HACIENDA LUISITA INC vs LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP, GR.

171101

FACTS:

On 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda

Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution
Option Plan (SODP). The SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848
qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the
basis and mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-
up referendum conducted by the DAR, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated,
opted to receive shares in HLI.
On 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from
agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application
subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s
continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.

On 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary,

ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the
entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which
used it in developing an industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to
RCBC in payment of LIPCO’s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations. LIPCO’s titles were
cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51
hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of
the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the
original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer,
unconstitutional?

HELD:

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on
agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the
farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always
own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to
ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved,
strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such
that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than
50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the
board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the
Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests
with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority
in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the
correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675
does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision
that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of
ensuring control by the farmers.
AGAPITO ROM ET AL vs ROXAS & COMPANY INC., GR 169331

FACTS:

Respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu,
Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land
covered by TCT No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994.

Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only
agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural
activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL, the lands subject of its application
were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area. Petitioners likewise aver that
since respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject parcels of land to the
DAR, it can no longer withdraw the same from the CARP’s coverage. Respondent refutes
petitioners’ contention that a landowner can no longer withdraw his property from the coverage
of CARP once he has voluntarily offered to sell the same to the DAR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a voluntary offer to sell a land under the CARL may be subsequently withdrawn.

HELD:

The court upheld that DAR’s Order which granted respondent’s application for exemption. Aside
from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the
grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted
in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there
was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by
respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of
CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-
classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is the rule that findings
of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but
even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of
the evidence on record.

Respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the
properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because
respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were
reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. "In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are
outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR." This being the
case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell because the subject
properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly beyond the CARP’s coverage.

ROXAS & COMPANY INC. vs. DAMBA-NFSW, GR 149548

The case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico, Banilad and
Caylaway, owned by herein petitioner Roxas & Company, Inc. At issue there was the validity of
the haciendas’ coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas’ application for their conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition
proceedings over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for
conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position to resolve the same, it being the
primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. In its Decision dated
December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper
acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxas’s application for conversion.
ANTONIO vs. MANAHAN, GR 176091

FACTS:

Subject of the instant petition are two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated at Gitnang Bayan I,
San Mateo, Rizal, with an aggregate area of 30,906 square meters, and registered in the name
of private respondent Manahan under Original Certificate of Title Nos. 9200 and 9150 of the
Rizal Provincial Registry.

Manahan and Antonio entered into a Leasehold Agreement whereby the latter undertook to
cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality
palay, each weighing 44 kilos.

Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) against
Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement as non-payment/remittance of the
stipulated rentals despite demands.

Specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint, Antonio averred, among others,
that he remitted the stipulated rentals regularly, except for the year 1993 when Manahan
refused to accept the same.

Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of Manahan. On appeal, DARAB ordered

respondent to respect tenant’s peaceful possession and cultivation of the said land. However,
DARAB subsequently set aside its initial ruling and reinstated PARAD’s decision. CA likewise
upheld the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not tenant petitioner is justified to be ejected from his peaceful possession and
cultivation of the disputed land.

HELD:

An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following
essential requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the
tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure and cannot be
ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes provided by law. In recognition
and protection of the tenant’s right to security of tenure, the burden of proof is upon the
agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession.

The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to
be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. Perusal of the record
shows that Antonio’s failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual
lease rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 Kilos cannot be considered willful and
deliberate. The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, the Court found Antonio’s dispossession,
however, still warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement
which prohibited, among other matters, the cultivation of other plants on Manahan’s properties,
the expansion of the tenant’s dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings and harvests
thereon.

Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every
landowner’s rights to his land" or "authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or
excessive manner in derogation of the landowner’s rights" impelled the court to uphold Antonio’s
dispossession. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away
from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming
modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by
those benefited by them. Hence, the petition was denied.
ADRIANO vs. TANCO, GR 168164

FACTS:

Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares
located in Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned
among the respondents (Alice and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick),
each receiving 7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare.

Controversy arose when Alice sent letter to petitioner Vicente informing him that subject
landholding is not covered by CARP and asked him to vacate the property as soon as
possible. Seeing the letter as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which
might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB
a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. He averred that in 1970, the husband of
Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has
been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of
the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he
was allowed to improve and establish his home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes
located at the middle of the plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession of and continues to
cultivate the land. Respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property. Insofar as
Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm
worker.

PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was performing
functions more than just a mere caretaker and was even allowed to live in subject landholding
with his family, he is therefore a tenant. Thus, respondents appealed to the DARAB which
affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the landholding is an agricultural land, that
respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees, and that they divided the fruits
equally between them, then an implied tenancy was created. The case was then elevated to CA
via a Petition for Review. They contended, among others, that the essential elements of tenancy
relationship are wanting in the instant controversy. They claimed that their property is not an
agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized area; Alice hired Vicente as a caretaker and,
therefore, the nature of their relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and,
there is no proof that the parties share in the harvest. The CA rendered a Decision in
respondents’ favor. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a bonafide tenant-farmer.

HELD:

Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only
meant to favor the poor and the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who,
notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from
the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of
defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them.

The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship exists are not supported by
substantial evidence.

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the
landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on
and cultivating the land.

The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant
do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist, the
following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is
sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites must concur in order to establish
the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.

After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the findings of the CA that the
essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
DAR vs. SUTTON
FACTS:
Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law. a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its
coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision
in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock
and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993
which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. The
DAR Secretary issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption
from the coverage of CARL but applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and appealing that the DAR A.O. No. 9 be
declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a
maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?

HELD:
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. . The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine
and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or
“agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR has no power to regulate livestock
farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was
properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform
beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
LUZ FARMS VS SEC. OF DAR

FACTS:
• In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines. It includes the
raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.
• In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39
of the said law.
• Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
• Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to
apply to it:
a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law
e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
f) ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands
are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx

ISSUE:
1. WON the CARL should include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
2. WON the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing “corporate farms” to
execute and implement “production-sharing plans” is unreasonable for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, with respect to livestock and poultry raisers.

Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.

WON the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:
1. NO. Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as they include
lands devoted to raising livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage. The use of land is
incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration of productivity in this industry. It was
never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry
in the coverage of the agrarian reform program of the government. The intention of the
Committee was to limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus, Section II of RA 6657
which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine
raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-
industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.

2. YES. As there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of
agrarian reform, there is no need to call upon them to distribute from 3% of their gross sales and
10% of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation.

3. (Separate Opinion) NO. Substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to
cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and
swine raising that make real differences:
a. There are no tenants nor landlords in livestock and poultry businesses;
b. Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land;
c. Land is not a primary resource;
d. Livestock and poultry production are industrial activities;
e. Livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by
tenancy law.

JURISPRUDENCE:
Raising of livestock, poultry, and swine are excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
ALITA V. CA
-petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring Presidential Decree No. 27
inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law; 2) Declaring that the 4 registered co-
owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners; & 3) Ejecting tenants,
namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and
Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.
-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur acquired by respondents Reyes
through homestead patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141
- Reyes wants to personally cultivate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate, relying on the
provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and regulations of MAR/DAR
-June 18, 1981: Respondents Reyes (Plaintiff) instituted a complaint against Minister of
Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX P.D. Macarambon, and Alita et.al
for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders
inapplicable to homestead lands. Defendants Alita filed their answer with special and affirmative
defenses.
-July 19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in
litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates
-November 5, 1982: Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian
City (Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing
complaint and the motion to enjoin
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants
filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
RTC: issued decision prompting defendants Alita et al to move for reconsideration but was
denied
CA: the same was sustained

ISSUE: whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian
Reform under P.D. 27.

HELD: --NO
We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of
tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a
sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice
precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the purpose
of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 to protect one’s right to
life itself by give a needy citizen a land wherein they could build a house and plant for necessary
subsistence.

Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights
over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship…in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease
or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise supports the
inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in
question,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still
own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
BAUTISTA vs. MAG-ISA VDA. DE VILLENA (Sept. 13, 2004)

FACTS:
A parcel of land was originally owned by Caluag. The original tenant-tiller of this land was
Aquilino Villena, husband of respondent. The tenancy relationship dated back to 1946 and
continued even after the demise of Aquilino through his surviving spouse, Susana. Upon the
instruction of Caluag, the house of Susana was transferred to the subject lot, because Caluag
had given Susana a portion thereof with an area of 1000 square meters as home lot and
seedbed. Since then, Susana had been in peaceful possession thereof until 1987 when a case
for ejectment was filed against her by petitioners. Petitioners argue that no tenancy relationship
exists with respect to the subject lot, since the property is a residential and not an agricultural
land. They further contend that even on the assumption that a tenancy relationship existed, the
CA erred in considering the area as respondent’s home lot. According to them, a home lot
should be constituted on the farm that the lessee is tilling, not on the residential lot of the
landowner. For these reasons, they claim that jurisdiction lies with the regular courts, not with
the DARAB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not this case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)

