+(,121/,1(

Citation:
Kinfe Michael Yilma, Fake News and Its Discontent in
Ethiopia, 5 Mekelle U. L.J. 98 (2017)

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline

Sun Dec 17 21:33:21 2017

-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance

of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License

-- The search text of this PDF is generated from

uncorrected OCR text.

-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope

of your HeinOnline license, please use:

Copyright Information

Use QR Code reader to send PDF to

your smartphone or tablet device
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia

"Social media has [...] empowered populists and other extremists to exploit people's
genuine concerns and spread their message of hate and bigotry without any inhibition."'
Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn

Kinfe Micheal Yilma*

1. Background

The early days of the web were pervaded by anarchist views of cyberspace.
What later came to be referred to as 'cyber libertarians' declared that
cyberspace is the new alternative space where government power ends, and
where freedom knows no bounds. A staunch cyber libertarian and co-founder
of the Electronic Frontier Foundation John Perry Barlow in his famous
'Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace' proclaimed: "governments of the
industrial world, you weary giants offlesh and steel, I come from cyberspace, the new
home of Mind. On behalf of thefuture, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather."2

Cyber utopians like Barlow thought cyberspace - the space created by the
Internet and its applications - is distinct from the bricks-and-mortar real space
- or 'meatspace' as Michael Froomkin would call it later. Writing in 1996,
David Johnson and David Post echoed Barlow's vision of cyberspace in a more
academic tone stating that 'a new boundary made of screens and passwords
that separates the virtual world from the real world has emerged'.' Johnson
and Post argued that the rise of a new virtual realm meant the rise of new legal
rules and enforcement that operate in parallel with real world law and order.

*Doctoral and Teaching Fellow, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne,
Australia; Lecturer-in-Law, School of Law, Addis Ababa University (On Leave), Ethiopia.
LLB (AAU), LLM (Oslo), LLM (London), Dip. (Oxford). Email:
kinfedesta a) elb.edu.au or kin&ey 0a2aau.edu.et. A thank you is due to Mulu Beyene
- the editor - for the kind invitation to scribble this piece, to Halefom Hailu for retracing
useful sources & to Black Rose for all the lingering thoughts that don't let go.
' Quoted in, Ethiopian Leader at UN Assembly Decries Use of Social Media to Spread Messages of Hate
and Bigotry, (UN News, 21 September 2016), available at http://bit.ly/2jaVzDI (last
accessed on 18 February 2017)
2 See John Perry Barlow, Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, 1996, available at
https://www.eff.org/cvberspace-independence (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
See David Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, Stanford
Law Review, Vol. 48, (1996), pp. 1367 et seq.

98
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

Barlow and other cyber anarchists were inspired by two major attendant events
of the time. The most immediate factor was the signing into law of the Online
Communications Decency Act by President Clinton. This law - perhaps the
first ever 'Internet law' in the world - criminalized dissemination of 'indecent'
and 'obscene' content over the Internet while knowing that it could be
accessed by minors. Many felt that the law tramples First Amendment free
speech rights of adults under the guise of protecting minors. Barlow, who was
once a lyricist, drafted his poetic Declaration shortly after attending a cocktail
party - and as he recently confessed, in between dances and glasses of
champagne - held after the World Economic Forum in Geneva Switzerland.'

Parts of the Act that criminalized 'indecent' content dissemination were later
struck down by the US Supreme Court, and Barlow's Declaration was the
'rallying cry' by the time. The second factor was the mushrooming of several
anonymous online spaces, where pirated copyright and pornographic materials
were shared and illicit goods were traded under the mask of anonymity. This
later caused what is called the first 'crypto wars' when the Clinton
administration of the time pursued strict policies on cryptographic tools. The
cyber anarchist view has, however, shortly faded into the background as
governments began to assert authority over the virtual space. Contrary to what
the cyber utopians envisioned, cyberspace came to be the 'most regulable'
space, as Lawrence Lessig would put it later.5

Governments now - against all the odds - exercise significant authority in the
digital space. But challenges still remain especially in fully regulating what is
called the 'dark web', where numerous criminal activities take place shielded

See John Perry Barlow, Does Cyberspace Exist? Is It Free? Reflections 20 years Later on A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, (Freedom of the Press Foundation, 8 February
2016), available at http://bit.1y/2ko0L98 (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
While cyber anarchist views soon ceded to the reality of government - and substantial
private - power, views of similar touch emerge occasionally in various forms. An example is
the myriad of calls for Internet bill of rights - or Magna Carta for the web, as the inventor of
the web Tim Berners-Lee called it in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations - which
declare or assert seemingly novel digital rights of Internet users in the face of growing
government and corporate surveillance. For more on the Internet bill of rights project, see
generally Kinfe Micheal Yilma, Digital Privacy and Virtues of MultilateralDigital Constitutionalism
- Preliminary Thoughts, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol. 25,
No. 2, (2017)

