DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Republic of the Philippines MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de
Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to
the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the
presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to
a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996
of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6,
1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by
the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law
by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately
after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman
obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40
p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three
points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three
other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17
appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not
contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum,"
which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point
as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for
purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are
in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is
a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the
House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or
nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the
presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of
Rule XVI, §97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's
motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123,
and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is
alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been
resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at
the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence
of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had
been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed
membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the
enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the
House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution
provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules
cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that
relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend
that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary
precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee
Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of
petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed
a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by
some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña
v. Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said
that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within
the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of
the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by
a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of
any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any
business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all
powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the
servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has
acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the
legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no
inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they
may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for
three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso
that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule.
Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending
that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on
three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It
may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for
the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider
an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding
his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature
had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it
was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made
by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50
N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting
on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to
this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question
in a case where private rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the
internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no
violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which
the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part
to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the
invitation to exercise our power.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of
the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this
statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is
subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally
left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether
done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have
already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation
in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call
for the exercise of our Art. VIII. §1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo
was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same
time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the
members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare
because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs
Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by
Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on
his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the
Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial
compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?"
and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt
as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume
that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants
a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how
many are against. 22
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and
even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any
matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide
a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the
constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last
and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the
members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was
suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep.
Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4
p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he
wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in
the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the
proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or
a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the
question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself
said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the purpose
of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the
sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21,
1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have
objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the
bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but
not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Tañada would have
voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no
claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill
embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal
to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been
obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts."
39
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned,
democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to
patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained
provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no
more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a
bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of
Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here
and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody
of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance
by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with
a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on
the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have
departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four
new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the
change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House
of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A.
No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4)
provides:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character,"
thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or
at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill
which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion
made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or
the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., concurs in the result.
Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII,
of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed,
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing
the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as,
and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent
disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province the
specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted
intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time,
it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the
new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume
jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues — is
shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion
cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the
vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my
firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by
petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who,
incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely
disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues.
My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach
and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in
the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under
the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority
exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as
presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or
obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their
application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to
emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself. Thus:
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that attended
the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements
which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by
the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance
on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of
bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substance of the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on
legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts — whether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatever — not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as
eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the
end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the
same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
4
This issue I wish to address forthwith.
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules,
both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's
review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached.
Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified
the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino
dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant
petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by respondents
in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the House's business. They
have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way
complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of
petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker
Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof
offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous
argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the
circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of
the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by
the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new
wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that
we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may determine the rules of its proceedings."
It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this
rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether
they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did
not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule
XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may move for a
reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual
executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have
been sent to the President before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made,
the motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to return such notification
to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to
the nomination, and shall be a final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the Secretary to the President
until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to
reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power Commission has been confirmed
by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who then signed the
appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed
against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying
on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the
applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its
own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that adopted by the Senate
itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The
Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to
say that another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the
vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover, should receive from the
Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above stated, against the Senate's construction
seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted
reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect the
appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with
perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum when the
perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members
of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that —
xxx xxx xxx
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of the said Committee,
and that "at least that number must have been actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met,
that is, if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and
thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was
raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affect, for the
purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath
was administered and before the testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13
members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous
quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a
quorum once established is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as
"what rules the House had established and whether they have been followed." It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our concern, and
by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as
valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules
Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the
validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the House has established and whether they
have been followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the
conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it
the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact
was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a consequence of this conviction,
petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure
which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence
of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a
tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the
jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majority
of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was a majority present two
or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to
rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems
to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal
that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal
conviction.
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once established is
presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect,
invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellin
was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress
on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the
Committee or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly
injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an
executive session for the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation
thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers at trial that his rights
have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance
upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every witness
under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness was
deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for
prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally
meticulous in obeying its own rules.
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance
of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as
'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.
Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now
beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of Article
VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national security cases. To a great
degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate
the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the Constitutional Commission
explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute political question.
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline
to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the significant
changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law.
One of the areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between
and among the three great branches of our government — the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To
upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by
providing "No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members." It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked
with screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up
vacancies in the judiciary — ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court
and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of
vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the
Supreme Court was given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government
more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing quasi
judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it
reduced the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of the powers
of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim
martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.
Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress — this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge
this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the
case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise
this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial
sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the
latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance
on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the
dismissal of the petition at bar.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper
officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch
of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial — as emanating from
the highest tribunal in the land — are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same veneration as
the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of the bill
was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or
repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it
requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted
the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill
is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the
constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an
enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption,
however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements
in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be
received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale for
the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill,
thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives,
its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also
justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that
it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is to be tested by
examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of
litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the
alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United States.
In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado
cited some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the
enrolled bill theory, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally attributed to that
doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry,
it has been held that "(u)nder the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents
and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of respective houses of Legislature are
required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices and filed with the
secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the
legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains
provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72,
73:
This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they control, and against such proof
the enrolled bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of this court
which created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must follow before a
bill can be considered for final passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill,
enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and
approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the
court enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the
processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex litigation if
the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General
Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the
records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim. There are four historical
bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was not subject to attack at common
law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must
indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated,
record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final act, the
enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in
Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its critics. From an
examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions,
especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results
which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping devices now used by
legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of
the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In
light of these considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et
non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law.
Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated
in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance
of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial opinions may
create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither justice nor
wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle
that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or
has been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature,
has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly.
Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers,
electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly
to keep accurate and readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and developing judicial
philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is
mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done.
The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government requires that we shut
our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree.
Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is "void." The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void.
Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our
obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the
constitution — by any person, corporation, state agency or branch or government — are brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of
our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic
evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such
presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to
the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . .
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption
of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information." 19
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag
v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this
ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and different from "urea"
and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended
to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
thereof. But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off
Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well
settled that enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" —
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
22
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:
. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the
petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning — the
immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be effected by
the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell
Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia
stressed:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected
by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold
is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy.
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply
it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized
in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress
shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional
requirement.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the
Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all,
but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain
valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes
farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to
speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors,
the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of
the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences
not intended by the law-making body.
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting
this contention, this Court ruled:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into
the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case of U.S. vs. Pens, where we explained the reason
thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe,
at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its companion cases. 25 Involved in
the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law.
The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in
its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was
invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute
had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of
a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an enrolled
bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate in view of the fad that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a
mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into
a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino,
Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute."
I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer
give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested
change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in
England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the
United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent
with our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure
as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified
under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of
law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on
transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry
open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of
conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search
for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of
correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed by
petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the
complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern
violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the House
which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are
procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As
well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a
matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII,
of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed,
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing
the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent
disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province the
specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted
intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time,
it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced,
powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the
new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume
jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues — is
shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion
cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the
vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my
firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by
petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who,
incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely
disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues.
My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach
and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in
the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under
the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority
exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as
presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or
obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their
application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to
emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself. Thus:
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that attended
the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements
which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by
the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance
on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of
bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substance of the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on
legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts — whether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatever — not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as
eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that
legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the
end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the
same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
4
This issue I wish to address forthwith.
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules,
both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's
review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its
coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached.
Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified
the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino
dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant
petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by respondents
in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the House's business. They
have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way
complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of
petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker
Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the substance thereof
offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous
argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably unwarranted under the
circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal of
the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by
the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new
wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that
we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. 2 It held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may determine the rules of its proceedings."
It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this
rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration.
With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether
they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did
not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule
XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may move for a
reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual
executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have
been sent to the President before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made,
the motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to return such notification
to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to
the nomination, and shall be a final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the Secretary to the President
until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to
reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power Commission has been confirmed
by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who then signed the
appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition for quo warranto was filed
against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying
on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the
applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its
own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that adopted by the Senate
itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The
Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to
say that another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the
vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for public office, moreover, should receive from the
Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above stated, against the Senate's construction
seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted
reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect the
appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with
perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum when the
perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members
of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that —
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of the said Committee,
and that "at least that number must have been actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met,
that is, if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and
thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was
raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affect, for the
purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath
was administered and before the testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13
members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous
quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a
quorum once established is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as
"what rules the House had established and whether they have been followed." It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our concern, and
by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as
valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules
Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the
validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the House has established and whether they
have been followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the
conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it
the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact
was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a consequence of this conviction,
petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure
which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged shall be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence
of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a
tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the
jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majority
of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was a majority present two
or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to
rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems
to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal
that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal
conviction.
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once established is
presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect,
invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellin
was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress
on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive
session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the
Committee or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly
injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
executive session for the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation
thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
xxx xxx xxx
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers at trial that his rights
have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance
upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every witness
under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to
do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness was
deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for
prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally
meticulous in obeying its own rules.
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance
of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as
'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.
Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now
beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of Article
VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national security cases. To a great
degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate
the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the Constitutional Commission
explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute political question.
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline
to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the significant
changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law.
One of the areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between
and among the three great branches of our government — the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To
upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by
providing "No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members." It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked
with screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up
vacancies in the judiciary — ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court
and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of
vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the
Supreme Court was given the power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government
more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing quasi
judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it
reduced the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of the powers
of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim
martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.
Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress — this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge
this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the
case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial
sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the
latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance
on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the
dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper
officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch
of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial — as emanating from
the highest tribunal in the land — are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same veneration as
the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the conclusiveness of the bill
was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or
repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it
requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted
the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill
is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the
constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an
enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption,
however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements
in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be
received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale for
the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill,
thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives,
its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also
justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that
it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is to be tested by
examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of
litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the
alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that
journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United States.
In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado
cited some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the
enrolled bill theory, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally attributed to that
doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry,
it has been held that "(u)nder the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents
and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire
as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals of respective houses of Legislature are
required to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices and filed with the
secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the
legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains
provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72,
73:
This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they control, and against such proof
the enrolled bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of this court
which created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must follow before a
bill can be considered for final passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill,
enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and
approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the
court enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the
processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex litigation if
the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General
Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the
records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim. There are four historical
bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was not subject to attack at common
law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must
indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final act, the
enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in
Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its critics. From an
examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions,
especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results
which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping devices now used by
legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of
the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In
light of these considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et
non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law.
Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated
in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941).
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance
of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial opinions may
create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither justice nor
wisdom requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle
that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or
has been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature,
has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly.
Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing presses, computers,
electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly
to keep accurate and readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and developing judicial
philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is
mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done.
The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or
presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government requires that we shut
our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree.
Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is "void." The proper
exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void.
Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our
obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the
constitution — by any person, corporation, state agency or branch or government — are brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of
our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the "extrinsic
evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such
presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to
the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . .
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption
of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information." 19
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag
v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this
ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and different from "urea"
and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members of Congress intended
to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off
Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well
settled that enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" —
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
22
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:
. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the
petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning — the
immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be effected by
the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell
Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia
stressed:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected
by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold
is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy.
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply
it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized
in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional
requirement.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the
Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all,
but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain
valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes
farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to
speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors,
the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of
the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences
not intended by the law-making body.
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting
this contention, this Court ruled:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into
the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval
of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case of U.S. vs. Pens, where we explained the reason
thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe,
at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its companion cases. 25 Involved in
the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law.
The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in
its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was
invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute
had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of
a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an enrolled
bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate in view of the fad that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a
mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into
a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino,
Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute."
I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer
give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested
change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in
England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the
United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent
with our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure
as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified
under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of
law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy 29 requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on
transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry
open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of
conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search
for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of
correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed by
petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the
complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern
violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the House
which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are
procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As
well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a
matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Davide, Jr., J., concurs. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on
February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office
for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows:

Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion
of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;

Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year from the first of January,
nineteen hundred and twenty-four;

And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the
Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be furnished said Governor-General for
his information.

The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no
effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void;
and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the
respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he
enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner
from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect. By special
appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the
court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.

In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that
looking through the form of the action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the
Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. May the Supreme Court of
the Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the
Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the
other interesting questions which have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here
suggested.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government of the Philippine Islands, which
Manila are familiar to students of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system of government,
each of the three departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another department. The
power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department
EN BANC may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.

