1.

MONCADO v PEOPLE’S COURT

FACTS: Petitioner stands accused of treason before the people’s Court, the information against him having been
filed by Prosecutor Ladaw on February 28, 1946. Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m.,
petitioner was arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence
at 199-A San Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa,
where he was detained. On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive,
Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olves, and ordered to accompany them to the
house at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from
the officers that they did not have any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but after the
officers told her that with or without her presence they would search the house at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado
decide to accompany them. Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been
ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and in the garage when she
left the house, had been ripped open and their contents scattered on the floor. Lt. Olves informed Mrs. Moncado
that they were going to take a bundle of documents and things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered
things, because they proved the guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued to
her. Subsequently, after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado found the
important documents and correspondence missing.

ISSUE: Whether or not illegally seized evidence is admissible in court.

RULING: The Supreme Court, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained
is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence in such case, the evidence
admitted, without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it.
In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was
acquired. The evidence illegally seized is still admissible as long as it is not excluded by the rules of court, on the
theory that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely because “the constable has been blundered”.
2. STONEHILL v DIOKNO

FACTS: Respondent (prosecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and
the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As
a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's
premises.
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus, he filed a petition with the Supreme Court
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as
evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in
the petitioner's residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's
premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose
rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be
exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation (for the 1st group of documents, papers,
and things seized from the offices and the premises).
People vs. Marti
FACTS: The proprietor of the courier company, upon opening the package, noticed a suspicious odor
which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited
agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the
suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.
ISSUE: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling: The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals.
Waterous Drug Corp. vs. NLRC
FACTS: Catolico, a pharmacist in Waterous Drug Corp., sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at
P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit
for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent
in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and
saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of
Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
ISSUE: WON the check is admissible as evidence
RULING: Yes. Marti ruling: the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence
of cause for the dismissal of Catolico.
People vs. Mendoza
FACTS: Octavio killed his wife Cecilla. Octavio called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac
arrived, they all brought her to Prepetual Help Hospital where Cecila was decalred DOA (dead on arrival).
The policemen investigated Gabac and found a gun in his waist. A .38 caliber revolver. He told them that
Octavio handed it over to him as soon as he arrived at the crime scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio
learned of his daughter’s death and that valuable were being taken away from her house. He and his
sons decided to go there and remove the rest of the property, including a memorandum receipt signed
by Octavio and a mission order authorizing him to carry such weapon. He said that Eusebio illegally
procured the memorandum receipt and mission order in violation of his right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
ISSUE: Was Octavio’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure violated when Eusebio
took the memorandum receipt and mission order and brought it to court?
RULING: NO. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to
immunity of one’s person from interference from THE GOVERNMENT and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Alvarez vs. CFI
G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937

FACTS:
Almeda, the Chief of the Secret Service of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of
Justice presented to Judge David of CFI-Tayabas an affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, the petitioner kept in his house the books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, he stated that his answers to
the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth
of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
from a reliable person .
Upon the affidavit, the judge issued the warrant and with the said warrant, several agents
of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence, and seized and took
possession of several articles. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who
issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion praying that the agent
Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in
the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having
disobeyed the order of the court. The petitioner asked that the warrant be declared illegal and set
aside, and prayed that all the articles in question be returned to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest was illegally issued.

RULING:
Yes. Article III of the Constitution provides that "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice on June
19, 1994 a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde,
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

The Department of Justice then formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. The petitioners assailed the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies of
her sworn statements. Petitioners claimed that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination. Further, they complained about the denial of their constitutional
right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against
them

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest
cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested committed it. The panel found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
Young v People
GR No. 213910, February 3, 2016

FACTS:
This was a case filed against Vinzon Young and Benny Young in violation of RA 9208,
otherwise known as “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.

Members of Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force of PNP, Arsua and Talingting
conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar in Cebu City and had observed that the
customers paid an amount of money in exchange of sexual intercourse and further learned that
petitioners were the owners.

In 2011, they conducted an entrapment operation resulting to multiple arrest, seizure of

sexual paraphernalia, recovery or marked money and rescue of 146 women and minor children.
Later, 6 of these women (GROs) executed affidavits identifying petitioners as owners. A criminal
complaint was filed in violation of RA 9208.

In defense, Vinson denied ownership and benny also claimed that he was neither the owner
nor the manager of the bar and not present during the raid. The Office of Prosecutor found probable
cause and ordered the indictment of petitioner bt RTC dismissed the case. The CA found the NTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack for probable cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in finding grace abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for
lack of probable cause.

RULING:
No. The proper course of action on the part of RTC was not to dismiss the case but to
proceed to trial. Determination of probable cause for warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. A
judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive
activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized
as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and
that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Ruling:

No. it is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by particulars. As to the issue that the items
seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,
ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of
the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar,
petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were
placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.However, the Court declared the two
warrants null and void. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court
ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of
probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations. Furthermore,
jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas).
The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate
with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
Prudente vs Dayrit

FACTS:

The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made
mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered
information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as
ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school
and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms,
explosives and ammunitions. Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives
hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military
Science and Tactics and at the office of the President. Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He
claimed that: Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts The examination of the said witness
was not in form of searching questions and answers Search warrant was a general warrant Violation of
Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure was valid

HELD:

No. Search Warrant annulled and set aside. Valid search warrant to issue, there must be
probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and
affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with
one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.

“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
US v Jones

Facts:

Respondent Jones was an owner and operator of a nightclub and came under suspicion of
narcotics trafficking. Based on information gathered through various investigative techniques, police
were granted a warrant authorizing use of a GPS tracking device on the Jeep registered to Jones’ wife (of
which Jones was the exclusive driver), but failed to comply with the warrant’s deadline. Officials
nevertheless installed the device on the undercarriage of the Jeep and used it to track the vehicle’s
movements. By satellite, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet and
communicated the location by cell phone to a government computer, relaying more than 2,000 pages of
data over a 28-day period. The government ultimately obtained an indictment against Jones which
included charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court granted Jones’ pre-trial motion
to suppress in part, only suppressing the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the Jones’s
home garage. A hung jury led to a second trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict. The D.C. Circuit Court
reversed the conviction, holding the admission of evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS
device violated the Fourth Amendment.

Issue:

Does the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and subsequent use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets a valid search

Ruling: Yes. In this case, its use violated society’s expectation that law enforcement would and could
not monitor all of an individual’s movements in his car for a 4-week period. While relatively short-term
monitoring of an individual’s movements on public streets may be reasonable, “the use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” Sotomayor
concurred, agreeing with Scalia that Katz supplemented rather than substituted the trespassory test for
whether a search has occurred. She agreed with Alito that most long-term GPS monitoring would
violate Katz, and noted that even short-term monitoring may violate an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy because of the unique nature of GPS surveillance.
People v. CA, GR 126005, Jan 21, 1999

Facts:

An Information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, and subsequently the petitioner Alynn
Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private
respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. The prosecution filed an amended information
including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued on May 27, 1994.

However, the respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo
and recalling the warrant for his arrest for lack of probable cause. The prosecution is hereby ordered to
withdraw its Amended Information and file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only.

The CA upheld the decision of RTC.

Issue: WON the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor.

Ruling:

Yes. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The public prosecutor has broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exist and to charge those whom he or she believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law.

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the
evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court. Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information
filed against the accused is valid on its face, and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice can be imputed to the public prosecutor.

MP:

The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court. Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information
filed against the accused is valid on its face, and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, GR 140946, Sept. 13, 2004

Facts:

This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc. for alleged violation
of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair competition).

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized
property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.

Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for
their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants."

The RTC denied the motion but Court of Appeals set aside the RTC’s order. CA
held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during thepreliminary examination conclusive evidence th
at Maxicorp produced or sold thecounterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales
receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in
the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."

Issue: WON there was a probable cause to issue the search warrants.

Ruling:

Yes. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed
rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a
given situation. Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply
because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his
name.

Probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of
a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.

MP:

Probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Nala v. Barroso, GR 153087 Aug. 7, 2003

Facts:

PO3 Alcoser applied for a search warrant against petitioner Nala, who was referred to in the application
as “Rumolo Nala alias Long” of “Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon for illegal possession
of firearms. When the search warrant was granted, Alcoser and other police officers searched
petitioner’s house and allegedly seized various firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash but was
denied by the judge.

Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition and examination of
witness Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to confirm
the information given by Nalagon.

The fact that the items seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the
same because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his
first name was erroneously stated therein as “Romulo” and not “Bernard”, considering that the warrant
was couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner
and no other.

Issue: WON there was a probable cause for the issuance for the issuance of search and seizure warrant
against petitioner.

Ruling:

No. Police officer failed to allege in the affidavit and its testimony for the issuance of the search warrant
that petitioner had no license to possess firearms. While Alcoser testified before the respondent judge
that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as “personal
knowledge” but only “personal belief” because neither he nor the witness verified, much more secured,
a certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a
firearm.

In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the examining
magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the
applicant and the witnesses. Probable cause must be shown by the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially where the
issue is the existence of a negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license
required by law. Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented is
void.

MP:

In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the examining
magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the
applicant and the witnesses. Probable cause must be shown by the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances.
Bernardo Betoy, Sr v. Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores
AM NO. MJJ-05-1108, Feb 26, 2006

FACTS
A Letter-Complaint signed by Petitioner charges Respondent with Dereliction of Duty in an
illegal possession of firearm case. That the Search & Seizure Order by the respondent was issued solely
relying on the mere affidavits of deponents police officers which should be considered hearsay and no
information personally known to the responding judge as required by settled jurisprudence through
examination with probing and exhaustive questions of witnesses in determining probable cause in order
for the Honorable Judge to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the Warrant. Nowhere, in the
affidavit and testimony of application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that
petitioner had no license to possess a firearm.

ISSUE
Whether or not Respondent judge failed to thoroughly examine the applicant and his witnesses in a
manner that would sufficiently establish the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of a
search warrant.

RULING
YES
In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the offense of illegal
possession of firearms, the elements of which are – (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess
the same. To establish probable cause of illegal possession of firearms the witness must have
personal knowledge of the existence of the firearms and the absence of such firearms. A testimony
before the respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this
does not qualify as "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief" because none verified, a
certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a
firearm.
Asilo v. People
645 SCRA 41

FACTS
The mother of private respondent entered into a lease with the Municipality of Laguna for the use and
enjoyment of property (a lot and a store). A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan and it was found
that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong by Engineer Gorospe. Visitacion received a
letter from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice.
Attached to the letter were copies of a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and a Memorandum issued by
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sasondoncillo. Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser then sent a letter
to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying within 15 days
from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna issued a Resolution authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being
occupied by Visitacion using legal means.

ISSUE
Whether or not the forcible demolition of the store constitutes a violation of the right to due process

RULING:
YES

In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual natural defendants did
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on human relations.
First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And,
the complaint for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s
right to due process. Thus, in causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the
individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which
belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute an
invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.

The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to private property of the
Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials should have accorded the spouses the due process of law
guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by
the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order.
20th Century Fox v. CA
62 SCRA 655

FACTS
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI)
assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy
campaign that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described therein. However, acting on a motion to lift search
warrants and release seized properties filed by the private respondents, the lower court issued an order
lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court wherein
the articles listed in the returns of the three search warrants which could not be a basis of any criminal
prosecution, now in the possession of the National Bureau of Investigation which under the law must be
delivered to this Court, but which the NBI failed to do. At the hearing of the Motion for
Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement
was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to
the truth of that bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.

ISSUE
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the application of
the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.

RULING
YES
The lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private respondents on
the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on
the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a
particular film have been committed. In the absence of probable cause that the private respondents
violated the PD; the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject
matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in
nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
Reyes vs. OMB

Facts:

A consolidated petitions were assailed on the joint resolution of the OMB in finding probable cause for the crimes of
Plunder and/or violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against the petitioner Jessica Lucilla “Gigi” Reyes together
with several others. The petitioner further assailed the resolution of the SB which directed the issuance of warrants of
arrest against her, and several others, as well as the Resolution with the same tribunal which denied her Urgent
Motion to suspend the proceedings.

Petitioners are all-charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam on the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the
PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. Gigi Reyes, as chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this
case, for fraudulently processing the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project
identification and cost projection;19 (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters,20 project reports,21 and
pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Implementing
Agencies (IAs);22 and (3) endorsement of the preferred JLN23-controlled Non-Government Organizations
(NGOs)24 to own;27

In her defense, Reyes filed her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit64 on January 3, 2014, contending that the letters and
documents which she purportedly signed in connection with the allocation of the PDAF of Senator Enrile were all
forged, and that none of the three (3) witnesses - Luy, Suñas, and Nova Kay B. Macalintal - who mentioned her
name in their respective affidavits, directly and positively declared that she received money from the PDAF in
question

On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, "along with several other related cases," the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution117 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the
accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and the
supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against petitioners for the charges against them?

Ruling:

No. no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying Reyes ‘s motion to
suspend proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s
issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94′. Under Section 7, Rule 65262 of the Rules of Court, a mere
pendency of a. special civil action for certiorari in relation to a case pending before it quo does not ipso facto stay
the proceedings therein, unless the higher· court issues a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary 1
injunction against the conduct of such proceedings. Otherwise stated, I a petition for certiorari does not divest the
lower courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for
certiorari is an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct
only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction . Thus,
under. Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the course of the principal case.

The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the
issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the
existence of an urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented. In this case, since the
Court did not issue any temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-
94, then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the proceedings before it.
Placer vs. Villanueva

Facts:

Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had
been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said information, respondent judge set
the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing,
respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the information to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the
findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent
to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscal’s certification in the informations of the existence of
probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.

Issue:

WON respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the
court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation?

Ruling:

Yes. Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a
warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing
magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause,
he maydisregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.
Lim vs. Judge Fenix

FACTS: Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security
escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
T
hereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended complaint
with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused.Therafter, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The
cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations,
among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable
Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall
issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of
arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists?

