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Jurisprudence – Estafa by Misappropriation

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Estafa
1. Define Estafa
Estafa is a criminal offense wherein a person defrauds another by the following
means:

1) By UNFAITHFULNESS or ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE;


2) By DECEIT;
3) By FRAUDULENT MEANS/

Estafa is committed by a person who defrauds another causing him to suffer


damage, by means of unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or of false pretense or
fraudulent acts.

2. Explain “Estafa through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence.”


Estafa through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence is done by:

(a) Altering quality, quantity and substance of subject matter of contract;


(b) Misappropriating or converting goods/property of another;
(c) Taking advantage of a signature in blank

3. Explain “Estafa through deceit or fraudulent acts.”


Estafa through deceit or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud is done by:

(a) Using fictitious name as means of deceit;


(b) Altering quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to art or business;
(c) By issuing unfunded checks or postdated checks;
(d) Availing of services of hotel, inn, restaurants etc. without paying therefor.

4. Explain “Estafa through fraudulent means.”


Estafa through fraudulent means is done by:

(a) Inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document;


(b) Resorting to some fraudulent practice to ensure success in a gambling game;
(c) Removing, concealing, or destroying, in whole or in part, any record, office
files, document and other papers.

5. What are the indispensable elements of estafa?


Estafa has two indispensable basic elements:

(a) Fraud; and


(b) Resulting damage or intent to cause damage capable of pecuniary estimation.

6. What is Fraud?
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another,
or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a
generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by
false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick,
cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit
is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so he shall act upon it to
his legal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. (Alcantara v. Court of
Appeals, 416 SCRA 418 (1998))
Deceit is a species of fraud. (Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785, 11 September
1985)
7. Is “intent to defraud” a necessary element of estafa?
Not really. Intent to defraud is not necessary in all types of estafa.

It is true that it is sometimes said that "deception with intent to defraud" is an


essential requisite of the crime of estafa, but while this is true as to estafas in
general, it is not true of those estafasmentioned in the article under consideration,
except in so far the abuse of confidence in misappropriating the funds or property
after they have come to the hands of the offender may be said to be a fraud upon
the person injured thereby. (United States v. Pascual, G.R. No. L-4265, 26
March 1908)

8. What kind of damage or intent to cause damage is required in Estafa?


Damage or prejudice may consist of:
(a) The offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result of the
defraudation;
(b) Disturbance of property rights;
(c) Temporary prejudice.
(Nagrampa v. People, 435 Phil. 455)

Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself


sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC. (Batulanon v. People, G.R. No. 139857, 15 September 2006)

9. What are the elements of Estafa with unfaithfulness, under Article 315,
par. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code?
The elements of Estafa under Article 315, 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code,

(a) That the offender has an onerous obligation to deliver something of value;
(b) That he alters its substance, quantity or quality
(c) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third persons;

10. What if the obligation asked is illegal?


It is still estafa even if the obligation be based is immoral or illegal.
11. What are the elements of Estafa with abuse of confidence, under Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code?
The elements of Estafa under Article 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,

(a) That money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and
(c) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another;
(d) That there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
(Asejo v. People, 555 Phil. 106, (2007))

The second element establishes three ways in which estafa may be committed
under this category:
1. Misappropriation of the thing received – the act of taking something for one’s
own benefit;
2. Conversion of the thing received – the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as it was one’s own;
3. Denial of the receipt of the thing received.

12. What do you mean by “Misappropriation” or “conversion”?


The words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used in the aforequoted Article
315, connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s
own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
"misappropriate" a thing of value for one’s own use or benefit, not only the
conversion to one’s personal advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without a right. (Sy v. People, G.R. No. 85785, 24 April 1989)

It is well-settled that the essence of estafa thru misappropriation is the


appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner (U.S. vs. Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67).
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. (Lee v. People, G.R.No. 157781, 11 April
2005)

Failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is


circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. (People v. Sullano, G.R. No. L-
18209, 30 June 1966)

13. What do you mean by denial of the receipt of the thing received?
It means that a person who has possession of a thing, does not return or denies
receiving the thing to the owner.

There are two kinds of possession:


a) Material Possession – The actual physical possession of personal property,
where the possessor cannot claim a better right to such a property than that of its
owner.
b) Juridical Possession – It is present when the possession of the personal
property arises from a lawful causation, contract or agreement, express or implied,
written or unwritten or by virtue of a provision of law.

When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender
from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration,
the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. (Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 1990)

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.

14. Is there a difference between Theft and Estafa?


Yes. If the offender has been given Material Possession of the personal property
and he misappropriates the same, he is liable for the crime of THEFT.

However, if the offender has been given Juridical Possession and Material
Possession of the personal property and he misappropriates the same, he is liable
for the crime of ESTAFA.
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between
the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives
the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft
even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with
the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession
of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa."

15. What are the elements of theft as compared to Estafa?


Theft has the following elements:
(a) That there be taking of personal property;
(b) That said property belongs to another;
(c) That the taking be done with intent to gain;
(d) That the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
(e) That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons or force against things.
(U.S. v. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000)

16. What is the nature of Demand needed as element of Estafa?


There must be a formal demand on the offender to comply with his obligation
before he can be charged with estafa.

The following are the exceptions:


a) When the offender’s obligation to comply is subject to a period;
b) When the accused cannot be located despite due diligence.

There can be no estafa without a previous demand. Demand may be made in


whatever form. The law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the
existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account,
upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same however, be established in the case at bar. (Tubb v.
People, G.R. No. L-9811, 22 April 1957)
The word "Demand" need not be used to show that demand had, indeed, been
made upon the person charged with the offense. A query as to the whereabouts of
the money is tantamount to a demand. (Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, 313
SCRA 477)

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need
not even be formal; it may be verbal. (Lee v. People, G.R. No. 157781, 11 April
2005)

In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of


misappropriation or conversion. (Sy v. People, G.R. No. 85785, 24 April 1989)

The consummation of the crime of [estafa]… does not depend on the fact that a
request for the return of the money is first made and refused in order that the
author of the crime should comply with the obligation to return the sum
misapplied. The appropriation or conversion of money received to the prejudice of
the owner thereof [is] the sole essential [fact] which constitute the crime of
[estafa], and thereupon the author thereof incurs the penalty imposed by the
[RPC]. (Salazar v. People, 439 Phil. 762)

Even if demand is not required by law, it is necessary to prove misappropriation.


Failure to account, upon demand, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 153460, 29 January 2007)

17. What are the elements of Estafa by taking undue advantage of the
signature in blank, under Article 315, par. 1(c) of the Revised Penal Code?
The elements of Estafa by taking undue advantage of the signature in blank are:

(a) That the paper with the signature of the offended party be in blank;
(b) That the offended party should have delivered it to the offender;
(c) That above the signature of the offended party a document is written by the
offender without authority to do so;
(d) That the document so written creates a liability of, or causes damage to the
offended party or any third person.
18. What are the elements of Estafa by means of deceit, under Article 315,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code?
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit are as follows:

(a) That there must be false pretenses, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
(b) That such pretenses, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means;
(d) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

19. What are the acts which would constitute a deceitful act?
As a general rule, in order to constitute deceit, there must be a false representation
as a matter of fact, a positive assertion of falsehood. (People vs. Manahan, CA-
G.R. No. 19602-R, 20 May 1958)

It might also consist in a fraudulent misrepresentation or contrivance by which one


man deceives another who has no means of detecting the fraud to the injury of
another. (People vs. Babel, 10 CAR 133)

There is no deceit if the complainant was aware if the fictitious nature of the
pretense.

20. What if the element of deceit was done AFTER the fraudulent act?
One of the elements of estafa is that “The false pretense or fraudulent act must be
committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.” If deceit
was not present or occurred after the commission of the fraud, there is no estafa.
Likewise also, if the deceit was not the motivating factor for the offended party to
get involved in a transaction with the offending party.

21. If there was no fraud on the part on the offending party, will the case for
Estafa prosper?
No. Fraud is an element of Estafa. Its absence is fatal to the prosecution of the
case. When the allegation of deceit has not been proven, there is no
Estafa. (Candido dela Cruz, CA 37 O.G. 1958)

22. How is Estafa by means of deceit committed:


Estafa by means of deceit are committed in the following ways:

a) Art. 315, 2 (a)


i) By using a fictitious name.
ii) By falsely pretending to possess
1. i. Power
2. ii. Influence
3. iii. Qualifications
4. iv. Property
5. v. Credit
6. vi. Agency
7. vii. Business or imaginary transactions
iii) By means of other similar deceits

b) Art. 315, 2 (b) – By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything


pertaining to his business.

c) Art. 315, 2 (c) – By pretending to have bribed any government employee

d) Art. 315, 2 (d)


i) That the offender post-dated a check or issued a check in payment of an
obligation;
ii) That such postdating or issuing a check was done when the offender had no
funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check.

e) Art 315, 2 (e)


i) By obtaining food, refreshment or accommodation at hotel, inn, restaurant,
boarding house, lodging house or apartment house without paying thereof, with
intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof;
ii) By obtaining credit at any of the said establishments by the use of any false
pretense;
iii) By abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from any
of the said establishment after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or
accommodation therein, without paying thereof.

23. Is mere issuance of a check with no funds, a crime of estafa?


No. The issuance of the check by the offender prior or simultaneous with the
transaction must be for the purpose of contracting the obligation. Otherwise if the
check is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, no estafa is committed.

However, if the check was issued by the debtor for the security of the creditor, but
not to be encashed, no estafa is involved.

The law penalizes the issuance of a check only if it were itself the immediate
consideration for the reciprocal receipt of benefits. In other words, the check must
be issued concurrently with, and in exchange for, a material gain to make it a
punishable offense under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. (Castro v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 50173, 21 September 1993)

24. I issued a check to my grocer as advance payment for the groceries he


would be delivering. Without my knowledge, my husband had emptied my
account. What will happen?
You will not be charged for the crime of estafa since there is already a pre-existing
obligation between you and your grocer, with the check as payment for the
groceries he would be delivering to you. You did not issue the check prior or
simultaneous with any act of fraud, thus it is not the cause of the fraud.

It was the rule that the mere issuance of a check with knowledge on the part of the
drawer that he had no funds to cover its amount and without informing the payee
of such circumstances, does not constitute the crime of estafa if the check was
intended as payment of a pre-existing obligation. The reason for the rule is that
deceit, to constitute estafa, should be the efficient cause of the defraudation and as
such should either be prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. (People v.
Lilius)

In the issuance of a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer derives no
material benefit in return as its consideration had long been delivered to him before
the check was issued. In short, the issuance of the check was not a means to obtain
a valuable consideration from the payee. Deceit, to constitute estafa should be the
efficient cause of the defraudation. (People v. Fortuno)

Good faith is a defense in a charge of estafa by postdating or issuing a


check (People v. Villapando, 56 Phil. 31)

25. I sent a notice of dishonor to my cousin, who issued me a check as


payment for my catering services. I had found out that his account had no
funds. Was deceit involved?
Deceit may not be incolved as your cousin could be charged for the violation of
B.P. 22, or the Bouncing Check Law.

There is prima facie evidence of deceit when the drawer fails to pay or make
arrangement for payment three days after receiving notice of dishonor.

26. Would charging a person for the crime of estafa and violation of the
Bouncing Check law, put him in double jeopardy?
No. A person can be charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first
under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or the Bouncing Check Law and
another under Article 315, 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code.

Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 2(d) but are not required
in B.P. 22. Under B.P.22, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to
the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Revised
Penal Code. (Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 59568-76, January 11, 1990)

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act
may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the
case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double
jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise
stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of
information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115
SCRA 570).

27. What are the differences between Esatafa and B.P. 22?
Other differences between the two also include the following:
(a) Damage and deceit are essential elements in Article 315 2(d) but they are not
required in B.P. 22.
(b) A drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under B.P. 22 even if he
had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability;
(c) Specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses;
(d) Estafa is essential a crime against property, while violation of B.P. 22 is
principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking
system;
(e) Violations of Article 315 are mala in se, while those of B.P. 22 are mala
prohibita.
(Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 59568-76, January 11, 1990)

28. What are the other ways that estafa can be done?
Estafa can be done in the following ways also:

a) By inducing another to sign any document


The elements are:
i) That the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
ii) That deceit be employed to make him sign the document;
iii) That the offended party personally signed the document;
iv) That prejudice be caused.
b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in gambling

c) By removing, concealing or destroying document


The elements are:
a) That there be court record, office files, documents or any other papers;
b) That the offender removed, concealed or destroyed any of them;
c) That the offender had intent to defraud another.

29. Where can the crime of estafa be prosecuted?


The courts in the place where the crime of estafa was committed has jurisdiction
over it. It means that the place where any of the elements of estafa had occurred is
where it may be prosecuted, regardless if it is in several places at once.

The crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted


at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the
essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. (Buaya v.
Polo, G.R. No. L-75079, 26 January 1989)

The theory is that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any
jurisdiction where the offense is in part committed. In transitory or continuing
offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either
province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others. (Tuzon v. Cruz, G.R. No.
L-27410, 28 August 1975)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 205144 November 26, 2014

MARGIE BALERTA, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The instant petition for review on certiorari1 assails the Decision2 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) on October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 affirming,
albeit with modification as to the penalty imposed, the Decision3 dated November
15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66, in
Criminal Case No. 99-1103, convicting Margie Balerta (petitioner) of Estafa.

