Sccoa

Appellant’s brief 1
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

COUNTRY OF DURHAM
(NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS)
*****************************
JACQUELINE LOUISE NEWTON )

Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
v. )
) FILE NUMBER OF THE ORIGINAL CASE:
JEAN-FRANÇOIS GARIÉPY ) 15 CVD 5703
Defendant-Appellant, ) Docket COA-17-1175
)
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APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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** a. SUBJECT INDEX **
INDEX OF CONTENTS OF THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT ON ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . .6
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
STATEMENT ON THE FACTS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
** b. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES **
Cornett v. Watauga Surgical Group, P.A., 194 N.C. App. 490, 493, 669
S.E.2d 805, 807 (2008) (cited on page 33)
Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 196,
657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008) (quoting N.C.R. App. P. 2) (cited on Page
39)
Donnelly v. University of North Carolina, No. COA14-208, North
Carolina Court of Appeals (2014) (cited on page 28)
Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir.2003) (citing Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797, 87 L.Ed.2d
567, 576 (1985)) (cited on page 27)
Lavalley v. Lavalley, COA01-965 COA01-1184, North Carolina Court of
Appeals (2002) (cited on page 37)
North Carolina Appellate Procedure Rule 28 (j) (cited on page 41)
North Carolina Constitution, Section 19 (cited on page 21)

North Carolina General Statutes 50-13.01 (cited on page 38)
North Carolina General Statutes 50-13.2(a)
North Carolina General Statutes 50-13.5(i) (cited on page 38)
North Carolina General Statutes § 8C–1, Rule 802 (2009) (cited on page
17)
North Carolina Rules of Evidence §801 (c) (2009) (cited on pages 17,
32)
Oliver v. Bynum, 163 N.C. App. 166, 169, 592 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2004)
(cited on pages 29, 32, 34, 35)
Sergeef v. Sergeef, No. COA 16-489, North Carolina Court of Appeals
(2016) (cited on pages 29, 32, 34, 35)
Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 709, 493 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1997)
(cited on page 18)

Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C.App. 244, 249, 671 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2009)
(cited on page 36)
State v. Blackwell, 207 N.C. App. 255, 257, 699 S.E.2d 474, 475 (2010)
(cited on pages 17, 25, 30)
State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009)
(cited on pages 17, 18, 25)
State v. Leak, No. COA14-591, North Carolina Court of Appeals (2015)
(cited on page 23)
State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 16, 316 S.E.2d 197, 205 (1984) (cited on
page 17)
State v. Skinner, No. A-2201-08T2, Supreme Court of New Jersey (2014)
(cited on page 27)
State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)
(cited on page 33)

State v. Younts, No COA16-213, North Carolina Court of Appeals (2017)
(cited on page 33)
Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir.1988) (cited on page 28)
United States Constitution, 4th amendment (cited on page 22)
United States Constitution, 5th amendment (cited on page 23)
United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (cited on page 21)

** c. STATEMENT ON ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW **
1. Did the court err in finding that because Dr. Ginger Calloway was
appointed by the Court in a previous temporary custody order, her
claims about the Defendant-Appellant’s mental health are not subject
to the North Carolina Rules of Evidence? (see also Proposed Issue on
Appeal #7)
2. Did the court err in finding that the Defendant-Appellant had
failed to comply with the order of February 8th 2016 (R p. 37) when the
court itself had replaced this order on November 23rd 2016 (R p. 114),
and that the first order was written before Dr. Calloway provided any
recommendations?
3. Did the court err in rejecting the Defendant-Appellant’s First
Amendment objection in which he asked the court that his political
positions as an activist and public, well-known intellectual figure in
America be stricken from the trial?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the
Defendant-Appellant had called the Plaintiff-Appellee an "evil
bitches," when in fact the Defendant-Appellant, according to his
testimony, was speaking on a public intellectual show and was talking
in general about people who use courts to abuse others?

5. Did the trial court err in giving instruction to the parties that
it would not consult an out-of-court psychological evaluation which
was not presented in evidence, and while having taken that commitment,
has then copied verbatim the contents of the psychological evaluation
in its findings of facts?
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that the
Defendant-Appellant had ‘refused to seek any counseling of his own’
while the Defendant-Appellant testified seeing a medical practitioner
when needed?
7. Did the trial court err in refusing to hear the Rule 702 objection
of the Defendant-Appellant concerning the inclusion of expert
evaluations?
Defendant did not ask plaintiff a single question about the minor
child the day of the hearing, when in fact he asked several questions
directly relating to the child on the record?
Defendant had only asked on one occasion about the minor child
(Finding of Fact #46, order starting at R p. 123) when in fact the
Defendant gave multiple examples of contacts he has made concerning
the child?
Defendant attributes all accountability for this litigation to Ms.
Newton (Finding of Fact #48, order starting at R p. 123) when the
Defendant simply stated that he had tried everything in terms of
offering collaborative parenting opportunities to the Plaintiff but
that he was faced with a complete absence of answers from the
Plaintiff and her lawyer?
11. To the extent that the custody decision would have been based on
this finding, did the trial court err in making the finding that the
child was not accustomed to being in the home of the Defendant-
Appellant, when in fact the child was taken from the Defendant-
Appellant from the moment of his birth through parental abduction
which was then followed by ex parte and temporary custody hearings,
which should be considered without prejudice to the parties in North
Carolina?
12. Did the trial court err in reaching a conclusion of law that was
not justified by the finding of facts in the permanent custody order?

