EW 101
ES vs. SIGINT
By Dave Adamy
D
uring the next two months, we will discuss the dif-
ferences between Electronic Support (ES) systems and
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) systems, both of which
are designed to receive hostile signals. The differences
between SIGINT and ES have to do with the reasons those sig-
nals are received, as summarized in Table 1. There are also
some technical differences between the typical environments
in which these systems work that dictate differences in system
design approach and system hardware and software.
SIGINT
SIGINT is the development of militarily significant informa-
tion from received signals. It is commonly divided into Com-
munications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT) as shown in Figure 1. Each of these subfields is some-
what related to ES as shown in Figure 2. ES is commonly divid-
ed into Communications ES and Radar ES as shown in Figure
3. The nature of communication and radar signals dictates dif-
ferences in mission between these two subfields. The following
paragraphs will focus on systems handling each type of signal,
42 differentiating the intelligence and ES roles.
COMINT and Communications ES
The Journal of Electronic Defense | January 2011
Figure 3 is a flow diagram showing the relationship be-
tween COMINT and Communications ES systems.
The dictionary definition of COMINT is “gathering of intel-
ligence by intercept of wire or radio communications.” Basi-
cally, this is listening to what an enemy says to determine
his capability, his force structure and his intentions. This im-
plies that a COMINT system deals with the internals (i.e., the
information carried in the modulation) of transmitted enemy
Table 1: SIGINT vs. ES
SIGINT Systems
Mission COMINT: Intercept enemy
communications and determine
enemy capabilities and intentions from
information carried on signals.
ELINT: Find and identify new
threat types.
Timing Timeliness of outputs is not
too critical.
Data Collected Gather all possible data on
received signals to support
detailed analysis.
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Figure 1: SIGINT comprises COMINT and ELINT to develop intelligence
from enemy communications and non-communications signals.
signals. Because of the nature of military communication, im-
portant signals can be expected to be encrypted and, of course,
in the enemy’s language. Decryption and translation of signals
can be expected to delay the availability of the information
recovered. Thus, COMINT can be considered more valuable to
strategic and high-level tactical considerations than to deter-
mination of appropriate immediate tactical response.
Communications ES focuses on the externals of communica-
tions signals: the type and level of modulation and the location
of the transmitters. It supports tactical responses to current
situations by determining the types and locations of enemy
emitters. By modeling all of the types of emitters against the
type of emitters used by various enemy organizations, esti-
mates of the enemy force structure can be made. The location
and location history of the observed emitters can be used to
ES Systems
Comms ES: Identify and locate enemy
communications emitters to allow development
of EOB and to support comms jamming.
Radar ES: Identify and locate enemy radars
to allow threat warning and to support radar
countermeasures.
Timeliness of information is
central to mission.
Gather only enough data to
determine threat type, operating mode and
location.
 E W101

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The Journal of Electronic Defense | January 2011

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IRUNLQHWLFDQGHOHFWURQLF Figure 4: ELINT systems gather threat data to support the development
ZHDSRQV of ES systems and subsystems for threat warning and countermeasure
selection.
Figure 2: ES comprises Comms ES and Radar ES. Both provide
is to determine the capabilities and vulnerabilities of newly
information about enemy emitters currently operating in support of EA
and weapon engagement. encountered enemy radars. As shown in Figure 4, the ELINT
system gathers enough data to support detailed analysis. The
indicate the location and movement of the enemy’s forces. The first task when a new radar signal type is received is to deter-
total laydown of transmitters is called the Electronic Order of mine whether the received signal is, in fact, a new threat. Two
Battle (EOB), and can be analyzed to determine the enemy’s other possibilities exist: it may be an old threat radar that is 43
capabilities and even his intentions. malfunctioning or there may have been something wrong with
In summary, COMINT determines the enemy’s capabilities the intercept system. If the received signal is, in fact, a new
and intentions by listening to what is said (i.e., signal inter- type of radar or a new operating mode, the detailed analysis
nals), while Communications ES determines the enemy’s capa- will allow modification of ES systems so that they will be able
bilities and intentions by analysis of signal externals. to recognize this new threat type.
Radar ES systems also receive hostile radar signals, but their
ELINT and Radar ES purpose is to quickly determine which of the enemy’s known
ELINT involves the intercept and analysis of non-commu- weapons is being deployed against a target at the moment.
nications signals, primarily from radars. The purpose of ELINT After threat type and mode identification is complete, this
information is displayed to operators along with the location
of the threat emitter and/or passed to other electronic warfare
systems or subsystems to support countermeasure initiation.
6,*1$/ '(7$,/(' 6833257
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unknown. In some ES systems, the operator is merely notified
that an unknown threat has been received. However, in other
systems, an attempt is made to guess the threat type. In some
ES systems, unknown threats are recorded for later analysis.
+267,/(
&20081,&$7,216 In summary, ELINT determines what capabilities the enemy
6,*1$/6 has, while Radar ES determines which of the enemy’s radars is
being used at the moment and where the emitter (hence the
weapon it controls) is located.
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$33/,&$7,21
68%6<67(06 $1$/<6,6 Next month, we will continue our discussion of the dif-
ferences between ES and SIGINT, covering the technical dif-
ferences between ES and SIGINT systems which are driven by
Figure 3: COMINT classically deals with signal internals to support
strategic actions; Comms ES deals with signal externals to support
their respective missions. For your comments and suggestions,
immediate tactical decision making. Dave Adamy can be reached at dave@lynxpub.com. a
 EW 101

