially prudent, then more bold, illustrates well, the
localisation of 'catastrophic' inputs of the system, those for which a small
variation in the input leads to an abrupt, dispropomonate variation in the
output. The current controversies about nuclear power are ittvolved in this
problematic, with aggravating circumstances where in thls case, according to
every probability, it will not be we who suffer from present decisions but our
grandchildren or great-grandchildren. finally, in certain particularly perverse
cases, the player finds himself, without suspecting it, in the situation of a mine-
clearirlg squad which, probing the soil, may inadvertently explode a mine. This
is a situation for which we readily find analogues in certain experimental pro-
cedures: notably in medicine.
That which, in the last analysis, justifies the gaming attitude is the fact that
the only conceivable way of unveiling a black box, is to play with it. All the
major technical and scientific achievements of humanity consist of unveiled
black boxes. Let us take, for example, the 'GalUean epistemological revolution',
which is at the origin of modern science and which has ensured its massive
success. It is foolish to go on saying that this was the advent of the experimental
method. For insofar as experimentation is a game, man .has played it, and highly
effectively, well before Galileo: notably with stone, fire and metal. it was a purely
mathematical step; that of recognising the notion of function. Unknown to the
ancient mathematicians the notion of function was forged among the sixteenth
century I talian algebraists, Uten lost sight of during the seventeenth century, not
to appear in its modem form until made explicit by Leibniz.
This notion accounts perfectly for a particularly simple type of black box:
those where each input u e U completely (and uniquely) determines the output
ye Y. In other words systems for wb.icl1 the passage of time has no effect on the
output, are systems without memory, and hence without an 'internal state'.
Once this idea is established in the mind, it remains only to search out those
phenomena which permit such a description (for example the motion of heavy
bodies). Thus this description develops more by 'thought experiment' than by
experimentation proper. In t11is case, the black box is reduced to a pure transition
mechanism: input -> output, yet still is no less capable of great complexity.
Even so, for a general system, the output is not a univocal function of the
input. All that happens to the system contributes to U1e value of an output: to
one input, there can correspond an infmityofpossibleoutputs.ln an intermediate
position there are black boxes where only a finite number of ou tputs corresponds
I
I Sec. 17.3] The Hermeneutic Approach 299

to one particular input. Such is the case of the black boxes governed by elemen-
tary catastrophe theory.

17.3 THE HE RM.ENEUTJC APPROACH


We can see that the essential task of the scientist is the unveiling of black boxes.
it is a tusk of interpretation, a hermeneutical task. Viewed from this angle,
science will perhaps be 10 a better position to set aside the cold pronouncement
made in 1929 by Heidegger: 'Science does not think'. The scientist, like the
phllosopher, seeks for the unveiling, for the etymological et - ).!jOf~a. lt is much
more than the simple statement of the brute fact .
What makes useful techniques for this task of interpretation? The most
readily available Is the analytic method.lt is reductionist: it consists of breaking
open the black box in order to see what there is inside. This crude method,
very milltary in spirit, appropriately appears to have been initiated by Alexander
cutting the Gordian Knot. Unquestionably, it has some success to its credit. But
to be really effective, the procedure demands that certain condttions are observed.
it is necessary at the outset that the elements arising from the destruction of the
system appear swble, reproducible and, by these facts. identifiable. As a con·
sequence, it is necessary that the dynamics of these elements be sufflciently
transparent in order that it can be formalised with a sufficient approximation
(and this condition is paradoxical, for the elements which have resisted destruc-
tion from the energy associated with the destruction of the system, probably
possess more opaque outer walls, more impermeable, than the initial black
box ... ; and further, watch out for artefacts!). In the end, tt is necessary that
the interactions between these elements do not lead to an over~omplicated
graph of interaction, but can be individually modelled in a quantitative manner.
If these conditions are not satisfied, then, it is not certain that knowledge of the
anatomy of Ute system will be very informative with respect to Its physiology. The
theoretical stagnation of neurophysiology in the face of cerebal functioning is a
reminder that it is not sufficient to know how a system is made In order to
understand how it functions.
Against this crude method wh !eh has the inconvenience, occasionally a
major one, of destroying the veritable object of study, a gentler method is to be
preferred. more respectful of the facts and of the entities to be examined.
This approach, which I will call hermenC!Utic, consists, by and large , of
reversing the well-known three states law of August Comte: lf the behaviour
of a system can not be described by simple law, explicitly formulated, try at
ftrst to describe this behaviour qualitatively with lite aid of tendencies, proper-
ties of an abstract character which guide it. And ii we cannot explain the data
Wtth the help of these tendencies then, despairing of a cause, unagme that a
'spint·,a psych ism (rite glwsr in the 1/Wclrine) , guides the system at least partially,
and try to g~t tmo its sfcm.