13. Did the trial court err in denying the Defendant-Appellant’s
request for reasonable shared legal and physical custody of the child?
14. Did the trial court err in ordering the Defendant-Appellant to be
absent on the day of the signing of the order, thus denying his right
to renew his objections to the Findings of the Court and make new
objections?
** d. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE **
A series of Temporary Custody Orders were entered in this case prior
to the Permanent Child Custody Order, including (1) the ex parte
custody order entered on December 30th 2015 (R p. 24), (2) the
temporary custody order entered on February 8th 2016 (R p. 37) and (3)
the temporary custody order entered on November 23rd 2016 (R p. 114).
The permanent custody order was entered on March 30th 2017 (R p. 123).
Each of these orders awarded the Plaintiff-Appellee with sole custody
of the child and denied the Defendant-Appellant’s rights to reasonable
custody.
** e. GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW **
This is a custody case in which the child was born during the marriage
of the Plaintiff and Defendant, in North Carolina. The District Court

Division in Durham has affirmed exclusive jurisdiction over the child
for custody proceedings, and therefore the North Carolina Court of
Appeal has jurisdiction over this appeal.
The order being appealed is a permanent custody order in that (1) it
does not state a reconvening time for the decision to be updated, (2)
it is titled ‘Permanent custody order,’ (R p. 123) (3) it determines
all issues related to the custody of the child and (4) there is no
mention that it is entered without prejudice. The order is thus
appealable under N.C.G.S. § 50-19.1 as it constitutes a final judgment
with regards to custody within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 1A-1, Rule
54(b). A notice of appeal was timely filed by the Defendant (R p.
183).
** f. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS **
Issue #1.
For the permanent custody hearing, the Plaintiff-Appellee decided not
to subpoena Dr. Ginger Calloway, who had been appointed in this case
to perform an evaluation in a temporary custody hearing, and therefore
Dr. Ginger Calloway was not present as a witness (R p. 125, Finding
#17). The Court also confirmed that the report that was filed by her
would not be considered as evidence (T p. 103 lines 11-22; T p. 147
lines 4 to 22; T p. 161 lines 22-23). Yet, the Court allowed questions
being asked to the Plaintiff-Appellee and Defendant-Appellant about

Dr. Calloway’s beliefs (T p. 17 line 5 up to 13; T p. 136 line 22 to T
p. 144 line 1; T p. 24 line 15 to T p. 25 line 2; T p. 57 line 24 to T
p. 59 line 5). The Defendant-Appellant objected to these questions as
hearsay (T p. 137 line 10 to T p. 141 line 18; see also a general
objection to hearsay at T p. 153 line 18 to T p. 159 line 7). The
Court overruled the hearsay objection (T p. 141 lines 19-21), claiming
that hearsay objections are not valid when the party aggrieved by the
rumors has not made an effort to subpoena the witness (T p. 139 lines
11-14) and that they do not apply to expert witnesses hired by the
court (R p. 153, Finding #10).
Issue #2.
The trial Court found that the Defendant-Appellant was in violation of
the temporary custody order entered on February 8th 2016 (R p. 37),
which stated "Lastly, defendant shall be required to fully comply with
all recommendations of said evaluator and shall participate in good
faith during the evaluation, including providing any and all necessary
releases for the evaluator to obtain medical records for the
defendant." (R p. 42; T p. 115 line 22 to T p. 118 line 20). The
Defendant objected to the interpretation of this statement made by the
Court on the day of the permanent custody hearing, claiming that the
psychological report did not constitute a judicial order, that it was
written before any recommendation by Dr. Calloway (T p. 117 lines 3-
18) and that no judiciary order had been written after the publication
of the report ordering him to do anything, thus meaning that he was

not under a judiciary order to perform the actions requested by Dr.
Calloway (T p. 117 line 3 to T p. 118 line 20). The trial court
ignored the objection of the Defendant-Appellant and found him to be
in violation of the report’s recommendations, despite the fact that
the most recent temporary custody order was not ordering him to follow
the recommendations (Findings of Fact #14, #15, #16, #27, #28, #48,
#55, #57, #58, order starting at R p. 123). The trial court later
cited this point as being the main point on which its decision to deny
reasonable custody to the Defendant-Appellant was based (T p. 162
lines 3-5; T p. 171 lines 6-14).
Issue #3. Several questions during the hearing concerned statements
made by the Defendant-Appellant in videos and on social media pages.
These communications were acts of free expression by the Defendant-
Appellant as a public intellectual and were intended as political
discourse for his audience (T p. 41 lines 11-25). None of these
communications were sent to the parties in this case and the
Plaintiff-Appellant recognized that she had herself taken the
initiative of consulting the Defendant-Appellant’s social media pages
to find these statements (T p. 62 line 25 to T p. 63 line 21). The
Defendant-Appellant objected to the inclusion of any political
statement he has made on the public space, claiming that they were
protected by the First Amendment and that they were irrelevant to the
well-being of the child (T p. 32 line 6 to T p. 33 line 3). The Court
denied his request and ordered him to answer the questions concerning
his public statements as a political activist (T p. 33 line 4). The
Court then made Findings of Facts based on these public statements
(Findings of Fact #21, #22, #23, #24, #25, order starting at R p.
123).
Issue #4. The Defendant-Appellant testified about one of the videos
referred to in Issue #3 that he had publicly denounced the fact that
he was the victim of perjury in family courts, committed by "evil
bitches." When asked about who he was referring to, the Defendant
denied that he was talking about anyone present in the room (T p. 37
line 22 to T p. 38 line 3), and indicated that he was thinking about
the people who have committed perjury against him through affidavits
in this case and in another case (see examples of such affidavits at R
p. 20-23). He specified that these people were not present in the room
(T p. 37 line 22 to T p. 38 line 12). The Court ignored the opposition
of the Defendant-Appellant and claimed that the Defendant-Appellant
was, deep inside, meaning to refer to Dr. Calloway, the Plaintiff, as
well as members of the Plaintiff-Appellant’s party (Finding of Fact
#23, order starting at R p. 123).
Issue #5. During the hearing, the Defendant-Appellant objected to the
inclusion of the contents of the reports in several objections (see
Issue #1). He also sought and obtained assurance by the Court that the
Court would not consult Dr. Calloway’s evaluation and that this
evaluation was not included in evidence (T p. 103 lines 11-22; T p.

