Lopez vs. Duruelo Case Digest Lopez vs.

Duruelo 52 Phil 229 Facts: On February 10,

1927, plaintiff Augusto Lopez was desirous of embarking u pon the interisland
steamer San Jacinto in order to go to Cebu, the plaintiff em barked at the landing
in the motorboat Jison which was engaged in conveying pass engers and luggage back
and forth from the landing to the boats at anchor. As the motorboat approached San
Jacinto in a perfectly quiet sea, it came too ne ar to the stern of the ship, and
as the propeller of the ship had not yet ceased to turn, the blades of the
propeller strucked the motorboat and sank it at once . As it sank, the plaintiff
was thrown into the water against the propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted
various injuries upon him. The plaintiff was hos pitalized. He filed a complaint
seeking to recover damages from the defendant. T he defendant however alleged that
the complaint does not have a right of action, a demurrer was submitted directed to
the fact that the complaint does not alleg e that the protest had been presented by
the plaintiff, within twenty-four hours after the occurrence to the competent
authority at the port where the accident occurred as provided for Article 835 of
the Code of Commerce. Issue: Whether the motorboat Jison is a vessel provided for
by Article 835 of th e Code of Commerce? Held: The word vessel as used in the third
section of tile IV, Book III of the C ode of Commerce, dealing with collisions,
does not include all ships, craft or f loating structures of any kind without
limitation. The said section does not app ly to minor craft engaged in a river and
bay traffic.Therefore, a passenger on b oat like the Jison, is not required to make
protest as a condition precedent to his right of action for the injury suffered by
him in the collision described in the complaint.Article 835 of the Code of Commerce
does not apply. RUBISO VS. RIVERA Case Digest RUBISO VS. RIVERA (27PHIL72) G.R. No.
L- 11407 October 30, 1917 Facts: The counsel of plaintiff brought a suit alleging
that his clients were th e owners of the pilot boat named Valentine, which has been
in bad condition and on the date of the complaint, was stranded in the place called
Tingly, of the mu nicipality of Battings. The defendant Rivera took charge or took
possession of t he said boat without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff and
refused to de liver it to them, under the claim that he was the owner thereof. The
refusal on the part of the defendant has caused the plaintiff damages because they
were una ble to derive profit from the voyages for which the said pilot boat was
customar ily used. The defendant, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased
the subj ect pilot boat. The plaintiff alleged that the sale on behalf of the
defendant R ivera was prior to that made at public auction to Rubio, but the
registration of this latter sale was prior to the sale made to the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not, the plaintiff still has the better right over the subject
vessel? Held: Under the Code of Commerce, Art 573 provides: Merchant vessels
constitute property that may be acquired and transferred by any of the means
recognized by law. The acquisition of a vessel must be included in a written
instrument, which shall not produce any effect with regard to third p ersons if not
recorded in the commercial registry.
The requisite of registration in the registry of the purchase of a vessel is nec
essary and indispensable in order that the purchaser’s rights may be maintained ag
ainst a claim filed by third person. It is undeniable that Rivera’s right cannot p
revail over those acquired by Rubiso in the ownership of the pilot boat, thought
the latter’s acquisition of the vessel at public auction was subsequent to its pu
rchase by the defendant, Rivera. Yu Con vs. Ipil | Araullo (1916) FACTS •
Respondent, Yu Con (Yu Con), chartered the banca “Maria” – owned by petitioner
Narciso Lauron (Lauron) with Gilcerio Ipil (Ipil) as its master and Juto Solamo
(Solamo ) as it supercargo – to transport certain merchandise and money from the
port of C ebu to Catmon. • Yu Con loaded the merchandise and delivered the money,
placed in a trunk, to Ipi l and Solamo. • Allegedly because there was no more room
for Yu Con’s trunk, Ipil and Solamo trans ferred the money to their own trunk in
the stateroom. • Before the ship could sail, the trunk and the money placed therein
disappeared. ISSUES/HELD • Are the petitioners liable for the loss? – YES.
