ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made
against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made
and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon,
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assemblyto petition the government for
exercise of the people power of revolution which redress of grievances which only affected the office of
overthrew the whole government. the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
government that resulted from it cannot be the President that it caused and the succession of the
subject of judicial review Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions
in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed
to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release
containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving
due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83
declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as
the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In
fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury
system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to
perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Milton Springer

50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides
that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and
House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the
government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was
furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the
objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of
NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature
creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress
into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception
is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
 BIRAOGO VS PTC

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO

vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.

vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption

committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,

and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative

body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending

parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers

but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such

facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its

operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated

authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include

the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if

not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative

Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the

previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who

may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the

inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised

Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form

such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds

already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and

not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for

public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial

power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he

must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of

the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the

powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the

powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain

inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the

implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in

interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is

“the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official

action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a

sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will

sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental

importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this

Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those

specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully

executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know

so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the

land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part

of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of

the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the

commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no

impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will

complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts

remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the

President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection

clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities

imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal

protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by

the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such

classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial

distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members

of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations

imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to

investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to

single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past

administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating

differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do

not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all

private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for

being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal

protection clause of the Constitution.

Francisco vs House of Representatives

Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an

investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the

Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public

trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on

Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13

October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being

insufficient in substance.

4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House

Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-

mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”

signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et.

al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of

Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once

within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for

violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1,

Article VIII of the Constitution.

1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a

determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent

is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of

this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the

purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended

to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule

making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without

need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House

Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an

impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one

year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,

along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,

2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the

Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against

the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should
have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral
system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only
one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to
be allotted for the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the
latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The
petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect
or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event
considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor

63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the
said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed
before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of
which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.

Lorenzo Tañada vs Mariano Cuenco

103 Phil. 1051 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Political Question Defined – Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost
the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed
that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a
political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of
Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority
party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will
come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

DAZA VS SINGSON
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989

FACTS:

The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Art.
VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party
joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza
and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his
petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from
serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of the
House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party
and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

RULING:

No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that
may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in
removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:

1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720
was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the
standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political
question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of
the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the
conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

Case Digest: Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, et al.

G.R. No. 193459 : February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTA, EVELYN PESTA, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN);
MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID
NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL);
FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,Respondent-Intervenor.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

FACTS:

For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration.

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the
committee "separately, one after the other"is to dismantle her own interpretation ofFranciscothat the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the
filing of the impeachment complaint. Petitioners Motion concedesthat theFranciscodoctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding
includes the Houses initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim thatper
Franciscoan impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.

Having uprooted her reliance on theFranciscocase in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned
from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice
Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion inFrancisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of
initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.Notably, the provisions of the
Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged inFranciscoprovided that an impeachment proceeding was to be
"deemed initiated" upon the Committees finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning of the Committees
finding,which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal
action on certain relevant matters."Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" didnotrefer to the aspects of filing and referral in the
regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist ofFranciscoin pronouncing what initiation means.

The Court adhered to theFrancisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want tostretchand those who want toshrinkthe
term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation
that the Courts Decision presents a sharp deviation fromFranciscoas it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common
sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation processof the impeachment
proceedingshall be commencedagainst the same official more than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would
 literally point to the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the
initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.

In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely appliedFranciscoon what comprises
or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation offiling-and-referralinFrancisco.
Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms ofFrancisco.

Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.

ISSUE: Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is mandatory.

HELD: The decision is sustained

POLITICAL LAW impeachment

The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer an impeachment complaint
within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding,
which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional
limitation on the Houses power or function to refer a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on the matter of
whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House
needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is
immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment
and oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulos concerns on the amount of time spent if "multiple
impeachment charges"are allowed. She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not
more than one complaint or charge.

In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing andreferral in the present case, with Franciscoas the guiding light.
Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell
a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the
impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods" She insists that the
Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its
business.

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the
stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not
provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment
proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of
inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the impeachment proceeding against
petitioner is conducted is beyond the Courts control. Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room
to operate, subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits.And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-
equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

DENIED FOR BEING BEREFT OF MERIT.

 G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-
staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended
for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray
that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:

1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
 Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR
ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

C ASE DIGEST: OCAMPO, et al. v. ENRIQUEZ, etc. (THE MARCOS BURIAL CASE)

CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, & 226294

FACTS:

President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's
superior to prepare the burial.

ISSUE:

Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB?
Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the law?

HELD:

It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents.

It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a law allowing anyone to
be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the
President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB.

The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone buried therein
would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.
 BAAEU v. Inciong
G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984, Makasiar, J.