147 lines 4 to 22). Yet, the Court decided to copy-paste content from
the psychological evaluation into the Findings of Facts in the order
(Findings of Fact #29, #30, #31, #32, #33, #34, #45, #55, #57, #58,
order starting at R p. 123).
Issue #6. When the Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the Defendant
may have failed to obtain medical counselling when he needed some, the
Defendant expressed opposition by testifying that, in the past, when
he needed to obtain medical counselling, he had visited a nurse
practitioner (T p. 17, lines 14-22). The Court decided to ignore the
Defendant-Appellant’s opposition and claimed that he had never sought
counselling (Finding of Fact #48, order starting at R p. 123).
Issue #7. This issue is only relevant if it is found by this Court
that the trial Court did not have to completely strike any reference
to the psychological report of Dr. Calloway (Issues #1, #2, #5). The
Defendant-Appellant objected to considering the expert report based on
an additional Rule 702 objection. The trial court refused to hear the
Rule 702 objection and claimed that the report was not going to be
used as evidence (T p. 159 line 7 to T p. 162 line 8).
Issue #8. On the day of the hearing, the Defendant-Appellant asked
several questions about the child to the Plaintiff-Appellee (see
instances of questions at T p. 69, lines 7-8; T p. 71, lines 6-7; T p.

73, lines 2-3). The Court decided to ignore these questions and
claimed that the Defendant-Appellant had not asked a single question
about the minor child (Finding of Fact #46, order starting at R p.
123).
Issue #9. The Defendant gave multiple examples of contacts he has made
with the Plaintiff’s party concerning the child (T p. 31, lines 4-6
and 9-11; T p. 93-94 starting at line 22; T p. 109 lines 10-12; p. 110
lines 21-25; p. 111 lines 2-9; p. 113 lines 18-20; p. 114 lines 16-21;
p. 129 lines 4-16). The Court decided to ignore the Defendant-
Appellant’s statements and claimed that the Defendant had only asked
on one occasion about the minor child (Finding of Fact #123, order
starting at R p. 10).
Issue #10. In his testimony, the Defendant-Appellant stated that he
had tried everything in terms of offering collaborative parenting
opportunities to the Plaintiff but that he was faced with a complete
absence of answers from the Plaintiff and her lawyer (see relevant
part of the testimony at T p. 98, starting at line 21). The Court
claimed based on this testimony that the Defendant-Appellant
attributes all accountability for this litigation to Ms. Newton
(Finding of Fact #48, order starting at R p. 123).

Issue #11. The Defendant-Appellant testified that the child was taken
at birth by the Plaintiff-Appellee against his will (T p. 96 lines 20-
25), and that later decisions based on perjury in temporary hearings
have led the Court to detain the child against the Defendant-
Appellant’s will from the day he was born up to the day of the
permanent custody hearing (T p. 27 lines 22-24). Nevertheless, the
Court made the finding that the child was not sufficiently accustomed
to being in the home of the Defendant-Appellant (Finding of Fact #49,
order starting at R p. 123).
Issue #12 and #13. The trial court concluded based on its findings
that the Defendant-Appellant was an unfit parent and denied his rights
to reasonable custody.
Issue #14. The Court ordered and/or counselled the Defendant-Appellant
to be absent on the day the signing of the order (T p. 175 line 14 to
T p. 176 line 5).
** g. APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS **
Issue #1. “When a defendant objects to the admission of evidence, we
consider, whether the evidence was admissible as a matter of law, and
if so, whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence.” State v. Blackwell, 207 N.C. App. 255, 257, 699 S.E.2d 474,
475 (2010). “The standard of review for alleged violations of

constitutional rights is de novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204,
214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 857,
694 S.E.2d 766 (2010).
The Court erred by denying the Defendant-Appellant’s objections to
hearsay (T p. 137 line 10 to T p. 141 line 18; see also a general
objection to hearsay at T p. 153 line 18 to T p. 159 line 7), and as a
result, inadmissible evidence has been introduced in the trial (N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 802), which resulted in Findings of Facts #16,
#27, #28, #29, #30, #31, #32, #33, #35, #36, #37, #38, #40, #45, #46,
#55, #56, #57 and #58, in the order starting at R p. 123. The hearsay
rule clearly states that "‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" (see
N.C.R. Evid. 801(c)). Of course, the witnesses had the right to
testify about how they reacted to the document of Dr. Calloway (see
State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 16, 316 S.E.2d 197, 205 (1984)), but the
Court erred by trusting these testimonies as truth despite the
Defendant-Appellant’s objections. Each of the Findings of Facts listed
above is not based in any admissible evidence, in fact the only
evidence that could justify these findings are the interrogations of
the Defendant-Appellant and Plaintiff-Appellee about Dr. Calloway’s
report (T p. 17 line 5 up to 13; T p. 136 line 22 to T p. 144 line 1;
T p. 24 line 15 to T p. 25 line 2; T p. 57 line 24 to T p. 59 line 5),
and therefore making these Findings of Facts constituted an abuse of

discretion by the trial court, in the absence of any testimony of Dr.
Calloway herself. Dr. Calloway was not present at the hearing and
therefore her beliefs about the mental health of the Defendant-
Appellant should not have been considered as facts, since her report
does not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule (N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8C–1, Rule 802 (2009)).
Issue #2. There is no factual controversy as to whether or not the
Defendant-Appellant followed the recommendations of the report of Dr.
Calloway, he did not. Thus the only matter to be reviewed by this
Court is whether or not the Defendant-Appellant was obligated, by law,
to follow her recommendations. Therefore, this issue is reviewable de
novo, given the contention of law of the Defendant-Appellant that a
judicial order that is written before a psychological evaluation
cannot delegate the task of writing judicial orders to a psychologist.
The Defendant-Appellant argues that there was no valid judicial order
ordering him to abide by Dr. Calloway’s recommendations, and this
Court must simply determine whether the "findings support the
conclusions of law" Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 709, 493
S.E.2d 288, 291 (1997). “The standard of review for alleged violations
of constitutional rights is de novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App.
204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C.
857, 694 S.E.2d 766 (2010).