HELD:
No,If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by
the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion
Requisites for Valid Warrants

B) Personally determined by the judge

People v. Inting

FACTS:

A Permanent Nursing Attendant filed a complaint against OIC-Mayor with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring

her to a very remote barangay and without prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC.

After a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Election Supervisor, a prima facie case was found.A criminal

case against the OIC-Mayor was filed with the respondent court for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its decision on the ground that the Provincial

Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec. 2 Art. III of the 1987

Constitution. Accordingly, the Provincial Election Supervisor should obtain written approval of the Provincial

Fiscal.

ISSUE:

WON the Provincial Fiscal may determine probable cause.

RULING:

NO.

The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor

for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
People v. Delgado

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private

respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting a preliminary investigation and

finding a prima facie case, informations were filed against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Toledo

City. The respondent court issued an order directing the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to

submit his report and the Toledo City INP to hold in abeyance the service of the warrants of arrest until the

submission of the reinvestigation report.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge alone makes the determination of probable cause in electoral cases.

RULING:

YES. The judge alone has the responsibility to determine probable cause even in election cases.
Allado v. Diokno

Facts:

The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-Crime Commission], is

heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Twest, a German national, who is reportedly an international fugitive

from justice. The whole investigation was triggered by an extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico

Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary. Based on the confession, Judge Diokno determined probable

cause and issued warrant of arrest.

Issue:

WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant.

Ruling:

Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for inorder that there be

probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and

prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. There is serious doubt on Van

Twest’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered.
 GOZOS vs TAC-AN

FACTS:

Private respondents who were all members of the PNP San Jose, Batangas,
demanded Dyogi to give them the handgun and his license. When Dyogi asked them to
give it back to him, respondent Blanco, who had the gun, pulled out his sidearm and fired
at Dyogi twice.

The Investigator in the OMB for the Military charged private respondents with
murder filed with the RTC. PR filed a motion to hold issuance of warrant to fist determine
whether or not there is probable caus. Respondent Judge Tac-an heard the parties and
rule that there is probable cause to hold Blanco to stand for homicide only and others
discharged.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent judge abused his authority in ordering the amendment of the
crime charged in the info. From murder to homicide and the number of the accused

RULING:

Yes. Where the trial judge conducted an inquiry not only to determine the
existence of probable cause, but also to determine what the charge should be and who
should be charged, it was held that the judge acted beyond his authority.
 AGUSTIN-SE vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:

Petitioners, who have been assigned to prosecute case against Lt. Acot and
Dulinayan before the Sandiganbayan for alleged ghost deliveries of assorted supplies
materials to the PH air force. And for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Acot and Dulinayan filed their respective motions to Quash or Dismiss and to defer
arraignment amainly on the grounds that 1. The right of the state to prosecute had
already prescribed 2. Their right to speedy disposition of case had been violated,

The Sandiganbayan required the assigned prosecutors to comment on the motions

filed by Acot and Dulinayan.

ISSUE: W/N the right to due process was violated by respondent

RULING:

No. Petitioners were given both opportunities to be heard – by filing their

pleadings which contained all their allegations and evidence in support of their
arguments, and the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the ruling complained of as
shown by the motion for reconsideration and appeals.
Bache &Co. v Judge Vivencio Ruiz

Facts: A search warrant was requested by officers of the Commission on Internal Revenue from herein respondent, and was
granted, without personally be present during the deposition of the request, as he only requested his Clerk of Court to do the
depositions of the witness presented and thereafter listened to him while he reads the deposition he had conducted without the
presence of Judge Ruiz. Herein petitioner contented to quash such search warrant but the team proceeded nonetheless, acquiring
some documents which was the result of the BIR’s assessment increase of the tax due. The lawyer of the petitioner contends that
there was a violation of Section 2, Article 3 of the Constitution, with regards to the Revised Rules of court that requires the judge to
personally question the validity of the witnesses and arguments of the appellant before granting a warrant.

Issue: W/n the said search warrant was valid

Held: No. It was provided by the Revised Rules of Court that the judge should personally examine the validity of the arguments,
evidence and witnesses of the appellant before granting such action. The Clerk of Court does not have any authority to do so as it
was expressly stated in the laws with regards to these matters that the judge should be the ones to examine.
MaximoSoliven v Hon. Ramon Makasiar

Facts: It was a case of libel filed by the President Corazon Aquino against petitioner Luiz Beltran in this consolidated case. Among
others, he claims that the warrant of arrest was acquired prematurely and illegally, as herein respondent did not personally examine
the witnesses and complainants for a prima facie evidence for a probable cause, as the constitution has already mentioned it to be
so.

Issue: W/n before the issuance of a warrant, the judge should personally examine the witnesses and complainants to identify the
prima facie case and probable cause.

Held: No.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge
is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be
sustained.
Simon Luna v Judge Lorenzo Plaza

Facts: Herein petitioner was being charged of murder by T-Sgt. CandidoPatosa, PC investigator of Tandag, Surigaodel Sur, for the
death of Jaime Diaz Ng. Upon examination of herein respondent of all the documents presented by Sgt. Patosa, together with the
witness’s statements, he issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner, which contained a provision that it shall not allow Luna to bail.
Upon a petition by petitioner for bail for lack of strong evidence, it was first granted by Judge Plaza, but was thereafter retracted.
Petitioner also filed an action against Judge Plaza claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without due process of law, on the
ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of
Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement. He claims
that Judge Plaza did not comply substantially with the requisites provided in issuing a warrant of arrest, as he asked the questions
made by Sgt. Patosa in his report, and he failed to ask “searching questions”.

Issue: W/n Judge Plaza complied with the requisites provided bt RA 3828.

Held: YES.Republic Act No. 3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 the following
paragraph :"No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he first
examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers."

Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; 3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers.

The Judge has considered the questions of Sgt. Patosa to be searching questions, thus, unnecessary for him to change the same. The
second requisite was also complied for, as the documents presented were made under oath, as well as, the third requisite was also
complied for as the searching questions and answers were recorded accordingly. The contention of Luna that his right to due
process was being violated was untenable, as there was probable cause in the eyes of the Judge, thus, satisfying the due process of
law.
KHO vs Hon. MAKALINTAL

FACTS: On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St.,
BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque.
On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search
warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The
search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and
investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the said
places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their
witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, NBI conducted the simultaneous searches on the said residences of
the petitioner (Kho) and they were able to confiscate the above mention objects stated in the warrant and the
simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and telecommunication equipment. The
confiscated items were verified in Camp Crame and were proven that all of them are unlicensed.
Petitioner (Kho) questioned the validity of the warrant and filed a motion to quash the previous decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the search warrant by the respondent is Judge valid.

RULING: Yes. In the absence of any showing that a judge was recreant of his duties in connection
with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for
doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.—After a careful study,
the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the
respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the
singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances enough to create a probable cause.

The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked
searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe
and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the
surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of
any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal
examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the
reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the petition at
bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
ALVAREZ vs. CFI OF TAYABAS G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

Facts: The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge
Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the
facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge,
on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner’s
house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at
seven o’clock on the night and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for
the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks
stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra,
two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of
copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of
invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,
promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.

As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the
petitionerfiled a motion praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt
for having disobeyed the order of the court. Motion granted. Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-
Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to
retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant and the seizure were valid.

Ruling: NO. Section 2 of Article 3 of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the
application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other
witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take
the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the
latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the
agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts were not personal but merely hearsay, it
is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.

The search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the respondent court authorizing the
relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are set aside
Bache and Co. v Ruiz 37 SCRA 823

FACTS: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec
46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72,
73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to
CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by
means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false
and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for
search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: No. The SC ruled in favor of Bache because Judge Ruiz failed to personally examine the
complainant and his witness.
The judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation. This has
been interpreted as requiring a personal and not merely delegated examination by the judge or by
the proper officer, because the purpose of the examination is to convince the judge or officer
himself and not any other individual.
Borlongan vs. Pena

Facts: Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and
attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of
agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the mo-
tion were documents that were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not
by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor claiming that said documents were falsi-
fied. The City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the MTCC. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation. Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process
because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they
were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submit-
ted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in
contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause.

Issue: W/N the procedure for the determination of probable cause was valid.

Ruling: Yes.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the Judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
1- Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause
2- If he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest in the case at bench, we find nothing wrong with the
procedure adopted by the trial judge --- he relied on the resolution of the prosecutor, as well as the supporting documents sub-
mitted by the respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits man-
datory before the judge can determine whether or not there exists probable cause to issue the warrant.

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause
for the filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of
arrest. To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of counter-affidavit was not necessary.

However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure laid down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records reveals that the Informations
should not have been filed and the warrants of arrest should not have been issued, because of lack of probable cause.
People vs. Mamaril

Facts: The Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied before
the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur Mamaril. On
said date, then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos issued Search Warrant No. 99-51.

Subsequently, the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police
officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellant’s
house, SPO3 Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. Thereafter, the policemen
searched the house.

The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a
buri bag ("bayong") under appellant’s house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-
glass case; (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc
chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellant’s room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico
took pictures8 of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a certificationthat the house was
properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought
appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer.

Issue: W/N the issuance of the search warrant was valid.

Ruling: No.

The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge
must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in
the form of searching questions and answers.

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their office
regarding the Search Warrant, presented before the court only the application for search warrant and the supporting
affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez.
Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined
them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law.

The prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the
existence of an application for a search warrant and the affidavits of the complainant’s witnesses.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Ortiz vs. Palaypayon

Facts: Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur is administratively charged
with gross ignorance of the law tainted with vindictiveness and oppression relative to a criminal case pending before
respondent judge.

The charge stemmed from a complaint for damage to property thru reckless imprudence involving a collision between a
Toyota Corolla owned by one Rosalinda Tanay and then driven by her husband, Roberto Tanay, and a mini-truck
owned by one Juliana Lu which was entrusted to herein complainant, and then driven by one Rodrigo Vasquez.

Respondent judge issued an order for the arrest of accused Juliana Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant, David
Ortiz, on the basis of mere affidavits by the offended party and without conducting the preliminary investigation
required by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent judge, instead of filing his comment on the complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of factual or
legal basis. He contends that Section 3, Rule 112 of Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, was substantially, if
not entirely, complied with. He claims that pursuant to the said rule, he personally examined in writing and under oath
the private complainant and his witnesses by asking the same questions propounded to them in their sworn statements
and the same answers were given. At the same time, respondent judge maintains that it is customary for him to adopt
the sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied of the existence of probable cause. This
practice, he claims, will expedite the proceedings and save the party litigants' time and money.

Issue: W/N the procedure for the determination of probable cause was valid.

Ruling: No.

From the foregoing factual and legal milieu, it is evident that there was no preliminary investigation conducted.
Respondent judge did not personally examine the complainant and her witnesses by asking searching questions and
answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause as mandated by law. He simply ignored the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process. This Court cannot countenance such blatant practice of disregarding fairly
elementary legal principles and substituting it with an unorthodox and highly irregular practice which appears
convenient only to respondent judge.

Furthermore, under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, aside from municipal trial judges, only fiscals and provincial,
city, and state prosecutors, can conduct preliminary investigation. A police officer was, and is not authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, hence, a judge cannot and must not rely on an inquiry made by a police investigator as the
law mandates him to conduct his own preliminary examination.
People vs Veloso
Facts:
-In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the
House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing
more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling
squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres
Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant
from Judge Garduño of the municipal court.
-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of
them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed
him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and
not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso
was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils,
Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game.
So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker
in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman
quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid
down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were
taken from his pockets.
Issue: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.
Ruling: Yes.
A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John
Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further
descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting
under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be
obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to
indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should
state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any
other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma.
Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without
difficulty.
Alvarez vs CFI
Facts:
The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him
as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the
task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the
search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different
documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts,
etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who
issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and
prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the
other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles
seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the
matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing
the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid
Ruling:
No.
The search warrant is illegal. The constitution mandates that the search warrant must state
with particularity describing the places to be search and the persons or things to be seized.
Corro vs Lising
FACTS:
Respondent judge issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of printed copies of
Philippine Times; manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times; newspaper
dummies of the Philippine Times; subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills,
leaflets, banners; typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines,
video machines and tapes which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of
committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
RULING:
NO.
An application for search warrant must state with particularity the alleged subversive
materials published or intended to be published by the petitioner publisher and editor of the
Philippine Times. Mere generalization will not suffice. The statements of private respondents Col.
Castillo and Lt. Ignacio in their affidavits are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause.
Prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
properties seized thereunder are ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Respondent officers are
ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises.
41. Pangandaman versus Casar

FACTS: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of
arrest against fifty “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional provision
requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to
be seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said warrant is valid?

R: NO. The said warrant is issued against fifty “John Does” not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would identify. Clearly such was violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe
the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its
unidentified subjects, be voided.
42. Stonehill versus Diokno

F: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against

petitioners personally, and corporations for which they are officers directing peace
officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations

and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers,
money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation
proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

I: Whether or not the search warrants are valid?

R: NO. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,
thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and
warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of
the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as

a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted
by the circumstances.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those
taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as
personality different from that of the corporation.

43. People versus Martinez

FACTS: September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on
duty at the Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a
concerned citizen reported that a pot session was underway in the house of accused
Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1
Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of
Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was
arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar
Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets
(containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized
items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused,
except for Doria, were found positive for methyl amphetamine HCL. On February
13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael
Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II
of RA 9165and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus
cost of suit. The CA supported the findings of the lower court. The accused were
found in flagrante.

I: Whether or not the accused can successfully assail the legality of the arrest.

R: YES. Section 2 as a constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket

prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures
in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain
view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs
search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
44. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Microsoft v Maxicorp.

Facts: Armed with search warrants, NBI conducted a search of Maxi Corp’s premises and seized property
fitting the description stated in the search warrant.

MaxiCorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for
their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of “general warrants”. Accordingly the warrants are
defective because it only states “items with the Microsoft logo”. RTC denied the motion and at the same
time denied their motion for reconsideration.

Issue: W/N the search warrant is lacking in particularity?