99
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

from the watchful eyes of law enforcement by layers of impenetrable

encryption. Recent examples are the drug empire 'Silk Road' built in the dark
web as well as terrorism-related content disseminated by the ISIL. Problematic
digital content made available in the 'open web' also remains to be a constant
headache for governments. In a widely hyped address to the G-8 Summit,
former French President Nicholas Sarchozy urged Internet giants to work with
governments to 'civilize' the Internet.6 Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam
Desalegn is the latest world leader to express his frustrations - as partly stated
in the epigraph above- about the unpalatable rogue web culture of spreading
hatred and disinformation.

This essay picks up on the recent exhibition of rogue behaviour in the

Ethiopian cyberspace in spreading hatred and falsehood. Informed by measures
taken in other countries, it offers some thoughts on how best to overcome the
rapidly growing ills of social media disinformation campaigns in Ethiopia. For
the sake of convenience, this essay uses the terms problematic content, fake
news and disinformation interchangeably unless the context dictates otherwise.
Suggestions offered are likewise intended to apply to the phenomena of
problematic Internet content, disinformation and fake news campaigns.

2. The Rise of 'Fake News': Some Examples

We now live in a world of ubiquitous computing, where access to information

and communication technologies has increased profoundly in most corners of
the globe. This access is mainly purveyed by social networking sites such as
Facebook and video sharing platforms like YouTube, which have billions of
users worldwide. Most individual Internet users increasingly rely very much on
news and other forms of information shared through these platforms. Instead
of watching television, listening to radio or even directly accessing sites of
mainstream media organizations, many people now appear to prefer receiving
their daily news through Facebook or webcasts - or amateurish videos
uploaded by ordinary users on YouTube. In short, what Facebook's CEO Marc
Zuckerberg recently called 'cultural shift' is occurring in the way how online
platforms are used by society in accessing and disseminating information.

6 See Eric Pfanner, "G-8 Leaders to Call for Tighter Internet Regulation", The New York
Times, (24 May 2011), available at https://(oo.l/s7O8OE ast accessed on 18 February
2017)
See Marc Zuckerberg, Building Global Communiy, (Facebook, 16 February 2017), available
at http://bitlv/2kXPew9 (last accessed on 18 February 2017)

100
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

These online platforms - in keeping with these developments - now have

sophisticated software that determine what information should be allowed to
circulate in their platforms, and tailored to the preferences of each profiled
user. This increasingly - and worryingly -has transformed sites such as
Facebook from mere social networking platforms to the 'most powerful
editor-in-chief of the globe' as they curate vast amount of information
disseminated both by the mainstream media and everyone else including those
that disseminate 'fake news' or problematic content such as hate speech.8 At
times, fabricated lies that gain wider circulation on the web get picked up by
the mainstream media, and once reported in the latter, it is more likely to be
accepted as truthful information.

Concerns relating to problematic content are as old as the Internet but those
regarding 'fake news' and 'disinformation' have particularly heightened in the
year 2016 and counting.9 Several coordinated misinformation and
disinformation campaigns curated through social media sites have been felt in
several parts of the world. From Brexit, where the 'leave' campaign - aided by
the right-wing British media'0 - allegedly circulated information that misled
voters, to rejection of the Colombian Peace deal (the deal, fortunately, was
accepted eventually), to spurious claims of violent attack by immigrants in
Germany (which recently has been retracted") to the incitement of violence

' See Espen Egil Hansen, "With Facebook's Flaws in the Spotlight, Marc Zuckerberg's Silence
is Deafening", The Guardian, (20 September 2016) available at http://tinurl.com/j6v4ao
(last accessed on 18 February 2017)
9 Of course, as in the case of almost every earthly phenomenon, one also finds biblical cord to
the rise of falsehood: 'And manyfalse prophets shall arise and shall lead many astray'. See Matthew
24: 11.
'o One such media is the 'Daily Mail', which has openly supported Brexit - and run several
factually inaccurate anti-immigration, terrorism and crime related stories. See Luke Lythgoe
and Hugo Dixon, "EU-bashing Stories are Misleading Voters - Here are Eight of the most
Toxic Tales", The Guardian, (19 May 2016), available at http://bit.ly/1TGcXB. This,
among other things, has recently led to an unprecedented decision by the editors of
Wikipedia English to ban the Daily Mail for being an 'unreliable' source and for poor fact
checking, sensationalism and flat-out fabrication. See Jasper Jackson, Wikipedia Bans Daily
Mail as 'Unreliable' Source, (The Guardian, 9 February 2017) available at
http://bit.1v/2kPkTOU (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
See Nick Miller, "Report of Mass Sexual Assault by Refugees in Frankfurt was 'Baseless',
Police say", The Age, (16 February 2017), available at htt(://bit.l/2R7MMM (ast
accessed on 18 February 2017)

101
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

and spreading of hatred in Burma against Muslims, social media disinformation

has been a destructive force. The effect was also profound and consequential in
the US and Ethiopia as I shall explain below.