G.R. No. 22041 September 11, 1924
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by
the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District. The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon,
President of the Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier, Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman,
Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco
Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmeña, Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji Butu,
Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago Lucero, all
members of the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante,
Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether
the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity
of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts
restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general rule of mandamus to be, that
the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to
compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative,
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a
gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols
[1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico,
235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896],
33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258
Ill., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous and instructive. They are found
among the decisions of our own court, of the United States Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of
these cases relate to the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary to explain that the
same rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief executive likewise govern the relations of the
courts to the legislature.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was an original application made in this court praying for a writ of
mandamus to the Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as provided by law. The Attorney-
General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the court, after an elaborate
discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these
Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The demurrer
was accordingly sustained and the complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on
the cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich.,
320), which we will now proceed to notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra, concerned a bill praying the
United States, Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C.
Ord, General Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from executing certain Acts of Congress.
Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court said the single point which required consideration was
this: Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be
unconstitutional? He continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the Executive
Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of
both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible
consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is
needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the
President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute the Acts of Congress, is it not
clear that a collision may occur between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the
Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in
that case could this court interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with
its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of
impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this
court to arrest proceedings in that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be had against
Andrew Johnson, as President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee.
But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an Act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief
against its execution by the President. . . .
Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on account of being written by
Judge Cooley, related to an application for mandamus to the Governor to compel him to perform a duty imposed
upon him by statute. Judge Cooley, in part, said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct
departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by
the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally
independent.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and
that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the
rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action of the department which controls, modifies, or in any
manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no
occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is
acting within its proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their proper province, because they are only
applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is
mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept
within their jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the
remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct
the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the Legislature could in like manner override
executive action also, the government would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the
other hand it would be readily cancelled that no court can compel the Legislature to make or to
refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever,
though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these cases the
exemption of the one department from the control of the other is not only implied in the framework
of government, but is indispensably necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other course than that which
leaves the head of the executive department to act independently in the discharge of his duties
might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to something worse, should the courts undertake to
enforce their mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we should concede, if
jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient
reason for failing to pronounce it, especially against an officer who would be presumed ready and
anxious in all cases to render obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved in
doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be
disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to place him in position where, in a matter
within his own province, he must act contrary to his judgment, or strand convicted of a disregard of
the laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns specifically the right of the judiciary to control by
mandamus the action of the legislature. French vs. Senate of the State of California, supra, was an original
proceeding in mandamus brought by the petitioners who were duly elected senators of the state to compel the
Senate of California to admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that the petitioners had been expelled
without hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the
court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the pleader, they do not make a
case justifying the interposition of this court. Under our form of government the judicial department
has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of
their house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by
the constitution. . . .
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest
expression of opinion by the United States Supreme Court. The record discloses that it was the firm opinion of
the late Chief Justice that the court should not assume jurisdiction of the proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the principles laid down in some of the
preceding authorities have been the subject of adverse criticism. It is said that the fallacy of the argument lies in
the statement that the three departments of the government are independent of each other. "They are
independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province and perform the duties that the law
requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon
him, or the manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to
this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the
judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the
thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus,
pp. 926-927.) But these were arguments which should have been presented years ago in this court, and which
when recently presented by counsel in his argument for the petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No.
20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go back and revise previous
decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not only impracticable but impossible since at least two
decision of the United States Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief
Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a court should ever be so rash as
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
to thus trench on the domain of either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular government as we
know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme Court to
issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not
against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but
against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question.
If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of
subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and
disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that
body. Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectable presented of the court ordering the
secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it
clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs.
Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of policy
or convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no
consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not prove to be effectual and
beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where
mischievous consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to
unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision
for any possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch
of a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the
Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the
Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General."
(Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and
the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may
thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for
any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to
the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the
Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution
has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to
suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long history suspended a member. And
the reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House
without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor
of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives
the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the
vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is
equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any
other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was,
in effect, our holding in the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when
we had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional
power of appointment. What was there announced is equally applicable to the instant proceedings.
While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is inserted so that the vital question
argued with so much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so that there may be at least an indication of
the attitude of the court as a restraining force, with respect to the checks and balances of government. The
Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the government, takes no
affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire system suggests the thought that no action should be taken
elsewhere which would constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard for the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not
authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has
been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for
cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to
make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would
hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have
grievances against the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition
and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of
action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.
Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AVANCEÑA, J., concurring:
I agree with the dispositive part and the grounds and considerations set forth in the decision about the want of
jurisdiction of this court to review the proceeding of the Senate. But this court having no jurisdiction, the
insinuation contained in the decision that proceeding of the Senate was illegal seems to me unnecessary and
improper.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
Among the important questions presented by the petition and demurrer in the present case, three may be
mentioned:
First. Is the resolution in question legal or illegal?
Second. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction even to consider its legality?
Third. Can the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?
FIRST. Legality of the resolution
The Supreme Court is unanimous in its opinion that the resolution, by which Jose Alejandrino was deprived of "all
his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" as an appointed senator, is an expulsion
or removal of him as such senator and therefore illegal and ultra vires for the reason that the power of expulsion
or removal of an appointed senator is vested exclusively in the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
(Section 17 of the Jones Law — Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 — Public Laws, vol. 12 p. 243.)
By reason of the unanimous opinion upon that question, it becomes unnecessary further to discuss it except to
give the particular reasons which induced my opinion. Said section 17 provides that: "Senators and
representatives appointed by the Governor-General shall hold office until removed by the Governor-General."
Section 18 provides, among other things, that "each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." The
petitioner is an appointive member of the Senate.
It will be noted from the two quotations just given, that the power to expel a member of either branch of the
Legislature, by the Legislature, is limited to "elective members," while the power "to punish members for
disorderly behavior" applies to all members whether elective or appointive. In view of the fact that neither
branch of the Legislature can expel an appointive member, can either branch deprive such a member of all his
"prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" under the power "to punish for disorderly
behavior"? It will be noted that the law contains no definition of the "punishment" which may be imposed for
disorderly behavior. Considering, however, that neither branch has the right to expel an appointive member,
certainly no one will contend that the punishment imposed for disorderly behavior may amount to an expulsion.
If the punishment amounts to an expulsion then certainly the Legislature has exceeded its authority and has
encroached upon the power of the executive, for the reason that the power to expel belongs to the Governor-
General.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
We have, then, the question squarely presented, whether or not a resolution of the Senate of the Philippine
Islands which deprives an appointed senator of all his "prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period
of one year" amounts to an expulsion. If it does, then the resolution is illegal, null, and void, and beyond the
powers of the legislative department of the Government and an unwarranted exercise of the powers which
belong to the Governor-General.
The said resolution not only deprives the petitioner of all his "prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the
period of one year" but also deprives the people of his district, composed of about one million persons, of any
representation or participation in the legislative, affairs of the government for a period of one year, — a right
which is guaranteed to them under the constitution. Such a result was certainly not contemplated by the
provisions of the Jones Law. Certainly the framers of the constitution of the Philippine Islands never dreamed
that when the Legislature of the Philippine Islands was given the power to "punish" its members for misbehavior,
that such a power would ever be used as a guise for "expelling" an appointive member.
The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a disciplinary measure. When a member of the
Legislature is removed either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature, a vacancy exists, and the law gives
the Governor-General the right to appoint, and the people of the district the right to fill the vacancy by election,
so that the people may again, under either case, be represented. A "suspension" of a member, however, does
not create a vacancy, and the people of the district are without a representative and the Governor-General
cannot appoint one and the people cannot elect one during the period of suspension. They are without
representation during that period. They are, for the period of suspension, taxed without representation. If a
member, under the power to punish, can be suspended for one year, for the same reason he may be suspended
for ten or more years, thus depriving the Governor-General of his right under the law, and the people of the
district, of a representative, and without a remedy in the premises.
If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the power to suspend or to deprive a member of all his
rights, and if the suspension is in effect a removal, then an appointed member may be removed, under the
power to punish, by a mere majority, while the law requires a two-thirds majority to remove an elective member.
In other words, if under the power to "punish," any member of the Legislature, including an appointive member,
may be in effect removed, then an elective member may be removed by a majority vote only thus encroaching
upon the power of the executive department of the government, as well as violating the powers conferred upon
the Legislature, because the Legislature cannot remove an elective member except by two-thirds majority.
It is strenuously argued by the respondent that the resolution depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" is not a removal from his office but a mere suspension.
The resolution does not use the word "suspend" but does use the word "deprive." It provides that the petitioner
is "deprived" of all his prerogatives, etc., for a period of one year. If that word means anything it means that all
of the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of the petitioner and the citizens whom he represents have
been taken from him and them. His prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments constitute his right to be a
member of the Senate under his appointment, his right to represent the people of his district, and his right to
exercise all the duties and to assume all the responsibilities pertaining to his office. His emoluments constitute
his right to receive his salary and the benefits pertaining to his office as a senator. If a value can be placed upon
his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and if he has been deprived of them, then it must follow that they
have been removed from him, or that he has been removed from them. At any rate, the resolution has
separated the petitioner and the people whom he represents and deprived them of all of their prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year; and, for all intents and purposes, he and the people
whom he represents, have been deprived of their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and in effect, have
been removed from any participation in the legislative affairs of the government.
A great many cases have been studied on the question of removal and suspension, and we are confident in the
assertion that the power to punish does not include the power to remove or suspend. A suspension from an
office or a deprivation of the rights of an officer of all his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, is in effect a
deprivation or a removal from office for the time mentioned in the order of suspension. It has been held that a
suspension from office for an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six months, lost its temporary character,
ceased to be a suspension, and in effect became a removal from such office. It was held, in the case of State vs.
Chamber of Commerce, that the suspension of a member was a qualified expulsion, and that whether it was
called a suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect disfranchised the person suspended. In the case of
Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that a suspension or a deprivation for either a definite or indefinite period is in
effect a removal. In the case of Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the power to remove an officer or punish
him does not include the power to suspend him temporarily from his office. A mere suspension would not create
a vacancy, and the anomalous and unfortunate condition would exist of an office, — an officer, — but no
vacancy, and of no one whose right and duty it was to execute the office. In the case of Commonwealth vs.
Barry, it was decided that to punish an officer for "disorderly behavior" such misbehavior must be such as affects
the performance of his duties or the legal or ordinary procedure of the body of which he is a member, and not
disorderly behavior which affects his character as a private individual.
In this connection it may be noted that the alleged "misbehavior" on the part of the petitioner was committed
outside of the legislative halls and at a time when there was no session of the Senate; that said alleged
"misbehavior" did not take place in or near the Senate chamber, nor cause any disorder, disturbance,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
annoyance, or impediment whatever to the orderly and dignified procedure of any session of the Senate; that
said "misbehavior" did not interfere in any manner whatever with the honor, dignity, and efficiency, nor with the
orderly proceedings of the Senate; that the petitioner did not know, at the time of the alleged "misbehavior,"
that he had been admitted as a member of the Philippine Senate. The question of his admission as a senator had
been under discussion for weeks theretofore.
Paragraph 2 of section 5 of the Constitution of the United States provides that "each house may determined the
rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel a member." That provision of the Constitution of the United States is exactly the language used in section
18 of the Jones Law, with the only difference that the phrase "expel a member" in the Constitution is changed in
the Jones Law to "expel and elective member." That provision of the Constitution of the United States has been
enforced for a period of about one hundred forty years. It will be noted that said provision of the Constitution of
the United States contains two provisions: (a) to punish and (b) to expel.
An examination of the long history of the Congress of the United States has been made for the purpose of
ascertaining how that august body has interpreted its powers under said provisions. First, it may be said that the
Congress of the United States is perhaps as dignified a legislative body as that of any of the states or territories
of the United States. Its records have been searched upon the question of its power to punish and remove its
members, and no case has been found — and it is believed there are none — where Congress, under its power to
punish, has attempted to deprive a member of all his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for
anytime whatever, although many cases of removal have been found under that power to remove. The power to
punish for disorderly behavior has never been exercised further than to impose a mere reprimand. We regard
the fact that the Congress of the United States has never exercised its power, to punish for disorderly behavior,
by depriving a member of all of his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, as strong proof that it did
not believe that its power to punish justified an order or resolution depriving a member of all of his rights,
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments. Many cases might be cited showing misbehavior of much more
serious character than that charged against the petitioner and where a reprimand only was imposed.
SECOND. Jurisdiction to consider question.
Whether or not the courts will take jurisdiction of any action whatever to interfere with, direct or control the
action of either the executive or legislative departments of the government, is a question which has been
presented to the courts many times since the leading case of Marbury vs. Madison was decided ([1803], 1
Cranch, [U. S.]., 137). In hundreds of cases which have come before the courts since that time, the decisions
have been about equally divided. One line of decisions indicates that the courts will never take jurisdiction to
control, order, or direct either the executive or legislative departments of the government to perform or not to
perform any particular act expressly imposed upon or confined to them either by the organic act or by statute.
(Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4 Wall. [U. S.], 475; Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320; Hawkins vs.
Governor, 1 Ark., 570; People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill., 229; State vs. Governor, 22 La. Ann., 1; Rice vs. Governor, 27
Minn., 1; Vicksburg & Co. vs. Governor, 61 Miss., 102.)
The other line of decisions hold that the courts will take jurisdiction to control, order and direct both the
executive and legislative departments of the government to do and to perform what are generally termed purely
ministerial duties imposed by either the organic act or by statute. (Tennessee & Railway Co. vs. Governor, 36
Ala., 371; Middleton vs. Governor, 30 Cal., 596; State vs. Governor, 72 Ind., 567; State vs. Governor, 5 Ohio
State, 528.)
It is here confidently asserted that a careful study of the first line of decisions will show, that each case might
have been decided upon the ground that the duty, the performance of which was sought to be coerced, was one
which was either a discretionary or official duty of the respondent, and that the doctrine relied upon, as
announced in said cases, was purely obiter dicta; that each of the first line of cases might have been decided
upon the ground that the performance of the particular acts was entirely within the discretion or official duty of
the respondent and a question confided solely to them.
From an examination of all of the cases upon the question before us, the following rule of law is accepted as the
general rule:
"That the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the government are distinct and independent, and
neither is responsible to the other for the performance of its duties, and neither can enforce the performance of
the duties of the other." Exceptions or modifications of this general rule will be noted later.
After a careful study of all the cases on the subject, we are of the opinion that a fair summary of the power of
the courts in the premises may be stated under two heads as follows:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
First. That the courts have jurisdiction to examine acts "actually" taken by the executive or legislative
departments of the government when such acts affect the rights, privileges, property, or lives of individuals.
Second. That the courts will not take jurisdiction to order, coerce, or enjoin any act or acts of either the
executive or legislative departments of the government upon any question or questions, the performance of
which is confided by law to said departments. The courts will not take jurisdiction until some positive "action" is
taken by the other coordinate departments of the government.
With reference to the first proposition, we desire to say that, while the courts hesitate, and rightfully so, to
inquire into the legality of the acts of the executive or legislative departments of government, yet they are
without discretion in the premises in cases where it is alleged that a person is illegally deprived of his life,
liberty, or property by said departments. The law makes no distinction with reference to the person or persons,
or departments or bureaus who are responsible for the illegal and unlawful deprivation of the right of individuals
in the state. The mere fact that such alleged illegal deprivation of life, liberty or property is caused by the chief
executive or the legislative department of the government, in the face of mandatory provisions of the law, is no
sufficient excuse or justification for a refusal on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction for the purpose of
inquiring into such alleged illegal deprivation and to make pronouncement thereon. Under the system of checks
and balances, by virtue of the existence of the different departments of the government, in the Government of
the United States and its territories, it becomes the legal and bounded duty of the courts to inquire into the
legality, when called upon so to do, of the acts of either of the other departments of the government and to
make pronouncements thereon. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534 [228 U. S., 549]; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil., 41, 211 224; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41
Phil., 322; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 65; U. S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24
Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)
There is no more sacred duty of the courts, when a case is presented to them in which the life, liberty, or
property of the citizens of the state are involved, than that of maintaining, unimpaired, those securities for the
personal rights of the individuals of the state which have been guaranteed to them by the organic law of the
land and which have received for ages the sanction of the jurists and the statesmen of the civilized nations of
the world. In such cases no narrow or illiberal construction should be given to the language of the fundamental
law of the state. (Ex parte Lang, 85 U. S., 163.)
Since the Constitution of the Philippine Islands is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other
departments of the government, and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, they are not liberty to
overlook or disregard its command, and therefore when it is clear that a statute or resolution of the Legislature
transgresses the authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislature, it is the duty of the courts to declare the
acts or resolutions unconstitutional, and from that duty the courts cannot shrink without violating their oath of
office. (United States vs. Fisher, 2 Cranch [U. S.], 396; Darmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton [U. S.], 518;
Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheaton [U. S.], 1.)
The duty of the courts to declare a law or resolution unconstitutional, in a proper case, cannot be declined and
must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the court. (Pollock vs. Farmer's Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U. S., 429.) Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute or resolution of the legislature is a
judicial matter, the courts will not decline to exercise jurisdiction upon the mere suggestion that some action
might be taken by the political agencies of the government in disregard of the judgment of the court.
(McPherson vs. Blacker, 146 U. S., 869.)
The doctrine of the all omnipotent power of the legislature as recognized by the Government of England, does
not prevail in the United States, and every law or resolution adopted by the legislative department of the
government must conform to the constitution. When a statute or a resolution of the legislative department
exceeds the jurisdiction and powers of the legislature, it is null and void.
The principle which permits courts to pronounce an act or resolution of the legislature null and void, because it
conflicts with the provisions of the constitution, is a doctrine so well established under constitutional
governments that it seems really unnecessary to discuss it here. It has been declared in many cases that the
power of the court to make pronouncements upon the legality of acts or resolutions of the legislative
department, is the strongest barrier ever devised against the tyrannies of political assemblies. The right to
construe the constitution and to apply it to particular laws or resolution of the legislature must necessarily be
lodged in some department of the government to insure that practical sanction to its mandates which are
essential for the preservation of their validity and force and the perpetuation of stable and orderly government.
The duty of the court to maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state and to permit no one to
transgress its provisions, is imperative. Whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, it is the sworn
duty of the courts so to adjudge. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the fundamental law of the
state. It has been said by eminent jurists and authorities that the judiciary should protect the rights of the people
with great care and jealousy, not only because it is its sworn duty, but also because in times of great popular
excitement the courts are the last resort. (Gardner vs. Stephens, 2 Am. Rep., 700; State vs. Peel Splint Co., 17 L.
R. A., 385; Rathbone vs. Wirth, 34 L. R. A., 408; Wells vs. Mo. Railway Co., 15 L. R. A., 847; State vs. Butler, 24 L.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
R. A., [N. S.], 744; Sanders vs. Commonwealth, 111 Am. State Rep., 219; State vs. Miller, 87 Ohio State, 12;
Miller vs. Johnson, 15 L. R. A., 524.)
The right and power of the courts to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional
limitations and are invalid, has always been considered a grave responsibility as well as a solemn duty, and its
exercise is, at all times, a matter of much delicacy, for, apart from the necessity of avoiding conflicts between
coordinate branches of the government, it is often difficult to determine whether such enactments are within the
powers granted to or possessed by the legislature. It has also been said that the power of the courts to nullify
acts of the legislature, as being in violation of the constitution, is one of the highest functions and authorities of
the courts. (Nichol vs. Ames, 173 U. S., 509; People vs. Henning Co., 260 Ill., 554; Edwards vs. Lesueur, 31 L. R.
A., 815.)
The courts have no jurisdiction in matters of a purely political nature which have been confided to the executive
or legislative department of the government, nor the power to interfere with the duties of either of said
departments, unless under special circumstances and when it becomes necessary for the protection of the
rights, the life and the property of the individuals of the state. (In re Sawyer, 124 U. S., 200; Luther vs. Borden, 7
Howard [U. S.], 1; Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4 Wall. [U. S.], 475.)
The jurisdiction of the courts over the acts of either of the other departments is limited to cases where the acts
of such departments tend to deprive the citizens of their rights, liberties, and property. To assume jurisdiction to
control the exercise of purely political rights, would be to invade the domain of the other departments of the
government. (Fletcher vs. Tutle, 151 Ill., 41.)
We do not desire to be understood, however, as holding that even political rights are not a matter of judicial
solicitude and protection and that the appropriate judicial tribunal will not, in a proper case, give a prompt and
efficient protection to citizens. (Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U. S., 346.)
In the case of Burnham vs. Morrissey (14 Gray [Mass.], 226), Mr. Justice Hoar, later a United States Senator, said:
"The house of representatives is not the final judge of its own powers and privileges in cases in which the rights
and liberties of the subject are concerned; but the legality of its action may be examined and determined by this
court. . . . Especially is it competent and proper for this court to consider whether its (legislature's) proceedings
are in conformity with the constitution and laws, because, living under a written constitution no branch or
department of the department is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the judicial department to
determine, in cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of the government and
even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws (or resolutions), have been exercised in conformity with
the constitution; and if they have not been, to treat their acts as null and void.
The house of representatives has the power, under the constitution, to imprison for contempt; but
this power is limited to cases expressly provided for by the constitution, or to cases where the power
is necessarily implied from those constitutional functions and duties, to the proper performance of
which it is essential. . . .
The doctrine of the omnipotence of either the executive or legislative department of government has long since
been denied, and has no place under the American flag.
Of course, when a discretionary power is conferred, with the right to act or not to act, and when the discretion is
honestly exercised and not abused, then the official or department is relieved from personal responsibility; but
when action is taken, and an individual of the state is thereby deprived, illegally, of his life, liberty or property,
his remedy to be restored to his rights is properly submitted to the courts. In every case where the courts are
called upon to exercise their original jurisdiction to question the illegality of action already taken by the
legislative or executive department of the government, they will not do so upon a mere formal or colorable
showing either as to the parties or subject-matter. The courts will look through the form to the real character or
substance of the alleged illegal act. (Wisconsin vs. Insurance Co., 127 U. S., 265; Louisiana vs. Texas, 176 U. S.,
1; Oklahoma vs. Railway Co., 220 U. S., 277.)
A statute or a resolution of the legislative department of the government which deprives a citizen of the rights
guaranteed to him by the Organic Law of the land is null and void. (Harrison vs. Railway Co., 232 U. S., 318;
Terral vs. Burke & Co., 257 U. S., 529.)
Decision of the highest courts, without number, may be cited in support of the rule "that all governmental
officers, departments or agencies are subject to judicial restraint when they act in excess of their authority
either statutory or constitutional, by virtue of which citizens are deprived of their rights." (Osborn vs. U. S. Bank,
9 Wheaton [U. S.], 739; Board of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 U. S., 531; United States vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196;
Virginia Cases, 114 U. S., 311; Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U. S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169 U. S., 466; Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S., 123; Philadelphia Co. vs. Stimson, 223 U. S., 605.)
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
CHECKS AND BALANCES
The three great departments of the government — the executive, legislative, and judicial — were created for the
purpose of "checks and balances." Under the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands the executive power of the
states is conferred upon the Governor-General. The legislative power is vested in the Senate and House of
Representatives. The judicial power is vested in the courts. The three great branches of the government are
separate and distinct, but are coequal and coordinate. Their powers have been carefully apportioned. The
legislature makes the laws, the courts construe them and adjudge as to the rights of persons to life, liberty, and
property thereunder, while the executive department executes the laws and the judgments of the courts. Each
department, in its own sphere, is in a sense independent. Each operates as a check or restraint upon the other.
The Acts of the legislative department have to be presented to the executive department for its approval. The
executive department may disapprove the Acts of the legislature if in its judgment they are not in conformity
with the organic law of the state or if in their enforcement they might work a hardship upon the people. The
judicial department is authorized to construe and interpret the Acts of the legislature. The judicial department is
authorized to determine the validity of the Acts of the legislature under the constitution. The executive
department may also set aside the judgments of the judicial department and modify the action of the courts by
the interposition of its pardoning power. The legislative department may also recall, modify, or annul decisions of
the courts if in its judgment the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in harmony with the general
policy of the state, by the enactment of a new law or by an amendment of the old, giving its such a nondisputed
meaning and interpretation as to clearly wipe out the decisions of the judicial department.
Thus, we have the checks and balances known under the American form of government. But in every case in
which one department controls, modifies, or influences the action of another, it acts strictly within its own
sphere, thus giving no occasion for conflict and thus preserving the purpose of the original scheme of a division
of powers among the three great coordinate branches of government, each operating as a restraint upon the
other, but still in harmony.
By the use of the power of veto and or pardoning, the executive department may annul and set aside absolutely
the action of both the legislative and judicial departments. The legislative department may, by adopting a new
law or by amendment or by passing a law over the veto of the executive department, annul, recall, and set aside
the action of both the executive and judicial departments. But it must be observed that when the judicial
department inquires into an act of either the executive or legislative departments for the purpose or determining
the legality of such acts, it is not because it desires to impose its own opinions upon such departments nor to
examine into the wisdom or advisability of a particular act or statute, but simply because said departments have
acted in a way which is forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and because the will of the people, as
declared in such fundamental law, is paramount and must be obeyed even by the legislative and executive
departments. In pronouncing a statute of the legislature illegal or an act of the executive department beyond its
powers, the courts are simply interpreting the meaning, force and application o the fundamental law of the
state.
If the doctrine that the different departments — executive, legislative and judicial — are absolutely independent
and one can never interfere to control or restrain, modify or annul, the action of the other, then the very purpose
of the organization of the three departments for "checks and balances" would be defeated. (Case vs. Board of
Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228;
Tajanlangit vs. Peñaranda, 37 Phil., 155; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 899; Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366; U. S. vs. Bull., 15 Phil., 7; Borromeo vs.
Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 599; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 152,
170, 172.)
The following are among the leading cases in which the courts have taken jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining the legality or illegality of acts, or orders or resolutions of the executive and legislative
departments:
First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —
(a) Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87), where the action of the Governor-General was
pronounced legal;
(b) Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534; 228 U. S., 549) where the action of the
Governor-General was pronounced legal;
(c) In re McCulloch Dick (38 Phil., 41, 62, 63, 109, 211, 244), where the action of the Governor-
General was pronounced legal;
(d) Borromeo vs. Mariano (41 Phil., 322), where the action of the Governor-General was pronounced
illegal.
Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the Government —
(a) Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), where the act of the legislative department was
pronounced illegal;
(b) Kilbourn vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168, 181, 199), where the act of the one branch of the
Congress of the United States was held illegal.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Referring to the second "Summary of the Powers of the Courts" above, it may be said that in this jurisdiction the
doctrine is now well established, that, until the executive or legislative department has taken some steps or has
acted upon some question, the courts will neither undertake to compel action nor to restrain action in said
departments. It is only when said departments have acted and their acts detrimentally affect the interest of the
citizen, that the courts will inquire into the legality or constitutionality of such acts. (Barcelon vs. Baker and
Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322;
Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 208671; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.)
The judicial department of the government will not attempt to intervene or control or direct or command any
action whatever upon any subject which has been specifically confided by law to the other departments, until
they have taken some action which tends to and does establish some theory or policy contrary to the organic
law of the land, or has deprived some citizen of his life, liberty, property, or privilege granted to him by the
organic law. Under such facts, the judicial department is, under the law, bound to take jurisdiction and to make
pronouncements thereon. In such cases it becomes the legal and bounden duty of the courts to inquire into the
legality or illegality of the acts of the other departments of the government and to declare what the law is and
what the rights of the parties are. When such a case is presented to the courts, its responsibility to the people of
the state, under the law, demands that a thorough investigation of the facts be made and of the rights of the
parties under the law, and to make a pronouncement, without reference to the fact whether or not the court
have the proper machinery for the purpose of enforcing their conclusions and judgments.
The following are among the cases holding that the courts will not intervene for the purpose of compelling or
directing any action on the part of the executive or legislative departments of the government with reference to
any duty or obligation specifically confided to said departments:
First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —
(a) Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366;
(b) Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612;
(c) Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320;
(d) Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570;
(e) People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill., 229.
Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the Government —
Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.
In view of the foregoing arguments and citation of authorities and inasmuch as the petitioner alleges that by an
act or resolution of the Senate of the Philippine Islands he has been deprived of his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments for a period of one year, which have been granted to him by the organic law of the land, through
the officers and employees of the Senate, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that under such allegations the
court is not only justified, but authorized and compelled under the duties and powers conferred upon it, to take
jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of examining into the question whether or not the petitioner has been
deprived of any rights granted to him under the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.
Are the facts stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and
do they justify the court in taking jurisdiction of the case?
The petitioner alleges that he is a Senator of the Philippine Islands legally appointed by the Governor-General
under the provisions of section 16 of the Jones Law; that by virtue of said appointment he is given all the rights
of a senator, with all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments thereunto belonging; that he has, as such
senator, the right to continue to serve the people of his district; that he has the right to be and act as a member
of the Senate until removed by the Governor-General; that he has been deprived of the right to act as a senator
and has been removed as such senator by the respondents and thereby deprived of a right conferred upon him
by law and of all of the rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments belonging to him as a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and as a member of the Senate; that the citizens of his district have been deprived of their
right to be represented and to participate in the affairs of their government; that unless the said resolution of the
Senate be pronounced illegal, null, and void, he will be unable to exercise the rights of a citizen and a senator