Ruling: Yes, the search warrant lacks particularity. The court ordered the some of the seized items to be
returned. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the
warrant.
45. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Burgos v Chief of Staff

Facts: 2 search warrants were issued against the petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mall” and “We Forum”. Newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
be issued for the return of the seized articles and that the respondents be enjoined using the articles
seized as evidence against the petitioner.

The petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the 2 warrants issued
indicated only one (1) and the same address.

Issue: W/N the 2 warrants were valid to justify the seizure of the items.

Ruling: Yes, the defect in the indication of the same address in the 2 warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the same place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search 2 distinct premises was evident
in the issuance of the 2 warrant.
46. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Frank Uy v BIR

Facts: Frank Uy, the manager of Unifish Packaging Corporation (UPC), was engaged in activities
constituting violations of the NIRC. The BIR requested and successfully secured a search warrant for
violation of Section 253. On the same day, a second warrant was issued with contents almost identical
to the 1st one, but consisted only of 1 page. 3rd warrant was issued the same day for violation of Section
238. Agents of BIR, with the PNP, searched the premises. They seized the items listed on the said
warrant. According to the petitioners, the warrant was inconsistent and defective.

Issue: W/N the search warrant issued was valid.

Ruling: Yes. It sustained the validity of the search warrant and comprehensively discussed each and
every defect alleged by petitioners.

A search warrant must conform strictly with the requirements of the constitutional provision. One of
which is that, the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched or the persons or
things to be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched, the
court ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officers enforcing the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community.
Petitioner: YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-KHATIB,
NABEEL NASSER ALRIYAMI, ASHRAF HASSAM AL-YAZORI, AND MOHAMMAD ABUSHENDI,
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No.: 126859
Date: September 4, 2001

Facts: Search Warrant 54-95 : a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does
of Apartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City; One (1) 45 Caliber
Pistol

Search Warrant 55-95 One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions; One (1) 9MM
Pistol with corresponding ammunitions; Three (3) boxes of explosives; More or less ten (10) sticks
of dymanites; More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords

Police searched searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber
pistol

Found in Apartment No. 2 were: 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions; 1
Bar of demolition charge; 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with magazine of
Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions; 1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its
cylinder; 1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions; 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade;
1 roll of detonating cord color yellow; 2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives
substance; 22 detonating cords with blasting caps and pound of high explosives TNT; 1 timer alarm
clock; 2 bags of suspected gun powder; 2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance; 1 small
box of plastic bag of suspected dynamites; One weighing scale; Two (2) batteries 9 volts with
blasting caps and detonating cord

All in violation of of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives

Issue: WON the items found are inadmissible as evidence for lack of particularity in
description

Ruling: No, items found in Apart. 2 are admissible. The law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of
the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.

Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.

One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.

The search in Apart 8 is illegal item seized is inadmissible.

Main Point: Partcularity of Description is achieved if objects described are limited to those
bearing direct relation to the offense
Petitioner: People of the Philippines, represented by Prov Prosec Faustino T. Chiong
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Judge Caesar Casanova RTC Bulacan, Azfar Hussain, Mohammad
Saged, Mujahid Khan, Mohammad Aslam, Mehmood Ali
GR No.: 126379
Date: June 26, 1998

Facts: On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before
Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession
firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte Bulacan

Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at
Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani
nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist
watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash

Issue: WON there was a valid search and seizure

Ruling: No, search and seizure proceedings are void.

Even after having received the warrant -- which directs that the search be limited only to the
premises herein described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 --thus literally excluding the apartment
units at the rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to correct said description.

The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.

The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.

Main Point: If there is no particularity in the description, any evidence obtained through the
search warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding.
Petitioner: PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,
RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA,
FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO,
CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL

Respondents: JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF
THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND,
GR No.: 122092
Date: May 19, 1999

Facts: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City; alleged that the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
located at Bislig, Surigao De Sur is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense. PD 1866 Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion issued a search warrant.

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Section 2, Article III - No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: WON there is a valid search warrant

Ruling:The assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply
authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The
warrant identifies only one place, and that is the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig Surigao del Sur. however, is made up of 200
offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out
over some one hundred fifty-five hectares. Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers
unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.

Main Point: The search warrant must be issued by the judge, particularly describing the place to be
searched; it is not enough that the police officers have knowledge of where to search. The place
must be described in the warrant.
Malaloan vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104879

May 6, 1994

Facts:

Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged
violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at Newport St.,
corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan
City issued the search warrant . On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed
with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the
Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. Firearms,
explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search.
And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal,
Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER
Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C.
Velasco.

On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression
of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City Court. On September 21, 1990, the
respondent Quezon City denied the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack opining that
the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region).

Peitioners theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place
to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such
position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. as amended by Circular
No. 19 on August 4, 1987.

Issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection
with an offense committed outside it’s territorial jurisdiction and issue a warrant to conduct search on a
place outside it’s territorial jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Yes. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency
guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other
courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against
public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to
issue search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes. Firstly, it is evident that both
circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search warrants and in
all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the
courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within
their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue
the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court
with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded,
as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned
branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has
yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses
contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be
searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated
and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should
a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued
by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be
denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 124461 September 25, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83,
QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA,

(Particularity of Description)

Facts:

Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an
application for the issuance of a search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City," for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of
the Philippines).

The search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuza's residence at the indicated address by a
composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th Criminal Investigation Command, Camp Sotero
Cabahug, Cebu City.

Private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion praying that the search warrant be quashed and
that the seized articles be declared inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse
owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company . The motion is based on the grounds that the search
warrant is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was applied to search the premises of one Belen
Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private
respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a non-
existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to
apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (5)
the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it was issued; and (6) its
implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong place which was lawfully
occupied by a different or wrong person.

The respondent Judge issued the assailed order quashing search warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the quashing the subject search warrant was proper?

Ruling:

Yes. Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the
questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually
located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be
seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned
by a different person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In the present case, it must be noted that the
application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 2of the compound at 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other
people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been
very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to
segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house
of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent
sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is
violative of the constitutional requirement.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs.

HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.,

G.R. No. 81510, 1990 Mar 14, En Banc

Facts:

Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar.

Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner a
telegram directing the petitioner to appear before POEA Anti Illegal Recruitment Unit.

On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged closure and seizure order.

POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating
respondents as members of a team tasked to implement the closure and seizure order. Doing so, the group
assisted by Mandaluyong policemen proceeded to the residence of the petitioner. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure
and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises.
The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and
witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the a letter requesting that the personal properties seized
at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was
contrary to law and against the will of the owner. Among the reasons were there was no prior notice of
the seizure and closure order, violating the due process clause of the Constitution and her right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose."

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

Ruling:

No. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2 , of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search;

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose
of deportation.
53. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIILIPPINES (PCGG) v SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay
Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their sequestration
because SIPALAY, according to the PCGG, is part of Lucio C. Tan’s ill-gotten
wealth. The principal objection of ALLIED raised regarding the order issued against
it is that the PCGG made use of an unauthorized and constitutionally defective search
warrant to effect the sequestration.

ISSUE: W/N the PCCG can issue a warrant for sequestration

HELD: The PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only
a judge and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law were
empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is
neither. It is not a judge. The PCGG cannot be considered as such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law because Executive Order No. 1, did
not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants/orders.
It should also by now be reasonably evident from what has thus far been said that
the PCGG is not, and was never intended to act as, judge.
54. MORANO vs. VIVO

FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, together with her minor son in her
first marriage, Fuyan Fun arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin under
a temporary visitor's visa for two months. Chan married Esteban Morano, native
Filipino citizen. to prolong their stay in the Philippines, chan and Fu obtained
several extension. The commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan and Fu to leave
the country with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their
arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond. Instead of leaving the country
they petitioned the CFI for prohibition to stop the issuance of warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: W/N the commissioner of immigration can issue warrant of arrest

HELD: The Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and
that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is
thus violative of the Bill of Rights. In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set
forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, requiring that the issue of
probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings
SEC 2(4) ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE A WARRANT

LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON J. LIWAG, Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) and JOHN DOES, agents of the CID, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national turned immigrant in the Philippines.
He was later forcibly taken to the CID Intelligence Office by CID agents assisted by the police,
upon the order of the respondent CID Commissioner, which was based on a complaint accusing
the petitioner of being an undesirable alien. A warrant of arrest was then issued by respondent but
there is no proof showing that said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension.
Petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to question the validity of his arrest
and detention by respondent Commissioner.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner,
preparatory to deportation proceedings, was legal.

Held: Yes, it was held that the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge does not
extend to deportation proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against
the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance
of counsel, if desired
Board of Commissioners vs Judge De La Rosa 197 SCRA 853(G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May
31, 1991)

Facts: William, then twelve years old, arrived in Manila from Hongkong had with him certificate
of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission
as Filipino citizens. The board of special inquiry admitted William a as Filipino citizen and issued
an identification certificate to William. The Board of Commissioners were directed by the
Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant
was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. Acting commissioner issued an order
affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond.
Thus he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to
dismiss was filed but denied

Issue: Whether or not the arrest of William was legal and valid?

Ruling: No, since the CID commissioner is not a judge he may not issue warrants of arrest in aid
merely of investigatory power. He may however order the arrest of an alien for the purpose of
carrying out a deporation order that has already become final.
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioners were among the suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three
months close surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in
Pagsanjan Laguna, to face the deportation proceedings.Seized during petitioners’ apprehension
were rolls of photo negatives and photos as well as posters and other literatures advertising the
child prostitution.Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
the Immigration act and the revised administrative Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any authority
to arrest and detained petitioner pending determination of the existence of a probable cause

Ruling: Yes. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
is that it must be based upon probable cause. The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were
monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested
and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that
the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
Camara v. Municipal Court
387 US 523

Facts: An inspector from the Department of Health entered a home to investigate possible
violations of a City’s housing code without a warrant.
An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of
Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible
violations of the city’s Housing Code. The inspector was informed that the Appellant was using
part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded
to inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment
building. The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant.
The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment again, which was refused.
The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district attorney’s
office. The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain
access to his apartment and were again refused because they did not have a search warrant.
A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. The CA held
the housing section “does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it ‘is part of a regulatory
scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a
right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable
conditions.’

Issue: WON administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate
4th Amendment rights.

Ruling: Yes. Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the
interests protected by the 4th Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted
without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the 4th Amendment guarantees
to the individual.

Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search] other than
by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. ‘Probable cause’ to
issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards,
which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of
time, the nature of the building (e. g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the
entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the
particular dwelling.
PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]

Friday, February 06, 2009

Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers
who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters
for investigation. The suspected articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him.

Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested
with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was
granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In
his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently
proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: WON the search of the defendant’s bag violated section 2, Article III.

Held: Yes. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or
search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or
had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence
against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.
People vs Valdez
G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS: Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz is charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated
and cultured 7 fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs
maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, all member of the police force, who testified how the
information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific
instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They,
then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw 7 flowering
marijuana plants approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his, then
they uprooted the plants and arrested him.

Appellant testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose
identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown
person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately
100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand
in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing
there, and denied any knowledge thereof, but later admitted to owning the marijuana out of
nervousness. They then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. Appellant contends that
there was unlawful search, since the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search
warrant, and that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant
from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the
seized evidence admissible.

HELD: No. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain
said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and
only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection
extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

The confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. The said
marijuana plants cannot likewise be admissible as evidence, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO y EBDANE.
FACTS:
The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165. On the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs
Enforcement Group, together with a female informant, went to the parking area of McDonalds, West
Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain alias "Nato." At around 7:00 p.m., the
appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant approached the appellant and
talked to him inside the vehicle.

Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant,
the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia chased the
appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab the appellant, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe
recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized
a gun tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the
police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for investigation.

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure that followed the warrantless arrest is valid?

HELD:
No. Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances
seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having comefrom an invalid search and seizure. In the
present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to
the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was
actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant
and the informant were just talking with each otherwhen he approached them. In sum, we hold that the
appellant’s acquittal is in order since theshabupurportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
TORREY DALE GRADY v. NORTH CAROLINA March 30, 2015
FACTS:
Torrey Dale Grady was convicted of a second degree sexual offense in 1997 and of
taking indecent liberties with a child in 2006. After serving his sentence for the latter crime,
Grady was ordered to appear in New Hanover County Superior Court for a hearing to determine
whether he should be subjected to satellite-based monitoring (SBM) as a recidivist sex offender.
Grady did not dispute that his prior convictions rendered him a recidivist under the relevant
North Carolina statutes. He argued, however, that the monitoring program--under which he
would be forced to wear tracking devices at all times--would violate his Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Unpersuaded, the trial court ordered Grady
to enroll in the program and be monitored for the rest of his life. Grady renewed his Fourth
Amendment challenge on appeal, relying on this Court's decision in United Statesv. Jones, 565
U. S. (2012). In that case, this Court held that police officers had engaged in a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they installed and monitored a Global
Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on a suspect's car and "the Government's installation
of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a 'search.' "

ISSUE: WON the requirement that Grady should be installed a tracking device constitutes
unreasonable search and seizures?

HELD:
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. he State faults Grady for failing to introduce "evidence about the State's implementation
of the SBM program or what information, if any, it currently obtains through the monitoring
process." Without evidence that it is acting to obtain information, the State argues, "there is
no basis upon which this Court can determine whether North Carolina conducts a 'search'
of an offender enrolled in its SBM program." In other words, the State argues that we cannot
be sure its program for satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders collects any information.

The SBM program is plainly designed to obtain information. And since it does so by
physically intruding on a subject's body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search. That conclusion,
however, does not decide the ultimate question of the program's constitutionality. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. The reasonableness of a search depends on
the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to
which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations. The North Carolina courts did
not examine whether the State's monitoring program is reasonable--when properly viewed as a
search--and we will not do so in the first instance.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents. (1989)
FACTS:
The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a
court order or search warrant. Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of
the Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE: WON Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal?

HELD:
No. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and
seizure or other rights. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times,
when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

*In the 1990 case, Accordingly the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners were also dismissed.
Section 2
6. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
B. When is search a “search”?