The 2016 US election has been controversial on several levels. The claims that
the victory of the current President has been - to some degree - facilitated by
Russia who allegedly coordinated a range of attacks to discredit the Democratic
nominee Hilary Clinton were, however, significant. One of these alleged
Russian-led attacks was that Russia had launched intensive campaigns of
disinformation to change the course of the election. This was mainly carried
out through dissemination of falsehoods about the candidates through social
media platforms mainly Facebook. These disinformation campaigns were
launched from websites which appeared legitimate to Facebook users. In
highlighting the enormous impact of the campaign, former US President
Barack Obama noted:

"[..] And, the capacity to disseminate misinformation, wild conspiracy theories,

to paint the opposition in wildly negative light without any rebuttal-thathas
accelerated in ways that much more sharply polarize the electorate and make it
very difficult to have a common conversation.,,12

The ills of disinformation have also reached Ethiopia, where the impact was no
less significant. The country was rocked by a series of protests since late 2015
that exhibited novel ways of airing grievance. In addition to generally peaceful
street protests in some parts of the country, self-declared 'activists' - who
mostly hail from the diaspora - have been actively engaged in 'hacktivism'.
Several government websites have been hacked, and defaced as part of the
protests.' 3 The protests, however, took a destructive turn. National
examination papers were leaked over social media, leading to postponement of
the exams and blocking of access to social media sites.
"

12 Quoted in, David Remnick, "Obama Reckons with A Trump Presidency", The New
Yorker, (28 November 2016), available at http://bit.ly/2f9hlGU (last accessed on 18
February 2017)
1 For more on this, see Kinfe Micheal Yilma, "Hacktivism: A New Front of Dissent,
Regulation", Addis Fortune, (14 February 2016), available at http://bit.(l/2k2TA07 (ast
accessed on 18 February 2017)
14 See Paul Schemm, "Ethiopia Shuts Down Social Media to Keep from 'Distracting'

Students", The Washington Post, (13 July 2016), available at http://wapo.st/2iMiKI8 (last
accessed on 18 February 2017). It has been reported that the exam leaks had costed the
government over 200 million Ethiopian Birr. Even after the exams were rescheduled to July

102
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

A number of falsehoods have been running in social media platforms. The

disinformation took a wild turn following the unfortunate stampede at a
traditional ceremony. Diaspora based 'activists' widely propagated that the
stampede - and the subsequent death - was caused by shootings by
government troops from a helicopter. And, they called for 'five days of rage'
through social media, which - with a dis-informed, emotional and mostly
unemployed youth - led to deaths and enormous destruction of private and
public property. The attacks also had taken racial tone in some parts of the
country. The alleged helicopter shooting was, however, shortly disproved by
independent foreign journalists." Government subsequently declared a state of
emergency for the duration of six months, and Internet access has been
significantly restricted in some parts of the country.'

Incidents of 'fake news' have also occurred in connection with other matters.
A more recent such news was that Ethiopia allegedly severed diplomatic ties
with South Sudan, and that the Ambassador was expelled.' 7 This was
immediately dismissed as untrue by both countries. Another relates to the
controversial travel ban introduced by the American head of state which some
sources wrongly reported that it would affect Ethiopian travellers." This had
stirred some dust but was soon disproved. False reports that allege dismissal or
death of higher government official - or claims of internal political fallout