and to enjoy the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments to him rightfully belonging; that by becoming a
member of the Senate he has not lost his rights as a citizen; that he is still entitled to be protected in all of his
rights and privileges as a citizen under the law; that the punishment imposed by said resolution is one created
after the alleged grounds for suspension had occurred; that the punishment imposed is quasi-criminal; that no
punishment for his acts had been prescribed as is expressly provided under the substantive law of the Philippine
Islands; that the punishment provided for in said resolution of the 5th day of February, 1924, was ex post facto
and is illegal and void under section 3 of the Organic Law, in that his acts were pronounced to be illegal by said
resolution long after they had been committed; that the respondents were without authority of law to remove
him as a member of the Senate; that the Governor-General only has the authority to remove him; that the
alleged acts for which he has been suspended were not committed in or near the Senate chamber; that they in
no way tended to or did interfere with the orderly procedure of the Senate and therefore cannot be regarded as
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
"disorderly behavior;" that the Senate has no right or authority to suspend or remove one of its members for
disorderly behavior unless and until such disorderly behavior tends to and does interfere with, hamper or impede
the legal and orderly procedure of the body; that while it requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate to expel its
elective members, he has been removed, contrary to law, by the Senate, when the Governor-General is the only
authority who can remove him; that if the Senate can remove him under the power to punish, then an appointive
member can be removed by a majority vote, while it requires a two-thirds majority vote to remove an elective
member; and, for all of the foregoing reasons, the petitioner and the people of his district have been deprived of
their rights, privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments by an actual act or resolution of the Senate, which is
contrary to law, and that he is entitled to have a pronouncement of his rights made by the courts and to be
restored to his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of which he has been so illegally deprived.
The Constitution of the Philippine Islands, the Organic Act (Jones Law) provides: "That no law shall be enacted
which deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to person therein the
equal protection of the laws." That provision of law is equally binding upon each department of government.
"Due process of law" cannot be used as a cloak for depriving a citizen of his rights when the procedure is based
upon a illegal or unconstitutional act or resolution.
Under the American form of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial departments are coequal and
co-important. But it does not follow that the judiciary, the constitutional duty of which is to declare and interpret
the supreme law of the land, has not the power to declare a law or a resolution, passed by the legislature or
either of its branches, unconstitutional. The will of the people, as expressed in their constitution, is the
paramount law and controls every and each department of the government. The judiciary, under its powers to
interpret the constitution and the laws, has the duty and the right to declare what the will of the people is, as
expressed in the fundamental law of the land. Hence, where the acts of the executive or legislative departments
violate the will of the people as expressed in the organic law of the land, it is the sworn duty of the judiciary to
interpret and to declare that the will of the people and the right of a citizen has been violated and transgressed.
While the imposition of a disciplinary measure by the legislature or either branch thereof upon one of its
members for an offense committed against its dignity may be regarded as a matter of internal concern only of
that body, over which the other departments may not exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the separation
established by the fundamental law, it does not follow that the legislature, in imposing disciplinary measure, has
not or may not overstep its own powers as limited or defined by the Organic Law. The legislative department of
the government cannot, under the guise of a resolution imposing disciplinary measure, transgress the
constitution, and when it does, its acts cease to be a mere internal concern. Even the members of the legislature
have their rights under the constitution. They have not lost the fundamental rights to their life, liberty, and
privileges as citizens by becoming members of the legislative department of the government.
The argument of the respondents leads to the conclusion that under their power to punish they may impose any
punishment which their wish, whim, prejudice, or caprice may dictate. That contention will hardly withstand the
scrutiny of modern civilization.
The respondents defend upon the ground that they are absolutely immune from judicial inquiry; that the courts
have no power or authority to inquire into the acts of the executive or legislative branches of the government,
however clear it may be made to appear that such departments do not possess the power or authority
exercised. The fact is evidently overlooked by them that the provision of the Jones Law above quoted is as
binding upon them as it is upon any department, bureau, or person in the government. The provisions of the
Jones Law, for the security of the rights of the citizen, stand in the same connection and upon the same ground
as they do in regard to his liberty and his property. It cannot be denied that both were intended to be enforced
by the judicial department of the government. As has been said, the writ of habeas corpus has been often used
to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even his life, against the exercise of unlawful authority on the part of the
executive and legislative branches of the government.
No man, individual, department, bureau, or officer in the Philippine Islands, under the Jones Law, is so high that
he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. The Philippine
Government is a government by law and not a government by the whim or caprice of any individual or
department. It (the law) is the only supreme power in our system of government; and every man who, by
accepting an office by appointment or election, participates in its function, is only the more strongly bound to
that supremacy (the law) and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it (the law) gives. Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights of the
citizens as against each other, but also upon rights and controversies between them and the government, and
the dockets of the courts are not without cases containing controversies of the latter class.
Shall it be said, in the face of the provisions of the Jones Law, and of the acknowledged right of the judicial
department of the government to decide in proper cases, that statutes which have been passed by both
branches of the Legislature and approved by the Governor-General are illegal and unconstitutional, and that said
department cannot give a remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his life or property without lawful
authority and without due compensation, simply because the executive or legislative department has ordered it?
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
If that is the law in the Philippines it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe nor
in any other government which has a just claim to a well-regulated liberty and the protection of the personal
rights, privileges, life, and property of the individual.
Can it be said that the judicial department of the government can intervene in a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus to relieve a citizen who has been imprisoned, illegally, and cannot take jurisdiction in proper proceedings
to consider the question whether or not he has been deprived of his property even though such deprivation has
been brought about by an illegal act or resolution of the Legislature, or by an order of the executive department
of the government? Here again we are of the opinion that the question contains its own answer to the average
citizen.
We cannot give our assent to the doctrine that the Senate or House of Representatives is the final judge of its
own powers and privileges, without restraint, especially in cases in which the rights, privileges, emoluments,
property, and liberties of a citizen are concerned. The legality of their action may always be examined and
determined by the courts. Especially are the courts competent, and it is proper for them to consider whether the
proceedings of the legislative department of the government are in conformity with the laws and the
constitution of the land, because, living under a written constitution, no branch or department of the government
is supreme; and it is not only the province, but the sworn duty, of the judicial department, to determine in cases
regularly brought before it, whether the powers of any branch of the government, even those of the legislature
in the enactment of laws or resolutions, have been exercised in conformity with the organic law of the land, if
they have not, to treat such acts or resolutions as null and void.
All of the foregoing arguments are intended to apply only to cases in which some action has been taken, which
illegally deprives a citizen of his rights, privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments. Nothing herein is intended to
modify in the slightest degree the decisions heretofore announced in the cases of Severino vs. Governor-General
and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, Perfecto vs. Wood, and Abueva vs. Wood, above cited. In those cases
the courts were called upon to require one or both of the other two coordinate departments to act in a particular
way upon questions which were specially confided to those departments, while in the present case the courts
are called upon to decide whether or not the action which the legislative department of the government has
taken is legal and in conformity with the powers conferred by the organic law of the land. A wide distinction must
be made between requiring a particular act to be done and a pronouncement upon the legality of that act after it
is performed. The courts will not require the legislative department of the government to adopt a particular law,
but they are authorized and empowered, and it is their sworn duty to pronounce a statute null and void after
adoption if the same is found to be contrary to the provisions of the organic law of the land and beyond the
powers of the legislative department. This doctrine is amply exemplified in the thousands of cases which have
been brought before the courts in petitions for habeas corpus where the petitioner alleged that he has been
imprisoned under an unconstitutional law and in many, many cases where men have been deprived of their
rights and property by an illegal and unconstitutional act adopted by the legislature. In the first class of cases
mentioned, the courts will never interfere in this jurisdiction to direct or coerce action, while in the second class
of cases the courts should always take jurisdiction for the purpose of determining and making pronouncements
upon the legality and constitutionality of acts actually taken.
In view of the facts and the law, we are compelled to decide that we are justified, authorized, and, under our
oath of office, compelled to take jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the
petitioner has been deprived, illegally, of a right guaranteed to him under the Constitution and laws of the
Philippine Islands. In exercising the high authority conferred upon us to pronounce valid or invalid a particular
resolution or statute of the legislature, we are only the administrators of the public will as expressed in the
fundamental law of the land. If an act of the legislature is to be held illegal by the courts, it is not because the
judges have any control over the legislature, but because the particular statute or resolution is forbidden by the
fundamental law of the land, and because the will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law, is
paramount and must be obeyed by every citizen, even the Legislature. In pronouncing a statute or resolution
illegal, we are simply interpreting the meaning, force, and application of the fundamental law of the state. If a
particular resolution or statute of the legislature is within its constitutional power, it will be sustained, whether
the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the resolution or statute covers a subject not
authorized by the fundamental law of the land, then the courts are not only authorized but are compelled and
justified in pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise or beneficient such resolution or statute
may seem to be. The courts will not measure their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department, as
expressed in the resolution or statute, upon the question of the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular
law, but the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular law must be tested by the provisions of the
fundamental law of the state. It is the sworn duty of the judicial department of the government to determine the
limits, under the law and the constitution, of the authority of both the executive and legislative departments.
THIRD. May the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?
In the Government of the Philippine Islands no man is so high that he is above the law. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It cannot be said,
in view of the acknowledge right of the judicial department of the government to pass upon the constitutionality
of statutes or resolutions of the legislative department, that the courts cannot give a remedy to a citizen of the
state when he has been illegally deprived of his life, his property, or his liberty by force, or by virtue of an
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
unconstitutional act or resolution of the legislative department. A contrary conclusion would sanction a tyranny
under the American flag, which has no existence even in the monarchies nor in any other government which has
a just claim to a stable government, a well-regulated liberty, and the protection of the personal rights of
individuals. Every department, every officer of the government, and every individual, are equally bound by the
mandatory provisions of the fundamental law. When a citizen under the American flag has been deprived of his
life, his liberty, or his property by an illegal statute or resolution, the official or department so depriving him
cannot say to the courts: "Stop here, for the reason that I (we) have acted as a representative of a different
department of the government."
A pronouncement, by the highest tribunal of justice in the Philippine Islands, that the resolution is ultra vires,
illegal, and void, we confidently believe, will be sufficient to cause an immediate revocation of the same, and the
adoption of a further order to the effect that all persons affected by it will be restored to their rights. We are
confident in that belief, because we cannot believe that the resolution was adopted out of a spirit of malice,
hatred, or revenge, but in the full belief that the law permitted it as a disciplinary measure. We cannot believe
that the honorable senators who took part in its adoption intended to deprive any of the citizens of their county
of the constitutional right. We are confident that the honorable senators recognize, as fully as the courts do, that
the constitution is the supreme law of the land and is equally binding upon them as it is upon every citizen, high
or low, and upon every branch, bureau, or department of the government. We are sure that the respondents will
be among the very first to openly criticize and vigorously denounce any person, entity, or department within the
Philippine Islands, who should be guilty of the slightest disregard or disobedience to the mandates of the
constitution — the law of the people.
The majority opinion decides that the petitioner and the people whom he represents have been illegally
deprived of their rights, but that he and they are without a remedy — damnum absque injuria. To that doctrine
we cannot give our assent.
The nightmare which runs through the majority opinion concerning the impossibility of the execution of a
judgment, is hardly justified in a stable and well-organized government, among a people who love peace and
good order, who despise disobedience to law and disloyalty to the constituted authorities. The history of the
Filipino people shows that they love peace, good order, and will, with a spirit of alacrity, obey the law when they
once understand what the law is. We rest in the confident faith that spirit still controls in the Philippine Islands.
The remedy prayed for should be granted in a modified form.
RESUME
1. The Organic Law (Jones Law) prohibits the removal of an appointive senator by the Legislature.
2. The said resolution has the effect of a removal of an appointive senator.
3. The resolution, therefore, is invalid, illegal, and void, according to the unanimous opinion of the court.
4. The legislative power and procedure of the Senate must be exercised in conformity with the Organic Law.
5. The courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the legality or constitutionality of a law or resolution of the
legislative department, whenever a citizen alleges that he has been deprived of his rights under such law or
resolution.
6. The courts of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of acts or resolutions or
procedure of the Senate.
7. The petition and demurrer present the question of the constitutionality of said resolution, as well as the
constitutional power of the Senate to adopt it.
8. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, having jurisdiction, its decree or order should afford relief from
the effect of said illegal resolution.
Therefore, the enforcement of the said illegal and void resolution should be enjoined.
OSTRAND, J., dissenting:
With much of what is said in the majority opinion I am in entire accord. I agree that the Senate in suspending the
petitioner, declaring his pay forfeited and depriving his senatorial district of the representation granted by the
Organic Act, exceeds its powers and jurisdiction. I also concede that the courts will not, by mandamus or other
writs, attempt to control the exercise by the other departments of the government of discretional or executive
powers or duties conferred upon them by the constitution or by constitutional statutes. I further concede that the
courts will not interfere with acts of another department when such acts are of a purely political and non-
justiciable character.
But when the court holds, as it in effects does in this case, that because the respondents are members of officers
of another department the courts have no power to restrain or prohibit them from carrying into effect an
unconstitutional and therefore void act of that department, an act wholly outside of its province, and which
deprives a citizen of rights and privileges to which he, by law, is entitled, I find myself unable to follow its
reasoning or to yield my assent to its conclusions.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Before entering upon a more extended discussion of the issues in the case, it may be well to emphasize that
there is here no question as to the power of the Philippine Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior.
That is conceded. But I contend that the court may intervene to prevent the execution of the penalty imposed if
such penalty transcends the domain of the Legislature and encroaches upon that of the Chief Executive in direct
violation of the Organic Act. I shall also maintain that the assertion in the majority opinion to the effect that this,
in substance, is an action against the Senate as a body, is erroneous.
The fundamental error into which the court has fallen is that it has failed to note the distinction between acts
within the province of a department and those outside thereof; it confuses entire absence of power with the
alleged improper exercise of legitimate powers. This distinction is obvious and very important. Where a power or
duty has been entrusted to the Chief Executive by the Organic Act, this court will not, under the rule laid down in
the case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366), attempt to
control or direct the exercise by him of that power or duty; he is presumed to be the best judge of the time and
the manner of its exercise. For the same reason, the court will not undertake to direct the exercise of the
discretional powers of the legislative department within its legitimate sphere. But it must necessarily be
otherwise where either department steps outside of its province and arrogates to itself any of the constitutional
powers of the other. The doctrine of non-interference by the judiciary with the other departments of the
government rests primarily on the ground that each department is presumed to possess special qualifications
and opportunities for the exercise of the powers entrusted to it by the constitution. It follows that the doctrine
does not apply to cases where a department goes beyond its legitimate sphere. This is, indeed, the first time any
court has ever held that in such cases there may be no judicial interference. (Bailey on Mandamus, p. 926.)
That the court has overlooked this distinction is very apparent from the fact that in all of the cases cited in
support of its conclusion, the acts complained of were within the province of the respondents and that in none of
them is there any question of the encroachment by one department upon the domain of another. It is very true
that in some of the cases dicta are to be found which, taken by themselves alone and without reference to the
context, may, at first sight, lead to the inference that the separation of the various departments of the
government is so complete that the courts, under no circumstances, will review any act of the Legislature or the
Executive, irrespective of its character, but when the cases where such dicta occur are closely examined, this
impression disappears and it becomes obvious that the dicta have no reference to acts of clear usurpation of
powers.
Five of the cases cited relate to judicial review of the exercise of the legislative powers. In the first of these
cases, Hiss vs. Bartlett ([1853], 69 Mass., 468), a habeas corpus proceeding, it was held that the House of
Representatives of Massachusetts had the implied power to expel a member and that the reasons for the
expulsion, and the question whether a member was duly heard before being expelled, could not be inquired into
by the courts.
French vs. Senate ([1905], 146 Cal., 604), was a proceeding in mandamus. The Constitution of the State of
California expressly gives either house of the Legislature authority to expel members by a two-thirds majority
vote. The petitioners had been so expelled from the Senate but alleged that it had been done without due
process of law and therefore asked that the Senate be compelled to again admit them as members. The court
denied the writ holding that the judicial department had no power "to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed
exclusively to that department by the Constitution."
State vs. Bolte ([1899], 151 Mo., 362), was a suit for a writ of mandamus to compel the presiding officer and the
secretary of the State Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and its chief clerk, to take the
necessary steps to complete the enactment of a certain bill, it being alleged that it had already passed both
houses by a majority vote. The petition was resisted on the ground that the presiding officer of the Senate had
ruled that the bill did not pass the Senate and that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling. The court
held that the duty the performance of which it was sought to enforce was one strictly within the line of the duties
of the presiding officer of the Senate and was not merely ministerial. The writ was therefore denied.
The case of Ex-parte Echols ({[1886], 89 Ala., 698), was a petition by one of the members of the State
Legislature for a writ of mandamus to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to compel him to send a
certain bill to the Senate. The Speaker ruled that the bill had not passed the house with the requisite majority of
votes and therefore refused to certify it to the Senate. The petition was denied, the court stating that it would
not "interfere with either of the coordinate departments of the government in the legitimate exercise of their
jurisdiction and powers."
There is, as far as I can see, absolutely nothing in these cases which can have any direct bearing on the present
case. In two of them the question before the court was the alleged abuse of constitutional powers resting in the
Legislature; the other three were actions to compel the performance of duties entrusted by law to the
Legislature or its officers and which were not merely ministerial. In all of them the Legislature operated within its
own domain.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The other cases cited to the same point in the majority opinion are actions directed against chief executives. The
two most favorable to the majority of the court are Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475) and Sutherland
vs. Governor (29 Mich., 320). The facts of the first case are stated in the majority opinion and need not be
restated here. But the portions quoted from the decision in that case should be read in connection with the
following quotation from the same decision, which I think forms its real basis:
The single point which requires consideration is this: Can the President be restrained by injunction
from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional?
It is assumed by the counsel of the State of Mississippi, that the President, in the execution of the
Reconstruction Acts, is required to perform a mere ministerial duty. In this assumption there is, we
think, a confounding of the terms `ministerial' and `executive,' which are by no means equivalent in
import.
A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in proper cases, be required of the head of the
department, by judicial process, is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple,
definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Very different is the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed, and among these laws the Acts named in the bill. By the first of these Acts he is
required to assign generals to command in the several military districts, and to detail sufficient
military force to enable such officers to discharge their duties under the law. By the supplementary
Act, other duties are imposed on the several commanding generals, and these duties must
necessarily be performed under the supervision of the President as Commander-in-Chief. The duty
thus imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely executive and political.
Considering the language here quoted, it is difficult to regard the first paragraph of the quotation from the same
decision in the majority opinion as anything but dictum. In any event, if it is to be taken as authority for the
proposition that the United States Supreme Court may prevent officers or members of Congress from carrying
into effect an unconstitutional resolution, it is definitely overruled by the decision in the case of Kilbourn vs.
Thompson (103 U. S., 168), in which the court held that an action would lie against the Speaker and other
officers of the House of Representatives of Congress for attempting to carry into effect an unconstitutional
resolution of the house committing Kilbourn to prison for contempt. The court further held that "the House of
Representatives (of Congress) is not the final judge of its own power and privileges in cases in which the rights
and liberties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action may be examined and determined by this
court."
The case of Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, is the leading case in favor of the view that all official acts of the
chief executive of a State are executive as distinguished from ministerial and therefore not subject to judicial
review. The case represents the extreme limit to which courts have gone in that direction and its soundness has
been questioned by most authorities on the subject, but because of the high reputation of the writer of the
decision, Judge Cooley, it is, nevertheless, entitled to consideration.
The case was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor of Michigan to issue a certificate of the
completion of the construction of the Portage Lake and Lake Superior Ship Canal. The statutes required the
governor to issue the certificate when he should be satisfied that the work had been done in conformity with the
law. The duty devolving upon the governor was therefore clearly discretional and this was recognized by the
court, but Judge Cooley preferred to plant the decision on additional and broader grounds, which may best be
stated in the language of the court:
. . . There is no very clear and palpable line of distinction between those duties of the governor which
are political and those which are to be considered ministerial merely; and if we should undertake to
draw one, and to declare that in all cases falling on one side the line the governor was subject to
judicial process, and in all falling on the other he was independent of it, we should open the doors to
an endless train of litigation, and the cases would be numerous in which neither the governor nor the
parties would be able to determine whether his conclusion was, under the law, to be final, and the
courts would be appealed to by every dissatisfied party to subject a coordinate department of the
government to their jurisdiction. However desirable a power in the judiciary to interfere in such cases
might seem from the standpoint of interested parties, it is manifest that harmony of action between
the executive and judicial departments would be directly threatened, and that the exercise of such
power could only be justified on most imperative reasons. Moreover, it is not customary in our
republican government to confer upon the governor duties merely ministerial, and in the
performance of which he is to be left to no discretion whatever; and the presumption in all cases
must be, where a duty is devolved upon the chief executive of the State rather than upon an inferior
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
officer, that it is so because this superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility were
confided in for a more accurate, faithful, and discreet performance than could be relied upon if the
duty were devolved upon an officer chosen for inferior duties. And if we concede that cases may be
pointed out in which it is manifest that the governor is left to no discretion, the present is certainly
not among them, for here, by law, he is required to judge, on a personal inspection of the work, and
must give his certificate on his own judgment, and not on that of any other person, officer, or
department.
We are not disposed, however, in the present case, to attempt on any grounds to distinguish it from
other cases of executive duty with a view to lay down a narrow rule which, while disposing of this
motion, may leave the grave question it presents to be presented again and again in other cases
which the ingenuity of counsel may be able to distinguish in some minor particulars from the one
before us. If a broad general principle underlies all these cases, and requires the same decision in all,
it would scarcely be respectful to the governor, or consistent with our own sense of duty, that we
should seek to avoid its application and strive to decide each in succession upon some narrow and
perhaps technical point peculiar to the special case, if such might be discovered.
And that there is such a broad general principle seems to us very plain. Our government is one
whose powers have been carefully apportioned among three distinct departments, which emanate
alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal
dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally independent. One makes the laws,
another applies the laws in contested cases, while the other must see that the laws are executed.
This division is accepted as a necessity in all free governments, and the very apportionment of
power to one department is understood to be a prohibition of its exercise by either of the others. The
executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same implication which forbids the courts to
take upon themselves his duties.
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and
that what are called the checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the
rest. The legislature prescribes rules of action for the courts, and in many particulars may increase or
diminish their jurisdiction; it also, in many cases, may prescribe rules for executive action, and
impose duties upon, or take powers from the governor; while in turn the governor may veto
legislative acts, and the courts may declare them void where they conflict with the constitution,
notwithstanding, after having been passed by the legislature, they have received the governor's
approval. But in each of these cases the action of the department which controls, modifies, or in any
manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no
occasion for conflict, controversy, or jealousy. The legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is
acting within its proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an
unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their proper province, because they are only
applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is
mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept
within their jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the
remedy is by impeachment, and not by another department of the government attempting to correct
the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the legislature could in like manner override
executive action also, the government would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the
other hand it would be readily conceded that no court can compel the legislature to make or to
refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever,
though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these cases the
exemption of the one department from the control of the other is not only implied in the framework
of government, but is indispensably necessary in any useful apportionment of power is to exist.
In view of the fact that the duty to be performed was discretional and therefore, by the concensus of judicial
opinion, not subject to judicial review, the extensive discussion of other grounds for the decision lays it open to
the same criticism as that frequently voiced in regard to Chief Justice Marshall's dissertation in the case of
Murbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch, 137); namely, that it was unnecessary to the decision of the case and therefore
in the nature of obiter dicta. It may also be noted that the courts of last resort in the States of Alabama,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio and Wyoming have
allowed writs of mandamus to the governors of their States for the performance of ministerial duties, without
bringing about any of the serious consequences predicted in Sutherland vs. Governor, supra. These States seem
to have fared fully as well as the States of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesotta, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Texas which, together with the
Philippine Islands, have adopted the opposite view.
But taking the decision in Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, at its full face value, I am unable to see that it is
determinative of the present case. I readily concede that under the decisions of this court all acts of the chief
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
executive within the limits of his jurisdiction are executive acts involving a measure of discretion and may not be
reviewed by the courts. It may also be conceded that no court can compel the legislature as such to make or
refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or "to take any action whatsoever though the
duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws." But that does not mean that the courts
may not restrain officers and individual members of the legislature from carrying into effect an unconstitutional
resolution transcending the limits of the legislative department and encroaching upon another. If that is beyond
the power of the courts, what will then become of the checks and balances of which Judge Cooley speaks and
which are regarded fully as essential a feature of our system of government as that of departmental distribution
of powers?
Time forbids a full discussion of other decisions of courts in the United States which adhere to the doctrine that
the judiciary will not interfere with the acts of the chief executive within the limits of his jurisdiction. It is
sufficient to say that they all relate to acts within the domain of the executive and that none of them has any
direct application to the present case.
But we are given to understand that by reason of its own previous decisions this court stands committed to the
doctrine that it has no power to interfere with any act of the other coordinate departments of the government
whether they transcend the limits of their jurisdiction or not.
A brief analysis of the decisions of this court upon the subject will show that this is a misapprehension.
The first of these decisions is that in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87), a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, conferred on the Governor-General the
power to suspend the writ whenever the public safety might require it in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or
invasion, and the case involved the question as to whether the courts may inquire into the legality of an order of
the Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ. The court held that "whenever a statute gives
discretionary power to a person to be exercised by him upon his own opinion on certain facts, such statute
constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts;" and that when the Governor-
General, "with the approval of the Philippine Commission declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or
invasion exists, this declaration or conclusion is conclusive against the judicial department of the government."
The writ was therefore denied.
The leading case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366), was
a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General to call a special election for the purpose of
electing a municipal president of the town of Silay, Occidental Negros, and to restrain the provincial board of
Occidental Negros from appointing a municipal president during the pendency of the action. By statute, the duty
of calling a special election devolves upon the Governor-General and the principal question presented for
consideration was whether the court had power to compel the Governor-General to immediately perform such
duty. The court denied the writ holding that "where a duty is devolved upon the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, rather that upon an inferior officer, it will be presumed to have been done because his
superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility were confined in for a more accurate, faithful, and
discreet performance than could be relied upon if the duty were put upon an officer chosen for inferior duties,"
and that the court would not undertake to direct or control the exercise of such duty. Incidentally, the court also
stated that "the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands are far
more comprehensive than those of State governors of the United States;" and laid down the rule that "the courts
of the Philippine Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere, by means of a writ of mandamus or injunction, with the
Governor-General as the head of the executive department in the performance of any of his official acts."
In the case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534), the facts may be briefly stated as follows:
The Governor-General deported certain Chinese persons from Manila to Amoy, China. The deportees
subsequently returned to Manila and brought an action in the Court of First Instance against the Governor-
General and certain police officials for damages, alleging that the deportation was unlawful. The defendants
thereupon filed a petition in this court for a writ of prohibition commanding the Judge of the Court of First
Instance to refrain from assuming jurisdiction in the case brought by the deportees, the petitioners alleging that
"the power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese Empire is a privative one of the Governor-General and is not
subject to judicial review." This court granted the writ holding that "the Governor-General, acting in his political
and executive capacity, is invested with plenary power to deport obnoxious aliens whose continued presence in
the territory is found by him to be injurious to the public interest, and in the absence of express or prescribed
rules as to the method of deporting or expelling them, he may use such methods as his official judgment and
good conscience may dictate;" that he could not be held liable in damages for the exercise of such power and
that the courts would not interfere.
Case R. G. No. 20867, Perfecto vs. Wood (not published in the reports) involved exactly the same principles as
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra, except that the special election
was to be called for the purpose of filing a vacancy in the Senate. The majority decision, signed by four justices,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
denied the petition on the same grounds as those stated in the Severino case. Three justices concurred in the
result on the ground that the case had then become a moot case.
The doctrine laid down in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, supra, was followed in the case of In re
McCulloch Dick.
The case of Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612), was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Insular Auditor, the
Executive Secretary of the Independence Committee and the Secretary of the same Committee to permit the
petitioners to examine all vouchers and documents in connection with disbursements and payments made from
the fund of the Independent Commission. The petition was denied, the court stating:
. . . It may be asserted as a principle founded upon the clearest legal reasoning that the legislature
or legislative officers, in so far as concerns their purely legislative functions, are beyond the control
of the courts by the writ of mandamus. The legislative department, being a coordinate and
independent branch of the government, its action within its own sphere cannot be revised or
controlled by mandamus by the judicial department, without a gross usurpation of power upon the
part of the latter. When the legislative department of the government imposes upon its officers the
performance of certain duties which are not prohibited by the organic law of the land, the
performance, the nonperformance, or the manner of the performance is under the direct control of
the legislature, and such officers are not subject to the direction of the courts. . . .
The case of Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), was a petition for a writ of prohibition commanding the
respondent Secretary of Justice to desist from carrying into effect the provisions of Act No. 2941 requiring the
Judges of the Courts of First Instance to draw lots every five years for exchange of districts. The court held that
the Act constituted an encroachment by the Legislature upon the Governor-General's power of appointment and
was therefore unconstitutional. The writ was granted.
What is there in these cases which can serve as authority for the theory that the courts may not interfere with
the execution of acts beyond the jurisdiction of the department sought to be restrained? Absolutely nothing. The
rather broad dictum in the case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros,
supra, that the courts of the Philippine Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere with the head of the executive
department in the performance of any of his official acts, must be considered in connection with the context and
is clearly limited to acts within the limits of his jurisdiction.
In Abueva vs. Wood, supra, the doctrine of noninterference with the Legislature is carefully limited to "actions
within its own sphere" and "duties not prohibited by the organic law of the land."
In the present case we are not dealing with an act of political and nonjusticiable character, nor is there a
question of interference with the exercise of discretionary powers of duties resting in the Legislature under the
Organic Act. We are simply called upon to prevent the carrying into effect of unconstitutional and therefore, in a
legal sense, nonexistent parts of a resolution of one of the branches of the Legislature which, if executed, will
result in an encroachment upon the domain of another department and deprive the petitioner of rights and
privileges to which he is by law entitled. There is no question as to the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior, but it must be insisted that the penalty shall not constitute a usurpation of the
powers of another department of the government in violation of the Organic Act. It is agreed that as long as the
penalty does not expressly or impliedly violate that Act, the courts will not interfere.
That the resolution is unconstitutional and void cannot be seriously questioned and is conceded in the majority
opinion, but in order to bring the issue into clear relief, it may be well to briefly state the reasons why it must be
so held:
The Senate exercises delegated powers, all of which are derived from the Organic Act. That Act provides for
twenty-two senators to be elected by the people and for two other senators to be appointed by the Governor-
General. In the language of the Act, the appointive senators "shall hold office until removed by the Governor-
General." The Act further provides that "The Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole
judges of the elections, returns and qualifications of their elective member." It will be observed that no power to
expel or remove appointive members is conferred on the houses of the Legislature, nor can such power be
inferred or implied from the statute, in view of the fact that it is expressly placed in the hands of the Governor-
General. The Act does not limit or qualify the term "remove" and it therefore includes both temporary and
permanent removals.
An examination of the Senate resolution in question shows that in effect it provides for a complete temporary
removal of the petitioner. It does not merely exclude him from the floor of the Senate Chamber, but he is also
"deprived of all his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments as such senator," for the period of one year. As far
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
as he is concerned, his removal from office for that period could not be made more complete. In attempting to
exercise the power of such removal, the Senate clearly arrogated to itself powers which it does not possess and
which, under the Organic Act, rest in the Chief Executive. Its resolution to that effect is consequent
unconstitutional and void. As is the case with an unconstitutional statute, it has, in the eyes of the law, never
existed.
We are therefore confronted with the facts that the petitioner is a duly appointed senate; that he, as a matter of
law, is not and never has been removed or suspended from office; that he, therefore, as such senate always has
been, and still is, entitled to all the prerogative, privileges, and emoluments of his office; and that, nevertheless,
certain officers and members of the Senate, without any legal authority whatever, deprive him of such
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, including his salary. The Senate has nothing to do with the
appointment of an appointive senator and is not, as in the case of elective members, the judge of his
qualifications; when duly appointed, the officers of the Senate are legally bound to recognize him as a senator;
they have no discretion in the matter and their duties in regard thereto are purely ministerial.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The decision of the court in the present case enjoys the distinction of being without a precedent and of resting
on no sound legal prejudice of which I am aware. The arguments advanced in its support are excuses and not
reasons. If carried to its logical conclusion, it may have far-reaching and serious consequences. If one branch of
the government may with impunity, and with freedom from judicial intervention, freely usurp the powers of
another branch, it may eventually lead either to anarchy or to tyranny. A wrong has been committed for which
there is no other remedy but that there sought by the petitioner, yet the court refuses to take jurisdiction on the
strength of alleged precedents which, as we have seen, in reality have no bearing whatever upon the issues of
the case. It is hardly necessary to say that when men are deliberately denied redress for wrongs, the temptation
is strong for them to take the law into their own hands and there is perhaps no more fruitful source of popular
unrest and disturbance.
I regret to see the decision find a place in our jurisprudence and can only hope that it will not be followed by this
court in the future.