Guanzon v. Major General De Villa 181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990

Main Point: In this case, there was no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the
attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from
sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the
"areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are
fully protected.

Facts:
The 41 petitioners(all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities) alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target
zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged
that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant
of arrest served. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep and were at the point of high-
powered guns. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. Those
who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations.
The public respondents(of the military and police represented by the Solicitor General) contend
that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements
for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush
out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives
were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for
the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record
such event.

Issue: W/N the warrantless searches and seizures in the conduct of the “Areal Target Zonings”
or “Saturation Drives” in Metro Manila are valid.

Ruling:
No. It appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest
before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no
showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved
even as the rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the
remedy should not be brought by a taxpayer suit where not one victim complaints and not one
violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring
soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no
permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary
restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the
RTC of Manila.
Section 2
6. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
C. No Presumption of Regularity in Search Cases

People v. Tudtud, GR 144037, Sept 26, 2003

Main Point: In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by
the allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before
asking them to open the subject box.

Facts:
In 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named
Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.

Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of marijuana.
Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry a carton, one of the,
fitted the description of Tudtud.

PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was
alright.” The latter opened the box, beneath dried fish were two bundle, one wrapped in a plastic
bag and another in newspapers. They asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained
what seemed to the police as marijuana leaves.

The two did not resist the arrest. Charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they
pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense that they were framed up. The trial court
convicted them with the crime charged and sentence them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

On appeal, respondents assign that the the marijuana leaves were seized in violation of their
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the
contents of the box. Tudtud testified that the police officer pointed a gun that he was obliged,
saying, “it was alright.”

Issue:
W/N the police officers can invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to
the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented.

OR W/N there is a presumption of regularity in search cases.

Ruling:
NO. In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the
allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before
asking them to open the subject box.

Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as
there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their
informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.
Section 2
6. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
C. No Presumption of Regularity in Search Cases

Sony Music v. Judge Espanol, GR 156804, March 14, 2005

Main Point: There is no presumption of regularity in search cases to prevent stealthy

encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal construction in
search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual.

Facts:
In 2000, Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. sought the assistance of the NBI agent Lavin
as they complained that Solid Laguna Corporation were engaged in the replication, reproduction
and distribution of Sony videograms without license and authority from the Video Regulatory
Board (violation of P.D. 1987); that Solid Laguna was manufacturing, selling, and distributing
various titles of CDs in violation of Sony Music’s copyrights (and a violation of RA 8293). Agent
Lavin, in applying for a search warrant, stated before Judge Dolores Español that an unnamed
person provided them information as to the presence of pirated CDs in the premises of Solid
Laguna; that Lavin and other witnesses were accompanied by unnamed persons to enter the
premise and conduct further investigation. The judge then issued two corresponding search
warrants; one for probable violation of PD 1987 and of RA 8293.

The search warrants were enforced and items were seized.

Solid Laguna thereafter presented a certification that they are actually authorized to
manufacture and sell CDs by the VRB at the same time it asked the court to quash the search
warrants and return the items seized.
Judge Español then quashed the search warrant because of the fact that the items seized as a
result of the two warrants were commingled hence they cannot be examined properly. That the
issuance of the warrant stemmed from the intimation made by petitioners. This being, the
warrants are of no force and effect because of the lack of probable cause.

Issue:W/N there is a presumption of regularity in search cases.

Ruling: No.
To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal
construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual. Consistent with this
postulate, the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the search process when an
officer undertakes to justify it.

Further, it cannot be overemphasized that not one of the applicants of the warrants testified
seeing the pirated discs being manufactured at Solid Laguna’s premises, they merely relied on
unnamed persons which is at best are hearsays.

The Supreme Court also noted that the lack of supporting evidence and documents in applying
for the search warrants on this infringement case does not mean that the master tapes of the
alleged copies being pirated should have been produced.
PEOPLE V. CHE CHUN TING

FACTS: Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two transparent bags of drugs to Mabel Po, in full
view of NARCOM agents. Police officers arrested the surprised man and conducted a search of Unit 122
where they found more bags of shabu so convicted for dispatching in transit and having in his possession
large amounts of shabu. He contends that the shabu is inadmissible in evidence as it was seized without
a valid search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is admissible without a valid search warrant?

RULING: No. The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of drugs found therein are illegal. A warrantless
search should be limited to the premises and surroundings that are under the immediate control of the
accused. As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a
polluted source, the “fruit of a poisonous tree.”

People V Chi Chan

Facts: Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani received a radio message from barangay captain of ambil island, looc,
oriental Mindoro saying that there is a suspicious boat in the vicinity of the island and when they
responded they saw a fishing boat and a speed boat who was transferring cargo to each other, upon
approachement of the police officer the speed boat sped away and was not able to caught except for
the fishing boat. Officer found shabu inside the boat and asked for its identification papers but failed to
do so. They were apprehended and have been read their rights. Information was filed against respondent
for violation of dangerous drug act and was found by the court guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondent contended that the drugs were from the barangay captian and that the search and seizure
was invalid.

Issue: Whether or not there was unreasonable search and seizure and if the warrantless arrest was
unjustified as to make the bag inadmissible?

Ruling: Court ruled that the appellant were actually committing a crime and were caught by the
apprehending officer in flagrante delicto. While acting upon the report of the barangay captain, spotted
appellant transferring cargos and the speed boat sped away upon closing naturally arouse suspicion, they
failed to provide paper and even offered big big lump sum of money to the officers.

Plain View
People V Evaristo
Facts: Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine
Constabulary together with Sgt. Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the Integrated National Police
were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At 5:00 in the afternoon, the officers heard
a successive burst of gunfire and they came upon Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon
approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon Evaristo and Carillo. They
inquired as to the whereabouts of Rosillo. The police patrol members were told that he had already
escaped through a window of the house. Vallarta noticed a bulge around the waist of Carillo and upon
being frisked he admitted the same to be a revolver. As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt.
Romeroso sought Evaristo’s permission to scour through the house which was granted. Romaroso found
a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms.
Evaristo and Carillo were ound guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in accidental discovery of evidence is
admissible

Ruling: Yes, the firearms seized was valid and lawful for being incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense
was committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant. these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view.

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to
enter his house. The officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein.
Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house,
thereby rendering his discovery of the subject as inadvertent and even accidental.
People v Doria
GR 125299, Jan. 22, 1999

FACTS:
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that Doria was engaged in
illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation which he
was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he
revealed that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the police team
to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Doria identified her as
“Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money. PO3 Manlangit, while
still outside the house, looked over her house and noticed a carton box under the dining table. One
of the box’ s flaps was opened, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by Doria. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the
house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from “Neneth ” and they
arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972]. RTC convicted them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid.

RULING:
No. Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis
of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. If there is no showing that the
person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested
to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and
the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to
her arrest.
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 142295

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos. The police received a report that petitioner was in possession of
certain firearms without the necessary licenses. When PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired
from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true, the latter issued a
certification stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber. Thus, police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the
house of appellant.
Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve
the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay
Chairman and Barangay Councilman to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon
arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant.
When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that
they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers
conducted a search of the house. The search yielded several items such as (a) a caliber .45 pistol with
five magazines found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios
found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver containing 8 pieces of live
ammunition found in the kitchen of the house. The appellant failed to produce any license that
prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in
his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver, were
merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assailed the manner in which the search was
carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission.
Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished
the search. However, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
HELD:
Yes. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching
officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion
of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a
poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It
was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to
emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.
True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or
any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, seizure of evidence in
'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object." Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view"
is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are.
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Hizon v Court of Appeals
265 SCRA 517 (1996)

FACTS:
Petitioners Hizon, et al were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing with
the use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing
by “muro ami” led to the apprehension of F/B Robinson, where Hizon et al were present.
The PNP Maritime Command and Task Force Bantay Dagat directed the boat captain to
get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial result tested the fish
positive of sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information. However, a second set of
fish samples yielded a negative result.
The RTC found Hizon et al guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of
the fishes. The CA affirmed the decision. Hizon et al questioned the admissibility of the evidence
against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest
of the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not fish samples seized by NBI in F/B Robinson without a search warrant are
admissible in evidence.

RULING:
Yes, as a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. But there are exceptions, Search and seizure without search warrant
of vessels and aircrafts for violation of customs laws have been the traditional exception. The same
apply to seizure of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
BAGALIHOG V. FERNANDEZ

FACTS:

Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to deathshortly after disembarking at theMasbate Airport. Witnesses
said one of the gunmen on a motorcycle. On the same day, the bagalihog’s house, which was near the
airport, was searched with his consent to see if the killers had sought refuge there. "he search proved
fruitless. two days later, the police seized his motorcycle and took it to the headquarters in Masbate.
they had no search warrant. the motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the
vehicles used by the killers. After investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged with
multiple murder and frustrated murder. Bagalihog then 'led a complaint for the recovery of the
motorcycle with an application for a writ of replevin, in dismissing the case, the respondent (judge said
he had no (jurisdiction over the motorcycle because it was in custodia legis and only the (judge trying
the criminal cases )Makati RTC could order its release.

Issue: Won Replevin was proper

Ruling:

Yes. where respondent Roxas confiscated and impounded petitioner’s motorcycle which was believed
one of the vehicles used by the killers of Rep. Moises Espinosa, the Supreme Court ruled that the
confiscation, without warrant, was unlawful. The constitutional provision protects not only those who
appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the motorcycle had not been
established; neither can the vehicle be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article.
In Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424,

Fcts:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of
firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces,
and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of
the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the
House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was
apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that
Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a
bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause
why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or
similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue
on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his
bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the
firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Ruling: No the Supreme Court said that, in the face of 14 armed policemen conducting the operation,
driver Arellano, being alone and a mere employee of the petitioner, could not have marshalled the
strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted on the vehicle. “Consent”
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is not consent within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. There was no probable cause. However, a warrantless search is not violative of
the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns
were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases
and placed inside a bag at the back of the car
People v Amminudin

Facts:

Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an
NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense,
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a
jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches
during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.

Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he
about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as
evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged. The officers
had all the time to obtain a warrant.
People v. Malmstedt, GR 91107, June 19, 1991

Facts:

Accused was a passenger on a bus from Sagada to Baguio City which was stopped at a checkpoint in Camp
Dangwa. The checkpoint was set up on the basis of reports that vehicles from Sagada were being used to transport
marijuana. Moreover, the information had been received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited in his
possession. During the inspection, officers noticed a bulge in accused’s waist. When accused refused to comply with the
request for identification papers, he was made to show what he had on his waist. It was found to contain hashish. On
stepping outside, accused stopped to pick up two travelling bags which upon being opened, were also found to contain
prohibited drugs. Accused claimed illegal search.

Issue: WON the search was illegal.

Ruling:

No. The search was made incident to his arrest when he was found in possession of illegal drugs. The arrest
was made on probable cause that he was committing a crime. Hence, the warrantless arrest search of the bus was a
valid search of a moving vehicle.
People v. Lo Ho Wing, GR 88017, Jan 21, 1991

Facts:

Upon arrival at the NAIA and after boarding a taxi, defendants’ vehicle was stopped by the PC after a tip from “deep
penetration agents” of the arrival of the defendants with shabu. The operatives disembarked from their car, approached
the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the
back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects permission to search their
luggage. Accused alleged that the search was illegal as the PC knew two days in advance of their arrival and yet did not
obtain a warrant.

Issue: WON the search was illegal.

Ruling:

No. It falls under the exception of search of a moving vehicle. The authorities had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence
reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member.
Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such
knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still
and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.
People v. Saycon – 236 SCRA 329

Facts:

The Coastguard and NARMCOM were alerted to the arrival of a suspected shabu courier in a ship
docking that morning. The suspected courier was invited for questioning and asked to reveal the
contents of his bag. Prohibited drugs were found and he was arrested without warrant.

Issue: WON the warrantless search valid.

Ruling:

Yes. This is the exception to the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to
the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before
searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant may be sought.
Mustang Lumber v. CA
257 SCRA 430

FACTS:
A huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner, the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the
DENR compound.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless seizure of the truck and its cargo was unlawful

RULING:
NO
It was duly established that the petitioner's truck was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard
loaded with lumber not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure
of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a
search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as
an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search.
People v. Barros
231 SCRA 557

FACTS
Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information which read as follows; That the accused while being a
passenger in a bus destined for Baguio City, without lawful authority did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of
dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing full well
that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or a source of a prohibited drug as inspected by 2 peace officers
sitting at the back of the bus as they were suspicious to its contents.

ISSUE
Whether or not constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated.

RULING
YES
There existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two (2) police
officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at
Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that
appellant Barros might be carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other
words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of "actually committing" or
"attempting to commit" a crime. There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have
reasonably led the police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when
appellant Barros boarded the bus or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the
checkpoint. The police officers, according to the record, had no "personable knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in brief, no
basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally
non-permissible and invalid.

It is, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the marijuana. His guilt
must, however, be established by constitutional means. The non-admissibility of evidence secured
through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a
powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and by the
trial court. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a
search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain exceptions, one of which relates to the search of
moving vehicles. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are
limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants
subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual
inspection.
People v. CFI
101 SCRA 86
FACTS
The records disclose that one week before; the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC)
was informed that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles
City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, 2 RASAC Agents stationed themselves in the vicinity,
succeeded in blocking the car owned by Sgt. Hope pass a checkpoint. They then identified themselves
also seeing boxes in the car, they went with Sgt. Hope to his destination. On the way, one of the agents
called up Col. Abad by telephone who joined them upon arriving at the destination. Due to the ‘receiver’
not appearing, they brought respondents and their car to their Camp.
After inspection there were 11 sealed boxes. On the same order of the intelligence officer, the
boxes were opened and the contents of the boxes revealed wrist watches and watch bracelets more or
less of assorted brands" supposedly untaxed.As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio
Cruz requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles
including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did. It was admitted that when the apprehending
agents arrested respondents and brought them together with the seized articles to the ASAC Office in
Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure.