9 2016, bogus claims that the exam papers are again leaked, and are on sale were circulated
on social media. The exams eventually were administered, anyway. The paranoia of leaks
have also led to the shutdown of social media sites (some even reported total Internet
blackout) since the end of May to early June 2017 during the national examinations. See
Ethiopia Blocks Internet Access to 'Stop Exam Cheats', (BBC News, 1 June 2017) available at
http://bbc.in/2rotCdM (last accessed 13 June 2017)
See William Davidson, "State of Emergency Likely to Ramp up Repression in Fractured
Ethiopia", The Guardian, (20 October 2016), available at http://bit.lv/2kfFP3x (last
accessed on 18 February 2017) [The reporter who was present at the festival notes: social
media activists characterisedthe bungled dispersal as a 'massacre',falsely accusing soldiers of shooting
peoplefrom a helicopter, and calledfor ive days of rage"].
16 It is to be noted that the State of Emergency has since been extended by four months. See
"Ethiopia Extends State of Emergency by FourMonths", Reuters, (30 March 2017), available
http //reut.rs/2rdceYF (last accessed on 13 June 2017)
See Ethiopia Cuts diplomatic Ties with South Sudan, (Ethiomedia, 24 January 2017), available
at http://bit.lv/2kFZdVY (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
See lifa' ,+Rdtl, PA a,g;7 APDP7l fM/I At'9P Y"A 2: (16 February 2016), available at
h!Wp/ /bitj T/2kAfZ6i; see also h(l.//bitj1y/2kfw110 (ast accessed on 18 February 2017)

103
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

within the government - or defection of high profile investors in opposition to

the government or alleged sale of land to neighbouring countries are rather too
commonplace." Sometimes these campaigns of disinformation and fake news
are run by platforms that are known to have links with or are avid supporters
of the Eritrean government, which maintains an open hostile policy towards
Ethiopia. 21

The actual impact of these campaigns is not clearly known, and most of them
have so far been carried out in a less coordinated manner to cause significant
damage. But some of them undoubtedly have the potential to cause suspicions,
uncertainty among the public and may also threaten internal security of the
country. Government's response to these and other threats posed through the
new media has, however, been haphazard as I explain in the next section.

3. Haphazard Measures

The Ethiopian government has a notably progressive track record in terms of

recognizing the socio-economic benefits of the Internet, and setting out a clear
policy path to reap these benefits. Ethiopia adopted its first national policy on
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in 2002, which has since
been updated in 2009 and 2016. Other related policies have likewise been
recently adopted by the government recently such as the Information Security
Policy of 2011 and the Broadband Strategy of 2016. Some of these policy
documents are translated into a number of laws including the several draft
pieces of legislation on e-commerce, e-signature and the more recently
enacted cybercrime and telecom fraud proclamations. Implementing agencies
have also been installed to roll the policies and laws into action. But the record
so far in developing a coherent and legally defensible approach in dealing with
emerging cyber threats is dismal. This is particularly the case in dealing with
the rising rogue web culture in Ethiopia.

'9 A recent example is here: Prominent Businessman Returned Home amid Rumours that He Fled
Ethiopia and Assets Confiscated, (Awramba Times, 28 January 2017), available at
hLtp://bit.ly/2m6aFsh (last accessed on 18 February 2017). It is also interesting to note that
Ethiopia's top sitcom 'Betoch' had run two episodes in Mid 2015 that touched on how
misleading information circulates in the fledgling Ethiopian cyberspace. See Episodes 100 and
101 of Betoch, available at http://bit.1v/2swlFGr and http://bit.1v/2sizdou respectively (last
accessed on 13 June 2017)
20 See, for instance, htt(s://www.tesfanews.net/ last accessed on 18 February 2017)

104
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

The government has been engaged in several measures which appear to be

ineffective, inefficient and legally questionable. Several reports often include
Ethiopia among countries that actively filter the Internet by blocking access to
several websites. 2 1 Unofficial reports have also documented blocking of several
dozens of websites. 2 2 Aggressive use of cyber tools for Internet filtering and
other major cyber operations have also been reported recently. The secret use
of Deep Packet Inspection - which could be used to sift through Internet
traffic, in addition to innocuous traffic management - has been reported since
2012.23

Ethiopia's cyber command - Information Network Security Agency (INSA)

-
has also been implicated in the use of intrusive cyber tools such as Finspy
spyware and Remote Control System against individuals whom the
government considers 'terrorists' .24 These have resulted in lawsuits abroad
against Ethiopia as well as a criminal complaint. 25 The form of measures grew
to Internet shutdowns and filtering of social media sites during the recent

21 See, for instance, Ronald Deibert et a], Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global
Internet Filtering, MIT Press, (2008), pp. 281-285; see also Open Net Initiative, Open Net
Initiative Annual Report: Ethiopia, (30 September, 2009), available at http://bit.v/212TBD6
(last accessed on 18 February 2017)
22 See these sources for a list of websites tested to have been blocked at some point in time:

http.://bitly/2jDHbFA; http://bit.lv/2kyASRO (last accessed on 18 February 2017)

23 See Ethiopia Introduces Deep Packet Inspection, (Tor Blog, 31 December 2012), available at

http: //bitly/ A0YRdc (last accessed on 18 February 2017)