The trial court erred in finding that the psychological report of Dr.
Calloway constitutes a judicial order and that by merely not following
her medical recommendations, the Defendant-Appellant was in violation
of a court order. Three temporary custody orders were entered in this
case. The first one is an ex parte order which does not order the
Defendant-Appellant to do anything in relation to Dr. Calloway (R p.
24). The second order was entered before the psychological evaluation
performed by Dr. Calloway and the Defendant-Appellant complied with
all explicit requests made in the order, except a specific sentence
stating "Lastly, defendant shall be required to fully comply with all
recommendations of said evaluator […]" (order starting at R p. 37).
Finally, the third order, which is the only temporary custody order
that was entered after the production and publication of the report of
Dr. Calloway, does not order the Defendant-Appellant to follow any
recommendation of Dr. Calloway (R p. 114). This order was entered
following a hearing in Court after the parties in this case had been
given the chance to review the psychological report written by Dr.
Calloway and argue their case about whether or not the Defendant-
Appellant should be ordered to follow Dr. Calloway’s recommendations,
but no party successfully obtained such order from the Court (order
starting at R p. 114).
The Defendant-Appellant believed that the third order, which does not
order him to abide by any recommendation of Dr. Calloway, was
indicative of the Court having been convinced that these

recommendations were not to be followed, and that this order was
replacing the second one. However, the trial court decided to consider
that he was in violation of both the second and third temporary
custody orders (Findings of Fact #14, #15, #16, #27, #28, #48, #55,
#57, #58, order starting at R p. 123). The part of Dr. Calloway’s
report that the court claims constituted a judicial order reads as
follows: "Whether he would accept a referral to a psychiatrist for
psychotropic medications, for example, to treat his thought disorder
is unknown. Such referral may add to the court’s knowledge regarding
amenability for rehabilitation. This treatment recommendation,
however, does not ensure that […]." (R p. 153) The Defendant-Appellant
notes that Dr. Calloway’s phrasing in this segment is in the
conditional, and that she does not order the Defendant-Appellant to do
anything against his will. The Defendant also notes that any
information about this report that has come into the trial does not
come from the written report itself, as the Court promised it would
not consider it (T p. 161 lines 22-23) nor would it consider the
Findings of Facts of temporary custody orders (T p. 125 Finding #14),
but it came from hearsay witnesses, and the Defendant-Appellant
properly objected to considering these testimonies as truth (See issue
#1).
Firstly, the court erred in finding that the Defendant was in
violation of the third temporary custody order (Finding of Fact #14, R
p. 125), because the order does not contain any language ordering the
Defendant-Appellant to follow Dr. Calloway’s recommendations (R p.
114-119).
Secondly, the court erred in finding that the second temporary custody
order was a valid judicial order. The Defendant-Appellant argued in
the trial court that the segment stating "Lastly, defendant shall be
required to fully comply with all recommendations of said evaluator
[…]" cannot have been binding on his individual liberties because it
was written before the psychological evaluation of Dr. Calloway had
even begun (T p. 117 lines 3-18). As such, it violates basic
constitutional principles that confine the exercise of judiciary
constraint powers to Courts. The language amounts to a delegation of
the judicial power of constraint to a private entity, in this case,
Dr. Calloway. Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution
states "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour […]." It is clear that Courts can only be established by
congress action, not by judges. By delegating judiciary constraint
power to a psychologist and by having her decide of recommendations
without due process, the trial court has literally created another
court. Furthermore, Section 19 of the North Carolina constitution
states "No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any

manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of
the land." Because the recommendations of Dr. Calloway concern a
medical treatment, adhering to them would have constituted a seizing
of the Defendant-Appellant’s medical liberty by an entity that is not
authorized to seize such liberties. Courts are the only environment
that is proper to exert constraints on individual liberties, because
they offer a legal remedy on appeal in cases where errors occur. By
ordering the Defendant-Appellant to comply with any request of Dr.
Calloway, and doing so before even knowing what these requests would
be, the trial court has delegated its exclusive jurisdiction to a
psychologist in private practice. One can easily see how such
delegations could go wrong. Dr. Calloway could have been ordering the
Defendant-Appellant to follow a medical procedure that he did not want
to follow, which would have violated his rights to self-determination
(incidentally, this is what she has done here). Dr. Calloway could
have ordered the Defendant-Appellant to pay her infinite amounts of
money, and had he not done so, the Court could then have found him
non-compliant with her requests. The issue is broadly known in law as
the non-delegation doctrine.
In this case, the trial court delegated its judiciary power to Dr.
Calloway and Dr. Calloway recommended, in the conditional, in a report
that was never reviewed in court, that the Defendant-Appellant "may"
undergo a psychiatric evaluation, which violates the 4th amendment
rights of the Defendant to be secure in his person (State v. Leak, No.

COA14-591, North Carolina Court of Appeals, 2015). The recommendation
of Dr. Calloway also violates the Defendant’s 5th amendment rights to
not be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."
The proper way for a psychological evaluator to be requesting that
medical treatments be performed on a party against their will in a
custody action would be to request that such treatments be ordered in
the trial court, thus obtaining a proper judiciary order that would
constrain the party to obtain such treatment. Here, neither Dr.
Calloway, nor the Plaintiff-Appellant were successful in obtaining a
judiciary order after the publication of the report by Dr. Calloway,
and therefore her recommendations do not have the effect of judiciary
constraint on the Defendant-Appellant. They are mere recommendations
by an out-of-court individual. Dr. Calloway herself recognizes this
fact in the report when she states "Restraint regarding removal of the
child and dictate to follow court orders are legal matters, not
treatment or psychological matters" (R p. 153). Thus, Dr. Calloway
indicates herself that her recommendations have no legal value absent
a court order enforcing them judicially. Because no such orders have
been successfully obtained after the publication of the report of Dr.
Calloway, this Court must conclude that the Defendant-Appellant was
never properly ordered by any Court to obtain the medical treatment
that is loosely suggested in Dr. Calloway’s report.

