ABELLO vs CIR
This being the case, donative intent
Civil Law; Donations; Elements of a Donation.—Donation has the
following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c)
the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ contribution of money without
any material consideration evinces animus donandi; The fact
that their purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the
donee does not negate the presence of donative intent.—Since
animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an
essential element of a donation, petitioners argue that it is
important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a
political contribution is a gift. Petitioners’ argument is not
tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the mind. It
cannot be perceived except by the material and tangible acts
which manifest its presence. This being the case, donative intent
is presumed present when one gives a part of one’s patrimony
to another without consideration. Second, donative intent is not
negated when the person donating has other intentions, motives
or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. This Court
is not convinced that since the purpose of the contribution was
to help elect a candidate, there was no donative intent.
Petitioners’ contribution of money without any material
consideration evinces animus donandi. The fact that their
purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the donee
does not negate the presence of donative intent.
Same; Same; Same; Donative intent is not negated by the
presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent.—Since the purpose of an electoral
contribution is to influence the results of the election, petitioners
again claim that donative intent is not present. Petitioners
attempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between
donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. This
Court reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the
presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent. Abello vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 452 SCRA 162, G.R. No. 120721 February 23, 2005
Abello vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Civil Law; Donations; Elements of a Donation.—Donation has the
following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c)
the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ contribution of money without
any material consideration evinces animus donandi; The fact
that their purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the
donee does not negate the presence of donative intent.—Since
animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an
essential element of a donation, petitioners argue that it is
important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a
political contribution is a gift. Petitioners’ argument is not
tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the mind. It
cannot be perceived except by the material and tangible acts
which manifest its presence.
is presumed present when one gives a part of one’s patrimony
to another without consideration. Second, donative intent is not
negated when the person donating has other intentions, motives
or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. This Court
is not convinced that since the purpose of the contribution was
to help elect a candidate, there was no donative intent.
Petitioners’ contribution of money without any material
consideration evinces animus donandi. The fact that their
purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the donee
does not negate the presence of donative intent.
Same; Same; Same; Donative intent is not negated by the
presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent.—Since the purpose of an electoral
contribution is to influence the results of the election, petitioners
again claim that donative intent is not present. Petitioners
attempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between
donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. This
Court reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the
presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent. Abello vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 452 SCRA 162, G.R. No. 120721 February 23, 2005
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
Donations; Wills and Succession; Donations Mortis Causa and
Donations Inter Vivos; Words and Phrases; Donation inter vivos
differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act
is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be
deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing
is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the
donor-testator.—The issue is thus whether the donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa. Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the
determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in
the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in
the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until
the death of the donor-testator. The following ruling of this
Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating: If the donation is
made in contemplation of the donor’s death, meaning that the
full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to
the donee only because of the donor’s death, then it is at that
time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis
causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor’s lifetime or
independently of the donor’s death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donor’s lifetime, not by reason of
his death but because of the deed of donation, then the
donation is inter vivos.
Same; Same; Same; The distinction between a transfer inter
vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation
of the donation depends upon its nature.—The distinction
between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as
the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its
nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and
accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749
of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the
rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation
must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the
validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Distinguishing Characteristics of a Donation
Mortis Causa.—The distinguishing characteristics of a donation
mortis causa are the following: 1. It conveys no title or
ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; 3. That the
transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The phrase “to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation
but that the donor intended to transfer the ownership of the
properties to the donee on the former’s death, not during her
lifetime.—In the donation subject of the present case, there is
nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in
the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to
the death of Celestina. The phrase “to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but
that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the
properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the decisive characteristics of
a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee.—More importantly,
the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die
before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of
no further force and effect shows that the donation is a
postmortem disposition. As stated in a long line of cases, one of
the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the
transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive
the donee.