24 For more on this, Kinfe Micheal Yilma, Developments in Cybercrime Law and practice in

Ethiopia, Computer Law and Security Review, Vol. 30, No. 6, (2014), pp. 727-728
25 See, for instance, the pending case of Kidane v Ethiopia, details available at
h ; see also Privacy International Seeking
Investigation into Computer Spying on Refugee in UK, available at h(://bit.ll/2kfTTWB (ast
accessed on 18 February 2017). The law suit has recently been rejected by the US Court of
Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court's decision relied on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. which generally exempts
states from civil suits in American courts. Moreover, the appellant's claim under the 'non-
commercial tort' exception of the Act failed because the alleged spying (which Ethiopia
appeared not to have disputed factually) was launched from outside America. See John Doe
(Kidane) v The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, USCA 16-7081, 14 March 2017.
Electronic Frontier Foundation et al has since lodged a request for rehearing or en banc
proceeding by the all judges (full court) of the Court of Appeals. See EFF Urges Court to Roll
Back Ruling Allowing Remote-Control Spying, (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 13 April 2017),
available http://bit.lv/2sizKXt (last accessed on 13 June 2017)

105
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

deadly protests in some parts of the country. The measure was taken following
the leaking of national examination papers on social media sites.

These measures are problematic in three respects. First, the sporadic and
piecemeal approach of the government reduces the effectiveness of these
measures. Responses of the government are often reactive, uncoordinated and
as such fall short of resulting in long-term solutions. Blocking social media sites
and Internet shutdown merely offer short-term respite. There is no guarantee
that similar or even more damaging incidents would not occur once Internet
access is restored. The Government's measures appear not to be guided by
clear goals, and are taken randomly just to quell the dust for a while. This robs
them of any value to sustainably address the ever rising and damaging rogue
web culture in Ethiopia.

Second, there are no known rules and procedures by which these measures are
taken. Little is known about how blocked sites are selected, who does the
selection, and whether it is possible to challenge such decision. The same
applies with respect to use of DPI, Internet shutdowns and engagements in
shoddy hacking and spying practices. This raises questions of legality both
under domestic and international law, and as such impinges on several rights
such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression and due process rights.
Chances of overreach are also higher when measures are taken randomly and
without clear accountability mechanisms. 26

Third, the efficiency - both economic and diplomatic - of these measures is

questionable. A recent report has indicated that Internet shutdowns have
resulted in an estimated loss of eight million dollars to the fledgling Ethiopian
economy.27 Recent leaks have also revealed that the Ethiopian government has
spent about a million dollars for buying spyware and other cyber tools. 28 And,
having read the Hacking Team's - one of the companies who sold these tools
-

26 For more on this, see Kinfe Micheal Yilma, Data Privacy Law and
Practice in Ethiopia,
International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 5, No. 3, (2015), pp. 183-184
27 See Internet ShutDowns Cost $2.4 Billion Last Year, (The Brookings Institution, 6 October

2016), p. 8 available at http://brook.gs/2eLlOff (last accessed on 18 February 2017)

28 See Andy Greenberg, "Hacking Team Breach Shows a Global
Spying Firm Run Amok",
WIRED, (June 7, 2016), available athttp://bit.ly/1HbExK (last accessed on 18 February
2017)

106
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

leaks, where Ethiopian authorities are ridiculed for poor use of the tools, one is
bound to question the wisdom in making such expenditure. 29

In the diplomatic front, frequent association with censorship, labels of

repression and authoritarianism haunts Ethiopian authorities in almost every
engagement with foreign donors and dignitaries. This must have been a very
uncomfortable topic for our officials. The diplomatic fire fighting is not also
without its economic costs. A recent report has revealed that Ethiopia spends
millions of dollars for lobbying American lawmakers to, among others, block
the passing of bills that paint the country's image in the negative light such as
frequent references to some people in jail as 'political prisoners' or 'prisoners
of conscience' or labelling the government as 'authoritarian'. One could
expect similar costly lobbying campaigns on the other side of the Atlantic
especially given some strong anti-government voices in the European
Parliament.

Ethiopia's unique position as a diplomatic capital of Africa also makes

restriction of Internet access a cause for concern. More recently, Addis Ababa
based diplomats have actually quizzed Ethiopian officials including the Premier
on a number of occasions about the Internet shutdowns, and the effect on their
operations." Doubtless, frequent and random practices of restricting access to
the Internet are likely to lend new weight to those who are not happy about
this diplomatic position. I proffer some suggestions below on how to mitigate
these concerns while at the same time upholding rule of law in the Ethiopian
cyberspace.