RATIONALE • It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss of the money occurred
through the manifest fault and negligence of Ipil and Solamo. o They failed to take
the necessary precautions in order that the stateroom cont aining the trunk in
which they kept the money should be properly guarded by memb ers of the crew and
they also did not expressly station some person inside the s tateroom for the
guarding and safe-keeping of the trunk. o All of these circumstances, together with
that of its having been impossible t o know who took the trunk and the money, make
the conduct of Ipil, Solamo, and t he other crew members eminently supicious and
prevent our holding that the disap pearance or loss of the money was due to a
fortuitous event, to force majeure. • Ipil and Solamo were depositaries of the sum
in question and, having failed to e xercise the diligence required by the nature of
the obligation of safe-keeping a ssumed by them and by the circumstances of the
time and the place, it is evident that they are liable for its loss or misplacement
and must restore it. • With respect to Lauron, he is also liable in accordance with
the provisions of t he Code of Commerce in force because, as the proprietor and
owner of the vessel who executed a contract of carriage with Yu Con, there occurred
the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to Yu Con through the
negligence of Ipil a nd Solamo and which theft does not appear to have been
committed by a person not belonging to the craft. • The old Code of Commerce
absolved the shipowner from liability for the negligenc e of the captain and its
crew but, in the light of the principles of modern law, this doctrine on the non-
liability of the shipowner for the unlawful acts, crim es or quasi crimes,
committed by the captain and the crew can no longer be maint ained in its absolute
and categorical terms. o In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in
making contracts with the captain do so through the confidence they have in the
shipowner who appointed h im; they presume that the owner made a most careful
investigation before appoint ing him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to
make such an investigatio n, and even though they should do so, they could not
obtain complete security, i nasmuch as the shipowner can, whenever he sees fit,
appoint another captain inst ead. o Thus, it is only proper that the shipowner
should be made liable.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19540 January
29, 1923

WING KEE COMPRADORING COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE BARK "MONONGAHELA,"

VICTOR S. FOX & CO., INC., owner of the bark Monongahela , THE ADMIRAL LINE, and C.
G. LOTHIGIUS, defendants-appellees. Luciano de la Rosa for appellant. Schwarzkopf
and Ohnich for appellees. MALCOLM, J.: The plaintiff in this case, Wing Kee
Compradoring Company, seeks to recover from the defendants, principally the Admiral
Line, as agent for the Bark Monongahela , the sum of P17,675.64, with interest and
costs, on account of goods, wares, an d merchandise sold and delivered by the
plaintiff to the defendants for the use of the crew of the Bark Monongahela. The
case, as submitted to the appellate cou rt, must be reconstructed as best it may,
from pleadings not altogether clear an d explicit, from facts taken in part from
the decision of the trial court, and i n part from the exhibits, the stenographic
notes not having been written up, and from the briefs on the questions of law which
are involved. Turning first to the pleadings, we find the plaintiff in its amended
complaint p raying for judgment against the defendants jointly and severally for
the sum of P17,675.64, meaning, thereby, we presume, that it had a just and
preferred claim upon and against the Bark Monongahela, and that the debt was due
from the Admir al Line, the agent; C. G. Lothigius, the captain of the boat; and
the owners of the boat, either Victor S. Fox & Co., Inc., or the United States
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. Captain Lothigius and the Admiral Line
answered. Th e owners were not cited to appear. No action against the bark was
taken. Followi ng the trial, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint,
without special fi nding as to costs. Turning next to the facts, the exhibits of
record show that b eginning with March 16, 1921, and ending with August 16, 1921,
various supplies were furnished the Bark Monongahela by Wing Kee Compradoring
Company. Most of th e bills for these goods are made out against the "Admiral Line,
S.S. Monongahela ." All are considered by the master and the first steward. It
appears, therefore , that the plaintiff was looking to the Admiral Line for
payment. The first requisitions for the supplies are on forms headed "The Admiral
Line." Then follows Manila, the date, and the name, "Wing Kee Compradoring Co."
Next is the order, reading: "Please deliver to S. S. Monongahela now lying at Bay,
the following goods and send bills to the Admiral Line:". After this goods are
named . At the foot is found, "United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporatio n," although these words are erased in a few of the requisitions, "The
Admiral L ine (Pacific Steamship Co.) Operating Agents. By J. J. Armstrong." On the
side o f the requisitions in red ink is the following: "Note: This requisition must
be receipted by either Chief Officer, Chief Steward or Chief Engineer and returned
to the Admiral Line, with six copies of invoice immediately after delivery of go
ods." After May 4, 1921, the requisitions seem to have been made out by the stew
ard and the master. We deduce from these documents that the Admiral Line was the
operating agent for Monongahela, and was responsible as such until the agency w as
terminated.