ISSUE
whether or not the seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized agents commissioned
to enforce customs laws without warrant of seizure constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure .

RULING
NO
What they did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code
directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed,
issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct interest. The
official capacity of the agents has never been questioned by respondents. Neither did respondents raise
an issue on the constitutionality of the law giving the agents the power to act as mandated. There 'is no
question that the Agents have not exceeded their authority nor have they acted so licentiously to bear
upon respondents moral embarrassment or substantial prejudice beyond what is necessary. The
purpose of the search and seizure is more than clear to us, hence, we rule out the suspicion that the
intention is only to elicit evidence to be used against respondents.
D) Instances of warrantless searches or seizures

iv. Consent/ Waiver

Caballes v. CA

Facts:

The policemen, while on a routine patrol, spotted a passenger jeep unsually covered with “kakawati” leaves.

Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the policemen flagged down the vehicle. With the consent

of the driver, Caballes, the policemen checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of high voltage wires

exclusively owned by NAPOCOR. Thereafter, Caballes and the high voltage wires were brought to the police

station.

Issue:

WON the warrantless search and seizure made by the policemen were valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, but admits of certain

exceptions. One of the exceptions is consented warrantless arrest, which is present in this case.
People v. Agbot

Facts:

The accused Antonio Agbot went to the house of his sister Leona Agbot, and demanded from her the return of his

twelve-year old daughter Milagrosa, who had been under the care and custody of Leona Agbot Subat since she was

two years old. Leona refused to surrender the child to the accused because of her sacrifices and expenses in the

upbringing and education of Milagrosa.

At about 7:30 pm, a gunshot was heard, and they found Leona wounded and later on died. An investigation was

conducted. On the course of the investigation in the house of the victim, the accused appeared thereat and admitted

to the policemen that he was the one who shot the victim. The policemen then proceeded to the house of the accused

and get the firearm.

Issue:

WON there was an illegal seizure of firearm for being no search warrant.

Ruling:

NO. The taking of the firearm was with consent that would not constitute a violation of constitutional guarantee

against admissibility of illegally seized objects as evidence against the accused.

LOPEZ v. COMMISIONER ON CUSTOMS

Facts:

Upon warrantless search of a hotel room, consent and voluntary surrender of papers belonging to the registered but

absent occupant was given by a woman identified as the wife of the occupant but who in fact was a “mere

manicurist”.

Issue:

WON the consent given by a woman identified as a wife but who in fact was a “mere manicurist” was sufficient to

justify a warrant of arrest.

Ruling:

Yes. The officers of the law cannot be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside ready

to accede in their request. Even ordinary courtesy would preclude them from inquiring too closely why she was

there.
 PEOPLE vs DAMASO

FACTS:

The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members
in Dagupan City. They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister
of someonewhom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, visitor of
Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the
appellant.

Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw
Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciango then allowed the group to enter inside the house. The
group to enter inside the house. The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso
without a valid warrant when the latter was absent. As they look around, they saw
subversive materials which they confiscated. Damaso was charged with Illegal possession
of firearms.

ISSUE: W/N there was a consent/waiver given to validly search Damaso’s house.

RULING:

No. Unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be waived by anyone except 1. The
person whose rights are invaded or 2. One who is expressly authorized to do so in his or
her behalf. In this case, Damaso was not in the house at that time Tanciangco, his alleged
helper, allowed the authorities to enter. Being a helper, she does not qualigy as a person
authorized to waive such right in representation of her employer.
 PEOPLE vs ASIS

FACTS:

Asis and Formento were charged in an Information where they robbed and stabbed
one Yu Hing Guan with a bladed instrument as a result, he sustained mortal stab wounds
and died.

When arraigned, both pleaded guilty and found to be deaf-mutes, thus they were
assisted i.e interpreter. After due trial, both were found guilty and sentenced to death. In
the reviewe befpre the SC, the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, but
object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts recovered from the bag of
Formento: arguing that the search was illegally done. The prosecution contends that it
was Formento’s wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag, and thus claims that her act
constituted a valid consent.

ISSUE: W/N Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent

RULING:

No. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses show that at the time the
bloodstained shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife was present. Since h
was physically present, he himself should have given consent, the waiver could not have
come from any other person.
 Spouses Veroy vs Layague

FACTS:

Capt. Reynaldo Obrero, raided the Davao City residence of petitioner spouses who
were already residing in Quezon City on Information that the said residence was being
used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers.

The team did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not
have a search warrant. Obrero contracted the spouses to ask permission granted with the
presence of a ranking military officer.

The team gained entry into the yard and kitchen, and entered the children’s room
and conducted the search which resulted in the recovery of several articles whoch include
a firearm and the-like.

ISSUE: W/N the officers violated the petitioners’ constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizures

RULING:

Yes. It was held that where permission to enter the residence is given to search for
rebels, it is illegal to search the rooms therein and seize firearms without a search
warrant.

Any evidence obtained in violation of unreasonable search and seizure for any
purpose in any proceedings.
People v. Conway B. Omaweng

Facts: Herein respondent was being charged of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as he was apprehended to be of
possession of processed marijuana in his car. He was convicted of the crime, as he had weak evidence to counter the allegations of
the prosecution. Among others, he filed this petition in this Court, claiming that the search and seizure of the contraband in his car
was without a warrant, as it was conducted in a checkpoint.

Issue: W/n the search and seizure without a warrant in the checkpoint a valid search and seizure that shall not deprive the accused
of his right to against unreasonable searches.

Held: YES. The fact that Omaweng has let the officers search the car was a submission of his right against unreasonable searches,
and that the illegal items were outright evidence of his possession of the same, thus, no warrant was needed for the seizure. Mere
possession of the dangerous drugs is already a violation of the DDA.
People v Antonio Correa y Cayton

Facts: The respondent, et al., were convicted for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as they were apprehended to be in
possession of the processed marijuana. They contend that the illegal drugs are inadmissible as the search and seizure was illegally
done, as they were apprehended when they were going back to LeornardoDulay’s home to get his sick child’s items, and it was done
without a warrant.

Issue: W/n the right to unreasonable search and seizure of respondents was violated, as it was shown that they have let the officers
search the car.

Held: NO.The appellants are now precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it
as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. The appellants never protested when SPO3 Jesus Faller, after identifying
himself as a police officer, opened the tin can loaded in the appellants vehicle and found eight (8) bundles. And when Faller
[25]

opened one of the bundles, it smelled of marijuana. The NBI later confirmed the eight (8) bundles to be positive for
[26]

marijuana. Again, the appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were
[27]

brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. We have ruled in a long line of cases that: [28]

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631). The
right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly.

(2) The appellants effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure in question by their voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the
trial.
[29]

We agree with the trial court that the appellants conspired to commit the offense which they knew to be unlawful:
The established circumstances of this case, considered collectively, demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the
conspiracy among the three accused to commit the offense at bar. They were apprehended at the same time; travelling
together in a motorized vehicle from the time they were first spotted by the arresting police officers at A. Bonifacio
Street until their actual arrest at Bambang Extension corner Jose Abad Santos Avenue in Tondo, Manila; at an unholy
hour of the night (until) around 3:00 to 3:45 oclock in the morning on June 18,1994; with Antonio Correa at the
steering wheel, Leonardo Dulay seated in front beside the driver and RitoGunida seated at the back of the motor
vehicle; carrying for delivery and transportation a large quantity of dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in tightly with
plastic tapes and concealed in a big tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Oil (Exhibit B). These factors leave the mind
of this Court at ease and free from any doubt that indeed the three accused had conspired and helped one another in
the delivery and transportation of the said contraband.
 People v Felimon Ramos
Fact: Felimon Ramos was being alleged of being part of the robbery groups that robbed multiple residences in Kalookan
City. He was apprehended and identified by the witness of the prosecution, and that upon apprehension, he was
carrying a .38 caliber paltik gun, without a valid warrant of arrest. He contends that such warrantless arrest should not be
allowed and that the gun found in his possession to be inadmissible for the lack of warrant.
Issue: W/n the frisk and seizure of the gun is inadmissible pursuant to Art. 3, Sec.2 of the constitution.

Held: NO. The rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a
judge. This is enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Such a rule, however, is not without exceptions. For instance, a warrantless search
48 49

made be validly made as an incident to a lawful arrest or in stop and search situations. Another recognized exception is when the
50 51

accused himself waives his right against unreasonable search and seizure. As this Court stated in People vs. Malasugui: 52

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

The evidence for the prosecution clearly discloses that accused Ramos voluntarily allowed himself to be frisked and that he gave the
gun to Pat. Alfredo Rodillas. This evidence remained unrebutted by Ramos because his testimony on cross-examination was, as
earlier noted, stricken off from the records. Moreover, his counsel did not object to any of the questions asked during the direct
examination of witness Lardizabal concerning the frisking of Ramos and the recovery from him of the gun. On cross-examination,
53

counsel for Ramos did not suggest or insinuate, even obliquely, that Ramos did not voluntarily allow himself either to be frisked or
dispossessed of the gun by Pat. Rodillas.
People vs Tudtud GR 144037 Sept 23 2003

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.

Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Relating to the report, the police
conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they
gathered information and leared that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his
neighbours, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.

Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day
with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and usually wore
a hat. At around 4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted themselves at the corner of
Saipon and McArthur Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00
pm, 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked “King Flakes.”
Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the
men fit Tudtud’s description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1
Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto
informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying
any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then said “it was
alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one wrapped in a plastic
bag and another in newspapers. When the bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana
leaves.

The police arrested Tudtud and his comapanion. They were charged with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs before the RTC of Davao City which convicted the accused.

ISSUE: WON Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is considered
a waiver.

RULING: NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3
of the Constitution. Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as
there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their
informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the
following requisites are present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that
when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the
contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was
alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself.

Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y
Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
PEOPLE VS. TABAR 222 Scra 144

FACTS: Respondent-accused was charged, together with her nephew, for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in an information which provided that the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there
sell and deliver, without authority of law, 3 sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a prohibited drugs, to a
person who posted himself as a buyer, in violation of the Dangerous Act of 1972.

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks
under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left her
shanty after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out, which she
voluntary did, the package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain
view to the member of the team.

The accused were then convicted of the offense charged against them in the trial court.
On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the lower court erred in admitting the
evidence against her when there wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore, violating the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation against the constitutional guarantee of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

RULING: No. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense without the corresponding arrest and search warrants.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach and seizure were without a warrant, the
appellant had effectively waived her constitutional right relative thereto by voluntarily
submitting to the seach and seizure.

When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his person
or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure
from unreasonable seach may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENCINADA G.R. No. 116720.

FACTS: At around 4pm of May 1992, SPO4 Bolonia was in his house when he received a tip
from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surgao from Cebu in the morning of
May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him marijuana. Bolonia was then
Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the Surigao City Police.

After receiving the tip, Bolonia notified the members of his team as well as his colleague.
Because the information came late, there was no more time to secure a search warrant.

In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia, Iligan and other police officers deployed
themselves to intercept Encinada. From their various positions, the police officers followed
Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle at Borromeo Street, still holding the plastic chairs. As
the tricycle slowly moved forward, Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop after
identifying himself as a police officer. When the vehicle stopped, Bolonia identified himself to
Encinada and ordered him to alight from the tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the
plastic chairs, to which the latter complied. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar
scent of marijuana. Making a small tear in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell the
what appeared to be marijuana, a prohibited drug. Encinada was brought to the central police
station.

The trial court emphasized that appellant was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto.
Hence the warrantless search following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana was
admissible in evidence.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless search upon the person of the accused.

RULING: No. There was no waiver by the accused of his right against unreasonable search
and seizure.

The search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause as the essential requirement.

In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City policemen.
Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to
a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless
arrest.
considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot
appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of
duty.

Appellants alleged acquiescence should be distinguished from the consent

appreciated in the recent case of People vs. Lacerna.[26] In said case, the search was
conducted at a validly established checkpoint and was made in the regular performance
of the policemens duty. Although it became intrusive when the policemen opened his
baggage, it was validated by the consent of appellant, who testified in open court that
he allowed such search because he had nothing to hide. In the present case, there was
no checkpoint established. The policemen stopped the motorela and forthwith subjected
the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. In contrast to the accused in
Lacerna, herein appellant testified that he openly objected to the search by asking for a
warrant.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot
stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. That the search
disclosed a prohibited substance in appellants possession, and thus confirmed the
police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal
search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the
evidence yielded by the search.

Appeal was GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
is ACQUITTED.
People vs. Aruta

Facts: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio
City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team
which proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. A The informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa"
who was then carrying a traveling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it
to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked. The
team confiscated the bag. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation
where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the technical report, the prosecution
rested its case. The defense assert that the the search and seizure of the items violated the accused-
appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in
evidence.

Issue: W/N the search and seizure of the items violated the accused-appellant's constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

Ruling: Yes.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be consent
given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right.

The act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed
as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search.

While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant
did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken
as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based
merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty."

To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.

The courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.
Papa vs. Mago

Facts: Having received information the day before that a certain shipment of misdeclared and undervalued
personal effects would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks allegedly carrying the goods.

When the trucks left the customs zone, elements of the counter-intelligence unit intercepted them. The trucks
and the nine bales of goods they carried were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation
those claiming ownership showed the policemen a “Statement of Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry
No. 147-5501” issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of one Bienvenido Naguit.

Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction,
alleging that she was the owner of the goods seized, which were purchased from Sta. MonicaGrocery in San
Fernando, Pampanga. She hired the trucks to bring the goods to her residence. She complained that the
goods were seized without a warrant, and that they were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the
Tariff and Customs Code even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had bought them
without knowing they had been imported illegally.

Issue: W/N the seizure was in accordance with law.

Ruling: Yes.

It is the settled rule that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws

The Tariff and Customs Code does not require any search warrant issued by a competent court before police
authorities can effect the seizure. But the Code requires it in the search of a dwelling house.

Therefore, except in the case of a search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs laws may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

The seizure made by Algao and his companion policemen was valid.
Pacis vs. Pamaran

Facts: Respondent Ricardo Santos is an owner of a car which he bought from a tax-exempt
individual. He paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Pedro Pacis, the Acting Collector of
Customs, received a letter stating that Santos' car was a hot car. The amount collectible was
P2,500.00, not just P311.00.

