TUPAS vs National Housing Corporation and Atty.

Virgilio Sy, as Officer-in-Charge of the

Bureau of Labor Relations
173 SCRA 33, G.R. No. L-49677, May 4, 1989
Facts: On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with
Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M.
Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned
and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting
thereon in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the
order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however,
set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a
motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays
that a certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
Issue: Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form union?
Ruling: With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the
guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No.
180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole
and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly
registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor
Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the
winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational
unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits
as may be provided by law."
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a
certification election among the affected employees of respondent National Housing
Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED

JOHN PAUL ERNEST S. RAVENA

12
 Salazar vs. Mathay

G.R. No. L-44061 September 20, 1976

Facts:

Petitioner Melania Salazar was appointed as confidential agent by the Auditor General,
GSIS. The said appointment was noted by the Civil Service Commission.

After 6 years, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS have been terminated as of the close of the
office hours.

Thereafter, the Auditor General, upon favourable recommendation of Mr. Pedro

Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to the examiner as Junior Examiner
receiving lower compensation. Said appointment was approved by the Civil Service
Commission.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Auditor General toreinstate her
former position as confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS.

Issue:

Whether or not the service of petitioner as “confidential agent” in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence and if not,
whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of
Junior Examiner in the same office.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that there are two instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of
Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of
the office, there exists "close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals
of personal trust or confidential matters of state."

Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the
termination of her services as confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS is in violation
of her security of tenure.

Accordingly, it can be said that petitioner was not removed from her office as
confidential agent in the office of the Auditor, GSIS, but that her term in said position has
already expired when the appointing power terminated her services.

13
 R. Marino Corpus vs Miguel Cuaderno, Sr.
13 SCRA 591 | March 30, 1962

Facts:
The Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, Marino Corpus, was
administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the
internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Monetary Board despite the
recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis for
actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension.
Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which
favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awarded PhP
5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner
was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent
for attorney’s fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position
may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor
Miguel Cuaderno, Sr..

Issue:
Whether or not the lack of trust and confidence by the appointing power a ground for
removing an employee or a public officer?

Ruling:
The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical
employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable.
No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a
cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioner’s claim for damages, the agreement between
a client and his lawyer as to attorney’s fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to
the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way
of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court.
Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.

14
 FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO
G.R. NO. L-69137 | August 5, 1986
Facts:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983.

 The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission
approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the
private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending
administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment."
 On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be
decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better
qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that
Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the
Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as
Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked."
 The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor
Ronald Duterte.
 The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to
question that order and the private respondent's title.

Issue:
The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary
but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority
indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent
Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
As one of the Justices, Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:
The Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
The Commission had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed
that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

15
 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) vs. Carlos P. Rilloraza
359 SCRA 525
June 25, 2001

FACTS: PAGCOR filed administrative charges against the respondent for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence
as their casino operations manager. Finding the defendant’s explanation unsatisfactory, PAGCOR
Board handed a resolution dismissing the respondent and several others from their positions in
PAGCOR. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission, the respondent was found guilty only of
Simple Neglect of Duty and was penalized only for one month and one day suspension. The
appellate court reaffirmed the decision of Commission but ordered the petitioner to reinstate
the respondent with payment of full back wages plus benefits. The petitioner, however, elevated
the case before the Court and argues that pursuant to Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869
the respondent is a primarily confidential employee. Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of the
appointing power and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him by the latter.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a casino operations manager is classified as “highly confidential”
employee. (2) If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, whether or not there
has been a sufficient cause of action to dismiss the defendant.