One of the important reasons why the Defendant-Appellant requests that
this Court makes the conclusion that judicial authority cannot be
delegated to private entities is that recommendations made by a
psychologist do not benefit from the appellate rights that are
provided in the case of judiciary orders. Allowing such delegation of
powers in this case has stripped the Defendant-Appellant of its
interlocutory appeal rights. Consider the following: (1) The Defendant
could not have appealed of the order entered on February 8th 2016
because he did not know what the recommendation of the psychologist
would be, and he had no reason to believe at that time that the
recommendations would violate his individual liberties (2) The
Defendant could not have appealed of the report by Dr. Calloway
because it was published and served to the Defendant by the Court on
August 31st 2016, well after the 30-days window for appealing of the
previous order, and there is no statute nor case law allowing the
Defendant-Appellant to appeal a psychological evaluation and (3) The
Defendant could not appeal of the November 23rd 2016 order because this
order did not enforce the recommendations of Dr. Calloway.
It is proposed that this Court must declare that a trial court cannot
delegate judicial constraint power to a private psychologist; that the
scope of a psychological evaluation must be limited to what is
properly and specifically requested in the order that requests the
psychological evaluation, and that in order for a recommendation made
by a psychologist to have the effect of a judiciary order, such

recommendation must be reviewed in court and re-stated in a judicial
order entered after review of said recommendation.
Issue #3
“When a defendant objects to the admission of evidence, we consider,
whether the evidence was admissible as a matter of law, and if so,
whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
475 (2010). “The standard of review for alleged violations of
constitutional rights is de novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204,
214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 857,
694 S.E.2d 766 (2010).
For this issue, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the court erred in
admitting public statements that he has made on the public space as
part of his artistic profession as a public speaker and comedian, and
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that these
statements justified depriving him of contact with his child. The
Defendant-Appellant is a public speaker and an activist who regularly
speaks on the public space about how family courts are used by women
in America as instruments of abuse against their exes and in order to
kidnap children through perjury. None of the speech mentioned at trial
indicated any intention to harm anyone involved in this case, nor was
any of this speech illegal. These acts of political speech simply
aimed at helping other men who go through false allegations and to
protest against the complete absence of due process in temporary

custody hearings in America. The only places where the Defendant-
Appellant used a swear word is when he mentioned that “evil bitches”
had committed severe crimes against him, including perjury and
extortion, but he also testified that these comments were not aimed at
anyone present in the room during the hearing and were intended for
his audience (T p. 37 line 22 to T p. 38 line 3).
The only legal theory by which acts of free speech could have been
relevant is if such acts indicated intents to abuse the child, but a
review of the statements made by the Defendant-Appellant clearly shows
that they are merely meant to express the Defendant-Appellant’s view
of the family court process in America, which is widely known to be
unfair to men.
Higher courts across this country have a long-standing position
against the inclusion of even more inflammatory public discourse as
evidence. For instance the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted “The
admission of defendant's inflammatory rap verses, a genre that certain
members of society view as art and others view as distasteful and
descriptive of a mean-spirited culture, risked poisoning the jury
against defendant.” and properly noted that “The difficulty in
identifying probative value in fictional or other forms of artistic
self-expressive endeavors is that one cannot presume that, simply
because an author has chosen to write about certain topics, he or she
has acted in accordance with those views. One would not presume that
Bob Marley, who wrote the well-known song “I Shot the Sheriff,”
actually shot a sheriff” (State v. Skinner, Supreme Court of New
Jersey, 2014). In the present case, the Court simply included the
public statements of the Defendant-Appellant in the Findings of Facts
(R p. 123) without indicating how these statements corroborated any
theory of the Defendant-Appellant’s ability to care for children.
“The first inquiry a court must undertake when a First Amendment claim
is asserted is whether the plaintiff has engaged in ‘protected
speech.’“ Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir.2003) (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797,
87 L.Ed.2d 567, 576 (1985)). In this case, the statements were made by
the Defendant-Appellant with the intent to communicate with his
audience on the Internet, which represents several hundreds of
thousands of people (see T p. 41 lines 16-25). “In deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to
bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether “[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether]
the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it.” (quoting Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410–
11, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974)). In this case, the testimony of the
Defendant-Appellant shows that he was engaging in these acts of free
speech in order to share with the general audience a concern that he
has about the lack of recourse against perjury crimes in America,
particularly in family courts (see T p. 41 lines 16-25).

Therefore, the only legal theory in which these statements could have
been relevant in a child custody hearing is if they constituted
harassment of the child or harassment of the Plaintiff-Appellant “The
Fourth Circuit held that harassment is not protected speech. Thorne v.
Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that a West Virginia
statute prohibiting use of the telephone to harass others did not
violate the First Amendment, as the statute required specific intent
to harass, thus indicating that the legislature sought to criminalize
conduct rather than speech by protecting citizens from harassment in
an evenhanded and neutral fashion).” (Donnelly v. University of North
Carolina, No. COA14-208, North Carolina Court of Appeals, 2014).
However, the speech of the Defendant-Appellant in this case cannot be
considered harassment as it was done in a public forum, was intended
for the audience of the Defendant-Appellant and it was not sent to the
Plaintiff-Appellee. Indeed, she has indicated in her own testimony
that she learned about these statements by stalking the Defendant-
Appellant’s social media pages (T p. 62 line 25 to T p. 63 line 21).
In addition, many of the acts of speech were done in fictional
settings or as jokes, as the Defendant-Appellant is also a comedian (T
p. 34 line 19 to T p. 38 line 18; see also T p. 34 lines 11-14).
These acts of speech led to findings that are irrelevant to the well-
being of the child, and simply indicative of the Defendant-Appellant’s
political position on a needed legal reform for Family Courts
(Findings of Fact #21, #22, #23, #24, #25, order starting at R p.