The demurrer to the petition should be overruled.

In the circumstances, upon what legal principles is this court precluded from granting the petitioner the relief he
demands? Why cannot, for instance, members of the Committee on Accounts and the Paymaster of the Senate
be directed to cause to be paid to the petitioner the salary fixed by law? Footnotes

1
Other courts have not hesitated to use the writ of mandamus to compel performance of similar duties by officers Promulgated January 25, 1924, not reported.
of the legislature. In Ex parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91), the writ was issued to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to compel him to certify to the Comptroller of Public Accounts the amount to which the
petitioner was entitled as a member of the House for mileage and per diem compensation. In State vs. Elder (31
Neb., 169), the writ was issued to compel the Speaker to open and publish returns of the general election. In
State vs. Moffitt (5 Ohio, 350), mandamus was held to lie to the Speaker of the House to compel him to certify
the election and appointment of officers. In Wolfe vs. McCaull (76 Va., 87), the writ was issued to compel the
Keeper of the Rolls of the House of Delegates to print and publish a bill passed by the Legislature and upon
request to furnish a copy thereof properly certified. (See also Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S., 168; State vs.
Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; People vs. Marton, 156 N. Y., 136.) As stated as the outset, it is erroneously asserted in the
majority opinion that this action is, in substance, a suit against the Senate as a body. This might be true if the
act complained of was an act within the jurisdiction of the Senate, but such is not the case here. A practical
illustration may, perhaps, make the point clear. Let us suppose that a majority of the members of the Senate
should agree to commit a crime against another member and should pass a senatorial resolution to that effect.
Would that, in anything but form, constitute a senatorial act? And suppose the same members should proceed to
carry the resolution into effect, would not an action lie against such members and could that, in substance, be
regarded as an action against the Senate? The questions answer themselves, and though in the present case the
illegal act does not constitute a crime, the analogy is, nevertheless obvious; the distinction is one without a
difference. As has already been pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has held that an action may, at
the instances of the injured party, be maintained against the presiding officer, as well as other officers, of one of
the houses of Congress for the execution of an unconstitutional resolution. In the same case it is also intimated
that the action will lie against all members who take direct part in the execution of such a resolution. (Kilbourn
vs. Thompson, supra.)

It may further be noted that though the prayer in the petition in this case does not expressly so state, the body
of the petition shows sufficiently that the remedy to be applied may not be the same in regard to all of the
defendants. The allegations seem broad enough to cover both mandamus and prohibition and the petition is not
demurred to on that ground. It is also possible that if evidence were permitted some of the defendants might be
absolved from the complaint.

It has been suggested that to entertain an action against a coordinate department of the government would be
an unwarranted assertion of superiority on our part. I fail to see the validity of this observation. This is not a
question of departmental superiority or inferiority. This court asserts no superiority for itself; it only maintains
the superiority of the law to which all of us must yield obedience. The pronouncements of the court are simply
the voice of the law as understood by the court and are not personal matters. Even if this action were brought
against a coordinate department as a body — which it is not — the court would still be in duty bound to apply
the law of the land to the case and do its best to enforce that law irrespective of the rank or importance of the
parties.

In the course of the argument of the case it was intimated that if the writ prayed for were issued its enforcement
might be the cause of disturbance and strife. The suggestion is almost an insult to the intelligence and
patriotism of the defendants and I feel sure that the fear thus expressed is entirely without foundation. At least
there has been no trouble of that kind in other jurisdictions where writs have issued to officers or members of
the legislature. If courts perform their duties with firmless, rectitude and moderation, regardless of personal or
political considerations, their decisions will be respected and their orders and writs generally obeyed. It is usually Republic of the Philippines
when courts fail in these respects, and thus prove unfaithful to their trust, that their orders are disregarded and SUPREME COURT
trouble ensues. Manila
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G.
TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G.
TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59, respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution
No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against
the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not
punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House
of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber
on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated
the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium
prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a
criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across
with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of
justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or
recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity
and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of
the Filipino people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be
appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges
against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege
speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or
subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent
papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why
he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report
of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the
Congress of the Philippines.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable
conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and
Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's
jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing
any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in
view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its talk,
and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960,
finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved
on the same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended,
and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres
Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution
No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to
produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There
is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,
he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly
behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July
8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making
without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against
the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of
the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he
hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his
speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be
questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business
before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no
power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or
is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered
in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they
shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But
is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the floor of the
House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress."
(Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words
during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on
a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea.
(3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest
to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies
to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions
one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because
after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer
that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension
of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however,
affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and making them
applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against
the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt,
115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the
power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for
the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110
Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S.
W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196
Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107
Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham
Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker,
for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument
that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts
will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with
the legislature since each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by
the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what
are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a
member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11
Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905,
several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed
mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere ,
explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been
held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power
to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63
Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every
legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative
body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '.
. . There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either
house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department
and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt
by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power,
would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles
controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary
action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the
allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we
feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found
the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal
attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several
instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924,
Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate.
The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court
held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner,
it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12
months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the
Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided
that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate
and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District."
Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who
was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the
Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by
the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign
nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the
conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of suspension for
one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which
the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12
months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations are found
in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera
vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more
weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies
have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from
acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the
Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House
had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should
be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing
new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to
present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of
lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought it
proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I concur with the majority that the petition filed by Congressman Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a case either for
declaratory judgment or certiorari, since this Court has no original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment
proceedings, and certiorari is available only against bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The
respondent committee, being merely fact finding, was not properly subject to certiorari.
I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a
writ of prohibition against the committee, in so far as House Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel, Resolution No.
175) constituted an unlawful attempt to divest him of an immunity from censure or punishment, an immunity
vested under the very Rules of the House of Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V, provides as follows:
If it is requested that a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the Member making
such request shall indicate the words excepted to, and they shall be taken down in writing by the
Secretary and read aloud to the House; but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to
answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other business has
intervened.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña had delivered his speech and before the House adopted,
fifteen days later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent Committee and empowering it to investigate
and recommend proper action in the case, the House had acted on other matters and debated them. That being
the case, the Congressman, even before the resolution was adopted, had ceased to be answerable for the words
uttered by him in his privilege speech. By the express wording of the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure
or disciplinary action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as it attempts to divest him of the immunity
so acquired and subject him to discipline and punishment, when he was previously not so subject, violates the
constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation, and Resolution Nos. 59 and 175 are legally obnoxious
and invalid on that score. The rule is well established that a law which deprives an accused person of any
substantial right or immunity possessed by him before its passage is ex post facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur.
vol. 16-A, section 144, p. 153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed. Supp. 1015; People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368;
U. S. vs. Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 849).
The foregoing also answer the contention that since the immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule
XVII, the House could, at any time, remove it by amending those Rules, and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175
effected such an amendment by implication. the right of the House to amend its Rules does not carry with it the
right to retroactive divest the petitioner of an immunity he had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is against it.
It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached when the Congressman delivered it, the subsequent
action of the House only affected the procedure for dealing with that liability. But whatever liability Congressman
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then incurred was extinguished when the House thereafter considered other business; and
this extinction is a substantive right that can not be subsequently torn away to his disadvantage. On an
analogous issue, this Court, in People vs. Parel, 44 Phil., 437 has ruled:
In regards to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties and of penal actions pertains to
remedial and not substantive law, it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal system, provisions for
limitation or prescription of actions are invariably classified as substantive and not as remedial law;
we thus find the provisions for the prescription of criminal actions in the Penal Code and not in the
'Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal.' This is in reality a more logical law. In criminal cases prescription is
not, strictly speaking, a matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to punish the crime and
consequently, goes directly to the substance of the action. . . . (Emphasis supplied.).
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws,
that the objectionable measures happen to be House Resolutions and not statutes. In so far as the position of
petitioner Osmeña is concerned, the essential point is that he is being subjected to a punishment to which he
was formerly not amenable. And while he was only meted out a suspension of privileges that suspension is as
much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine, which the House could have inflicted upon him had it been so minded.
Such punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the constitutional provision against ex post
facto legislation. Nor is it material that the punishment was inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power. "The
ex post facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled, "can not be evaded by giving civil form to
that which is essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.] 1104, 1106; Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18
L. Ed. 276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules is to protect the freedom of action of its
members and to relieve them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of
political convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. it is unrealistic to overlook that, without the immunity so
provided, no member of Congress can remain free from the haunting fear that his most innocuous expressions
may at any time afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever a majority, however transient, should
feel that the shifting sands of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to assure that members of the
House of the House may freely act as their conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the
parliamentary immunity from outside pressure enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal
interpretation and application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as instances of disciplinary taken notwithstanding
intervening business, are not truly applicable. Of the five instances cited by Deschkler (in his edition of
Jefferson's Manual), the case of Congressman Watson of Georgia involved also printed disparaging remarks by
the respondent (III Hinds' Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the debate immunity rule afforded no defense; that of
Congressmen Weaver and Sparks was one of censure for actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec. 1657); while
the cases of Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds,
sec. 1248, 1252 and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of the U. s. House of Representatives as it stood before
the 1880 amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was
to the following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):
This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a semicolon, and the Chair asks the attention of the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Wilson) top the language of that rule, as it settles the whole question:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the person calling him to be order
shall repeat the words excerpted to —
That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words spoken in debate "and they shall be taken done
in writing at the Clerk's table; and no Member shall be held to answer, or be subject to the censure of
the House, for words spoken, or other business has intervened, after the words spoken, and before
exception to them shall have been taken.
The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order" is "excepting to words spoken in debate."
the second part of the rule declares that a Member shall not be held subject to censure for words
spoken in debate if other business has intervened after the words have been spoken and before
"exception" to them has been taken. Exception to the words of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Harding), the gentleman from Massachusetts
(Mr. Banks), the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rosseau), and also by the Speaker of the House, as
the records of the Congressional Globe will show. The distinction is obvious between the two parts of
the rule. In the first part it speaks of a Member excepting to language of another and having the
words taken down. In the last part of the rule it says he shall not be censured thereafter unless
exception to his words were taken; but it omits to add as an condition that words must also have
been taken down. The substantial point, indeed the only point, required in the latter part of the rule
is, that exception to the objectionable words must have taken.
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases and the Rules of our House of Representatives is
easily apparent. As Rule 62 of the United States House of Representatives stood before 1880, all that was
required to preserve the disciplinary power of the Hose was that exception should have been taken to the
remarks on the floor before further debate or other business intervened. Under the rules of the Philippines House
of Representatives, however, the immunity becomes absolute if other debate or business has taken place before
the motion for censure is made, whether or not exceptions or point of order have been made to the remarks
complained of at the time they were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not
bar the members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself fro remarks made on the floor, that
disciplinary power does not, as I have noted, include the right to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a
member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post
facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress should be deprived of the same protection. Surely
membership in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the individual citizen.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. If may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraint or violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitation all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate or even more just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed., 324-325.)
Court will not interfere with the action of the state senate in reconsideration its vote on a resolution
submitting an amendment to the Constitution, where its action was in compliance with its own rules,
and there was no constitutional provision to the contrary. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So.
963) (Emphasis supplied.).
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner,
should not deter it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the questioned
resolutions and of all action that has been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues remain so
important as to require adjudication by this Court.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, Reyes, and I venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime which purports to be one of law, where law is supreme, even
the Congress in the exercise of the power conferred upon it to discipline its members, must follow the rules and
regulation that it had itself promulgated for its guidance and for that of its members. The rules in force at the
time Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech declared by the House to constitutes a disorderly conduct
provides:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of
the House therefor, if further debate or other business has intervened. (Rule XVII, Sec. 7, Rules,
House of Representatives.)
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after
June 23, 1060 when the House created the committee that would investigated him. For fully 15 days the House
took up other matters. All that was done, while the speech was being delivered, was to have certains portions
thereof deleted. I hold that pursuant to its own Rules the House may no longer punish Congressman Osmeña for
the delivered fifteen days before.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery,
except to have some part of the speech deleted, show that the members of the House did not consider
Osmeña's speech a disorderly conduct. The idea to punish Congressman Osmeña, which came 15 days after,
was, therefore, an afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that Congressman Osmeña is being made to answer for an
act, after the time during which he could be punished therefor had lapsed.
The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we
hold that the House may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental principle of law that an amendment
takes place only after its approval, or, as in this case, to the extent of punishing an offense after the time to
punishing an had elapsed. Since the rule, that a member can be punished only before other proceedings have
intervened, was in force at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may not ignore said
rule. It is said in the majority opinion that the rule limiting the period for imposition of a penalty for a speech to
the day it was made, is merely one of procedure. With due respect to the majority, we do not think that it is
merely a rule of procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time in which the House may take punitive
action against an offending member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to punishment. As Mr.
Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out, the rule is substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be ignored
when invoked.
If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House should observe its own rule and not violate it by
punishing a member after the period for indictment and punishment had already passed. Not because the
subject of the Philippic is no less than the Chief Magistrate of the nation should the rule of the House be ignored
by itself. It is true that our Government is based on the principle of separation of powers between the three
branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition that this Court should not interfere with the legislature
in the manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that the Court cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what
the law is when any of its (the House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes the law.
Congressman Osmeña had invoked the protection of a rule of the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state
what the rule being invoked by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being violated in meting out
punishment for his speech; we should not shirk our responsibility to declare his rights under the rule simply on
the board excuse of separation of powers. Even the legislature may not ignore the rule it has promulgated for
the government of the conduct of its members, and the fact that a coordinate branches of the Government is
involved, should not deter us from performing our duty. We may not possess the power to enforce our opinion if
the House chooses to disregard the same. In such case the members thereof stand before the bar of public
opinion to answer for their act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as their norm of conduct.
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent personally believe that vitreous attacks against the
Chief Executive, or any official or citizen for that matter, should be condemned. But where the Rules,
promulgated by the House itself, fix the period during which punishment may be meted out, said Rules should
be enforced regardless of who may be prejudicated thereby. Only in that way may the supermacy of the law be
maintained.
Footnotes
1
These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the views of petitioner.
2
Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.
3
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189; Hiss. vs. Barlett & Gray. 468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.
4
Rules of the House not the force of law, but they are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for
the orderly and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870)
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
5
Corpus Juris Secumdum, p. 870. his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations
against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance;
approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
6
South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649; 151 s. w. 515.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
7
146 Cal. 604; 69 L. R. A. 556.