In the Manila Daily Bulletin for August 2, 1921, appeared the following: "Notice —
Bark Monongahela — The undersigned hereby give notice that they are not re
sponsible in any manner whatsoever for any indebtedness incurred by the Bark Mon
ongahela, its Master and/or Crew — The Admiral Line." The trial judge found as a f
act that on or before August 4, 1921, the Admiral Line had ceased to act as agen t
for the Monongahela. Nevertheless, supplies were furnished the Monongahela aft er
these dates by the plaintiff. Turning finally to the law, we find section 1 of
Title 2 of our Code of Commerce , given up to the subject, "Owners of Vessels and
Their Agents." The first artic le in this section (art. 586), and the provision of
law which in our judgment is controlling, reads: The owner of a vessel and the
agent shall be civilly liable for the acts of the captain and for the obligations
contracted by the latter to repair, equip, and p rovision the vessel, provided the
creditor proves that the amount claimed was in vested therein. By agent is
understood the person intrusted with the provisioning of a vessel, o r who
represents her in the port in which she happens to be. The civil law, in this
respect, is not at all dissimilar to the common law. By t he general law of the
United States, as well as of England and of Europe, it has been held, that when the
agents buy in their own names, but really for the acco unt of their principal, the
seller has an option to look to either for payment, unless (1) he trusted the agent
exclusively; or (2) by the usage and understandi ng of the business the agent only
is held; or (3) unless the special circumstanc es of the case show that only the
agent was intended to be bound and the seller knew it or was chargeable with
knowledge of it. Although the English rule that, where the agents buys in his own
name for the account of a foreign principal, th e agent only is bound appears not
to have been followed in the United States, ye t the general doctrine is the same,
that the seller has an option to resort to e ither. (Berwind vs. Schultz [1885], 25
Fed., 912.) Applying more directly the law to the pleadings and the facts, it is
first to be noted that the plaintiff has not followed out its allegation that it
has a clai m against the Bark Monongahela, and might not have prospered any way,
considerin g the rather dubious doctrine announced in the case of Health vs.
Steamer San Ni colas ([1907], 7 Phil., 532). Not only this, but the plaintiff has
made no effor t to bring the owner of the bark into the case and has pushed with no
enthusiasm its case against the captain of the boat. What apparently the plaintiff
wants i s for the Admiral Line, as the agent for the Bark Monongahela, to pay the
claim, leaving the latter to reimburse itself, if sees fit, from the owners. To all
this appellee answers that as the agency has ceased, action cannot be bro ught
against the Admiral Line. To our minds this is a rather far-fetched argumen t, for,
pursued to its logical conclusion, every agent for a vessel could thus a void
responsibility pursuant to article 568 of the Code of Commerce, by giving u p its
agency when threatened with suit to enforce the obligations of third parti es.
Moreover, the bills were presented when the Admiral Line was yet the agent. In
resume, therefore, we are of opinion and so hold that the Admiral Line, as ag ent
for the Bark Monongahela, is liable to the plaintiff for supplies furnished the
Monongahela between March 16, 1921 and August 2, 1921, but is not responsibl e for
supplies furnished after that date. The mathematical additions show that t he debt
of the Admiral Line to the plaintiff amounts to P16,526.29. In accordance with the
foregoing, judgment is reversed, and the plaintiff shall
have and recover from the defendant, the Admiral Line, the sum of P16,526.29, wi
thout interest and costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-32640 December
29, 1930

WALTER A. SMITH & CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CADWALLADER GIBSON LUMBER
COMPANY, defendant-appellee. Jose Erquiaga for appellant. DeWitt, Perkins and Brady
for appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.: On August 30, 1926, the steamer Helen C, belonging to the defendant,
the Cadwall ader Gibson Lumber Co., under the command of Captain Miguel Lasal, in
the course of its maneuvers to moor at the plaintiff s wharf in the port of
Olutanga, Zamb oanga, struck said wharf, partially demolishing it and throwing the
timber piled thereon into the water. Whereupon the plaintiff brought the instant
action to r ecover of the defendant the sum of P9,705.83 as damages for the partial
demoliti on of the wharf and for the loss of the timber piled thereon. The
defendant denied the plaintiff s causes of action, and in defense alleged th at the
demolition of the wharf was due to the excessive weight of thousands of b oard feet
of timber piled upon it by the plaintiff to be loaded and shipped on t he steamer
Helen C and to the bad condition of the piles supporting said wharf. In view of the
evidence adduced by both parties, the trial court held that the d efendant was not
liable for the partial collapse of the plaintiff s wharf, and f or the loss of the
timber piled thereon, dismissing the complaint with costs aga inst the plaintiff.