Antecedents

The Information, dated October 27,1999, filed against the petitioner before the
RTC partially reads as follows:

That on or about May 31, 1999 until June 17, 1999, in the Municipality of Balasan,
Province ofIloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then an employee/cashier of Balasan Associated
Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC)[,] was in[-]charge of collecting
and keeping the collections turned over to her by the collectors of the cooperative
[and of] account[ing] for and deposit[ing] the collected amount to the depository
bank which is the Balasan Rural Bank, Balasan, Iloilo, but said accused, far from
complying with her obligation, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfullyand feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert toher personal use and benefit the total collection of One Hundred Eighty[-
]Five Thousand Five Hundred Eighty[-]Four Pesos and 06/100 (₱185,584.06)
Philippine Currency and despite repeated demands, the said accused failed and still
fails, to liquidate or render formal accounting of her collections or return the
aforesaid amount to the Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
to its damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ₱185,584.06.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment, the petitioner entered a "not guilty" plea.5 Pre-trial then
ensued. The parties stipulated on the following: (a) the identity and existence of
Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC); (b) the
identity of the petitioner and her position as a cashier in BABMPC; (c) the
petitioner "cannot withdraw from the bank account of [BABMPC] alone;" and (d)
the criminal complaint against the petitioner was filed on the basis of the findings
of an internal auditor and not of an independent accountant.6

Version of the Prosecution

During the pre-trial, the prosecution manifested that BABMPC’s Manager,


Napoleon Timonera (Timonera), and Internal Auditor, Ruben Ambros (Ambros),
would take the witness stand. Timonera would testify on the function of BABMPC
and the duties of the petitioner, while Ambros’ testimony would revolve on the
facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the complaint. The prosecution
intended to offer before the RTC no other documentary evidence except the
affidavits of Timonera and Ambros.7

In the course of the trial, only Timonera appeared to testify. When the proceedings
before the RTC was concluded, both the prosecution and the defense did not
formally offer any documentary evidence.8

In Timonera’s testimony, he stated that BABMPC is registered with the


Cooperative Development Authority and is engaged in micro-lending, trading and
equipment rental.9 At the time he took the witness stand, Timonera was
BABMPC’s Manager, and he was authorized through a board resolution to
represent the cooperative in pursuing the criminal complaint against the
petitioner.10

According to Timonera, the petitioner worked as one of the three cashiers in


BABMPC.11 She used to receive daily remittances, deposit to the bank, withdraw
and issue loans12 specifically in connection with Care Philippines’ account
involving an amount of ₱1,250,000.00.13 Care Philippines entrusted the sum to
BABMPC, which in turn can release to borrowers loans ranging from ₱500.00 to
₱50,000.00.14
The petitioner neither resigned nor was terminated from employment, but she
stopped reporting for work from June 19, 1999 onwards after BABMPC
discovered discrepancies and fraud in her records.15 Bank records showed that
there was a variance of ₱40.00 indicated in BABMPC’s passbook, on one hand,
and in the deposit slip, on the other.16 This prompted BABMPC’s bookkeeper,
Rose De Asis (De Asis) to request the Internal Auditor, Ambros, to verify with the
bank, which in turn disowned the entries and signatures in the passbook made and
affixed between March 12, 1999 and June 15, 1999.17 BABMPC also found out
from the bank teller that the petitioner declaredthe cooperative’s passbook as
missing since March 1999, hence, a new one was issued on May 6, 1999.18 The
petitioner used the new passbook in making actual transactions with the bank, but
she kept the old passbook, upon which she made falsified entries to prevent
BABMPC from discovering the discrepancies.19 The court asked Timonera how he
knew that the signatures in the old passbook were affixed by the petitioner herself.
Timonera replied that it was the petitioner who kept the passbook, 20 and
collected, remitted and withdrew money from the bank.21 BABMPC’s bookkeeper,
De Asis, on the other hand, merely controlled the vouchers and the records of the
transactions.22 The petitioner and De Asis were the two authorized signatories of
BABMPC as regards the passbook kept with the bank.23

Upon audit, BABMPC found that "there was a discrepancy of some ₱185,000.00,"
₱90,000.00 of which in the passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the
records of the cooperative kept by the petitioner. When asked by the petitioner’s
counsel about where exactly was the discrepancy shown in the copy of the bank’s
ledger and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPC’s records, Timonera
answered that he is not an accountant and Ambros knew more about the matter. 24

Timonera also stated that BABMPC had sent the petitioners three letters, dated
June 22, 1999, June 24, 1999 and August 30, 1999. The first letter requested the
petitioner to report to the office to explain the discrepancies. The second letter
requested the petitioner to pay BABMPC. The first two letters were brought tothe
petitioner’s house by BABMPC’s secretary, Marilyn Mombay (Mombay). Both
times, the petitioner was not at home, and it was Estela Balerta, the former’s sister-
in-law, who received the letters. The last letter was sentby mail, but the petitioner
refused to receive it as well.25

Timonera also testified that without the petitioner’s presence and permission, the
latter’s table and drawers were opened through the use of duplicate keys kept by
De Asis. The use of the duplicate keys to open each other’s office drawers was
howevera common practice between the petitioner and De Asis.26
Version of the Defense

The defense, on its part, offered the testimony of the petitioner.

The petitioner testified that the lastday she reported for work as a cashier in
BABMPC was on June 17, 1999. Timonera got angry that day when the petitioner
reminded him of his cash advances, which were already equivalent to his salaries
for five months. The petitioner emphasized that Timonera had exceeded the
allowable cash advance amount of one month salary.27

On June 18, 1999, the petitioner suffered from migraine and was advised by her
doctor to rest for two weeks. The day after, Timonera visited the petitioner’s
house, instructed her to rest, and informed her that she will be notified in case a
necessity for her toreport for work arises. On June 25, 1999, the petitioner received
a letter requiring her to go to BABMPC’s office. She complied with the directive
on the same day. Timonera then presented to the petitioner the result of Ambros’
audit showing that she incurred a shortage of ₱80,000.00. She was not however
furnished a copy thereof. The petitioner also protested that the audit was conducted
in her absence, but Timonera informed her that they would just thresh the matter
up in court.28

The petitioner likewise stated that she can no longer find the receipts, vouchers and
books in her drawers showing the cash advances of Timonera. Her plea for the
conduct of an independent audit also fell on deaf ears.29

On July 7, 1999, the petitioner proceeded to the Balasan Police Station to report
about the forced opening of her table and drawers which occurred on June 25,
1999. She also informed the police that the amount of ₱5,000.00 kept in the
drawers was missing. She confronted BABMPC about the missing cash. Ambros
admitted that he and De Asis opened the drawers, but made no mention of any cash
found thereon.30

The petitioner alleged that Timonera was ill motivated when he initiated the filing
of the criminal complaint against her. Timonera intended to evade his financial
liabilities from BABMPC relative to his cash advances and the money which he
had diverted to other projects in violation of the rules of the cooperative. The
petitioner also suspected that Timonera must have speculated that the former had
money as she then had plans to go abroad.31
Prior to the petitioner’s reminder to Timonera about the latter’s cash advances,
there was no untoward incident whatsoever between them. She admitted though
that she did not report Timonera’s cash advances to BABMPC’s board.32

The petitioner testified that the only shortage she was aware of involved the
amount of ₱1,896.00, which was reflected in a past monthly audit. To date, the
amount remains unsettled.33

Ruling of the RTC

On November 15, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,34 the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa by misappropriation and hereby sentences [the
petitioner to] five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum,
together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay [BABMPC]
₱185,584.06 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.35

The RTC’s reasonsare quoted below:

According to the [petitioner], the internal audit wherein she has a shortage of
₱185,584.06 was false. However, she failed to prove and explain to the Court the
exact figure or amount of money she is accountable of. She failed to cause an audit
of her own to show that no shortage was incurred by her. Her testimony was not
corroborated by any witness or other documentary evidence. What she did was
simply to deny her shortage and pointed to [Timonera] as one responsible for the
filing of charges against her. But the [petitioner] alone, being the one keeping the
passbook of the cooperative, was able to misrepresent with the Rural Bank of
Balasan that the passbook was lost and thereafter, she secured a new passbook.
After she secured a new passbook, she used both the old passbook and new
passbook and falsified the entries in the old passbook making it appear that the old
passbook was presented and transactions were made using the old passbook with
the bank. With this scheme, it is clear that the accused has all the intention to
defraud. For what is the purpose of using the old passbook when it was already
cancelled and of no legal use? Worst is that, by means of falsification, she made
false entries in the old passbook to mislead the officers of [BABMPC] to believe
that the money entrusted to her is safely kept, when in truth[,] there were already
shortages.

The Court believes that the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming to point
out the [petitioner’s] criminal liability to the offense charged.36

Ruling of the CA

The petitioner challenged the above ruling before the CA raising the factual issues
of whether or not, as claimed by BABMPC, she had (a) falsified the entries in the
passbook, (b) received collections for remittance to the bank, (c) misappropriated
BABMPC’s money, and (d) committed estafa.37

On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, the decretal
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 99-
1103 with modifications with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed. The
[petitioner] is hereby sentenced to four (4) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporalas maximum
and to pay [BABMPC] the amount of Php185,584.06.

SO ORDERED.38

The CA based its disposition on the following:

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under subsection 1


(b) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

I. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in


trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond;

II. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the


person who received it, or a denial on his part that he received it;

III. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of


another; and
IV. That there be demand for the return of the property.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or


property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made.
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of
another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not
only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of
the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused
fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to besold and fails to
give an account of their whereabouts.39

All the elements are present in the instant case. Firstly, it was sufficiently proven
from the testimonies of both the prosecution and defense witnesses that the
[petitioner] was employed as one of the three cashiers of the cooperative. From the
testimonies, it was established that as a cashier, she was responsible in handling the
specific account of the money loaned by Care Philippines to the cooperative. The
money from Care Philippines was used by the cooperative for micro-lending, that
is, lending a small amount of money to small entrepreneurs from ₱500.00 to
₱50,000.00. Being such a cashier, [thepetitioner’s] duties include receiving daily
remittances, making deposits to and withdrawals from the bank, as well as issuing
loans. By receiving the money of the cooperative, [the petitioner] also had the
obligation to make delivery of or to return the same to the cooperative.

Secondly, on the matter of misappropriation, [the petitioner] deplored the conduct


of an internal audit in her absence but she merely denied the shortage of money as
shown by the result of the internal audit. [The petitioner] did not cause an audit of
her own to rebut the evidence against her. She did not show any documentary
evidence nor present any witness to support her claims. It is axiomatic that denial
is the weakest form of defense. As held in People v. Magbanua, "[i]t is elementary
that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and
self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Through the use of the two (2) passbooks, [the petitioner] was able to dispose of
the funds of the cooperative to the latter’s disadvantage. Moreover, [the petitioner]
did not refute the evidence of the private offended party that she maintained two
(2) passbooks. The certification issued by the Assistant Manager of the rural bank
showing that [the petitioner] had declared as lost the old passbook was not
contradicted by the defense at all. In like manner, there was no evidence presented
by the defense to controvert the claim that the [petitioner] falsified the initials of
the bank employees every time she records an entry in the old passbook, either
withdrawal or deposit.

Thirdly, it is needless to say that the cooperative was greatly prejudiced by the
misappropriation of its funds and by the denial of [the petitioner] of the shortfall.
Considering that the amount loaned by Care Philippines to the cooperative for its
micro-lending project was Php1,250,000.00 and considering further that most of its
clients only borrow from Php500.00 to Php50, 000.00, [the petitioner’s] shortage
of ₱185, 584.06 is already a substantial amount that could have been lent to a
number of borrowers of the cooperative.

As to the last element pertaining to the demand by the offended party, it has been
held that, "[i]n a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is
evidenceof misappropriation or conversion. However, failure to account upon
demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation". Moreover, a query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as
the one proven in the present case, is tantamount to a demand. The prosecution in
the case at bar, was able to show that the offended party inquired as to the
whereabouts of the shortage amounting to Php185, 584.06. The General Manager
of the cooperative sent letters to the [petitioner] asking her to report to the offices
of the cooperative in order to explain a number of questionable transactions that
they have discovered.

In fine, the evidence of the prosecution was able to establish beyond any
reasonable doubt that [the petitioner] committed estafa by misappropriation under
Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. With the evidence on record, We find
no convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.40 (Some citations
omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)

Issues

Undaunted, the petitioner assails the above ruling. Restated, the issues she presents
for our resolution are whether or not: (a) she is entitled to an acquittal considering
that a cashier possesses no juridical possession over the funds he or she holds; (b)
demand, as an element of the crime of estafa, had been proven in the instant
case;and (c) her guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.41

The petitioner claims that in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled
that a cashier cannot be convicted of estafaif he or she has no juridical possession
over the funds held.43 Further, the element of demand was not established. There
was no proof conclusively showing that the three letters were sent to the petitioner
by BABMPC. Assuming they were sent, no ample evidence exists to prove that
they were in fact received by the petitioner.44

More importantly, the prosecution had not discharged the burden of proof required
to convict in criminal cases. First. Timonera admitted that he did not have any
personal knowledge about how the petitioner committed the acts of
misappropriation.45 Second. The statements of the Internal Auditor, Ambros, were
vital, but he never appeared in court to testify or to shed light on any documents
purportedly pointing to the petitioner’s liability.46 Third. No representatives of the
bank testified on the alleged inconsistencies found in the passbooks.47 Fourth. Even
the amount of money claimed to have been misappropriated was not determined
with certainty.48 Fifth. In convicting the petitioner, the RTC and the CA primarily
relied on the falsified entries made on the passbooks, but they were not formally
offered as evidence, and the prosecution failed to establish that the petitioner was
solely in control of the said passbooks.49

In its Comment,50 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
petitioner had juridical possession over the funds, which were lent by Care
Philippines to BABMPC. The petitioner received daily remittances, deposited to
and withdrew money from the bank, and issued loans in connection with the said
account. Moreover, while denying having incurred the shortage, she offered no
explanation as to how much money she was accountable for. No other witness
corroborated the petitioner’s claims as well. The petitioner also failed to refute the
existence of the two passbooks. Anent the prejudice caused to BABMPC, the
amount of ₱185,584.06 was substantial and could have been loanedto a number of
borrowers.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the instant petition.

The petitioner had no juridical possession over the allegedly misappropriated


funds.

Chua-Burce is instructive anent what constitutes mere material possession, on one


hand, and juridical possession, on the other, for the purpose of determining
whether the first element of estafais present in a particular case, viz:
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element
absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received bythe
offender from the offended party (1) in trustor (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up
even against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was
primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to
the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees.

In People v. Locson, the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money


received by him for the bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory
that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. We explained in
Locson that –

"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank,
and the possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the
defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it
to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking or
apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."

In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, a travelling sales agent


misappropriated or failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods
he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable for
estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft.
In the Guzman case, we explained the distinction between possession of a bank
teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability – "The case cited
by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory
that appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was selling
for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving teller
of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held
guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by
a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an
agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in
agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is
payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds
received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as
against the bank. Anagent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own
principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in
consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for
advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault
(Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)."51 (Citations omitted,
underscoring ours and italics in the original)

In the case at bench, there is no question that the petitioner was handling the funds
lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of
BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical or material possession, but she
held no independent right or title, which she can set up against BABMPC. The
petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the Court finds
that juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafaby
misappropriation is absent in the instant case.