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines
8
Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497) William Willet, Jr. of New York); par. 2498 (Louis v. Mc and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
Fadden of Pensylvania). officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the
9
Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of Representative by Louis Deschler (1955) p. 382. following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu
Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu
Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong
10
the Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu
domestic affairs as can be given them, without in the meantime impairing the rights of sovereignty Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @
by the people of the United States." (Preamble) Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So
Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified
11
Apart from the view that power to remove includes the power to suspend asan incident. (Burnap aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said
vs. U. s. 252, U. S. 512, 64 L. Ed. 693, 695.) This view is distinguishable from Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1
Phil., 175.(See Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N. E. 120) But we need not explain this now. Enough to rely on
congressional inherent power.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel,
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
12
See appendix par. VII, Cushing.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an
13
This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for declaratory order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash
judgments, and (b) availability of certiorari or prohibition against respondents who are not exercising bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
judicial or ministerial functions (Rule 67, sec. 1 and 2). accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition
would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that
petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the
14
See supra. arraignment on 27 May 1991.

15
Phil., 83. Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional
liberty upon a recognizance.

On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and Preliminary Injunction
before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Republic of the Philippines Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The
SUPREME COURT Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
Manila

The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the consideration of
EN BANC her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.

G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001 On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs. On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship from the
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin
AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents. petitioner from leaving the country.

VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in
criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case
and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner
filed a motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose
applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously
omitted in the complaint.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's arraignment
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana after
having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a
resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two
amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March
1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal
cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266,
assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding
Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the
nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and
desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to
post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with her arraignment on 12 April 1993
until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to
consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into
one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash
said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga).
The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion of the
prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03rd August
1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was
elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25
January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and
hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or
hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon
notice.
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of
the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court
of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the
suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at
that time." 2
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged
with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of
the statute provides:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether
as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service,
has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As
amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
3
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer — may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information
under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary
employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination
of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no
ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in
the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been
held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may
be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the
information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct
thereof. It has been said that —
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that
the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
x x x .'
"xxx xxx xxx
"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that
the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any
other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for
which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of
the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a
challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in
Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal
proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the
information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep.
Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance
in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the
case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the Sandiganbayan
has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon to resolve several other
matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12
petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to
Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago
vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from
acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended
informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the
denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to
raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against
her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is
self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in
her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan
to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline
its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the
order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the
encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and
'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification
that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-
equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the
Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government
instrumentality has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an
arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
subscribes to the view 19 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can
unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by the
Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it
appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.89.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95.
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said
fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea
and formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor the
aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign
exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529
of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea
and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a
similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued
the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for
petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law
from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea
and formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the
Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute
of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off.
Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled
that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their
reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the elaborate
printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this
appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal
evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of
the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be
punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and
that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted
that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that
the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved,
whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of
the journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.

Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be
required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative
Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission
shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary "to keep a
correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for
the ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission
as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of
Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine
EN BANC die.

G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916 The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine
Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate,
the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears therein
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant. recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee. subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to
appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the
same Code also provides that:
TRENT, J.:

Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .

The information in this case reads:

The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal
importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting
among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a
foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce
into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing
125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the
said accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal the
said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and concealment of the
same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought,
imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act committed
in violation of law."
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided
for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by
their order: Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment
thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may take
judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed
by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron
vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it
our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of
1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show,
with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.

On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been
arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in
Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties were
imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later
withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive
evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From
the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces
and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have
indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact
may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the
legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence
is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to influence the belief respecting
it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions."
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention,
must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the
acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are
as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in
other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment
apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in
direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the
resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death
or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these
considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative
records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of
the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many
contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22
L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348),
decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question; and, out
of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the
proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals required to be kept in each of its
branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon
judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that
they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should
rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of
time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in
the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a
later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point.
As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the
various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals
say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court
did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain,
bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto
Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business of a wine merchant,
with an office and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of lading
for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents
were indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the
negotiations incident to the release of the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were
delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the
paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of
merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names
were not listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned,
instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse,
being aided by the customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the serial number of each
barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11
o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to
Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left
and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one of his
employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the
vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-five and told Sese to load these
five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was complied with
by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on
the 10th, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened
and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then
proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying the
barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on
Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that the five
missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents,
accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here found the five missing barrels, which
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
were identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty,
the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in size to the
heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several baskets of lime
scattered about the basement of the house and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these
baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was discovered which
bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of
house No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found, upon
investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one
F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the
same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso
and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these
three barrels each was found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and
securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the
three barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were
in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons,
apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken
to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily
confessed his participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium
found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under
arrest at the time the three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which
end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that
the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing
the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of
opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April 10, following the instructions given
him by Beliso. On being further questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium
transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso
for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous
importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The
customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several large tin receptacles, in every
way similar to those found at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At
first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of Isabela and
Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the
trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and
that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in
the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25
barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked
during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just
arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium
was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I
wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt of the appellant
beyond any question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to him
from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this huge smuggling
transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the
decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized
under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has filed in this Court
a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of
the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently
enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General, was
substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the President of
the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present compensation
of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers and members, respectively, as set in the
Constitution). The section expressly provided that "the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides "that the salary increase
of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the
effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642)
contained the following items for the House of Representatives:
SPEAKER
1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to December 29,
1965
and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00
MEMBERS
2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at P7,200 from July 1 to
December 29, 1965
and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . . P 16,000.00
2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . . 165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as
amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses
to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to
and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of
Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along
the lines summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial
construction of the law involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue by suggesting that an
opinion on the matter be sought from the Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the
suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on
November 26, 1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the Justice Secretary could act, respondent
Aguiluz, as former Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass
in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in force;
hence the filing of the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action, for
lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the House should be joined parties defendant.
On the merits, the answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional provisions,
insofar as present members of the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the
passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the
House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices to make the higher compensation effective for
them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause.
As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965;
Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405, December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs.
Auditor General, L-23825, December 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022,
March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful
expenditure or waste of state funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to
say that since the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in audit and the approval of the
payment of the Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent
auditors were indispensable or proper parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the
Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who
approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased compensation to the members of the House of
Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the term of those House members who approved the
increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the
approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural
temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with
the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any
such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p.
867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between
them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full
term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the
plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the
members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
(whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the
enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not
apportionable between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution,
Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it
was decided that the Legislature should be bicameral in form, initially recommended that the increase in the
compensation of legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the term of office of all members of the
Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual compensation of four
thousand pesos including per diems and other emoluments or allowances and exclusive of travelling
expenses to and from their respective residences when attending sessions of the National
Legislature, unless otherwise fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature
that approved such increase. (Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over
and made more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after the expiration of the term of
office of the Members of the National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase. (Aruego, 1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of
the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed
its present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered.
From the first proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present,
the intendment of the clause has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of the Legislature
that approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to
circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its adoption.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the Representatives but also of the
Senators who approved the increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all the members of the
Congress" instead of specifying "all the members of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction without a
difference, since the Senate and the House together constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the
reason for specifying the component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a
unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of the" before "House" in the provision
being considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed
the shorter expression "of the Senate and the House". It was grammatically correct to refer to "the members of
the Senate and (the members) of the House", because the members of the Senate are not members of the
House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the House" would imply that the members of the Senate also
held membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the Senators, as well as that of the
Representatives, must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the "terms" (in the plural) "of the
members of the Senate and of the House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the Constitution does in
section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As previously observed, the use of the singular form
"term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the Constitution envisaged both legislative
chambers as one single unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, "until the expiration
of the full term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before the effectivity of the
increased compensation would subject the present members of the House of Representatives to the same
restrictions as under the Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered whether this was not, in
fact, the design of the framers of the 1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original limitation or
the present one, as amended, as maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before
an increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election, two assemblymen's terms, of 3
years each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the increase could become operative,
because the original Constitution required that the new emolument should operate only after expiration of the
term of assemblymen elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an assemblyman's
term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators hold
office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the legislature on its last session just prior
to an election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the original restriction, because to the last year of the
term of the approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be added. Once again an
identical period must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of the Senators are elected every
two years, so that just before a given election four of the approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to
run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an
increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after the expiration of the term of
the succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until December 30, 1941,
six years after 1935. Under the present Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the
participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be collectible until December 30, 1969, since the
said Senators' term would expire on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to approve the increase in
compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new compensation would still operate
on December 30, 1941, four years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November of 1938
(subsequent to the approval of the increase) would end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding
the elections in November of that year, the higher compensation would be operative only on December 30,
1969, also four years later, because the most recently elected members of the Senate would then be Senators
chosen by the electors in November of 1963, and their term would not expire until December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the amended constitution can not be
just due to accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional
salaries has been maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument
that by requiring members of the present House to await the expiration of the term of the Senators, who
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concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under the
Constitution as originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval of increases of
compensation just before an election by legislators who can anticipate their reelection with more or less
accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved interpretation of
the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134
is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation
may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act)
authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the
Constitution and must be held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation
Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the
increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December
30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are
prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation
authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before
December 30, 1969. No costs.
We concur in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring opinions of Justices Bengzon, Zaldivar and Castro.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
Fully concurring with the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, I should like only to mention a few thoughts related to
some points contained therein.
As stated in the majority opinion, it is argued by respondents that if it was intended that the increase should
take effect at the same time, the provision of the Constitution could have been phrased as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Congress approving such increase.
They maintain that in specifying "the Senate" and "the House" instead of just using the words "the Congress" the
body obviously considered that inasmuch as the terms of the Representatives and Senators under the legislature
provided for, would not necessarily coincide, the effective date of the increased salary of the Representatives
could also be different from that of the Senators.
The fact that "Congress" is not used in the provision in question, in my opinion, is rather an argument for the
petitioner herein. "Congress" is not used, obviously because after every four years the Congress is dissolved. On
the other hand, the term of a member of the Senate, being six years, goes beyond the duration of one Congress
and extends to that of the next Congress. In other words, while the term of the members of the House of
Representatives coincides with the lifetime of the Congress, the term of a member of the Senate goes beyond
the existence of one Congress.
The Constitution, instead, uses (1) "Senate" and "House of Representatives" and (2) adds "all" before "the
Members", clearly intending that no increase in the compensation therein provided for shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the most junior among the members of the Senate at the time the increase
was approved. Precisely, therefore, because the Constitution speaks of "Senate" and "House of Representatives"
instead of "Congress", the prohibition against effectivity continues even after the end of the Congress which
approved the measure and, which amounts to the same thing, even after the end of the term of the members of
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
the House of Representatives approving the increase. In specifying "the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase", the Constitution leaves
no doubt that until after the condition is met as to the Senate, no increase in the compensation laid down for
Senators and Representatives shall take effect.
It is also contended by respondents that the Constitution in using "term" instead of "terms" shows the clear
intention to consider the "term" of the Senators independently from that of the Representatives. The contention
is untenable. The provision clearly uses "term" in the general sense. For, otherwise, even in referring to
members of the Senate alone, it should have used "terms" since the Senators had originally different terms of
office (two, four and six years), as provided for in Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, a provision
contemporaneous with the one involved herein. Yet just the same, the Constitution uses the would "term"
(singular) to cover all these different terms of office.
I am of the opinion therefore that no other course is open to the Supreme Court in this case but to apply the
provision of the Constitution restricting the increase of salaries of Senators and Representatives by subjecting it
to a period of waiting. To forestall the view that the Supreme Court thereby offends equity, because the other
Constitutional officers — including the members of said Court — are already receiving their increased salaries
under Republic Act No. 4134, suffice it to bear in mind that it was within the hands of the legislators themselves
if they had so desired, to have provided that the salary increases of the aforesaid other Constitution officers take
effect at the same time as their own. In other words, if they had thought it would be inequitable to grant salary
increases to others before they could receive their own salary increase — an argument which, I am glad to note,
has not been advanced — they could have easily provided that the salary increases therein given be effective
December 30, 1969, as in their case.
I consequently reiterate my concurrence.
ZALDIVAR, J., concurring:
During the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines House Bill No. 6190 was
approved, and this bill was signed into law on June 20, 1964 by the President of the Philippines and became
Republic Act No. 4134.
Section 1, paragraph A of Republic Act 4134 provides, among others, that the annual salary of the President of
the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be forty thousand pesos, and that of the
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be thirty-two thousand pesos each. The paragraph
ends with this sentence: "The salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution."
The pertinent provision of the Constitution as far as the effectivity of any law increasing the compensation of the
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives is concerned reads as follows:
. . . No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. . . . (Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution)
Inasmuch as House Bill No. 6190 was passed during the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the
Philippines, in 1964, said bill was approved by the House of Representatives whose members were elected in the
elections of November, 1961 and whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1965; and by the Senate
whose membership was composed of: eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959 and whose term
would expire on December 29, 1965; eight Senators who were elected in November, 1961 and whose term
would expire on December 29, 1967; and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1963 whose term
would expire on December 29, 1969.
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing the opinion of the Court in the case now before Us, interpreting the effectivity
clause in paragraph A, Section 1 of Republic Act 4134 in relation to the pertinent provision of Article VI, Section
14, of the Constitution, herein-above quoted, says that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act
4134 for the Senators and Members of the House of Representatives will not take effect until December 30,
1969. I concur with this opinion because it will not be until December 29, 1969 when the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives that approved the increase in 1964 would expire.
And I also agree with the opinion that in so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (Appropriation Law for the fiscal year
1965-1966) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation for the Members of the House of
Representatives prior to December 30, 1960 violates the Constitution and must be held null and void..
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
My opinion in this regard is based upon a personal knowledge of how the constitutional proviso, Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our present Constitution. It was the
Second National Assembly which amended our original Constitution. I was a humble Member of the Second
National Assembly, representing the province of Antique.
The three important amendments that were incorporated in our Constitution by the Second National Assembly in
1940 were the provisions regarding (1) the establishment of a bicameral legislature composed of a House of
Representatives and a Senate, to take the place of the then existing unicameral legislature known as the
National Assembly; (2) the change in the term of the office of the President of the Philippines, and the Vice-
President, which formerly was for a period of six years, to that of four years, with the proviso that no person shall
serve as President for more than eight consecutive years; and (3) the creation of the Commission on Elections.
It is regrettable that the deliberations of the Second National Assembly on the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution were mostly done in caucuses behind closed doors, and the discussions were not recorded. It was
during the first special sessions of the Second National Assembly in September, 1939 when discussions on
proposed amendments to the Constitution were held. It was only after the propose amendments had been
approved in caucuses when the amendments were embodied in a resolution and submitted to the National
Assembly in open session. The amendments as approved in caucuses were embodied in Resolution No. 38 and
adopted on September 15, 1939. However, during the second regular sessions in 1940 Resolution No. 38 was
amended by Resolution No. 73 which was adopted on April 11, 1940. That is how the amendments came to be
known as the 1940 Amendments. Those amendments were approved in a plebiscite that was held on June 18,
1940.
I still have vivid recollections of the important points brought up during the deliberations in caucus over
proposed amendments and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too the influences that worked, and the
pressures that were brought to bear upon the Assemblymen, in the efforts to bring about agreements on very
controversial matters and thus secure the insertion of the desired amendments to the Constitution. The
discussions on the proposed amendments affecting the legislative branch of the government were specially of
interest to us then because we were in some way personally affected, as most of us were interested in running
for reelection.
It is not my purpose here to impose on anyone my recollections of matters that were brought up during our
caucuses then, but I only wish to emphasize the fact that my concurring opinion in the decision of the case now
before Us has for its basis my honest and best recollections of what had transpired, or what had been expressed,
during the caucuses held by the Members of the Second National Assembly in the deliberations which later
brought about the 1940 amendments.
I distinctly remember that the proposed amendment to change the legislature from unicameral to that of
bicameral, just as the proposal to change the term of office of the President from six years without reelection to
that of four years with one reelection, at first met very strong oppositon by a considerable group of
Assemblymen. But somehow the opposition was finally subdued, so to say. In the case of the legislature, the
basic idea of having two chambers of the legislature — one chamber serving as a check to the other — was
accepted. It was then considered as a wise idea to have the Senate as the upper chamber, to be composed of
members who would be elected at large, and it was expected that those who would be elected to the Senate
would be men of national prestige; prestigious because of their known integrity, in their record and experience
as a public servant, or in their prominence as a successful member of his profession. It was even said, then, that
the Senate would be a training ground for future Presidents of the nation. And so, when it was agreed that a
bicameral legislature would be provided in the Constitution, the next matter that had to be considered was the
tenure of office of the members of each of the two chambers of the legislature. As far as the terms of the
members of the lower chamber, to be known as the House of Representatives, there was no disagreement over
the idea that their term be for a period of four years, to coincide with the term of the President. But as far as the
term of office of the members of the upper chamber, to be known as the Senate, there was at first a divergence
of opinion. There was a group that supported the idea that the term of the members of the upper chamber be
four years, similar to that of the House of Representatives, so that in the national elections that would take place
every four years there would be elections for President, Vice-President, and all the members of the Congress of
the Philippines. However, there was a very strong advocacy on the part of top political leaders at that time that
the Senate should be made a continuing body, such that the complete membership of that chamber should not
be elected during the national elections that would take place every four years.
Finally, it was agreed that the members of the Senate, which was decided to be composed of twenty-four, would
have a term of six years, one-third of which number would be elected every two years. The idea of having
elections of one-third of the membership of the Senate was adjusted to the situation that in between two
national elections there were the elections for local officials. The question regarding the term of office of the
Members of the first Senate to be elected under the Constitution as amended was settled by inserting a proviso
that the first senators elected should, in the manner provided by law, be divided equally into three groups: the
senators of the first group to serve for a term of six years, those of the second group to serve for a term of four
years, and those of the third group for a term of two years (Article VI, Section 3). And for the purposes of the first
elections under the amended Constitution Commonwealth Act No. 666 was enacted by the National Assembly
providing, as far as the first Senate was concerned, that "The Senate shall, within ten days after it shall have
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
been organized with the election of its President, determine by lot which of the elected Senators shall belong to
the group who shall serve six years, which to the group who shall serve for four years, and which to the group
which shall serve for two years." (Section 9, Com. Act No. 666)
When the matter regarding the compensation of the members of both chambers came up for the deliberation,
there were proposals that the Senators be given more compensation than the Members of the House of
Representatives, and a number of proposals were presented regarding the amount of compensation that would
be paid to the Senators or to the Representatives, as the case may be. This matter was the subject of long
discussions. It was finally agreed that the amount of compensation for the Senators and for the Members of the
House of Representatives be the same, and it was fixed at P7,200.00 per annum each, including per diems and
other emoluments, exclusive only of travelling expenses in going to and returning from the sessions. There was
an increase of P2,200.00 over the P5,000.00 per annum that the Members of the National Assembly were
receiving at the time. It is thus seen that in the matter of compensation the sense of the Members of the Second
National Assembly who amended the Constitution in 1940 was to provide for an equal compensation for the
Members of the Senate and to the Members of the House of Representatives.
When the matter regarding the increase in the compensation of the Senators and of the Representatives came
up for consideration, there was unanimity among the Assemblymen in support of the idea that members of the
Congress of the Philippines may approve a law increasing their compensation, but that no Member of the House
of Representatives or of the Senate that approved the law increasing the compensation should receive the
increased compensation during their term of office when the increase was approved. I remember that the
question as to when the increase of compensation as approved by the Members of the Congress of the
Philippines should take effect was the subject of a prolonged and heated discussion. Many Members of the
National Assembly wanted to continue with the provision of Article VI, Section 5 of the original Constitution that
"No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of
the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase." I have taken note that no less than
eighteen members of the Second National Assembly in 1940 were members of the 1934 constitutional
convention that drafted the original Constitution, and it was this group of Assemblymen that were zealous in
maintaining the idea that one full term of a member of the legislature subsequent to the approval of the increase
in compensation should be made to lapse before the increase shall take effect. But this idea could not be
insisted upon because while that was feasible in the case of Members of the National Assembly which was a
unicameral body, that idea could not be adopted in a bicameral body where the term of office of the members of
one chamber was not the same as that of the members of the other chamber. I recall that it was finally agreed
to simply adopt the constitutional precept that no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
receive any increase in compensation, as approved by the House and the Senate of a particular Congress, before
the expiration of the term of all the members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate that approved
the increase. Inasmuch as the term of the Members of the House of Representatives is shorter than that of the
Senators, it was understood that the expiration of the term of the Members of the Senate that approved the
increase should be awaited before the increase in compensation would take effect. As finally worded by the
Committee on Style of the Assembly, and that Committee on Style was headed by the illustrious and
indefatigable Assemblyman Gregorio Perfecto, who later became a worthy member of this Court, that
constitutional precept which became part of Section 14, Article VI of the amended Constitution was worded as
follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It should be noted that the above-quoted portion of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution talks of the
"expiration of the full term of all the Members" then followed by the words "of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." This proviso contemplates not the Representatives or the Senators
who voted in favor of the increase, but the Senate and the House of Representatives as a body that approved
the increase. And so, because the understanding of the amending Assemblymen was that the effectiveness of
the increase should take place after the expiration of the term of the Senators with the longest term among the
Members of the Senate that approved the increase the constitutional proviso was so worded "shall take effect
until after the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase." It will be noted that this Section 14 starts with using the words "Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives" in referring to the compensation to be received by each. They are considered individually.
But in the matter of determining the time when the increase is to take effect they are considered as collective by
the use of the phrase "all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase." The use of the word all includes every Member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives,
regardless of whether or not he or she voted affirmatively for the increase. It is the House and the Senate that
approved the increase. And so because the effectiveness of the increase depends on the expiration of the term
of all the members of both chambers it stands to reason that all the members of the two chambers were taken
into consideration, and because when the increase was approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives there were members of the Senate whose term of office was longer than that of some other
Members of the Senate and of the Members of the House of Representatives it is the term of the Senators which
was the longest that should first expire before the increase should take effect. That is how I understood then that
portion of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, and I sincerely believe that that was also how most if not all
of my colleagues understood it.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The question precisely was raised whether under that constitutional proviso, as above-quoted, the Members of
the House of Representatives who are elected during the elections subsequent to the approval of the increase by
the Congress of the Philippines could receive the increased compensation inasmuch as the term of those
Members of the House that had approved the increase had already expired. I remember that it was the
understanding of the Members of the National Assembly that those members of the House of Representatives
who would be elected subsequent to the approval of such increase could not immediately receive the increased
compensation as approved during the preceding Congress; and neither could the eight Senators who would be
elected along with those Representatives in the same elections. To allow those newly elected Representatives
and Senators to receive the increased compensation would give rise to a situation whereby the Members of the
House of Representatives and eight Senators would be receiving a compensation higher than that received by at
least sixteen Members of the Senate, including the President of the Senate, as the case might happen. That
would be inconsistent with the basic idea adopted by the Members of the National Assembly that the
compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives and those of the Senate should be the same; and
it is only logical that when we say that the compensation of the Members of the House and of the Members of
the Senate is the same, that compensation should be the same not only in amount but also at the same time
within their respective terms of office.
It was envisaged by the Members of the National Assembly that the salary increase, under the constitutional
proviso now in question, would become effective after the lapse of two years, or four years, as the case may be,
after the commencement of the term of office of those Members of the House of Representatives that are
elected in the elections subsequent to the approval of the increase. In the case of the lapse of four years, which
we have just stated, it would mean that it would be the Members of the House of Representatives who would be
elected in the second elections subsequent to the approval of the increase who would receive the increased
compensation.
As I have stated, it was the sense of the Members of the Second National Assembly that approved the
constitutional amendment in 1940 that the increase in the compensation for Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate would take effect only until after the expiration of the full term of the
senators who were Members of the Senate that approved the increase. It is my recollection that the main idea of
the Members of the National Assembly in adopting the proviso in question was to maintain the equality of the
compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate at all times.
Three situations were anticipated to happen by the amending Assemblymen under the constitutional proviso in
question:
1. This is the first situation. Let us take the case of the First Congress of the Philippines which was elected in
November, 1941 already under the Constitution as amended in 1940. This Congress was composed of a House of
Representatives whose members were elected for a term of 4 years, to expire on December 29, 1945; and of a
Senate composed of eight Senators with a term of 6 years to expire on December 29, 1947; eight senators with
a term of 4 years to expire on December 29, 1945, and eight senators with a term of 2 years to expire on
December 29, 1943.
If a law increasing the compensation of Members of Congress was passed during the sessions of 1942, supposing
that there was no war, the increase would take effect on December 30, 1947, after the expiration of the term of
the eight senators who were elected in the elections in November, 1941 who served for a term of six years. The
term of the eight senators who were elected in 1941 and who would have served for only two years would have
expired on December 29, 1943; and the term of the eight senators who would have served for four years would
have expired on December 29, 1945. The term (4 years) of the Representatives who were elected in November,
1941 would also have expired on December 29, 1945. But in November, 1943 elections for eight senators who
would serve for a regular term of 6 years would have taken place; and likewise elections for a full House of
Representatives and for another set of senators to serve for a full term of six years would have taken place in
November, 1945. If the war did not upset the national affairs a new Congress would have convened in January,
1946, already composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate whose members would all have been
elected for a term of six years each.
So, on December 30, 1947 when the increase in the compensation would take effect, the increased
compensation would be uniformly enjoyed by all members of Congress (Senators and Representatives alike) —
those Senators who were elected in the 1943, 1945 and 1947 elections, and by the Members of the House of
Representatives who were elected in the 1945 elections. Under that situation, the Members of the House of
Representatives who were elected in 1945 would have waited for two years before they could receive the
increased compensation that was approved in the 1942 sessions of Congress. And this is so, because it is on
December 29, 1947, when the six-year term of the eight Senators who were Members of the Senate that
approved the increased compensation in 1942 (along with the then existing House of Representatives) had
expired.
2. Now let us take the second situation. Let us take the case of a Congress that is normally constituted. When I
say "normally constituted" I mean a Congress composed of a House of Representatives whose members had
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
been elected for a term of four years, and a Senate that is composed of Members who had each been elected for
a term of six years, although at different elections, as provided in the Constitution.
We make the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines as an example. This Congress covered the period
of four years from January, 1954 to December, 1957, inclusive. During the first two years (or two regular
sessions) this Congress was composed of the House of Representatives whose members were elected in the
elections of November, 1953 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1957; and twenty-four senators:
eight who were elected in November, 1953 whose term would expire on December 29, 1959; eight who were
elected in November, 1951 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1957; and eight who were elected in
November, 1949 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1955.
If a law increasing the salary is passed, say in the first regular session of the Third Congress in May, 1954, then
the increase provided for in this law would take effect on December 30, 1959. Why? Because that law was
approved by the House of Representatives (the term of whose members ended on December 29, 1957) and by a
Senate at least eight of whose members were elected in November, 1953 and whose term of office would expire
on December 29, 1959. That means that the members of the House of Representatives who were elected in the
elections of November, 1957 (many of whom may be members of the Third Congress who voted for the law in
May, 1954) would have to wait for two years before they could receive the increased compensation. In other
words, beginning December 30, 1959, the Members of the House of Representatives and all the Members of the
Senate (those elected in the 1955, 1957 and 1959 elections) would all be uniformly getting the increased salary.
3. Let us take the third situation. We still use the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines as an
example. Let us suppose that the law increasing the compensation was passed in the third regular session of the
Third Congress in May, 1956. This time the Third Congress is composed of the same members of the House of
Representatives who were elected in November, 1953, but the Senate has a different composition. The Senate
would already be composed of eight new Senators who were elected during the elections of November, 1955
and whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1961, the remaining eight Senators elected in 1953 and
eight Senators who were elected in 1951. If the law increasing the compensation is passed during the regular
session of 1956 this law would be approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate that had eight
new members whose term would expire on December 29, 1961. Since the term of these new eight Senators
would expire on December 29, 1961, then the increased compensation would take effect on December 30, 1961.
In November, 1957 there were elections and a new House of Representatives was then elected, and the term of
office of the members of the new House would expire on December 29, 1961. Likewise, a new set of eight
Senators were elected whose term would expire on December 29, 1963. Those Members of the House of
Representatives who were elected in November, 1957, among whom perhaps were Representatives who voted
for the increase during the 1956 sessions, would not enjoy the increased compensation because their term
would expire on December 29, 1961 — the very same date of the termination of the term of the eight Senators
who were elected in 1955 and who were Members of the Senate that approved the increase during the session
of 1956. In this case the increased compensation would be received by the Members of the House of
Representatives who were elected in the elections of November, 1961, along with the Senators who were
elected in November, 1961 and the remaining Senators who were elected in 1959 and 1957. They would all be
receiving the same compensation and at the same time while they are in office during the term for which they
were elected.
As far as the House of Representatives is concerned, the situation as portrayed in this third case is the same
situation as that which was contemplated by the framers of the original Constitution of 1935 when it was
provided in the Constitution as adopted that the increase in salary should not take effect "until after the
expiration of the full term of the Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase." In the example we have given, the increase in salaries of the Members of the House of
Representatives which was approved by the Members of the House in the third regular session of the Third
Congress did not take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the House who were
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The case now before Us is similar to Case No. 3 that we have portrayed above. Republic Act 4134 was approved
during the regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines in May, 1964 and signed into
law by the President on June 20, 1964. As I have stated earlier, the increase provided in this law was approved
by the House of Representatives whose members were elected in November, 1961, and whose term of office
expired on December 29, 1965; and by the Senate composed of eight Senators who were elected in November,
1963 whose term would expire on December 29, 1969, eight Senators who were elected in November, 1961
whose term would expire on December 29, 1967, and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959
whose term had expired on December 29, 1965. Inasmuch as the increase would take effect at the expiration of
the term of the Senators who were elected in November, 1963 — which is on December 29, 1969 — the
Members of the present House of Representatives cannot receive this increased compensation during their
present term of office. It will be the Members of the House of Representatives who will be elected in November,
1969, along with the Senators elected in 1965, 1967 and 1969, who will receive this increased compensation.
They will then all be receiving the same compensation during the time that they are in office.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
I have endeavored to make a discourse of facts as I know them, because I sincerely believe that the
interpretation embodied in the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, of the
pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14 of our Constitution is in consonance with the facts and circumstances
as I remember them, and as I know them. As I have stated at the early part of this concurring opinion, it is not
my purpose to impose on anyone my recollection of what transpired, or of what had been discussed about, or of
what had been agreed upon, by the Members of the Second National Assembly during the deliberations which
brought about the 1940 amendments to our Constitution. My perception and my memory are as frail as those of
any other human being, and I may have incurred myself in error. It just happened that the facts and the
circumstances that I have herein narrated, as I remember them, have engendered in my mind an opinion, nay a
conviction, which dovetails with the opinion of my illustrious colleague that has penned the opinion for the
majority of the Court in this case.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
There is, to be sure, a specific rule of interpretation that would allow "or" to be interchanged with "and," in which
event a negation of the concept of joinder would ensue. But this is the exception rather than the general rule.
The exception is resorted to only when a literal interpretation would pervert the plain intention of the writer or
draftsman as gleaned from the overall context of the writing and/or from external factors. This does not obtain in
the provision under discussion. Indeed, a departure from the general rule and a resort to the exception would
pervert section 14 of article VI. Note the parity of compensation of the senators and the members of the House
of Representatives. If the expiration of the full term of the members of the Senate would be considered as
separable from the expiration of the full term of the members of the House of Representatives, despite the
conjunction "and," then the result would be to allow members of the House of Representatives to enjoy the
increase in compensation ahead of the senators, thereby producing a disparity of compensation. Furthermore, if
the framers of the provision were concerned with the realities of the term of office of the senators and that of
the representatives, more than with the reality of the parity of compensation, then they should have staggered
the effectivity of entitlement to the increased salary and allowed the first group of senators elected after the
approval of the increase to enjoy such increase.