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of Labor Laws)

FACTS

The Secretary of Labor, issued Policy no. 9 interpreting article 94 of Labor Code as regards Right to Holiday pay, stated among others, that PD
850 principally intended to benefit daily-paid workers. Those who are paid by the month, i.e., he is paid uniformly from January to December is
presumed to have been paid with legal holidays, unless his salary is deducted for the month the holiday occurs. Invoking this Policy, the Bank
stopped paying its employees for the legal holidays.

ISSUE

Whether or not, PD 850 was intended only for daily wage workers.

RULING

“It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and
explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far
as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be
paid their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have
the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO,Petitioners,
– versus –
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, Respondents
x––––––––––––––––––––––x
G.R. No. 187910
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner
– versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of
House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals
to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress,” convening the Congress into a Constituent
Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The
petitioners contend that the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or
revision of the same as the separate voting of the members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and
substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the “members of Congress” without distinction as to which
institution of Congress they belong to).
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No. 1109.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners’ supplications. While some may interpret petitioners’ moves as vigilance in preserving the
rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will
assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal
claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the
court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach
is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties
entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch
of government before the courts may step in.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved
that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No
actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and
hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet
performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial
oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the
courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with
the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and
sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’
personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It
is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which mandates courts of justice to settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of
“personal injury” to the broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the
ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

PACU vs Secretary of Education GR No 5279 31 October 1955

Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. However, the Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the
petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for relief.

Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court

Decision: Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it

is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. The

power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their

protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and

controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not

constitute a justiciable controversy

 Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos,
Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2,
51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election
for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
no jurisdiction.

Montesclaros vs COMELEC GR N 152295 09 July 2002

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership to youths

“at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK elections

be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20

February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK election on

November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15

July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of

Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition

and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement

on 11 March 2002.

Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision

of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioner’s perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not present

actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty

legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA

No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
 GONZALES VS. NARVASA
July 06, 2013

GR No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR
based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR
based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to
petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter
by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek
judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43,
the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being
that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he
will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

july 31, 1997 G.R. No. 108399

ALUNAN VS MIRASOL

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila nullifying an

order of the DILG, which cancelled the general elections for the SK dated December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila on the ground that the

elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first SK under the LGC of 1991 (R.A. 7160). On September 18, 1992, the
DILG issued a resolution through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III exempting the City of Manila from holding its SK election on December 4,

1992. This was issued in relation to the letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila. In its resolution, the

DILG stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang

Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and

January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to coincide with

the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila, which then issued an injunction ordering petitioners to desist

from implementing the order of the DILG. Trial of the case ensued and a Decision was issued holding that the (1) the DILG had no power to

"exempt" the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C, §2(1) of the Constitution the power to

enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall" is vested

solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for

general elections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the "exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of the equal

protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILG's records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held between January 1,

1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held on December 4, 1992.

Petitioners sought this review oncertiorari .

They insist that the City of Manila, having already conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on

December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite §532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that: All seats

reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sangguniang shall be deemed vacant until such time that the

sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected:

Provided, That, elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa BlG 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and

January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected

within the said period shall be extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code.

Issue: Whether the case has been moot and academic. Held: The Supreme Court held that the issue is not moot and it is necessary in fact to

decide the case on the issues raised by the parties. The case comes with the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and

academic if it is “capable of repetition and yet evade review.” Rejecting the contention of being moot and academic, the Supreme Court in the

Southern Pacific Terminal case

held: The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at

bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and
at one time the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission without a chance of redress.

Moreover in Roa vs. Wade the US Supreme Court explained:

“[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will

come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive.

Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non-mootness. It truly could be ‘capable of

repetition, yet evading review.’”

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case filed against petitioner by private

respondents is DISMISSED.

Gonzales v Narvas

aG.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts:On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory

Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. In his capacity as citizen

and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants,

advisers and assistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through a mandamus to furnish the petitioner with

information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the

recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang

Issue: Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact show what

particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in

assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in immediate danger of

sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted

from Congress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending power, petitioner cannot

be allowed to question the PCCR’s creation. The petitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest. With regards to the petitioner’s

request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that citizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a

mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the

petitioner is a citizen. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish

petitioner with the information requested.

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary Case Digest
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of
Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435,
declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report
to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as
an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity
for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced
civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing
to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution.
Pormento vs. Estrada

Facts:

Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998 elections. He sought the presidency again in the May 2010

elections. Pormento opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. COMELEC (Division) denied his petition as well as his

subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime,

Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of

votes.

Issue:

Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view of the prohibition in the Constitution which states that: "[t]he

President shall not be eligible for any reelection?