123). The Defendant argues that this Court must protect his right to
free speech against the violations of his rights that have occurred in
temporary custody hearings. A victim of legal abuse has the right to
call out his abusers on the public space. It would be unfair that this
Court allows the trial court to repress the rights of a victim of
legal abuse to talk about the wrongs that were committed against him
on the public space, especially given that the false allegations that
were made against the Defendant-Appellant have had negative
consequence on his income, reputation and profession (T p. 119 line 12
to T p. 120 line 9). Public personalities must have the right to
defend their reputation when false allegations are made against them.
Issue #4. “Accordingly, should we conclude that there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings of fact,
such findings are conclusive on appeal, even if record evidence might
sustain findings to the contrary.” (Laprade v. Barry, North Carolina
Court of Appeals, No. COA16-11 (2017)). “ ‘Findings of fact are
conclusive if supported by competent evidence, irrespective of
evidence to the contrary.’ ” (quoting Oliver v. Bynum, 163 N.C. App.
166, 169, 592 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2004).” (Sergeef v. Sergeef, No. COA
16-489, 2016).
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Defendant-
Appellant had called all the parties in this case “evil bitches”
(Finding of Fact #23, order starting at R p. 123) when in fact his own
testimony indicated that he was referring to people who were not

present in the room and who had committed perjury against him (T p. 37
line 22 to T p. 38 line 12). There is no other evidence indicating
that the Defendant-Appellant meant to refer to the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff’s counsel, and Dr. Calloway, and therefore the finding of
the court appears to be unreasonable and not based in any evidence. It
was clear from the context that the Defendant-Appellant was opposing
to this interpretation as he denied that he was referring to anyone in
the room (T p. 37 line 22 to T p. 38 line 12).
Issue #5. “When a defendant objects to the admission of evidence, we
consider, whether the evidence was admissible as a matter of law, and
if so, whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
475 (2010). This particular issue mixes issues of facts and of law,
because the Court indicated repeatedly, following the Defendant’s
objections, that it would not consult the psychological report of Dr.
Calloway, yet the Court copy-pasted parts of the psychological report
into its Findings of Facts. Thus the Defendant-Appellant suggests that
this matter should be reviewed as a plain error, that is, a complete
and deep misapprehension of the law by the trial court.
Following the Defendant’s objections, the Court repeatedly indicated
that it would not consult the psychological report of Dr. Calloway (T
p. 103 lines 11-22; T p. 147 lines 4 to 22; see also T p. 161 lines
22-23). Yet, it can easily be seen that the Court has copy-pasted
findings from the report into the Findings of Facts that are not
justified by any other evidence at the trial:
- Finding #29 was copied from the 4th paragraph of R p. 148, the 3rd
paragraph of R p. 149 and the 5th paragraph of R p. 148
- Finding #30 R p. 128 was copied from the 3rd paragraph of R p.
149. (paragraph counts not including the headers)
- Finding #31 R p. 128 was copied from the 4th paragraph of R p.
153.
- Finding #32 R p. 128 was copied in part from the 6th paragraph of
R p. 153.
- Finding #33 R p. 128 was copied from point 7 of R p. 151 as well
as paragraph 6 of R p. 153.
- Finding #40 R p. 129 assumes concerns for the Defendant-
Appellant’s mental health that are mentioned throughout the
report.
- Finding #45 R p. 129 was copied from the 3rd paragraph of R p.
146.
- Findings #55, #57 and #58 R p. 131 assume that the Defendant has
mental health issues, as indicated in the report.
Thus, the Court has provided misleading instructions to the parties
when it claimed that it would not accept the report of Dr. Calloway as
substantive evidence (T p. 103 lines 11-22; T p. 147 lines 4 to 22;
see also T p. 161 lines 22-23). Including these findings not only
violates several rights of the Defendant-Appellant with respect to the
rules of evidence against hearsay (see N.C.R. Evid. 801(c), Issue #1),
but the trial court has also severely misled the Defendant-Appellant
by letting him believe that evidence would not be consulted, and yet
consulting this evidence and making findings with it.
16-489, 2016).
Appellant had ‘refused to seek any counseling of his own.’ (Finding of
Fact #48, R p. 130). The only qualifying evidence on this matter is
that the Defendant-Appellant testified seeing a medical practitioner
when needed, which contradicts the Finding (T p. 17, lines 17-22). The
Court has not obtained any evidence that this statement by the
Defendant-Appellant was wrong, and there is no reasonable
justification why it would conclude that the Defendant-Appellant has
not obtained counseling. It was clear from the context that the
Defendant-Appellant disagreed with this interpretation since he denied
not seeking any counsellor of his own and indicated that he did
consult a nurse practitioner when he felt he needed medical care (T p.
17, lines 17-22).
Issue #7. (“Where the plaintiff contends the trial court's decision is
based on an incorrect reading and interpretation of the rule governing
admissibility of expert testimony, the standard of review on appeal is
de novo.”) (Cornett v. Watauga Surgical Group, P.A., 194 N.C. App.
490, 493, 669 S.E.2d 805, 807 (2008)). “Under a de novo review, the
court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C.
628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). (quoted from State v. Younts, No COA16-213, 2017).
The Defendant-Appellant objected to considering the expert report
based on an additional Rule 702 objection. The trial court refused to
hear the Rule 702 objection and claimed that the report was not going
to be used as evidence (T p. 159 line 7 to T p. 162 line 8), resulting
in Findings of Facts #16, #27, #28, #29, #30, #31, #32, #33, #35, #36,
#37, #38, #40, #45, #46, #55, #56, #57 and #58, in the order starting
at R p. 123. The trial court’s refusal to hear the Rule 702 objection
is a denial of right that adds to the fact that the trial court has
misled the parties by stating that it was not including Dr. Calloway’s
report into evidence when it effectively did (T p. 161 lines 3-17).
Denying a proper objection without reason is a plain error in law that
cannot be reasonably defended.

