G.R. No.

141284 August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO
REYES, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility
patrols around the metropolis.

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the
President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/20001 (the "LOI") which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.2 Task
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum,
dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.3 In the Memorandum, the
President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective
crime prevention program including increased police patrols.4 The President further stated that to heighten police
visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.5 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing
or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.6 Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.7

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:

xxx

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in
the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to
national security.

3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized
syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and
firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP
NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes
specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro
Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-
trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office]
and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the
state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over
Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and
police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing
crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates
is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is
 achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be
organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating,
monitoring and assessing the security situation.

xxx.8

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping
Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
Airport.9

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000
and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE

CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY

REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN

FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5
(4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO

PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY

MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.10

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in law enforcement.

Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,11 dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor
General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.

The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines,
contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is
not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of
police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the
President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3)
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in
the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.13 The
term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.14 The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."15

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and
the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien
to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National
President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the
present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any
specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its
members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the
joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have
been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization"
of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in
the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative
and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and
personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of
the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no
standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy
this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.16 In not a few cases,
the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people.17 Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.18 In this case, a reading of the petition shows that
the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of
calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits
that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated
in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the
Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for
the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to
warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
said troop [Marine] deployment."19

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed
forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which
are beyond the review powers of this Court.

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of
judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the resolution
of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised.
Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the
armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and
order and promotion of the general welfare.20 For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state
of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the
citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos
v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times
when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-
chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.

xxx21

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the President’s power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar
result.

We now address the Solicitor General’s argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary
because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.22 It
pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless,
the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in
instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political
questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the
case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

As Tañada v. Cuenco23 puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of
the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves
then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,24 "[p]rominent
on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on the one question."

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that "(T)he Judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."25 Under this definition, the Court cannot
agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom.26 Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court.27 When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned.28

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.29 Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of
the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.30A
showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry,
for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.31

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner
as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court’s
duty of "purposeful hesitation"32 before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power
is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:

xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where
the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.33 That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully
discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence;
then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated
sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence
by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it
is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first
sentence: "The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by
the First Sentence: "The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead
of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces
of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.34
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion
or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call
out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed
forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given
full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out
the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there
is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the
other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered
judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an
injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion
was gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila..."35 We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the
situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the
areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient
factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
character of the police force.

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts
that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3,
Article II36 of the Constitution.

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.37 Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or
orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines.39 It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers.40 In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.41

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution,
the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually
participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the
patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of
the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction.
The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that
bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:

1. Elections;42

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;43

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;44

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;45

5. Development of the culture and the arts;46

6. Conservation of natural resources;47

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;48

8. Enforcement of customs laws;49

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;50

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;51

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;52

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;53

13. Sanitary inspections;54

14. Conduct of census work;55

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;56

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;57

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.58

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.59 What we have here is
mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic
purposes has persisted,60 and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the
use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those
surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act61 of the US, the use
of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A
provision of the Act states:

§ 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.62

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US
courts63 apply the following standards, to wit:

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner
that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive,
or compulsory64 George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards
for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN
THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law
Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?

xxx
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even
when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some
1âw phi 1

future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is
permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the
Solicitor General:

3. The designation of tasks in Annex A65 does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,66 8(k)67 and 9(a)68of
Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)69 of Annex A, all arrested
persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive
force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)70 of Annex A, are all low impact and
defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory
military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power
for civilian law enforcement.71

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will
gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The
power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it
has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his
authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the President’s
determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained
that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom
and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the
shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Puno, J., see separate opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing, J., joins the opinion of J. Mendoza.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber,
including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party. 1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment
in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and
joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members. 2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. 3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and
injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the
petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments
because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being
the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed
the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered
to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae
in compliance with an order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected
by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House
of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v.
Cuenco. 6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
 discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly nominated. The Senate
then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens
Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon
the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-
man composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court,
contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be
chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could
nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was
an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was
involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the
requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion
of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate
and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in
connection therewith.

... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given
situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such
statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on
constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the
manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the
House in the choice of its representatives.

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be
technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is also
not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a
petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the
Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy
has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held
through Chief Justice Fernando:

In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the
Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained
from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for
an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it.
Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still
rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
 The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now
resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us,
the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being
barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is
an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional
statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.

Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking
the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick review of that
case for a proper disposition of this one.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by
the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on
Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party.
Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made
common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and
reorganize the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on
appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party
colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration Administration
was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was
thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his
appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista
defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were
still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid
because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives
as required by the Constitution. The Court held:

... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does
not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House.
Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift
from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to
thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House
of Congress.

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution
because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of
the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no
different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently
floundered, like the UNIDO.

The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows
reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such
changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no
less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justified his
designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the
Court held:

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority
of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against
members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of
their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the
House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary
number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to
the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the
Constitution.

In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by
the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably simplify the present controversy.
The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not
provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself,
then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP,
 not being a duly registered political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges
granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot
legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. 9

xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the
right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly
registered with the Comelec. 10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission
on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the
petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so
to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence
is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of
Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as
long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category.
That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support
Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal
Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in
the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both
chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its
President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there
have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in
any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a
number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be
considered still temporary because of such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral
Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The
independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the
Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in
the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on
Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from
it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional
election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now
commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact
prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling
the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect,
the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised
may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change
its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has
been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no
alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the
said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret
and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The
Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cows, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

 FISCAL AUTONOMY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her
capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.

A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA April 15, 1992

REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O. REYES, JR. and
GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY PENSION.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly
pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant petition on their
own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
similarly situated.

Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the Treasurer of the Philippines. The
respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials of the Executive Department involved in the
implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the Annual Appropriations Law.

We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the petition on its
merits.

The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:

On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in
any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his
natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957) which provided that:

Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased
or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be
the salary or the retirement pension which a Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-
four had ceased to be such to accept another position in the Government or who retired was
receiving at the time of his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued
prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.

Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Republic Act
No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the occasion of the Armed Forces
Loyalty Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement benefits to the
members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment features of Republic Act No. 1797 and
Republic Act No. 3595.

Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential
Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the
Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of officers and
enlisted men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909 was also
issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have retired
prior to September 10, 1979.

While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number in the tens of
thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a
handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.

Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional
Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act No.
1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under the impression that Presidential Decree 644 became law
after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and
Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said
retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional Commissions, in order
to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequate old age
pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by
worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the petitioner retired Chief Justice, a retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions
of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively.

President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it
would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the
policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to
select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over
those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."

Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez,
Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which we treated as
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of their monthly
pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential Decree 644 repealing
Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tañada v. Tuvera, (136
SCRA 27 [1985]) and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]). Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared
for the first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly dated April 4,
1977 but published only on September 5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect of
law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.

In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request. The dispositive portion reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O.
Reyes and Guardson Lood are GRANTED. It is hereby AUTHORIZED that their monthly pensions
be adjusted and paid on the basis of RA 1797 effective January 1, 1991 without prejudice to the
payment on their pension differentials corresponding to the previous years upon the availability of
funds for the purpose.

Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain
appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:

XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY

A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.

For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts, adjudication

of constitutional questions appealed and other cases, operation and maintenance of the Judicial and
Bar Council in the Supreme Court, and the adjudication of regional court cases, metropolitan court
cases, municipal trial court cases in Cities, municipal circuit court cases, municipal, court cases,
Shari'a district court cases and Shari'a circuit court cases as indicated hereunder P2,095,651,000

xxx xxx xxx

Special Provisions.

1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriation for the
Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
augment any item of the Court's appropriations for: (a) printing of decisions and publications of
Philippine Reports; b) commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme
Court and any payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement, and other operating
expenses of the courts' books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of
printing equipment; e) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual
 and casual employees, for judicial administration; f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's
Electronic Data Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in
international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and
representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator,
Chief of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i)
compensation of attorneys-de-oficio; PROVIDED, that as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increases in
salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis
supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for
payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the
adjusted rates to retired justices of the Supreme Court entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the
Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

xxx xxx xxx

Activities and Purposes

1. General Administration and Support Services.

a. General administrative Services P 43,515,000

b. Payment of retirement gratuity
of national goverment officials
and employees P 206,717,000
c. Payment of terminal leave benefits to
officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000
d. Payment of pension totired jude
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000

(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992)

C. COURT OF APPEALS

For general administration, administration

of personnel benefit, benefits and the
adjudication of appealed and other cases
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000

Special Provisions.

1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in
accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Presiding Justice may be authorized to use any savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court
of Appeals for purposes of: (1) improving its compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any
deficiency in any item of its appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and payment of
adjusted pension rates to retired justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-
225-C.A. (page 1079, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)

2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for
payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the
adjusted rates to retired justices of the Court of Appeals entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the
Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-6-225-C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations Act,
FY 1992).

XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT

For general fund adjustment for

operational and special requirements
as indicated hereunder P500,000,000

xxx xxx xxx

Special Provisions

1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:

xxx xxx xxx

1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the payment
of back salaries and related personnel benefits arising from decision of competent
authorityincluding the Supreme Court decision in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-
 C.A. and COA decision in No. 1704." (page 11649 Gen. Appropriations Act, FY 1992;
Emphasis supplied)

On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 the Special
Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (General Appropriations Act, FY 1992,
page 1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for the Court
of Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the
General Fund Adjustments (page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the payment of the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively nullified the veto of the President on House
Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting Republic
Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions was further justified by
reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would erode the very foundation of our
collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and standardization of compensation. We should
not permit the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement pensions under existing laws
already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil servants."

Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:

1) The subject veto is not an item veto;

2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;

3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;

4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.

Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of this Court that the veto
constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Court's resolution.

On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA with G.R. No.
103524.

The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.

It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons including
the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three branches of
government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution.
Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on
fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws,
the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and
controversies.

The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian
of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go
beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself or any of its branches does
not violate the basic liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was emphatically explained by Justice
Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it
does not assert any superiority over the other department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
(Emphasis supplied)

The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But
even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2),
Article VI, Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act
like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of
the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the
Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may
contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.

The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or
items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])

We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different.
An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill
(Bengzon, supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose
(Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L.
Ed, 312) declared "that an "tem"of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a
specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)

We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the basis of the
disputed veto.

The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to meet
certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the different
branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.

The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that
permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due.

An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will readily show that
portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been
vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.

Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring
savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to
transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.

In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is not an
item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. This was not touched. It was not vetoed.

More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992 Appropriations Act
were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else.

What were really vetoed are:

(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and

(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA.

We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the provisions of a
law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a
final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.

A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.

Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was extended to
retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595.

On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic Acts 1797
and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was
surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.

It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and Constitutional
Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When
her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in the 1992 General
Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now challenged in
this petition.
It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act
No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced
from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.

House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto
of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent
premises.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General
Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to
accomplish.

Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved that purpose
because it was not properly published. It never became a law.

The case of Tañda v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically requires that "all laws
shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the Court's answer to the petition of Senator Lorenzo Tañada
and other opposition leaders who challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which, while never published, were
being enforced. Secret decrees are anathema in a free society.

In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA secured certification from
Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4, 1977 Supplement to the Official Gazette
was published only on September 5, 1983 and officially released on September 29, 1983.

On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already categorically spoken in a
definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not immediately or
soon thereafter published although preceding and subsequent decrees were duly published in the
Official Gazette. It now appears that it was intended as a secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION"
as the notation on the face of the original copy thereof plainly indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that
the decree was published in the back-dated Supplement only after it was challenged in
the Tañada case as among the presidential decrees that had not become effective for lack of the
required publication. The petition was filed on May 7, 1983, four months before the actual publication
of the decree.

It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975. Moreover, the
publication was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it was done in 1977 when the
now demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977 supplement was actually published and released only
in September 1983. The belated publication was obviously intended to refute the petitioner's claim in
the Tañada case and to support the Solicitor General's submission that the petition had become
moot and academic.

xxx xxx xxx

We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and that,
consequently, it did not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting Justices (including
Justice Lood, whose request for the upgrading of his pension was denied on January 15, 1991) are
therefore entitled to be paid their monthly pensions on the basis of the latter measure, which remains
unchanged to date.

The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure stability in legal
relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other decisions of this Court, the
ruling and principles set out in the Court resolution constitute binding precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita Kamaganak
Association, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution)

The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they undermine the
principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the
Supreme Court.

We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its powers to pass laws
in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law is and whether or not it violates a
provision of the Constitution.

As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay the
retirement pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every year.
Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which
may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as retirement laws
remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension
rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.

Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto
the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is merely to
execute the laws as passed by Congress.

II

There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to set aside a
Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:

Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.

We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on various past
occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294
[1982]), it ruled:

It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with
rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to
grant them either expressly or implicitly certain powers. These they exercise not for their own benefit
but for the body politic. . . .

A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law
may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and
fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. . . . It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then
are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their
conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of
which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right.
(At pp. 338-339)

The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on fiscal autonomy. The OSG
Comment reflects the same truncated view of the provision.

We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it allocate less than one
percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, and court personnel all over the
country but it also examines with a fine-toothed come how we spend the funds appropriated by Congress based on
DBM recommendations.

The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:

The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman to
submit budget proposals in accordance with parameters it establishes. DBM evaluates the
proposals, asks each agency to defend its proposals during DBM budget hearings, submits its own
version of the proposals to Congress without informing the agency of major alterations and
mutilations inflicted on their proposals, and expects each agency to defend in Congress proposals
not of the agency's making.

After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, the
tight and officious control by DBM continues. For the release of appropriated funds, the Judiciary,
Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman are instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare
Work and Financial Plans and requests for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves
these plans and requests and on the basis of its approval authorizes the release of allotments with
corresponding notices of cash allocation. These notices specify the maximum withdrawals each
month which the Supreme Court, the Commissions and the Ombudsman may make from the
servicing government bank. The above agencies are also required to submit to DBM monthly,
quarterly and year-end budget accountability reports to indicate their performance, physical and
financial operations and income,

The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when importuned for
needed funds, to release additional allotments to the agency. Since DBM always prunes the budget
proposals to below subsistence levels and since emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal
year, the Chief Justices, Chairmen of the Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make
pilgrimages to DBM for additional funds to tide their respective agencies over the emergency.
What is fiscal autonomy?

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee
on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM
rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence end flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this
grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating
to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the
Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary
is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the
President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency
and efficiency. The Court stated that:

There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once
given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria
v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer
is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to
another.

The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:

Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the payment of
the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the
Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in
contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."

III

Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them pursuant
to RA 1797.

The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been enacted by
practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably
in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on retirement are founded
on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with
pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v.
Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)

Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to entice
competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative
security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by illness or
accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their
Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).

As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through the
years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.

P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5
years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be
computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances
each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990,
stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include
the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on
the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra)

The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is, again, a
misimpression.

Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of thousands
while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men
retire at a much younger age — some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep.
Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement
provision is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices
whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.

The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given by the
Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the power to declare,
in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of
independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be
increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except through
impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The
President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar
Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our
continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions.
We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and
coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution)

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and the ground
that there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to retired Justices ignores these
provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the
Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the
independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on
retirement benefits of Justices.

One last point.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:

. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from
taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives and
have ceased performing public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen,
and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is
done under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)

The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office
whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law.

Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muñoz Palma,
Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the
government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should
show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.

All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging in "robbery" is
intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.

If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then quality of research
in that institution has severely deteriorated.

In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v. Topeka but Citizen's Savings
and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874].
Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of
building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was
declared void on the ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient period. Public
use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost housing,
squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What
was "robbery" in 1874 is now called "social justice." There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case.
Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell "loan" correctly.
Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.

The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary requesting adjustments
in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to mention the high cost
of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284,
July 12, 1991);

Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the
least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to
luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.

For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not
deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional.
The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are
ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for
the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No.
91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010,
submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These

Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value
that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the
government properties they used during their tenure.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted
when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to
them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:
1âw phi1

Valuation under
Valuation under COA
Difference
Name of Justice Items Purchased CFAG Memorandum
(in pesos)
(in pesos) No. 98-569A
(in pesos)
Artemio Panganiban Toyota Camry, 341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90
(Chief Justice) 2003 model

Toyota Grandia, 136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00

2002 model

Toyota Camry, 115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00

2001 model
Ruben T. Reyes Toyota Camry, 579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50
(Associate Justice) 2005 model
Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00
2003 model

Angelina S. Gutierrez Toyota Grandia, 115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00

(Associate Justice) 2002 model
Adolfo S. Azcuna Toyota Camry, 536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00
(Associate Justice) 2005 model

Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00

2002 model
Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10

Ma. Alicia 5,800.002

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc
dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum
No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.

Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty.
Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG
formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued
in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justices,5the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG
guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget
and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and
utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the
recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the
discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property would be
tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.

OUR RULING

We find Atty. Candelaria’s recommendation to be well-taken.

The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is
provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional
bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.9

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.10To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would result in
the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11

Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely
exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the
discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself.12 Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts:
decisional independence and institutional independence."13 Decisional independence "refers to a judge’s ability to
render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law."14 On
the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
legislative branches of government."15 Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence
of the judiciary as a body."16

In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in
Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts
of judicial independence in the following manner:

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or
her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence
when he can do his job without having to hear – or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear –
criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial
independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a
class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public
confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of
judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics
and emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole
repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government is attended with grave abuse of discretion,18 no less than the Constitution provides a number of
safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained.

The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in
Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the
members of the judiciary.19 The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy,20 and grants
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence21 has
characterized administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges
and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.22

The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary
during their continuance in office,23 and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."24 With these guarantees, justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely
by their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or
unworthy motives.25

All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly
stating the Court’s powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of
government to interfere with the Court’s affairs.

Fiscal Autonomy

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the
Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a
court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from
courts,26 the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane
to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first
instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to
exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a
violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
independence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section
3, Article VIII. This provision states:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following
manner:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of
full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM
rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this
grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)

In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino’s veto of particular provisions of the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary’s constitutionally guaranteed independence
and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating
to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the
Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary
is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.30

The Court’s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more
extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations;31 real fiscal autonomy
covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any
outside control or interference.

Application to the Present Case

The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme
Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court
En Banc’s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary
serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and
the appellate courts:

WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15
April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";

WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing for
sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as a
privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and

WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring
Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the
need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the
retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized
both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA
has previously recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional
retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs,
and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel
as provided by law and by its own grants.33

Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court
En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they
determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of
the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and
benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised
and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon
the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s
own affairs.

As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM),
Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:

Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. – The full and sole authority and
responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned by the national government
agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government,
the local government units and the governing bodies or managing heads of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation,
who shall constitute the appropriate committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours

This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and sole
authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he
determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice
of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc. However,
whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion
is unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property
Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the
Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the
Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance.
 SC ACTUAl CASE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it
has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this
case, including that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has
been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent
in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the
nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident
naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came
to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission
on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private
respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the
assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors
that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and
installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for
dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms
that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has
become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the
Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence,
illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will
and led to the induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine
elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels
of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also
elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces
dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned,
which victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator.
Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at
the hands of the party in power.

What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on
Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the
terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a
more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more
assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of
the tragedy.

Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the
administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.

Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner
went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent
herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made
of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the petitioner
claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or Manila
paper.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders.3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.4 On certiorari before this Court, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the
elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6

This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M.
Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent
Pacificador, Opinion had refused.7

The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.

The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and
decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety
days from the date of their submission for decision.

While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions.
The records are voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might
be, for the noble profession of the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and
considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.

The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests
involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en
banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices
involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all
other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.

The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms
"contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy
between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly
heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still
administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections,9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the
contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation
had as yet been made when the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the
private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique
whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.

In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this
theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement
would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only
then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject
to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases."

As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by
division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could
be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a
whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the
Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation
controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving
elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the
election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the
Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filed and
not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power.

This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while
denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended
such an irrational rule.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters
related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation
controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No.
1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:

Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It
may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the
proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds
mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the
complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power
only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was
adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-
proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage,
considering the first administrative and the second judicial.

Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973
Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the
Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being
drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of
disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible
scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in
the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to
an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the
office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same
sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and
"qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as
his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be
heard and decided by it only en banc.

We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission
on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en
banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with
the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in
the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily
decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been
observed by the Commission en banc.

After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation
summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he
might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would have already expired.

It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the
Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that
the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it.
That argument would militate against the purpose of the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the
election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as
sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the
Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting
standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution

Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra,
the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved
in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.

Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent
Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of
the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law
partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14

Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular
relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not
certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's
refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any
criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the
motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.16 The litigants
are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just
decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only
out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a
lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do
so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and
rendered the proceeding null and void. 17

Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which
was the February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of
travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by
assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power"
he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the
previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without
reason, to send the rec•rds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.

But not yet.

Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because
he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned
and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him.
Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of
freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and
shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race,
unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not
see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."

A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the
mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta
Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of
others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime,
saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I
die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped
praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."

That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The
despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been
banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with
new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to
express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.

This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last,
after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only
then, and not until then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the book is closed.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have
legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission
on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

 EFFECTS OF UNCONSTITUTIONLITY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9396 August 16, 1956

MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL T. FLORES, defendant-appellant.

Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for appellant.

Zafra, Lara, De Leon and Veneracion for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to recover from Manuel T.
Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941. Defendant
pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw
differently, sustaining plaintiff's contention that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, and that deducting the time during which said laws were in operation — three years and eight months1 — the
ten year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954. Wherefore said court ordered
the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on the merits.

Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending the period of
limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this court in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5)
1807. He cites jurisprudence holding that when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had
never been passed, and no rights can be built upon it.2

Some members expressed doubts as to whether the order of the lower court was appealable in nature; but we
agreed not to discuss the point, inasmuch as the question submitted by appellant could speedily be disposed of.
In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held that the moratorium laws suspended the period of prescription. That was
rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla
decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is
quoted from a resolution of this Court4

2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the decision the Moratorium law
could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general
rule is that an unconstitutional statute —

"confers no right, create no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it." (11 Am.
Jur., pp. 828, 829.)

there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its effects "since the actual
existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding the
general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix,
JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1 See Alcantara vs. Chico, 49 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 150.

2 Norton vs. Shelby, 118 U. S., 425-454; Am. Jur. Vol. 11, p. 827.

3 98 Phil., 133.

4 Araneta vs. Hill, 93 Phil., 1002.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners,

vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor, Department of Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September 27, 1972,
authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them."

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested
with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to
the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.

In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . . . as defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.

Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals.
The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such
offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the
President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
civil courts" and vice versa.

On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal Case No.
MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military
Commission No. 1, for the crimes of:

(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of
Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and

(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.

The accused were:

1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc

2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana

3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

4. Antonio Occaciones

5. Leopoldo Nicolas

6. Enrique Labita

7. Oscar Yaun

8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie

9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping

10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge

11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak

12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga

 13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho

14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong

15. Manuel Beleta, and

16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).

(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)

Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the
recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the
requests of the defendants' lawyers) to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the
military court (Annexes A to C of Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were detained
without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.

Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used
as a state witness. He was released from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).

Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35
defense witnesses filled up twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 75, Rollo).

On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding
five (5) of the accused namely:

1. Luis Tan

2. Ang Tiat Chuan

3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

4. Antonio Occaciones, and

5. Leopoldo Nicolas

guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.

A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).

Eight (8) of the accused, namely:

1. Oscar Yaun

2. Enrique Labita

3. Eusebio Tan

4. Alfonso Tan

5. Go E Kuan

6. William Tan (petitioner herein)

7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and

8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)

were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).

On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and
commissions.

On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA
144), vacating the sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al.
and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law,
over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open
and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the
military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:

Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused
stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among
 others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution,
in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process, Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are
called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government

and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature
for the President as Commander in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those
of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation of
powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual
should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary.
It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are
regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of martial
law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of
the civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA
144, 158-160.)

In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed in this Court
by some 217 prisoners 1 in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the
military commissions during the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-79600,
79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA
700). The petitioners asked the Court to declare unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals,
annul the proceedings against them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil courts where their right
to due process may be accorded respect.

Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings
leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as
their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.

The Court —

(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of some who had fully served their
sentences, or had been acquitted, or had been granted amnesty;

(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and

(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still serving the sentences meted to them by the
military courts, but, without ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners Virgilio

Alejandrino, 2Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado,
Daniel Campus, 3Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, 4 are concerned.
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the immediate
release of the abovementioned petitioners, unless there are other legal causes that
may warrant their detention.

The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana,

Benigno Bantolino, Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan,
Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino,
Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A.
Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando
Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis.
Democrito Lorana who are all military personnel.

As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE

the necessary informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the
offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this decision,
without prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence submitted by the parties and
admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the period of the
petitioners' detention shall be credited in their favor.

The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO
CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant
of bail which may be initiated by the accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160
SCRA 700, 711-712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order No. 226 designating State
Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in
the court of competent jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was
designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).

Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for:

1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and

2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67
including those who had already died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)

The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:

this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court Order in the case of Cruz, et
al. vs. Ponce Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565
as all accused are detained 6 except those that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)

He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he increased the
recommended bail to P140,000 for each accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case
(Crim. Case No. 88-825), he recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000 for each of the accused, except
Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on October 28,
1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9, Rollo) because of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).

Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of
RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued
an order on October 26, 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting
affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing
the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order (Annex F, Petition). The State
Prosecutor has not complied with that order for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the
criminal cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 of the now
defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs.
Enrile habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).

On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated
October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be permanently
enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because they had
already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).

On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition for being premature as:

... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E) whose
annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure). The filing in the lower court of such motion is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of that remedy (which they have
not yet availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)

Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court that the lower court had issued warrants
for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the
respondents from implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).

The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in
reprosecuting them upon the supposed authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:

1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of informations by the Secretary of Justice against
THOSE who, like the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the period of martial
law.

2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were not parties in that case, who were not
heard, and over whom the court did not acquire jurisdiction.

3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.

4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had been acquitted by the military tribunal
which the State itself had clothed with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may
not retroactively divest of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that acquitted the petitioners would amount to
an ex post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo, Supplemental Petition).

6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it was filed without a
prior preliminary investigation, nor a finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State Prosecutor
(Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information in Criminal
Case No. 88-824 for illegal possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing on
January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is not stated. It may be
because Benemerito, the gunman who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by the Military
Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the information for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825)
against the petitioners and twelve (12) others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37,
Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it will not constitute double jeopardy
because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from
attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription,
because "it had been interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets with the Military Commission" (p. 67,
Rollo).

The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military
commission were null and void because we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over
civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime
before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).

The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs.
Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and
acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz vs.
Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever
faced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the
petitioners Tan, et al. herein.

The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and injustice unless given a limited application
only to the parties/petitioners therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings against themselves
and prayed for a retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone are affected by the
judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all and sundry who at one time or another had been tried and sentenced by a court
martial during the period of martial law.

Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who
were not parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a case shall
not adversely affect persons who were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this
court's pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military courts against the civilian petitioners
therein and ordering the refiling of informations against them in the proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of
persons who were not parties in that case and who, not having submitted to the court's jurisdiction, did not have
their day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their reprosecution, based on the decision in Cruz vs.
Enrile in which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of their right to due process, the same right
of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this Court endeavored to protect when it nullified the proceedings against
them in the military tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of civilians by military process was not
due process. 7

There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs.
Enrilewhich needs to be rectified. For, although the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners
who were still serving their sentences after conviction by the military courts and commissions, and we directed the
Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations against them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the
court martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their sentences; (2)
had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not order their reprosecution,
retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.

In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by the military courts and were still
serving their sentences, and another rule for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of
their sentences. The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the Court ordered to be
reprosecuted before the proper civil courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court
ordered to be released from custody).

In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to
future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no
retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State.
Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the
Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on
the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving
evidence in his defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting
civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they
have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and commenced
serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a military court, much less those who were acquitted and
released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed, why
should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair
hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil
court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of being
acquitted the second time around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the
completion of his second trial which may take as long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or
already served.

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year
period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987
of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to
the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the
question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out
all the acts of the local government thus abolished:

In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.' Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of commissioners
created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the acts
done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a
nullity because the executive order is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.' For the existence of Executive Order 386 is 'an
operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As Chief Justice Hughes explained in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:

'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity, cannot be justified.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act
done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. (Municipality of
Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)

The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before
Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians
should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings
were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of
the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been
affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose
and came before us.

Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place them
in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.

The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State:
 The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any
offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to
treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom
or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary
litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has
been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution
is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)

Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military
commission in their particular case by retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had
exercised over them would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict
constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is one which —

1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act;

2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed;

4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;

5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful; and,

6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay
Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)

Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.

We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information against them is invalid because there was
no preliminary investigation, no finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of the
information by the City Fiscal before it was filed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge the
petitioners from the information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The temporary restraining order which we issued on
January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

 POWERS

A. Rule Making Power

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as
trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never
be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever
question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-
month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge
looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial
review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and
duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of
its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction;
and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress
convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal
Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated
January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing
to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor
General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction
over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents
are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as
important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court
is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds
of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of
Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in
this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the

assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar
as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17
contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of
the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the
manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and
implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA

G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas,
filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this
Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality
of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice
Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the
finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment
becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire
which can render the execution unjust or impossible.5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on
the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for
reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When
in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
 follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the
cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive
has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to
pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital
sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of
execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor
can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be
ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3)
by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible
that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can
not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways
is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been
fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay
the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution
ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction
to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is
the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control
of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It
bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. 1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to
restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which,
among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption
that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of
their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs
judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance
of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in
the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so.
Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law
in question." 12The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for
the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . .
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in

all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of
the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it
the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the
rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no
jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and
supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less
than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a
certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution
date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein

respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia,
that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital
information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders
nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to
information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the
appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital

information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over
the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative
 Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the
discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution
of sentence are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise
day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers
pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides
that the death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the
President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to
reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to
the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the
applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the President would be
earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution

to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and
Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may beprovided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by

means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State
policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever
limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III,
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by
his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's
right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on
the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted
the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December
15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from
contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend
on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final
and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the
TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite
as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed
in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of
law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No.
7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts
and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to
grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective
as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1)
that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had
either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that
Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment
be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator
Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and
thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on
January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to
resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of
resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law
are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was
also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new
members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different
from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No.
8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly
a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment
but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of
Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The
extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was
at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it
needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and
equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue
whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite
posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator
Pimentel. 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives
to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter
and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that
extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with
minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25
expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition,
the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence
of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has
served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been
the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our
clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of
capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-
death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than
an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse
of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to
assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the
very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the
courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by
the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the
mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of
law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 171845 October 10, 2012

SPOUSES GODFREY and GERARDINA SERFINO, Petitioners,

vs.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC., now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
decision2 dated February 23, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No.
95-9344.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The present case traces its roots to the compromise judgment dated October 24, 19953 of the RTC of Bacolod
City, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-9880. Civil Case No. 95-9880 was an action for collection of sum of money
instituted by the petitioner spouses Godfrey and Gerardina Serfino (collectively, spouses Serfino) against the
spouses Domingo and Magdalena Cortez (collectively, spouses Cortez). By way of settlement, the spouses Serfino
and the spouses Cortez executed a compromise agreement on October 20, 1995, in which the spouses Cortez
acknowledged their indebtedness to the spouses Serfino in the amount of ₱ 108,245.71. To satisfy the debt,
Magdalena bound herself "to pay in full the judgment debt out of her retirement benefits[.]"4 Payment of the debt
shall be made one (1) week after Magdalena has received her retirement benefits from the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). In case of default, the debt may be executed against any of the properties of the spouses
Cortez that is subject to execution, upon motion of the spouses Serfino.5 After finding that the compromise
agreement was not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order or public policy, the RTC approved the
entirety of the parties’ agreement and issued a compromise judgment based thereon.6 The debt was later reduced to
₱ 155,000.00 from ₱ 197,000.00 (including interest), with the promise that the spouses Cortez would pay in full the
judgment debt not later than April 23, 1996.7

No payment was made as promised. Instead, Godfrey discovered that Magdalena deposited her retirement benefits
in the savings account of her daughter-in-law, Grace Cortez, with the respondent, Far East Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. (FEBTC). As of April 23, 1996, Grace’s savings account with FEBTC amounted to ₱ 245,830.37, the
entire deposit coming from Magdalena’s retirement benefits.8 That same day, the spouses Serfino’s counsel sent
two letters to FEBTC informing the bank that the deposit in Grace’s name was owned by the spouses
Serfino by virtue of an assignment made in their favor by the spouses Cortez. The letter requested FEBTC to
prevent the delivery of the deposit to either Grace or the spouses Cortez until its actual ownership has been
resolved in court.

On April 25, 1996, the spouses Serfino instituted Civil Case No. 95- 9344 against the spouses Cortez, Grace and
her husband, Dante Cortez, and FEBTC for the recovery of money on deposit and the payment of damages,
with a prayer for preliminary attachment.

On April 26, 1996, Grace withdrew ₱ 150,000.00 from her savings account with FEBTC. On the same day, the
spouses Serfino sent another letter to FEBTC informing it of the pending action; attached to the letter was a copy of
the complaint filed as Civil Case No. 95-9344.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 95-9344, the spouses Cortez manifested that they were turning over the
balance of the deposit in FEBTC (amounting to ₱ 54,534.00) to the spouses Serfino as partial payment of their
obligation under the compromise judgment. The RTC issued an order dated July 30, 1997, authorizing FEBTC to
turn over the balance of the deposit to the spouses Serfino.

On February 23, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed decision (a) finding the spouses Cortez, Grace and Dante liable
for fraudulently diverting the amount due the spouses Serfino, but (b) absolving FEBTC from any liability for
allowing Grace to withdraw the deposit. The RTC declared that FEBTC was not a party to the compromise
judgment; FEBTC was thus not chargeable with notice of the parties’ agreement, as there was no valid court order
or processes requiring it to withhold payment of the deposit. Given the nature of bank deposits, FEBTC was
primarily bound by its contract of loan with Grace. There was, therefore, no legal justification for the bank to refuse
payment of the account, notwithstanding the claim of the spouses Serfino as stated in their three letters.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

The spouses Serfino appealed the RTC’s ruling absolving FEBTC from liability for allowing the withdrawal
of the deposit. They allege that the RTC cited no legal basis for declaring that only a court order or process can
justify the withholding of the deposit in Grace’s name. Since FEBTC was informed of their adverse claim after they
sent three letters, they claim that:
Upon receipt of a notice of adverse claim in proper form, it becomes the duty of the bank to: 1. Withhold payment
of the deposit until there is a reasonable opportunity to institute legal proceedings to contest ownership; and 2) give
prompt notice of the adverse claim to the depositor. The bank may be held liable to the adverse claimant if it
disregards the notice of adverse claim and pays the depositor.

When the bank has reasonable notice of a bona fide claim that money deposited with it is the property of
another than the depositor, it should withhold payment until there is reasonable opportunity to institute legal
proceedings to contest the ownership.9(emphases and underscoring supplied)

Aside from the three letters, FEBTC should be deemed bound by the compromise judgment, since Article 1625 of
the Civil Code states that an assignment of credit binds third persons if it appears in a public instrument.10 They
conclude that FEBTC, having been notified of their adverse claim, should not have allowed Grace to withdraw the
deposit.

While they acknowledged that bank deposits are governed by the Civil Code provisions on loan, the spouses
Serfino allege that the provisions on voluntary deposits should apply by analogy in this case, particularly Article
1988 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 1988. The thing deposited must be returned to the depositor upon demand, even though a specified period or
time for such return may have been fixed.

This provision shall not apply when the thing is judicially attached while in the depositary’s possession, or should
he have been notified of the opposition of a third person to the return or the removal of the thing deposited.
In these cases, the depositary must immediately inform the depositor of the attachment or opposition.

Based on Article 1988 of the Civil Code, the depository is not obliged to return the thing to the depositor if notified of
a third party’s adverse claim.

By allowing Grace to withdraw the deposit that is due them under the compromise judgment, the spouses Serfino
claim that FEBTC committed an actionable wrong that entitles them to the payment of actual and moral
damages.

FEBTC, on the other hand, insists on the correctness of the RTC ruling. It claims that it is not bound by the
compromise judgment, but only by its contract of loan with its depositor. As a loan, the bank deposit is owned by the
bank; hence, the spouses Serfino’s claim of ownership over it is erroneous.

Based on these arguments, the case essentially involves a determination of the obligation of banks to a third
party who claims rights over a bank deposit standing in the name of another.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious and see no reason to reverse the RTC’s ruling.

Claim for actual damages not

meritorious because there could be
no pecuniary loss that should be
compensated if there was no
assignment of credit

The spouses Serfino’s claim for damages against FEBTC is premised on their claim of ownership of the deposit with
FEBTC. The deposit consists of Magdalena’s retirement benefits, which the spouses Serfino claim to have been
assigned to them under the compromise judgment. That the retirement benefits were deposited in Grace’s savings
account with FEBTC supposedly did not divest them of ownership of the amount, as "the money already belongs to
the [spouses Serfino] having been absolutely assigned to them and constructively delivered by virtue of the x x x
public instrument[.]"11 By virtue of the assignment of credit, the spouses Serfino claim ownership of the deposit, and
they posit that FEBTC was duty bound to protect their right by preventing the withdrawal of the deposit since the
bank had been notified of the assignment and of their claim.

We find no basis to support the spouses Serfino’s claim of ownership of the deposit.

"An assignment of credit is an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit, known as the assignor, by a legal
cause, such as sale, dation in payment, exchange or donation, and without the consent of the debtor, transfers his
credit and accessory rights to another, known as the assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it to the same
extent as the assignor could enforce it against the debtor. It may be in the form of sale, but at times it may constitute
a dation in payment, such as when a debtor, in order to obtain a release from his debt, assigns to his creditor
a credit he has against a third person."12 As a dation in payment, the assignment of credit operates as a mode
of extinguishing the obligation;13 the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing (in this case, the credit due
from a third person) by the debtor to the creditor is accepted as the equivalent of the performance of the obligation.14

The terms of the compromise judgment, however, did not convey an intent to equate the assignment of Magdalena’s
retirement benefits (the credit) as the equivalent of the payment of the debt due the spouses Serfino (the obligation).
There was actually no assignment of credit; if at all, the compromise judgment merely identified the fund from
which payment for the judgment debt would be sourced:
(c) That before the plaintiffs file a motion for execution of the decision or order based [on this] Compromise
Agreement, the defendant, Magdalena Cortez undertake[s] and bind[s] herself to pay in full the judgment
debt out of her retirement benefits as Local [T]reasury Operation Officer in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, upon
which full payment, the plaintiffs waive, abandon and relinquish absolutely any of their claims for attorney’s fees
stipulated in the Promissory Note (Annex "A" to the Complaint).15 [emphasis ours]

Only when Magdalena has received and turned over to the spouses Serfino the portion of her retirement benefits
corresponding to the debt due would the debt be deemed paid.

In Aquitey v. Tibong,16 the issue raised was whether the obligation to pay the loan was extinguished by the execution
of the deeds of assignment. The Court ruled in the affirmative, given that, in the deeds involved, the respondent (the
debtor) assigned to the petitioner (the creditor) her credits "to make good" the balance of her obligation; the parties
agreed to relieve the respondent of her obligation to pay the balance of her account, and for the petitioner to collect
the same from the respondent’s debtors.17 The Court concluded that the respondent’s obligation to pay the balance
of her accounts with the petitioner was extinguished, pro tanto, by the deeds of assignment of credit executed by the
respondent in favor of the petitioner.18

In the present case, the judgment debt was not extinguished by the mere designation in the compromise judgment
of Magdalena’s retirement benefits as the fund from which payment shall be sourced. That the compromise
agreement authorizes recourse in case of default on other executable properties of the spouses Cortez, to satisfy
the judgment debt, further supports our conclusion that there was no assignment of Magdalena’s credit with the
GSIS that would have extinguished the obligation.

The compromise judgment in this case also did not give the supposed assignees, the spouses Serfino, the power to
enforce Magdalena’s credit against the GSIS. In fact, the spouses Serfino are prohibited from enforcing their claim
until after the lapse of one (1) week from Magdalena’s receipt of her retirement benefits:

(d) That the plaintiffs shall refrain from having the judgment based upon this Compromise Agreement executed until
after one (1) week from receipt by the defendant, Magdalena Cortez of her retirement benefits from the [GSIS] but
fails to pay within the said period the defendants’ judgment debt in this case, in which case [this] Compromise
Agreement [may be] executed upon any property of the defendants that are subject to execution upon motion by the
plaintiffs.19

An assignment of credit not only entitles the assignee to the credit itself, but also gives him the power to enforce it
as against the debtor of the assignor.

Since no valid assignment of credit took place, the spouses Serfino cannot validly claim ownership of the retirement
benefits that were deposited with FEBTC. Without ownership rights over the amount, they suffered no
pecuniary loss that has to be compensated by actual damages. The grant of actual damages presupposes that
the claimant suffered a duly proven pecuniary loss.20

Claim for moral damages not

meritorious because no duty exists
on the part of the bank to protect
interest of third person claiming
deposit in the name of another

Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable for acts referred to in Article 21 of the Civil
Code.21 Article 21 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code, is part of the cause of action
known in this jurisdiction as "abuse of rights." The elements of abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty;
(b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.1âwphi1

The spouses Serfino invoke American common law that imposes a duty upon a bank receiving a notice of
adverse claim to the fund in a depositor’s account to freeze the account for a reasonable length of time,
sufficient to allow the adverse claimant to institute legal proceedings to enforce his right to the fund.22 In
other words, the bank has a duty not to release the deposits unreasonably early after a third party makes known his
adverse claim to the bank deposit. Acknowledging that no such duty is imposed by law in this jurisdiction, the
spouses Serfino ask the Court to adopt this foreign rule.23

To adopt the foreign rule, however, goes beyond the power of this Court to promulgate rules governing pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.24 The rule reflects a matter of policy that is better addressed by the other
branches of government, particularly, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which is the agency that supervises the
operations and activities of banks, and which has the power to issue "rules of conduct or the establishment of
standards of operation for uniform application to all institutions or functions covered[.]"25 To adopt this rule will have
significant implications on the banking industry and practices, as the American experience has shown. Recognizing
that the rule imposing duty on banks to freeze the deposit upon notice of adverse claim adopts a policy adverse to
the bank and its functions, and opens it to liability to both the depositor and the adverse claimant,26 many American
states have since adopted adverse claim statutes that shifted or, at least, equalized the burden. Essentially, these
statutes do not impose a duty on banks to freeze the deposit upon a mere notice of adverse claim; they first require
either a court order or an indemnity bond.27

In the absence of a law or a rule binding on the Court, it has no option but to uphold the existing policy that
recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking. It likewise rejects the adoption of a judicially-imposed rule giving third
parties with unverified claims against the deposit of another a better right over the deposit. As current laws provide,
the bank’s contractual relations are with its depositor, not with the third party;28 "a bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind the fiduciary nature of its relationship
with them."29 In the absence of any positive duty of the bank to an adverse claimant, there could be no breach that
entitles the latter to moral damages.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the decision dated
February 23, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 95-9344
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 TENURE/SEC 11

SEC !!

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46267 November 28, 1938

FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner,

vs.
SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent.

Vicente J. Francisco and Francisco Zandueta for petitioner.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno for respondent.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la
Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and
holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession
thereof, with costs to said respondent.

Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was
discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was
presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year.

On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial
Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad
interimappointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly
adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad
interimappointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner,
pursuant to which he took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties thereof. After his
appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as
executive judge, performed several executive acts, some of which consist in the designation of the assistant clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as administrative officer, under the orders of the petitioner,
as executive judge of said court, to take charge of all matters pertaining to the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
which are handled by said execute judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as
notary public for the Province of Palawan, said appointment to expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having
authorized justice of the peace Iñigo R. Peña to defend a criminal case the hearing of which had begun during the
past sessions in Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence of ten days to justice of the peace
Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan (Exhibit 8); and in having granted a leave of absence of thirteen days to the
justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).

On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad
interimappointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month
and year.

On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa,
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the
necessary oath and assumed office. On the same date, August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to
said appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the
corresponding final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit 11).

The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the rest, and alleges,
as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the constitutionality of Commonwealth
Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued
by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the
necessary oath, entering into the discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as
administrative acts.
The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the petitioner may
proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was
issued in his favor.

As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an appointment issued to him on June 2, 1936,
and confirmed by the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year, he received, on November 7,
1936, a new ad interim appointment, issued in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which
took effect on the same date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth Judicial District, with authority
to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
upon which he immediately took the corresponding oath and entered into the discharge of his office. Under his
former appointment of June 2, 1936, the petitioner had authority preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while, according to his new appointment
of November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First
Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be noted that the territory over
which the petitioner could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that
over which he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility
between the two appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each of them, resulting
in the absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the
functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both
judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the courts of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the
petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office
occupied by him by virtue thereof.

The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to
an office newly created or reorganized by law, — which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by
him — , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former
appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from
said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled
to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124). law phi 1.net

In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the
President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or
nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of public interest, being one of the means
employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes, which is the administration of justice, considering the
organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or
substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without detriment to the smooth
running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No.
145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have
accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and
afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional
or not. The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law
(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and
entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full
knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from
questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued,
is unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the
approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were to
disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.

It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936,
and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, whose Fifth Branch was
being presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad interim appointment of November 7,
1936, to the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over said Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila together with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into
the discharge of the functions of said office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the office occupied by
him under his said appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he has been appointed judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, which appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to question the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by accepting said appointment
and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well
settled doctrine established by both American and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of
constitutional questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the
petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259;
Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner, 36 Phil., 116; Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil., 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris,
699, section 40; id., 780, section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold when a judge of first instance, presiding over a
branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another
appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the
same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First
Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding
salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law
by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue occupying the office
conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.

Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.
So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L.
CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and
RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an
appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An
act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review,
aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of
judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as
protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by
a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the
Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its
enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it
being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of
absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any
support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on
October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents
were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the
debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the
case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by
memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.

1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is
concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as
members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on
the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not
protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties
intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of
private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the
totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing
to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary
of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we
act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest
which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and
assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United
States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate
lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing
themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On
August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later
amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1.
The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70)
days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which
shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts,
and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the
honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study
ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system.
There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a
phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that
the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the
disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest
— can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the
courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected
by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted
could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which
since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has
proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does
not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the
first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt
that the last two decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy.
New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically
underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially
has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of
justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national
leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and
satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is
on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike
in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes
further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and
economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and
change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the
gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social
justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then
"that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity.
Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could
be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final
disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not
conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of
clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts
exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend
towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development,
the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to
resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang
Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did
not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing
and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to
take place, would be the most thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations
. enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of
course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges,
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact
business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of independence of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the
Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first
was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year
a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other
such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having
the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
was introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the
President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases,
a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In
consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that
some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than
diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated
into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored
by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter,
Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval
with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial
Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these
guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus
of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill
held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar
who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill
would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality
of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly,
the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully,
of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the
Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time
and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the
vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its
inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if
done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated
such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners
from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts
to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ...
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary
question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases
enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is
with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto
proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of
the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of
First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim
appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on
Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule
squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of
Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any
doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the
opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial
District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and
constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is
admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A
mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner
vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the
National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security
of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or
the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle
is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do
say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security
of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional
and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until
then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered
a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to
affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power
of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization
consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by
the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for
the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was
made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization
of all branches of the government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance
were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the
fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district
of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even
less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for
solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v.
Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido
abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario
correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o
se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining,
the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso
de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del
gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged
statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly
a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept
independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of
Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of
the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance
with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until
the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all
the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security
of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of
words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that
antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President
Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of
providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know
how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by
Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle
of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not
through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he
possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of President as the
"symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising
the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the
light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The
adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the
members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least
half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation
may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary,
especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of
tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar
provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise
administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member
of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any
intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of
the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that
in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would
be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could
have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is
given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from
the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers
vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for
approval." 80Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into
Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional
provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and
in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants,
as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a
power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under
the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation.
As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those
insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of
the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a
relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon,
likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the
same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances,
and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of
power against power. That we should avoid.

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The
questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial
Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No.
93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a
standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the
statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of
the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind
the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as
their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this
observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to
administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of
delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a
deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-
delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another
objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally
bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President,
within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this
Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners
cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by
incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the
ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the
event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even
acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as
earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this
opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was
the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion
was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the
framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The
challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set
forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly
studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had
administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this
opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not
inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief
Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for
the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed
to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at
the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to
secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The
Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a
moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to
perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure
provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence
of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending
that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so
firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and
action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v.
Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of
those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are
of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant
after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are
confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but
as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a
judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v.
Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of
law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by
outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow
that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and
the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or
one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of
the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something
to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers
assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and
aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as
validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate
underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

 SEC 13

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines,
and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO
NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA
SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks a
reconsideration of the Court’s April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong’s petition
forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogo’s petition, and
reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in
SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First
District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.

Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine case
law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also prayed
for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the pending
incident.

After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack of
merit.

Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all
considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once and
for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling on his
motion as follows:

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume
and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties
who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement
in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of
Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since
performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and country
do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v. COMELEC3 that if
one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives is lacking, then not
even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental
law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper proceedings before the proper
tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice would tilt against her favor and
would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But, first things first.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents
were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of
Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

In our Decision, We held that:

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel
the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence
there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country
or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered
as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private
high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum,
through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by
the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now
Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the
constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the proper
denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken
their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held
that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted
with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to
inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by
law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in
the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in
the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other
words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born
citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be
strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of
her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only
deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be
deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the
foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief
that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.4 lavvphil

These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and that the
COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been affirmed. He even
went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was composed of two
parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part. For this purpose,
the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED from her
candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out the
name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the concerned
Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG
as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.5

Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of the
substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not suspend the
execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC should not have
proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.

His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and apply only
that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and discard the prejudicial part which, obviously, would just be
a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which Biraogo
dichotomized was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to
Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2,7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be
implemented for not having attained its finality.

Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong
was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to
officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.8It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case
in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving
a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of
the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.10

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

xxxx

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong’s
proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with
irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.11 The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-
Chato,12 to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of
office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled
that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially
relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that
are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent
Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for
this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional
bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be to
usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction
over all matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive
period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications
for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged.13 Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of
Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure.
Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at
any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding. lavvphi1

In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his motion for
reconsideration.

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a complete
turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which, although
unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court en banc on
July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said departure or
turn-around.

Such a position deserves scant consideration.

The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who
took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a
member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to
sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it.
The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to
preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full
advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In
consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions
stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no
one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the
majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that
decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.

We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any member
of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a
qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on
the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.

Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is
validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of
the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until
the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a
reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.

In sum, we hold that Biraogo’s Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This Court
did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based on
citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in
G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
 SEC 14

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012

SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN, doing business under the trade name "KAREN'S TRADING," FGU INSURANCE
CORPORATION, GODOFREDO GARCIA, CONCORDIA GARCIA, and REYNALDO BAETIONG, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. (petitioner) to challenge
the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 which dismissed the appeal of the
petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction3 and denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration.4The appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 had sought to nullify the December 16, 2003 order5 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for sum of money and damages on the ground
of non prosequitur.

The Antecedents

The antecedent facts of the petition before us are not disputed.

An alleged breach of contract was the initial event that led to the present petition. The petitioner claims that one
Leticia Magsalin, doing business as "Karen’s Trading," had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply,
delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioner’s Makati City condominium
project called "The Regency at Salcedo." The breach triggered the agreement’s termination. When Magsalin also
refused to return the petitioner’s unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary liabilities despite
demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance) demanding
damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

On April 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 02-488 against both Magsalin and
FGU Insurance. It was raffled to Branch 61 of the RTC of Makati City. The complaint sought Two Million Three
Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty Four Pesos and Sixty Centavos (₱2,329,124.60) as actual
damages for the breach of contract.

FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the corresponding officer’s
return declared that both she and "Karen’s Trading" could not be located at their given addresses, and that despite
further efforts, their new addresses could not be determined.

In August 2002, FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner filed its opposition to the
motion. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance
was obliged to file an answer.

In October 2002, in an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for
leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. In January 2003, the petitioner filed its reply
to FGU Insurance’s answer.

In February 2003, FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. Attached to the
motion was the subject complaint,6 with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia named as
third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties over the surety and
performance bonds it executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally
liable in the event it is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488.

The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground
that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

In May 2003, the RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a motion
to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was
granted.

In June 2003, Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about the
surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin.7 Of the three (3) persons named as third-party
defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer to the third-party complaint; the officer’s returns on the summons to the
Garcias state that both could not be located at their given addresses. Incidentally, the petitioner claims, and
Baetiong does not dispute, that it was not served with a copy of Baetiong’s answer. The petitioner now argues
before us that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to exert efforts to serve
summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a motion to serve summons by publication should have been filed for this
purpose. The petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the
summons to the third-party defendants.8

The Order Of Dismissal

With the above procedural events presented by both parties as the only backdrop, on December 16, 2003 the RTC
issued a tersely worded order9 dismissing Civil Case No. 02-488. For clarity, we quote the dismissal order in full:

ORDER

For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,10 prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a
Rule 41 petition for review.11

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It argued that the appeal
raised a pure question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the December 16, 2003
dismissal order.

The petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised questions of fact in the appeal.12 Thus -

While, the instant appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same involves questions of fact based on
the records of the case. It must be emphasized that the lower court’s dismissal of the case based on alleged
failure to prosecute on the part of plaintiff-appellant was too sudden and precipitate. This being the case, the facts
[sic] to be determined is whether based on the records of the case, was there a definite inaction on the part of
plaintiff-appellant? A careful examination of all pleadings filed as well as the orders of the lower court vis-à-vis the
rules should now be made in order to determine whether there was indeed a "failure to prosecute" on the part of
plaintiff-appellant[.]13 (emphases supplied)

The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.14 The petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

The petitioner pleads five (5) grounds to reverse the CA’s resolutions and to reinstate Civil Case No. 02-488. In an
effort perhaps to make sense of the dismissal of the case (considering that the trial court had not stated the facts
that justify it), the petitioner draws this Court’s attention to certain facts and issues that we find to be of little
materiality to the disposition of this petition:

Grounds/ Statement of Matters Involved

I. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the Appeal as the matters therein involve
both questions of law and fact.

II. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that
petitioner never received a copy of the Answer of Third-party defendant-respondent Reynaldo Baetiong.

III. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that there is
no joinder of indispensable parties and issues yet because defendant-respondent Leticia B. Magsalin as well
as third-party defendant-respondents Godofredo and Concordia Garcia’s whereabouts were unknown,
hence no service yet on them of the copy of the summons and complaint with annexes[.]

IV. The lower court erred in declaring that Petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the fact that it was
party respondent FGU which caused the cancellation of the hearing.

V. It is evident that the lower court’s dismissal of the case is a clear denial of due process.15

In our Resolution dated February 13, 2006,16 we required the respondents to comment. FGU Insurance’s
comment17alleges that the present petition is "fatally defective" for being unaccompanied by material portions of the
record. It reiterates that the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 was improperly filed under Rule 41 and should have
been filed directly with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Baetiong, in his comment,18 asserts that the
dismissal of the appeal was in accord with existing laws and applicable jurisprudence.

The Ruling Of The Court

Preliminarily, we resolve the claim that the petition violates Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the attachment of
material portions of the record. We note that FGU Insurance fails to discharge its burden of proving this claim by not
specifying the material portions of the record the petitioner should have attached to the petition. At any rate, after a
careful perusal of the petition and its attachments, the Court finds the petition to be sufficient. In other words, we can
judiciously assess and resolve the present petition on the basis of its allegations and attachments.

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition on the ground that the December 16, 2003 dismissal orderis
null and void for violation of due process. We are also convinced that the appeal to challenge the dismissal order
was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. We further find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488
for failure to prosecute is not supported by facts, as shown by the records of the case.

The Dismissal Order is Void

The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be
dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as
such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly
state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]"19 As a prejudicial dismissal, the
December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint
in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is
dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on
the merits.20

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The rule states:

RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.

The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner
failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular
facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial
date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length
of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal
orderdoes not say.

We have in the past admonished trial courts against issuing dismissal orders similar to that appealed in CA-G.R. CV
No. 83096. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the
reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal.21 A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.22

We thus agree with the petitioner that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 constituted a denial of due process.
Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided,
as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.23 Where the
reasons are absent, a decision (such as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support
it and is thus a nullity.24

For this same reason, we are not moved by respondent FGU Insurance’s statement that the disposition of the
present petition must be limited to the issue of whether the CA had correctly dismissed the appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 83096.25 This statement implies that we cannot properly look into the validity of the December 16, 2003
dismissal order in this Rule 45 petition. A void decision, however, is open to collateral attack. While we note that the
validity of the dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was never raised by the
petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review an
unassigned error if it finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just
decision in an appeal.26 In this case, the interests of substantial justice warrant the review of an obviously void
dismissal order.

The appeal was properly filed

under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

While the nullity of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order constitutes the ratio decidendi for this petition, we
nevertheless rule on the contention that the appeal was erroneously filed.27

In dismissing the appeal, the CA relied on the premise that since the facts presented in the petitioner’s appeal were
admitted and not disputed, the appeal must thereby raise a pure question of law proscribed in an ordinary appeal.
This premise was effectively the legal principle articulated in the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,28 cited by the CA in its
April 8, 2005 resolution. Respondent FGU Insurance thus contends that the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 02-488 was an appeal filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The reliance on Joaquin is misplaced as it is based on the conclusion the appellate court made in its April 8, 2005
resolution — i.e., that the pleading of undisputed facts is equivalent to a prohibited appeal. The reliance is
inattentive to both the averments of the subject appeal and to the text of the cited case. The operative legal principle
in Joaquin is this: "[W]here a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the
judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which [is
properly subject to the review of this Court.]"29 In this case, as already pointed out above, the facts supposedly
supporting the trial court’s conclusion of non prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats the
application of Joaquin.

At any rate, we believe that the filing of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
was proper as it necessarily involved questions of fact.

An authority material to this case is the case of Olave v. Mistas.30 Directly addressed in Olave was the CA’s
jurisdiction over an ordinary appeal supported by undisputed facts and seeking the review of a prejudicial order of
dismissal. In this case, a complaint was filed before the RTC in Lipa City to nullify an instrument titled "Affidavit of
Adjudication By The Heirs of the Estate of Deceased Persons With Sale." The RTC dismissed the complaint, with
prejudice, after the plaintiffs had moved to set the case for pre-trial only after more than three (3) months had lapsed
from the service and filing of the last pleading in the case. The plaintiffs thereafter went to the CA on a Rule 41
petition, contending, among others, that the trial court had erred and abused its discretion. As in the present case,
the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the issues therein were legal; they pointed out that
the circumstances on record were admitted.31 They argued that the proper remedy was a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The CA denied the motion and entertained the appeal. It rendered a decision reinstating the complaint on the
ground that there was no evidence on record that the plaintiffs had deliberately failed to prosecute their complaint.

When the case was elevated to this court on a Rule 45 petition, we squarely addressed the propriety of the plaintiffs’
appeal. Though mindful that the circumstances pleaded in the appeal were all admitted, we categorically held
in Olave that the appeal was correctly filed. We observed that despite undisputed records, the CA, in its review, still
had to respond to factual questions such as the length of time between the plaintiffs’ receipt of the last pleading filed
up to the time they moved to set the case for pre-trial, whether there had been any manifest intention on the
plaintiffs’ part not to comply with the Rules of Court, and whether the plaintiffs’ counsel was negligent.

Significantly, in Olave, we agreed with the plaintiffs that among the critical factual questions was whether, based on
the records, there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint. This same question is
particularly significant in the present case given that the order appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 does not
even indicate the factual basis for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488. Due to the absence of any stated factual
basis, and despite the admissions of the parties, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096, still had to delve into the
records to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial dismissal even exist. Since the dismissal of Civil Case No.
02-488 appears to have been rendered motu proprio (as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not state if it
was issued upon the respondents’ or the trial court’s motion), the facts to be determined by the CA should include
the grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio
dismissal pursuant to the grounds mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.32 These
grounds are matters of facts. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not disclose its factual basis, we are thus
persuaded that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

The Dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not Supported by the Facts of the Case

We also find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Based on available records and on the
averments of the parties, the following events were chronologically proximate to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-
488: (a) on March 24, 2003, the court admitted FGU Insurance’s third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled
the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU Insurance’s motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the
third-party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner.

None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu
proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as follows:

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief;

(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;

(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or

(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

In our view, the developments in the present case do not satisfy the stringent standards set in law and jurisprudence
for a non prosequitur.33 The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.34 There must be
unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.35

In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness to prosecute its
complaint. Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed
1âw phi 1

by the petitioner to justify the dismissal of their case.

While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The
repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even
before it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same
cause of action. Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the
case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.36

This court is thus of the opinion that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Neither facts, law or
jurisprudence supports the RTC’s finding of failure to prosecute on the part of the petitioner.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April
8, 2005 and October 4, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order dated December 16, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 02-488 is declared NULL and VOID, and the
petitioner’s complaint therein is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35612-14 June 27, 1973

NORBERTO MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, GUMACA BRANCH, PRESIDED
OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN MONTECILLO, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON
PROVINCE, respondents.

Estanislao A. Fernandez and Feliciano Landicho for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. for
respondents.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack
of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was our ruling that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his
confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. It is to credit of his able counsel, former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for
provisional liberty is carried on with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to
secure his release is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary. Deference to its
command precludes a reconsideration. This resolution will likewise briefly touch upon the question of why the
issuance of a brief dismissal order does not in any wise offend against the constitutional provision requiring that no
decision "shall be rendered by any court of record without on which it is based."1

1. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his detention. There is
aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is
latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that
there be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ imposes on the
judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has
to discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon
as possible. What is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no
violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease.

The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation. Petitioner's deprivation of
liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a determination by the judge in compliance with
the constitutional provision requiring the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
produced.2 No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that petitioner's co-accused, Nelso
Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to challenge the filing of
one information where there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v. People,3 required three separate
amended informations. There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously
issued, not only in the case of the parties in such petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the
circumstances, would not therefore lie."4

2. Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he, however, entitled
to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any flaw in one's confinement,
provisional liberty may still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order
of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First Instance in the
order now challenged. Such actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. In the landmark
decision of Chief Justice Concepcion, People v. Hernandez,5 the right to bail was rightfully stress as an aspect of the
protection accorded individual freedom which, in his eloquent language," is too basic, too transcendental and vital in
a republican state, like ours, ...."6 To be more matter of fact about it, there is this excerpt from de la Camara v.
Enage 7 "Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability,
however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his
cage. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a
capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-
present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted."8

The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it could be terminated
by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on behalf of respondent Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
did stress the absence of authority on the part of special counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to
intervene in this case on behalf of the state but did so, his failure to object being the basis of the bail granted by the
municipal court of Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation was denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule
definitely on this aspect as independently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner,
when the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in
accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan.9 Thus: "'The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the
limitation that the person applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The
purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is
free.'" 10Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence. The
authoritative doctrine in People v. San Diego 11 is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special
civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void." 12

Nor is the San Diego ruling novel. As far back as 1958, in People v. Raba, 13 it was held: "Considering that Talantor
did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the provincial fiscal at least three days before the hearing thereof
and the court failed to require that a reasonable notice thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court
acted improperly in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard" 14 Just after San Diego, this
Court had occasion to stress anew such a principle in People v. Bocar. 15 As set forth in the opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes: "It cannot be denied that, under our regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal presumption of
innocence before conviction, an accused is entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the only exception being when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. But even in the latter instance, the high regard
reserved by the law for personal freedom is underscored by the provision placing upon the prosecution, not on the
defense, the burden of proving that the accused is not entitled to bail. This protective attitude towards the sanctity of
the liberty of a person notwithstanding, due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should
be afforded full opportunity to present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in
this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such
petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute grave abuse of
discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari." 16

The last sentence in the above excerpt finds application in the matter before us. No grave abuse of discretion yo
justify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has been shown. That is why our resolution sought to be
reconsidered should stand.

3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing the petition through
a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is
had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, 17 what is expected of the judiciary
"is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as
established. Nor is there any regid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity
and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad.
There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide
by what the Constitution directs." 18 What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early
case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, 19 the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous
presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is
to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, 20 the above decision was cited with approval, with the
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following. "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order
appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based
on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is
untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar." 21

It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is subjected, to
searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of
petitioner Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisionary liberty. Under the circumstances, as the
facts of the clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus be unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution
which certainly would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency
shown the parties dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision
arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the
Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of
the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call
for application. In that sense, a minimum resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by
a constitutional command.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing the petitions
for of merit reiterated and the temporary restraining order issue by us on October 16, 1973 lifted so that the case
against petitioner can be duly heard forthwith. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31342 April 7, 1976

JUAN T. BORROMEO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, ALMA AZNAR and JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

G.R. No. L-31740 April 7, 1976

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, ALMA AZNAR and JOSE B. AZNAR, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Matias
H. Aznar, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. BORROMEO, As Special Administrator of the Estate of Simeon
Rallos, respondents.

Vicente J. Francisco for Juan T. Borromeo.

Ciriaco Lopez, Jr. & Associates for Emmanuel B. Aznar, et al.

BARREDO, J.:

Cross-petitions for the review of the per curiam resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 30092-R, Juan T.
Borromeo etc. vs. Emmanuel B. Aznar, et al, dated November 19, 1969 which review entirely its previous decision
of January 30, 1968 thereby ultimately holding that the transactions in question are equitable mortgages instead of
absolute sales of real properties and granting the heirs of the deceased Simeon Rallos a period of one year from the
finality of the resolution within which to effect a redemption of said properties, without prejudice to the right of the
opposing party to foreclose the declared mortgages if no such redemption takes place and the amounts stated in the
documents are not fully paid, arid ordering furthermore the Aznars to pay said heirs P10,000 for and as attorney's
fees and the costs. In G.R. No. L-31342, petitioner Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Simeon Rallos, prays for the modification of the per curiam resolution in order to include an award of moral and
exemplary damages of P200,000 and P50,000, respectively, and to increase the award of attorney's fees to not less
than P75,000, whereas in G.R. No.
L-31740, the Aznars are asking that said resolution be set aside and that the decision of January 30, 1968 be
reinstated and affirmed.

There are three preliminary questions We have to resolve. First, Borromeo contends that this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Aznars in G.R. No. L-31740 because the latter failed to file said petition
within fifteen days from December 20, 1969, the date they were notified of the resolution now under review.
Borromeo's theory is that upon the filing of his own petition in G.R. No. L-31342 on December 20, 1969, by way of
appeal from the aforesaid resolution in so far as it failed to grant him the awards referred to in said petition, the
Court of Appeals was divested of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration which the Aznars filed on
the same date, December 22, 1969, in the Court of Appeals praying for the reversal of the same resolution, copy of
which had been received by them only on December 20, 1969. According to Borromeo, what the Aznars should
have done upon being notified of the filing of the petition in G.R. No. L-31342 should have been to file already their
petition for review with this Court instead of filing or continuing with their motion for reconsideration in the Appellate
Court, and that since the latter court had lost its jurisdiction over the case by reason of his (Borromeo's appeal),
citing in this respect the resolution of this Court of September 3, 1965 in G.R. No. L-24762 (Manila Electric Co. vs.
Public Service Commission et al.), the Aznars' motion for reconsideration did not suspend their period for appeal to
this Court which they made only on February 27, 1970 (erroneously alleged as March 11, 1970 by Borromeo).

Obviously, Borromeo's. contention has absolutely no merit. To start with, when We issued Our resolution of January
13, 1970, granting the Aznars an extension of fifteen (15) days from the time they were to be notified of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of its action on their motion for reconsideration then still pending therein. We
already knew that the petition of Borromeo against the same resolution of the Court of Appeals had already been
filed with Us. In other words, in that resolution, the Court already recognized the right of the Aznars to file their own
separate appeal from the resolution of the Court of Appeals after the reconsideration thereof was to be denied by
the Court of Appeals notwithstanding Borromeo's appeal was already with Us. Besides, to sustain Borromeo's
theory would lead to the absurd proposition that one party may be deprived of the right to appeal from the portion of
a decision against him just because the other party who had been notified of the decision ahead had already
perfected his appeal in so far as the said decision adversely affects him. Indeed, We have already virtually ruled
against such pose of Borromeo in Timoteo Simsim vs. The Hon. Judge Feliciano Belmonte etc. et al., 34 SCRA 536
and People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252. The Meralco resolution invoked by Borromeo is not in point.

Borromeo secondly tries to make capital of the fact that while it is true that the brief of the Aznars was filed on time,
on August 31, 1970, the last day therefor, it did not contain a digest of the arguments nor the text of the resolution
sought to be reviewed, which are required by the rules (Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 56 read together with Section 16 of
Rule 46) and that these requirements were complied with only on September 19, 1970, for which reason, he prays
that their appeal should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule 50. We are not impressed. The digest of
arguments and the copy of the appealed resolution are not in strict sense parts of the brief so as to justify the charge
that the Aznars filed their brief in two parts. No conceivsble prejudice could have been caused to anyone concerned
by their late filing nineteen days after the reglementary period had expired, the brief itself, with the assignments of
error and the arguments supporting them, having been filed already within said period. Of course, it would be Ideal if
all the requirements of the rules were complied with on time, but there is nothing in principle or in the precedents
relied upon by Borromeo that makes it imperative for Us to dismiss an appeal upon no more ground than such
obviously unintentional and harmless technicality as the omission of the requirements herein complained of.

The third preliminary issue raised by Borromeo is that the appeal of the Aznars in G.R. No. L-31342 involves purely
questions of fact. It is argued that the reversal by the Court of Appeals of its original conclusion, upholding the trial
court, that the transactions in question were absolute sales, by holding in its per curiam resolution that they were
actually equitable mortgages, does not constitute an error of law but a mere reappraisal or reweighing of the
evidence which it has the power to do. Borromeo insists that a ruling as to whether a transaction is a sale or a
mortgage involves no more than evaluation of the evidence and is consequently a factual matter beyond the
Supreme Court's authority to review except under peculiar circumstances that do not obtain here.

To be sure, this is not the first instance that a reversal by the Court of Appeals of its own original decision has been
brought to Our attention. And indeed, where the reversal was the result exclusively of a reevaluation or reweighing
of the evidence, this Court has refrained from interfering. No doubt, it would be inimical to the interests of justice and
would not be conducive to the fair and just resolution of judicial controversies to deprive a court of the power to
reconsider possible errors committed by it in any of its actuations. It is in fact one of the inherent powers of courts
"to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." (Section 5 (g),
Rule 135) And the Court of Appeals is certainly included in the contemplation of such rule. The only limitation to this
power is that it cannot be exercised anymore after the action or judgment concerned has already become final and
executory by the expiration of the corresponding reglementary period for the purpose, this as a matter of public
policy requiring that litigations should from the very nature of things have a definite conclusion at a given time even
at the risk of occasional errors or unintended injustice.

We perceive however that the instant case does not fall under the foregoing principles. While the main impugned
resolution does relate ultimately to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals, We see that in reversing its previous
findings of fact, which it arrived at after excluding on grounds of legal incompetency the corresponding evidence
presented by Borromeo, the Appellate Court first reversed those rulings on the admissibility of said evidence and
declared them competent, and then predicated its new factual conclusions on these subsequently admitted
evidence it had rejected in its original decision. And so, it is safe to presume that had not the Appellate Court
reversed its legal rulings on the admissibility or competency of the evidence referred to, it would not have reversed
its actual conclusion as to the nature of the transactions in controversy. Accordingly, and on the theory that if this
Court should hold that the later rulings of the Court of Appeals on the admissibility of evidence are erroneous in law,
the inevitable result would be that the factual conclusions of said court in its original decision, which were favorable
to the Aznars, would be revived, it is now the position of the Aznars that their attack against said later rulings
constitute legal issues over which this Court has jurisdiction. After carefully studying all the points respectively raised
by the parties, We are convinced that this contention is well taken and We shall now proceed to resolve the legal
issues on admissibility of evidence which are extensively, exhaustively and very well discussed by both counsel in
their briefs and other papers filed with the Court and for which they are both worthily deserving of commendation for
unusual diligence and expertise in the work of advocacy, thereby lightening considerably the work of the Court. We
refer equally to the late Senator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for Borromeo, and Atty. Ciriaco Lopez Jr., who is
appearing for the Aznars.

As already stated, the main controversy here centers on the true nature of the three documents, Exhibits A, B and
C, which on their faces are unquestionably deeds of absolute sale of the real properties therein described executed
by the deceased Simeon Rallos on various dates in favor of Emmanuel Aznar, in Exhibits A and C, and his sister,
Alma Aznar, in Exhibit B. In his complaint in the court below, Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of
Simeon Rallos, alleged that these documents were in fact equitable mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by
Matias Aznar, deceased father of Emmanuel and Alma, and prayed for their reformation. The trial court dismissed
the said complaint and on appeal, said dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original decision of
January 30, 1968 penned by Justice Ramon NOLASCO and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francisco B.
Capistrano and Justice Antonio Cañizares The pertinent portions of said decision read thus:

We have examined Exhibits A, B and C carefully, and we find them clear, unambiguous and
unequivocal. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. (Article 1370, Civil Code.) The
intention of the parties is to be deduced from the language employed by them, and the terms of the
contract, where unambiguous, are conclusive, in the absence of averment and proof of mistake, the
question being, not what intention existed in the minds of the parties, but what intention is expressed
by the language used. When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be
determined by its contents alone; and a meaning' cannot be given it other than that expressed. (City
of Manila vs. Rizal Park C., 53 Phil. 515; 17 C.J.S. 700.).

According to the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara, who claimed to have been present when the
transactions took place, her deceased father merely borrowed money from the late Matias Aznar in
the sums of P6,000.00 and P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to the latter
the properties described in Exhibits A, B and C. She testified that the transactions were disguised as
absolute sales and Rallos was assured by Matias Aznar that he could exercise the right to
repurchase the lots and would deliver to him the corresponding options in writing.

We find the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara in this respect unreliable and insufficient to justify
the reformation of the instruments in question. While it is true that relationship does not disqualify a
witness, it calls for a close scrutiny of his testimony. For obvious reasons, the testimony of close
relatives by affinity or consanguinity to corroborate a claim is not given much credence. (People vs.
Guzman, 70 Phil. 23.) As correctly observed by the trial court, her testimony cannot be considered
as absolutely unbiased or impartial, as she was naturally interested in an outcome of the case
favorable to the plaintiff. More than this, however, the record shows that Rallos was even cautioned
by his daughter Crispina and her husband before signing Exhibit A. The fact remains that Exhibits A,
B and C were signed by Rallos himself as a party thereto. His successors-in-interest cannot now be
heard to complain that the parties to said exhibits intended the same to be loans with mortgages
contrary to what are clearly expressed therein. The natural presumption is that one does not sign a
document without first informing himself or its contents, and that presumption acquires greater force
where, as in the case at bar, not only one but several documents, executed at different times, were
signed by Rallos. (Javier vs. Javier, 7 Phil. 261.) It is the duty of every contracting party to learn and
know the contents of a contract before he signs and delivers it. He owes this duty to the other party
to the contract, because the latter may, and probably will pay his money and shape his action in
reliance upon the agreement. To permit a party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that he
signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made, or to allow him to admit that he
signed it but did not read it, or know its stipulations, would absolutely destroy the value of all
contracts. (Tan Tun Sia vs. Yu Bino Sentua, 56 Phil. 711; Moran, Idem pp. 123-124.).

The appellant urges that Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, which, according to Crispina Rallos
Alcantara, were her notations allegedly representing the deductions made by Matias Aznar for
advance interest, attorney's fees and miscellanous expenses are corroborative of her testimony that
the transactions in controversy were really loans with mortgages. We, likewise, find the said exhibits
weak and unsatisfactor as evidence of the facts asserted. They are clearly self-serving, as they were
admittedly prepared by the declarant herself (2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 690; 2 Jones on
Evidence, 2d., Ed., Sec. 895), who was a daughter of the deceased Rallos and who cannot,
therefore, be said to be disinterested witness. With respect to Exhibit J, the option to repurchae Lots
Nos. 462 and 7032, also relied upon by the appellant as allegedly corroborative of the testimony of
Crispina Rallos Alcantara that all the transactions in question were loans secured by mortgages, it is
to be noted that said exhibit his to do with the two lots mentioned therein and none other. Certainly, it
is no proof that Rallos was similarly given a written option to redeem any of the lots covered by
Exhibits B and C, which, according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, was taken back by Matias Aznar
but never renewed. The evidence shows that the period fixed in Exhibit J expired without the lots
involved being redeemed.

To show, too, that Matias Aznar had agreed to the repurchase of the lots in question by Rallos, the
plaintiff presented at the trial of the case Exhibit L, which appears to be a copy of a draft of deed of
absolute sale. This exhibit deserves but the scantest consideration, it being undated, unsigned and
unsubscribed by any purported party thereto. Besides, even granting arguendo that the same was
prepared by a lawyer of the Aznars, as alleged by Crispina Rallos Alcantara, we fail to see its
materiality to the resolution of the main issue involved in this case of whether or not reformation is
proper or justified, as the draft appears to have been drawn in favor of Crispina RalloE Alcantara
who was not a party to the instruments sought to be reformed, and there is nothing in said exhibit to
indicate that the contested transactions were really loans secure by mortgages.

As to Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2 Q-3, R and R-1, which, according to the appellant, were erroneously
ignored by the court below, the same invariably refer to an alleged indebtedness of Rallos to Matias
Aznar and not to the defendants, Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, to whom the properties in question
appear to have been sold (Exhibits A, B and C). The said exhibits fail to show clearly and
satisfactorily that the transactions mentioned therein relate to the same transactions and the same
parcels of land involved in the case at bar.

The appellant further contends that the considerations paid for the lots in dispute were very
inadequate or unusually low which would justify reformation under the provisions of Articles 1602,
paragraph 1, and 1604, of the Civil Code. This contention is untenable.

The evidence shows that Lot No. 7032 was sold to the defendant Emmanuel for P6,000.00 (Exhibit
A), which was higher than its assessed value of P4,447.25 in 1954 when the transaction took place
(Exhibit A-1). The price paid for Lots Nos. 519-B, 519-C, 467 and 490 is P40,000.00 also in lump
sum (Exhibit C). The total consideration for said six lots is P45,000.00, which was more than one-
half, or approximately 60%, of their total assessed value of P74,647.00 at the time of transaction in
1954 (Exhibits B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, C-3 and C4). It is to be noted that at the time of the sale, there
was a mortgage encumbrance of P5,000.00 on Lots Nos. 2713 and 7728 in favor of the Go Chan &
Sons Realty Corporation, while Lots Nos. 519-B, 519-C, 467 and 490 had a mortgage encumbrance
of P20,000.00 in favor of the Philippine National Bank, which obligations were assumed by the
defendants-vendees (Exhibits 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33 and 34). In fact, when Exhibit C was executed,
the indebtedness to the bank was already due and demands for the payment thereof had been
made upon Rallos (Exhibits H and H-1).

On this question of the vsluation of the subject lots, the plaintiff presented HIPOLITO S. Ricardo, at
one time Deputy City Assessor in Cebu City, who testified that the assessment of a real estate
property was only about 40% of its fair market value, but the same was not the basis for determining
the fair market value of a real estate property; that the factors considered by their office in appraising
the fair market value of a real estate property were the transactions of the parties and the prices
appearing in the deeds of sale of the adjacent or neighboring lots, but in the absence thereof, the
capitalization system was used, based upon the investment in the property, its income, plus 6%
interest annually after deductions for taxes paid, insurance premiums, repairs, losses and other
miscellaneous expenses; and that in the assessment of real properties their office had a schedule of
values to be followed, and a partial revision of the assessments was made yearly. According to him,
however, their scheal of was not applied in the assessment of Lots Nos. 2713 and 7728, covered by
tax declarations, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and subject matter of Exhibit B, and of Lots Nos. 519-C, 619-
B, 46'7 and 490, covered by tax declarations, Exhibits C-1, C-2, C-3 and C4 and subject matter of
Exhibit C. As to the assessment of Lot No. 7032, covered by tax declaration, Exhibit A-1, and subject
matter of Exhibit A, the said schedule was used. At any rate, taking the assessment of the seven lots
involved in this case as a reasonable basis for determining their actual valuation at the time of the
transactions, and considering the encumbrances existing on six of the lots and their purchase by the
defendants, Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, at one time and in lump sums, this Court is not prepared to
conclude that under the attendant circumstances, the considerations paid for the lots in question
were unusually inadequate or shockingly low to warrant the application of the provisions of
paragraph No. I of Article 1602 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage. (Manalo vs. Gueco, 42 Phil.
925; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844.)

The appellant points out that, according to the bank records, Exhibits T, T-1, U U-1, V, V-1, W and
W-1, the appraised values of the lots mortgaged with the bank were considerably higher than the
prices paid for them. The fact remains, however, that the mortgage obligation of Rallos secured by
the same six lots was only P20,000.00, which was assumed by the defendants-vendees. Besides,
no bank appraiser or representative was presented by the plaintiff at the trial to testify as to how the
appraised values appearing in said exhibits were arrive at.

On the other hand, the testimony of Vicente Kyamko also relied upon by the appellant to prove the
alleged fair market values of the subject lots, deserves but scant consideration. The said witness
admitted that he was not a licensed appraiser, and that he did not know what the assessed values of
the lots in question were in 1954, although, according to him, the assessed value of a real property
was the basis for computing or estimating its fair market value. However, even
granting arguendo that there were differences in value or some inadequacy of consideration here,
nevertheless; the same cannot be said to be controlling when viewed in the light of the entire
evidence Page 341 adduced in this case. A difference in value is not always a decisive factor for
determining whether the contract is one of sale with right to repurchase or a mere loan with
guaranty. (Ocuma vs. Olandesca [CL] 47 O.G. 1902.) Mere inadequacy is not a sufficient ground for
the rescission or resolution of a contract when both parties, as in the instant case, were in a position
to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction. (Askay vs. Coselan 46 Phil. 179.)

In its tenth assignment of error, the appellant assails the trial court's finding that the defendant
vendees were in possession of the lots in question after the execution of the deeds of absolute sale,
Exhibits A, B, and C. It contends that the defendants never possessed the contested lots. We see no
merit in this contention.

The records show that after the execution of the documents in question, the defendants, Emmanuel
and Alma Aznar, transferred in their names the tax declarations covering the properties sold to them,
paid the taxes thereon and caused the issuance of new certificates of title accordingly (Exhibits 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40). They demanded for the payment to them
of the rentals due from the tenants of the lots, and began to collect the rentals from them after the
maturity of the promissory note of Rallos for P1,800.00, Exhibit I, which, according to the defendant,
Emmanuel, represented the rentals for one year collected in advance by Rallos from the lessees.
Thereafter, defendants Emmanuel and Alma Aznar filed detainer suits against those occupants who
failed to pay their rents to them (Exhibits D to D-21, inclusive, 41, 41-A, 41-B, 41-C and 41-D).
Certainly, those facts belie the appellant's claim that the defendant vendees were never in
possession of the lots in dispute.

From the evidence adduced, we are satisfied that after the execution of the deeds of absolute sale,
Exhibits A, B and C, the defendants vendees took possession of the subject lots, and they were in
possession thereof and collected the rentals due until the plaintiff's administrator was authorized by
the court a quo to collect the rents and deposit them in a bank, subject to the court's disposition.

The appellant capitalizes, too, on the statement, Exhibit K, which allegedly shows that Matias Aznar
charged Rallos with the payment of the taxes due on the contested lots. According to Crispina Rallos
Alcantara, the said exhibit was prepared by an employee of Matias Aznar upon the latter's orders,
when she went to see him concerning the repurchase of the lots. This, however, was denied by the
defendant, Emmanuel Aznar, who claimed that after the sale, neither Rallos nor his daughter
Crispina went to see any of the Aznars in their office for the redemption of the lots. The exhibit in
question, allegedly a statement of account of Rallos to Matias Aznar involving the disputed
transactions is neither dated nor signed. much less by the party sought to be charged. The alleged
writer thereof was not presented at the trial of the case, and we have only the biased testimony of
Crispina as to its authenticity or preparation. Even if it were true, however, that the writing was
made, as alleged by Crispina, we cannot consider the name as proof of what was said or transacted
then. The mere making of written -memorandum immediately after the interview does not make the
memorandum affirmative intrinsic proof of the things said or transacted. (32 CJS 948.) Knowledge
on the part of the person who made the memorandum, at the time it was made, that the statements
or entries therein were correct must be shown (32 OJS 947), and this the plaintiff failed to do. On the
other hand, the record indubitably shows that after the execution of the questioned instruments, the
taxes on the lots subject matter thereof were paid by the defendants vendees. Consequently, we
 hold that Exhibit K has no evidentiary value, and the lower court was correct in disregarding it ( Pp
82- 95, Record of L-31740.)

However, in its per curiam resolution of November 19, 1969, wherein Presiding Justice Capistrano who had by then
been elevated to this Court was substituted by his successor Presiding Justice Julio Villamor, this rather strong
position taken by the appellate court was completely reversed by itself as follows:

While it is true that in our decision rendered in this case, we held that the notations or memoranda of
Crispina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B3 and C5 were self-serving and
unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted (Decision, p. 24), the same, however, as now
correctly contended by the plaintiff-appellant in his motion for reconsideration, may be considered as
constituting part of the res gestae, and as such, are admissible in evidence to show the nature of the
contracts in question and the relation of the parties involved.

Statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main ion
as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate qualify, or the act, are admissible
as part of the res gestae. Accordingly, the attendant circumstances and the
statements then made by the pudes are admissible as part of the res gestae to show
the execution of a contract, and, where relevant, matters said and done which are
parts of the res gestae of the negotiation and execution of a contract are admissible
to show the existence and nature of the contract and the relation of the parties.
Matters attendant upon a sale or conveyance may also be admissible m part of the
res gestae. (32 CJS 30-32.)

Coversations occurring during the negotiation of a loan or other transaction, as well

as the instrument given or received, being part of the res gestae, are competent
evidence to show the Page 343 nature of the transaction and the parties for whose
benefit it was made, where that fact is material. (National Bank vs Kennedy, 17 Wall.
[U.S.] 19, 21 L. Ed. 554, cited in 20 Am. Jur. 57.)

... The character of the transaction is precisely what the intention of the parties at the
time made it. It will therefore be discovered that the testimony of those who were
present at the time the instrument was made, and especially of those who
participated in the transaction, becomes most important. (Cuyugan vs. Santos, 34
Phil. 100, 114-115.)

Thus, while the testimony of Crispina Rallos Alcantara may nor, be free from bias, she being the
daughter of the deceased, Simeon Rallos, the same should not, however, be totally rejected on the
ground of bias alone (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil. 124; People vs. Pagaduan 37 Phil. 90), considering
that it appears to be clearly and sufficiently supported by memoranda which, as already stated, are
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae (Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5) and by the ledgers
of the Philippine National 7 Bank .(Exhibits X and Y). Besides, mere relationship of a witness to a
party does not discredit his testimony in court, (U.S. vs. Mante, supra.)

In this connection, the appellant has pointed out in his motion under consideration that on of this
Court's decision, there was an erroneous citation of C.J.S., i.e., Vol. 32 pp. 947-948 thereof. The
said citation, however, appears and may be found in the 1964 edition of the Corpus Juris Secundum,
Vol. 32, pages 947-948.

In the case at bar, there is another factor why the transactions in question should be considered as
equitable mortgages. This factor consists of the unusual inadequacy of the prices of the sale of the
properties involved. For purposes of comparison, the prices paid for the properties mentioned in
Exhibits A, B and C and the asses values thereof are hereunder tabulated:

Lot No. Purchase Assessment

Price as per Tax
declaration

7032 P6,000.00 P4.447.25

(Exh. A) (Exh. A-1)

2713) 4,679.00
(Exh. B-1)

7728) 5,000.00 9,308.00

(Exh, B, (Exh. B- 2)

519- 150.00
C) (Exh. C-1)

519- 31.300.00
B) (Exh. C-2)

467 ) 17,760.00
(Exh. C-3)
 490 ) 40,000.00 11,440.00
(Exh. C) (Exh. C-4)

P51,000.00 P79,084.25

From the foregoing tabulation, it can be seen that the total amount paid to Simeon Rallos for all the
properties involved is only P51,000.00 as against the total assessed values thereof which amounted
to P79,084.25, or a difference of P28,084.25. In short, the total sum paid as purchase price for the
subject lots represents only 64% of their total assessed valuation. To our mind, this constitutes a
strong indication that the transactions in question were really loans with mortgages and not absolute
sale.

Moreover, it appears that Lots Nos. 519-C, 519-B, 467 and 490 covered by the deed of absolute
sale (Exhibit C) were previously mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, which obligation was
assumed by the supposed vendee in the transaction under consideration. As appraised by the
Philippine National Bank and as shown in its inspection and appraisal report, marked as Exhibits T,
U and V in this case, the market values, respectively, of said properties are as follows:

TCT No. 1096 - Lot No. 490

Market value - Land

572 sq. m. at P25/sq. m. ...................P14,300.00

TCT No. 10915 - Lot No. 467

Market value - land

888 sq. m. at P25/sq. m. ...................P22,200.00

TCT No. 10832 - Lots Nos.

519-B and 519-C

Market value - land

14,242 sq. m. at P10/sq. m. ................142,420.00

Total. . . . . . . . . . P178,920.00.

There is, therefore, a difference of P138,920.00 between the purchase price of the same properties
stated at P40,000.00 in the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) and the total market value as appraised
by the Philippine National Bank amounting to P178,920.00.

Under Republic Act 357, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, a bank may grant loans
against a real estate security and improvements thereon on the basis of the appraised value of the
real estate made by the bank itself. Section 78 of said Act provides that "loans against real estate
security shall not exceed 70% of the appraised value of the improvement." Inasmuch as the
appraisal of the mortgage values of the lots in question were made by competent officers of the
Philippine National Bank in the performance of their assigned duties and who are presumed to have
regularly performed such duties, the same are not only admissible in evidence but are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (Section 38, Rule 130,
Rules of Court.)

If a prima facie, case exists, it sustains the quantum of evidence on the point which it covers, shifting
the burden of proof to the other party. It relieves a party of the burden of proving the fact presumed.
The same result is effected by any substitute for evidence, such as statutory regulations
prescribing prima facie evidence of specified facts. (1 Jones on, Evidence 2 Ed., Sec. 369.)

It results, therefore, as previously stated, that the appraisal of the lots in question made by the
officials of the Philippine National Bank in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law is not
only admissible in evidence, but is a prima facie evidence of the specified facts stated therein. The
defendants, however, presented no evidence to rebut the same. We have here, therefore, a case
where four of the seven lots involved appear to have been sold for the total sum of P40,000.00
(Exhibit C), which is equivalent to only 22% of their market values as appraised by the Philippine
National Bank. Certainly, this fact clearly bolsters the plaintiff's claim that the transactions in
controversy were really loans secured by mortgages and not absolute sales, as there is gross
unusual inadequacy of the prices paid for the same. The fact that the properties were mortgaged
 and a notice of lis pendens was annotated on the corresponding certificate of title at the time of the
sale does not lessen nor affect the values of the lands.

It has been held that in determining the amount of compensation, or the market value
of the property taken, no account should be given ... to the fact that the property is
mortgaged. (City of Detroit vs. Fidelity Realty Co., 182 N. W. 140, 213 Mich., cited in
29 C.J.S. 972-973.)

As regards the lis pendens annotation on the certificates of title of the subject lots, the facts show
that the same arose from the action for support filed by Lourdes Rallos against her husband, Simeon
Rallos. Such annotation appears to be improper as an action for support is one in personam and a
notice of lis pendens is available only in real actions, that is, actions affecting the title to or the right
of possession of real property and not in any other action. (Saavedra vs. Martinez, 58 Phil. 767;
Garchitorena vs. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. L-9731, May 11, 1957; Somes vs. Government of the
Phil., 62 Phil. 432; and Geronimo vs. Navs, G.R. No. L-12111, January 31, 1969.)

On the question of possession of the properties in litigation, however, which was likewise raised by
the appellant in his motion under consideration, we are not disposed to disturb our findings on this
point. At least, the records show that after the execution of the documents in question (Exhibits A, B
and C), the defendants exercise over the litigated properties acts constitutive of dominion and
possession for sometime prior to the appointment of the plaintiff-appellant as the administrator
thereof in 1957. The transferred in then names the tax declarations of the properties described
therein, cause the issuance of new certificates of title thereto accordingly in July, August and
November, 1954, and paid the corresponding taxes therein (Exhibits 7 to 12, 21 to 26 and 36 to 40).
Prior to the institution of the present action, the defendants, too, appeared to have demanded for the
payment to them of the rentals due from the lands in dispute, and in 1956, they filed detainer suits
against the occupants thereof who failed or refused to pay the rents to them (Exhibits D to D-21,
inclusive, and 41, 41-A to 41-D, inclusive).

It appears, to that after the death of Simeon Rallos in 1956, the plaintiff who was appointed special
administrator of the decedents estate was authorized by the court a quo to collect the rentals due
from subject premises in an order issued on August 8, 1957 and had since then been in possession
of the lots in question up to the present (printed Record on Appeal, pp. 34-38). Thus, paragraph 2 of
Article 1602 of the Civil Code is not applicable in the present case.( Pp. 117-124. Id.)

Thus, as may be seen, in overturning its own previous conclusion that the deeds in question are really absolute
sales by subsequently finding that they are equitable mortgages, the Court of Appeals did not do it by just
committing a turnabout in its appreciation or evaluation of the evidence. Rather, it reversed first its rulings on the
admissibility of the relevant evidence by admitting those it had rejected in its original decision and then premised the
reversal of its conclusions therein on these newly admitted evidence. Indeed, it appears to Us from the above
ratiocination of the Court of Appeals in its per curiam resolution, considered together with the arguments adduced by
it relative to the same matters in its original decision, that had that court found no reason to admit and take into
account said evidence, it would not have reversed its previous finding that the subject deeds are absolute sales. In
the final analysis, therefore, the specific question of law raised by the Aznars in this appeal is whether or not the
Court of Appeals committed a legal error in admitting the evidence it had originally held to be incompetent. To
reiterate, it is evidently their position that in the affirmative, no alternative is left to Us except to grant the prayer of
their petition.