Based on such discrepancy, Pacis instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and
detention. The car was taken by agents who were authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant.
Santos wrote to Pacis about the seizure. Santos also filed a case of usurpation of authority against
Pacis. Manuel Pamaran, an Assistant Fiscal, proceeded with the charge against Pacis.

Issue: Whether Customs Collectors can issue a warrant of seizure and detention.

Ruling: Yes.

The Collector of Customs has the requisite authority to issue a warrant of seizure and detention for
an automobile whose duties and taxes have not been paid for.

In exercising this authority, the Collector has not committed a violation of the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure and he may not be prosecuted for usurption of judicial
function.
People vs Gatward
Facts:

U Aung Win was caught in NAIA after arriving from Bangkok, Thailand. He had his
luggage inspected then proceeded to the conveyor to retrieve another baggage, but never came
back. The Customs Examiner became alarmed by this and subjected the luggage under x-ray and
found the powdery substance of heroin. Thereafter, the Customs Police were alerted and U Aung
Win was caught the next day at the check-in counter trying to depart.
Gatward was caught with the help of U Aung Win’s information during his investigation. He was
found bound for Amsterdam and already on the plane but was off-loaded in time. His baggage,
however, was not unloaded as it would delay the flight. The baggage was returned on the returning
flight, subjected to x-ray examination where two envelopes of heroin were found.
Issue:
Whether or not Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s suitcases may be searched without warrant.
Held:
Yes.
The trial court was also correct in rejecting the challenge to the admissibility in evidence
of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. While no search warrant had been obtained
for that purpose, when appellant checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger
of KLM Flight No. 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with
customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any
objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in
flagrante delicto.
People vs Leila Johnson
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a
widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the
Philippines to visit her son’s family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic
on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the
next day, June 26, 1998.
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her
duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs,
prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the
United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying “Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon.” (“Sir, I do not
believe that it is just a panty.”) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest women’s
room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1
Rizalina Bernal. Ramirez then asked her “to bring out the thing under her girdle.” Accused-
appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the
women’s room. The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of
580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu.”
ISSUES:
Whether or not the warrantless search is valid?
RULING:
Yes.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage
are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
People vs Susan Canton
Facts:
Canton was charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. She was caught in
possession of metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) without prescription or license. Susan was
bound to Saigon, Vietnam. Prior to her flight, she passed through the metal detector and beeped.
A civilian inspector of the airport searched her and upon frisking, she felt something that is bulging
in the abdomen of Susan. They were able to recover packets that were wrapped with packing tape.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.
Held:
Yes.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure
outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. The interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
115. Dela Cruz vs People

FACTS: Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled,
"coming back and forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was
at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left
his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz
was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel He frequently traveled, "coming back and
forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the
Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the
floor with a porter.14 It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.

Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray
scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela
Cruz’s bag. Inside there were three revolvers and it alerted the airport personnel of the
predicament.

Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was
also informed of his constitutional rights.

Petitioner pleaded that the firearms weren’t his and they were implanted to frame him and that
the search of the airport personnel was unwarranted. However, the court didn’t merit his
arguments.

Issue: Whether or not that the search and seizure of the three revolvers are valid?

Ruling: Yes, the search was valid because searches even without a search warrant are valid under
these circumstances. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the
absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence
in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs
search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. With the case, it is
valid under (iv) and (vi).
116. TERRY vs OHIO

Facts: Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in
what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and
frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.

Issue:Whether or not the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in
violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Held: the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into
evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular
case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a
reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed
and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his
suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in
scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.
117. POSADAS vs CA

Facts: While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and
they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They
then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found contrabands. The
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess the
firearms and ammunitions but failed to do so.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search was valid.

Held: An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private

person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
118. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – People v Solayao

Facts: SPO3 Jose Nio conducted an intelligence patrol as required to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The team met the group of accused Nilo
Solayao. The police team became suspicious when they observed the group of Solayao drunk and
wearing camouflage uniform. Upon seeing the government agents, the group fled.

Confiscated from Solayao is a homemade firearm called Latong. He admitted that he had no permission
to possess the firearm. Solayao was found guilty, then he appealed to the court against the admissibility
of the evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.

Issue: W/N there was an unlawful warrantless search?

Ruling: No. There was justifiable cause to “stop and frisk” the accused when his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first. Suspicion also arouse when the group was spotted dressed in
camouflage.
119. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Malacat v CA

Facts: in response to bomb threats reported 7 days earlier, Police were on foot patrol. They met 2
groups of Muslim looking men, where each group consisted of 3 to 4 men, posted at opposite side of the
corner of Quezon blvd. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. The police
then approached the group after 30 minutes,, then they fled in different directions. Upon searching
Malacat, the police found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter’s front waist line. A .38
Caliber revolver from his companion was also recovered. The police did not issue any receipt for the
grenade and calibre allegedly recovered.

Issue: W/N the searched made is valid pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.

Ruling: Yes. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A
warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as
one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search
of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to
a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”
120. Art. 3. Sec. 2 – Manalili v CA

Police operatives based on the information that drug addicts were roaming around in the area, saw a
man who appeared to be high on drugs and introduced themselves as policemen. Said man avoided
them and tried to resist, when they asked what the man was holding in his hand, the man held out his
wallet and allowed police officers to examine it, who found what he suspected to be crushed mj leaves.
The substance found on Manalili’s wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section and was confirmed
as mj.

Issue: W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.

Ruling: Yes. Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.

It did not, however abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.
Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Rosa Aruta y Menguin

288 SCRA 626 (1998)

Facts: In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec
1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of
marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a
travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM
officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello
about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same,
they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation

Issue: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest and/or search and seizure

Ruling:No, this situation does not fall under valid warrantless arrest and/or seizure. In searches
and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent
any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the
person arrested.

To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the
abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when
the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable
cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.

Main Point: Probable Cause must be present even in warrantless arrests and searches and
seizures.
 People v Sy-Chua
GR No. 130667 February 4, 2003

Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs and ammunitions as
penalized in RA 6425 and 7659.
Police Version – They were tipped and waited for accused to arrive at Thunderbird hotel. Informant
pointed at accused Binad Sy-Chua who just arrived, carrying a Zest-O juice box. SPO2 Nulud and
PO2 Nunag accosted him, introduced as PO and searched his body which yielded .22 caliber firearm
bullets. The box had two plastic bags containing shabu.
Sy-Chua’s version – He was on the way to meet his wife and son. Feeling sleepy, he stopped in front
of a small store near the hotel to buy ciga and candies. When somebody approached and examined
his car, he called the former out. That person pointed a gun to him and introduced himself as a
policeman, took Sy-Chua’s car keys, and was pulled away while the police searched his car. At
Salakot police station, he was held in BR for 15mins, and was made to hold juice box in front of the
reporters.

Issue: WON there was a valid stop-and-frisk

Ruling: No, S-A-F: act of stopping a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for
weapons; PO must introduce; initiate inquiries; approach and restrain unusual and suspicious
conduct; check outer clothing; there must be a genuine reason; search and seizure should PRECEDE
arrest.
 People v Victor Cogaed y Romana
GR No. 20334 July 30, 2014

Facts: P S/Insp. Sofronio Bayan was tipped that one Marvin Buya would transport Marijuana from
Brgy. Lunoy, to Poblacion of San Gabriel La Union . Checkpoints were organized. Passenger jeepney
from Brgy.L arrived at SPO1 Taracata’s checkpoint. Drive signalled. Taracata approached Victor
Cogaed y Romana and Santiago Dayao; asked about content of their bags; latter don’t know;
arrested, brought to P.S. Cogaed’s bag: 4 rolled pieces of Marijuana fruiting tops and Dayao bag:
Marijuana brick.
Dayao exempted 14 y.o.; Cogaed illeg. arrest be not doing, about to, or have done
crime;waived his right because he did not protest when asked to open bag.

Issue: WON there is a valid warrantless search and seizure under the stop-and-frisk

Ruling: No. Reqs. were not complied with.

“Suspiciousness”, ability of PO to discern based on personal experiences with criminal
offenders or behaviour. In this case, had not the driver pointed, PO would not have suspected. PO
should not adapt suspicion of another person, infringement upon one’s basic right to security.
“Genuine reason” not mere hunch to validate S-A-F
“Limited to outer clothing”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROLANDO DE GRACIA,

Facts:

The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by
ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the Government.

As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a team under one Col. delos Santos raided
the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five
bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar
Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then
present through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. As a result of the
raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the
Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and
ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. No
search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so
much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed.

Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the raiding team?

Ruling:

Yes. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is out considered opinion that the instant case falls under one
of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was
being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989
when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Lacerna vs. Dangerous Drug Board

Facts:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue.

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees

Issue: Whether or not the parts of Sec. 36 of R.A 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for person
accused of crimes unconstiutitonal?

Ruling:

Yes.Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification
for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private
and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
Pimentel vs. Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May
10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution
No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to
be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

Issue: Whether or not the mandatory drug testing as an additional qualification to be a Senator is
unconstitutional?

Ruling:

Yes.In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to
what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement.
127. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN DE LA CRUZ

FACTS: Accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and his co-accused Reynaldo

Beltran y Aniban were charged for violating Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section
21, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. De la
Cruz died in the Manila City Jail. The present appellate proceeding is, therefore,
limited only to appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban. Appellant assails the manner in
which the so-called buy-bust operation is conducted in order to enforce the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He stigmatizes it as no different from seizure of evidence from one's
person or abode without a search warrant.

ISSUE: W/N the arrest of appellant without a search warrant is valid and lawful

HELD: While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence

from one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not
necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. A buy-bust
operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor
in flagrante delicto.
128. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO DORIA

FACTS: A buy bust operation was conducted which resulted in the arrest of
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao and were charged with violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Gaddao, however, was not
with Doria when the buy bust operation was conducted. Doria, having left the marked
bills at the house of Gaddao led police to retrieve the said bills. An agent suspected
Gaddao of being involved and searched her house which resulted in the seizure of a
box of marijuana.

ISSUE: W/N Gaddao was in flagrante delicto when the Police arrested her.

HELD: Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant
Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the
marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without
any conspiracy.
129. ESPIRITU vs. LIM

FACTS: Espiritu, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of
certain witnesses that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke
at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said “Bukas tuloy ang welga
natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na.”

ISSUE: W/N the arrest of Espiritu is lawful

HELD: Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the
arresting officers, was inciting to sedition. The authority of the peace officers to make
the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, was
still lawful. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes
difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction)
SEC 2 IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,

ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

Facts: Military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City,
to verify confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (Liquidation Squad)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound, and the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the 5 male "sparrows" who murdered 2 Capcom mobile patrols. In view
of this verification, Rolando Dural (accused) was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or not their arrest was valid and legal?

Ruling: The arrest of persons involved in the act of rebellion need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]

Facts: Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Sucro was suspected of selling marijuana based on information from a police informant.
His activities were monitored and confirmed that several transactions were taking place in
the area of a certain chapel. The police decided to move in on an ongoing transaction and
was able to apprehend a buyer who identified Sucro as the seller. The police also recovered
several marijuana sticks from the chapel where Sucro left them.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid since the accused was not in the act of committing any
offense at the time of his arrest.

Ruling: Yes. A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; and when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]

Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an
ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. One of the agents went to said location,
asked for a certain Don. Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a
plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200 treated with ultraviolet
powder. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report and a team was subsequently
organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the
agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others and the
accused who was found positive of the ultraviolet powder. There was no authorization by any
search warrant to conduct the raid. The lower court, considering the evidences and testimonies
obtained found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid and legal

Ruling:NO, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza
(Father)was not authorized by any search warrant. Appellant's right against unreasonable search
and seizure was clearly violated. The agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal
that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their
intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a
search warrant during that time.

As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a

search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority.
People vs. Elamparo
329 SCRA

Summary: A buy-bust operation led the pursuing officers of a drug runner into the house of his
alleged supplier/dealer. In the house, they witnessed the alleged dealer repacking bricks of
marijuana and arrested him.

Facts: Joel Elamparo has been convicted with Illegal Possession of Drugs. Police Officer
Baldonado of Caloocan City Police received a report from an informant that "some people are
selling shabu and marijuana somewhere in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City." Thus, Baldonado
organized a buy-bust team and deployed at a known "market" for buyers of marijuana. Thereafter,
a runner approached the poseur-buyer to confirm an order. The runner then left and returned with
the marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer and buy-bust team member, then handed over the marked
money and arrested the runner who freed himself and ran.

The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a bungalow-type house with steel gate.
Having trapped the runner inside the house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the
marked money. The police officers likewise found Joel Elamparo (D) repacking five bricks of
"marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table inside the house. Elamparo (D) was
then arrested.

Issues: WON the warrantless arrest is valid.

Ruling: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person,
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. When the runner wrenched himself free from the grasp of
Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of Elamparo. The members of the buy-bust team
were justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were
pursuing a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police officers cornered the runner and
recovered the buy-bust money from him. They also caught Elamparo in flagrante delicto repacking
the marijuana bricks which were in full view on tap of a table.
5 generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have been
judicially formulated: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
Rizaldy Sanchez Y Cajili v. People
GR 204589, November 19, 2004

Facts: Sanchez was charged with possession of shabu and violation of Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. The information alleged that on the 19th day of March 2003, in the Province
of Cavite, the accused, not being authorized by law, have in his possession, control and custody,
0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug.

PO1 Elmer Amposta, et al., was dispatched to Barangay Alapan, Cavite to conduct an operation.
The group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few
minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group
chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they
noticed Rizaldy holding a match box. SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents
of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent
plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a
regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to
the police station. The forensics chemist said that the substance was shabu.

Sanchez presented a different version of the events. He, together with Darwin Reyes, were on their
way home from Brgy. Alapan transporting a passenger, when their way was blocked arresting
officers, who told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely
transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus
Police Station where he was further investigated. RTC ruled that Sanchez was caught in flarante
delicto.