CASTRO J., concurring:
Republic Act 4134, increasing the salary of all the members of Congress, was approved on June 20, 1964. In the
light of the constitutional prohibition or station embodied in section 14 of article VI of the Constitution, when
does such increase in salary take effect? Shall effectivity be this year 1966 for the members of the House of
Representatives, considering that the full term of the members thereof who participated in the approval of the
salary increase has expired? Even if the full terms of all the members of the Senate, as composed in 1964, have
not expired? Or shall effectivity be only on December 30, 1969, after the expiration of the full term of the
senators elected in 1963? .
The prohibition or limitation may be stated elsewise: "The full terms of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase must first expire before an increase in compensation can take
effect." Would the literal meaning of the provision still be in doubt?
The framers of the constitutional provision under discussion certainly were not wanting of competent legal
stylists. With such more reason, then, must they be regarded as having achieved a unity of intention, statement
and meaning. These experienced stylists could have so easily phrased the provision differently to conform to a
different intention. For example, it could have been: ". . . until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives approving such increase, as the case may be." But
this was not done, and we cannot deviate from what able stylists have plainly stated in plain language.

I fully adhere to and support the position taken by my esteemed brethren, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Jose P. Bengzon
and Calixto Zaldivar. Their thorough going treatment of the issue effectively exploits logical, historical and Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
empirical considerations leading quite inevitably to the firm conclusion that the salary increase provided for by
Congress in 1964 can take effect, for any and all members of Congress, only after the expiration of the full term
of the senators elected in 1963, that is to say, only after December 29, 1969.

There is, however, a vital aspect of the problem that, in my view, requires not only projection but emphasis as
well. This is the language of the pertinent constitutional prohibition or limitation which by itself forcefully
compels the very conclusion arrived at by the majority of the Court.

We cannot overemphasize the essential role of language. It is one of the distinctive qualities of man, especially
of modern thinking man. Man does feel and analyze his intellectual and material experiences; but more than this
he has the ability to articulate, and through articulation he manages synthesis and brings forth the creation and
evolution of culture, literature, science and law. In the process, the unceasing effort is to say what is meant and
to mean what is said.

How, then, is the constitutional prohibition or limitation on congressional salary increases stated? "No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." This statement has a literal message of striking
clarity. The phrase "No increase in said compensation shall take effect" establishes the character of the provision
as a prohibition or limitation, as can be seen from the unqualified words "no increase". The words "until after the
expiration of the full term" impart the period of time during which the prohibition or limitation operates, after
which period the increase in compensation can take effect. Whose full term must first expire before the increase
can take effect? It is the full term "of the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase." The immediate as well as lasting impact of these words is that what must first expire is the full
term of the members of both houses of Congress approving the increase. It cannot be the full term of the
members of either house, nor yet the full term of the members of the Senate or that of the members of the
House of Representatives.

The key word is the particle "and". "And" is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined
with" (Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 105); "along or together with," Republic of the Philippines
"added to or linked to," used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with clause (Webster's New SUPREME COURT
International Dictionary, p. 98). The word "and" does not mean "or"; it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder Manila
or union, "binding together relating the one to the other" (See 3 Words and Phrases, 569-571.).

FIRST DIVISION
As understood from the common and usual meaning of the conjunction "and," the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of the full term of all the members of the House
of Representatives. From the perspective of semantics, it is undeniably perceived that those who framed the
constitutional provision, when they utilized the word "and," stated what they meant and meant what they stated.

G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the Philippines,
respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as
a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by
virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the
salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's
contention that the retirement gratuity of members of Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum under
Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with incoming members of Congress whose terms of office
would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate that such salary increases
could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on June 20,
1964 such increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were constitutionally
prohibited from receiving such salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going around
the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of doing
indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials
and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took
effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under
said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take
effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to
the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in
Philconsa vs. Mathay 1 "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on
December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with
a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of
pay as provided by law." 2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in
petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of
Congress which he never received during his incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision in
Philconsa vs. Mathay could become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full terms of
all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however, pending resolution by the Auditor
General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman
likewise expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its
supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the Auditor General's
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of the
salary increase of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No. 4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20, 1972, by the Auditor General
through respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and furnished him with copy of the 2nd indorsement
of June 29, 1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing the appeal of Congressman Singson from the Auditor
General's adverse decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of
P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency
which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969)
should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act 4134 could
be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of all members
of Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of
the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of
pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must
necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Constitution
during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase
the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As
stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman
Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly." 3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that during his entire tenure as
Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his government service,
the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of
Congress precisely because of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of
retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as
salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement." 4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when
his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased
salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form
of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other
emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez. 5 In striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void
insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for being
violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another
species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office" and that
"Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution." 6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of
office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly."
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply refuted by the Office of the
President in dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve to
show the untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of P32,000 is the rate of pay
prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in office, while Mr.
Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited to the annual compensation of
P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his retirement gratuity at the rate of
P32,000 per annum after the expiration of his term of office would effectively give him
the benefits of increased compensation to which he was not entitled during his term,
thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against increased compensation of
legislators during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which was presumably in
the mind of Congress when it stated in Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary increases
herein fixed shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement supports the proposition that,
as Mr. Singson's retirement legally started simultaneously with the beginning of the term
of his successor and the effective rate of pay of his successor and all incoming members
of Congress was already the new rate of P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of pay
that should be made the basis in computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that
P7,200 per annum is Mr. Singson's authorized compensation during his term of office
and, therefore, the rate of pay prescribed by law for him on his retirement, while P32,000
per annum is the allowable compensation of incoming members of Congress during their
term and, hence, the rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their retirement. There is,
then, no basis for equating a constitutionally prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson
with a statutory prescribed rate of pay for his successor in computing his retirement
gratuity.
It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay (P32,000) authorized
him Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in the instant case, not to compensate him for
services during the constitutionally prohibited period, but would simply serve as basis for
computing his retirement gratuity for services rendered by him not only as a member of
Congress but in other branches of the government as well. The foregoing contention
carries its own refutation. Retirement benefit is compensation for services rendered
(PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied for retirement as an
"elected official," it is evident that he seeks compensation not only for services rendered
in other branches of the Government but also for his services as member of Congress
using P32,000, an amount prohibited for him but allowed for his successor, in the
computation of his retirement gratuity." 7
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives"
was filed on the grounds that —
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by
any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and
mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S.
Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch
of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant
with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial
are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be
tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by
the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege
shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section
16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which states, inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo
case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It
does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in
United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not
the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and
thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by
unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside
his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate,
aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the
State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions
to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City,
on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted
by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when
he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a
mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose,
he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the
project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities
or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free
man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There
is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to
discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience
of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform
his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should
such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that
may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to
such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue
is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices
to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a
co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention
does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1âwphi1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e
is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives
Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an]
inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and
other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of
the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect
a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."6 This simply
means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function
depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law
of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.8
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free
exercise of his power of
locomotion.11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is
restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free
action according to his own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the
notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society.16
Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive
setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social
mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public
office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and also in separate opinion of Justice Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., I concur in the main and separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate opinion.
Puno, J., I concur with the main and separate opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the separate opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;
For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted by
the trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is
currently pending appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of Representatives, accused-appellant
claims that his constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his incarceration pending appeal of the
judgment of conviction and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his legislative functions, including
attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings.
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-
appellant's motion is bereft of any legal merit.
The Bill of Rights provides —
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.1 (emphasis
supplied)
This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz —
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
above stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the constitutional privilege is not in
order.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege
from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that
stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means
of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has
already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. In People v. Divina2 we held that the trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of
guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid
and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal justification
for accused-appellant's motion. The Constitution states that —
Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. In
Aguinaldo v. Comelec,11 Aguinaldo v. Santos12 and in Salalima v. Guingona13 we laid down the doctrine that a
public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-
elected official may have committed during his previous term.14 The administrative liability of a public officer is
separate and distinct from his penal liability.1âwphi1.nêt
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since the Constitution itself provides
for the immunities from the general application of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an
express constitutional grant.

