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 Capitol Medical Center Inc., vs. NLRC, GR No. 147080, April 26, 2005

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005]

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO,
EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO
GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA
COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE,
JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA
MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL
EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO
MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER
MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA
BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA
RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO, ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS
STA. BARBARA, JR., respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57500
and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Antecedents[2]

Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers
(the Union, for brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. had been the bone of contention between the Union and the petitioner. The
petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike
on April 15, 1993.
The Union had to contend with another union the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned
Employees (CMC-ACE) which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a
Resolution on November 18, 1994 granting the appeal. He, likewise, denied the motion filed by the
petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to the Court which rendered
judgment on February 4, 1997 affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus:

1. Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of
Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and

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2. Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical
Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees.[3]

The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997
addressed to Dr. Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested
for a meeting to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of
the Court.[4] However, in a Letter to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the
proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the Union was
not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Unions
Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the following
grounds:

3) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and other
documents as required by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union.

4) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the National Labor Relations
Commission.[5]

Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations in a Letter
dated October 16, 1997 and suggested the date, time and place of the initial meeting. The Union further
reiterated its plea in another Letter[6] dated October 28, 1997, to no avail.
Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary
Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union
alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b)
coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.[7]
A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no
agreement was reached. On November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board
requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;[8] the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional
Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted.
On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes [9] of the alleged strike vote
purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at the
corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300
union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14
members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled. [10]
On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on
December 1, 1997, the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of
jurisdiction over the dispute. The Union likewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions,
not limited to contempt and other penalties, against the hospital director/president and other responsible
corporate officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith, to bargain collectively with the Union, to
adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guilty of unfair labor practices,
and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises. [11]
On December 4, 1997, the SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor
dispute. The decretal portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center
pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are directed
to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to
resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that
may exacerbate the situation.

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Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and
counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreements in compliance with
aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.[12]

In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike
and returned to work.
For its part, the petitioner filed a petition[13] to declare the strike illegal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97. In its position paper,
the petitioner appended the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the property across the hospital
which was being used as a parking lot, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue,
Quezon City. Also included were the affidavits of Simon J. Tingzon and Reggie B. Barawid, the
petitioners security guards assigned in front of the hospital premises. They attested to the fact that no
secret balloting took place at the said parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. of November 10,
1997.[14] The petitioner also appended the affidavit of Henry V. Vera Cruz, who alleged that he was a
member of the Union and had discovered that signatures on the Statements of Cash Receipt Over
Disbursement submitted by the Union to the DOLE purporting to be his were not his genuine
signatures;[15] the affidavits of 17 of its employees, who declared that no formal voting was held by the
members of the Union on the said date, were also submitted. The latter employees also declared that
they were not members of any union, and yet were asked to sign documents purporting to be a strike vote
attendance and unnumbered strike vote ballots on different dates from November 8 to 11, 1997.
In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those
members who alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997. [16]
In the meantime, on September 30, 1998, the Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision
denying the petition for the cancellation of the respondent Unions certificate of registration. The decision
was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on December 29, 1998.
In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision on December 23,
1998 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97 in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by
the respondents illegal. The fallo of the decision reads:

1. Declaring as illegal the strike staged by the respondents from November 28, 1997 to December 5,
1997;

2. Declaring respondent Jaime Ibabao, in his capacity as union president, the other union officers, and
respondents Ronald Q. Centeno, Michael Eustaquio and Henry Vera Cruz to have lost their employment
status with petitioner; and

3. Ordering the above respondents to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) by way of damages.[17]

The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice
of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of
the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees who alleged
that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the
security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike vote presented by the respondents. The
Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have
filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by
this Court instead of staging a strike.
The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered a Decision [18] on June 14,
1999, granting their appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the

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petitioners petition to declare the strike illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a
strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled as follows:

We find untenable the Labor Arbiters finding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10,
1997, claiming that this is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot
across the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that
no strike voting took place in the parking lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting
ever took place at all because the same was conducted in the parking lot immediately/directly fronting,
not across, the hospital building (Annexes 1-J, 1-K to 1-K-6). Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19)
(sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike voting, did so involuntarily for fear
of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro forma (Annexes H-2 to H-
19).[19]