300 To the frontiers of human power: Games [Ch. 17

Faced with this programme, we could protest its irrationality, its abandon·
ment, apparently, of all the power of modem science. To this. it could be replied
that Galilean physicism has not done away with the Aristotelian 'qualities',
but has obscured them will mathematical formalism. If heavy bodies fall to the
ground, it may be either because they have a tendency to move to their natural
place, the centre of the earth, or because they arc subject to the potential
V = + gz (where z is height and g is the constant of gravitation). The two
explanations are as verbal as each other, the second having the advantage of
being quantitatively precise. Particle physicists who, classically, starting with the
trajectories after coUisions (diffusion) , determine the interaction potential (the
inverse problem) are doing no more than disclosing the 'deep tendencies' under·
lying every such collection of phenomena. A simple potential such as that of
gravity, V = gz , can be interpreted as the intentionality of a psychism: the
tendency of a body to seek its natural place, according to Aristotle. So, where
the tendencies are numerous, conflicting and tangled, it is quite natural to try
to organise them into a unique subjectivity, of which they will be the instantan·
eo us components. At bottom, it is necessary to resolve the problem of synthesis,
and then when mathematical synthesis fails (synthesis is deftned in general by
those mathematical instruments which are analytic continuation or the analytic
action of groups) there remains only 'subjective synthesis': as Comte himself
discovered.
In the face of a puzzling local situation, universal reason, the logos, is not
sufficient. it is necessary to have recourse to that skill, a form of artful intelli·
gence, which the classical Greeks caJled the 'Metis' [ l) . Ll is typical that all the
major achievements of mathematicians are due at the outset, to 'artfulness'; a
paradoxical situation, for in mathematics, a science of exemplary rationality,
progression is accomplished more by tricks than by general methods of great
weight.
Now ruses play a fundamental part in games; it is by artful thinking that
winning strategies in a game are determined. The herrneneutlc task, in the
face of a particularly enigmatic black box, is to be able to associate itself to a game,
in which the interpreter and 'the spirit in the box' will be the players. The
interpreter will h.ave won when he has seen through the strategy of the system's
internal demon and then the black box will be unveiled ....
This brings us to another justification for this 'subjective' synthesis. In
effect, the semantic study of language reveals that the most complex semantic
concept is that of the individual human (localised by a proper noun). Thus
while there exists. for a given situation, a hope of rendering it Intelligible, this
will be by seeing it in terms of the behaviour of human psychism [2]. Should
this identification fail, there remains little hope of having at our disposal psycho·
logical means which allow the internal simulation of mechanisms interior to the
system.
That such a 'psychologising' interpretation of the bermeneutic task is weU·
Sec. 17.4] Aermeneutics and the Theory of Games 301

founded, even in pure science.! require only proof the following fact: two kinds
of blacks boxes, not counting the straight functional relation, are practised in
science; the elementary catastrophe model, on the one hand, and statistical inter·
pretation, on the other, are particular cases of them. In order to prove this, let
us invoke the general schema of the theory of two person games (cf. I. Eke land
[3 J .•.).

17.4 HERMENEUTICS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES


Each of two players, Peter and John, has at his disposal a space which is identified
as his own: P for Peter, J for John. To play, each player chooses a point in his
space: p in P; J in J. Once these choices are made (independently of each other),
a third member, an authority (the "baJik'), detennines the respective gains of
the two players Gp ; GJ as functions GJ(p;j); Gp(p;j) of the chosen points. The
aim of each player is to maximise his gain.
But suppose then that the presence of Peter be unknown to John. John is
now in the presence of a "black box', the input of which is the pointj in 1, and
the output the gain GJ(p;j). The inverse problem can now be posed: which cases
of a black box with real output can be associated with a two-person game.
The reply is positive in two quite well known cases in science: first when
the black box characteristics are of the kind defined by elementary catastrophe
theory. The system has then an Internal spaceS, and the points representative
of the state evolving towards a maximum of the potential function V(S;u). S
can then be thought of as associated with an internal player (Peter), the gain
function of whom is exactly the poteniial V(S;u).
Here, the interpretation of the black box develops by endowing its interior
'spint' with a pennanent mtentionahty defined by the potential V(S;u) (this
potential itself bemg able to have a relatively complex topological structure}.
Let us now consider the case of a statistical interpretation. To an mput u
corresponds a cloud of points in the output Y. This cloud is centred on a point
y0 = t/J(u), and for every output corresponding to a trial, we can write y = y0 + 6
where y 0 is the 'signal' and ·s• is the 'noise' (we suppose in general thalli is
small). The classifying of the distribution of the noises (li) as a classic measure
like that of Gauss, accepts that in the box, besides the idea of the correspondence
u -> t/J(u), there is a demon for which the time space is a Euclidean space Sin
which the points chosen by the demon is directed In a 'stochastlc' manner, that
is, in a confused, ergodic manner, satisfying the central !unit theorem (that is,
the law of large numbers). The demon's gain Is thus defrned by a function
A = S -+ R which is taken as linear. Such a dynamic can be generated very
deterministlcally (for example though the systems called Anosov... ). In this
case, m its attempt at interpretation, the human mind confers on his presumed
partner only a very rudimentary mentality, that of a dronkm sailor whose
erratic progress generates a Browruan movement....

302 To the frontiers of hu.man power: Games [Ch. 17

Between tltis case and that of a lasting intentionality defined by a potential,


there is no doubt a whole range of intermediate dynantics to discover. Placed
between the stubborn determinism of a potential, and the gratuitious spontaneity
of an 'arbitrary' choice, they will without question be better able to simulate the
real behaviour of human psychism. Perhaps the Qualitative Dynamics of the next
few ye :us will be able to contribute to the exploration of this obscure field.

17.5 PREGNANCE OF CONFU cr


The need for 'subjective synthesis' comes about from a basic psychological
phenomenon: the pregnance of conflict.
Every obviously indeterminate natural (or socio..cultural) situation demands
notice , a commitment of attention by the mind. The demand of such uncer·
tainty may end in feeUngs of uneasiness should the deterministic issue of
the indeterminate process be a potential menace to our integrity. On the
other hand, if the process has no obvious repercussions for us, it never·
theless possesses a tremendous fascination. There is little doubt that there
is a general dynantical reason for this pregnance of 'chance':every uncertain
situation is analogically represented by a body in an unstable position, such
as a cone resting vertically on its point. The indeterminacy is reduced by
moving to a stable state, the falling of the cone on to one of its generators....
In this 'catastrophe', the passage from a Wgher level of energy (metastable
equilibrium) to a stable lower level liberates energy, and this energy can, by its
spreading in the surrounding milieu, provoke secondary catastrophes there, by
virtue of tlte principle of the 'contagiousness of catastrophes', and they may
be revealed as potentially threatening to our organism or to our interests. ll is
hence important to nave as exact an understanding as possible of the possible
outcomes of uncertain situations, in order possibly to act to prevent the appear·
ance of threatening c;atastrophes. or in any case to predict the spatial (and causal)
spreading of possible outcomes. The concept of 'tendency ' appe:u:s naturally in
this exantination of possible outcomes, for the choice of the most probable
outcomes corresponds to an innate 'tendency' of the system and it is initially
natural to interpret the uncertain situation as resulting from the conflict between
diverse 'tendencies' pressing for resolution. The paradigm of every uncertain
situation is 'conflict'. Man has a very profound phylogenetic and cultural history
of conflict, but this does not, however, exhaust, in the long run, the totality
of conflict situations which can appear in the narural or cultural mllieu.ln this
sense, the observing of the evolution of a connict is always rich in lessons for the
mind, which finds there either the satisfaction of revealed anticipation, or on the
other hand, a surprise which offers a puzzle for solu tion. In other respects, the
interpretation of an uncertain situation as due to a conflict of balancing amagon·
istlc tendencies often provides extremely valuable global insighu into the process.
Since, in a process, there has, in effect, been recognised a structure of
Sec. J 7 .6] The Anthropology of Games 303

