Republic vs.

bagtas

Laws Applicable: Commodatum

Lessons Applicable:

FACTS:

May 8, 1948: Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines through
the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book value of
P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for a period of 1
year for breeding purposes subject to a breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the
bulls
May 7, 1949: Jose requested for a renewal for another year for the three bulls but
only one bull was approved while the others are to be returned
March 25, 1950: He wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the
value of the 3 bulls
October 17, 1950: he reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a deduction of
yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General.
October 19, 1950: Director of Animal Industry advised him that either the 3 bulls
are to be returned or their book value without deductions should be paid not later
than October 31, 1950 which he was not able to do
December 20, 1950: An action at the CFI was commenced against Jose praying that
he be ordered to return the 3 bulls or to pay their book value of P3,241.45 and the
unpaid breeding fee of P199.62, both with interests, and costs
July 5, 1951: Jose V. Bagtas, through counsel Navarro, Rosete and Manalo, answered
that because of the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in
the barrio of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines, he could not
return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC: granted the action
December 1958: granted an ex-parte motion for the appointment of a special sheriff
to serve the writ outside Manila
December 6, 1958: Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of Jose who died on
October 23, 1951 and administratrix of his estate, was notified
January 7, 1959: she file a motion that the 2 bulls where returned by his son on June
26, 1952 evidenced by recipt and the 3rd bull died from gunshot wound inflicted
during a Huk raid and prayed that the writ of execution be quashed and that a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued.
ISSUE: W/N the contract is commodatum and NOT a lease and the estate should be
liable for the loss due to force majeure due to delay.

HELD: YES. writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as
to costs
If contract was commodatum then Bureau of Animal Industry retained ownership or
title to the bull it should suffer its loss due to force majeure. A contract of
commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a
compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of
the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in
bad faith, because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the
contract. And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable if he
keeps it longer than the period stipulated
the estate of the late defendant is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the
bull which has not been returned because it was killed while in the custody of the
administratrix of his estate
Special proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of the
deceased Jose V. Bagtas having been instituted in the CFI, the money judgment
rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by means of a writ of execution
but must be presented to the probate court for payment by the appellant, the
administratrix appointed by the court.
CATHOLIC VICAR VS CA 165 SCRA 515

Date: September 31, 1988

Facts:
- 1962: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (Vicar), petitioner, filed
with the court an application for the registration of title over lots 1, 2, 3 and 4
situated in Poblacion Central, Benguet, said lots being used as sites of the Catholic
Church, building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, dormitories,
social hall and stonewalls.
- 1963: Heirs of Juan Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano claimed that they have
ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3. (2 separate civil cases)
- 1965: The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of Vicar to lots 1 ,
2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private respondents (heirs), the decision of the lower
court was reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.
- VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2
and 3.
- During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1) witness, who testified on the
alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest,
Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the return of the land to them;
and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000 per month. On the
other hand, Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet, Atty.
Sison, who testified that the land in question is not covered by any title in the name
of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs. Vicar dispensed with the testimony of
Mons. Brasseur when the heirs admitted that the witness if called to the witness
stand, would testify that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for 75 years
continuously and peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.

Issue: WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3 merely as bailee borrower
in commodatum, a gratuitous loan for use.

Held: YES.

Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was
borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.
They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use,
they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.

The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did
not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust
the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came
only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner
Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive
prescription because of the absence of just title.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not meet the requirement of 30
years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy
the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription
because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings
of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3
was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because
there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged
purchases were never mentioned in the application for registration.

Pajuyo v. CA GR No. 146364 June 3, 2004

Facts: Pajuyo entrusted a house to Guevara for the latter's use provided he should
return the same upon demand and with the condition that Guevara should be
responsible of the maintenance of the property. Upon demand Guevara refused to
return the property to Pajuyo. The petitioner then filed an ejectment case against
Guevara with the MTC who ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal with the CA,
the appellate court reversed the judgment of the lower court on the ground that
both parties are illegal settlers on the property thus have no legal right so that the
Court should leave the present situation with respect to possession of the property
as it is, and ruling further that the contractual relationship of Pajuyo and Guevara
was that of a commodatum.
CLAIMS:
Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY AND
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION:
1. In ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was in fact a
commodatum, instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial
Court and in holding that “the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is
without legal and factual basis”.
2. In reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that the parties are in pari delicto being both
squatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land.
3. In deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the so-called Code of Policies of
the National Government Center Housing Project instead of deciding the same under
the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the terms and conditions of
which are the laws between themselves.
CA:
1. Pajuyo and Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied
the contested lot which the government owned.
2. Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a squatter.
Perez had no right or title over the lot because it is public land. The assignment of
rights between Perez and Pajuyo, and the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra,
did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal
fault. The court will leave them where they are.
3. Reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held that the Kasunduan between
Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant
relationship. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract
but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain.
Issue: Is the contractual relationship of Pajuyo and Guevara that of a commodatum?

Held: No. The Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum is
devoid of merit. In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and
return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another
feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a
certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until
after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for
which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the
thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely
tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case
the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a
kind of commodatum. The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by
Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not
require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good
condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract
different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from
that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on
tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal
of permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding
of the property would then be unlawful.

QUINTOS VS BECK 69 PHIL 108

Facts: Quintos and Beck entered into a contract of lease, whereby the latter occupied the
former’s house. On Jan 14, 1936, the contract of lease was novated, wherein the QUintos
gratuitously granted to Beck the use of the furniture, subject to the condition that Beck should
return the furnitures to Quintos upon demand. Thereafter, Quintos sold the property to Maria
and Rosario Lopez. Beck was notified of the conveyance and given him 60 days to vacate the
premises. IN addition, Quintos required Beck to return all the furniture. Beck refused to return 3
gas heaters and 4 electric lamps since he would use them until the lease was due to expire.
Quintos refused to get the furniture since Beck had declined to return all of them. Beck
deposited all the furniture belonging to QUintos to the sheriff.

ISSUE: WON Beck complied with his obligation of returning the furnitures to Quintos when it
deposited the furnitures to the sheriff.
RULING: The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because under
it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving for
herself the ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the
furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit A; articles
1740, paragraph 1, and 1741 of the Civil Code). The obligation voluntarily assumed by the
defendant to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's demand, means that he should return all
of them to the plaintiff at the latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with
this obligation when he merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his
benefit the three gas heaters and the four eletric lamps.

As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the
latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the
deposit of the furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was nt entitled to place
the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the
furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric
lamps.