The judge who took cognizance of this cause held: The evidence shows that said
wharf was built in 1921 and repaired in 1925. The r epairs, according to the
deposition of Wilson C. Smith, a witness for the plaint iff, consisted in replacing
6 bents of piles leaving more than 9 old bents of pi les without being replaced.
Therefore, the wharf of the plaintiff was old. The c ourt is inclined to believe
that the steamer Helen C slightly struck the dock bu t not with force, for it was
difficult for her to strike it with force, as herei nbefore stated, and due to the
bad condition of the dock the slight impact was s ufficient to destroy it. The bent
of the piles toward the east side of the dock, as may be seen from the pictures
Exhibits E and F, after its destruction, does not necessarily mean that the
destruction of the wharf was caused by a strong im pact, as the weight of the
60,000 board feet of lumber piled thereon, after such slight impact by the steamer
against the dock, might have caused said piles to lean toward that side. We are of
opinion that this finding is supported by the evidence. In this connec
tion, it is to be noted that the witness, Dionisio Pascua (for the plaintiff) te
stified that the 60,000 board feet occupied one-fourth of the wharf. In other wo
rds, by the testimony of the plaintiff s witnesses it has been proved that the p
laintiff company piled up on the wharf a quantity of timber which exceeded its c
apacity of resistance, because if the whole wharf had a capacity of 100,000 boar d
feet of timber, one-fourth of it could sustain one-fourth of that amount, or, about
25,000 board feet of timber. But it appears that the plaintiff company loa ded
60,000 board feet, weighing over 100 tons, within a space capable of support ing
only 25,000 board feet. This must have helped to bring about the collapse of the
wharf on the eastern side and the consequent sliding down of the timber pil ed up
on one side. The court below did not make any definite finding as to the negligence
of the ca ptain, but the plaintiff apparently infers that there was negligence on
his part , considering the testimony of its witness Venancio Ignacio to the effect
that t he impact of the ship with the wharf was due to the excessive force with
which t he captain, ordered the winches to work. This was denied by the captain,
testify ing for the defendant. If, to this denial, we add the facts found by the
trial c ourt that said captain dropped two anchors from the prow and the kedge-
anchor fr om the poop, and besides, fastened two lines of cables to the piles
ordinarily u sed by vessels in docking at that wharf, as preliminary to drawing the
vessel al ongside the wharf, it will be seen that said winches must have been
carefully op erated, and if any force was employed in working them, it was
doubtless due to t he fact that the vessel had already dropped anchor and could not
move rapidly an d the drawing of the vessel up to the wharf was against the stream
which flowed from east to west. We do not believe that the mere statement of the
witness Igna cio who has not been shown to possess technical knowledge of the
maneuvers for d ocking vessels, is sufficient to justify a holding that the force
employed by th e winches on that occasion was excessive under the circumstances of
the case, es pecially so if the captain s testimony is to be considered, that the
winches wer e carefully operated. The witnesses for the plaintiff state that the
steamer Helen C struck the wharf twice, but the trial court, after examining the
evidence, found said testimony t o be exaggerated. As has been stated, the
plaintiff seeks to recover against the owner of the stea mer Helen C, with whom it
had not contractual relations basing its action on the acts of Captain Lasa who was
in command of the vessel when docking at the plain tiff s wharf in Olutanga,
Zamboanga. In support of its contention, the plaintiff cites the doctrine laid down
in the case of Ohta Development Co. vs. Steamship Pompey (49 Phil., 117), wherein
it was held that the defendant company, as shipowner, was liable for the
indemnities arising from the lack of skill or from neg ligence of the captain. In
the case cited, the steamship Pompey, under the command of Captain Alfredo Ga lvez,
was carrying cargo consisting principally of flour and rice for the plaint iff. The
ship docked with her bow facing the land and fastened her cables to the posts on
the pier. The evidence shows that heretofore other ships docking along side said
pier had the bow facing the land and fastened a cable to a tree situat ed farther
west on the beach, a precaution taken to avoid the ship getting too c lose to the
pier. When the Pompey docked, at the time in question, she did not f asten the
cable to the tree on the shore, nor drop her kedge-anchors from the pr ow. After
being docked, they proceeded to unload the flour and rice which were f irst
deposited on the pier and later transported to the plaintiff s warehouse on land,
where it was officially receipted for. The work of discharging and haulin g the
cargo to the plaintiff s warehouse was accomplished without any interventi on on
the part of the plaintiff and exclusively by laborers and the crew of the ship. The