ES vs. SIGINT – Part 2

Antenna and Range
Considerations
By Dave Adamy

T
his month, we will deal with some technical dif-
ferences between ES and SIGINT systems dictated

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by mission and environment considerations. These 
differences have to do with the anticipated inter-  
cept geometry, the different types of information 
VHF VHF
taken from intercepted hostile signals, and time 
6&$1 VHF 
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criticality of intercepts.  6&$1
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ANTENNA ISSUES 


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Antennas can be characterized as directional or non-  UJ 
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directional. This is, of course, a great over-simplification. 
RIWL

Antennas, such as whips and dipoles, are sometimes (incor-          
rectly) described as omni-directional. This is not true, as both G%%HDPZLGWKLQ'HJUHHV
antenna types have nulls in their coverage. However, both
types, if vertically oriented, provide 360 degrees of azimuthal
coverage. There are also circular arrays of directional anten- Figure 2: The percentage of angular space within the antenna beam
varies inversely with the beamwidth, as does the dwell time at the
50 nas that provide full azimuthal coverage. Directional anten- signal’s angle of arrival.
nas (including but not limited to parabolic dishes, phased
arrays or log periodic antennas) restrict their coverage to a the time, so it will input any new signal to a receiver as soon
The Journal of Electronic Defense | February 2011

reduced angular sector.
Angular coverage has a significant impact on the prob-
ability of intercepting a hostile signal at an unknown direc-
tion of arrival. As shown in Figure 1, a 360-degree coverage
antenna (or array of antennas) “looks” in all directions all of
&RYHUDJHE\
1%DQWHQQD
(PLWWHUGZHOOLQDQWHQQD
as it occurs. The directional antenna, on the other hand,
must be scanned to the direction of arrival of a new signal
before it can be received. If a hostile signal is present for a
limited time, the probability of intercept is a function of the
antenna beam width and the scan rate of the antenna. For an
intercept to occur, the antenna must
be moved to place the signal’s direc-
tion of arrival into the antenna beam
coverage area.
As shown in Figure 2, the beamwidth
%:ž63
determines the percentage of possible
%: $QWHQQDEHDPZLGWK angles of arrival covered by the anten-
63 $QWHQQD6FDQ3HULRG na. To use this part of the figure, draw
a line straight up from the beamwidth
to the black line, then draw right to the
black ordinate value. This considers only
one search dimension (e.g., azimuthal
(PLWWHUGZHOOLQDQWHQQD

search); a two-dimensional search is
&RYHUDJHE\ significantly more difficult. In the same
žDQWHQQD figure, the amount of time that a scan-
ning antenna will dwell on the signal’s
angle of arrival (also in azimuth only)
is shown as a function of beam width
)L  $  G OLN GL O KL LG  I OO L K I for various circular scan periods. To use
Figure 1: A 360-degree antenna, like a dipole or whip, provides 100 percent coverage of all
this part of the figure, draw straight up
azimuths of arrival, while a narrow-beam antenna must be scanned to the correct direction
of arrival. from the beam width to the green line
 E W101
INTERCEPT RANGE CONSIDERATIONS
 Figure 4 shows an intercept situation for ei-
ther an ES or SIGINT system. Note that the range

at which a receiving system can intercept a hos-
*DLQLQG%IRU(ԀFLHQF\

 tile signal depends on the effective radiated pow-

er of the target signal, the applicable propagation
 mode, the receiving antenna gain in the direction
of the emitter, and the sensitivity of the receiving

system. Propagation modes are discussed in detail
 in the “EW 101” columns in the July, August and
September 2007 editions of JED.
 Radar and data link signals typically propagate
in the line-of-sight mode. In this mode, the inter-