HELD:
YES, it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. For agrarian reform cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
DARAB. The instant case involves the tenancy rights of respondent against petitioners.
Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB. Respondent was a
tenant of petitioners’ predecessors. Respondent’s rights as an agricultural lessee are therefore
enforceable against Maria Lopez and Lorenzo Caluag’s transferees, herein petitioners. There is
no legal basis for petitioners’ restrictive interpretation of the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Its
jurisdiction encompasses “all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of all agrarian laws.” A home lot is incident to a tenant’s rights. The
right to retain or remove it is therefore an agrarian dispute that should be resolved by the
DARAB. Having situated the home lot on the subject lot since 1957, respondent can be ejected
therefrom only for cause or upon proof that the tenancy relationship has already been severed.
Petitioners should prove before the DARAB their grounds for ejectment. Petition DENIED.
DAR VS. CUENCA
FACTS
Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City
and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and
sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under
the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive
Order No. 405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of
Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the
implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if
at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have been completed between
June 1988 to June 1992; that Executive Order No. 405 amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL
and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then President Corazon Aquino no longer
had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.
Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio. The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease
and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the
determination of the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but
was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also
had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.

ISSUE
Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court

RULING

Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs
prayed for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of
EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the
allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following
averments. The main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not
the issue of compensation. Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the
DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just
compensation. To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first
necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the
propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-
judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the
simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is
clearly agrarian.
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
COOPERATIVE (DEARBC). Petitioner
vs.
JESUS SANGUNAY and SONNY LABUNOS, respondents
Topic: Agrarian Disputes

Doctrine: Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, DARAB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform maters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matter
involving implementation of CARP. Hence, at first instance, only DARAB can determine and
adjudicate agrarian disputes.

Facts:
1. A 2M sq. m. landholding, covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, was
awarded to petitioner DEARBC, an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the CARP.
2. DEARBC claimed that:
a. Respondent Sangunay illegally entered a portion of its property called “Field 34” and
utilized a portion of 1.5 hectares of such property wherein he planted corn, built a house and
resided in such from 1986 to present.
b. Respondent Labunos also illegally entered same portion and tilled 8 hectares wherein
he planted trees, gmelina, mahogany andother crops as a source of his livelihood.
c. Both respondents failed to return the lands despite demand and such illegal occupation
resulted in deprivation of use of land and damages.
3. DEARBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance with
Damages with DARAB Region Office against several people, among them were respondents.
4. The Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARBC on the ground that respondents failed to
prove ownership of such portions of the landholding.
5. Respondents elevated the case to DARAB Central Office. They argued that:
a. Sangunay’s and Labunos’ position:
i. Land was an accrual deposit he inherited from his father in which he had been in open,
public, adverse, actual, physical and continuous possession of land as an owner.
ii. He cultivated such land with the knowledge of DEARBC. He presented Tax Declaration
and Real Property Historical Ownership issued by Municipal Assessor, showing that he
declared property for taxation even before DEARBC acquired it.
iii. He was a qualified farmer-beneficiary entitling him to security and tenure under CARP
6. DARAB dismissed DEARBC’s case for lack of jurisdiction as such issue of ownership of
subject land is a regular case which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts and not as an
agrarian dispute.
a. The dispute does not relate to any tenurial agreement.
7. DEARBC appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the petition for procedural infirmities in it
verification, certification and attachments.
8. Hence, this petition.
9. DEARBC claims that DARAB has jurisdiction because it partakes of a boundary dispute
or an ouster of an intruder found under DARAB Rules of Procedure and AO 03.
10. Respondents argue that jurisdiction of DARAB is limited to agrarian disputes and
implementation of CARP. Issues of possession may be dealt with by DARAB only when they
relate to agrarian disputes.

Issue: W/N DARAB has jurisdiction over the case of DEARBC

Held: No! DARAB does not have jurisdiction.

1. Jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, is
determined by allegations and relief prayed for.
2. Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, DARAB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform maters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving
implementation of CARP.
3. Hence, at first instance, only DARAB can determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes.
4. According to RA 6657, “agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner
to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.”
5. Clearly, no agrarian dispute exists as DEARBC only prays for ejectment and does not
involve tenurial agreements. Both parties werecontending for the ownership of parcels of land.
6. The ruling of DAR v Abdulwahid is inapplicable as the dispute involved in such case was
the “terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agra beneficiaries.
7. DEARBC’s complaint lacks allegations to persuade Court in considering it as an agrarian
dispute.

PETITION IS DENIED.