Same; Same; Same; To classify the donation as inter vivos
simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
affection is erroneous—love and affection may also underlie
transfers mortis causa.—To classify the donation as inter vivos
simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the
affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered
by the latter is of no particular significance in determining
whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not,
because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other
words, love and affection may also underlie transfers mortis
causa.
Same; Same; Same; Donations mortis causa must comply with
the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code, failing
which the donation is void and produces no effect.—As the
subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition,
the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should
have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and
produces no effect. As noted by the trial court, the attesting
witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary
public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which
provides: Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
Heirs of William Sevilla vs. Sevilla
Civil Law; Property; Donations; Donation is an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another who accepts it; Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential and the attendance of a
wise consent renders the donation voidable.—Donation is an act
of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another who accepts it. Under Article 737 of the
Civil Code, the donor’s capacity shall be determined as of the
time of the making of the donation. Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential, and the attendance of a
vice of consent renders the donation voidable.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Factual findings of the trial court,
if affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great
respect.—Petitioners, however, insist that respondent Leopoldo
Sevilla employed fraud and undue influence on the person of the
donor. This argument involves appreciation of the evidence. The
settled rule is that factual findings of the trial court, if affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great respect. There are
exceptional circumstances when findings of fact of lower courts
may be set aside but none is present in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fraud and undue influence that
vitiated a party’s consent must be established by full, clear and
convincing evidence otherwise, the latter’s presumed consent to
the contract prevails.—Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. We have
consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense. In the instant case, the self-serving testimony of the
petitioners are vague on what acts of Leopoldo Sevilla
constituted fraud and undue influence and on how these acts
vitiated the consent of Felisa Almirol. Fraud and undue influence
that vitiated a party’s consent must be established by full, clear
and convincing evidence, otherwise, the latter’s presumed
consent to the contract prevails. Neither does the fact that the
donation preceded the partition constitute fraud. It is not
necessary that partition should first be had because what was
donated to Leopoldo was the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot
No. 653.
Same; Same; Same; There is said to be no consent and
consequently no contract when the agreement is entered into by
one in behalf of another who has never given him authorization
therefor unless he has by law a right to represent the latter.—
Anent the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, we find that the same
is void ab initio and not merely unenforceable. In Delos Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, which is a case involving the sale of a lot by a
person who is neither the owner nor the legal representative, we
declared the contract void ab initio. It was held that one of the
requisites of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code
is the consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to
the contract. The legal capacity of the parties is an essential
element for the existence of the contract because it is an
indispensable condition for the existence of consent. There is no
effective consent in law without the capacity to give such
consent. In other words, legal consent presupposes capacity.
Thus, there is said to be no consent, and consequently, no
contract when the agreement is entered into by one in behalf of
another who has never given him authorization therefor unless
he has by law a right to represent the latter.
Same; Same; Same; A donation inter vivos is immediately
operative and final.—In the case at bar, at the time Felisa
executed the deed of extra-judicial partition dividing the share of
her deceased sister Honarata between her and the heirs of
Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, she was no longer the owner of the
1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653, having previously donated
the same to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla who accepted the
donation in the same deed. A donation inter vivos, as in the
instant case, is immediately operative and final. As a mode of
acquiring ownership, it results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation
is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Moreño-Lentfer vs. Wolff
Donations; Words and Phrases; A donation is a simple act of
liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it, but when a large amount of money is
involved, the Court is constrained to take the donee’s purported
claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt; A
donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its
acceptance should be in writing.—Petitioner Moreño-Lentfer’s
claim of either cash or property donation rings hollow. A
donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives freely
of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. But when
a large amount of money is involved, equivalent to P3,297,800,
based on the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are
constrained to take the petitioners’ claim of liberality of the
donor with more than a grain of salt. Petitioners could not brush
aside the fact that a donation must comply with the mandatory
formal requirements set forth by law for its validity. Since the
subject of donation is the purchase money, Art. 748 of the New
Civil Code is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money
equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance should have
been in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for
non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law.