Issue: WON was caught in flagrante delicto hence a search warrant was no longer necessary.
Ruling: No. The search and seizure on Sanchez was unlawful. A search as an incident to a
lawfularrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The law requires that the search be incidental to
a lawful arrest. Therefor,e it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person
and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.

Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the
search. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. An arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Even casting aside
the petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez
before conducting the search on him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only after the discovery by
SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. What happened in this case was that a search
was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the
search.
Saraum v. People
GR 205472, January 25, 2016

Facts: Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The Information reads that on the 17th day of August, 2006, 12:45 A.M. in Cebu, the
said accused, with deliberate intent, and without being authorized by law, did then and there have
in his possession 1 lighter, 1 rolled up tissue paper, 1 aluminum tin foil, which are instruments
and/or equipments intended for administering any dangerous drug into the body.
Saraum, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon
testified that a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in
Barangay Lorega, Cebu. A buy-bust team was then formed against a certain “pata”. PO1 Aniñon
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house,
which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter
Espcranza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot
session. PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items. Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense.
He testified that on the date and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way
to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were already with
"Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors.

Issue: WON the arrest of Saraum was valid without a search warrant.
Ruling: Yes. Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime. In arrest in flagrante delicto,
the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him while they were in the
course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding
arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of
the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence
at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to
have "countless, lawful uses."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRICO BRIONES BADILLA, August 31, 2016
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On Sepmtember
2010, PO2 Paras received a phone call from a concerned citizen informing him that someone was
indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA Compound. PO2 Paras and his companions responded to the call
and saw a man, later identified as appellant Enrico Briones Badilla, standing along the alley. Appellant
was suspiciously in the act of pulling or drawing something from his pocket; thus, as a precautionary
measure, and thinking that a concealed weapon was inside his pocket, PO2 Paras immediately introduced
himself as a police officer, held appellant's arm, and asked the latter to bring out his hand from his pocket.
It turned out that appellant was holding a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras
confiscated the plastic sachet from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him.

ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE EXISTING DOUBT AND PATENT
ILLEGALITY WHICH ATTENDED HIS ARREST

HELD:
No. On the first error, appellant argues that there was no basis for his apprehension because there
was no prior knowledge that he was the suspect in the alleged indiscriminate firing incident and that there
was no mention that he executed an overt act reflecting any intention to commit a crime. However, in any
event, appellant was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant
in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Such arrest is
commonly known as in flagrante delicto. 2 requisites to be valid.

We emphasize that the series of events that led the police officers to the place where appellant
was when he was arrested was triggered by a phone call from a concerned citizen that someone was
indiscriminately firing a gun in the said place. Under the circumstances, the police officers did not have
enough time to secure a warrant considering the "time element" involved in the process. To obtain a
warrant would be impossible to contain the crime. In view of the urgency of the matter, the police officers
proceeded to the place. There, PO2 Paras saw appellant, alone in an alley which used to be a busy place,
suspiciously in the act of pulling something from his pocket. Appellant's act of pulling something from
his pocket constituted an overt manifestation in the mind of PO2 Paras that appellant has just committed
or is attempting to commit a crime. There was, therefore, sufficient probable cause for PO2 Paras to
believe that appellant was, then and there, about to draw a gun from his pocket considering the report he
received about an indiscriminate firing in the said place. Probable cause means an actual belief or
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or about to be committed.

Thinking there was a concealed weapon inside appellant's pocket and as precautionary measure,
PO2 Paras (who was three or four meters away from appellant) immediately introduced himself as a
police officer, held appellant's arm, and asked the latter to pull his hand out. Incidentally, appellant was
holding a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras then confiscated the plastic
sachet from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him. When an accused is
caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized, but are duty- bound, to arrest him
even without a warrant. And considering that appellant's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful.
ELMER G. SINDAC @ "TAMER," v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Sindac of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. The Philippine National Police, Real, Quezon (PNP Real), conducted surveillance operations on
Sindac's alleged drug trade. PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis saw Sindac meet with a certain Alladin Cañon
who sold and handed over a plastic sachet to him. Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, PO3
Peñamora and PO1 Asis rushed to the scene and introduced themselves as police officers. Cañon escaped
but the policemen were able to apprehend Sindac. When ordered to empty his pocket, Sindac brought out
his wallet which contained a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After initially
determining that such substance is shabu, the policemen arrested Sindac and brought him to the police
station. There, Sindac's arrest was recorded, the seized item was marked in Sindac's presence, and a
request for chemical test was prepared. A laboratory examination later confirmed that the plastic sachet
seized from Sindac contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in the lower courts.

ISSUE: WON Sindac’s conviction for violation of article 11 of RA 9135 should be upheld?

HELD:
No. The appeal of Sindac is meritorious. In this case, the Court finds that there could have been
no lawful warrantless arrest made on the person of Sindac. Based on the records, the arresting officer,
PO3 Peñamora, himself admitted that he was about five (5) to ten (10) meters away from Sindac and
Cañon when the latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet to the former.

Considering that PO3 Peñamora was at a considerable distance away from the alleged criminal
transaction (five [5] to ten [10] meters), not to mention the atomity of the object thereof (0.04 gram of
white crystalline substance contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it highly doubtful that said
arresting officer was able to reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to prompt him
to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, thereupon, a warrantless search. These similar
circumstances were availing in the cases of Comerciante v. People and People v. Villareal where the
Court likewise invalidated the in flagrante delcito arrest and ensuing warrantless search. In this relation, it
should also be pointed out that no criminal overt act could be properly attributed to Sindac so as to rouse
any reasonable suspicion in the mind of either PO3 Peñamora or PO1 Asis that Sindac had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sindac's actuations of talking to and later
on, receiving an unidentified object from Cañon, without more, should not be considered as ongoing
criminal activity that would render proper an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Based on the foregoing, it is, in fact, quite perceivable that PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis had
proceeded to apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from previous surveillance
operations conducted on Sindac's alleged drug dealing activities. Advancing to a warrantless arrest based
only on such information, absent circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer's "personal
knowledge" as described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5,
Rule 113. It is settled that "reliable information" alone - even if it was a product of well-executed
surveillance operations - is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. It is further required that the
accused performs some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, which, as already discussed, is missing in the instant case.

Verily, warrantless arrests conducted without this indispensable requisite, personal

knowledge, should be struck down as unlawful, as in this case.
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON.
BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon
Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued. Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two
(2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police
station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing
trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested
without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests. Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to
the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the
police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none
had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no
lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception
to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

ISSUE: WON a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner
Go

HELD:
No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7.”

Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however, constitute “personal
knowledge.”

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
Section 2
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit

People v Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701 (1994)

Main Point: The law requires “personal knowledge”. Obviously, “personal gathering of information” is
different from personal knowledge. The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission
of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.

Facts: Alfaro, a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His
drinking companions, Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. Patrolman
Perez arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the accused
and the victim. Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio wristwatch said to
belong to Alfaro, without a warrant and without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel.

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest is valid

Ruling: No. The warrantless arrest was invalid. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have “personal knowledge” nor was the
offense “in fact just been committed.”

While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is
not enough. The law requires “personal knowledge”. Obviously, “personal gathering of information” is
different from personal knowledge. The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission
of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which
the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of
real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the Constitution, still
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 2
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit

People v Don Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)

Facts: NARCOM (Narcotics Command) agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information
that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were
given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain
Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later
identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made
a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of
the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The
accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained
and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of Don Rodrigueza is valid

Ruling: No. The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the
qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling
marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual
exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the
situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search
warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view.

The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put
under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes
the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited
drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in
the house of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion
to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti
of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to
do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted.
Section 2
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit

People v Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 [GR 74189, 26 May 1993]

Facts:
A buy-bust team of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio
Abugatal. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who
was himself to pose as the buyer. Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked money representing
payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned 10 minutes later with a
wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him
under arrest and confiscated the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be
marijuana.
Upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where
he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as
the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen immediately arrested him. They found in the right
front pocket of his trousers the marked money.
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession. Enrile refused to make any statement
pending consultation with a lawyer. They were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act by the
RTC of QC. The RTC found Enrile and Abugatal guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to
life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00. Both appealed. Abugatal, however, was killed in an attempted
jailbreak and thus the appeal is dismissed as to him.

Issue:. W/N the warrantless arrest of Enrile is valid

Ruling: No. It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the
marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he
did lead the policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even
assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.

Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable.
Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house
had no personal knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana.

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information
supplied by Abugatal and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful,
arrest Enrile.
149. PEOPLE v CUBCUBIN, GR 136267, OCTOBER 2, 2001

FACTS: At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, the Cavite City Police Station has receiveda telephone
call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City.
For this reason, a police team composed of SPO1 Malinao Jr. , PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy Jr., PO3 Manicio and SPO3
Manalo responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle. A tricycle driver, who
refused to divulge his name, then told PO3 Rosal that the accused-appellant and the victim were last seen together
coming out of the Sting Café, located about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Danet Garcellana,
a food server/ waitress at the said café told the police investigators that she had seen the accused arrive together
with the victim however she did not know if they left together. Garcellano described the accused-appellant in
which then another tricycle driver told the investigators that he knows a person that fits the description given by
the waitress and told them where his house is. As they went to the house and upon entering, SPO1 Malinao
noticed a “bloodied” white Hanes t-shirt. As he picked up the shirt, two(2) spent .38 caliber shells fell. As they
proceeded the search, PO3 Estoy found on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom a homemade
Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver and five live ammunitions. The police station then took custody of Cubcubin
and the evidences found. After an evaluation of the evidence, a formal criminal complaint was then filed against
the accused-appellant. The trial court convicted the accused-appellant guilty as charged for murder.

ISSUES: Whether or not the arrest of the accused- appellee was valid.
Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged incriminating evidences was valid and legal.

RULING: Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended points out the three
instances when warrantless arrest is lawful. The case at bar, falls under par. B Sec. 5 which provides that for a
warrantless arrest to be valid, two conditions must concur: first, the offender has just committed an offense and
second, the arresting peace officer has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it. It has been held that “personal knowledge of facts” in an arrest without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable ground for suspicion. In this case, the arrest of
the accused-appellant was shortly after the victim was killed. The question therefore, is whether there was
“probable cause” for the arresting officer to believe that the accused committed the crime. The court found none.
The arresting officers did not have ‘personal knowledge of the facts as their knowledge of the circumstance from
which they allegedly inferred that the accused was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told
by others. They merely relied on information given to them by others.
As to the validity of the search and seizure, even assuming that the warrantless arrest to be valid as the
prosecution contends, the search cannot be considered incidental thereto. A valid warrantless search incidental
to a valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested
or within the area of his immediate control. It is clear that the warrantless arrest cannot be justified on this
ground for neither the t-shirt nor the gun were within the area of accused-appellants control. Nor the warrantless
search is justified under the “plain-view doctrine”. The alleged evidences against the accused did not merely
stumble upon the police officers as such they are purposely sought it. Hence the things obtained as a result of the
search are illegal and are inadmissible evidence against the Cubcubin.
150. PEOPLE v GERENTE, 219 SCRA 756

FACTS: The case is all about killing of certain person Clarito Blace by the appellant that was arrested by the
police force. Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought.
He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture
of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal
Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There
they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed
by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as
one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then
sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The
dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination.

ISSUE: Is the arrest valid?

RULING: 'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace.
They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments
of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente,
as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death
of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without a warrant.
151. PADILLA v CA, GR 121917, MARCH 12, 1997

FACTS: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf
a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: (1) .357 caliber
revolver with 6 live ammunition; (2) M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo; (3) .380 pietro beretta with 8
ammo; (4) 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver. Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His
arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On
Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles
City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision
and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was
denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a
complete turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal.

ISSUE: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

RULING: No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no
warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan
Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure—a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When
caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioner’s warrantless arrest
was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no
supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because
arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property
is valid:
- Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless
arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police
who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly
found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)
- Search of moving vehicle
- Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be
searched must be within arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that
curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea.
People v. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1

FACTS: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such
as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by
the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur.

From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly
a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house
searched.

Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias
Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and
claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged
extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his
family.

He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding
the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

ISSUE: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
several NPA-related documents are lawful.

RULING: NO. Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the
information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them is unlawful.
The trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of
aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act,he was plowing his field. It is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or
actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The
test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

People v. Sucro

FACTS: Pat Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison Sucro
(Accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house.
Accused was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported
through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later
identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police
officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was
intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical Center. Macabante saw the police
and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from
accused in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested accused at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel
and another teabag from Macabante.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest made without warrant is lawful

RULING: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec.
12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched from
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without
a search warrant. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However, warrantless search and seizures are legal as long as Probable Cause existed. The police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of
the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are
regularly in performance of their duties
People v. Briones – 202 SCRA 708

FACTS: The accused-appellants are questioning their conviction by the RTC of robbery with double
homicide. The contend that the trial court erred in holding that the crime committed is robbery with
double homicide despite insufficiency of evidence, in not holding that the evidence obtained against
them is inadmissible for violation of their constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and against
self-incrimination during custodial investigation, and in not holding that their guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. They likewise argue that their arrest was illegal for having been made without
a warrant.

ISSUE: WON the court erred without considering the validity of the arrest.

RULING: The constitutional rights of the appellants to remain silent and to counsel, the same cannot be
held to have been violated. It is not disputed that the appellants were investigated by the police.
However, it is important to note that the confession, admission or evidence obtained from the appellants
was never offered in evidence by the prosecution. on appellants' claim that since their warrantless arrest
is void, all the other proceedings, including their conviction, are also void, We find such claim undeserving
of merit. It is unequivocally clear that no valid arrest was made on the accused-appellants, the arrest
having been made without any warrant at all. Neither can the appellants' arrest qualify as lawful arrest
without a warrant under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because the police
officer effected the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed the crime. It is eyewitnesses Francisco who had such personal knowledge. In
like manner, we cannot accept appellee's allegation that Briones was a fugitive from justice at the time
of the latter's arrest because it is not supported by the evidence on record. In sum, therefore, the
warrantless arrest of the appellants is illegal. Nevertheless, such unavailing technicality cannot render all
the other proceedings, including the conviction of the appellants, void. It cannot deprive the state of its
right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.
People v Alvario
275 SCRA 529

FACTS:
On January 29, 1993, Esterlina Quintero (Ester), a 29-year old girl, took her time off as a
housekeeper at Pasong Tirad,Makati, to look for another place of employment. Ester was accepted
by Armando Alvario as a cook and a laundress in Bel-Air Subdivision. Alvario was just a caretaker
of the house. Based on Ester’s testimony, Alvario raped her by pointing a gun at her in the
maids’quarter. Also, she testified that Alvario did not allow her to go out of the house and to use
the telephone.
On January 28, she had phoned her sister and subsequently, her sister and four Makati
police came to the house in Bel-Air. When Alvario and Ester opened the door, she pointed at
Alvario and said that he raped her. Alvario was arrested immediately.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of Alvario is valid.

RULING:
No. The arrest of Alvario violated his constitutional r i ght aga i ns t
war r an t l ess ar rest s . A person can be arrested even without a warrant when an offense
ha s i n f ac t be e n co mmi t t e d a nd t he pol i c e ma n making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the
personal knowledge of the arresting officers was culled from the information supplied by
the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his
arrest.
Larranaga v CA
287 SCRA 521

FACTS:
On September 15, 1997, some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest
petitioner without a warrant.
Petitioner resisted the arrest and immediately phoned his sister and brother-in-law.
Petitioner’s sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit who had dissuaded the police
officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest over the phone. He proposed to meet with them
at the CIG headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The police officers yielded and returned to
the CIG headquarters. Petitioner, together with his sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG
headquarters aboard their own vehicle.
Atty. Armovit questioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer
Ruben Zacarias. After consulting with his superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the
arrest and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an undertaking in writing that he
and petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for
preliminary investigation. Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without
the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must
be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However, pendi ng t he re
s o l ut ion o f th e Co u rt fo r th e pe titio n fo r c ertiora ri, p roh ib itio n and mandamus
with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge
issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.

ISSUE:
WON the arrest of Petitioner Larranaga without a warrant was legal?

RULING:
No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace officer or a
private person. To be sure, even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest
would still be illegal because of the absence of a warrant. It does not appear in the case at bar that
petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense when
the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, petitioner was attending
classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that time.
People v Olivarez
GR 77865, December 4, 1998

FACTS:
Danilo Arellano was found to have killed Mr. Sy and his father in the business
establishment (Cardinal Plastic Industries) where he was working. It was found out that after the
incident, appellant Arellano, a regular worker in the establishment had not yet reported for work.
Melchor Salle, cousin of Arellano volunteered to bring the investigating officers to Arellano.
Salle was able to secure information from a friend of Arellano, Appellant Olivarez, Jr. who
accompanied them to find Arellano who was then invited to police station after he admitted
his participation.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Marcelo said that he conducted an investigation on the person of
Rafael Olivarez. Marcelo apprised him of his constitutional rights but Olivarez declined any
assistance of a lawyer during the investigation.
On direct appeal, the appellants who were imprisoned, sought their acquittal on the ground
that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest made without warrant was lawful.

RULING:
No, none of the 3 exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest concurred such as (1) when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is absent to commit an offense in
his presence; (2) when the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (3) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgement
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
At the time appellants were apprehended, 2 days had already lapsed after the discovery of
the crime they were not doing nor had just done any criminal act.
Cadua v CA

Facts A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify
the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached said place, they met up with the
complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers invitation, both mother and
daughter boarded the mobile unit to join them in conducting a search of the nearby area. The accused
was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of complainants, he was identified as a
logical suspect in the offense just committed. Po3 Burdeos and companions reported to a hold up
incident in North Fairview. They asked the victim and received the explanation of who were the culprits.
They saw 2 men and were armed. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued, resulting in his conviction. Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based
on probable cause and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to his
arrest.

Issue: Won the arrest in a pursuit of a criminal without warrant is valid

Ruling: yes. Both the trial and appellate courts, according to respondents, found that at the time that
petitioner was arrested, the police officers had probable cause to arrest him based on the information
which was given by the complainants. Petitioner Cadua and his companion, Aguilar, were positively
identified by both complainants (mother and daughter) as the perpetrators of the robbery even before
the police officers alighted from the car to approach petitioner and his companion, according to
respondents. When the police officers effected the arrest, they already had probable cause and personal
knowledge that petitioner was a suspect in an offense just committed. As a logical consequence,
according to respondents, the search incidental to the arrest is valid, and the revolver recovered
admissible in evidence

It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts, in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may
pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any
crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable
man in believing the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later
found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace officer might arrest and
detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground
to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would
be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to
mislead the officer. The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about the
streets and uninhabited premises at midnight.
People v Cubcubin

Facts:

Someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of
August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city;
by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet
Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean,
mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a
tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano
fitted accused-appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and
accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house,
he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the brand name "Hanes" (Exh. H)9 and the name "Dhenvher" written
in the inner portion of the shirt's hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close
examination, he said that he found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38
caliber shells fell from it. There, accused-appellant was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the
victim's companion. The police investigators asked accused-appellant where the fatal gun was. Accused-
appellant was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed (Exh. B-3)15 along with the
things seized from him. After an evaluation of the evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for
murder against accused-appellant. He took blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the
NBI for laboratory examination.16 Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26,
1997 without a warrant, was illegal.

Issue: Won an arrest without personal knowledge that a criminal committed the act is valid

Ruling: No Under §5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the
offender has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held
that "'personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In this case, the arrest of accused-
appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was
"probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-
appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. The two did not have "personal
knowledge of facts" indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based
entirely on what they had been told by others, Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on
information given to them by others it was held that the policemen, not having “personal knowledge” of
facts indicating that the accused committed the crime, the arrest was invalid.
People v. Compacion

FACTS:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando Compacio y Surposa
was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the
6thNarcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment
conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion who was then the barangay captain of barangay
Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on 9 July 1995. -

During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the backyard of Compacion which they suspected
to be marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4
Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, On 12 July 1995, the team applied for a search
warrant with the office of Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge
Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The team then
left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around 6:30 p.m., then went to the house of
Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so because it
was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge to go back in the
morning. Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of
Compacion in the early morning of 13 July 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for
Compacion. The prosecution contends that Compacion opened the gate and permitted them to come
in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted
that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4
Villamor then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425 and informed him
of his constitutional rights.

ISSUE

W/N Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.

HELD:

Yes. Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards against reckless, malicious
and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the constitutional provision. Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a
warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the conduct of a search and seizure
is, however, not absolute. There are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as
when the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of the
premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it
is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws.
Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA

Facts:

Upon the request of the Chancellor of UP Diliman, the NBI sent agents to the university and tried to
arrest two members of a fraternity who were identified by two witnesses as responsible for the killing of
a member of another fraternity.

Issue: WON the attempt to arrest was valid.

Ruling:

No. The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission
of the crime. NBI agents had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two
students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of
two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI. Their
attempt to arrest them without a warrant was illegal.

"Personal knowledge" of facts means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406

Facts:

When Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed
Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up where the
other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene
Araneta. After which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime.

A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with
the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket,
told the police authorities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the
four men scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert
Blanco, were apprehended.

Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with
bullets. The line of defense the accused have adopted is one of denial. Tirso Acol escaped from
detention during the trial, thus obviating any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had
appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be considered as having abandoned his appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid arrest.

Ruling:

Yes. It falls within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest that an offense has in fact been committed,
and the one has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; Inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been
robbed.

Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the
robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
People v. Rabang – 187 SCRA 682

Facts:
Victor Boban, then 18 years of age and a cargador at the Asuncion Market, Tondo, Manila, testified that
he saw his friend, the victim Henry Cortez, also a cargador, stabbed him from behind with a fan knife at
the base or nape of the neck.

In December 1984, he executed a statement there (Exhibit E) asked by the police investigators to
identify the assailant from a group of about ten (10) detention prisoners. He pointed out the appellant
to the police as the person who had stabbed Henry Cortez. The Assistant Fiscal of Manila filed against
the Rabang an information for the crime of murder.

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a
decision finding the appellant guilty of murder.

Appellant assails the legality of his arrest by the police investigators allegedly for the reason that it "was
based solely on the basis of the tip and say-so from a telephone informant ... refused to identify himself.
He claimed that he was arrested and exposed to accusatorial proceedings without being informed of his
constitutional rights.

Issue: WON the arrest against Rabang is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court considers that appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. An
examination of the record reveals that this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant before this
Court. He had not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus,
any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty "and [by] participating in the trial.

Appellant's claim that he was arrested and exposed to accusatorial proceedings without being informed
of his constitutional rights, has not been substantiated. The booking and information sheet and progress
report marked as Exhibits "G" and "I" respectively, which were prepared by the police investigators
explicitly stated that appellant had been properly informed of his constitutional rights. In fact, after he
was informed of his constitutional rights, appellant chose to remain silent and requested the assistance
of counsel. It has not been asserted that appellant gave a confession, judicial or extrajudicial, oral or
written.
People v. Lopez
246 SCRA 95

FACTS:
Paras, Edgardo Castro and Jesus Reyes went to the Barangay Hall to file acomplaint against Mario Lopez
who reportedly rained stones on the house of Evelyn Paras. While they were at the Barangay Hall,
appellant Leonardo Lopez who is the brother of Mario Lopez suddenly appeared behind them and in a
swift and sudden motion, stabbed Jesus Reyes at the back with the use of a knife. After the first attack,
Edgardo Castro told Jesus Reyes to run even as he searched for a piece of wood with which to parry the
blows of Lopez. Suddenly, Edgardo Castro was also struck at the back. He lost consciousness. In the
meantime, Jesus Reyes fled and ran for his life as he was being pursued by the appellant. He then fell on
the ground face down. As he was trying to stand, appellant stabbed him at the back for a second time.
Appellant thereafter sped towards the market at Onyx Street in San Andres, Manila. Both Edgardo
Castro and Jesus Reyes were rushed to the Philippine General Hospital treatment. Unfortunately, Jesus
Reyes expired. His family spent four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) for his burial. After the incident,
appellant went into hiding and was not heard of or seen in the neighborhood until seven (7)months later
when Evelyn Paras saw him at his house. She called the police and the appellant was promptly arrested.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest was valid.

HELD:
YES.
It is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-
appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment,
participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the
first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this
ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
Velasco v. CA
245 SCRA 677

FACTS
Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the NBI a complaint-affidavit accusing Lawrence Larkins of the
crime of rape allegedly committed against her. Acting on the basis of the, petitioners proceeded to the
office of Larkins in Makati and arrested the latter then detained. Larkins was able to post his bail. Judge
Padolina forthwith issued an order setting aside the warrant of arrest.A complaint against Larkins for
rape was executed again. It contains a certification by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor that it is "filed
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not
having opted to avail of his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant
to Article 125 of the RPC. . . ."
Larkins, filed a Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based
on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. The trial court denied the aforesaid motions. The
petitioners claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid
RULING
No
Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting officers failed
to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule
112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered
to the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged
being punishable by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is
a police station and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at
Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23
November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in
court.
People v. Buluran
325 SCRA 476

FACTS

Dominador Meyer, Jr., had an altercation with a cousin during a birthday party. The victim, Edilberto
Meyer, Sr., tried to pacify them,bringing Dominador outside to cool-off. While the two were talking,
Reynaldo Danao warned them not to make any trouble. Suddenly, Reynaldo boxed the victim who also
retaliated with a fistblow. Reynaldo managed to run away but returned, accompanied by his barkadas or
gangmates (Cielito Buluran, Leonardo Valenzuela and Jaime Danao), They were armed. Without
warning, Reynaldo stabbed the victim. They fled the scene. The victim died

After amending the information, of the four suspected perpetrators of the crime, only two were
arrested and tried. During trial, the prosecution presented testimonies of three eyewitnesses to the
stabbing incident. An appeal was as follows “the court erred in convicting the appellants who instead
are entitled to acquittal on grounds of violation of their constitutional rights and procedural rights to
due process which divested the court of jurisdiction.” Appellants argue that their warrantless arrest and
the lack of preliminary investigation render the criminal proceedings against them illegal for violation of
their constitutional rights.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was an irregularity in the arrest.

RULING
NO
Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they never raised
this issue before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the
records, show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during the custodial investigation.
Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases
in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction. In this case, the basis of the conviction by the trial court was the testimonies of the three
eyewitnesses, Artemio Avendao, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria Castillo. It is noteworthy that appellants
never attempted to impeach their testimonies during trial. Neither do they assail the credibility of said
witnesses on appeal.
Atty. Humberto Basco vs PAGCOR
Facts:
In 1997, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casionos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869, which provides that it shall regulate
and centralize all games of change authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Petitioner h
ere contented that PD1869 is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause for
the reason that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Issue:
Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
Held:
No. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be comfortable
to Article 3, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.
The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The Landoil Group of Companies who was led by Jose De Venecia Jr,. was able to obtain
foreign loans syndicated by various banks. These foreign loans was guaranteed by
PHILGUARANTEE. Congressman De Venecia’s group of companies was unable to seasonably
service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANEE to assume its obligation as
guarantor. In, ESDA resolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power. PCGG was
created to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses including their family, subordinates, and
close relatives. A case was filed against the De Venecia, Bondoc and et al. However, Bondoc’s
complaint or case was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation on the equal protection clause the dismissal of the
complaint to Bondoc.
Held:

No.

One final point.

The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. De Venecia Jr, and the respondents Bondoc and company
are similarly situated. Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they
allegedly gave unwarranted favors to De Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter’s foreign loans.
When petitioner admitted that no undue favour was granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such
guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against respondents Bondoc and company. To give
a more favoured treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to
indulge in invidious discrimination.
Himagan vs People
Facts:
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catitigan, Davao City. He was charged with
attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47, of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. This law provides that if there is a complaint against a member of PNP for grave
felonies the penalty is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend
the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial
and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan
questioned the suspension because under Sec 47 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claimed that the imposition of preventive
suspension over ninety (90) days is contrary to Civil Service Law and is a violation of his
constitutional right of equal protection of the laws.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection clause.
Held:
NO. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to
his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.