ORDOÑO VS EDUARTE

This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte originally filed
with this Court on April 18, 1988. On August 10, 1989, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which the case was referred for investigation, submitted a report
confirming in substance the charge of violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of
Office of a lawyer and recommending the suspension of herein respondent.

The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan,
Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the
Estate of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty.
Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26,
1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case
No. 391 was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the
children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not
appeal. On June 13, 1987, while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale,
prepared and notarized by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also
conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal
services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of
conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari.

On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein
respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating
that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the
deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received
no consideration therefor).

On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report finding the charges to be true
and recommending a one-year suspension of the respondent from the practice of law.

The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of
Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420
square meters as the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition
that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees.

Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the
subject property in favor of the respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the execution
of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property,
has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession."

In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20 hectares of land allegedly conveyed to
the respondent) was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals.
Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial necessity
or of the lawyers is of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an
attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harrased client, in breach of
the rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney
and client, and of the rights of both." The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased
the property in litigation. (Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We agree
with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid
money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at
a time when the property is still the subject of a pending case.

For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, respondent
has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting."

The last issue to be resolved is whether respondent violated any law in preparing and notarizing the
deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations therefor, when in truth there
were none so received by the seller. In her answer, respondent admitted that Antonia Ulibari did not
actually sell the parcels of land to her children for the considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that
she (respondent) "utilized the form of deed of sale as the most convenient and appropriate document to
effect the transfer of the parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's children in accordance with her wish that
said parcels of land be given to them.

In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do
any falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the documents which do not reflect the true transaction,
respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, respondent is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in
the four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended from the
practice or law for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year, effective
from the date this judgment becomes final.

SUSPENSION ORDERED.
AFURONG VS AQUINO

FACTS:
Paraluman B. Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment against Victorino Flores for nonpayment
of rentals and the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Paraluman Afurong and the court
issued a writ of execution. Facing eviction, Flores sought help from Citizens Legal Assistance Office and
they assigned Atty. Angel G Aquino to his case. He filed two petitions. When the court set a pre-trial, he
filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement and signed his name as counsel for Flores and indicated the
address of Citizens Legal Assistance Office as his office address notwithstanding the fact that he was
separated from Citizens Legal Assistance Office at that time. In the aforesaid motion, he stated that he
could not attend the pre-trial conference because he had to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that same day and hour.

But the Clerk of Court of the JDR Court certified that a decision had been rendered on the
aforementioned special proceedings case and that there was no hearing.

Thus, Afurong filed a verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Aquino, for filing frivolous
harassment cases to delay the execution of a final decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion
for Postponement, and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance Office.

Atty. Aquino denied the charges against him and contended that such acts had been done
without malice.In a Reply, complainant asserted that Atty. Aquino was declared guilty of contempt of
court and correspondingly fined by this Court for making false allegations in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report finding that Aquino failed to
perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics
and Sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the ROC in force at the time of the commission of the acts in question. They
recommended that he be penalized with 6 months suspension. Board of Gov. of the IBP resolved to
adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

ISSUE:
WON Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons
of Professional Ethics and Sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the ROC in force at the time of the commission of the
acts in question

RULING:
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.

Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that there
was no apparent purpose for it than to delay the execution of a valid judgment.

Aquino committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that he
had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as the pre-trial of the Civil Case.
Such act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment
of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

Lower court correctly declared respondent in contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d),
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was still employed with the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office.

The Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice and SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of notice hereof.
MUÑOZ VS CA & DELIA SUTTON

FACTS:
Delia T. Sutton; a member of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap,
Parlade, and Associates. A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" regarding Vicente Muñoz v.
People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals case, by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August
14, 1971. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor, of minimizing the effects of
grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals of certain alleged facts not so considered as
such. Atty. Delia Sutton failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a
petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a
finding of facts in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what
transpired. The petition quotes, on page 5 thereof, a portion of the decision appealed from, summing
up the evidence for the defense, and makes reference thereto as ‘findings’ of the Court of Appeals,
which is not true; that, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a portion of the same
quotation, that the same ‘are the established and uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of
Appeals,’ which is, likewise, untrue; that, on page 8 of the petition, it is averred — ‘It being conceded
that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible, although they are conflicting, the
same cannot be binding on, and is therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. On page 9 of
the petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had ‘affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year
and one (1) day imposed by the lower court,’ although, in fact, the minimum penalty imposed by the
trial court was ‘four (4) months of arresto mayor’; the Court resolved to require counsel for the
petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making the aforementioned
misrepresentations. However, at such a hearing, respondent Delia T. Sutton appeared. While her
demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from contrite

ISSUE:
Whether Delia Sutton violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by asserting as
finding of fact by the court, which actually is not