16-489, 2016).
Appellant had not asked a single question about the minor child on the
day of the hearing (Finding of Fact #46, order starting at R p. 123),
when no evidence suggests that it is the case, and indeed the record
indicates that the Defendant-Appellant has asked several questions
about the child (see instances of questions at T p. 69, lines 7-8; T
p. 71, lines 6-7; T p. 73, lines 2-3).

16-489, 2016).
Appellant had only asked on one occasion about the minor child
(Finding of Fact #123, order starting at R p. 10). It was clear from
the context that the Defendant-Appellant disagreed with this
conclusion as he has provided multiple examples of contacts with the
Plaintiff’s party concerning the child (T p. 31, lines 4-6 and 9-11; T
p. 93-94 starting at line 22; T p. 109 lines 10-12; p. 110 lines 21-
25; p. 111 lines 2-9; p. 113 lines 18-20; p. 114 lines 16-21; p. 129
lines 4-16).
16-489, 2016).
Appellant attributes all accountability for this litigation to Ms.
Newton (Finding of Fact #48, order starting at R p. 123). There is no
evidence suggesting that this is the case. The only relevant portion
of the evidence is the Defendant-Appellant’s testimony that he has
tried everything in terms of offering collaborative parenting
opportunities to the Plaintiff but that he was faced with a complete
absence of answers from the Plaintiff and her lawyer (see relevant
part of the testimony at T p. 98, starting at line 21).
Issue #11. Whether a temporary custody order entered against the
Defendant’s consent can then be used as a basis for prejudice against
the claims of the Defendant-Appellant is a matter of law and therefore
reviewable de novo on appeal. “[W]hether an order is temporary or
permanent in nature is a question of law, reviewed on appeal de novo.”
Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C.App. 244, 249, 671 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2009).
The Defendant-Appellant testified that the child was taken at birth by
the Plaintiff-Appellee against his will (T p. 96 lines 20-25), and
that later decisions based on perjury in temporary hearings have led
the Court to detain the child against the Defendant-Appellant’s will
from the day he was born up to the day of the permanent custody
hearing (T p. 27 lines 22-24). The Defendant-Appellant argued during
the trial that temporary custody orders should be without prejudice (T
p. 20 lines 8-17). The Defendant-Appellant made every effort possible

to get as quick as possible to the Permanent custody hearing so that
his rights would finally be respected, in vain (T p. 27 lines 22-24).
In Lavalley v. Lavalley (COA01-965 COA01-1184, North Carolina Court of
Appeals, 2002), this Court notes that temporary custody orders without
prejudice “facilitate the entry of temporary custody orders between
parties, as the parties will know that neither party will be
advantaged by events occurring between the date of the temporary order
and the hearing on the merits,” and “A party should not lose the
benefit of a temporary order if she is making every effort to have the
case tried but cannot get it heard because of the case backlog.” By
considering the amount of time that the child had spent in the
Defendant-Appellant’s home, the trial court has essentially held
against the Defendant-Appellant’s case the fact that he has never seen
the child. However, the facts of this case is that the child was
abducted on the very day of his birth by the Plaintiff-Appellee, and
that the Court has ruled with temporary orders that the Defendant-
Appellant had no right to see his son, against his consent and in
violation of his constitutional rights. The ruling by the trial court
(Finding of Fact #49, order starting at R p. 123) is invalid as it
creates a prejudice against the Defendant-Appellant for a series of
temporary decisions that were taken in violation of his constitutional
rights in temporary hearings.
Issue #12 and #13. It is argued that, given the issues mentioned
above, the Defendant-Appellant was denied the rights to reasonable

custody in circumstances that do not justify such conclusion of law (R
p. 131-132). The finding that the Defendant-Appellant is unfit is
unsupported by evidence, and therefore his request for reasonable
custody rights has been improperly denied, in violation of N.C.G.S.
50-13.5(i) “prior to denying a parent the right to reasonable
visitation, [the court] shall make a written of finding of fact that
the parent being denied visitation rights is an unfit person to visit
the child or that such visitation rights are not in the best interest
of the child.”
The decision also violates N.C.G.S 50-13.2(a) as the Defendant-
Appellant has requested joint custody, but the court did not consider
it “Joint custody to the parents shall be considered upon the request
of either parent.” Finally, the decision violates N.C.G.S 50-13.01
which states that the policy of the State of North Carolina is to
“Encourage programs and court practices that reflect the active and
ongoing participation of both parents in the child's life and contact
with both parents when such is in the child's best interest,
regardless of the parents' present marital status, subject to laws
regarding abuse, neglect, and dependency.”
Issue #14. “Aside from the possibility of plain error review in
criminal appeals, Rule 2 permits the appellate courts to excuse a
party’s default in both civil and criminal appeals when necessary to
‘prevent manifest injustice to a party’ or to ‘expedite decision in
the public interest.’” Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp.
Co., 362 N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008) (quoting N.C.R.
App. P. 2).
While the Defendant-Appellant did not object to this instruction by
the Court, as he was not informed of his rights at the time, the
Defendant-Appellant is asking this Court to use its Rule 2 power for
plain error review in order to review this oral order by the trial
court, which has misled the Defendant-Appellant in being absent on the
day of the signing of the permanent custody order. The Court ordered
and/or counselled the Defendant-Appellant to be absent on the day the
signing of the order (T p. 175 line 14 to T p. 176 line 5). The
Defendant-Appellant has understood the trial court’s statement to be
an order not to be present, but whether we view the statement as an
order or as legal counsel, the statement has effectively misled the
Defendant-Appellant to be absent on the day of the signing of the
order, which resulted in a manifest injustice to the Defendant-
Appellant. Indeed, by not being present on the day of the signing of
the order, the Defendant-Appellant was unable to re-state his
objections as well as state new objections to the findings of facts
and conclusions of law made by the Court. Because the mailing to his
address in Canada took more than 10 days, the Defendant-Appellant
received the order after the 10-day window had elapsed, thus keeping
him from submitting a motion to amend. Effectively, the misleading
instructions of the Court have violated the Defendant’s right to
submit further objections for preserving his appellate rights.