4. Overcoming Fake News: Some Thoughts

Ethiopia is just beginning to see the menace of 'fake news' and disinformation
campaigns. With increasing Internet access, rise of extremist foreign based
media (traditional and new), shrinking independent local media and apparent

29 See Daniel Berhane, Ethiopia: Hacking Team Irked by INSA's 'Reckless and Clumsy Usage', (Horn
Affairs, 9 July 2015), available ath t://bit.lv/21zklvp (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
'o See Ethiopia to Spend $1.8 million in 2017 for Lobbying - Nazret.com Exclusive, Nazret,
13 February 2017, available at http://bit.1y/2ko3XR (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
3 See Prime Minister Hailemariam Briefs Addis Ababa-based Diplomats
on the Current Situation,
(FDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, 17 November 2016), available at
htt (ast accessed on 18 February 2017)
(//bit.l/2kZKxlS

107
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

distaste to state-run media, the threat is yet to increase and prove destructive.
This state of affair requires the government to take a range of measures. Of
imperative measures, I briefly outline four here. First, the government must
break away from its habitual piecemeal approaches such as temporary
shutdown of the Internet, and follow a considered and sustainable policy path
to meet the challenge head on. It has taken encouraging steps in rolling out
useful policy documents such as the information security policy. These policy
documents, however, must be revitalized based on new developments and put
forward clear policy direction.

The ruling party has recently acknowledged the threats of 'fake news' and
disinformation, and has vowed to create a 'social media army' to counter the
challenge by providing accurate information to the public. 3 2 Along these lines,
reports have indicated recently that the government adopted a Council of
Ministers regulation for the establishment of a 'Cyber Talent Development
Institute' [Author's literal translation]." Of the stated roles of the Institute
include training an ethical, educated and patriotic cyber army that responds to
the country's 'cyber war'. The envisioned cyber combatant roles of future
trainees sound absurd but we shall wait and see how the said regulation reads
once published in the law gazette in due course. That the government pursues
the case of a social media army openly, and with a clear legal framework is
promising. This creates a sense of certainty, and hopefully accountability.
However, it must be taken at national level, and pursued more vigorously.
Such efforts would allow the government to look into long-term measures in
dealing with not just fake news but also all other forms of hybrid threats
presented by the Internet.

Countries like China - known for their fierce online censorship - have been
suspected of secretly hiring about two million individuals to weigh in on social
media debates on behalf of the government." But these government employees

32 see m'Y' q7?i: hwa a)W'Jn ~7~ thl',' e-49ftW) ;v': gZCl4 c (.:J10 5
wqmh+.
2009), available at http://bit.y/2k380nS (last accessed on 18 February 2017); see also

2009), 7q 76-96
33 k ft a ~j,~
See 9fhCfL-P ?'W)l*W71Q Aa )T h+&L-Y'5 Mg=l .:J'A AXQ7'
11, ±mf'f: AN' .L: (W,91LY 15 ` 2009), available at http://bit.lv/2nV9HDx (last
accessed on 18 February 2017)
See generally Gary King et a], How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Postsfor
Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument, American Political Science Review, Vol. 11,
(2017)

108
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

do not appear to engage in constructive debates but in infusing onto social

media sites information that praises the government, and its achievements,
thereby overwhelming users engaged in other useful debates. Ethiopia's
planned social media army must distance itself from such unhelpful
engagements as this would further distort the flow of information, burden
legitimate speech, and ultimately reinforce fake news." The aim should rather
be to counter falsehood by presenting the public with truthful information
based on reliable and verifiable facts, than to dictate the truth.

Second, the government must adopt clear rules by which measures such as
blocking of websites, Internet shutdowns or even offensive or defensive cyber
operations are taken for legitimate purposes. The procedures by which
websites are assessed for filtering, the body responsible for such assessment and
an oversight mechanism by which requests for blocking or other measures
could independently be assessed must be clearly spelt out by law. In the
absence of transparent rules, these measures risk impinging upon human rights
enshrined under international and domestic laws, such as the right to freedom
of expression, the right to privacy and due process rights. Transparent and
accountable procedures also avoid unnecessary but damaging diplomatic blows
and image tarnishing reports of human rights groups.

Ethiopia already has some laws that could potentially apply to the advent of
fake news and disinformation on the Internet such as the computer crime law
of 2016.36 But a law dedicated to address problematic content generally is
warranted. The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology has
recently commissioned a comprehensive study on the development of an
online content regulatory framework. The Consultant - to which the author
has been a lead investigator - has presented a comprehensive report to the

"See Kinfe Micheal Yilma, Molliying the Web in Ethiopia, Matching Practice to Policy, Horn
Africa Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 2, (March/April 2017), available at http://bit.ly/2swAicV
16 For more on this, see generally Kinfe Micheal Yilma,
Ethiopia's New Cybercrime Legislation:
Some Reflections, Computer Law and Security Review, Vol. 33, No. 2, (2017); see also of the
same title in Mizan Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, (2016)

109
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

Ministry for further action. A future legislation based on this study could be a
pertinent instrument to address the matter.