Same; Unjust Enrichment; Solutio Indebiti; The quasi-contract of
solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one
shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.—The
quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient
principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense
of another. It applies where (1) a payment is made when there
exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty
to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the
payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or
some other cause. In the instant case, records show that a
bank-to-bank payment was made by respondent Wolff to
petitioner Cross in favor of co-petitioner Moreño-Lentfer.
Respondent was under no duty to make such payment for the
benefit of Moreño-Lentfer. There was no binding relation
between respondent and the beneficiary, Moreño-Lentfer. The
payment was clearly a mistake. Since Moreño-Lentfer received
something when there was no right to demand it, she had an
obligation to return it. Following Article 22 of the New Civil Code,
two conditions must concur to declare that a person has unjustly
enriched himself or herself, namely: (a) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (b) such benefit is derived at the expense of or to
the damage of another.
Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa
Sevilla De Leon
Civil Law; Donation; Donation is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership; Essential Elements of Donation.—Under the New Civil
Code, donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership.
Among the attributes of ownership is the right to possess the
property. The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a)
the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that
the donation be made in a public document and that the
acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate
public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified
thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
Same; Same; Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property, except on account of officiousness,
failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the
donation, or ingratitude.—As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment
the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee,
provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law
from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is
generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be
valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and
the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the
knowledge of the donor.
Same; Same; In order that the donation of an immovable
property may be valid, it must be made in a public document;
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or
in the Assesor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered
valid and official.—In order that the donation of an immovable
property may be valid, it must be made in a public document.
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or
in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered
valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely
evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of
third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by
the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest
Quilala vs. Alcantara
Donations; As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results
in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor
to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is
not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the
donation.—The principal issue raised is the validity of the
donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article
749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be
made in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which
the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the
donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It
may be made in the same deed or in a separate public
document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the
donee.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Donation,” Defined; A stipulation in
the donation that it was made for and in consideration of the
“love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and
as an act of liberality and generosity” is sufficient cause for a
donation.—In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained
the number of the certificate of title as well as the technical
description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the
donation was made for and in consideration of the “love and
affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act
of liberality and generosity.” This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as “an act of
liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.”
Same; Formalities; The requirement that the contracting parties
and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the
instrument is not absolute—the specification of the location of
the signature is merely directory.—As stated above, the second
page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-
hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the
right-hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting
parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin
of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law
merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument
is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to
avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already
been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party
affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify
that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the
time of signing. Simply put, the specification of the location of
the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties
signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served,
and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed
substantially complied with.
Same; Same; Notarial Law; Acknowledgments; The lack of an
acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not
render the donation null and void; An instrument of donation
should be treated in its entirety—it cannot be considered a
private document in part and a public document in another, as
the fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public
converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
document.—In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by
the donee before the notary public does not also render the
donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and
a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of
donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the
donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second
page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance,
which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized
deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
Same; Succession; Collation; Property donated inter vivos is
subject to collation after the donor’s death, whether the
donation was made to a compulsory heir or a stranger, unless
there is an express prohibition if that had been the donor’s
intention.—It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier
of facts, can not make a determination of whether Violeta was
the daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of
Violeta. These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate
probate or settlement proceedings affecting the respective
estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the
donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still be
subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771, in
relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the
donor’s death, whether the donation was made to a compulsory
heir or a stranger, unless there is an express prohibition if that
had been the donor’s intention.