The Journal of Electronic Defense | February 2011


               cept range is given by the formula:
G%%HDPZLGWKLQ'HJUHHV
)LJXUH  7KH JDLQ RI D QDUURZ EHDP DQWHQQD YDULHV LQYHUVHO\ ZLWK LWV EHDPZLGWK
RI = Anti-log
Figure 3: The gain of a narrow-beam antenna varies inversely with its beamwidth. {[ERPT – 32 -20 log(F) + GR – S] / 20}
Where: RI = the intercept range in km
ERPT = the effective radiated power of the target
for the selected scan period, then draw left to the green ordi-
emitter in dBm
nate value. It should be noted that a frequency search must be
F = the frequency of the transmitted signal
made during the time the antenna is pointed at each possible
GR = the gain of the receiving antenna in the
angle of arrival. The narrower the antenna beam, the slower
direction of the target emitter
the receiving antenna must be scanned to allow for frequency
S = the sensitivity of the receiver system in dBm
search. Thus, the longer it will take to find a signal of interest
at unknown frequency and angle of arrival. Frequency search Communication signals will propagate in the line-of-sight or
will be discussed next month. 2-ray modes, depending on the link distance, antenna heights
Normally, SIGINT intercepts are less time critical. Thus, a and frequency. If propagation is in the 2-ray mode, the inter-
delay in intercept caused by scanning a narrow beam antenna cept range is given by the formula:
is likely to be acceptable. However, because ES systems must 51
RI = Anti-log {[ERPT – 120 + 20 log(hT) + 20 log (hR) +
typically intercept a hostile signal within a small number of
GR – S] / 40}
seconds, a wide coverage antenna or array of antennas is usu-
Where: RI = the intercept range in km
ally required.
ERPT = the effective radiated power of the target
As shown in Figure 3, there is a trade-off of the half power
emitter in dBm
(3 dB) beamwidth of an antenna and the antenna gain. This
hT = the height of the transmitting antenna in meters
figure is for a 55-percent efficient parabolic dish antenna, but
hR = the height of the receiving antenna in meters
this trade-off applies to all types of narrow beam antennas.
GR = the gain of the receiving antenna in the
The receiving antenna gain is an important consideration in
direction of the target emitter
the range at which a hostile signal can be intercepted, as dis-
S = the sensitivity of the receiver system in dBm
cussed below.
This means that wide-coverage (hence low-gain) anten- As you can see from these formulas, the intercept range is
nas are almost always required for ES systems, while narrow- always impacted by the receiving antenna gain and the sensi-
beam (hence high-gain) antennas may be the best solution for tivity of the receiving system. Note that the sensitivity is the
SIGINT systems. required signal strength for a successful intercept. The more
sensitivity the receiving system has,
the lower this number will be. For ex-
ample, a high-sensitivity receiver might
have a sensitivity of -120 dBm, while
(53
+267,/( a low-sensitivity receiver could have a
5$1*(
(0,77(5 sensitivity of -50 dBm.
The effective radiated power (ERP)
*$,1 5(&(,9(5 of the target emitter is the amount of
6<67(0 power it transmits in the direction of
the intercepting receiver. Tactical com-
6(16,7,9,7< munication threats will usually have
360-degree antennas with fairly constant
gain vs. azimuth; the ERP is the sum of
Figure 4: The range at which a receiving system can intercept a hostile emitter signal is a function
of antenna gain and receiver system sensitivity. the transmitter power (in dBm) and the
 E W101
while an ELINT system would be speci-
fied to intercept side lobe transmissions
$9(5$*(
6,'( 6,'(/2%( from target radar emitters. This means
/2%(6 *$,1 that an ES system will often require less
sensitivity and/or receiving antenna
gain than an ELINT system.
%25(6,*+7
SIGINT systems are generally as-
*$,1
sumed to require greater intercept
range than ES systems – however, as
with all generalities, this depends on
0$,1/2%( the specific mission and situation. If
we accept that SIGINT systems require
Figure 5: Radar ESM systems are often characterized as receiving signals from the boresight of greater intercept range, the receiv-
threat radar antennas, while ELINT systems are often characterized as receiving average side lobe ing antenna gain and/or the sensitiv-
level signals. ity must be greater than required for
antenna gain (in dB). However, radar threats are expected to ES systems. Narrow-beam antennas have higher gain, but
have narrow-beam antennas. As shown in Figure 5, the narrow- provide reduced probability of intercept (in a short time
beam antenna has a main lobe and side lobes. The side lobes are period). Thus, they are more appropriate for SIGINT applica-
shown simplified in that they are all the same strength – actual tions. Full-coverage antennas, while they provide less gain,
antenna side lobes vary. However, the drawing is realistic in can provide significantly better probability of intercept in
that the nulls between the lobes are much narrower than the a short time period, so are generally most appropriate for
lobes. This means that an intercept receiver pointed at the radar ES systems.
threat emitter away from the direction of the main beam can be
expected to encounter an ERP at the average side lobe level. This What’s Next
level is usually stated as: S/L = -N dB, where N is the number of Next month, we will continue our discussion of the technical
dB that the average side lobe level is below the boresight gain. differences between ES and SIGINT, with coverage of receiver
Although not always true, it is fairly common for an ES sys- and data collection issues. For your comments and suggestions,
tem to be specified to receive the main lobe of a radar threat Dave Adamy can be reached at dave@lynxpub.com. a
52
The Journal of Electronic Defense | February 2011

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