A Senator of Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more I vote to deny the motion.
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any committee thereof.3
Footnotes
1
RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.
2
I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].
3
unjustified broadening of the privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. 19 Phil, 208, 212.
4
Neither the legislative history of this provision nor the general principles of official immunity support an Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].
5
expanded interpretation of such privilege. 44 SCRA 37 [1972].
6
Art. III, Sec. 1.
7
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution4 limited the privilege from arrests to "all cases except 8
Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.
9
treason, felony, and breach of the peace." This provision was taken from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.
10
which was in turn based upon the American Constitution. In accordance with American precedents, the word See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155: Dumlao v.
"treason, felony and breach of the peace" have been construed to include all indictable offenses.5 Thus, under Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, 96 SCRA 763
the 1935 Constitution the freedom from arrest only encompassed civil arrest. (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
11
Black's Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
12
20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan.
Under the 19736 and the 1987 Constitution, the privilege was broadened to include arrests for crimes punishable 140F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.
13
by imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members Ibid, p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.
14
of Congress immunity from arrest remained the same — to ensure that they are not prevented from performing Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Gas. 1084, 1087.
their legislative duties.7 In fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected the proposal of one of its members 15
Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
16
to expand the scope of the parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike arrest, it was not Sheldon, Krantz, 1088 Supplement. The Law of Correction and Prisoners' Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
17
demonstrated that the conduct of searches would prevent members of Congress from discharging their Ibid.
legislative functions.8 GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;
1
1987 Constitution, Art. III, sec. 13.
2
221 SCRA 209 (1993).
3
It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a necessary adjunct to the vigorous and effective Art. VI, sec. 11.
4
performance of official functions. Members of Congress in particular, who are called upon to exercise their Art. VI, sec. 15. — The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
discretion and judgment in enacting laws responsive to the needs of the people, would certainly be impeded in except treasons, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from the arrest during their
the exercise of their legislative functions if every dissatisfied person could compel them to vindicate the wisdom attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
of their enactments in an action for damages or question their official acts before the courts.9 any speech and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
5
Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425.
6
Art. VIII, sec. 9. — A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress more than six years imprisonment, be privilege from arrest during his attendance at its sessions, and
from the consequences of his wrongdoing. Thus, despite the widening of its scope to include criminal offenses, in going to and returning from the same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
the privilege from arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the offenses of which the accused is involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for
charged. Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by afflictive penalties or with capital its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A member shall not be
punishment, does not fall within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of Congress could only questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Batasan or in any
invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. As committee thereof.
enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe,10 "when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a 7
1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.
8
privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would Ibid., 178-185.
9
be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same" Mechem, F.R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), 431.
10
Supra.
11
Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.
12
The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, an 212 SCRA 768 (1992).
13
afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the 257 SCRA 55 (1996).
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
14
Salalima v. Guingona, id. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was
an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not
in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication
began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress
of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open
letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I
feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious
Manila study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by
plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages
for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned,
the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that,
even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court,
plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan
is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus
Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for
President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is
'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" —
the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of
NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of
MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the
Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job
Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel
Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to
USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners"
wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is
considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices
mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.
(Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational
technique the following:

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) (a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on
whether it is libelous or not. "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of (b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution: only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of
democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key
positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect
the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the
planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with
a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and
integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and
civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be
divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional
military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or
retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of
the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that
"they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Republic of the Philippines
Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except SUPREME COURT
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Manila
Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and
(9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the
planned coup d'etat". EN BANC

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the
letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and
that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-
Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs
"are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this
statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they
are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described
as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it
is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor
and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the
complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not
have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly
tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs
were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less,
unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
ESCOLIN, J.:
The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order are: [1] whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a
Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and [2]
whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving
as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980.
Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise
qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would
expire on March 3, 1986.
On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa
elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing
first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

1
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1. Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 1
and since then he has discharged
the functions of said office.

On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude
respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be
the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the
context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can
hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from
the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections;
and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa
elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They are
covered by the provision on members of sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings, February
20, 1984, p. 92, Rollo]
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was
acting within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in
accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which reads as follows:
SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:

1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or 1] x x x
employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution provides as follows:
2] He shall:

Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold
any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the cases
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, during provided for in Section 48, paragraph 1 6 of this Code;
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. ...

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions
mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said
provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine. SO ORDERED.

A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a holder Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente,
thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot complain of any Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office." 4 It is therefore of no avail to
petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local elective official to act as an elected
member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
It provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Thus, while it may be said that within the purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in
the nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the Footnotes
incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no 1 Exh. "7", Resp., p. 89, Rollo.
question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been 2 Exh. "8", Resp., p. 90, Rollo.
discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to 3 Sec. 1, Art. XIII, 1973 Constitution.
vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions. 4 42 Am. Jur. 926.
5 Sec. 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:
1] The vice-governor shall be an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no with all the rights, duties and privileges of any member thereof;
right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that Section 205. Composition:
respondent should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-governorship when he filed his 1] xxx
certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 2] The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, vice-governor,
697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of elective members of said sanggunians, and the president of the Katipunang
which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials Panlalawigan, etc. ...
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, 6 Section 48, par. 1, BP Blg. 337 reads:
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of Sec. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the Office of the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor — [1]
candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor, city or municipal mayor refuses to
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local Government assume office, fails to qualify; dies, or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is
Code. The reason the position of vice-governor was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is explained by otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the vice-
the following interchange between Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, as the case may be, shall assume the office for
legislation: the unexpired term of the former.

MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the proposed amendment it would cover only
governors and members of the different sanggunians? Mayor, governors?

MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunian or barangay
officials. A vice-governor is a member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.

MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local officials?

MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation ...

MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-governor, the vice-mayors?
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative
body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:

(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto
A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero
to qualify him to run for election as a Director.

(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila (iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R.
BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO,
SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten
shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI,
against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and
others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case,
Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman
Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation
the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."

On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC
Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.

This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in allowing
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747. Petition.

A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are being given and The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may
made: intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now
reads:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a
private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors: SEC. 11.

Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius appellate jurisdiction.
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
Rafael R. Recto or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,

Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of
Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. an offense committed in relation to his office,

b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto
proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero
Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation,
during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be
called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in
effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in
respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their
respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on
May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene,
he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on
the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the
Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as
counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of
the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be
done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional prohibition
against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to
intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that question is
not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC
Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby
made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana
and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.
Footnotes
1 p. 23, Rollo.
2 p. 6, Ibid.
3 Am. Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P. 1046.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D.
ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS
U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G.
PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO
M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R. VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET
Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time
composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro
L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E.
Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated
with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had
filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the
Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest,
thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition.
Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the
latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings
and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter
being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative
respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as
to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred
to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are merit.
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation
created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the SO ORDERED.
contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not
sought.
Fernandez, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado
JJ., concur.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the
Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.
its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that
said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body
in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that the
constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:
I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the Court. I would merely like to
carry forward however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify
themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be
balanced between the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more
than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by
petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative"
composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This denouement,
however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the Court. I would merely like to
component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, carry forward however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion.
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence,
the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify
themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be
balanced between the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more
than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by
petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative"
composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This denouement,
however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced Footnotes
by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

1 Page 2, Resolution of public respondent Tribunal of May 27, 1988; p. 25, Rollo.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators
designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices
and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may,
as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA,
JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the
Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had
hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding
it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into
the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing
to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the
"political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a
decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the
legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits
where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter,
the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive
action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated
Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle
to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what
may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to
ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative
branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It
does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and
legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone
who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is —
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power
to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following
votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case
No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members,
three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of
Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as
follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman
1st District
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET
Benguet LDP Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed
Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos,
Congressman Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the
LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for
1st District Palawan allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are
"not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously
LDP confirmed the expulsions. 3

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it
Congressman 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. 4

2nd District Nueva Ecija

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera,
received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
LDP Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:

Congressman 13 March 1991

1st District Davao del Sur

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

LDP
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

Congressman

4th District Batangas I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the
LDP House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory
and copies of which are hereto attached.
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

Thank you.
Congressman

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur For the Secretary-General

(formerly GAD, now NP) (SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest
was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
because —
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three
(23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots
cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be
aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107
73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation,
votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim
the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a
Bondoc the winner of the contest.
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the
for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among
finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1
Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting
appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose
E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which
he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue
with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a
constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent
member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered
in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the
cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the
Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for
a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the
House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the
party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices
from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component
in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving
members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a
decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership
in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation
on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal
well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs.
Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the
Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that
this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of
electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from
membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a
member of the Tribunal.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,
resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all
contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members
of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases
before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon
assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the
independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be
relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT
them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in
the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely
judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the
term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive
with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and
to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first
instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be
allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty
will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc
against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other
representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and
to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment 5 on
the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in
its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G.
Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination
and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of
Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole
authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein,
those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments
as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation
of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the
Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely
nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9
and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-
of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of
action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover,
the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not
the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a
party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner
does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House
of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito
Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had
nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by
cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although
the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief
is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and
implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from
the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was
impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced
the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation
reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take
Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of
the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political
parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political
aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having
the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to
control the voting in the tribunal.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a
nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election
and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control
them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,
81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature
and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while
composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following
exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either
of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will
distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate
of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral
Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will
still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not
separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if
the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies
we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from
Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate
proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of
government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave
unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because
apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that
the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It
is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of
the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the
Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems
to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in
spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1,
they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political
considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when
there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with
sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust
that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986,
Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution,
would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party
therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral
tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc,
is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of
the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member
of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of
Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the
votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by
the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not
entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were
changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his
elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was
temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a
lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the
HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave
of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the
disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party
disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The
purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's
decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement
for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is
clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in
the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong
arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor
indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the
Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by
the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs.
Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of
the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the
House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of
the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991,
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda")
is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the
prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in
the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies
thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming that said act were
politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the second paragraph,
Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and
rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order
Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture which, I believe, is
violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this
reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among
three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments is separate from, yet
coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. 1 As
Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-
important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately
without the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to say, one
department may not control or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular functions. 2 (Emphasis
supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the point that
those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done
pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. 3 In other
words, one department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the constitutional
competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been delegated by the Constitution to said
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise it free
from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever. 4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the exercise of its power of
judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political questions. 5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives withdrew and rended
the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it seems,
precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly
helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP
members to join the said political party. As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House
Electoral Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of Representatives and the House Electoral
Tribunal was informed of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a employ to
thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him (petitioner Bondoc) against
Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and which decision would be
favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not only does the action of the House of Representatives
violate the independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it also violates the security of tenure of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of Representatives has the sole
authority to nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in the House Electoral Tribunal, upon
recommendation of the political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole power to remove any of them from
the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion of a House member from a political party. A
Tribunal member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with
his legislative term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating representation in the electoral
tribunal based on political affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member of the Tribunal
changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the
members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system. 6
The House of Representatives has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the electoral tribunal
(representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House has expelled him from its
ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my mind, necessarily include the power to remove said
member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the
proportional representation of the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and
respected, no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power
not with policy, wisdom or expediency. 7 The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such
legislative act is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the
House of Representatives should have done what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority to
the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot question the act of the Chief
Justice, should he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as members of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Matters such as who will be designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote
— surely are matters that not merely concern political action as far as members of the House are concerned, but
are the very essence of political action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice to
such political controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena which in the long run could
undermine and destroy their independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. 8 It is not
within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts as to keep them within the
bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively of legislative
concern. 9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand
so aptly observed, "one cannot find among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the validity
of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
understood that the three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian
monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could be better
evidence of complete dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one 'Department' as to its
authority on a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes supreme the
Department that has the last word. " 10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted by society runs
counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may be because the society is still
unsure of what the best division of power would be and so temporarily accepts the existing one, or because the
society has vacated its decisionmaking function and special interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum.
In either case, the Court can neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role
as guardian to claims of fraud, nor invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be ignored. To do
either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily source of power." 11
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is politically motivated, precipitated as
it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to
me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is done within the
limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically
motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its
acts are and will always be politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike
down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this court — who should ultimately
judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the power to institute what it
perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a political system
would be greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a
complacent body politic will result. It is the responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant
about their government to the end that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy. To leave this task to the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of democratic
government itself
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the majority. I believe that
the questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral
Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which the Court can not intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any
agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the
lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the
"dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming that said act were
politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the second paragraph,
Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and
rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order
Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture which, I believe, is
violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this
reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among
three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments is separate from, yet
coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. 1 As
Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-
important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately
without the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to say, one
department may not control or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular functions. 2 (Emphasis
supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the point that
those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done
pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. 3 In other
words, one department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the constitutional
competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been delegated by the Constitution to said
department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise it free
from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever. 4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the exercise of its power of
judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political questions. 5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives withdrew and rended
the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it seems,
precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly
helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP
members to join the said political party. As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House
Electoral Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of Representatives and the House Electoral
Tribunal was informed of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a employ to
thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him (petitioner Bondoc) against
Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and which decision would be
favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not only does the action of the House of Representatives
violate the independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it also violates the security of tenure of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of Representatives has the sole
authority to nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in the House Electoral Tribunal, upon
recommendation of the political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole power to remove any of them from
the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion of a House member from a political party. A
Tribunal member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with
his legislative term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating representation in the electoral
tribunal based on political affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member of the Tribunal
changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the
members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system. 6
The House of Representatives has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the electoral tribunal
(representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House has expelled him from its
ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my mind, necessarily include the power to remove said
member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the
proportional representation of the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and
respected, no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power
not with policy, wisdom or expediency. 7 The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
legislative act is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the
House of Representatives should have done what it has done. lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the
"dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.

Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority to
the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot question the act of the Chief Footnotes
Justice, should he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as members of the House Electoral Tribunal. 1 Annex B, p. 29, Rollo.
Matters such as who will be designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote 2 Annex D, p. 34, Rollo.
— surely are matters that not merely concern political action as far as members of the House are concerned, but 3 Resolution No. 03-91 p. 35, Rollo.
are the very essence of political action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice to 4 Annex D-2 p. 36, Rollo.
such political controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political 5 The comments of the respondents were later treated as their answer ers to the petition
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena which in the long run could to which the Court gave due course.
undermine and destroy their independence. 6 p. 53, Rollo.
7 p. 93, Rollo.
8 p. 94, Rollo.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the 9 p. 111, Rollo.
legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. 8 It is not 10 p. 99, Rollo.
within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts as to keep them within the 11 p. 127, Rollo.
bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively of legislative 12 p. 130, Rollo.
concern. 9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand 13 p. 142, Rollo.
so aptly observed, "one cannot find among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the validity 14 p. 150, Rollo.
of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be 15 5 p. 152, Rollo.
understood that the three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian 16 p. 157, Rollo.
monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could be better Padilla, J.:
evidence of complete dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one 'Department' as to its 1 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56.
authority on a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes supreme the 2 Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 338, 349.
Department that has the last word. " 10 (Emphasis supplied) 3 Kilbourn vs. Thomson, 103 US 168, 25 L. ed. 177; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612.
4 Mr. Justice Concepcion in Tanada, et al. vs. Mariano Jesus Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-
10520, 28 February 1957.
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted by society runs 5 Neptali Gonzales, Philippine Political Law, 1966 ed., p. 102.
counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may be because the society is still 6 Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
unsure of what the best division of power would be and so temporarily accepts the existing one, or because the 7 Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 182.
society has vacated its decisionmaking function and special interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. 8 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192.
In either case, the Court can neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role 9 People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535.
as guardian to claims of fraud, nor invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be ignored. To do 10 delivered on occasion of the Oliver Wendell Homes Lecture of 1958 and published in
either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily source of power." 11 LEARNED HAND, The Bill of Rights 4 (1958).
11 Philippines Strum, "The Supreme Court and Political Questions" a study in judicial
evasion, 1974 ed., p. 103.
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is politically motivated, precipitated as
it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to
me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is done within the
limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically
motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its
acts are and will always be politically motivated.

Republic of the Philippines

The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike SUPREME COURT
down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this court — who should ultimately Manila
judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the power to institute what it
perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a political system
would be greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a EN BANC
complacent body politic will result. It is the responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant
about their government to the end that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy. To leave this task to the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of democratic G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
government itself

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner,

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition. vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
SARMIENTO, J., disssenting: and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.

Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the majority. I believe that DECISION
the questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral
Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which the Court can not intervene.
PUNO, J.:

