Josefa Fulgencio, Fernando Fulgencio –versus- Benita Gatchalian et al.

GR No. L-5772 January 23, 1912 21 Phil 252

Facts: Josefa Fulgencio (Fulgencio) and Benita Gatchalian (Gatchalian) were conjointly
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Dionisio Fulgencio. However, Benita
Gatchalian tendered her resignation which was accepted by the court.
The conflict arose when, in the exercise of Fulgencio of her duties, was not able to
acquire possession of the all conjugal private property which was under the legal possession of
Benita Gatchalian, Petrona Clavo, Emerita Cristobal, Leoncia Belen and Gabriela Lopez despite a
repeated demand for them to deliver the estate.
In Fulgencio’s complaint, the deceased, Dionisio Fulgencio, legally married, in second
wedlock, the defendant Benita Gatchalian, with whom he did not have, during the time they
were married, any surviving or posthumous child, and left only one legitimate son, by his first
marriage, named Fernando Fulgencio. On marrying Gatchalian, he brought the sum of 2,500
pesos Mexican currency as shown as private property and such sum produced, up to the time of
the husband's death, several thousand pesos and the several properties, including the one’s
under the supervision of Gatchalian. With the exception of the said sum of 2,500 pesos Mexican
currency, all the conjugal private properties are under the control and in the legal possession of
the defendants.
Gatchalian and the other defendants denied absolutely each and all the facts alleged
against them in the complaint filed by Fulgencio. As a special defense, Gatchalian added that
her deceased husband, Dionisio Fulgencio, on his marriage with her, brought as property of his
own only a few articles from his drug store, amounting to the sum of 100 pesos; that the
defendant Gatchalian, on her marriage with the said deceased, brought 9,000 pesos in cash and
3,000 pesos in goods; that the profits obtained by the widow Gatchalian, in the business in
which she engaged with the said sum, as well as with the 100 pesos brought in by her deceased
husband, were squandered by the latter in his lifetime in gambling, and that consequently, the
capital brought to the marriage by Gatchalian, far from increasing, was considerably diminished.
She further claims that all the property designated under the letters A and G, paragraph 8 of the
complaint, was acquired by the defendant Gatchalian with her own funds, except those which
were the subject matter of current accounts, yet unsettled, with various commercial houses in
Manila.
The lower court then required Gatchalian to surrender possession of the properties
subject of the complaint.

Issue: WON the wife’s paraphernal property must be included in the settlement of the husband’s
estate.

Held: Yes.
It has not been conclusively proven that the property claimed by the administratrix is
paraphernal and belongs exclusively to the defendant Benita Gatchalian. As such they are
deemed to be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the conjugal partnership,
and therefore, the administratrix has the right to be placed in possession of the same for the
purpose of its inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the rights of the widow
Benita Gatchalian in relation to her own property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for,
once the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has been made, the latter will have the
same opportunity to claim the exclusion of the property belonging to her exclusively and that of
the nature of paraphernal property..
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN –
versus- MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA
GR NO L-21917 | 29 November 1966 | 18 SCRA 898
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea — and Carlos
Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her
and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez
by whom he had two (2) children.
Having been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos
Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their
son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.
On May 17, 1961, Mrs Gurrea was granted by the Court of Appeals an alimony
amounting to P1,000.00 per month.
Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will
and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs.
Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted probate of
said will.
Thereafter Pijuan was appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one Pilar
Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.
On February 27, 1963, after her motion to continue the alimony after death of Carlos has
been dismissed, she moved for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
In an order dated April 20, 1963, said motion for reconsideration was denied.
Mrs. Gurrea claims that the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as
administratrix, for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Mrs. Gurrea, as an administrator, has a preferential right over Pijuan, as the named
executor.

HELD: No, under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court said preference exists "if no
executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate."
None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos
Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it
cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not
only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment
as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties
thereof.
The order of preference in the appointment of regular administrators does not apply to
the appointment of a special administrator. Furthermore, the order appointing the special
administrator lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.