The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a
showing that the NCMB decided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of
the said decision, or that any such request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the
secret balloting and to which the NCMB agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB
with such notice before the strike vote was conducted.[20]
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the said
motion on September 30, 1999.[21]
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision and resolution of the
NLRC on the following allegation:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, ACTED
CAPRICIOUSLY, AND CONTRAVENED THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN
REVERSING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 23, 1998 (ANNEX E) AND IN
UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE STAGED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM
NOVEMBER 28, 1997 TO DECEMBER 5, 1997.[22]

On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC.
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on
the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE NLRCS FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT
STRIKE.[23]

The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a
strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, is merely directory and not mandatory. The use of the word shall in the
rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Unions duty to
submit the said notice of strike vote.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared that
the respondents complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike. The petitioner insists that, as
gleaned from the affidavits of the 17 union members and that of the overseer, and contrary to the joint
affidavit of the officers and some union members, no meeting was held and no secret balloting was
conducted on November 10, 1997.
The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held on
the said date by the respondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular inspection of

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the area where the respondents members allegedly held the voting. The petitioner also points out that it
adduced documentary evidence in the form of affidavits executed by 17 members of the respondent
union which remained unrebutted. The petitioner also posits that the CA and the NLRC erred in reversing
the finding of the Labor Arbiter; furthermore, there was no need for the respondent union to stage a strike
on November 28, 1997 because it had filed an urgent motion with the DOLE for the enforcement and
execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118915.
The petition is meritorious.
We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of
Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads:

Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the
Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot
in a meeting called for the purpose.

The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party,
supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the
regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least
twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule.

Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of
the Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code and has the force and effect of law.[24]
Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor
Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct
of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the
date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB
would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of
supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC,[25] the Court enumerated the notices required by
Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the
NCMB:

1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional
Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;

2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike
thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice.
However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period
need not be observed.

4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour
prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.

5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.

A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a
notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a
conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for

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amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall
be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union
may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose
of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union
members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union
bossism and even corruption.[26] A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to
the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is
false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it
is too late.[27] The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to
amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, [28] while the seven-day
strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries
the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.[29]
The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before
the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct
a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the
conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c)
should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the
employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite
personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of
the unions decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot
determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular
conduct. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least
24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union
illegal.
In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the
NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the
petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the
respondent union was illegal.
Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines [30] and Section 7, Rule XXII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,[31] no labor organization shall declare a strike unless
supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the
strike illegal.[32] The union is thus mandated to allege and prove compliance with the requirements of the
law.
In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the
one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his
decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10,
1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the
only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in
their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of
the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the respondent
Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA
declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative
weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The
NLRC and the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were
uniform and pro forma.
We agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted by the
respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital, at the corner of Scout
Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. This can be gleaned from the affidavit of Barbacena
and the joint affidavit of Tingzon and Barawid, respectively:

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1. That I am working as an overseer of a parking lot owned by Mrs. Madelaine Dionisio and located right
in front of the Capitol Medical Center, specifically at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay
Avenue, Quezon City;

2. That on November 10, 1997, during my entire tour of duty from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., no voting or
election was conducted in the aforementioned parking space for employees of the Capitol Medical Center
and/or their guests, or by any other group for that matter.[33]

1. That I, Simon J. Tingzon, am a security officer of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency
(hereinafter referred to as VPSSA), assigned, since July 1997 up to the present, as Security Detachment
Commander at Capitol Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as CMC) located at Scout Magbanua
corner Panay Avenue, Quezon City;

2. That my (Tingzon) functions as such include over-all in charge of security of all buildings and properties
of CMC, and roving in the entire premises including the parking lots of all the buildings of CMC;

3. That I, Reggie B. Barawid, am a security guard of VPSSA, assigned, since June 1997 up to the
present, as security guard at CMC;

4. That my (Barawid) functions as such include access control of all persons coming in and out of CMCs
buildings and properties. I also sometimes guard the parking areas of CMC;