Held:

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection

will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this

case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal

relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit

any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case

or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,

when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead

or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be

raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent

events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010

elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second

time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. (Pormento

vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010)

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
“The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take
over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did
not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces
“to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to
the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that
the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has
no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

Case Digest: Bankers Association vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206794 : November 26, 2013

BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and PERRY L. PE,Petitioners,v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondent.

BRION,J.:

FACTS:

The petitioners included a prayer for the issuance of a TRO to assail the legality of the Commission on Elections (Comelec's) Resolution No.
9688dated May 7, 2013, entitled "In the Matter of Implementing a Money Ban to Deter and Prevent Vote-Buying in Connection with the May
13, 2013 National and Local Elections" (Money Ban Resolution).

Under the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec resolved:

1. To prohibit the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013
exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per day in banks, finance companies, quasi-
banks, pawnshops, remittance companies and institutions performing similar functions. However, all other non-cash transactions are not
covered.

For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are hereby deputized to implement with
utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, and
Republic Act No. 6426.

2. To prohibit the possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) or its equivalent in
any foreign currency from May 8 to May 13, 2013. For this purpose, all cash being transported and carried exceeding such amount shall be
presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation of the money ban.

3. All withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals or encashment of checks in cash involving a total amount exceeding
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day from date of the publication of this resolution until May 13, 2013 shall
be presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for vote-buying and election fraud and shall therefore be treated as a "suspicious
transaction" under Republic Act No. 9160 or the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001" as amended by Republic Act No. 9194. For this purpose,
the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) is hereby deputized to monitor and initiate investigations, and if necessary, inquire into and
examine the deposit and related accounts involved in the suspected transaction pursuant to procedure and requirements of Republic Act No.
10167.

The Comelecs Resolution No. 9688-A,issued on May 9, 2013, amended the Money Ban Resolution by:

1. exempting withdrawals that are routine, regular and made in the ordinary course of business of the withdrawing client on the basis of the
prevailing "Know-Your-Client/Customer" policy of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which requires banks "not only to establish the identity
of their clients but also to have background knowledge of their normal business transactions,"and

2. presuming that the possession or transportation of cash in excess ofP500,000.00 from May 8 to 13, 2013 was for the purpose of vote-buying
and electoral fraud when the same was without tenable justification or whenever attended by genuine reason engendering belief that the
money would be used for vote-buying.

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9688-A on the same day that the petitioners filed the present petition.

On May 10, 2013, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order,enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing before the issuance of
the Money Ban Resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding the implementation of the Money Ban Resolution was moot?

HELD: Petition dismissed.

By its express terms, the Money Ban Resolution was effective only for a specific and limited time during the May 13, 2013 elections, i.e., from
May 8 to 13, 2013. The Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order on May 10, 2013; thus, the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the
most critical period of the elections from May 10, 2013 to actual election day. With the May 13, 2013 elections over, the Money Ban Resolution
no longer finds any application so that the issues raised have become moot and academic.

POLITICAL LAW: power of judicial review

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.The Court, as a rule, will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case and
proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the Court no
longer has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy."[W]ithout a justiciable controversy,
the [petition would] become a [plea] for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction."

While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle, these exceptions relate only to situations where: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.

In the present case, we find it unnecessary to consider the presence of the first, second and third requirements when nothing in the facts and
surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of the fourth requirement, i.e., the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

We note that the Comelec did not make any parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013 elections to address the evil that its Money Ban
Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did not issue a similar resolution for the October 28, 2013 barangay elections. If the May 13, 2013
elections had come and gone without any need for the measures the assailed Resolution put in place and if no such measure was necessary in
the elections that immediately followed (i.e., the October 28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe that it is now premature for the Court to
assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution would be issued in the succeeding elections such that we now have to consider the legality of the
Comelec measure that is presently assailed.

We consider it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the Comelecs
concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for any formal Comelec resolution if and when the need arises.
Congress, too, at this point, should have taken note of this case and has the plenary authority, through its lawmaking powers, to address the
circumstances and evils the Money Ban Resolution sought to address. In other words, Congress can very well act to consider the required
measures for future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.

Arceta vs Mangrobang GR No 152895 15 June 2004

Facts: On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a check to Oscar Castro payable to cash for the amount of Php 740k even with full

knowledge that the account has no sufficient fund for the said amount. The check was subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The City

Prosecutor of Metro Manila charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). She did not moved for the charge to be dismissed and

pleaded not guilty. She then petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 citing the Lozano

doctrine.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 is the lis mota of the case?

Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. Every law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification

there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution and not one that is speculative, doubtful or argumentative. Petitioner failed to

show that BP Blg 22 by itself or by implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic
violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262
for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid
law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his
pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack
on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity
and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erred in declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions
only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy
of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court,
it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to
enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same
holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive
function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.