unloading of the cargo on to the pier was hastily done and there being but fifteen
or twenty laborers engaged in hauling it to the plaintiff s warehou
se, a large amount of cargo accumulated on the dock. At 11:10 that morning, the
pier sank with all the merchandise. As may be noted, the facts in that case were
different from those in the case in question. In the former a contract of marine
transportation existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereas in the
latter no previous contractual rela tion existed between the parties. For this
reason, the case of Ohta Development Co. was decided upon articles 587 and 618 of
the Code of Commerce. But the insta nt case, dealing, as it does, with an
obligation arising from culpa aquiliana or negligence, must be decided in
accordance with articles 1902 and 1903 of the Ci vil Code. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code prescribes: Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or ne gligence shall be liable for the damage so done. And
article 1903 of the said Code states: The obligation imposed by the next preceding
article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible. The father, or in case of his death, or
incapacity, the mother, is liable for an y damages caused by the minor children who
live with them. Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated
persons subject to their authority and living with them. Owners or directors of any
establishment or business are, in the same way, liabl e for any damages caused by
their employees while engaged in the branch of the s ervice in which employed, or
on occasion of the performance of their duties. The State is subject to the same
liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have
been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act
performed, in which case the provisions of t he next preceding article shall be
applicable. Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages cau sed by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject th
ereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family t o
prevent the damaged. In the case of Maryland Casualty Co. vs. Matson Nav. Co. (177
Cal., 610, 612), i n an action similar to the present, the court held: . . . the
plaintiff could only recover, if at all, upon a sufficient showing of negligence on
the part of the defendants in the handling of their ship, as a res ult of which the
injury complained of arose; and if the finding of the trial cou rt, to the effect
that there was no negligence in respect to the matter complain ed of on the part of
the defendants, is sustained by sufficient evidence, there is an end to the
plaintiff s case. The same doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court of Spain in its
judgment of Ju ne 23, 1900, in deciding a case similar to the one at bar, where the
plaintiff w as a third person without any contractual relation with the defendant
before the acts were committed which gave rise to the complaint. In that judgment,
the cou rt said:
. . . the action for damages caused by an act or omission arising from fault or
negligence, requires an allegation of one or the other of said causes, which is the
basis of said action, according to articles 1089, 1093, 1902, and 1903 of th e
Civil Code; and such proof must be made by the plaintiff in accordance with th e
general principle of evidence regarding obligations as laid down in article 12 14;
and it is not sufficient merely to suggest — what at any rate cannot be admitt ed —
that from the mere existence of damage, liability must be presumed and that t he
defendant must rebut such a presumption. And Manresa, committing on article 1902 of
the Civil Code, among other things, s ays the following: Among the questions most
frequently raised and upon which the majority of cases have been decided with
respect to the application of this liability, are those r eferring to the
determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or ne gligence of the
person responsible therefor. These are the two indispensable factors in the
obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice there can be no
liability, and although this elemen t is present no indemnity ca be awarded unless
arising from some person s fault or negligence. With respect to the determination
of damages, it must be definite and the injury must not be occasioned by the
performance of an obligation or by acts or omissi ons of the injured party himself;
and for the proof of the fault or negligence, mere suggestions or inadmissible
presumptions will not suffice, but such evidenc e must be adduced as to exclude all
doubt regarding their existence and relation to the injury, for, in order to give
rise to an obligation, there must be betwe en the fault or negligence and the evil
resulting therefrom a casual relations. (12 Manresa, 601,602.). In Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), this court held that article 1903 of the Civil
Code is not applicable to obligations arising from contracts, but only to
obligations arising without any agreement; or, to employ technical l anguage, that
article refers only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractua l. Manresa (vol.