In the prosecution of the crime of estafa, demand need not be formal if there exists
evidence of misappropriation. However, in the instant case, conclusive proofs of
both misappropriation and demand are wanting.

"Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts
of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty
because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt."52

At the outset, it is significant to point out that neither the prosecution nor the
defense had made any formal offer of documentary evidence.53 The two passbooks,
ledger, and three demand letters, while mentioned by Timonera in his testimony,
were notformally offered as evidence. The Court notes too that the contending
parties each had only one witness, namely, Timonera, for the prosecution, and the
petitioner, for the defense. Both of their testimonies were therefore without any
corroboration. Considering the absence of formal offers of documentary evidence,
the judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA solely hinged on who was more
credible between the two witnesses.

While this Court does not find Timonera’s testimony as incredible, by itself alone,
it is insufficient to discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in
criminal cases. The petitioner was indicted for allegedly misappropriating the
amount of 185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to state with certainty where in
the records held by the petitioner were the discrepancies shown. Timonera evaded
answering the question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that
Ambros knew more about the matter.54 Note too that Timonera admitted it was the
petitioner and De Asis who were the two authorized signatories relative to the
funds lent to BABMPC by Care Philippines.55Hence, the petitioner did not have
sole access over the records and funds. Consequently, the authorship of the
falsified entries in the passbook cannot be attributed with certainty to the petitioner
alone. It was thus fatal for the prosecution’s cause that Ambros, De Asis, Mombay
and the bank personnel did not take the witness stand especially since documentary
evidence were never formally offered as well.

The RTC and the CA faulted the petitioner for not offering countervailing
evidence, including an audit conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a
conviction tobe handed on that ground because the "[c]ourts cannot magnify the
weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution’s failure to discharge the
onus probandi."56

"Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This,


however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one
of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court
must acquit."57

"In a criminal case, the accused isentitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind."58

In the case at bar, however, the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting
merely of Timonera’s testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of the petitioner, and
does not amply rebut her right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged.

The acquittal of the accused from the crime charged does not necessarily negate
the existence of civil liability.1âwphi1However, in the instant case, the prosecution
had failed as well to present preponderant evidence from which the Court can
determinately conclude that the petitioner should pay BABMPC the amount of
₱185,584.06.

Eusebio-Calderon v. People59 is instructive anent the effects of the two kinds of


acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
In the case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by our law as well as its different effects on the civil liability
of the accused. Thus:

x x x. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of this instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to benot the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if
the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This
is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, x x x. 60 (Citation
omitted and underscoring ours)

In the case now under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner notbecause
she is found absolutely innocent of the crime charged. The Court acquits merely
because reasonable doubt exists anent her guilt. Hence, the petitioner can still be
held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant evidence exist to prove the same.

Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court indicates how preponderance of evidence
shall be determined, viz:

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party


having the burden of proofmust establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(Underscoring ours)

In the instant petition, the prosecution manifested during the pre-trial that
Timonera's testimony would touch on the functions of the BABMPC and the duties
of the petitioner.61 During the trial, Timonera made references to the alleged
falsifications and misappropriations committed by the petitioner. However, he
denied specific knowledge of where exactly the falsifications and
misappropriations were shown and recorded.62 This, plus the fact that the
prosecution made no formal offer of documentary evidence, leaves the Court in the
dark as to how the petitioner's civil liability, if any, shall be determined.

In precis, the Court finds that Timonera's testimony does not quality as
preponderant evidence from which the Court can conclude that the petitioner is
civilly liable to pay BABMPC the amount of ₱185,584.06.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The


Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No.
00693 is REVERSED. The petitioner, MARGIE BALERTA, is ACQUITTED of
the crime of Esta/a under Article 315(l)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The
directive of the Court of Appeals for Margie Balerta to PAY Balasan Associated
Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative the amount oL₱185,584.06 as CIVIL
LIABILITY is likewise SET ASIDE for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per Special Order No. 1887 dated November 24, 2014
in view of the inhibition of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
1
Rollo, pp. 18-36.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate
Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring; id. at 39-
48.
3
Rendered by Judge Rogelio J. Amador; records, pp. 136-139.
4
Id. at 1.
5
Id. at 36.
6
Please seePre-Trial Order, id. at 39-40.
7
Id.
8
CA rollo, p. 5.
9
TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 2.
10
Id. at 3-4.
11
Id. at 7.
12
Id. at 3.
13
Id. at 7.
14
Id. at 8.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id. at 8.
17
Id. at 8-9, 11.
18
Id. at 10-11.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 10.
21
Id. at 12.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 16.
24
Id. at 9.
25
Id. at 12-13.
26
Id. at 15.
27
TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 4.
28
Id. at 5-6.
29
Id. at 6.
30
Id. at 7, 9.
31
Id. at 10.
32
Id. at 12.
33
Id. at 11, 13.
34
Records, pp. 136-139.
35
Id. at 139.
36
Id.
37
Rollo, p. 43.
38
Id. at 47.
39
Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 172820, June 23, 2010, 621 SCRA 538,
547.
40
Rollo,pp. 44-47.
41
Id. at 23.
42
387 Phil. 15 (2000).
43
Id. at 27; rollo, pp. 32-33.
44
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
45
Id. at 25.
46
Id. at 26.
47
Id. at 27.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 28-29.
50
Id. at 95-105.
51
Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, supra note 42, at 26-27.
52
BSB Group, Inc. v. Go, G.R. No. 168644, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA
596, 606.
53
TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 2, CA rollo, p. 5.
54
TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 9.
55
Id. at 16.
56
People v. Gatlabayan, G.R. No. 186467, July 13, 2011, 653 SCRA 803,
824.
57
People v. Santos, Jr., 562 Phil. 458, 473 (2007).
58
People v. Bansil, 364 Phil. 22, 34 (1999).
59
484 Phil. 87 (2004).
60
Id. at 99.
61
Records, pp. 39-40.
62
TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 9.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ELSA MACANDOG MAGTIRA, G.R. No. 170964


Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus -
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


March 7, 2012
Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Petitioner Elsa Macandog Magtira seeks in this petition for review


on certiorari (filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) to reverse the decision[1] and
the resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252. The CA
affirmed with modification the joint decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 148, that found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of seven (7) counts of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The records show that seven criminal informations for estafa were filed against the
petitioner. Except for the amounts misappropriated and the private
complainants[4] involved, the informations were similarly worded, as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the year of 2000, in the


City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused received
in trust and for administration from complainant x x x as contribution
to a Paluwagan in the amount of x x x under [the] safekeeping of
accused [Elsa] Macandog Magtira, with the express and legal
obligation on the part of the accused to return and/or account for the
same, but the accused far from complying with her obligation with
intent to gain, abuse of confidence and to defraud complainant, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said
contribution (Paluwagan) and/or the proceeds thereof x x x and despite
repeated demands, the accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the
aforementioned amount.[5]
The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges.[6] Thereafter, the
seven cases were tried jointly. The following facts were established: first, the
petitioner was the custodian of the funds of the Paluwagan where the private
complainants were members;[7] second, that demands were made against the
petitioner by the private complainants for the return of their contributions in
the Paluwagan; and third, the petitioner failed to meet the private complainants
demand for the return of their contributions.

During trial, the petitioner denied misappropriating the contributions of the


private complainants. She claimed that she was robbed of the Paluwagan funds in
the early afternoon of February 28, 2000. By way of corroboration, the petitioner
presented a copy of an entry in the police blotter dated February 28, 2000 and the
affidavits of five individuals attesting to the robbery.[8]

From the evidence adduced, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged
and declared:

[I]t is clear to the Court that the accused is not disputing in all the cases
that (a) sizeable amount of money belonging to different persons were
received by her in trust or for administration, involving the duty to make
a delivery thereof to the owners; (2) that there is a demand to her that
same be returned but she cannot do so.[9]

The RTC explained that while the robbery of the entrusted money is a valid
defense against estafa, the petitioners evidence of the robbery was wanting. The
RTC observed that the petitioners testimony was self-serving and inconsistent on
some of the material details of the robbery. The RTC also noted the petitioners
failure to account for and to deliver the contributions which were collected from the
private complainants after the robbery. Finally, the RTC found that the petitioners
credibility affected by her own demeanor of indifference during trial showed no
semblance of worry or [of] being concerned [10] about the serious charges filed
against her.
Dissatisfied with the RTCs decision, the petitioner elevated her conviction to
the CA which affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the penalty of
imprisonment imposed. The CA held:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-1766 where the amount of the


fraud is P85,000.00, the incremental penalty is six (6) years to be
added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law,
or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus six (6) years
of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 02-1767 where the amount of the


fraud is P65,000.00, the incremental penalty is four (4) years to
be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by
law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus four (4)
years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-1768 where the amount of the


fraud is P60,000.00, the incremental penalty is three (3) years to
be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by
law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus three (3)
years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to eleven (11)
years of prision mayor maximum, as the maximum penalty.

(4) In Criminal Case No. 02-1769 where the amount of the


fraud is P34,000.00, the incremental penalty is one (1) year to be
added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law,
or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus one (1) year of
the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate penalty should
be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to nine (9) years
of prision mayor medium, as the maximum penalty.

(5) In Criminal Case No. 02-1770 where the amount of the


fraud is P85,400.00, the incremental penalty is six (6) years to be
added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for by law,
or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus six (6) years
of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.

(6) In Criminal Case No. 02-1771 where the amount of the


fraud is P100,000.00, the incremental penalty of seven (7) years
is to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided for
by law, or eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum plus seven
(7) years of the incremental penalty. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum penalty.

(7) In Criminal Case No. 02-1772 where the amount of the


fraud is P153,000.00, the incremental penalty is thirteen (13)
years to be added to the maximum period of the penalty provided
by the law. The penalty cannot go beyond twenty (20) years as
the law provides that in no case shall the penalty be higher
than reclusion temporal regardless of the amount of the fraud.
Hence, the indeterminate sentence is four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as the minimum
penalty, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as
the maximum penalty.[11] (italics supplied)

The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration;[12] hence, the


present petition.

The Issue
The ultimate issue for consideration is whether the petitioner should be held liable
for the crimes of estafa. The petitioner argues that the CA and the RTC erred in
rejecting her argument that no misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds was clearly
established in the record.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of
the petition. The OSG maintains that the elements constituting the crime
of estafa with abuse of confidence had been fully established by the prosecutions
evidence. The OSG insists that the petitioner failed to clearly prove by competent
evidence her affirmative defense of robbery. The OSG also insists that the petitioners
conduct in failing to inform all the members of the alleged robbery bolsters the
circumstance of her misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds. Lastly, the
petitioners misappropriation of the Paluwagan funds was substantiated by her
failure to deliver the Paluwagan funds out of the contributions made by the private
complainants after the robbery.

The petitioner subsequently filed a reply, reiterating the arguments in her


petition.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

Preliminary consideration

A preliminary matter we have to contend with in this case is the propriety of


resolving one of the issues raised by the petitioner who has appealed her judgment
of conviction by way of a Rule 45 review. A reading of the petition shows that the
petitioner raises both errors of law and of fact allegedly committed by the CA and
the RTC in their decisions. First, we are called to determine whether a proper
application of law and jurisprudence has been made in the case. Second, we are also
called to examine whether the CA and the RTC correctly appreciated the evidence
to which the two courts anchor their conclusions.

As a rule, a Rule 45 review is confined to the resolution of errors of law


committed by the lower courts. Further, in a Rule 45 review, the factual findings of
the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding and
conclusive on the Court.[13] We emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided
exceptions[14] to this rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or
more exceptional circumstances are present in the case. The petitioner must
additionally show that the cited exceptional circumstances will have a bearing on the
results of the case.
The petitioner cites in this regard the alleged misappreciation of the evidence
committed by the CA and the RTC. The petitioner contends that both courts
disregarded her evidence, namely: the affidavits of five individuals and the police
blotter. She argues that she should not be faulted for the non-presentation in court of
the five individuals who executed the affidavits which attested to the robbery since
she was then represented by a counsel de oficio. She also argues that both courts
disregarded the evidence of her reputation of being a kind person of good moral
character. She asserts that she delivered to the private complainants their respective
shares in the Paluwagan funds prior to the robbery.

She further argues that the conclusions of the CA and the RTC were contrary
to the Courts ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals[15] where it held that estafa cannot be
committed through negligence or, as in this case, where the explanation by the
accused raises reasonable doubt on whether the amount in question was
misappropriated.

After a careful study of the records, we find that the petitioners cited
exceptional circumstances are more imagined than real. We find no compelling
reason to deviate from the factual findings of the CA and the RTC in this regard.
Misappropriation as an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of
using, or disposing of, anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to
a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.[16] We have previously held that
the failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in trust without
offering any satisfactory explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation.[17] We have also held that the demand for the return
of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account are similarly
circumstantial evidence that the courts can appreciate.[18]

As the CA and the RTC did, we find no clear evidence establishing that the
petitioner was actually robbed of the Paluwagan funds. In the first place, the five
individuals who executed the affidavits were not presented in court. While the
petitioner faults the counsel de oficio for their non-presentation in court, we find no
proof that her counsel had been negligent in performing his legal duties. Incidentally,
we also reject this line of argument for two other reasons: first, it was raised only for
the first time in the present appeal; and second, it involves a factual determination
of negligence which is inappropriate under a Rule 45 review.

We additionally note from a facial examination of the affidavits that the


affiants were not even eyewitnesses to the robbery; hence, their statements do not
sufficiently prove the actual occurrence of the robbery. More importantly, the
affidavits do not also establish with reasonable certainty that the petitioner was
actually robbed of the Paluwagan funds.
Moreover, we cannot give much credence to the police blotter whose contents
were mainly based on the statements made by the petitioner to the police. If at all, it
is evidence of what was entered, not of the truth or falsity of the entry made. We
give due respect to the evaluation made by the RTC in this regard:

Thus, there seems to be a discrepancy as to the time and number of


persons (robbers) who entered the residence of the accused. Further, the
accused claims that there was a policeman who went to her house who
was called by her lessee (or lessor) but the accused cannot remember
his name.
But then, the accused never testified as to whether the policeman
investigated the scene of the crime and some people in the vicinity.
Surely at that hour, near such market, where there are people in the
vicinity, people will notice strangers or other persons who enter the
house of another or who leave the same whether in a hurry or not.

The accused even admitted that she was hesitant to report the matter to
the police[.] Why was the accused hesitant? She claims that the robber
warned her that he will harm her if she reports the incident. But
immediately after the incident, the accused reported the incident, but
nothing happened to her up to the present.[19] (underscoring supplied)

Besides, the petitioner failed to explain her failure to account and to deliver
the Paluwagan funds arising from contributions made by the private
complainants after the alleged robbery incident. On record are the positive and
unrefuted testimonies of the private complainants that they remitted contributions to
the petitioner even after the robbery. In other words, if the petitioner had in fact been
robbed of Paluwagan funds, the robbery would not have affected the accounting and
the delivery of the Paluwagan funds arising from the contributions made by the
private complainants after the alleged robbery. As the records show, despite the
continued receipt of contributions from the private complainants, the petitioner
failed to account for, and to deliver, the Paluwagan funds.

The Petitioners Conviction

We now go to the crux of the present appeal and determine whether the
evidence adduced warrants the petitioners conviction of the crime charged.
The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence has the following
elements under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the


offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same[;]

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or


property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt[;]

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the


prejudice of another; and

(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[20]

We find that all the above elements are present in the present case, having
been established by the prosecutions evidence and by the petitioners own
admissions. The first element was established by the evidence showing that the
petitioner received various sums of money from the private complainants to be held
in trust for them under the Paluwagan operation. The petitioner admitted that she
was under obligation, at a fixed date, to account for and to deliver
the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants in the sequential order agreed upon
among them. The second element was established by the evidence that the
petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private
complainants on the agreed time of delivery. The third and fourth elements of the
offense were proven by evidence showing that the petitioner failed to account for
and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the private complainants despite several
demands made upon her by the private complainants. Each of the private
complainants testified as to how they were prejudiced when they failed to receive
their allotted Paluwagan funds.

Given the totality of evidence, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner of


the crime charged.

The Penalty

The decisive factor in determining the criminal and civil liability for the crime
of estafa depends on the value of the thing or the amount defrauded.[21] With respect
to the civil aspect of the case, the petitioner filed a manifestation[22] which showed
the satisfaction of her civil monetary liability with six (6) out of the seven (7) private
complainants.

Anent her criminal liability, the evidence shows that the amount of money
remitted by the private complainants to the petitioner all exceeded the amount
of P22,000.00. In this regard, the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, provides the appropriate penalty if the value of the thing or the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period


to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. [italics ours]
As provided by law, the maximum indeterminate penalty when the amount

defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 is pegged at prision mayor in its minimum period or

anywhere within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, plus

one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 of the amount defrauded but

not to exceed twenty years. In turn, the minimum indeterminate penalty shall be one

degree lower from the prescribed penalty for estafa, which in this case is anywhere

within the range of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or six

(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.[23] Applying this

formula, we affirm the penalty imposed by the CA as it is fully in accordance with

the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of


merit. We AFFIRM the decision dated November 10, 2005 and the resolution dated
January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27252, finding
petitioner Elsa Macandog Magtira GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7)
counts of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Dated November 10, 2005. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas
Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
Josefina Guevara-Salonga; rollo, pp. 39-55.
[2]
Dated January 10, 2006; id. at 57.
[3]
Dated February 7, 2003 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1766 - 02-1772. The Joint
Decision was penned by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel; id. at 67-103.
[4]
They are: (1) Alfredo Martinez, (2) Cherry Bondocoy, (3) Rebecca Zoleta, (4)
Maria Ester Binaday, (5) Saturnina Zaraspe Perez, (6) Emerita Velasco, and (7)
Domingo Venturina.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 58-64.
[6]
Id. at 71.
[7]
Id. at 65-66.
[8]
First, the affidavits of Felipe Macandog and Segundo Macariola stated that they
found the petitioner bound and gagged inside her house on February 28,
2000. Second, the joint affidavit of spouses Reynaldo and Marina Ainza attested that
together with the petitioners lessor, Nilo Lopez, they went to the house of the
petitioner and saw her lying on the floor and untied; while the room was in disarray.
Upon the lessors instruction, the spouses sought police assistance. Lastly, Nilo
Lopez averred in his affidavit that he immediately went to the house of the petitioner
after being informed of the robbery. That upon his instruction, the police was called.
[9]
Rollo, p. 89.
[10]
Id. at 93.
[11]
Id. at 52-54.
[12]
Supra note 2.
[13]
Iron Bulk Shipping Phil., Co., Ltd. v. Remington Industrial Sales Corp., 462 Phil.
694, 703-704 (2003).
[14]
They are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Dueas
v. Guce-Africa, G.R. No. 165679, October 5, 2009, 603 SCRA 11, 20-21.)
[15]
G.R. No. 102784, April 7, 1997, 271 SCRA 12, 22.
[16]
Aw v. People, G.R. No. 182276, March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 64, 77.
[17]
Id. at 77-78.
[18]
Id. at 78, citing Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132422,
March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 468.
[19]
Supra note 3, at 92.
[20]
Aw v. People, supra note 15, at 75.
[21]
Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 172820, June 23, 2010, 621 SCRA 538, 552.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 194-198 and 225. The Acknowledgment Receipts were issued by (1)
Alfredo Martinez, (2) Cherry Bondocoy (received by Cielo Anduque), (3) Rebecca
Zoleta, (4) Maria Ester Binaday, (5) Saturnina Zaraspe Perez (wife of Aniceto
Perez); and (6) Emerita Velasco. The petitioner is still paying Maria Venturina on
installment basis.
[23]
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258,
302.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ANDRE L. D AIGLE, G.R. No. 174181


Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
-versus- Acting Chairperson,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:


Respondent. June 27, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------------
-----x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[1]

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision[2] dated March 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated
January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL convicting petitioner Andre L. DAigle of the crime of
Estafa. Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated August 17, 2006 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the following
Information:

That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in


the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the
Managing Director of Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit, Phils. for
management, care and custody the following company properties:

a) Electric transformer worth P16,500.00

b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of


computer boxes worth P490,000.00
c) Machine spare parts consisting of
- set of rack and pinion
- pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30
- pair of meter gears 42 teeth
- set of gears 32 teeth
- gear bith bearing inserted
- 3 SL 20 bearings V plate
- one-way clutch
- one-way bearing CSK 20HC5
- 8 of LJ 34 bearings V type
- roller bearing 1 x 0
- 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value
of P12,765.35

d) [Equipment] and raw materials valued at P162,400.00

with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND,


SIX HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS & 35/100 (P681,665.35)

under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that
is, exclusively for the machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from
complying with his obligation with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon
him by his employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate
properties to his own personal use and benefit and despite several demands
made upon him, accused refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return
or account for the same to the damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils.,
represented by its President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in the aforesaid sum
of P681,665.35.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial and trial
on the merits.

During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho (Parducho),
Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a corporation primarily engaged
in the manufacture of underwires for brassieres. According to him, petitioner was the
former managing director of SPI tasked with the management of the company as well as
the management, care and custody of SPIs personal properties. At the time that he was
holding said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC
Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire bending
machine similar to that being used by SPI.[7]

Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and responsibilities as
SPIs managing director[8] due to alleged conflict of business interest. Because of this,
Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPIs properties and reviewed its financial
statements, vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed
some of SPIs employees.[9] These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire
materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare parts,
while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner, went missing and were
left unaccounted for.[10] Further investigation revealed that some of SPIs wire bending
machines, computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was
confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that
TAC copied the wire bending machines of SPI.[11]
In a letter dated January 14, 1997,[12] SPIs counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to
turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand,
petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI also filed a replevin case against him
for the recovery of the electronic and computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue of the
Writ of Replevin,[13] an electronic box found inside TACs premises was recovered from
petitioner while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.

In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated spare parts for
SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and maintenance of SPIs
machines. He also claimed that he had an understanding with SPI that TAC would support
SPIs operation until its business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10%
share in SPI, TAC would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00
each so that he could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would
provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as well as the control panels. However,
petitioner was not able to finish fabricating the bending machines as he was dismissed by
SPI. As a consequence, he filed a labor case against it before the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of its
machines. While he admitted that SPIs electronic transformer, computer boxes and motor
drives were recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned out that
he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise his right
of lien over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI,
collectibles amounting to P900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary
of P80,000.00. Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own
benefit.[14]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner for the
crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315[15] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It
ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to SPI, upon
demand, the properties entrusted to his care, custody and management is sufficient
evidence of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision[16] rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D AIGLE to


suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusio[n] temporal as maximum; to indemnify private
complainant in the amount of P191,665.35 and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision[18] dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed with
modification the trial courts Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna (Branch 93), dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-
SPL, is MODIFIED to the effect that appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[20] was likewise denied in a Resolution[21] dated
August 17, 2006.

Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER-
ACCUSED[S] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF
VALID REASONS/JUSTIFICATION.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT, (RTC-BRANCH 93, SAN PEDRO,
LAGUNA), AND AT THE SAME TIME MODIFYING THE EXTENT
OF THE PENALTY [IMPOSED] FOR THE CRIME ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED.[22]

Our Ruling

After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the petitioner vis-
-vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent), and in the light of the
practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the courts below, this Court finds
the instant petition partly meritorious.

Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain petitioners
claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for Reconsideration without valid
reason or justification. The reason for the appellate courts denial of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is clear and simple, that is, after it made a thorough evaluation of the issues
and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA found that same were already passed
upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision. This is very plain from the contents of
the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied due to a
valid reason and justifiable cause.

Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision did
not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a judgment is not rendered defective just because
of the absence of a declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the dispositive
portion. The ratio decidendiof the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt of the
petitioner and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the courts
below. Indeed, petitioners guilt was duly proven by evidence of the prosecution. In any
event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is
sufficient if it states: 1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended
its commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability
or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
civil action has been reserved or waived. We find that all of these are sufficiently stated in
the trial courts Decision.

Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming the
said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He argues that Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was given juridical
possession of the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of
the things allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPIs properties was only by
virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose behalf he
has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said properties.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters that
the prosecutions evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime charged. Based
on SPIs records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on several occasions
for the sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for brassieres. However after the conduct
of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor.

Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.

Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:

1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the


offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the
same;

2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or


property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the


prejudice of another; and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the


offender.[23]

All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.


Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business
transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the
latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used in
the fabrication as well as the electronic devices while work would be done at petitioners
premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic
transformer, electronic box and a computer box.[24] When petitioner, however, was not able
to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded for the return
of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand and simply kept the
properties as lien for his claims against SPI.[25]

From petitioners own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the aforementioned
elements is very clear. SPIs properties were received by the petitioner in trust. He received
them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and spare
parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioners alleged
dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.

The Court cannot agree with petitioners postulation that he did not acquire juridical
possession of SPIs properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue of his
official function as SPIs corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the equipment
subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the
fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use them
without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only physical
possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held in Chua-
Burce v. Court of Appeals:[26]

When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the
offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x
With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able to
prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved
by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[27] The failure to
account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.[28]As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the
properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioners
own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of
preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure to
return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to
appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly noted by the CA:

We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that SPIs


demand for the return of the properties subject of this case was made on
January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no longer the managing
director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on November
19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPIs demand for the return of its
equipment and materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the
said properties and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for
them raises the presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x x x[29]

Lastly, it is obvious that petitioners failure to return SPIs properties valued at P191,665.35
caused damage and prejudice to the latter.

In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy between
him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was a stockholder of the
latter.Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioners stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Court
consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. As
correctly pointed out by the CA:
Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support
appellants allegation that the acts complained of in this case were corporate
acts. His allegation without more that he had an agreement with Mr. Bernie
Kelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellants) share in SPI would be increased
to 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give his act of
retaining the properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also no
evidence that he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much
less of SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that appellants actuation
should be considered as a corporate act, for which he claims he could not be
held personally liable. x x x[30]

Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses to
be credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for its
part, did not disturb the trial courts appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched doctrine
that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the
parties.[31] Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them
obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the Court
accords deference to the trial courts appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly, the
RTCs finding of petitioners guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.

The proper imposable penalty

The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount
of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved
exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years
imprisonment.
In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved which
is P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable
should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days to eight (8) years of prision mayor.[32] [A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case
shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.[33] Hence, sixteen
(16) years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of prision mayor. And since
same exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged at twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its maximum to prision
mayor in its minimum is prision correccionalin its minimum to medium periods. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x.[34]

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly pegged
the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but erred in
imposing the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is
beyond the lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly,
petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August 17, 2006,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

*
Per raffle dated June 25, 2012.
*
Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
*
Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
[1]
Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005).
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 162-181; penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman and
concurred in by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes and Associate Justice Rebecca
De Guia-Salvador.
[3]
Records, vol. II, pp. 500-507; penned by Judge Francisco Dizon Pano.
[4]
CA rollo, pp. 225-226.
[5]
Id. at 182-216.
[6]
Records, vol. I, pp. 1-2.
[7]
TSN, January 28, 1998, pp. 6-7.
[8]
Exhibit A, records, vol. I, p. 196.
[9]
TSN, January 28, 1998, p. 9.
[10]
Exhibit B, records, vol. I, p. 227-230.
[11]
TSN, July 13, 1998, pp. 4-5.
[12]
Exhibit L, records, vol. I, p. 207.
[13]
Exhibit N, id. at 212-213.
[14]
TSN, November 11, 1998, pp. 14-16.
[15]
Article 315. Swindling (estafa) Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
[16]
Supra note 3.
[17]
Records, vol. II, p. 507.
[18]
Supra note 2.
[19]
CA rollo, p. 180.
[20]
Supra note 5.
[21]
Supra note 4.
[22]
Rollo, p. 43.
[23]
Cruzvale, Inc. v. Eduque, G.R. Nos. 172785-86, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 534,
545.
[24]
TSN, November 11, 1998, p. 14.
[25]
Id. at 14-15.
[26]
387 Phil. 15, 26 (2000).
[27]
Lee v. People, supra note 1.
[28]
Id.
[29]
CA Decision p. 13; CA rollo, p. 174.
[30]
Id. at 16; id. at 177.
[31]
Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) v. Estrada, G.R. No. 171052,
January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 616, 621.
[32]
See Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 171121, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 322, 339.
[33]
Id.
[34]
Id.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ERLINDA ASEJO, G.R. No. 157433


Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 24, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:


The present petition[1] seeks to reverse and set aside the November 27, 2002
Decision[2] and February 28, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed with modification the February 27, 2001 Decision[4] of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, convicting petitioner of estafa as defined in
Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Facts

Petitioner and her husband, Eliseo Asejo, were charged with estafa on July 6,
1999 alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of May 1998, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, with unfaithfulness or abuse
of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously defrauded Vilma F. Castro in the manner as follows:
on the date and place aforementioned, said accused received the
amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, from complainant
as they will deposit the said amount in a bank for two months to
serve as show money to the concerned people that they are liquid
in their business and return said amount on or before July 18,
1998, but said accused, once in possession of said amount, far
from complying with their aforesaid obligation, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to their own personal use
and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon them by
said complainant to return the amount of P100,000.00, they failed
and refused and still fails (sic) and refuses (sic) to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said offended party in the amount
aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
During the arraignment on September 21, 1999, Erlinda Asejo pleaded not
guilty. Eliseo Asejo, on the other hand, was still at large and had not yet been
tried. At the trial, the prosecution presented private complainant, Vilma Castro, who
testified that on April 30, 1998, the Asejo spouses went to her house to borrow PhP
100,000. The money was supposed to be shown to the bank (show money) to make
it appear that the Asejos were financially liquid. On May 6, 1998, petitioner went
back to Castros house where she received the amount and signed a Trust
Undertaking[6] which reads:

For and in consideration of the trust conveyed upon us, the


undersigned hereby acknowledged the receipt of the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine currency, from MRS. VILMA F. CASTRO said
amount being extended and received by us not as loan or credit
and without interest, nevertheless, we hereby undertake and
commit to return the same amount to said MRS. VILMA F.
CASTRO on or before July 18, 1998 without need of prior
demand.

In view of the foregoing, and as a token of gratitude for the trust


and confidence reposed upon us, we, the undersigned, solidarily
promise and warrant faithful compliance of the terms and
conditions herein-above committed.[7]

When the obligation became due, Castro went to the spouses to demand
payment but Castro failed to collect the money.[8]

A corroborating witness, Alberto Bato, testified that he saw the petitioner


on May 6, 1998 in Castros house. Petitioner and Castro were then discussing about
money when Bato was called to sign as a witness to the Trust Undertaking.[9]
Petitioner admitted that she received PhP 100,000 but claimed that the amount
was Castros down payment for petitioners lot. She testified that in April 1998, she
offered her lot for sale to Castro because she needed money to pay a loan with the
bank. They allegedly agreed to the price of PhP 250,000 with a down payment of
PhP 100,000 and the balance payable upon the return of Castros husband from
abroad. Castro, however, decided to withdraw from the sale and demanded the return
of the PhP 100,000. Petitioner was able to return only PhP 15,000 and six (6) pigs
allegedly valued at PhP 17,498. In 1999, petitioner claims that she was called to the
house of Castro's in-laws and was harassed to sign an antedated document entitled
Trust Undertaking by Alberto Bato, a policeman.[10] She further alleged that since
she could not return the PhP 100,000, she was compelled by Castro to push through
with the sale at the lower amount of PhP 150,000.

The agreement, however, did not materialize due to the foreclosure of the
property. Petitioner claims that Castro filed the complaint for estafa for petitioners
failure to return the full amount she received as down payment.[11]

On February 27, 2001, the trial court rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Erlinda Asejo guilty


beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA
defined and penalized in Article 315, subdivision no. 1, paragraph
b, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an
indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision
correccional as minimum to nine years and six months of prision
mayor as maximum, as well as orders her to pay to complainant
the amount of P100,000.00 representing the amount of the fraud.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals


On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the
penalty:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with


the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to thirteen (13) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Hence, petitioner is asking this Court to reverse the judgment of conviction in


view of the prosecutions alleged failure to present a formal demand letter as a
requisite for a conviction of estafa. Petitioner further asserts that the transaction was
actually a loan because the Trust Undertaking did not specifically enjoin her to return
the very same thing that she received, but merely the same amount.[14]

The Issues

WHETHER FORMAL DEMAND IS REQUIRED TO HOLD


PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315 1(B)

WHETHER THE AMOUNT RECEIVED WAS PURSUANT TO


A LOAN AND NOT A TRUST AGREEMENT

The Courts Ruling


The petition has no merit.

The appellate and trial courts found the version of the prosecution consistent
with the evidence. According to the trial court:

First, the money, which she received from complainant on May 6,


1998, could not have been given as down payment for the
property, which was mortgaged with the bank and sold at public
auction on May 8, 1998. Second, the trust undertaking could not
have been signed in 1999 because it was already attached to the
affidavit-complaint dated September 29, 1998 as Annex A and the
memorandum for preliminary investigation (Exhibit B) shows that
the affidavit-complaint was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on September 29, 1998. Third, it is contrary to human
experience for one not to require a document or receipt for the
down payment of P100,000.00 for the sale of a property. Fourth,
the mortgaged obligation of the accused as of March 1998 was
more than the price allegedly offered to complainant for the
property to be sold.[15]

The foregoing findings clearly support private complainant's claim regarding


the purpose of the money, that is, that petitioner received the money in trust to be
used as proof of her financial liquidity. The Trust Undertaking, which was regularly
executed, shows that the agreement was not a loan. This places the transaction within
the purview of Art. 315, the relevant paragraphs of which read:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud


another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisiόn correccional in its maximum period
to prisiόn mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud
is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prisiόn mayor or reclusiόn temporal, as
the case may be;

x x x provided that in the x x x cases mentioned, the fraud be


committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,


money, goods or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under Art. 315 1(b) are:
1. That the money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the


offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;


and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

All these elements are present in the case at bar. Petitioner admitted having
received in trust the amount of PhP 100,000 from Castro; the amount was
misappropriated or converted; such misappropriation or conversion was to the
prejudice of Castro; and Castro demanded payment from petitioner.

Petitioner asserts that upon receipt of the amount, it was transferred to her and
she was not prohibited to use or spend the same.[16] The very same money cannot be
returned but only the same amount. This makes the transaction a loan and not a trust
agreement; thus, her liability is merely civil and not criminal.

Petitioners arguments are not meritorious. Art. 315 1(b) explicitly includes
money in its scope. The nature of money, that is, the exact bills and coins received
in trust cannot be returned, was already considered by the law. As long as the money
was received in trust, on commission, for administration, or under an obligation to
return, failure to account for it upon demand is punishable under Art. 315 1(b). The
Solicitor General added:
In a trust agreement, the transfer of the property to the trustee is
mere physical possession and not juridical possession. Unlike in
a contract of loan where the debtor acquires juridical possession
and is technically the owner of the amount, in a trust, the
obligation of the trustee is fiduciary in nature, i.e. to take care of
the thing strictly for the benefit of the trustee in accordance with
the purpose of the express trust.[17]

In the case at bar, the amount was received by the petitioner for the sole
purpose of using it as show money to the bank. The money was entrusted to her for
a particular purpose. Hence, she did not acquire the right to dispose or spend the
amount as she sees fit; she had the obligation to account for said amount.

Furthermore, the Trust Undertaking expressly states that the amount was
received by the petitioner not as a loan or credit. Under the parol evidence
rule,[18] petitioner cannot vary the terms of the written agreement by claiming that
the amount was received pursuant to a contract of sale of their lot.
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed
that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b),
thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a
written demand be necessary, the law would have stated
so. Otherwise, the word demand should be interpreted in its
general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.[19]
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the
money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand,
thus:

[T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to


the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only
that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same
way, however, be established by other proof, such as that
introduced in the case at bar.[20]

Similarly in this case, there was a demand for petitioner to pay private
complainant. This was admitted by petitioner and the private complainant in their
testimonies. Castro stated that she went to the house of petitioner in Pangasinan to
demand the return of the money, while petitioner stated that Castro demanded the
return of the down payment because allegedly, the sale did not materialize. In both
versions, the fact remains that demand was made upon petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the November 27, 2002 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR


No. 25128 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Erlinda Asejo is found GUILTY of the crime
of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. She is SENTENCED to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from four (4) years and two (2)
months of prisiόn correccional as MINIMUM to thirteen (13) years and one (1) day
of reclusiόn temporal as MAXIMUM. She is ordered to pay complainant PhP
100,000 representing the amount of the fraud.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-11.
[2]
Id. at 12-18. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner
and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Danilo B. Pine.
[3]
Id. at 31.
[4]
Id. at 19-27.
[5]
Id. at 13 & 19.
[6]
Id. at 14 & 20.
[7]
Id. at 14.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id. at 22-23.
[10]
Id. at 23-24.
[11]
Id. at 15.
[12]
Supra note 4, at 27.
[13]
Supra note 2, at 17.
[14]
Rollo, p. 98.
[15]
Supra note 4, at 25.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 97-98.
[17]
Id. at 59.
[18]
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 130, Sec. 9.
[19]
Rollo, p. 17.
[20]
101 Phil. 114, 119 (1957).
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

WILMA TABANIAG, G.R. No. 165411


Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:

June 18, 2009


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For review before this Court is the February 27, 2004 Decision[1] and September 22,
2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24906, which
affirmed the October 16, 2000 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 268, Pasig City, finding Wilma Tabaniag (petitioner)
guilty of the Crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, with modification as to the penalty.
The Information[4] dated September 15, 1994, in Criminal Case No. 106995, reads
as follows:

That on or about and during the month of January 1992, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each
other, received in trust from one Dennis Espiritu assorted jewelries (sic) amounting
to P509,940.00 under the express obligation on the part of the accused to sell the same
and thereafter to remit the proceeds of the sale and/or return said jewelries (sic) if not
sold to said complainant, but the accused once in possession of said jewelries (sic), far
from complying with their aforesaid obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate, and convert to their own personal use and benefit and despite demands
to pay the proceeds of the sale and/or to return the said jewelries (sic) in the amount
of P509,940.00, they failed and refused, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
in the aforementioned amount of P509,940.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Co-accused Melandia Olandia
(Olandia) was dropped from the Information upon the request[6] of complainant
Dennis Espiritu (Dennis).[7] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Dennis and his wife Ma.
Victoria (Victoria) [complainants].

On March 5, 1997, the prosecution filed a Motion[8] for the admittance of an


Amended Information. The defense filed their Opposition[9] to the said motion.

On August 27, 1997, the RTC issued an Order[10] granting the motion of the
prosecution. The RTC ruled that the amendments to the Information sought by the
prosecution were merely amendments in form and thus allowable under the rules.

The Amended Information[11] reads as follows:

On or about and during the month of February 1992, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together, and mutually helping and aiding each
other, received in trust from one Victoria Espiritu assorted jewelries (sic) amounting
to P155,252.50 under the express obligation on the part of the accused to sell the same
and thereafter to remit the proceeds of the sale and/or return said jewelries (sic) if not
sold to said complainant, but the accused once in possession of said jewelries (sic), far
from complying with their aforesaid obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate, and convert to their own personal use and benefit and despite demands
to pay the proceeds of the sale and/or to return the said jewelries (sic) in the amount
of P155,252.50, they failed and refused, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
in the aforementioned amount of P155,252.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

The defense presented two witnesses, namely: petitioner Tabaniag and Juan
Tapang III (Tapang).

On October 16, 2000, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused WILMA TABANIAG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor in its maximum period
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period
and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Sixty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred
(P62,900.00). With costs.

SO ORDERED.[13]

The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are as follows:

Complainants, both doctors by profession, are engaged in part-time jewelry


business.[14] Petitioner, on the other hand, is an agent who sells the pieces of
jewelry of complainants on commission basis. On February 7, 1992, petitioner
received from Victoria several pieces of jewelry amounting to Php106,000.00 as
evidenced by a trust receipt[15] signed by petitioner. Later on February 16, 1992,
petitioner again received several pieces of jewelry amounting to Php64,515.00 as
evidenced by another trust receipt[16] signed by petitioner.
After weeks passed, Victoria alleged that she made several verbal
demands[17] to petitioner to return the pieces of jewelry. Likewise, complainants
filed a complaint[18] at Barangay Kapitolyo, Pasig City, against Tabaniag, Jane
Bisquera (Bisquera) and Olandia for estafa and violations of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Petitioner, in her defense, alleged that she entrusted the pieces of jewelry to
Bisquera who issued Security Bank Checks[19] as payment. Petitioner claimed
that Victoriaknew that she was planning to sell the pieces of jewelry to
Bisquera.[20] Moreover, petitioner contends that she and Olandia delivered the said
Security Bank checks to Victoria, who then deposited the same to her account. The
checks issued by Bisquera bounced as the accounts were closed and
thus Victoria asked petitioner to do something about it. Petitioner claimed that she
filed cases for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Bisquera. Likewise, petitioner
asked the court for the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest and a hold departure
order against Bisquera.[21]

On cross-examination, however, petitioner admitted that the cases she filed


against Bisquera did not involve the same checks which are the subject matter of
the case at bar.[22]

On February 27, 2004, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision finding accused-appellant Wilma Tabaniag guilty


beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa is AFFIRMED with the indeterminate
penalty modified to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as the maximum, and with the award of indemnity
in the amount of Php62,900.00, deleted.

SO ORDERED.[23]
The pertinent portions of the CA decision are hereunder reproduced, to wit:
Tabaniag entered into an agreement with Victoria Espiritu for the sale of jewelry.
She obligated herself, among others, to deliver and account for the proceeds of all jewelry
sold and to return all other items she could not sell. The jewelry could not be sold on
installment. She abused the confidence reposed upon her by misrepresenting herself to
have sold the jewelry to a certain Bisquera and failing to remit the profit after demand to
do so by Espiritu. Due to her failure to forward the returns from the sale of the jewelry,
Espiritu suffered loss of income and profit.

The receipts issued to and signed by Tabaniag corroborate the prosecution's


testimonial proof that she personally received the jewelry. Tabaniag's uncorroborated
claim that Victoria Espiritu directly transferred the jewelry to a certain Jane Bisquera
cannot stand along against this factual finding. The checks issued by Bisquera do not
conclusively prove a direct transaction between her and Espiritu. x x x[24]

On March 26, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] assailing


the CA decision.

On August 2, 2004, Dennis filed a Motion to Dismiss,[26] attaching thereto an


Affidavit of Desistance,[27] to the effect that he was withdrawing the criminal
complaint because he and petitioner had already reached an amicable settlement,
the latter obligating herself to pay the civil aspect of the case.

On September 22, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution[28] denying petitioner's


Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the Motion to Dismiss filed by Dennis.

Hence, herein appeal with the following assignment of errors:


First Assignment of Error

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE


WAS ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE ON THE PART OF ACCUSED/PETITIONER TABANIAG IN
ENTRUSTING THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES (SIC) TO BISQUERA FOR SALE ON COMMISSION TO
PROSPECTIVE BUYERS.

Second Assignment of Error

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF


THE AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION DESPITE ITS VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF
ACCUSED TABANIAG.

Third Assignment of Error

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING


THAT THE LETTER COMPLAINT SENT TO THE BGY. CAPTAIN OF BGY. KAPITOLYO WHICH
WAS NEVER RECEIVED BY ACCUSED A DEMAND IN CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 1(b) OF
ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

Fourth Assignment of Error

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
MOTION TO DISMISS/AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE OF ESPIRITU WILL NOT EXONERATE
ACCUSED TABANIAG DESPITE IT BEING THE SAME PERSON WHO EXECUTED THE SAME
AFFIDAVIT TO DISMISS CASE VERSUS ACCUSED MELANIA OLANDIA.

Fifth Assignment of Error

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RENDER A


JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]
The petition is impressed with merit.

The elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are
the following: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the
offended party to the offender.[30]

Anent the first error raised by petitioner, this Court finds that, given the facts
of the case and the evidence on record, the evidence is wanting to prove that
petitioner hadmisappropriated or converted the pieces of jewelry entrusted to her
by Victoria.

In his Complaint-Affidavit,[31] Dennis alleged that petitioner gave the pieces of


jewelry to her sub-agent Bisquera for the latter to sell the same. Furthermore,
Dennis alleged that the checks issued as payment were dishonored, the reason
being that the accounts were closed.

Petitioner does not deny entrusting the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera. The records
of the case reveal that petitioner had in fact entrusted the pieces of jewelry to
Bisquera as evidenced by two receipts[32] dated February 16, 1992. The same is
bolstered by the testimony of Tapang, who testified that he witnessed petitioner
give the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera.[33] Thus, since the pieces of jewelry were
transferred to Bisquera, petitioner argues that she could not be guilty of
misappropriation or conversion as contemplated by Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words
convert and misappropriate connote an act of using or disposing of anothers
property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon. To misappropriate for ones own use includes not only conversion
to ones personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right.[34]

The factual milieu of the case at bar is similar to Serona v. Court of


Appeals[35](Serona) where pieces of jewelry were also transferred to a sub-
agent. The Solicitor General, however, contends that the doctrine laid down
in Serona is inapplicable as the agreement between complainants and petitioner
provide a clear prohibition against sub-agency.[36]

The conditions set forth in the two trust receipts signed by petitioner read:
x x x in good condition, to be sold in CASH ONLY within _____, days from date of signing
this receipt. If I could not sell, I shall return all the jewelry within the period mentioned
above. If I would be able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and account the whole proceeds
of the sale thereof to the owner of the jewelries (sic) at his/her residence: my
compensation or commission shall be the over-price on the value of each jewelry quoted
above. I am prohibited to sell any jewelry on credits or by installment, deposit, give
for safekeeping, lend pledge or give as security or guarantee under any circumstances or
manner, any jewelry to other person or persons, and that I received the above jewelry in
the capacity of agent.[37]

Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the aforementioned conditions do


not, in any way, categorically state that petitioner cannot employ a sub-agent. A
plain reading of the conditions clearly shows that the restrictions only pertain to
the manner in which petitioner may dispose of the property: (1) to sell the jewelry
on credit; (2) to sell the jewelry by installment; (3) to give the jewelry for
safekeeping; (4) to lend the jewelry; (5) to pledge the jewelry; (6) to give the jewelry
as security; and (7) to give the jewelry as guarantee. To this Court's mind, to
maintain the position that the said conditions also prohibit the employment of a
sub-agent would be stretching the plain meaning of the words too thinly.
Petitioner is thus correct in citing Serona, which is instructive and may be
applied by analogy, to wit:

Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to a sub-agent for sale on commission basis. x x
x
It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment
by an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement to the
contrary between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment
of Labrador as petitioners sub-agent was not expressly prohibited by Quilatan, as the
acknowledgment receipt, Exhibit B, does not contain any such limitation. Neither does it
appear that petitioner was verbally forbidden by Quilatan from passing on the jewelry to
another person before the acknowledgment receipt was executed or at any other time.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners act of entrusting the jewelry to Labrador is
characterized by abuse of confidence because such an act was not proscribed and is, in
fact, legally sanctioned.
xxxx
In the case at bar, it was established that the inability of petitioner as agent to comply with
her duty to return either the pieces of jewelry or the proceeds of its sale to her principal
Quilatan was due, in turn, to the failure of Labrador to abide by her agreement with
petitioner. Notably, Labrador testified that she obligated herself to sell the jewelry in
behalf of petitioner also on commission basis or to return the same if not sold. In other
words, the pieces of jewelry were given by petitioner to Labrador to achieve the very same
end for which they were delivered to her in the first place. Consequently, there is no
conversion since the pieces of jewelry were not devoted to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon.
Similarly, it cannot be said that petitioner misappropriated the jewelry or delivered them
to Labrador without right. Aside from the fact that no condition or limitation was imposed
on the mode or manner by which petitioner was to effect the sale, it is also consistent with
usual practice for the seller to necessarily part with the valuables in order to find a buyer
and allow inspection of the items for sale.
In People v. Nepomuceno, the accused-appellant was acquitted of estafa on facts similar to
the instant case. Accused-appellant therein undertook to sell two diamond rings in behalf
of the complainant on commission basis, with the obligation to return the same in a few
days if not sold. However, by reason of the fact that the rings were delivered also for sale
on commission to sub-agents who failed to account for the rings or the proceeds of its sale,
accused-appellant likewise failed to make good his obligation to the complainant thereby
giving rise to the charge of estafa. In absolving the accused-appellant of the crime charged,
we held:
Where, as in the present case, the agents to whom personal property was
entrusted for sale, conclusively proves the inability to return the same is
solely due to malfeasance of a sub-agent to whom the first agent had
actually entrusted the property in good faith, and for the same purpose
for which it was received; there being no prohibition to
doso and the chattel being delivered to the sub-agent before the owner
demands its return or before such return becomes due, we hold that the
first agent cannot be held guilty of estafa by either misappropriation or
conversion. The abuse of confidence that is characteristic of this offense
is missing under the circumstances.
Furthermore, in Lim v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing Nepomuceno and the case
of People v. Trinidad, held that:
In cases of estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the accused personally,
through his own acts, and his mere negligence in permitting another to
take advantage or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot
constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1-b, of the Revised Penal
Code; unless of course the evidence should disclose that the agent acted
in conspiracy or connivance with the one who carried out the actual
misappropriation, then the accused would be answerable for the acts of
his co-conspirators. If there is no such evidence, direct or circumstantial,
and if the proof is clear that the accused herself was the innocent victim of
her sub-agents faithlessness, her acquittal is in order.[38]

Petitioner thus cannot be criminally held liable for estafa. Although it cannot
be denied that she received the pieces of jewelry from complainants, evidence is
wanting in proving that she misappropriated or converted the amount of the pieces
of jewelry for her own personal use. Likewise, the prosecution failed to present
evidence to show that petitioner had conspired or connived with Bisquera. The
mere fact that petitioner failed to return the pieces of jewelry upon demand is not
proof of conspiracy, nor is it proof of misappropriation or conversion.

In addition, this Court takes notice of the findings of fact by the RTC in the separate
civil action instituted by complainants, the same docketed as Civil Case No. 63131,
dealing with the civil aspect of the case at bar:
xxxx
Jane Bisquera cannot interpose the defense that she is not privy to the
transaction. Her admission that she has indeed received the pieces of jewelry which is
the subject matter of the controversy and her offer to extinguish the obligation by
payment or dacion en pago is contradictory to her defense. Therefore, she is estopped
from interposing such a defense.
Furthermore, earlier in her transaction with Wilma Tabaniag, the principals, Sps.
Espiritu, were not alien to her but were in fact disclosed to her, hence, she has
knowledge that the spouses are the principals of Tabaniag.
Bisquera, being a sub-agent to Tabaniag, is in fact privy to the agreement. x x
[39]
x

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had in fact transferred the pieces
of jewelry to Bisquera. Thus, contrary to the finding of the CA, petitioner could not
have converted the same for her own benefit, especially since the pieces of jewelry
were not with her, and there was no evidence of conspiracy or connivance between
petitioner and Bisquera.
Moreover, even Victoria cannot deny knowing that petitioner had given the pieces
of jewelry to Bisquera, as Victoria herself was the one who deposited the checks
issued by Bisquera to her account, to wit:

Q. Now, madam witness, there is a (sic) mentioned here an amount of P300,000.00


regarding the violation of bouncing check, am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And according to you, these were payments made by Wilma Tabaniag, am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who is the drawer of these checks with a P300,000.00 that you mentioned in this
particular document, not less than P300,000.00?
A. The total check P300,000.00 was under my name.

Q. No, I mean, who is the drawer?


A. Mrs. Tabaniag issued and the other pieces of jewelry were issued by a certain Jane
Bisquera.

Q. No, not jewelries, checks.


A. I'm sorry, checks.

Q. How much was issued by Jane Bisquera?


A. The total is P320,872.00

Q. That was by Jane Bisquera alone?


A. Yes, sir.[40]
Lastly, although petitioner may have admitted that the cases she filed
against Bisquera do not involve the same checks, which are the subject matter of
the case at bar, the same does not necessarily manifest a criminal intent on her
part. On the contrary, what it shows is that petitioner too may be an unwilling
victim of this day-to-day malady of bouncing checks, common in our business
field. Certainly, petitioner may have been negligent in entrusting the pieces
of jewelry to Bisquera, but in no way can such constitute estafa as defined in the
RPC.

As a final note, a reading of the records and transcript of the case seemingly shows
an unintentional reference by the parties in describing the transaction as one of
sale.[41] The foregoing notwithstanding, if this Court were to consider the
transaction as one of sale and not one of sub-agency, the same conclusion would
nevertheless be reached, as the critical elements of misappropriation or
conversion, as previously discussed, are absent in the case at bar.

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and
persuasion so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.[42] What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with
moral certainty.[43] In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden. Based on the foregoing, it would then be unnecessary to discuss the other
assigned errors.

Notwithstanding the above, however, petitioner is not entirely free from any
liability towards complainants. The rule is that an accused acquitted of estafa may
nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so
warrant.[44] However, since there is a separate civil action instituted by
complainants, this Court deems it proper for the civil aspect of the case at bar to
be resolved therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals


in CA-G.R. CR No. 24906, dated February 27, 2004, and its Resolution dated
September 22, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Wilma Tabaniag
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, without prejudice, however, to the recovery
of civil liability in Civil Case No. 63131, before the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 268, Pasig City.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Vicente Q.
Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-46.
[2]
Id. at 61-62.
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 22-28.
[4]
Id. at 8-9.
[5]
Id. at 8.
[6]
Affidavit dated July 27, 1995; records, p. 98.
[7]
TSN, May 23, 1996, pp. 11-12; records, p. 104.
[8]
Records, pp. 186-188.
[9]
Id. at 193-195.
[10]
Id. at 206-207.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 10-11.
[12] Id. at 10.
[13] Id. at 28.
[14]
TSN, October 10, 1996, p. 5.
[15]
Exhibit B, folder of exhibits, p. 2.
[16]
Exhibit C, folder of exhibits, p. 3.
[17]
TSN, October 16, 1997, p. 14.
[18]
Exhibit D, folder of exhibits, p. 4.
[19]
Exhibit 4, folder of exhibits, pp. 2-4.
[20]
CA rollo, pp. 51-53.
[21]
TSN, August 12, 1999, p. 8.
[22]
Id. at 19.
[23]
CA rollo, p. 154.
[24]
Rollo, p. 43.
[25]
CA rollo, pp. 160-172.
[26]
Id. at 185-186.
[27]
Id. at 187.
[28]
Id. at 194-195.
[29]
Rollo, p. 16.
[30]
Salazar v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149472, August 18, 2004, 437 SCRA 41, 46.
[31]
Records, p. 6.
[32]
Exhibits 11 and 12 for the defense, folder of exhibits, pp. 19-20.
[33]
TSN, January 20, 2000, p. 6.
[34]
Amorsolo v. People, G.R. No. L-76647, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 556, 563, citing U.S. v. Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67
(1907) and U.S. v. Panes, 37 Phil. 116 (1917).
[35]
G.R. No. 130423, November 18, 2002, 392 SCRA 35.
[36]
Rollo, p. 131.
[37]
Exhibit B and C, folder of exhibits, pp. 2-3. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[38]
Serona v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35, at 41-44. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[39]
Rollo, pp. 105-106. (Emphasis supplied.)
[40]
TSN, October 16, 1997, pp. 24-25.
[41]
See TSN, October 17, 1997, p. 12; TSN, October 10, 1996, pp. 6-7.
[42]
People v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 139341-45, July 25, 2002, 385 SCRA 224, 232.
[43]
Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.
[44]
Serona v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157781. April 11, 2005]

ROBERT CRISANTO D. LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES and ATOZ TRADING CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 19947 dismissing the appeal
of petitioner Robert Crisanto D. Lee and the Resolution [2] denying his motion for
reconsideration.
At the instance of Atoz Trading Corporation (ATC), 10 separate Informations were
filed, on September 27, 1994, in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159,
against petitioner in his capacity as marketing manager of ATC. The cases were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 107020 to 107029. Except for the dates and the amounts involved,
the Informations contained common allegations for the crimes allegedly committed, as
follows:

1. CRIM. CASE No. 107020:

That on or about the 10th day of January, 1992, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the Marketing Manager of Atoz Trading Corporation
represented by Johnny M. Jaotegan was authorized to [receive] payments for the
company; Thus received from Ocean Feed Mills Company's Client, the amount
of P47,940.00 through telegraphic transfer, with the corresponding obligation to
remit/account the same to Atoz Trading Corporation; but accused, far from complying
with his obligation to remit the same despite notices and demands made upon him,
with intent [to] gain, unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence and to defraud
Atoz Trading Corporation represented by Johnny M. Jaotegan once in possession of
the money received from Ocean Feed Mills, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously misapplied, misappropriated and converted to his own personal use
and benefit the amount of P47,940.00 to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
in the aforementioned amount of P47,940.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Other than Criminal Case No. 107023 which was ordered dismissed on motion of the
prosecution, joint trial on the merits of the remaining nine cases eventuated, following the
arraignment of petitioner on February 20, 1995 during which he pleaded Not Guilty.
The proceedings before the trial court and the evidence adduced by the parties were
summarized by the CA as follows:

During the joint trial of the remaining cases, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: (1) Johnny Jaotegan, the President and Chief Operating Officer of Atoz
Trading Corporation; (2) Jeffrey Corneby, the general teller of UCPB, Greenhills, San
Juan; (3) Maria Concepcion dela Cruz, the corporate secretary of Ocean Feed Mills;
and (4) Ellen Gusar, the accounting clerk-computer encoder of Atoz Trading
Corporation. Their testimonies tend to establish the following factual backdrop:

Atoz Trading Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Atoz, is a stock corporation


engaged in the trading of animal feeds, feeds supplements, raw materials and
ingredients for feed mills, with herein [petitioner] Robert Crisanto Lee as the
corporations sales manager from early 90s to 1994. In the course of Lees employment
therewith, he was able to bring in Ocean Feed Mills, a Bacolod-based company
engaged in the manufacture of pelletized feeds for prawn and fish, as one of Atozs
clients. Having personally found Ocean Feed Mills, [petitioner] handled said account.