** h. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT **
After review of the errors of the trial court in the order of R p.
123, it appears that the trial court found the Defendant-Appellant to
be an unfit parent without qualifying evidence. Given the repeated
refusals of the trial court to abide by the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence, which has resulted in the child being unjustly separated
from his father for almost two years, the Defendant-Appellant is
asking for this Court to take immediate action that will help repair
the relationship between the Defendant-Appellant and the child, which
was broken against his consent and in violation of his rights. The
Defendant-Appellant prays that this Court:
1. Orders the Plaintiff-Appellee in this case to agree on a date,
time and location within North Carolina with the Defendant-
Appellant within 30 days after the judgment of this Court for
transferring the child to the Defendant-Appellant.
2. Provide the Defendant-Appellant with sole legal and physical
custody of the child effective on the moment of transfer.
3. Refers the case back to the trial court for a permanent custody
hearing where a joint custody plan can be set up.
4. Sanctions the Plaintiff-Appellee in the amount of $1000 for
burdening the Record on Appeal with material that is irrelevant
to the issues discussed.
5. Provides any other relief that this Court may deem just.
While it is a usual practice of this Court to transform the order into
a pendente lite order, the reality of this practice is that it is too
often used to further delay the exercise of parental rights (which in
this case have now been unjustly withheld from the father for 2
years). The child was taken from the Defendant-Appellant at birth
based on false rumors, hearsay, and inadmissible evidence, and it is
time for this Court to show that it will not participate to the unfair
separation of children and their parents, and that it will provide
reparation to the child when a judgment has done so for too long.
** i1. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE **
I, Jean-François Gariépy, certify that the word count of this
APPELLANT BRIEF is 8611 words, in compliance with Rule 28 (j) of the
North Carolina Appellate Procedure.
This the 27th day of November 2017.
_____________________________
Jean-François Gariépy, Ph. D.

** i2. PROOF OF SERVICE **
I, Jean-François Gariépy, certify that a copy of this APPELLANT BRIEF
was served on all interested parties via email, as well as by
certified mail under the exclusive care and custody of the United
States and Canadian Postal Services, properly addressed as follows:
Jacqueline Louise Newton
C/O Ellis Family Law, P.L.L.C.
PO BOX 603
Durham, NC, 27702
USA
This, the 27th day of November, 2017.
_____________________________
Jean-François Gariépy, Ph. D.
450-436-1674
2180 rue Hotel-de-Ville
Sainte-Sophie, QC
Canada, J5J 1K5
jeanfrancois.gariepy@gmail.com

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Appellant’s brief 1

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

(NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS)

JACQUELINE LOUISE NEWTON )

INDEX OF CONTENTS OF THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT ON ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . .6

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

STATEMENT ON THE FACTS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

S.E.2d 805, 807 (2008) (cited on page 33)

Donnelly v. University of North Carolina, No. COA14-208, North

Carolina Court of Appeals (2014) (cited on page 28)

567, 576 (1985)) (cited on page 27)

Lavalley v. Lavalley, COA01-965 COA01-1184, North Carolina Court of

Appeals (2002) (cited on page 37)

North Carolina Appellate Procedure Rule 28 (j) (cited on page 41)

North Carolina Constitution, Section 19 (cited on page 21)

North Carolina General Statutes 50-13.01 (cited on page 38)

North Carolina General Statutes 50-13.2(a)

North Carolina General Statutes 50-13.5(i) (cited on page 38)

(cited on pages 29, 32, 34, 35)

Sergeef v. Sergeef, No. COA 16-489, North Carolina Court of Appeals

(2016) (cited on pages 29, 32, 34, 35)

(cited on page 18)

(cited on page 36)

(cited on pages 17, 25, 30)

(cited on pages 17, 18, 25)

State v. Leak, No. COA14-591, North Carolina Court of Appeals (2015)

(cited on page 23)

State v. Skinner, No. A-2201-08T2, Supreme Court of New Jersey (2014)

(cited on page 27)

(cited on page 33)

State v. Younts, No COA16-213, North Carolina Court of Appeals (2017)

(cited on page 33)

United States Constitution, 4th amendment (cited on page 22)

United States Constitution, 5th amendment (cited on page 23)

United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (cited on page 21)

** c. STATEMENT ON ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW **

appointed by the Court in a previous temporary custody order, her

claims about the Defendant-Appellant’s mental health are not subject

to the North Carolina Rules of Evidence? (see also Proposed Issue on

2. Did the court err in finding that the Defendant-Appellant had

3. Did the court err in rejecting the Defendant-Appellant’s First

Amendment objection in which he asked the court that his political

positions as an activist and public, well-known intellectual figure in

America be stricken from the trial?

Defendant-Appellant had called the Plaintiff-Appellee an "evil

bitches," when in fact the Defendant-Appellant, according to his

testimony, was speaking on a public intellectual show and was talking

in general about people who use courts to abuse others?

it would not consult an out-of-court psychological evaluation which

has then copied verbatim the contents of the psychological evaluation

in its findings of facts?

Defendant-Appellant had ‘refused to seek any counseling of his own’

while the Defendant-Appellant testified seeing a medical practitioner

of the Defendant-Appellant concerning the inclusion of expert

directly relating to the child on the record?

(Finding of Fact #46, order starting at R p. 123) when in fact the

Defendant gave multiple examples of contacts he has made concerning

Defendant attributes all accountability for this litigation to Ms.

Newton (Finding of Fact #48, order starting at R p. 123) when the

Defendant simply stated that he had tried everything in terms of

c. STATEMENT ON ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

d. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

e. GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW

f. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS