PALE CASES SET 3 is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the

is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of
the case of his client.
1. Montecillo vs Gica
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented
Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even 2. IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the GUTIERREZ
adjudged moral damages.

Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed
the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat
against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly
rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that
the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
Facts:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. In a criminal case he
was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
was sentenced to the penalty of death.

The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court.
Upon review the judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the penalty was changed
Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a
to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
conditional pardon.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President
of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not The widow of the victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court
reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise
agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended …as attorney
Atty. Del Mar from practice. by …by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well morals.
as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del
Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who
voted against him. Issue:

The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of
disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had the rule on disbarment aforecited.
he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would
have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also Ruled:
intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice”.
No. The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission to the bar the Rules of Court not only
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended. prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
The lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant.
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
3. [G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998]
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the
flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, petitioners, vs. HON.
both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation COURT OF APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the
registered owner of a parcel of land in Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City. Private
respondent obtained a P4,000,000.00 loan from the China Banking Corporation and
mortgaged the property to said bank. Private respondent signed and executed a Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage covering the property in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano
and Felicidad L. Oronce.
In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondent’s indebtedness with the bank. However, private
respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the premises to petitioners upon
the expiration of the one-year period from April 13, 1992. Almost six months later since the
execution of the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused the registration of the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds. Simultaneously, they
obtained a new title consistent with the fact that they are the new owners of the property and
paid the real estate taxes on the property. Petitioners sent private respondent a demand letter
asking it to vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three other consecutive notices sent
through the Quezon City post office, was unclaimed. Hence petitioners filed before the MTC,
a complaint for unlawful detainer against private respondent.
However, during the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, private respondent filed an
urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Eduardo B.
Flaminiano, in contempt of court. The motion was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo
Gonzales who resided at the contested property. Gonzales alleged that petitioner Flaminiano
and her husband entered the property through craftiness and intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m.
on that day, two 2 men knocked at the gate. When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened
the gate for pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that they would like to visit
Gonzales’ mother who was ailing. Once inside, the two men identified themselves as
policemen and opened the gate for 20 men, two 2 trucks and an L-300 van to enter. It turned
out to be the brother of petitioner Flaminiano. That person said, “Kami ang may-ari dito.
Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas.” After Gonzales had told him that the
property was still under litigation before the Court, the man said, “Walang Supreme Court –
Supreme Court.” When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises, to
order the people to leave, she said, “Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin ito. Maglalagay ako
ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap.” When a power generator was
brought inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it
would create would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner Flaminiano said,
“Walang awa-awa sa akin.” Atty. Flaminiano butted in and, referring to Gonzales’ mother,
said, “Ialis mo na, matanda na pala.” When Gonzales prevented the switching on of some
lights in the house due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano suggested, “Bakit hindi mo ipasunog
ito? May insurance pa kayo 5 million, madali lang ‘yan. Short circuit.” Since the Flaminianos
and their crew were not about to leave the property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty.
Antonio Gonzales, and informed him of what happened. However, instead of confining
themselves in the driveway, the Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in
food.
Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had just been
discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed until the next day, September
22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in the house. Gonzales took pictures of
Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty. Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales and
told him, “Hindi ako natatakot kahit kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court,
gusto ko nga mag-reklamo kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting dito,
gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito.”
In its supplemental motion[45] to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband, Atty.
Flaminiano, in contempt of court, private respondent alleged that the Flaminianos committed
additional contumacious acts in preventing another member of the family, Mrs. Cipriana
Gonzales, from entering the property. In her affidavit, Mrs. Gonzales said that the
Flaminianos and their people used “the whole house, except the bedrooms, for their filming
activities.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Eduardo Flaminiano’s actions were unbecoming of a lawyer.
HELD: Yes.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as alleged by
private respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On an erroneous
assumption that she had been legally vested with ownership of the property, she took steps
prior to the present proceedings by illegally taking control and possession of the same property
in litigation. Her act of entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.
Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband, Eduardo
Flaminiano, a lawyer whose actuations as an officer of the court should be beyond reproach.
His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore property without the consent of its occupants
and in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals and making utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court, are certainly
unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his comment on the
motion for contempt that petitioners “peacefully” took over the property. Nonetheless, such
“peaceful” take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew
was still in force. Notably, he did not comment on nor categorically deny that he committed
the contumacious acts alleged by private respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano has
flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting “activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.”
Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the writ
of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and accordingly fined P20,000.00 therefor. Her
counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, is ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for
committing contumacious acts unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely.
4. G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU
CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Ysasi III was employed by his father, herein private respondent Ysasi, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. His employment as
farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light,
power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses. As farm administrator, petitioner was
responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm, and for