RULING: No. PAGCOR employees like casino operations manager are not highly confidential
employees by operation of law under Section 16 of P. D. 1869. First, the classification of a
particular position as primarily confidential, policy- determining or highly technical amounts to
no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the
true test being the nature of the position. Undoubtedly, it can be gleaned that the duties of a
casino operations manager call for a great measure of both ability and dependability, but his
position lacks confidence, trust or close intimacy reposed in him by his superior so as to qualify
his position as primarily confidential. Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining
or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter (that is, the charter for the operations
of the PAGCOR) pertains to exemption from competitive examinations to determine merit and
fitness to enter the Civil Service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of
tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions
within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on courts. Executive
pronouncements such presidential decrees can be no more than initial determinations that are
not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of
the Chief Executive to deny any offer the protection of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the
Constitution which states that “no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.” In other words, Section 16 of P.D. 1869 cannot be
given stringent application without compromising the constitutionally protected right of an
employee to security of tenure. Regardless of whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical, the Supreme Court, being the final arbiter, shall decide the
matter not by title but by the nature of the task entrusted by the appointing power to it. The
Supreme Court held that since a casino operations manager is not among those highly
confidential appointees or employees it classified to be, the respondent is not bound to be
dismissed by PAGCOR Board because the latter has no sufficient cause of action to do so: the
former being protected of his right to security of tenure.

16
 SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. SSS

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on
June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that
the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to
pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of
service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the
children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), Sec. 31, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law". Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees
to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution, Art. IX (B), Sec. 2, "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters", also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that
the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged
by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

17
 Reynaldo d. Lopez vs Civil Service Commission and Romeo v. Luz, Jr.
194 SCRA 269 G.r. No. 92140 February 19, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana,
was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila
South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the DOTC was
reorganized, and the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful evaluation of a placement committee of
the PPA,Luz was rated third.Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez, but the PPA
General Manager said Luz was not qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The
CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA complied. Still, the CSC found that the re-
assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in
the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant
who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’ appointment and instead substituting its
decision for that of the PPA.
Ruling:
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting
the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not
disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment
delegated to the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by
the respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employees
according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a
screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen the
qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and
capabilities of the future appointees.The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether
or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility,
nothing else. To go beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the
appointing authority and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No.
6656) does not confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or
disapproving becomes ministerial.The Court has defined the parameters within which the
power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the
case of Luego v.Civil Service Commission, 143SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the
Commission is actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications
and appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved."
We further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply
because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.The
Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.
Petition is GRANTED.

18
 University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres, petitioners,
vs.
Civil Service Commission, respondent.
G.R. No. 132860 April 3, 2001

Facts:
"Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los
Baños (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to
August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government'' official
representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific
(CIRDAP).

"When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied by Dr. Eulogio Castillo, the
then Director of the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter, Dr.
Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not later than September 15, 1989. Dr.
De Torres did not report to work.

"On January 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote
the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB
effective January 3, 1994. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB.
"On June 30, 1994, Dr. De Torres wrote Chancellor Villareal seeking reconsideration [of] the two
aforementioned decisions. On July 4, 1994, Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and
notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped
from the rolls he may report for duty effective January 3, 1994.

"On June 9, 1995, Dr. De Torres and the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB) filed
separate requests for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 dated May 5,
1995. In its CSC Resolution No. 96-1041 x x x, the commission denied the motion for
reconsideration, further stating that CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 [stood] and that since
separation from the service was non-disciplinary in nature, the appointing authority may
appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil service law and rules."6

The CSC rationalized its ruling in this manner:

"It could be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that De Torres was already on AWOL
beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year
was denied by then Chancellor De Guzman. It is a fact that De Torres' absence from work was
not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should
report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to
assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service."

Issue: Whether or not the issuance by the COMMISSION of Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and
961041, is hereby GRANTED.

Ruling:
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Respondent Civil Service Commission's
Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 96-1041 are SET ASIDE. No costs.
There is no question that the UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner on the Civil Service Rules
regarding leaves. The former warned the latter of the possibility of being considered on AWOL
(absence without leave) and of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report
for duty upon the expiration of his authorized leave.

19
However, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained
in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of
being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. Indeed, as
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs Emiliana N. Bernardo explained to the CSC in her October
12, 1994 letter:12 "UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from
the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show that his
salary was increased several times during his absence – on January 1, 1988, March 16, 1988,
and July 1, 1989. His appointment was also reclassified with promotion in rank from Training
Specialist II to Assistant Professor IV effective March 16, 1988. This promotion was approved by
the UP Board of Regents during its 1015th meeting held on August 25, 1988."