It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any
agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle principle of separation of powers.
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot represent
the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the
May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal
alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of Leyte against their will.
The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the land.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and
Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the
decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping,
intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner
was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the
COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It
was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to
extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of
inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio
Bates,2 Danilo D. Maglasang,3 Cesar A. Laurente;4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera;5
(c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;6 and (d)
Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly
filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the respondent.7 The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and
assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of
evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.8 On May 11, 2001, the
COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against
him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation.9
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative
and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128
and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the
COMELEC Second Division.10 Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is very
strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification case
and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.11
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty
of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to
the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading.12 The records, however, do
not show the date the petitioner received the motion.
13
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest
number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification."14 It also
directed the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the
complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission.15 As a result,
petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes.16
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has
yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It
was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with
the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together with the copy of the
petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division
informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to
investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC
Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance.17 Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and
rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his
authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit
of Alex B. Borinaga;18 (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay Monterico;19
(c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;20 (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;21 and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y.
Padayao.22
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,23 alleging that (a) he did not receive
a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute the
allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification
and after personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c)
that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only on May
22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation,
and requested the setting of a hearing on his Motion.24
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties were ordered to
submit their respective memoranda.25 On June 4, 2001, petitioner submitted his Memorandum26 in support of his
Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process;
(b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of
suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional candidate be
expediently made, even while the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He
attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior
Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre;27 (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer;28 (c) Copy of
certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;29 (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito
Restituto;30 and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion,31 Igmedio Rita32 and Gerardo Monteza.33 Respondent Locsin's
memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.34
Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14,
2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found the
petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A copy of said
Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.36
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even
before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It
issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the
legislative district for said office."37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and
assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration38 from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered his
disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration.39 Petitioner alleged in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of
the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure
and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and
her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.40
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Proclamation,41 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin
who garnered only the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that:
(1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that
any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a
Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was
valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation42 stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on
the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in
support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second
Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress
hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses43 which he
claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply,44
Rejoinder45 and Sur-Rejoinder46 were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for
resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July
24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack
of jurisdiction and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla.47 Commissioners Florentino
A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting opinions48 to the Javier resolution.
It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented
by the latter, he concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally worth
mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second
Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he people
of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. x x x." 49
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and Summary of
Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent
Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the
motion for reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on
June 1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla, promulgated
by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and
to REVERSE the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001,
for insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission
(Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing and without any finding
that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the
Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim
forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent"
the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the
Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and
invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the
Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate
who garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of
Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth legislative district of
Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable
Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-
324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation
of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative of election laws, established
jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission
(Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and
without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated
on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for
"the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim
forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the
same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated
on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and
invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established
jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth
legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for
the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of
Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte
and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the
disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14,
2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the
proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3)
Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the
MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the majority. The
Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority decided that no one will be assigned to write
a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and
the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on his
vote."50
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.51
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a
"Comment and Manifestation"52 with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which
the decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of
Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed
office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House.53 Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its
regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but will openly defy
and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her position.54
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order55 constituting the members of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene
and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the
city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte x x x."
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350
votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district.56 On the same day, petitioner took his oath of
office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.57
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia,
informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of
respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.58 Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of the
fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my
constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of Representative of the
fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff support." On the
basis of this letter, a Memorandum59 dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-
General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no legal obstacle to complying
with the duly promulgated – and now final and executory – COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x."
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en banc
resolution on September 20, 2001,60 no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence,
petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter61 addressed to respondent
Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-
General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of
Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is
available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has
officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001,
that she shall 'openly defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a
legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter
that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on
it most expeditiously." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become final and
executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said
resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the House, to formally
register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature proclamation has been
declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction of public respondents has
deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
In his Comment,63 public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the
implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a ministerial duty but one which requires the
exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House;
and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the House
Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment,64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of respondent
Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the
House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in compliance with the
opinions65 rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director Leonardo C. Palicte III
stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void
since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He
also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an action
for quo warranto involving a member of the House of Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot issue the
writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly violating the principle of separation
of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House
of Representatives is not a ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be
compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed against the Speaker
and Secretary-General because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement the resolution of the
COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it after her proclamation and after she had
taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House
of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and
the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first
be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision because of
the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been categorically
affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-
043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated therein
are not proper grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives under
section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late."67
In his Reply,68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House
of Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation
which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner did not
obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation
controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P.
Blg. 88169 and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself
recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for
adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial
act and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as
Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the sovereign will of the
electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second
Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public
respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and
void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 340270 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
grounds for disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Omnibus
Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
xxxxxxxxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the offices
concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number which must be consecutive,
according to the order of receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding
initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within which to file his
verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit
their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the answer. The
hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission through the fastest means of
communication, his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion
of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and recommendation of the
hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately docket the case
consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same to a member
who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date of consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days
from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the
opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this
requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the proof of
service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed, viz:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
"Rule 14. Summons
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall give notice
thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court
concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner provided for in the Rules
of Court in the Philippines."
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted. The
hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings, reports and recommendations
within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete
records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons
nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of
the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his
disqualification because he never received summons.71 Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed
Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to
suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification.
He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by personally
going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the
disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to
cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered
not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent
his proclamation and assumption to office." (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted on
May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification.
After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however,
respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent
Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through registered mail. The
records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service.72 This violates COMELEC Rules of
Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties concerned, at least three (3)
days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be
heard on shorter notice, especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own
motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the
motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof of service of notice
thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are
not affected."
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the
suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can
dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 664673 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the
complainant or any intervenor", viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the
trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service of
the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper.74 It cannot be acted upon by the
COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension
of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again by registered mail. A
registry receipt76 was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does
not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an
Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest
the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the
Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let
alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning
candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific
finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the
petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the
Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx and considering the serious
allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend
the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders."77 (emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce
evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of
section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the
Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from the
filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from
completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an
oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the
Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for
disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the
Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the
parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted
for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the
evidence of the parties in the main disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to present only on the hearing
for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for the
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the hearing for the disqualification
case.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift the
Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the disqualification case against him. This
submission was sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded,
upon consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the evidence to
disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:
"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns only
the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for
the submission of the parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion.
This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of the order
of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the
suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla
that the Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en
banc had the opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his
side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both sides."78 (emphases
supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in support of his
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was
utterly deprived of procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null and
void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on
his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation.79 He urged the
COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the
suspension be lifted.80
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on
substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It
relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC
Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the
COMELEC en banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based mainly on the
allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was
predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified."81
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the petitioner,
failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.82
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall
be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate,
personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of
giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and
distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and
Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current elective position
as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the prohibited period, public equipments and
vehicles belonging to and owned by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing
gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within the
territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without period, and clearly
for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent."83
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance, Cesar
A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the
markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the
property owned by the Codilla family.84
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned
by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob,
Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.85
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to
check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City Engineering Office,
Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired
why we had to go to Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla,
Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver sand and
gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla."86
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged that
on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello,
Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic)
congressman during election."87 His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the supposed order
of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same
could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin,88 Alfredo C. De la Peña,89 Miguel P. Pandac,90 Paquito
Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios,91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,92 Abner Casas,93 Rita Trangia,94 and Judith Erispe95
attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged
that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the
flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in
the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the
petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner,
particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of
value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or
offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any
person, association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the public in
general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or
against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
xxxxxxxxx
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or
indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the
government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled
corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan
political activity x x x."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction.97 They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265
and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails
to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint
with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to
register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From
the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section 261
(a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was
done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the
proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In
the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said
Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest
number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only
through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait
accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any
decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent
cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled that the
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2)
it ordered the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and
for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is
still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner
as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner
cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the
election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet
been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor
cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day,
the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief
that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.100
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could
not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies
and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final
and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other
proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division
shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special
Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation."
(emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,101 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in
disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special
action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and executory
after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of
election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not
become final and executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the
lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes
cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed."
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes
cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for
Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro
forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
(emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified.102 In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will
must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the
highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.103 In
Domino v. COMELEC,104 this Court ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed.
xxxxxxxxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that
the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law
then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does
not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the
electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the
people's right to elect officials of their choice."105
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances such as
age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election offenses. She contends that the election of
candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the votes
cast in his favor should not be considered.106
This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,107 this Court ruled that the effect
of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified
winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She
maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation
because she has become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum
to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC Second
Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in
directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.'"
(emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive for the
immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature considering that the Resolution has yet
to become final and executory."108 Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a central
issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc
has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no
moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's
proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall
be decided by the Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the
grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said
decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling."
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be verified and shall
point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling which are
not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-
four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two
(2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of Court
concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof." (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the
instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought before the
HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.109
We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The
issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made
and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest
involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to
the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because
the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or
en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto with
the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for
having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such
proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.
She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature
assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is
the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via
a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
23
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for Id., pp. 41-46.
24
mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an Id., p. 47.
25
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes Id., p. 71.
26
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other Id., pp. 211-233.
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."112 For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it 27
Id., Annex "4," p. 281.
28
must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely Id., Annex "6," p. 283.
29
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and Id., Annex "7," p. 284.
30
certain right to warrant the grant thereof. Id., Annex "8," pp. 285-286.
31
Id., Annex "9," p. 287.
32
Id., Annex "10," p. 288.
33
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is Id., Annex "11," p. 421.
34
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the Id., pp. 92-93.
35
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol II, pp. 6-20.
36
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how Id., Annexes "B" and "C", pp. 57-76.
37
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only Id., Annex "D-1", p. 138.
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.113 38
Id., pp. 23-41.
39
Id., p. 87.
40
Id., pp. 174-192.
41
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 1-14.
42
House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, pp. 163-165.
43
the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes Id., pp. 166-173. Annex "A" contains the Affidavits of Edgardo Apuya, Carmelita Manongsong,
as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Danilo Pingoy, Rolando Viovicente, and Samuel Antipuesto; Annex "B" includes the Affidavits of
Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en Samuel Antipuesto, Pastora Capuyan and Feliciano Apuya; Annex "C" consists of Affidavits of
banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of Agripino Beltran, Taciana Beltran, Samuel Antipuesto, Buenaventura Tasan, Rustico Alogbate,
the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has Pastora Capuyan, Feliciano Apuya, Ellen Pingoy and Joel Ranolas; Annex "D" contains the Affidavits
become final and executory. of Noel Gomez and Jovito Laurente; and Annex "E" contains the Affidavit of Roman Domasin.
44
Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 108-115.
45
Id., pp. 43-163.
46
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally Id., pp. 212-219.
47
settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law Petition, Annex B-2; Rollo, pp. 149-159.
48
demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of Petition, Annexes B-4 and B-5; Rollo, pp. 162-179.
49
law except the reign of chaos and confusion. Rollo, pp. 40-44.
50
Petition, Annex B; Rollo, pp. 40-146.
51
Id., Annex B-1; id., pp. 147-148.
52
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall Rollo, pp. 323-337.
53
administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th Memorandum dated August 31, 2001; Rollo, pp. 403-407.
54
legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner Petition, Annex D-1; Rollo, pp. 216-225.
55
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall Id., Annex E; id., pp. 226-233.
56
be immediately executory. Id., Annex A; id., p. 34.
57
Id., Annex A-5; id., p. 39.
58
Id., Annex F; id., pp. 234-242.
59
SO ORDERED. Id., Annex H-1; id., pp. 245-249.
60
Id., Annex G; id., p. 243.
61
Id., Annex I; id., pp. 250-255.
62
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Id., Annex J; id., pp. 256-257.
63
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Rollo, pp. 281-287.
64
Carpio, J., no part. Id., pp. 382-401.
65
The first Memorandum of Chief Counsel Palicte III dated July 22, 2001 was issued at the instance of
Secretary General Nazareno on the basis of a Memorandum issued by COMELEC Chairman Benipayo
ordering the investigation of the Provincial Board of Canvassers and the Provincial Election
Footnotes Supervisor of Leyte in connection with the proclamation of respondent Locsin, id., pp. 408-412. A
second Memorandum reiterating his previous opinion was issued on August 31, 2001 pursuant to a
1
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 1-7. request made by respondent Locsin relative to the COMELEC En Banc Resolution of August 29, 2001,
2
Id., Annex "A-1," p. 8. id., pp. 403-407.
3 66
Id., Annex "A-2," p. 9. Rollo, pp. 288-348.
4 67
Id., Annex "A-4," p. 11. Resolution dated October 18, 2001, HRET Case No. 01-043; Annex 5, Comment of Respondent
5
Id., Annex "A-3," p. 10. Locsin; Rollo, pp.377-379.
6 68
Id., Annexes "A-5" to "A-6," pp. 12-13. Rollo, pp. 426-454.
7 69
Id., Annexes "B-1" to "B-5," pp. 14-18. Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, December 3, 1985.
8 70
Id., p. 23. Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Hearing and Reception of Evidence of
9
Id., p. 21. Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections,
10
Id., pp. 24-26. From the Records, it appears that respondent Locsin did not file a separate Motion December 15, 2000.
71
for Intervention. See petitioner's Answer, Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 74; Motion to Lift Suspension of
11
Id., p. 26. Proclamation, id., p. 42; Memorandum, id., p. 343; Motion for Reconsideration, id., vol. II, p. 24.
12 72
Id., Registry Receipt No. 78660, p. 30. Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 26.
13 73
Id., pp. 36-40. The Electoral Reform Law of 1987, January 5, 1988.
14 74
Id., p. 39. Cledera vs. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 562 (1971); Andra v. CA, 60 SCRA 379 (1979); Sembrano v.
15
Id., pp. 39-40. Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30 (1988).
16 75
Id., p. 234. Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 27.
17 76
Id., pp. 74-79. Id., p. 30, Registry Receipt No. 78660.
18 77
Id., Annex "1," pp. 80-81. Id., pp. 36-40.
19 78
Id., Annex "1-A," p. 82. Rollo, p. 89.
20 79
Id., Annex "2," pp. 83-84. Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 214-228.
21 80
Id., Annex "2-A," pp. 122-123. Id., pp. 229-231.
22 81
Id., Annex "3," pp. 124-125. Rollo, p. 89.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
82
Id., pp. 95-102. SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q.
83
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 3. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners,
84
Id., p. 11.
85
Id., p. 10. vs.
86
Id., p. 9. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V.
87
Id., p. 8. MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES,
88
Id., p. 304. DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON Q. BUESER,1 NAPOLEON R. BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and
89
Id., p. 306 SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
90
Id., p. 307.
91
Id., p. 310.
92
Id., p. 312. -----------------------------
93
Id., p. 313.
94
Id., p. 318.
95
Id., p. 319. G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002
96
See Affidavits of Arnel Surillo, id., p. 308; Tolentino Denoy, id., p. 314; Jerome Ychon, id., p. 315;
Benjamin Aparis, id., p. 316; and Rene Maurecio, id., p. 317.
97
Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states: "Section 1. Authority of the Commission to SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q.
Prosecute Election Offenses.- The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M. SARENAS, petitioners,
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same,
except as may otherwise be provided by law." vs.
98
Copy of the facsimile message was attached to the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. See COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS F. OPLE, and Members,
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 57-76. namely: SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L. CAYETANO, LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE, ROBERT
99
Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989). Z. BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG, GREGORIO HONASAN, RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR.,
100
Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 (1996); Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997). TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S. ROCO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and
101
May 7, 2001. REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A. ASISTIO, EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, MANUEL M.
102
Labo v. COMELEC, supra; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991); Aquino v. COMELEC, supra. GARCIA, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., PACIFICO M. FAJARDO,
103
Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 546 (1994). ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M. PADILLA, ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and SPEAKER
104
310 SCRA 546 (1999). MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
105
Id., pp. 573-574 (citations omitted).
106
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 87.
107
315 SCRA 175 (1999). DECISION
108
Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 37.
109
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective CARPIO, J.:
members."
110
HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988, 1 HRET 32-33.
111
Rule 17, Revised Rules of HRET provides: "Quo Warranto.- A verified petition for quo warranto The Case
contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate
who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10)
days after the proclamation of the winner." Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
112
Section 3 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. injunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET" for
113
Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198 (1936); Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203 (1968); Meralco Securities brevity)2 and the Commission on Appointments ("CA" for brevity).3 Petitioners pray that respondents be ordered
Corp. v. Savellano, et al., 177 SCRA 804 (1982), as cited in I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to include party-list
714 (1997). representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be
enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized.

Antecedent Facts

Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House of Representatives
("House" for brevity), as follows:

"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
Republic of the Philippines
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
SUPREME COURT
communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious
Manila
sector."

EN BANC
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The Act sought to "promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives, to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
G.R. No. 141489 November 29, 2002
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."4
On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for
the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations,
including petitioners from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives5 (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-
NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered,
APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
6
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House
members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA.7 From available records, it does not appear that after
the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA
were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas
F. Ople,8 as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired),9 as
Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring
of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives.10 On the same day, HRET Secretary
Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement11 of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members,12 and
against the CA, its Chairman and Members.13 Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List
System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,14 and 2.4 seats in the CA.15
Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the
letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8, 2000,16 the Court en banc directed the consolidation of
G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion17 to amend their petitions to implead then
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of
the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the
Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
"Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from
their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members,"18 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list. xxx"19
According to the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment,20 at the time petitioners filed the instant petitions
the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of
the remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP
(68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to
KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1 representative was an independent.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment,21 petitioners alleged that, following the Solicitor General’s computation,
the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA. Petitioners particularly assail the presence of
one LP representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that the LP representatives should be ousted
and replaced with nominees of the 14 party-list representatives.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-
LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE
ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are procedurally defective and
substantially lacking in merit for having been filed’ prematurely, thus:
"It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading determine the existence of a cause of
action. In the instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of them was elected by a party or
organization registered under the party-list system as a Member of the HRET or CA to represent said party or
organization under the party-list system of the House of Representatives."22
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under review, citing the following
pronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :23
"Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire
a relatively minor significance, and the transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure."
Petitioners’ reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The "procedural questions" that petitioners want
the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters that are specifically provided for in
the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution24 explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution,25 each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral
tribunal.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit: constitutional questions."30

"Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of
the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its
organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem proper." (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters
of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the
HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14, 2001,
a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot now resolve the
issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the "present composition" of the House of
Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is
certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence of a proper petition assailing the present
composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the
instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion, which is outside our
jurisdiction.31

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.
"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after both Houses of
Congress shall have organized themselves with the election of the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be composed of SO ORDERED.
twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented herein. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Mendoza, J., no part; a respondent in G.R. No. 141489.
(Emphasis supplied) Austria-Martinez,J., on leave.

Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Footnotes
1
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list Erroneously cited in petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction, Rollo
representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to of G.R. No. 141489, p. 3, as "DIDAGEN Q. BUESER".
2
seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on Docketed as G.R. No. 141489.
3
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek Docketed as G.R. NO. 141490.
4
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941, "An Act Providing For the Election Of Party-List Representatives
to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ Through The Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor" (1995).
5
direct recourse to this Court is premature. Erroneously cited in petitioners’ Amended Petitions as "Association of Philippine Cooperatives".
6
1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 19 states in part:
"Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the constituted within thirty days after the Senate and House of Representatives shall have
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.26 However, under the doctrine of separation of been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. xxx"
7
powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 34, and Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 46.
8
absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Rollo, of G.R. No. 141490, p. 18.
jurisdiction.27 Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left 9
Rollo, of G.R. No. 141489, p. 15.
alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.28 Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take 10
Ibid., p. 56.
11
if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. Ibid., p. 58.
12
Ibid., p. 3.
13
Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 3.
14
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 26.
15
from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the May Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 32.
16
11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the Ibid., p. 21.
17
CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply Ibid., p. 23; Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 18.
18
refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sections 17 and 18.
19
nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not R.A. No. 7941, supra, see note 4.
20
consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list Supra, see note 7.
21
representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 60, and Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 71.
22
petitioners at this time. Supra, see note 7.
23
214 SCRA 789 (1992).
24
Supra, see note 18.
25
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts Ibid.
26
unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actual controversy; (2) the Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326 (1993); Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
27
person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
28
the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution Guingona, Jr. vs. CA, 292 SCRA 402 (1998).
of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.29 29
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000); Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260
SCRA 88 (1996); Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 (1992); Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204
SCRA 516 (1991); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
30
The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they are entitled Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra.
to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they claimed that they have
been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As such, they do not possess the
personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus standi. The party raising the constitutional
issue must have "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from
that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former
party to only 17 members. 2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except
the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. 3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition
and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent
both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. 4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on
Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His
claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political
stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond
the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party
respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that
the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus
curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
Republic of the Philippines tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
SUPREME COURT days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority
Manila vote of all the Members.

EN BANC Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v.
Cuenco. 6
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF ... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent. parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that
chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and
was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly nominated. The
Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the
Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal,
whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to
complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came
to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the
Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats
pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the petition
was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what
was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in light
of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not
the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question,
thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we
are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that
said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of
the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null
and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within
the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the
proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has
been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6
C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the
manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the
House in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be
technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is
also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this
proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right to sit as
a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers
Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the
Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained
from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for
an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still
rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]
constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the
situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling,
the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the
enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on
the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are
invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick
review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by
the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on
Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party.
Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made
common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker
and reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on
appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their
party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration Administration
was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was
thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his
appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista
defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they
were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid
because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of
Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not
suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the
Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to
another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a
constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the
Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the
other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and
suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or
have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows
reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such
changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no
less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justified his
designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the
Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF
THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to
it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not
only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of
successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to
which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of
the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House
belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity
with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was
supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably simplify the
present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP
which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization.
As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered political
party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No.
881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required
proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. 9
xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is
to give the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political
parties who are duly registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the
Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28,
1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the
sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the
House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on
Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall
in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded
therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23,
1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right
to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the
majority party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and
its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that
there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be
expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic
Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives
would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the
Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be
written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would
virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House
of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral
Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on
Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal
from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general
congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that
as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but
in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in
nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the
existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the
important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of
the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any
time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party
to another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has
been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no
alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon
the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to
interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The
Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and
is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cows, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG BAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives
of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio Chairman of the Commission
on Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO,
HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON.
JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M.
BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on
Appointments for the House of Representatives of the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioners.
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for Lorna L. Verano-Yap.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the
candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido,
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of mandate of proportional representation because:
KAIBA.

1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to
represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They were:
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their respective
political parties or coalitions;
1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party)
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa
3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan) 3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the minority
4. Hon. Raul Daza LP was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and
5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban
6. Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban
7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP 4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission because
8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House (p. 31, Rollo).
9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND
10. Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP
11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments as a
representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen
of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).
(pp. 115-116, Rollo.)

In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader,
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque the members of the Commission on Appointments including Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding
Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged: (1) that the legality of the
in the House. reorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this
Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March
a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the 3, 1989, 160 members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had expressly renounced in writing their
House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be respective political party affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p.
reorganized. 119, Rollo).i•t•c-aüsl After its petition for registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989 by the
First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP become
the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that as KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the
representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Coalesced Majority of the members who would sit in the Commission on Appointments.
Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon. Lally Laurel-
Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N.
Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez. Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better light than those
already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointments because: (1) the Constitution
was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House members to the Commission on Appointments; (2)
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the Commission on Appointments
objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp. 217-218, Rollo).
to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP,
as follows:
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues involved may touch on the
validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the LP to representation, which are
1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo).
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP
3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP
4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the
5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP 1987 Constitution which reads:
7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP
8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP
9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
10. Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
(p. 122, Rollo.) tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote
of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)
Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.

On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary
Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare
as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan,
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin
them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the
After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the petition should be
dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the revision of the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional representation of the political
parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, where this
Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as
prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were political in nature, it would still
come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of
the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government."

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as
the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member
also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an
opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House
membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be
able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at
least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the
Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical
indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments
should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they
were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their EN BANC
party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on
Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

SO ORDERED.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-
NUCD), petitioners,
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, vs.
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents.

Sarmiento, J., took no part. NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners.

Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents.

RESOLUTION

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Tañada on October 27, 1992 and respondents
Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved
for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following grounds:

Senator Tañada alleges that:

DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions;
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Tañada to the Commission
on Appointments.
In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:
1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 1
and Daza vs. Singson. 2
2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to function as a
constitutional body.
3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties and must
govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which contemplates a
realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the Commission.
On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its separate
Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7, 1993 their separate
Comments on the Motion of the respondents.
Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the reasons/arguments
submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the following grounds:
1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical
representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP — 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN — .5
NPC — 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD — 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the
basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority
in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding
one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional membership
was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is
no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party — either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
xxx xxx xxx
We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing
the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional
representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on
the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than
what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more
power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful
membership in the Commission. 3
The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada in the Commission on Appointments for the year
alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former Senator's
Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the following years the
composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party
and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. During
this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate,
including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never
contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as
member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older Tañada's
membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Tañada
as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.
It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada, he had his Citizens
Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner of the latter
party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the
Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone
representative of the Citizens' Party. 5 Senator Tañada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953
until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate
of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got
re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party
coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from
1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late Senator
Lorenzo Tañada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in
the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional
membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in
1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the
Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional representation
to the Commission, with the late Senator Tañada becoming the 16th Senator of the Coalition, enabling it to
put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Tañada filled up the 18th
membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in the Commission.
The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any
practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice or
tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of
practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality
of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional
provision, does not vest power on the legislature. 6
2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the
Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and
including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted
the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the
Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at
the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. 7 In fact,
respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld the doctrine
enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission
based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments.
The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision.
3) Senator Tañada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the party must
make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN. It was the
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect respondent Senator
Tañada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties — NPC and LAKAS-NUCD) as part of
his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously nominated by the various political
parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in the Commission on Appointments,
Senator Romulo moved:
Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for
election to the Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its
membership : Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and
Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmeña for NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-
NUCD; and Senator Tañada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9
4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party system,
entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership
in each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect that "under the Constitutional
provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the
majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of
Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical
representation in the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission.
The Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in
each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a
party to membership in the Commission on Appointments.
5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to
the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there
must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on
Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of
the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot
disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in
unusual situations like the case at bar.
Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate
as ex-officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of
proportional representation . . . .
The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of the
Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of Section 18
which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation. This
interpretation finds support in the case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court held that the constitutional
provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on
Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation
must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt in
consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers
to every clause and word thereof.
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve Representatives in
order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission on
Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members", and in Section 19
of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call
of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred
upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide that the
presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least
four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of
the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it
has the required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission
can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto.
Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on
proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence
of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the impasse in
the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE
. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a
coalition with another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from
this decision. 15
The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the case. It
does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have explicitly said so.
What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join their half-memberships
to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments.
For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their
own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator
Wigberto Tañada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition,
may not insist in electing both Senator Tañada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a
violation of the rule on proportional representation.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members of the
Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution to
twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The
question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a settled rule — that it
belongs to this Court.
The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning the
membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court is a Senate
recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution
is a function of this Court.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court,
it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers of our
Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the
role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves
as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may
breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers.
The election of respondents Senators Tañada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and
when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We
quote from our decision:
. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission
on Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by
sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August
27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength,
knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority
granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16
For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE DIANNE ROSALES MANRIQUE