this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there. After his
marriage, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He
suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions. During the entire
periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and
petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice,
private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands
for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from private respondent's auditor
and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not
acted upon. Petitioner then filed an action with the NLRC against private respondent for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of
full back wages, 13th month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees. The NLRC dismissed the case, holding that petitioner abandoned his
work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private
respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice
of said termination of employment to the DOLE
Issues:
1.) WON petitioner De Ysasi III abandoned his work
2.) WON the counsel of both parties exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts
Held:
1.) The SC ruled in the negative. The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
employee are as follows: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie. There are significant
indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his
decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and
strained family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health.
Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter informing private respondent of his intention
to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.
2.) The SC ruled in the negative. The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as
revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may
well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much
their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of
a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising
settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than
for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary,
their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as
they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been
less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall
exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If
he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in
this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
5. PAJARES V. ABAD SANTOS
G.R. No. L-29543 November 29, 1969
Teehankee, J.
FACTS:
Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for
recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was eventually assigned to the sala of the
respondent Judge Abad Santos. instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares,
however, moved for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam
Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said
company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as
their purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues
raised in the complaint. After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria
Pajares for a bill of particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the
said court, she then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
alleging in support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pajares’ lawyer faithfully adhered to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay"
HELD:
NO.
The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging
of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
This simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven
years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask
from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the
expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance,
premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief,
and attorney's fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to
appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated
interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this
worthless cause. "the circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is
frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such
attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote
to meritorious cases." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an analogous case)
6. People vs. Rosqueta
G.R. No. L-36138 January 31, 1974
FACTS:
Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio was the counsel of appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr.,
Eugenio Rosqueta and Citong Bringas. Atty. Estacio was required by the Court to show cause
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file the brief for
appellants within the period. He failed to show cause as required, thus, the Court suspended
him from the practice of law except for the purpose of filing the brief. Atty. Estacio then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration where he explained that he did actually prepare an explanation
the same being left with Antonio Rosqueta Sr, father of the appellants Antonio and Eugenio,
for the latter to mail it. But then Rosqueta Sr.’s house burned down together with the
explanation. He only came to know of this fact when he was preparing for the Motion for
Reconsideration.
He stressed that the appellants wished to withdraw their appeal as they could not
raise the money needed for pursuing it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Estacio should continue
HELD:
NO. His liability is mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the irresponsible
conduct of which he is guilty. Atty. Estacio should be aware that even in those cases where
counsel de parte is unable to secure from appellants or from their near relatives the amount
necessary to pursue the appeal, which does not necessarily conclude his connection with the
case. He should be aware that in the pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a
client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough
that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in
this case is inexcusable. At any rate, the suspension meted on him under the circumstances is
more than justified. It seems, however, that well-nigh five months had elapsed. That would
suffice to atone for his misdeed.
WHEREFORE, The suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The
requirement to file the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for
negligence and inattention to duty.
7. G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL,
JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and
LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages
to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987
but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the 15 day period for appeal cannot be extended.
HELD:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
A line of Jurisprudence explain:
“In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of
the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as
yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within
the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.”
In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.
8.[Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30(1998)]
G.R. No. 130068. October 1, 1998.*
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 130150. October 1, 1998.*
MANILA PILOTS’ ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier.
The Philippine Ports Authority(PPA) filed a complaint for a sum of money against FESC,
Capt. Gavino (assigned by MPA as FESC’s compulsory pilot) and the Manila Pilots’
Association (MPA) praying that the defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to
pay. The trial court ruled in favour of the PPA which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Neither FESC nor MPA was happy with the decision of the Court of Appeals and both of them
elevated their respective complaints via separate petitions for review on certiorari.
Upon motion by FESC in G.R. No. 130150, said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 130068.
The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario through its associate, Atty.
Herbert A. Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC in both G.R. No. 130068 and G.R. No.
130150.
Issue:
Whether the counsel for FESC disregarded his undertaking under the Rules of Court
concerning the certification against forum shopping by not informing the court of any similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
Held: Yes
Inasmuch as MPA’s petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by registered mail on August 29,
1997 and taking judicial notice of the average period of time it takes local mail to reach its
destination, by reasonable estimation it would be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its
petition in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have received a copy of
the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the other petition initially filed
with the First Division. It was therefore incumbent upon FESC to inform the Court of that fact
through its certification against forum shopping. For failure to make such disclosure, it would
appear that the aforequoted certification accompanying the petition in G.R. No. 130068 is
defective and could have been a ground for dismissal thereof.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario,
displays an unprofessional tendency of taking the Rules for granted, in this instance
exemplified by its pro forma compliance therewith but apparently without full comprehension