conflict between abstract tendencies or more generally berween anthropomorphic


'agents'. the 'players', we may identify ourselves with one of the players and
try to imagine the winning strategy for this player. It is difficult for the mind, to
envtsage simultaneously the strategies of all the players taken In isolation. In
taking part the problem is considerably slmpllfted affectively, for any g~ven
player. it is an observable fact that it is difficult in a game, to take Into account
simultaneously the Interests of all the players (thus, in commentaries of games of
chess. the commentators are, m generlll, very hard on the loser, always identifying
with the here and now of the winner).
The necessity to participate in such a confiJct arises without doubt partially
from this incapacity to have an objective attitude. In identifying with a player,
one benefits from all the affective potential linked to such identification. And
this leads us naturally to consider all the problems raised by the game In so far
as it concerns man's cultural activity.

17.6 THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF GAMES


If it is true, as I have maintained elsewhere [4), that human consciousness only
exists as a goal-directed Intentionality, then, to maintain the existence of a
natural target in itS absence, consciousness must create a fictionlll object on
which to act, in order to attain the state of 'well-being' which accompanies all
desired and weD-programmed action. This is already seen in the animal: the cat
which plays with a ball of string as if with a mouse, projects the image of the
prey on to the obviously non-edible object. (There will be a place here for the
evocation of freaks of natwe (Jeux de la natwe ~.t spectacular realisations of
exceptional dynanucal situations and the problem of uncertainty are found once
again). In identifying himself with one of the actants of an external conflict,
man makes real the situation by prOJecting himself on to the external being, and
where he himself lives the conflict through the Interposed person. More precisely:
a first examination of the situation determines whether there is a potential
danger for us. [f yes, then we work to Identify with the apotropaic tendency wblch
favours a not-unfavourable outcome, one which preserves our organism (for
example: avoiding a projectile moving towards our body). My participation In
this kind of conflict, in a task of self-defence, happens automatical1y. In this
struggle the conscience will be content or discontented according to the perspec·
lives of success (or lack of success). But suppose that the conflict situation does
not reveal any threat to us. We will continue to be just as interest.ed In it, and,
most often we will identify with one of the agents of the conflict. This imaginary
participation will be for us a source of undeniable pleasure: suave, ITIIlri
n14gno ... (Lucretius: De Narm-a Rerum).

tTnnmtor's note: )cux de la nature' in r rench is more appo~te then 'fruk or nature' in
l' ngllih The word '•pon • IJ used In cenaln circumstances. 'Caprice' Invokes ' uncertainty'
nther than 'pme·.

304 To the frontiers of human power: Games £Ch. 17

One step more, and we will arrive at those socially organised, pure conllict
situations which are games of chance. There, the possible outcomes (like numbers
in a lottery) are equiprobable and completely interchangeable. One does not
identify as 'agent' so abstract an object as a number than by the procedure of
'betting', which consists of depositing part of one's wealth on the place attributed
to the corresponding outcome: like the gambler staking on a number in roulette.
There is hardly any question that behind the psychological mechanism of the
laying of a bet, there is in the gambler the quasi-magical desire to affect the
outcome of the process. (In a football match,lhe supporters of a club can act on the
morale of their team by their noisy manifestations of support).