Verily, these acts are clearly inconsistent with separation or dropping from the service. Private
petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three
times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents,
the highest governing body of UP.13 Since the commencement of the Complaint before the CSC,
the University has consistently stood by his side. When respondent ruled against him in its
assailed Resolution No. 95-3045, the University promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
favoring his cause. Then, UP joined Dr. De Torres in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, as
well as in the Petition now before us. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the
University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ.

Needless to say, UP definitely recognizes and values petitioner's academic expertise. As the vice
chancellor for academic affairs explained, "[d]ropping him from the rolls will utterly be a waste
of government funds and will not serve the best interest of the country which is suffering from
'brain-drain'."22 Even UP President Emil Q. Javier advised Complainants Baskiñas and Medina to
"give Dr. de Torres the opportunity to honor his service obligation to the University," 23 referring
to petitioner's required return service in view of a fellowship abroad earlier granted him by the
institution.
Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres.
His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.

Luna Mae G.Biñas LLB I-C

20
 Navarro v. Civil Service Commission

226 SCRA 522 G.R. Nos. 107370-71 September 16, 1993

Facts:
Cable drums were stolen from Ford Stockyard in Mariveles Bataan on June 21, 1989 who were
owned by Takaoka Engineering Construction Co. Ltd worth P21,250.00. The suspect for the
stolen cable drums is the Petitioner Mario Navarro .The Senior Deputy Administrator of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) approved an Order terminating the services of Navarro and
finding him guilty as charged.
Navarro appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB rendered its
decision setting aside the Order issued by the Senior Deputy Administrator of EPZA. The
decision of the MSPB also reinstated Navarro with payment and back wages and other benefits
due him from the time of his dismissal. The MSPB denied the motion for reconsideration of the
EPZA. The Regional Trial Court of Bataan dismisses the criminal case filed against Navarro and
his co-accused for qualified theft. EPZA sought to reverse the decision of the MSPB before the
CSC and on July 16, 1992, the CSC rendered its decision setting aside the MSPB’s decision dated
December 11, 1991 and the CSC found Navarro guilty of grave misconduct and reimposed the
penalty of dismissal. The CSC also denied in its Resolution dated September 11, 1992 the
motion for reconsideration of Navarro.
In the recourse, Navarro claims that the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess jurisdiction in deciding the case without considering other pertinent evidence but
the EPZA filed for the dismissal of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
manifestation to support the plea of the Petitioner in the argument that there can be no appeal
in the MSPB’s decision exonerating Navarro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission and the Export Processing Zone Authority acted
without jurisdiction.
HELD:
The MSPB rendered a favorable decision for Navarro and this fact alone should have prevented
EPZA from appealing to the Commission on the bases of prevailing jurisprudence. Under P.D.
807 or The Philippine Civil Service Law, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over MSPB’s
decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges and P.D. 807 does
not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees.
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative cases involving suspension for
more than thirty days or removal or dismissal from office. P.D. 807 provides that appeals shall
be made by the party adversely affected by the decision. The party adversely affected by the
decision refers to the government employee whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action. EPZA, for appealing MSPB’s decision and exonerating Navarro
from administrative charge and CSC, for taking recognizance of, and deciding the appeal shows
that both EPZA and CSC acted without jurisdiction.

SHIELA MAE D. GERAPUSCO I-C

21
 Civil Service Commission vs Dacoycoy
G.R. No. 135805 April 29, 1999

Facts:

On November 29, 1995, a complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and

nepotism was filed by the Vice-President of the Citizens Crime Watch, Allen Chapter of
Northern Samar, George P. Suan, at the Civil Service Commission-Quezon City against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern
Samar. After a fact-finding investigation of the CSC RO8- Tacloban City on January 28, 1997, the
Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support
the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission
found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively,
and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School
Administrator, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Dacoycoy invoked
the power of the Court of Appeals via special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission ruling that respondent did not appoint or
recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism.

Issue:
Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
Ruling:

Yes, Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. Sec 59 (1) of EO 212 defines nepotism as all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor
of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or
office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him. Further, the word
"relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree
either of consanguinity or of affinity.