Third, the threats of fake news and disinformation could barely be addressed
unless the government put in place a dedicated and well-equipped institution
that monitors, assesses and determines websites or social media accounts that
pose real threats to the country. Useful lesson could be drawn from the recent
experience of other countries. In the awake of the controversial 2016 US
election, the Congress, for instance, has adopted the 'Countering Disinformation
and PropagandaAct' as part of the broader 'National Defence Authorization Act'
in late 2016. The Act envisages establishment of a 'Global Engagement Centre'
within the Department of State, with the involvement of representatives from
other departments including the Department of Defence, to 'lead,
synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize,
understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and
disinformation efforts aimed at undermining national security interests'. 38

The Czech Republic - which reportedly is targeted by about four dozens of

fake news sites accessed by 25% of the population - similarly has installed a
new institution within the Ministry of Interior.3 The Center against Terrorism
and Hybrid Threats is tasked to deal with, among other things, foreign
disinformation campaigns. 40 The Center is an investigative body that monitors
the public information sphere, assesses threats to internal security and submits
reports to the Ministry for further action.

African countries have also created new institutions to deal with related
matters but way before the recent 'fake news' debacle. Kenya, for instance,
has established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission - following
the 2008 post-election ethnic violence - to 'investigate complaints of ethnic or
racial discrimination and make recommendations to the Attorney General, the

1 See Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, Development of Online Content

Regulatory Legal Framework for Ethiopia: Situational Analysis Report, June 2016 (On file with
author)
" See National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 1 14 h Congress of the United
States S. 2943, 2016, Section 1287.
39 See Rob Cameron, Fake News: Czechs Try to Tackle Spread of False Stories, (BBC News, 2
February 2017), available at http://bbc.in/2kXYGRd (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
40 See details about the Centre here: http://bitly/2kbovbB (last accessed on 18 February
2017)

110
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

Human Rights Commission or any other relevant authority' on the remedial

measures to be taken where such complaints are valid."

The Commission has recently floated two vacant posts: Social Media Monitors
(to identify sites or accounts that spread hatred) and Social Media
Investigations Officer (to investigate identified accounts and adduce evidence
before courts of law). 42 These are advertised following the rise of hate speech
on social media platforms including by members of Parliament in the run up to
the election in August 2017.

As early as 2002, South Africa has also established a body called 'Cyber
Inspector' with broader powers under the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act of 2002. Cyber Inspectors are empowered to monitor and
inspect any web site or activity on an information system in the public domain
and report any unlawful activity to the appropriate authority and to conduct
searches and seizures to prevent or tackle illegal activities on the Internet with
court warrants.

With the proper regulatory and procedural safeguards as well as an oversight

mechanism, a dedicated body could be installed within Ethiopia's INSA to deal
with matters of 'fake news' and disinformation campaigns. This would make
sense as the Agency is responsible for coordinating the country's cyber
response against all forms of threats posed in the cyber realm. Of statutory
powers of INSA, its authority to take measures to counter all forms of cyber
threats, collect, analyze and disseminate information on trans-boundary cyber
threats to national security as well as power to conduct cyber operations makes
it the right institution to deal with menacing hybrid threats in cyberspace.
This is more so given that hybrid threats such as disinformation campaigns are

4 See National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008, Section 25 (2 (h)), available at
hLt ://bit.I /IZRdbX (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
42See Lynetlgadwah, "Agency Hiring Social Media Monitors to Track Hate Mongers',
Business Daily, (January 11, 2017), available at http://bit.1/2iPOlXO (last accessed on 18
February 2017)
* See Electronic Communications and TransactionsAct, 2002 (as amended), Sections 81-82
See Information Network Security Agency Re-establishment Proclamation, Federal Negarit
Gazeta, Proclamation No. 808/2013, Art 6(4 & 14); Council of Ministers Regulation to
Provide for Execution of Information Network Security Agency Reestablishment
Proclamation, Federal Negarit Gazeta, Regulation No. 320/2014, Art 9 cum Art 2(5)

111
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

increasingly posing threats to national security worldwide. That some

members of the diaspora actively engaged in these campaigns are apparently
working with foreign state actors makes the matter more of a national security
concern. This makes INSA a more pertinent body in this particular scenario.