Transactions between the two companies were then coursed through [petitioner], so
that it was upon the latters instructions that Ocean Feed Mills addressed its payments
through telegraphic transfers to either Atoz Trading and/or Robert Lee or Robert
Lee since [petitioner] explained that it was difficult for him to claim the check at
UCPB Greenhills.

When [petitioner] ceased reporting for work in 1994, Atoz audited some of the
accounts handled by him. It was then that Atoz discovered Ocean Feed Mills unpaid
account in the amount of P318,672.00. Atoz thus notified Ocean Feed Mills that
[petitioner] was no longer connected with the corporation, and advised it to verify its
accounts. Promptly preparing a certification and summary of payments, Ocean Feed
Mills informed Atoz that they have already fully settled their accounts and even made
overpayments.

Bank documents prepared and submitted by UCPB Greenhills, San Juan, later showed
that [petitioner] maintained therewith Savings Account No. 117-105532-0, to which
account the payments made by Ocean Feed Mills to Atoz through telegraphic
transfers, have either been credited or deposited. Jeffrey Corneby, UCPB Greenhills
general teller, testified that upon receipt of telegraphic transfers coursed through
UCPB, it is customary for said bank to either credit the amount to payees account if
payee has an account with the bank, or just issue a managers check for the amount
transmitted if the payee has no account.

Meanwhile, Ellen Gusar, whose duty was to prepare statement of accounts to be sent
to Atozs clients, attested that [petitioner] took the duly-prepared statement of accounts
of Ocean Feed Mills and never returned the same, on the pretext that he had already
sent them to the Ocean Feed Mills. She also confirmed that, as of September 30, 1992,
the subsidiary ledger of Atoz showed that Ocean Feed Mills had an outstanding
balance of P318,672.00.

After the prosecution rested its case, the [petitioner] filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
therein alleging that the evidence thus far presented by the prosecution in each of the
cases were insufficient inasmuch as [I]t is bereft of any evidence of formal demand
upon the accused to remit the amounts allegedly misappropriated, before the filing of
the subject cases. In an Order dated January 23, 1996, the trial court denied the
demurrer for lack of factual and legal basis (Records, p. 200).

In his defense, [petitioner] maintained that he had informed Lu Hsui Nan, the man
whom he alleged to be the real president of Atoz, of the manner in which Ocean Feed
Mills transmitted its payments and that Nan said it is okay although unusual, as long
as I [petitioner] maintain the customer and the relationships and as long as they pay
us (TSN, March 26, 1996, p. 14). He also asserted that as soon as the bank credited
the remittances to his account, he would withdraw the same either in cash or in the
form of managers checks and remitted the same to Beth Ligo, Atozs cashier. He
insisted, however, that Beth Ligo, instead of issuing acknowledgment receipts of the
aforesaid remittances, merely recorded the same and furnished copies thereof to the
credit and collections and the accounting departments of Atoz.

On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled Johnny Jaotegan to the witness stand, and
presented additional witnesses, namely: (1) Lu Hsui Nan, whom the prosecution
presented as Atozs vice president and director; and (2) Elizabeth Ligo, Atozs cashier
from 1985 to 1994.

Nan denied having knowledge that Ocean Feed Mills made payments through
telegraphic transfers addressed to Atoz Trading Corporation and/or Robert Lee as
payee, saying that he only learned of the same when [petitioner] ceased working for
the corporation.

Ligo, on the other hand, testified that she did not receive any payment from Ocean
Feed Mills, hence she did not issue provisional receipts for the same. She added that it
was only on April 7, 1992 when she issued Provisional Receipt No. 502 for Ocean
Feed Mills payment of P25,500.00 collected by [petitioner].
Jaotegan claimed that on August 12, 1994, between 10 p.m. to 1 a.m., he went to
Paraaque, accompanied by his counsel and some policemen, and tried to locate
[petitioner], and that upon finding him, we asked him [petitioner] to remit the
payments made by Ocean Feed Mills to Atoz Trading Corporation. (TSN, 14 May
1996, p. 19).

On sur-rebuttal, [petitioner] declared that Jaotegan did not demand the payments made
by Ocean Feed Mills [Company] but only demanded from him the return of the
service car and the cellular phone assigned to him.[4]

On July 23, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the
crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused ROBERT


CRISANTO LEE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine (9) counts of the crime
of Estafa, defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances present in the
commission of the crime hereby sentences said accused to suffer the following:

1) In Crim. Case No. 107020 An indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and to pay Atoz Trading Corporation the amount of P47,940.00 as actual
damages plus costs.

2) In Crim. Case No. 107021 An indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and to pay Atoz Trading Corporation the amount of P47,940.00 as actual
damages plus costs.

3) In Crim. Case No. 107022 An indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to five (5) years and six (6) months of prision correccional in its maximum
period as maximum and to pay Atoz Trading Corporation the amount of P17,000.00
as actual damages plus costs.

4) In Crim. Case No. 107024 An indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and to pay Atoz Trading Corporation the amount of P47,000.00 as actual
damages plus costs.
5) In Crim. Case No. 107025 An indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and to pay Atoz Trading Corporation the amount of P54,000.00 as actual
damages plus costs.

6) In Crim. Case No. 107026 An indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and nine (9)
months of prision correccional in its minimum period as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period as maximum and to pay Atoz
Trading Corporation the amount of P15,000.00 as actual damages plus costs.

7) In Crim. Case No. 107027 An indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and to pay complainant the amount of P23,256.00 as actual damages plus
costs.

8) In Crim. Case No. 107028 An indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to fifteen (15) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period as maximum and to pay private complainant the
amount of P93,000.00 as actual damages plus costs.

9) In Crim. Case No. 107029 An indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional in its medium period as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and to pay private complainant Atoz Trading Corporation the amount
of P44,696.00 as actual damages plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA contending that:

A) THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED


GUILTY OF ESTAFA THRU CONVERSION OR MISAPPROPRIATION EVEN
WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR DEMAND; AND

B) THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS


EVIDENCE OF CONVERSION OR MISAPPROPRIATION SINCE THERE IS
LACK OF IT. (Appellants Brief, p. 4; Rollo, pp. 32-40, 35).[6]
In a Decision on September 13, 2002, the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
assailed decision. The appellate court, likewise, dismissed the petitioners motion for the
reconsideration of its decision.
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, the petitioner filed the instant petition for
review and raised the following:
A.) WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN BE CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME
OF ESTAFA THRU CONVERSION (ART. 315, PAR. 1-[b] OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE), LACKING THE ELEMENT OF FORMAL DEMAND BEFORE THE
FILING OF THE CASES AGAINST HIM; AND
B.) WHETHER THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WERE ISSUED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR NOT.[7]
The petitioner contends that demand is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a
criminal complaint for estafa. He posits that demand must be made formally. The
petitioner cites the commentary of Justice Ramon C. Aquino, based on the rulings of the
CA in People v. Pendon[8] and People v. Bastiana.[9] The petitioner, likewise, echoes the
commentary of Justice Aquino that even in Tubb v. People,[10] the Court ruled that there
must be demand for funds or property held in trust. The petitioner asserts that the
respondents failed to prove the element of demand on its evidence-in-chief and attempted
to prove the same only on its rebuttal evidence. In any event, the petitioner asserts that
the evidence adduced by the respondents to prove the petitioners misappropriation is
doubtful.
The respondents refute the contention of the petitioner, thus:

The fourth element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., that demand was made by the offended party, was adequately and clearly
proven by the prosecution. It must be stressed that prior to the filing of the subject
criminal cases against petitioner, private complainants president, Johnny Jaotegan,
had demanded from petitioner to turn over to him the subject sums of money. Thus, in
the evening of August 12, 1994, Johnny Jaotegan, along with his counsel Atty.
Fernando Flor and some Paraaque policemen, went to petitioners house in Paraaque
and there he asked petitioner to remit said sums of money and to return the company
car and a cellular phone (TSN, May 14, 1996, pp. 16-19). It also appears that earlier,
private complainants officers had encountered difficulty in locating petitioner after his
continued failure to report for work in August 1994, prompting said officers to seek
the assistance of the Paraaque police for that purpose (Ibid., p. 17). Evidently, as
petitioner admitted, there was a demand made on him to account for the money he had
collected from private complainants customer.

Contrary to petitioners proposition, prior demand need not be made formally


(See People vs. Valeriano, CA, 61 O.G. 282, 284 [1965], citing Tubb vs. People, 101
Phil. 114 [1957]). This Honorable Court has suggested in the Tubb case that previous
demand may be made in whatever form. There, the complainant, after having failed to
locate the whereabouts of the accused to whom he had entrusted P6,000.00 for the
purchase of rattan and who neither delivered the rattan nor returned the money, met
the accused by chance at the Manila Hotel one year later and asked him about the
money. Charged with estafa, the accused claimed that no demand had been made
upon him. The Honorable Court declared:

It is urged that there can be no estafa without a previous demand, which allegedly has
not been made upon herein petitioner, but the aforementioned query made to him by
Quasha, in the Manila Hotel, was tantamount to a demand. Besides, the law does not
require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same
[may], however, be established in the case at bar.

(Tubb vs. People, supra, at 119)

Indeed, in Barrameda vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 477, 485 [1999], this
Honorable Court, citing Tubb vs. People, supra, held that the specific word demand
need not be used to show that demand had, indeed, been made upon the person
charged with the offense. A query as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount
to a demand.

Notably, in his cited book, former Chief Justice Aquino does not, in anyway, purport
to subscribe to the view that a demand must be made formally. What he merely says is
that while this Honorable Court ruled in Tubb that, under the law, a demand is not a
condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement and that the failure
to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation, the same ruling states that there must still be some demand,
regardless of its form. In the same manner, while he cited in his book the Court of
Appeals ruling in People vs. Pendon (supra) and People vs. Bastiana (supra) that
such demand must be made formally and before the action is filed and that in the
absence of demand, an accused cannot be convicted of estafa, it is apparent therefrom
that Justice Aquino made use of the citation only to set forth the diverging opinions of
the Court of Appeals on the matter, namely, (1) one view holding that the demand
must be made formally (People vs. Pendon, supra); (2) another one holding that such
demand is not required if there is a specified time for delivery (People vs. Librea, CA,
48 O.G. 5304); and (3) still another one holding that a report to the police was
considered a demand (People vs. Baquir, CA-G.R. No. 5349-R, January 26, 1951).[11]

We agree with the respondents.


Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or


any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: a) that money, goods
or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender; or denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.[12]
The words convert and misappropriate as used in the aforequoted law connote an
act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate a thing of value for
ones own use or benefit, not only the conversion to ones personal advantage but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right.[13] Misappropriation or
conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence.
Demand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a
criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accused may be convicted of the felony under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the
Information.[14] In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is
evidence of misappropriation or conversion.[15] However, failure to account upon demand,
for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[16]
Demand need not be formal. It may be verbal. In Barrameda v. Court of
Appeals,[17] the Court ruled that even a query as to the whereabouts of the money is
tantamount to a demand:

It must be noted that the specific word demand need not be used to show that demand
had, indeed, been made upon the person charged of the offense. A query as to the
whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount
to a demand.[18]

In the present case, the prosecution adduced proof upon cross-examination of the
petitioner that he failed to return the funds held in trust before the complaint for estafa was
filed against him:
Anent the second element of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b), there was a strong
and positive evidence that in all the criminal cases filed before this Court, the accused
had, indeed, converted the proceeds of the telegraphic transfers (remitted by Ocean
Feed Mills [Company] in favor of Atoz Trading Corporation) to his own benefit. A
perusal of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated March 26, 1996, page 30, reads:

Cross-Examination of Robert
Lee conducted by
Atty. Flor:
Q - According to you, Mr. Witness, the Ocean Feed Mills whenever they remit their
payment, they do it through telegraphic transfer?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - And according to you, the telegraphic transfer is paid to or the payee is Atoz
Trading and/or Robert Crisanto Lee?
A - Just Robert Lee only.
Q - That Robert Lee refers to you?
A - Yes, Sir.

In the foregoing cross-examination, accused admitted that he received the telegraphic


transfers sent by Ocean Feed Mills. In the same Transcript of Stenographic Notes, pp.
34-36, accused tried to defend himself by alleging that the proceeds of the remitted
amount were given to Ms. Beth Ligo, cashier of Atoz Trading Corporation.