CSC found the respondent guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons
Rito, a driver and Ped, a utility worker, as they are under his immediate supervision and control
as the school administrator. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the
positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was
Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the
appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was
the school administrator. It was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available for
the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as "very
satisfactory". He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level
employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment
of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving
as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.

The Court grants the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44711 it also revives and affirms the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy
from service.s

22
 Jose V. De Los Santos Et. Al. vs Hon. Nicasio Yatco Et. Al.
106 Phil 745, G. R. No. L-13932, December 24, 1959

Facts:
The parties submitted to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a compromise
agreement on December 9, 1957, referring to a sale by installment of a parcel of land by plaintiff
to private respondent (Francisco Mendoñez). Honorable Judge Nicasio Yatco rendered a decision
stating: judgement is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and conditiond set forth
therein, for the parties to comply therewith. However, private respondent had failed to pay
monthly installments since January 1958. Hence, plaintiffs filed a motion for execution on March
1958. Private respondent moved for postponement in order to give parties enough time to settle
matters amicably which the court granted. It was not clear what happened during the hearing on
March 22, 1958. However, the court issued a writ of execution on March 25, 1958 and defendant
filed an urgent motion to quash the writ of execution on April 17, 1958. According to private
respondent, he went into a verbal agreement with Pacita V. De Los Santos right after the
execution of the compromise agreement. They agreed that plaintiffs would consider the
compromise agreement unenforceable if private respondent pays his indebtedness in full and at
one time through a GSIS loan that plaintiff is willing to facilitate. After defendant has secured the
loan and paid plaintiff, plaintiff is still asking payment from defendant for attorney’s fees and
interest all amounting to 14,563.00. Defendant says he is willing to settle at 13, 563.00 because
he has already paid Php1,000.00 in advance. However, plaintiffs refused to accept the offer made
by defendant and insisted that the Php1,000.00 be forfeited in plaintiff’s favor. During the pre-
trial conference held on June 2, 1958, plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear. Thus, Judge Yatco
quashed the writ of execution he earlier issued by his order on June 4, 1958 because he found
no justification for the issuance of said order. Hence, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to
revoke the order which quashed the earlier issued writ of execution alleging that Honorable
Judge Yatco acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:
Whether or not Honorable Judge Nicasio Yatco committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered that the writ of execution he earlier issued be quashed?

Ruling:
NO, Honorable Judge Yatco did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he ordered that the
writ of execution he earlier issued be quashed. The court cited Dimayuga vs. Raymundo 176 Phil
143, wherein the court said that: there is no question in this country that a judge may quash a
writ of execution issued by him, particularly where it was improvidently issued. Because there
was no opposition to the statements proven by defendant that there was a verbal agreement
that amended the compromise agreement, the court cannot validly execute the ordered
compromise agreement without proper hearing. Furthermore, plaintiffs has already received
more than Php12,000.00 from defendant from the latter’s previous payments made before the
parties went into a compromise agreement. In consideration also that plaintiffs is still using a
portion on the land in question, court finds that no irreparable damage was done to plaintiffs.
Thus, the court denied the petition of plaintiffs.

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 CSC, Anicia De Lima v. Larry M. Alfonso
G.R. No. 179452
June 11, 2009

FACTS: Respondent Larry Alfonso was charged with Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service and preventively suspending him from his position as Director
of the Human Resources Management Department of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP). Respondent argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case filed against him. According to him, it is the PUP Board of Regents that has
the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees pursuant to the provisions of
R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. No. 4670 Without ruling on the motion, Assistant
Commissioner Atty. Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR, issued an Order dated
December 11, 2006 directing the Office of the President of PUP to implement the preventive
suspension order against respondent.

Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On May 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of Alfonso

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against
Alfonso.

RULING: As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to
supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as
PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or
professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants
accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen
against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary
cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and
decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the
investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21, 2007 Decision and August 23, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 061821 and 061908 dated
October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006, respectively, as well as its Order ] dated December 11,
2006 placing respondent under preventive suspension are hereby REINSTATED. The CSC is
ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against respondent with dispatch.

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