of and with less than faithful commitment to its undertakings to this Court in the interest of
just, speedy and orderly administration of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.26 He is an officer of the court exercising a privilege which is indispensable in the
administration of justice.27 Candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.28 Candor in all dealings is the very essence of
honorable membership in the legal profession.29 More specifically, a lawyer is obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.30 It
behooves a lawyer, therefore, to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.31 Being an officer of the court, a lawyer has a
responsibility in the proper administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument
to advance its ends—the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain
these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
9. Lorenzo Jose vs Court of Appeals
70 SCRA 257 – Legal Ethics – Solicitor General May Recommend Dismissal of a Case in the
Interest of Justice
FACTS:
In February 1968, Lorenzo Jose was caught possessing several firearms and explosives. He
was prosecuted for illegally possessing said firearms and explosives. During trial, he said that
he is authorized to carry the explosives but he cannot present (at that time) his permit hence he
made a reservation to present his evidence at a later time. The trial court acquitted him in the
other cases but convicted him for illegal possession of hand grenade.
He filed a notice of appeal but at the same time asked the trial court for a new trial so that he
may be able to present his new evidence. The trial court denied the request for new trial
because Jose was able to perfect his appeal.
The Court of Appeals likewise denied Jose’s request for a new trial as it ruled that there is no
reversible error committed by the trial court. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration and for
new trial. The Solicitor General opposed the MFR/New Trial as it stated that the evidence
sought to be presented by Jose does not fall under “newly discovered evidence”; that his
permit to possess a hand grenade was supposed to be known to Jose at the time of the trial and
not discovered thereafter.
Undeterred, Jose submitted a reply where he finally indicated he is an undercover agent for the
Philippine Constabulary; that being such, he was authorized to carry firearms and explosives;
that the reason why he did not disclose the same immediately was because of his fear for
reprisals considering that he resides in “Huklandia”; he enclosed a letter from then Major
General Fidel Ramos confirming this fact.
With the foregoing, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation where he recommended the
granting of the new trial – even if the same violates the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Solicitor General is correct.
HELD: Yes. This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the
overriding goal of courts of justice — to render justice where justice is due to secure to every
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.
The Solicitor General embodies the principle that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of
a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while
guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. The recommendation by the Solicitor General
in this case acknowledges that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this
case to the court of origin for a new trial.
10. People v Pineda
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns
(rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside
the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the
house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza and all minor
children of the couple – and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed – Moved for
consolidation.Their plea is that “said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by
one impulse.” The respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal
to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also
ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 “be dropped from the
docket.”
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground
that “more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was
killed.” The defensethen opposed and the judge denied the MR. People then came to the Court
on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
Issue:WON the fiscal was right for filing separate cases. WON he may be compelled by the
Judge on this matter.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly
performed.We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A
prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments
thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. we must have to
recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his
conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may
result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases.
The impact of respondent Judge’s orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the
prosecutor’s on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a
criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who
did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. In the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to
tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder
and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide
and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or,
for that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal’s
discretion should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and
void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made
permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or
whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249
and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.
11. PEOPLE VS MADERA
Prosecutor Must Recommend Dismissal of Case If There is No Ground To Sustain It
In April 1970, while Elino Bana was sleeping, three men barged at the doorstep of his
house. He was then shot by one the men who broke in, namely, Raymundo Madera. Behind
Madera were Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres. Elino Bana died before he could be
brought to the hospital but he made a dying statement wherein he positively identified Madera
as his shooter. Two of Bana’s sons who were at the house when the shooting happened
identified Madera as the shooter as well as the two behind him. The trial court convicted the
three for murder. They appealed. Then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza recommended the
conviction of Madera but also recommended the acquittal of Marianito and Generoso.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is correct.
HELD: No, insofar as Marianito and Generoso is concerned – Madera’s guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. But Marianito’s and Generoso’s guilt were not established. Their
mere presence behind Madera when the latter shot and killed Bana is not constitutive of their
guilt without any showing that they shared the criminal intent of Madera. It must be shown
that they had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated
by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid
thereto whether physical or moral. This was absent in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court lauded the Solicitor General for recommending the acquittal of the two.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the prosecutor’s finest hour is not when he wins a
case with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the
advocate’s natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the
conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only
the guilty and to protect the innocent.
12. G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
JORGE P. TAN, JR. v JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO (Presiding Judge of Circuit
Criminal Court, Tacloban City)
FACTS: The petitioners here are the accused of criminal cases lodged before the court of the
respondent judge. In a special civil action for certiorari with prohibition, the petitioners are
seeking the annulment of the Judge's Orders in denying the petitioner's motion to disqualify
the said judge from hearing their criminal cases and their petition for a transfer to New Bilibid
Prison in Muntilupa from Camp Bumpus PC Headquarters in Tacloban City. This Court issued
a TRO against the respondent judge from further proceeding with the criminal cases of the
petitioners. The petition was subsequently amended to include People of the Philippines and
thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of the People of the Philippines. The Solicitor
General informed this Court, that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were
not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice. Considering the circumstances of the instant
case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on
hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the
oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or
innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and so they
recommend the remand of the criminal cases. However, private prosecutors objected to the
remand of this case. The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear
before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to
that of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the
Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present
proceedings.
RULING: The Court held that the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and
take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General. It appears, however, that
respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not
he should be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has
already become moot. The Court ordered the remand of this case to another trial judge.
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State,
it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution.
The prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. It is for the purpose of realizing these objectives that the prosecution
of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts,
with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense.
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in
control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines
represented by the fiscal.
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the
State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Section 1
of PD No. 478, provides: xxx the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.. It is evident,
therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or
the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that
of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the
Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and
control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled
rules on the matter.
The position taken by SG in recommending the remand of the case to the trial court is not
without any plausible justification. In support of his contention, the SG stated:(a) Respondent
judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in
connection with the decision of the two cases against petitioners; (b) in the latter part of 1973,
with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent judge received, through one of his
court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of
the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal and other evidences showing the
respondent's judge prejudice towards the case.Considering the circumstances of the instant
case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on
hand to support them, the Court felt that respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to
the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt
or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice.
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and
impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. According
to Chief Justice Castro, a judge should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.
Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of mind" and,
consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. It must
be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they
can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.
13. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON anddefendant-appellant.
FACTS: In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is
that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with
Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and
with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged
provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend
"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is
supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's
representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs.
Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor
vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases
paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials
for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have
been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3 contains these
words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available
therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as
filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, certifying that the voucher
has been pre-audited and signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the
provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was
paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary
hereof. " It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of falsicification of public
documents and six crimes of malversation?
HELD: In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled
that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the
falsification and malversation are separate offenses.
The falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime because the
falsifications were not necessary means for the commission of the malversation. Each
falsifications and each malversation constituted independent offense which must be punished
separately.
The overall result is that in these three cases six separate offenses of falsification and six
separate crimes of malversation were committed. appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of
he said twelve offenses. As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification
because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive
public monies from the provincial treasurer. He is a co-principal in the six crimes of
malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses.
A private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is
also guilty of malversation.
14. Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)
Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in
the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan
Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of
his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government
position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or
removal of attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in an
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be
inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety.
Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the
concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal
knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office
held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but
also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that
should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar should
refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for
the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains
unsullied.
15. PCGG v.SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al.
GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.)
“Matter” is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is notthe
“matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then
President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for “reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages” against respondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies of the Marcoses. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed
with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others,
nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments
thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper
disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel
Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the
administration of former President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s
present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the
sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in said service.”
ISSUES:
Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD:
disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General,
Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the
bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot,
by any standard, qualify as reasonable.

The petition is denied.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of “matter” referred to
in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the “intervention” made by the
former government lawyer on the “matter.” The American Bar Association in its Formal
Opinion 342, defined “matter” as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction
or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws,
or briefing abstract principles of law.

Beyond doubt, the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in
the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.” We
hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylightin stressing that the “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law” are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
“matter” and cannot disqualify. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
interventionwhile a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. The evils sought to be remedied by
the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “xx x drafting, enforcing or interpreting governmentor agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.” The petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza
as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation
of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting
Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused
by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the
client to losenot only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the
benefit of the work done by the latter The Court has to consider also the possible adverseeffect
of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government
service. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General
should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this
independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of
their office.

Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive
effect on the rule of law. Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others,
that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot
apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are