RULING:
Yes. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition
for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts
in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When given
an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her appearance before the Court and thereafter in her
memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable.
Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her relative
inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure.
As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create
or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does
the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the
duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client’s cause." What is
more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence.
ERECTORS VS NLRC

The private respondent, Danilo Cris, a contract worker as Earthworks Engineer in Taif, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, filed the case with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on February 27,
1984 for the illegal termination of his contract of employment with the petitioner herein, Erectors, Inc.
The petitioner, as a defense, contended that the private respondent was estopped from questioning the
legality of his termination as he already voluntarily and freely received his termination pay. The POEA,
on September 27,1984, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents ERECTORS, INC. and SOCIETE AUXILLAIRE
D'ENTERPRISES (S.A.E.) jointly and severally, to pay the complainant, DANILO CRIS the sum of SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SIX DOLLARS AND SIXTY SIX CENTS ($ 7,166.6), or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, representing the unpaid salaries for the unexpired
term of complainant's contract. 1

The decision was received by the petitioner on October 25, 1984. Fifteen days later, or on November 9
of the same year, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The motion which was treated as an appeal was dismissed by the NLRC
"for having been filed out of time." 2

The petitioner, through counsel, alleged that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the case and affirmed that the motion for reconsideration or appeal was seasonably filed
explaining thus:

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that between 25 October 1984 (date of receipt of the POEA decision) and 09 November
1984 (actual date of filing of petitioner's motion for reconsideration), there were actually fifteen (15)
calendar days, however, it can not be disputed that within said period there were only ten (10) working
days, and five (5) non-working or legal holidays, which were as follows:

October 26, 1984--Saturday

October 27,1984--Sunday

November 1, 1984--All Saint's Day

November 3, 1984--Saturday

November 4,198--Sunday 3

xxx xxx xxx

In support of its contention, the petitioner cited two provisions allegedly of the 1984 POEA rules and
procedures, specifying Rule XXIV, sec. 1, and Rule XXV, sec. 2, thereof, which purportedly provide:

Rule XXV

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. Finality of Decision, Order or Award — all decisions, orders or award shall become final after
the lapse of ten (10) working days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties and no appeal has been
perfected within same period.

RULE XXIV

Section 1. Motion for Reconsideration. — The aggrieved party may within ten (10) working days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution of the Administration, may file for a motion for
reconsideration; otherwise, the decision shall be final and executory (Emphasis supplied) 4

These cited rules do not exist. Nowhere in any law or rules relative to the POEA may the above
provisions be found.

The POEA was created only on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797. Pursuant to the said
Executive Order, the then Minister of Labor, Blas F. Ople promulgated on September 5, 1983 the POEA
Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment which took effect on January 1, 1984. These 1984 Rules
were superseded on May 21, 1985 by the POEA Rules & Regulations.

For the reason that the petitioner's appeal with the NLRC was filed on November 9,1984, the 1984 Rules
should govern. And this was precisely what the petitioner insisted upon — the POEA rules obtaining in
1984 must be applied. 5 Yet therein, it is clear that the period for perfecting an appeal or a Motion for
Reconsideration is ten (10) calendar days. The pertinent rule on the matter is found in Book VII, Rule 5,
of the 1984 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment (POEA/MOLE) to wit:

Section 1. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR APPEAL. The aggrieved party may, within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution file a motion for reconsideration
which shall specify in detail the particular errors and objections, otherwise the decision shall be final and
executory. Such motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal as provided in this Rule
otherwise the same shall not be entertained.

The above rule is expressed in a language so simple and precise that there is no necessity to interpret it.

Moreover, as early as 1982, this Court, in the landmark case of Vir-Jen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc.
vs. NLRC6 construed the ten (10) day period for filing of appeals7 from decisions of Labor Arbiters or
compulsory arbitrators as ten (10) calendar days, as well as the raison d' etre for the shorter period,
thus:

xxx xxx xxx

...if only because We believe that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded that
labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, disposed of. Long periods for any acts to be done by the
contending parties can be taken advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor claims
are decided in their favor and management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the
employers more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defense, what with well-paid talented
lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the
point that not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than what is due them.

xxx xxx xxx

The POEA rule applicable in this case is precisely in consonance with the above ruling in that it expressed
in no uncertain terms that the period for appeal is ten (10) calendar days. For "not even the Secretary of
Labor has the power to amend or alter in any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocably
specifies or fixes." 8

There is, thus, no doubt that the law mandates that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal with the NLRC is ten (10) calendar days and not ten (10) working days.

It is, therefore, obvious that the counsels for the petitioner deliberately tried to mislead this Court if
only to suit their client's ends. On this regard, said counsels have much explaining to do.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of
the public respondent, dated December 28, 1984, AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on July 10, 1985 is hereby LIFTED. The counsels for the petitioner are also admonished for
foisting a non-existent rule with the warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. With triple costs against the petitioner.
ADEZ REALITY VS CA

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