VIII, page 67) in his commentaries on articles 1103 and 1104 of th e Civil Code
clearly sets forth this distinction, which was also recognized by t his court in
the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359) . In commenting
upon article 1093 (Vol. VIII, page 30) Manresa points out the di fference between
"culpa substantive and independent, which, by itself, gives ris e to an obligation
between persons not formerly bound by any other obligation" a nd culpa considered
as an "incident in the performance of an obligation which al ready existed. . . .
In the Rakes case (supra), this court based its decision expressly on the princi
ple that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to a culpa not arising
from a contract. On this point the court said: The acts to which these articles
(1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code) are applicabl e are understood to be those not
growing out or preexisting duties of the partie s to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties, whethe r springing from contract or
quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are s ubject to articles 1101, 1103,
and 1104 of the same Code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, G ulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil.,
359, 365.).
It is not true that proof of due diligence and care in the selection of and inst
ructions to a servant relieves the master of liability for the former s acts; on
the contrary, such proof shows that the liability never existed. As Manresa (vo l.
VIII, page 68) says, the liability arising from an extra-contractual wrong is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission, which, while free from any wrong ful
intent, and due to mere negligence or carelessness, causes damaged to anothe r. A
master who takes all possible precaution in selecting his servants or emplo yees,
bearing in mind the qualifications necessary for the performance of the du ties to
be entrusted to them, and instructs them with equal care, complies with his duty to
all third parties to whom he is not bound under contract, and incurs no liability
if, by reason of the negligence of such servants though it be duri ng the
performance of their duties as such, third parties should suffer damages. It is
true that under article 1903 of the Civil Code, the law presumes that the master,
if regarded as an establishment, has been negligent in the selection of , or
instruction to, its servants, but that is a mere juris tantum presumption a nd is
destroyed by the evidence of due care and diligence in this respect. The Supreme
court of Porto Rico, construing identical provisions in the Civil Co de of Porto
Rico, held that these articles are applicable only to cases of extra -contractual
wrong. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.) This distinction was
clearly stated by this court in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leyn es (930 Phil., 624),
wherein the action was based on the defendant s extra-contr actual liability for
damages occasioned by the carelessness of an employee of hi s, in the performance
of his duty as such. This court, after citing the last par agraph of article 1903
of the Civil Code, held: From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when
an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in th e selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the sel ection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et d e jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. it follows
necessarily that if the em ployer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presum ption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.lawphi1>net This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately
on his own neglige nce and not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spani sh law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doc trine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant is conclu sively the negligence of the master. The
opinion of this court is thus expressed, to the effect that in case of extra
-contractual wrong, some fault personally imputable to the defendant must exist,
and that the last paragraph of article 1903 only establishes a rebuttable presu
mption and is on all fours with Manresa s authoritative opinion (Vol. XII, page
611), that the liability created by article 1903 is enforced by reason of non-pe
rformance of duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiorit y
existing between the person liable for the damage done and the person who by h is
act or omission has caused it. The defendant contends in its answer that the
captain and all the officers of th e steamer Helen C were duly licensed and
authorized to hold their respective pos itions at the time when the wharf in
question collapsed, and that said captain, officers, and all the members of the
crew of the steamer had been chosen for the ir reputed skill in directing and
navigating the steamer Helen C, safely, carefu lly, and efficiently. The evidence
shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plain tiff s wharf collapse was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and di rect a vessel of any tonnage, and