17.7 SKILL AND GAMES


It is appropriate here to consider the relationship between skill and games. The
spectacle of a tightrope-walker fascinates us because we ourselves join in the
acrobat's fight with gravity. Is a work of art anything other than a denial. of
choice? It is certainly true of a work of art in a technological sense: viaduct or
tunnel, the work of art makes real the simultaneous passing of two actants in
conflict: a railway line, on the one hand, river or mountain, on the other. In
aU these cases we find again the phenomenon of r!rreshold stabiliSlltioll £5]. The
artist will be h.e who resists a fatal outcome, the coUapse onto the at tractors at
the lowest level: 'un coup de desjamais n'abolira le hasard' (MaUarme).
We may also talk of the theatre, that fictitious conflict offered as a spectacle.
While there is in the plot a reversible situation we are in the field of oomedy. On the
other hand, once irreversible outcomes appear, comedy veers to tragedy (the
ruin of the gambler) ; and should the irreversible overtake us, it will be through
the medium of the two tragic feelings, according to Aristotle: terror, if we are
subjugated, or compassion, if we preserve consciousness of our security.
Vertigo is the beginning of this Irreversible collapse. Vertigo (R. Caillois's
illinx [6]) Is really only a game when it happens in a periodic and reversible
fashion, otherwise it is a luring to death.

17.8 SCJENCEANDGAMES
But let us return to the game as a hermeneutic function, that which unvells
black boxes. It is a matter of discovering the strategles of variations in inputs
which are most likely to reveal significant behaviours of the outputs. In the
absence of pre-existing theory, we are reduced to pouering about, without
any great internal motivation. Here is the major vice of a modern experimental
science like biology. The scientist tinkers with his system, without any precon·
ceived ideas: 'lf I do this, the system does that'. On this count, we will be able
to experiment on a system quasi-indeflllitely, without every demonstrating
significance in the behaviour of the outputs. Consequently, the putting into
Sec. 17 .8] Science and Games 305

acuon of a valid theory is never accomplished. It will be said, In defence of


experimenters, that their aim is solely to pursue lbe game of discovery wilb
nature. This would be all well and good, if the experimentation was not relatively
costly. The scientist should be held responsible for the social cost of his experi·
ments. An experiment which does not lead to the support of a known theory (or
Its rejection) should be thought of as of no value. The disdain for theory that
manifests Itself amongst experimenters has as its source the analytic-reductionist
attitude, but despite this in order to discover a good strategy, it is necessary to
identify oneself to one of the permanent factors of the system. It is necessary
to ·get imo the skin' in some kind of way. It is very like a loving identifi.cation,
and how is one able to love things one has previously, and irrevocably, broken.
All modem science is thus based on the postulate of the stupidity of objects.
If this postulate appears sufficiently well-founded in physics (where theoretical
difncultics arise most often from the infinite number of entities to consider), it
is not so in biology (nor a fortiori in the human sciences). The phenomena of
adaptation of certain living species in the face of our chemical or biological
extermination policies should urge on us a little more humility. Rather than
stupidly attributing to chance, favourable neo-Darwinian mutations in order to
find a quick explanation, we would do better to ask ourselves whether there are
not similar structures to human intelligence involved. The idea that there be in
nature instances in which behaviour imitates, even exceeds, our own intelligence
and thus threaten our best-laid plans, is likely to provoke in us genuine anxiety.
For then our capacities to progress in the unveiling of nature vanish, and a grey
world, a world, it would seem, without games would emerge, a veritable tomb
of humanity. Useless now to evoke the existence of 'extraterritorial beings'
who dominate us. It would be sufficient to imagine that there exist beings of an
abstract nature, quasi-Piatonist, which can play lhJs role. All well-informed
science should accept t.his possibility and hold Itself ready to meet the challenge.

REFERENCES
(I I On the 'Met is', see the work of M. Detienne, I .-P. Vernant, Les Ruses de
I'Jnrelli'gence: la Miuis des Grecs, Flammarlon.
[2 j Recall in references to this, the reply of Oedipus to the riddle of the Sphinx:
'Man. Will he not be the paradigmatlcal reply to aU riddles?·
[3j Ekeland, 1., Topologic differenrielle et theorie desjeux, Pub/. Math.IHES,
13, 4, 1974, pp. 375-388.
[4 I Thorn, R., D'un modele de la science a une science des modeles. .S:vmhese,
3,1975, pp. 359 379, Reidel.
(5J Thorn, R.,Srructura/ stability and morphogenesis, Benjamin, 1975.
(6J Caillois, R., Les Jeux etles hommes, Gallinard, 1958.

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