Republic vs. Silim
Contracts; Donations; Kinds of; Words and Phrases; “Pure or
Simple Donations,” “Remuneratory or Compensatory Donations,”
“Conditional or Modal Donations,” and “Onerous Donations,”
Defined and Distinguished.—Donations, according to its purpose
or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and
(4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the
underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest
form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory
donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee
for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable
debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation
is made in consideration of future services or where the donor
imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the
donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation
given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon
the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is
the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost
of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Same; Same; Same; Of the different classifications of donations,
onerous donations are the most distinct since, unlike the other
forms of donations, the validity of and the rights and obligations
of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely
governed not by the law on donations but by the law on
contracts.—Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the
onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the
other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and
obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law
on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code
provides: Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations
by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion
which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
Same; Same; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Presumptions;
Where the trial court considered the written acceptance of the
donation in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that
such exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.—
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of
exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as
Exhibit “8,” was offered in evidence. However, private
respondents now question this exhibit because, according to
them “there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by
the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibit appear on
record.” Respondents’ stance does not persuade. The written
acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial
court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this
exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
Estoppel by Laches; Words and Phrases.—Estoppel by laches, or
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Donations; The purpose of the formal requirement for
acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
duly communicated to the donor.—The purpose of the formal
requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such
acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held: x x x A strict
interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion that
the annulment of the donation for being defective in form as
urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with the
unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However,
we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a
literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not
in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their
intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such an
interpretation. The purpose of the formal requirement is to
insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated
to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that
Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed
it later and requested that the donated land be not registered
during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the
Court cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffective
because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of
the donee’s acceptance. That would be placing too much stress
on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear
reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the
separate instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later
acknowledged by Juan.
Same; The actual knowledge by the donor of the construction
and existence of the school building pursuant to the condition of
the donation fulfills the legal requirement that the acceptance of
the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.—In
the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed
after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of
the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot
through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of
Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was
being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated
property that respondents came to know of the Deed of
Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the
construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the
legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the
donee be communicated to the donor.
Same; Contracts; Administrative Law; Contracts or conveyances
may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any
of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the
service and as long as the same are not prohibited by law.—On
respondents’ claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals,
that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia
of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of a
special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines, it circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive
is undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau character of the possession. (Italics ours)
of Public Schools. Such being the case, his acceptance was
authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code
which states: SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances.—Contracts
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the
Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or
Civil Law; Donation; Revocation of donation; Annulment or
instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or
reduction of donation in case of subsequent adoption of a minor
exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not
by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties
prohibited by law.
to another, is within four (4) years from date of adoption if the
donation impairs the legitime of the adopted.—In the case of the
Same; Words and Phrases; “Exclusively used for school
subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously
purposes,” Construed.—What does the phrase “exclusively used
donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may
for school purposes” convey? “School” is simply an institution or
sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four
place of education. “Purpose” is defined as “that which one sets
years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the
before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim,
legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of
object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought,
the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code,
an object to be attained, an intention, etc.” “Exclusive” means
Articles 760, 761 and 763).
“excluding or having power to exclude (as by preventing
entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use);
Same; Same; Same; Burden of proof; Donor has the burden to
limiting or limited to possession, control or use.”
allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law for
which the annulment or reduction of the donation can be
Same; The condition for the donation—that the lot be exclusively
based.—Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor,
used for school purposes—is not violated when the lot donated
who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by
is exchanged with another one, where the purpose for the
law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the
donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a
donation can be adjudged.
school.—Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the
donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was
Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint for annulment of the
exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation
donation does not allege nor prove that the donation impairs the
remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school.
legitime of the adopted child, but that unrebutted evidence
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In
exists that the donor has another piece of land and that the
fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
grandfather of the donees was owner pro-indiviso of one-half of
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation.
the donated land, fatal to the complaint.—Unfortunately, in the
The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of
case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that
funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building
the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child.
which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the
Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the
donated lot.
donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the
contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has
Calicdan vs. Cendaña,
another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in Dolores,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Donation; A deed of donation, albeit Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject
void for having been executed by one who was not the owner of to litigation. The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is
the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that
and adverse character of the donee’s possession.—Moreover, the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of
the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the
executed by one who was not the owner of the property value of the which can then more easily be taken from the
donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.
character of respondent’s possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda
Maningding v. Court of Appeals, we held: Even assuming that
the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with
formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse
possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a
private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of
ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the
verbal donation under which the defendant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in
question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a