The thrust of the per curiam resolution is that the plaintiff Borromeo was able to prove that the defendants Aznars
"retained part of the purchase price" stipulated in deeds in question and that there was unusual inadequacy of said
purchase price thereby justifying the use in this case of the presumption created by Article 1602 of the Civil Code
whenever said circumstances are shown (Paragraphs 1 and 4 of said article). According to the Court of Appeals,
these circumstances were proven through, among other evidence, the testimony of plaintiff Crispina Rallos,
Alcantara, the daughter of the deceased Simeon Rallos, who declared that she was present on all occasions when
the three transactions in dispute took place between her father and Matias Aznar and that while thus listening to
their conversations she took down notes of the various amounts mentioned by them and the respective purposes
thereof such as interest, attorney's fees, other obligations to be paid out of the money being borrowed by her father,
etc., which notes were Identified at the trial as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5. More specifically, the Court of
Appeals held that because the testimony of the witness Alcantara was corroborated by these notes, it should be
believed, from which it can be gathered that it was only because said notes were considered by it as inadmissible
that in its original decision, said testimony and notes were deemed to be without evidentiary value for being self-
serving. "While it is true," says the appealed resolution, "that in our decision rendered in this case, we held that the
notations or memoranda of Cristina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5. More specifically,
the Court of Appeals held that because the testimony and notes were deemed to be without evidentiary value for
being self-serving. "While it is true," says the appealed resolution, "that in our decision rendered in this case, we
held hat the notations or memoranda of Cristina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibit A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 were self-
serving and unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted (Decision, p. 24), the same, however, as nor correctly
contended by plaintiff-appellant in his motion for reconsideration, may be considered as constituting part of the res
gestae, and as such are admissible in evidence to show the nature of the contracts in question and the relation of
the parties involved." (p. 18, Annex C of the petition.) It is the ruling upholding the admissibility of said notes and
memoranda as parts of the res gestae that the Aznars contend to be a legal error committed by the Court of
Appeals.

We cannot see how the disputed notes and memoranda can be considered in any sense as part of the res gestaeas
this matter is known in the law of evidence. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that Crispina was not a
party to the transaction in question. Only Simeon Rallos, on the one hand, and Matias Aznar, if she is to be
believed, or Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, as the documents show, on the other, were the parties thereto. The record
does not reveal why Crispina was with her father and the time, hence, there can be no basis for holding that she
actually took part in the transaction. That she allegedly took notes thereof while there present made her at best only
a witness not a party. It cannot be said, therefore, that her taking down of her alleged notes, absent any showing
that she was requested or directed by the parties to do so or that the parties, more particularly the Aznars, who are
being sought to be bound by then, knew what she was doing, constitute part of the transaction, the res gestae itself.
If such alleged taking of notes by Crispina has to be given any legal significance at all, the most that it can be is that
it is one circumstance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one circumstance relevant to the main fact in dispute.
In other words it could at the most be only circumstantial evidence.

The trouble however is that the admission of said notes and memoranda suffers from a fatal defect. No witness
other than Crispina has testified as to the veracity of her testimony relative to her alleged notes and memoranda.
Not even her husband who, according to her, was present on one of the occasions in issue, was called to testify. It
cannot be denied that Crispina is interested in the outcome of this case. In the words of the Court of Appeals itself in
its original decision, "her testimony cannot be considered as absolutely unbiased or impartial", hence, "unreliable
and insufficient to justify the reformation of the instruments in question." Such being the case, how can the notes
and memoranda in dispute add any weight to her testimony, when she herself created them? Surely, they cannot
have anymore credibility than her own declarations given under oath in open court.

The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties relative to the issue of whether or not self-serving statements
may be admitted in evidence as parts of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but We fee they are
rather very interesting and illuminating, but We feel they are rather off tangent. The notes supposedly prepared by
witness Alcantara during the transaction between her father and the Aznars do not partake at all of the nature of
hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda contemplated in Section 10 or Rule 132 which provides:

SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the
witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly
stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that there is need to refresh the
memory of the witness, which is not the case here. Nowhere in the record is there any indication that Alcantara
needed during her testimony the aid of any memorandum in respect to the matters contained in the notes in dispute.
Besides, under the above witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple
reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the
witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be
corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he support
his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion
in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this
requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with
caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true
when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence, which is exactly the
case of Crispina Alcantara.

The other pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals in its original decision but
which it subsequently admitted upon motion for reconsideration of Borromeo, thereby causing the appellate court to
reverse its own affirmatory conclusion as to the nature of the transactions in dispute as absolute sales, are the
following:

1. Exhibit J, the document giving Simeon Rallos the option to "repurchase" the lots sold under
Exhibit A, which however expired without Rallos excercising the same.

2. Exhibits X and Y, alleged ledgers of the Philippine National Bank apparently showing the items in
the current account of Southwestern Colleges, Inc. purportedly corresponding to the checks
allegedly issued by Matias Aznar to Simeon Rallos in the course of the controversial transactions
herein invoked and which, it is contended, proves that the amounts actually received by Rallos were
less than the stipulated prices, because corresponding interests for the alleged loan had already
been deducted.

3. Exhibit K, supposedly a statement of the account of Rallos with Matias Aznar allegedly by
Crispina Alcantara to have been prepared by an employee of Aznar who, however, was not called to
testify.

4. Exhibits T, U and V, purported inspection and appraisal reports allegedly submitted by

investigators of the Philippine National Bank to whom the property described in Exhibit C covering
four lots, Nos. 467, 490, 519-B and 519-C had been mortgaged indicating therein the market value
thereof as appraised by said investigators and on the basis of which Borromeo now maintains that
there was inadequacy of the purchase price in said deed of sale Exhibit C for the purposes of the
presumption in Article 1602 of the Civil Code that the disputed transactions are equitable mortgages.
As regards Exhibit J, the contention of the Aznars is that in its per curiam resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed
itself as to the evidentiary value of this exhibit without giving any reason at all. What is worse, whereas in its original
decision, the Appellate Court pointedly held that since Exhibit J was an option to repurchase that had expired
without being exercised, it could not alter the true nature of Exhibit A, the deed of absolute sale of the properties to
which said options refers, in its resolution, this exhibit was used as basis for the further inference that there were
also similar options relative to the other two sales in question, Exhibits B and C, merely because Crispina Alcantara
testified that Aznar, hence the same could not be produced.

Again, We find the position of the Aznars to be well taken. True it is that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of
question of fact and as such has the inherent power to reverse its findings. For it, however, to alter its factual
findings without any adequate basis borders on being whimsical and capricious. At the very least, to do is such a
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision. (Section 4 (b), Rule 45.) In this case of Exhibit J here, nowhere in the appealed
resolution is there any explanation for the Court's turnabout. The casual reference in the said resolution of Exhibit J
as being corroborative of the testimony of Crispina Alcantara together with her notes, Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-
5, is certainly an unwarranted conclusion, considering specially that We have already ruled above that there was no
legal basis for the Appellate Court's reversal of its original position as to said notes themselves. In this connection,
the same notes constitute the main support of Crispina's testimony, hence the corroborative force of Exhibit J must
necessarily dissipate without them. Indeed, under the circumstances, with the notes of Crispina being inadmissible,
and absent any other pertinent document to back up her work, the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals
regarding options to repurchase the properties covered by Exhibits B and C appear hollow and baseless.

The appealed resolution also reversed the Appellate Court's original pose anent the admissibility of Exhibits X and Y
by attributing to it corroborative evidentiary value of the testimony of Crispina, although it did not even mention said
exhibits in its earlier decision. As in the case of the exhibits previously discussed, We are of the considered opinion
that it was legal error for the Court of Appeals to have thus ruled in favor of the admission of these exhibits, X and Y
merely by implication. It is true that their contents were discussed in the resolution, but no reason is given therein
why they have suddenly become admissible.

These exhibits purport to be ledgers of the Philippine National Bank corresponding to the current account of the
Southwestern Colleges owned by the Aznars. Now, it is undisputed that these exhibits were offered only in rebuttal
and that no witness testified on them, not even for purposes of Identification. How the Appellate Court came to take
them into account is surprising, considering that the appealed resolution does not contain the slightest discussion
relative to these exhibits. Obviously, such a procedure cannot deserve Our sanction. We reject it as unjudicial.

The same observation may be made with respect to Exhibits T, U and V. No one testified as to their controversial
contents. Nobody even Identified them. They were just marked and shoved in as part of the documentary evidence
of Borromeo in rebuttal. In an effort to give them a semblance of admissibility, counsel now contends that they are
public documents appearing to have been prepared by employees of the Philippine National Bank. But although this
bank is a government bank, it is not wholly owned by the government, there being private persons owning shares
thereof. This is a matter of judicial notice. Officials and employees of the Philippine National Bank are not, therefore,
public officers within the contemplation of Section 38 of Rule 130. Moreover, assuming otherwise or that these
exhibits could have any standing as public or official records, under Section 35 of Rule 132, they do not prove
themselves, as certain requisites must be complied with before they can be admitted, none of which appears to
have been established in connection with the exhibits in question. Worse, it is clear in the record that these exhibits
relate to only one of the three transactions herein involved. Accordingly, We do not see any justification at all for
their admission as evidence to prove the true nature of the said transactions.

Very little needs be said of Exhibit K. In its original decision, the Appellate Court rejected this exhibit holding: "The
exhibit in question, allegedly a statement of account of Rallos to Matias Aznar involving the disputed transaction is
neither dated nor signed, much less by the party sought to be charged. The alleged writer thereof was not presented
at the trial of the case, and we have only the biased testimony of Crispina as to its authenticity or preparation. Even
if it were true, however, that the writing was made, as alleged by Crispina, we cannot consider the same as proof of
what was said or transacted then. The mere making of written memorandum immediately after the interview does
not make the memorandum affirmative intrinsic proof of the things said or transacted. (32 C.J.S. 948.) Knowledge
on the part of the person who made the memorandum, at the time it was made, that the statements or entries
therein were correct must be shown (32 C.J.S. 947), and this the plaintiff failed to do. On the other hand, the record
indubitably shows that after the execution of the questioned instruments, the taxes on the lots subject matter thereof
were paid by the defendants vendees. Consequently, we hold that Exhibit K has no evidentiary value, and the lower
court was correct in disregarding it." (Pages 94-95, Record of L-31740.) On the other hand, in the impugned
resolution, the only mention made of Exhibit K is but casual thus: "Crispina Rallos Alcantara went to Matias Aznar to
know the total indebtedness of her father, which, according to Aznar had accumulated to P55,428.00 (Exhibit K)."

We are not prepared to give Our assent to such a mode of treating a factual issue. If anything, the subsequent
treatment thus given to the document in question reflects lack of serious consideration of the material points in
dispute. That is not the way to decide judicial controversies. While courts do not have to so rationalize their
decisions as to meet all the arguments of counsel to the satisfaction of the latter, it is imperative for the credibility of
the judiciary and the maintenance of the people's faith therein that pivotal contentions be not treated in cavalier
fashion that leaves the motive or grounds for the court's ruling to pure speculation and imagination. The attempt of
counsel to classify this exhibit as some kind of admission by Matias Aznar is without merit, if only because it was not
to Crispina, the witness, to whom the alleged admission was made and it is not explained why the supposed
employee of Aznar, a certain Baltazar, who imputedly prepared it was not called to testify and be cross-examined.

In the final analysis, therefore, it is evident that the Court of Appeals has sought to support its reversing per curiam
resolution with props that are legally untenable. True it is that the reversal involves factual findings, but as already
explained earlier, a careful review of the appealed resolution reveals unmistakably that the reversal was induced by
the reconsideration by the Court of its previous rulings on the admissibility of the relevant evidence, such that its
original conclusions of fact would not have been altered had the Court not been convinced by the motion for
reconsideration of Borromeo that the exhibits it had rejected or refused to consider are admissible under the law. In
these premises, and it being Our considered view that the rulings in the appealed resolution as to the admissibility of
the exhibits concerned are legally erroneous, the irresistible conclusion is hat the original decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the trial court must stand. Indeed, We have gone over both decisions and We are satisfied
that they were studied and are in accord with law and justice.

We are not overlooking the point by counsel that some of the exhibits in question (Exhibits X and Y and T, U and V)
were not specifically objected to on the grounds We have discussed above. The truth is that counsel's proposition is
not entirely accurate. These exhibits are supposed to be records of the Philippine National Bank, but nobody
testified to even Identify them as genuine. And they were introduced only in rebuttal. True it is that the technical
objections mentioned by Aznars' counsel when they were offered were general — for being immaterial, irrelevant
and impertinent, but the explanation accompanying these general grounds included the point that defendants were
being deprived of the right to cross-examine the ones who prepared the exhibits. In fact, the objecting counsel is
quoted to have expressly argued that "It appears that these exhibits are hearsay." (referring to Exhibits T U and V
(Page 241, Brief for Respondents.) Furthermore, inasmuch as the Court of Appeals failed to give any reason for
overturning its previous conclusions, without explaining why it considered these evidence admissible, after ruling
against them in the original decision, We deem it superfluous to rule squarely on counsel's contention.

That somehow the Court of Appeals has been overly swayed by the masterly presentation of Borromeo's case by
his notably brilliant counsel is, of course, understandable in the course of the administration of human justice but it is
the ever existing responsibility of judges to guard themselves against being awed by the professional proficiency
and fame of the lawyers appearing before them and to be doubly careful in studying and resolving the issues they
raise. And in this respect, there is no substitute for well grounded preparation, up-to-dateness in the development of
the law and legal principles and an adequate sense of logic and proportion inspired solely by probity of the highest
order. The assertion made in some quarters about alleged inherent inequality before the courts resulting from the
disparity of the abilities of respective counsels of the parties cannot have real ground for being, if only the judges
remain conscious of the inevitable fact that they are supposed to possess the levelling factor their own knowledge
pitted against those of the most learned advocates, to augment the possible inadequacy of the opposing attorney,
who in most cases are of the poor who cannot afford the fees of better barristers.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the per curiam resolution of the Court of Appeals appealed in G.R. No. L-
31740 is hereby reversed and the original decision of that court dated January 30, 1968 in CA-G.R. No. 30092-R is
affirmed. In consequence, obviously, the prayer of the petition in G.R. No. L-31342 being to augment the reliefs
granted by the appealed resolution to Borromeo cannot be granted, hence said petition is hereby ordered
dismissed. Costs against Borromeo, as administrator of the estate of Simeon Rallos.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs the result.

Fernando, J., is on leave.

Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.