that the appellee contracted his services beca
use of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being s o,
we are of opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been
overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a f amily in
selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by t his court
in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all
liability.lawphi1>net By virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must
be as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Yu Biao Sontua & Co. vs. Ossorio | Romualdez (1922) FACTS On March 12, 1920, 2K
cases of petroleum and 8,473 cases of gasoline were loaded in the motor boat
Alfonso o The loading was done without the permission from the customs authorities
o The cases were loaded by means of straps supporting 10-12 cases at a time o The
cases were placed in the hold of the ship, which is 14ft from the boiler o f the
main engine and 4ft from the boiler of the smaller engine On March 13, the smaller
engine was in operation preparatory to the departure Subsequently, a fire broke out
with an explosion on board Alfonso followed by a violent expulsion of gasoline and
petroleum Due to the magnitude of the fire and the inflammability of the materials
and the proximity of the steamer Y. Sontua, the fire spread to the said steamer
Sontua brought this action to recover from Ossorio, the owner of Alfonso, allegi ng
that the damages were due to the negligence of the agents and employees of Os sorio
Ossorio contended that the damages were caused by a fortuitous event and are not
imputable to his or any of his agents’/employees’/mandataries’ negligence CFI ruled
in favor of Sontua and held that: o The explosion was due to the negligence of the
persons in charge of Alfonso o Ossorio is liable for the negligence of his agents
and employees ISSUES/HELD • WoN the explosion was due to the negligence of the
persons in charge of Alfonso? – YES. • WoN Ossorio, the owner of the motorboat, was
liable for the negligence of his ag ents and employees? – YES. RATIONALE Issue #1
Expert testimony introduced by Sontua shows the explosion and fire, which caused
the damages, are imputable to the negligence of the persons having charge of Al
fonso at that time. It was shown that: o Due to the manner by which the cases were
loaded, the cases would receive bump s resulting in damage to the cans and
consequent leakage (use of straps) o The gases formed by the volatilization are apt
to accumulate in a compartment without sufficient ventilation (hold of a ship) o
This accumulation will cause the gases to ignite upon comin gin contact with a
spark or upon temperature being sufficiently raised (smaller engine was in oper
ation) Issue #2 The rule is that where the vessel is one of freight, a public
concern or public
utility, it owner or agent is liable for the tortuous acts of his agents The Code
of Commerce further provides that the general liability of a vessel own er extends
to losses by fire arising from other than a natural or other excepted cause,
whether occurring on the ship, or communicated from other vessel, or fro m the
shore. This means that losses by fire are not within the exceptions (act o f God or
peril of the sea except by local custom) UNLESS proximately caused by o ne of the
exceptions Re: allegation that obligations under Art. 612 of the Code of Commerce
are inher ent in the master, the SC said that although such duties are inherent to
the mas ter, it does not Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 130068, Oct. 1,
1998 As a general rule, negligence in order to render a person liable need not be
the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with
one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the
injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is
not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it
being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. CONCURRENT
NEGLIGENCE: It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury
would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an
injury ar e concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not h ave happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes
and recov ery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor’s neg ligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the neg ligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
Contributory Negligence – where both the plaintiff and the defendant are
negligent , the damages to be awarded may be reduced by the courts (Thermochem Inc.
v. Nav al, G.R. No. 131541, Oct. 20, 2000) Burden of Proof Q: Who has the burden of
proving that the defendant was negligent? A: As a general rule, the person alleging
negligence has the burden of proving t he same. But there are two notable
exceptions to the rule: (1) where the law its elf provides for instances where
negligence is presumed; and (2) when the thing speaks for itself (res ipsa
loquitor). Exceptions (1) Presumption of Negligence Art. 2184: “It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding
two months.” Art. 2185: “Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
person driv ing a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was viol
ating any traffic regulation.”

Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC | Feliciano (1994) RATIO DECIDENDI
A ship’s captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary authority
to decide what the safety of the ship and of its crew and cargo specifically req
uires on a stipulated ocean voyage. FACTS • Captain Tayong was hired by Trenda
World Shipping and Sea Horse Ship Management through Inter-Orient Maritime
Enterprises for a period of 1 year. • He took command of Inter-Orients vessel in
Hong Kong. o He was instructed to replenish bunker and diesel fuel, to sail
forthwith to Ri chard Bay, South Africa, and there to load 120, 000 metric tons of
coal. • Since a storm would hit Hong Kong, precautionary measures were taken to
secure t he vessel’s safety considering that the turbo-charger was leaking and the
vessel w as 14 years old. • Captain Tayong followed-up the requisition by the
former Captain for supplies of oxygen and acetylene, necessary for the welding-
repair of the turbo-charger and economizer. • The vessel sailed to Singapore. o On
the way to Singapore, the vessel stopped in the middle of the ocean for 6 h ours
and 45 minutes due to a leaking economizer. o He was instructed to shut down the
economizer and use the auxiliary boiler ins tead. • When the vessel arrived in
Singapore, the Chief Engineer reminded Captain Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene
supplies had not been delivered. o Upon inquiry, the Captain was informed that the
supplies could only be deliver ed on Aug. 1 as the stores had closed. • Captain
Tayong called the shipowner, Seahorse Ship Management and informed them that the
departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected because of the delay in
the delivery of the supplies. o He was advised to contact Mr. Clark, the Technical
Director. o According to Mr. Clark, after being informed that the ship cannot
travel witho ut the supplies, Captain Tayong agreed with him when he said by
shutting off the water to the turbo chargers and using the auxiliary boilers, there
should be no further problem. o According to Captain Tayong, he was informed by Sea
Horse to wait for the supp lies. • Captain Tayong immediately sailed for South
Africa upon the delivery of the supp lies. • Upon reaching South Africa, Captain
Tayong was instructed to turn-over his post to the new captain. He was thereafter
repatriated to the Philippines. o He was not informed of the charges against him. •
He then instated a complaint for illegal dismissal. ISSUES/HELD WoN Captain Tayong
was illegally dismissed? – YES. RATIONALE • Confidential and managerial employees
cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any tim e, and without cause as reasonably
established in an appropriate investigation. o They are also entitled to security
of tenure, fair standards of employment and the protection of labor laws. • The
captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee. • A captain commonly
performs 3 distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the s
hipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel; and (3) he
is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. o The most
important is the role performed by the captain as the commander of th e vessel.
Such a role analogous to that of “Chief Executive Officer” of a present-da y
corporate enterprise. • A ship’s captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of
discretionary authority to decide what the safety of the ship and of its crew and
cargo specifically req uires on a stipulated ocean voyage. o The captain is held
responsible for such safety. • The captain has control of all departments of
service in the vessel, and reasona ble discretion as to its navigation. • It is the
right and duty of the captain, in the exercise of sound discretion and in good
faith, to do all things with respect to the vessel and its equipment an d conduct
of the voyage which are reasonably necessary for the protection and pr eservation
of the interests under his charge. o It is a basic principle of admiralty law that
in navigating a merchantman, the master must be left free to exercise his own best
judgment. o The requirements of safe navigation compel us to reject any suggestion
that th e judgment and discretion of the captain of a vessel may be confined within
a st raight jacket. • The master is entitled to delay for such a period as may be
reasonable under the circumstances. • Captain Tayong had reasonable grounds to
believe that the safety of the vessel a nd crew required him to wait for the
delivery of the supplies needed. o The vessel had stopped mid-ocean for 6 hours and
45 minutes on its way to Sing apore because of its leaking economizer. o Captain
Tayong did not maliciously and arbitrarily delay the voyage to South A frica. • The
decision of Captain Tayong did not constitute a legal basis for his summary
dismissal. Sweet Lines Inc, vs. CA Case Digest Sweet Lines Inc, vs. Court of
Appeals (121 SCRA 769) Facts: Herein private respondents purchased first-class
tickets from petitioner at the latter’s office in Cebu City. They were to board M/V
Sweet Grace bound for Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the
scheduled hour of about m idnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 am
of July 9, 1972 only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there
on the same day at a bout 4:00 pm. The vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972
at around 8:00 am. Instead of docking at Catbalogan (the first port of call), the
vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban. Private respondents had no recourse but to
disembark and bo ard a ferry boat to Catbalogan. Hence, the suit for breach of
contract of carria ge. Issue: Whether or not the mechanical defect constitutes a
fortuitous event which would exempt the carrier from liability. Held: No. As found
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no for tuitous event or
force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its un dertaking of taking
the private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place, m echanical defects in
the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that exempts the carrier from
responsibility. In the second place, even granting arguendo th at the engine
failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for the delay of d eparture. When
the vessel finally left the port, there was no longer any force m ajeure that
justified by-passing a port of call.