Cross-Examination
conducted by
Atty. Flor:
Q - This Beth Ligo, Mr. Witness, according to you, she is the cashier of what
company?
A - Both of Atoz and Chiu-Nichi Agro Resources.
Q - According to you a while ago, whenever the Ocean Feed Mills remit their
payment, it goes to your account at UCPB and then you withdraw that money
from UCPB, Greenhills, sometimes in cash and sometimes in the form of
managers check payable to Atoz Trading. A while ago, Mr. Witness, you testified
that you withdraw the cash from your bank account, is it not?
A - Since it was credited in my account, I have to withdraw it from my account.
Q - You withdraw the payments remitted from Bacolod to Greenhills UCPB, from
your bank account?
A - Because it was credited.
Q - My question is, did you withdraw the remittances from your bank account?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - After you withdraw that money from your bank account, you immediately go and
see Miss Beth Ligo and surrender that cash to her, is that what you want to tell
us?
A - What do you mean by immediate.
Q - According to you, a while ago, Mr. Witness, UCPB Greenhills is just in front of
your office at Greenhills, is it not?
A - Correct, Sir.
Q - When you learned that there is a remittance from Bacolod from their payment of
Atoz product, you go to your bank and withdraw that remittance in cash and
immediately with this cash, you just cross the street and surrender it to the
cashier Ms. Beth Ligo, is it not correct?
A - If what you mean upon crediting of payment from Ocean Feed Mills to my account
and I withdraw it immediately, sometimes it was credited and before I know about
it a day or two after. That is the situation.
Q - Yes, my question is when you learned that telegraphic transfer was made by
Ocean Feed Mills to Atoz Trading and/or Robert Lee and incidentally it ended up
in your account, what you normally do is you go and withdraw that amount in
cash and considering that your office is just across the street, with the cash you
go and see the cashier Miss Beth Ligo and right there and then give her the
cash?
A - Yes, because all remittances are handed to the cashier.

From the foregoing testimony of the accused, it is clear that Mr. Robert Crisanto Lee
had, indeed, misappropriated or converted to his personal use the payments of Ocean
Feed Mills which were remitted thru telegraphic transfers in nine (9) instances since
the account of Ocean with Atoz remains outstanding up to the present (Exh. I, I-1 and
J) as corroborated by Ms. Beth Ligo (cashier of Atoz) where she stated on rebuttal that
the accused did not remit these payments of Ocean. It is evident that the accused
assumed the right to dispose of the remittances as if it were his own, thus, committing
conversion with unfaithfulness and a clear breach of trust.

It is quite obvious that the misappropriation or conversion committed by the accused


resulted to the prejudice of both Atoz Trading Corporation and Ocean Feed Mills
particularly the latter, which had a belief all along that its payments were credited to
its outstanding balance. Since records reveal that up to this even date, Ocean has an
outstanding balance of P318,672.00, sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning
of Article 315 a(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the third element of this kind of
Estafa is satisfied.[19]

The respondents, likewise, adduced evidence on rebuttal testimony of Johnny M.


Jaotegan, the president of ATC, that he, in the company of policemen, demanded the
production of the funds from the petitioner but that the latter failed to account for and
return the same.[20]
The bare fact that the respondents adduced proof of demand only when they
presented Johnny M. Jaotegan as rebuttal witness and not as a witness on their evidence-
in-chief does not enfeeble the case of the respondents. It bears stressing that in resolving
a case, the trial court must consider all the evidence adduced by the parties on their
evidence-in-chief, rebuttal evidence and sur-rebuttal evidence. Moreover, the petitioner
testified on sur-rebuttal evidence and denied the testimony of Jaotegan on rebuttal,
hence, cannot feign prejudice.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), with
Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 59.
[3] Id. at 72.
[4] Id. at 45-48.
[5] Id. at 69-71.
[6] Id. at 50.
[7] Id. at 35-36.
[8] 53 O.G. 174.
[9] 54 O.G. 4300.
[10] 101 Phil. 114 (1957).
[11] Rollo, pp. 140-143.
[12] Salazar v. People, 439 Phil. 762 (2002).
[13] Ibid., Sy v. People, G.R. No. 85785, 24 April 1989, 172 SCRA 685.
[14] Salazar v. People, supra, citing United States v. Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67 (1907).
[15] Sy v. People, supra.
[16] People v. Sullano, G.R. No. L-18209, 30 June 1966, 17 SCRA 488.
[17] 372 Phil. 352 (1999).
[18] Id. at 362.
[19] Rollo, pp. 67-69.
[20] TSN, 4 May 1996, pp. 16-19.
Dear PAO,
My former boyfriend owes me money amounting to more than P300, 000.00 because at the early
stage of our relationship, he was able to convince me to invest in the stock market. One time, I
asked him to show me the Stocks Certificate as proof that he bought stocks for me but he was not
able to show me anything. Recently, we broke up because I found out that he was engaged in
another relationship. I asked him to return my money and he said that he will but he never did
return anything despite repeated demands.

Currently, I am working abroad and I want to file a case against my former boyfriend. What
possible cases can I file against him? How can I file these cases?
KR

Dear KR,
From the facts that you stated, it is very clear that you entrusted your money to your boyfriend
for the purpose of investing into stocks. His failure to present to you any stock certificate when
you demanded it from him is a clear indication that he never used your money to invest in the
stock market.

For his failure to account to you the money that you entrusted to him, your former boyfriend may
be held liable for estafa by misappropriation under Article 315 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Under the said provision, a person may be charged of estafa if he/she “misappropriates or
converts, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property”. The penalty for the said offense depends on the amount of money or property
misappropriated.

You may also opt to file a case for collection of sum of money against your former boyfriend.
This is a civil case, the purpose of which is to be able to recover your money including all the
interests that is due to it.

If you choose to file a criminal complaint for estafa, you need to be personally present because
you have to subscribe to the criminal complaint you are instituting against your former
boyfriend. A criminal complaint under the rules is a sworn written statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by an offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated (Section 3, Rule 110, 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure).

If you choose to file a collection case, you may execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of anyone you trust to file the said collection case. The SPA must be executed before the
Philippine Consulate in the place where you are working as an overseas worker. After executing
the SPA, you may send the same to the person named therein as your attorney-in-fact so that
he/she can file the collection case in your behalf.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ANDRE L. D AIGLE, G.R. No. 174181


Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus- Acting Chairperson,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:


Respondent. June 27, 2012
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[1]

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision[2] dated March 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated
January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL convicting petitioner Andre L. DAigle of the crime of
Estafa. Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration[5] thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the following
Information:

That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then
the Managing Director of Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit, Phils. for management, care and
custody the following company properties:

a) Electric transformer worth P16,500.00

b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of computer boxes
worth P490,000.00
c) Machine spare parts consisting of

- set of rack and pinion

- pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30

- pair of meter gears 42 teeth

- set of gears 32 teeth

- gear bith bearing inserted

- 3 SL 20 bearings V plate

- one-way clutch

- one-way bearing CSK 20HC5

- 8 of LJ 34 bearings V type

- roller bearing 1 x 0

- 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value of P12,765.35

d) [Equipment] and raw materials valued at P162,400.00

with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
PESOS & 35/100 (P681,665.35)

under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that is, exclusively for the
machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from complying with his obligation with grave abuse of
confidence reposed upon him by his employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate properties to his own
personal use and benefit and despite several demands made upon him, accused refused and failed
and still refuses and fails to return or account for the same to the damage and prejudice of Samfit,
Phils., represented by its President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in the aforesaid sum of P681,665.35.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial and trial
on the merits.
During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho
(Parducho), Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a corporation primarily
engaged in the manufacture of underwires for brassieres. According to him, petitioner
was the former managing director of SPI tasked with the management of the company
as well as the management, care and custody of SPIs personal properties. At the time that
he was holding said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC
Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire bending
machine similar to that being used by SPI.[7]

Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and responsibilities as
SPIs managing director[8] due to alleged conflict of business interest. Because of this,
Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPIs properties and reviewed its financial
statements, vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed
some of SPIs employees.[9] These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire
materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare parts,
while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner, went missing and were
left unaccounted for.[10] Further investigation revealed that some of SPIs wire bending
machines, computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was
confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that
TAC copied the wire bending machines of SPI.[11]

In a letter dated January 14, 1997,[12] SPIs counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to
turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand,
petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI also filed a replevin case against
him for the recovery of the electronic and computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue
of the Writ of Replevin,[13] an electronic box found inside TACs premises was recovered
from petitioner while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.

In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated spare parts for
SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and maintenance of SPIs
machines. He also claimed that he had an understanding with SPI that TAC would support
SPIs operation until its business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10%
share in SPI, TAC would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00 each
so that he could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would
provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as well as the control
panels. However, petitioner was not able to finish fabricating the bending machines as he
was dismissed by SPI. As a consequence, he filed a labor case against it before the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of its
machines. While he admitted that SPIs electronic transformer, computer boxes and
motor drives were recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned
out that he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise
his right of lien over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI,
collectibles amounting to P900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary
of P80,000.00. Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own
benefit.[14]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner for
the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315[15] of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to
SPI, upon demand, the properties entrusted to his care, custody and management is
sufficient evidence of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision[16] rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D AIGLE to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusio[n] temporal as maximum; to indemnify
private complainant in the amount of P191,665.35 and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision[18] dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed with
modification the trial courts Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna (Branch 93), dated
January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL, is MODIFIED to the effect that appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The decision is AFFIRMED in
all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[20] was likewise denied in a Resolution[21] dated


August 17, 2006.

Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER-ACCUSED[S] MOTION FOR


RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF VALID REASONS/JUSTIFICATION.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, (RTC-
BRANCH 93, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA), AND AT THE SAME TIME MODIFYING THE EXTENT OF THE
PENALTY [IMPOSED] FOR THE CRIME ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED.[22]

Our Ruling

After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the


petitioner vis--vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent), and in
the light of the practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the courts below, this
Court finds the instant petition partly meritorious.

Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain
petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for Reconsideration
without valid reason or justification. The reason for the appellate courts denial of
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is clear and simple, that is, after it made a
thorough evaluation of the issues and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA
found that same were already passed upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision.
This is very plain from the contents of the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied due to a valid reason and justifiable cause.

Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
did not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a judgment is not rendered defective just
because of the absence of a declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
dispositive portion. The ratio decidendiof the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt
of the petitioner and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the courts
below. Indeed, petitioners guilt was duly proven by evidence of the prosecution. In any
event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is
sufficient if it states: 1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the
civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. We find that all of these are
sufficiently stated in the trial courts Decision.

Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming
the said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He
argues that Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was
given juridical possession of the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical
possession of the things allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPIs properties
was only by virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose
behalf he has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said properties.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters that
the prosecutions evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime
charged. Based on SPIs records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on
several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for
brassieres. However after the conduct of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to
properly account therefor.

Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.

Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:

1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender
or denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[23]

All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.

Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business


transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the
latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used
in the fabrication as well as the electronic devices while work would be done at
petitioners premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an
electronic transformer, electronic box and a computer box.[24] When petitioner, however,
was not able to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter
demanded for the return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand
and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims against SPI.[25]

From petitioners own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the
aforementioned elements is very clear. SPIs properties were received by the petitioner in
trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending
machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after
petitioners alleged dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.

The Court cannot agree with petitioners postulation that he did not acquire
juridical possession of SPIs properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue
of his official function as SPIs corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the
equipment subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be
utilized in the fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on
how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired
not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the
Court held in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:[26]

When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the offender from the
offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires
both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x

With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able
to prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be
proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[27] The failure
to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation.[28]As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the
properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to
petitioners own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the
purpose of preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate,
failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is
tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly noted by
the CA:

We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that SPIs demand for the return of
the properties subject of this case was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no
longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on November
19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPIs demand for the return of its equipment and
materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said properties and the fact that he
failed to return or at least account for them raises the presumption of misappropriation and
conversion. x x x[29]
Lastly, it is obvious that petitioners failure to return SPIs properties valued at P191,665.35
caused damage and prejudice to the latter.

In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy
between him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was a
stockholder of the latter.Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has
no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioners stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Court
consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. As
correctly pointed out by the CA:

Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support appellants allegation that
the acts complained of in this case were corporate acts. His allegation without more that he had
an agreement with Mr. Bernie Kelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellants) share in SPI would be
increased to 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give his act of retaining the
properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also no evidence that he acted on behalf of
TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much less of SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that
appellants actuation should be considered as a corporate act, for which he claims he could not be
held personally liable. x x x[30]

Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses
to be credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for
its part, did not disturb the trial courts appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched
doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between
the parties.[31] Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of
them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the
Court accords deference to the trial courts appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly,
the RTCs finding of petitioners guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.

The proper imposable penalty


The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount
of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved
exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years
imprisonment.

In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved which
is P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable
should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor.[32] [A] period of one (1) year shall be added
to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in
no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.[33] Hence,
sixteen (16) years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of prision
mayor. And since same exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged
at twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its
maximum to prision mayor in its minimum is prision correccionalin its minimum to
medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x
x.[34]

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly pegged
the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but erred in
imposing the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is
beyond the lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly,
petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August 17, 2006, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)


Per raffle dated June 25, 2012.

Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.

Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
[1]
Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005).
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 162-181; penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman and concurred in by Presiding Justice
Ruben T. Reyes and Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador.
[3]
Records, vol. II, pp. 500-507; penned by Judge Francisco Dizon Pano.
[4]
CA rollo, pp. 225-226.
[5]
Id. at 182-216.
[6]
Records, vol. I, pp. 1-2.
[7]
TSN, January 28, 1998, pp. 6-7.
[8]
Exhibit A, records, vol. I, p. 196.
[9]
TSN, January 28, 1998, p. 9.
[10]
Exhibit B, records, vol. I, p. 227-230.
[11]
TSN, July 13, 1998, pp. 4-5.
[12]
Exhibit L, records, vol. I, p. 207.
[13]
Exhibit N, id. at 212-213.
[14]
TSN, November 11, 1998, pp. 14-16.
[15]
Article 315. Swindling (estafa) Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
xxx
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
[16]
Supra note 3.
[17]
Records, vol. II, p. 507.
[18]
Supra note 2.
[19]
CA rollo, p. 180.
[20]
Supra note 5.
[21]
Supra note 4.
[22]
Rollo, p. 43.
[23]
Cruzvale, Inc. v. Eduque, G.R. Nos. 172785-86, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 534, 545.
[24]
TSN, November 11, 1998, p. 14.
[25]
Id. at 14-15.
[26]
387 Phil. 15, 26 (2000).
[27]
Lee v. People, supra note 1.
[28]
Id.
[29]
CA Decision p. 13; CA rollo, p. 174.
[30]
Id. at 16; id. at 177.
[31]
Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) v. Estrada, G.R. No. 171052, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA
616, 621.
[32]
See Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 171121, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 322, 339.
[33]
Id.
[34]
Id.

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