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Nitafan v CIR 152 SCRA 284

Javellana vs. executive secretary 50 scra 33


Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new
1987]
1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought
to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from FACTS:
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. 1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo
He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the
Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified Judges of the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution.
Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free RTC National Capital Judicial Region.
election there being intimidation and fraud. 2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were
their salaries.
concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the
Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, 3. Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their
there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people
had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10,
of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.”
was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their
ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. ISSUE: Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries
of Judges/Justices?
Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552
HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID
February 27, 1950.] (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such
Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and
(P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all
contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would and Judges does not fall within the constitution protection against
reduce it in violation of the Constitution. decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the
to a diminution thereof? constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by
the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent
taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not the people adopting it should be given effect.
include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from
diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in
second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be
1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' deemed discarded.
compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on
judicial salaries really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO
These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other DAVIDG.R. No. L-6355-56August 31, 1953
commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real
property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their Facts
judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered
charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s andJustice Fernando Jugo’s
diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No
as an infringement of the fundamental charter. salarywherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exemptfrom the income
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of
did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives his compensationfixed by the Constitution or by law.” According
in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellantCollector
not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in supra, was not receivedfavorably by Congress, because immediately
the public interest (Evans vs. Gore). after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To
bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
considers the pertinent discussionin the Lower House of House Bill constructionthat the intent of the framers of the organic
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. law and of the people adopting it should be given
Issue(s) effect.Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs.
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Meer on the issue of imposing income tax
Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme Court on judges’salaries.
and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section
13 of Republic Act No. 590 constitutional? DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19,
Ratio Decidendi 1997)Facts:
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, pres
judges, in a rather exhaustive and wellconsidered decision found i d e n t o f P e o p l e ’ s I n i t i a t i v e f o r R e f o r m s , Mo
and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of dernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to
Perfecto vs.Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials,
the collection of income taxes from the salariesof Justice Jugo through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article
and Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for
of the Philippines, and so o r d e r e d t h e r e f u n d o f s a i d the right of the people to exercise the power todirectly
taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently
R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 5 9 0 i s constitutional, the court the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of
believes that this is a clear example of interpretation the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter
or ascertainment of themeaning of the phrase “which set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
shall not be diminished during their continuance in Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law
office,” found insection 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiatas as intervenors -oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to
enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein
decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
or any part thereof bythe Legislature is an invasion of the and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition
well-defined and established province and jurisdiction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and
of theJudiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the
legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or actdeclaratory of following: (1) The constitutional provision onp e o p l e ’ s
what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding initiative to amend the constitution can only be
weight with the courts. Alegislative definition of a word as i m p l e m e n t e d b y l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to
elsewhere;otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof.
function in defining a term. The court reiterates thedoctrine laid Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision,
down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the therefore it isoutside the power of people’s initiative. The
collection of income taxon the salary of a judicial officer is a Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Issues:
Further, thecourt holds that the interpretation (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
and application of the Constitution and of statutes executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution
is within theexclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislaturemay not onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3)
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials
of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, would constitute a revision or an amendment of the
especiallywhen the interpretation sought and provided in Constitution.
said statute runs counter to a previous Held:
interpretationalready given in a case by the highest court of the Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self ex
land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed,that Section 13, e c u t o r y , t h u s , w i t h o u t i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation the
Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or
judicial officer granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
shall b e c o n s i d e r e d “ n o t t o b e a d i m i n u t i o n o f h i s provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution
compensation fixed by the No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of
C o n s t i t u t i o n o r b y l a w ” , constitutes and invasion of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an
province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is of established rule
theopinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression thatw h a t h a s b e e n d e l e g a t e d , c a n n o t b e d e l e g a t e
of the fundamental principles underlyingthe separation of powers. d ( p o t e s t a s d e l e g a t a n o n d e l e g a r i p o t e s t ) . T h e del
In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, egation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the
dissentingopinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and latter cannot validly promulgate rule sand regulations to
thus their salaries are subjected to the Income TaxLaw prevailing. implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.T h e
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a
the constitutional provisionin question until it was finally approved r e v i s i o n , a s i t w o u l d a f f e c t o t h e r provisions of the
by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for
members of the Judiciary taxable. Theascertainment of that intent is public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A
revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. economy.
73748 - May 22, 1986)
FACTS: Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President therefore null and void.
Laurel were taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation
No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not
Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that the "new just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the
government was installed througha direct exercise of the power of sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to
the Filipino people assisted by units of the New ArmedForces of the play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
Philippines." century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple
ISSUE: meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
HELD: Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman
Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
matter but belongs to the realmof politics where only the people are Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid
the judge.The Court further held that: of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
1.The people have accepted the Aquino government subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00
which is in effective control of the entire country; per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to
2.It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to
new government. cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the
Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching
bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3
Feb 1997] According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a
InsuranceSystem (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it.
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in
Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 question.
only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of
foreigners.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in
contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time,
Renong Berhad. not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from
granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on qualified, too.
prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues
ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2,
G.R. NO. 78059 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be
AUGUST 31, 1987 deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article
FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions
De Leon, as Barangay Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay occupied by petitioners.
councilmen for the memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin
Esguerra in replacing the petitioners. Further, the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission further shows the clear, unequivocal and express intent
On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a memorandum of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of ratification is the
antedated December 1, 1986 designating new officers barangay act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification"
captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution. mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the
plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of
The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by
Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their
(6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue votes on the date of the plebiscite."
until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or
up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification Therefor, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2,
of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has 1987, the actual date of the voting and not February 8, 1987, the
the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. announcement of the resolution.

However, the respondents contend that the terms of office of


elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
continued in office by virtue of the following provision: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance
plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18,
“All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision)
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC.
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, HELD: The propose amendments shall be approved by a majority of
1986.” the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular
... and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for
that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not
office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision
been repealed for being inconsistent with because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the
the aforementioned provision of the Provisional Constitution. revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be
unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire
ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all
validly recognized? Whether or not the 1987 constitution was the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to
already in effect on February 2, 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT
or February 8, 1987, its announcement? piecemeal.

HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional
Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order AQUINO VS ENRILE
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of
for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals
replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan
of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special
be considered as the effective date of replacement and not affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’
December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the declaration of Martial Law.
dictates of justice. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to
the declaration of Martial Law.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion,
year deadline, the aforementioned provision in the Provisional insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state,
Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of
"Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore,
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order.
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
1998 Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the
Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an
Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary
agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of before Thomas Jefferson took office.
the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief
the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they
nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as
the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions,
and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered
minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body by the end of Adams’s term.
that he was inreceipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as
senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions.
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed,
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Issues
Tatad. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Issues: Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?
of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
orpetition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the mandamus?
relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear Holding and Rule (Marshall)
that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or The order granting the commission takes effect when the
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been
prerogatives. exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act
required from the person possessing the power has been
However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became
support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or effective when signed by President Adams.
even from practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who
minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
become the minority leader. Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal
of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is
While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office,
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver
All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The country afford him a remedy.
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed void.
by the Senate itself, not by the Court.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of
necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If
courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both Representatives.
apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the ISSUES:
Constitution. 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers Constitution.
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had 2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to resulted in a political crisis.
apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior
courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere
surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at
liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the HELD:
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and 1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
form without substance. (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
writs of mandamus. against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that within a one-year period.
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003. power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
FACTS: Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June
2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"