Measures taken to tackle threats to internal security must, however, not open
the door for an overreach. Powers of institutions charged with such powers
must be upended with an oversight mechanism in the form of judicial - or, at
least ministerial oversight. INSA already has the power to launch cyber
operations by its own motion -and based on a request from the federal and
state governments- but without judicial oversight. This must be reformed to
require some form of independent oversight so that measures do not overrun
fundamental rights and freedoms. With a proper oversight and accountability
mechanism - and of course proper capacity building - introduced into the
present regime, INSA could be a useful body to coordinate the country's
efforts towards tackling emerging cyber threats.

Fourth, the government must also take some practical measures that reinforce
the above measures. One important practical measure is to support the local
independent media to engage in professional journalism. This would
significantly aid in countering disinformation campaigns as the rise of fake news
and disinformation is attributable partly to the lackluster approach of the
mainstream media to the truth. With reliable information from trusted media
organizations, social media users are less likely to be allured by fake news. Fake
news could significantly be countered with authentic news. The government
support to the media could take both hands on and hands off forms.

On top of building the capacity of the media, the government should comply
with requests of the media for information. The government's apparent heavy-
handed approach towards the media must be reversed, and the relationship
must be built on a new ground. Measures that tend to pull the media towards
extreme views must be eased to allow a balanced, impartial and professional
journalism that purveys for the public good. Instead of seeing the media as the
'opposition', the government must develop trust and thick skin to harbor
criticism. This, of course, does not absolve the media from responsibilities to
distance themselves from practices that undercut their reliability, impartiality
and loyalty to public interest. More so in the case of the state-run media,
whose misguided approach has actually lent weight for the spread of distorted
information on the web.

112
 'Fake News' and Its Discontent in Ethiopia - A Reflection

The state-run media may not have been engaged in disinformation - or may
not have run fake news as such - but it has clearly been under-informing the
public. This has allowed for it to be overrun by 'fake news'. In the campaign to
reclaim the truth in public discourse, government must reorient its self-
inflicting use of the public media. Reclaiming the truth must start with
allowing the public to reclaim its media that serves the interest of all. A truly
public media that professionally, impartially and independently serves the
interests of all voices will have the potential to considerably overcome the
falsehood mill easily and effectively.

Another crucial practical measure is to engage in raising awareness of the

public about the ills of problematic content on the Internet. Most of the rogue
web culture flourishing in the Ethiopian cyberspace is a result of lack of
awareness about the legal and ethical consequences of some social media
activities. This is understandable given that the Internet is a recent
phenomenon in Ethiopia but it must carefully be addressed by teaching ethical
use of social media. The best way to deliver this is through already existing
subjects like civic and ethical education. Didactic measures about Internet
etiquettes starting from primary schools would significantly reduce rogue web
culture among the gullible youth. Responsible use of social media or other
web platforms - which could very well be attained through awareness raising
measures - is crucial in eroding the rein of fake news and disinformation.

All the above measures are essentially local which the Ethiopian government
could achieve on its own accord. But that is not enough to address the matter
fully. The global nature of the Internet and Internet firms such as Facebook and
YouTube makes national measures half full. This is more so because most of
the problematic content targeted at Ethiopian users emerge from overseas
particularly from some groups of the Ethiopian diaspora. International
cooperation mechanisms, both with Internet firms and states where some of
the perpetrators reside must be sought. This would permit targeted measures
against perpetrators rather than indiscriminate measures such as blocking sites
or shutting down the Internet.

113
Mekelle University Law Journal Vol. 5 (1) June 2017

Recent developments, especially the dialogue with American State Department

officials on how to counter hate speech on the Internet is encouraging." The
government must further seek collaboration with other countries as well as
Internet firms that have strong user base in Ethiopia. Useful lessons could be
drawn from the European Commission, which has recently joined forces with
big tech firms, such as Facebook, to jointly deal with extremist and hate speech
in online platforms through a co-regulatory mechanism." The Premier's
unprecedented frustration expressed at a global stage should serve as a genuine
motivation for an effective, efficient and legally defensible response to the 'fake
news' phenomenon. In present day Ethiopia, where destructive 'activism' is as
fashionable as ever, robust policy, legal and institutional mechanisms must be
put in place to tame the rising rogue web culture.

See US and Ethiopia Hold 7t Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Bilateral Working Group
in Addis Ababa, (Joint Press Release, December 2016), available at
https://ethionia.usembassv.pov/prl21616.htm1 (last accessed on 18 February 2017)
46 See European Commission, European Commission and IT Companies Announce Code of Conduct
on Illegal Online Hate Speech, (Press Release, 31 May 2016), available at
https: //goo. I/FV9ARf (last accessed on 18 February 2017)

114