5. That on November 10, 1997, both of us were on duty at CMC from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with me
(Barawid) assigned at the main door of the CMCs Main Building along Scout Magbanua St.;

6. That on said date, during our entire tour of duty, there was no voting or election conducted in any of the
four parking spaces for CMC personnel and guests.[34]

The allegations in the foregoing affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the
NLRC that a secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of
Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The respondents failed to prove the existence
of a parking lot in front of the hospital other than the parking lot across from it. Indeed, 17 of those who
purportedly voted in a secret voting executed their separate affidavits that no secret balloting took place
on November 10, 1997, and that even if they were not members of the respondent Union, were asked to
vote and to sign attendance papers. The respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence that the said
affiants were coerced into executing the said affidavits. The bare fact that some portions of the said
affidavits are similarly worded does not constitute substantial evidence that the petitioner forced,
intimidated or coerced the affiants to execute the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of
Appeals and NLRC are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

 Phimco Industries Ins. vs. Phimco Industries Labor Association, GR No. 170830, Aug. 11,
2010

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

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THIRD DIVISION

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 170830

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR BRION,
ASSOCIATION (PILA), and BERSAMIN,
ERLINDA VAZQUEZ, RICARDO ABAD, and
SACRISTAN, LEONIDA CATALAN, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
MAXIMO PEDRO, NATHANIELA
DIMACULANGAN,* RODOLFO
MOJICO, ROMEO CARAMANZA, Promulgated:
REYNALDO GANITANO, ALBERTO
BASCONCILLO,** and RAMON August 11, 2010
FALCIS, in their capacity as officers
of PILA, and ANGELITA BALOSA,***
DANILO BANAAG, ABRAHAM
CADAY, ALFONSO CLAUDIO,
FRANCISCO DALISAY,****
ANGELITO DEJAN,***** PHILIP
GARCES, NICANOR ILAGAN,
FLORENCIO LIBONGCOGON,******
NEMESIO MAMONONG, TEOFILO
MANALILI, ALFREDO PEARSON,*******
MARIO PEREA,******** RENATO
RAMOS, MARIANO ROSALES,
PABLO SARMIENTO, RODOLFO
TOLENTINO, FELIPE VILLAREAL,
ARSENIO ZAMORA, DANILO
BALTAZAR, ROGER CABER,*********
REYNALDO CAMARIN, BERNARDO
CUADRA,********** ANGELITO DE
GUZMAN, GERARDO FELICIANO,***********
ALEX IBAEZ, BENJAMIN JUAN, SR.,
RAMON MACAALAY, GONZALO
MANALILI, RAUL MICIANO,
HILARIO PEA, TERESA
PERMOCILLO,************ ERNESTO RIO,
RODOLFO SANIDAD, RAFAEL
STA. ANA, JULIAN TUGUIN and AMELIA
ZAMORA, as members of PILA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Phimco Industries, Inc.
(PHIMCO), seeking to reverse and set aside the decision,[2] dated February 10, 2004, and the

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resolution,[3] dated December 12, 2005, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70336. The
assailed CA decision dismissed PHIMCOs petition for certiorari that challenged the resolution, dated
December 29, 1998, and the decision, dated February 20, 2002, of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC); the assailed CA resolution denied PHIMCOs subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.

PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with principal address at Phimco
Compound, Felix Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA)
is the duly authorized bargaining representative of PHIMCOs daily-paid workers. The 47 individually
named respondents are PILA officers and members.

When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31, 1994,
PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues,
mainly due to disagreements on salary increases and benefits.

On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a
Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock. Seven (7) days later, or on March 16, 1995, the
union conducted a strike vote; a majority of the union members voted for a strike as its response to the
bargaining impasse. On March 17, 1995, PILA filed the strike vote results with the NCMB. Thirty-five (35)
days later, or on April 21, 1995, PILA staged a strike.

On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing through force, intimidation and coercion the
ingress and egress of non-striking employees into and from the company premises. On May 15, 1995, the
NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO, effective for a period of twenty (20) days, or until June 5, 1995.

On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to
explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed
during the strike. Three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were informed
of their dismissal.

On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal
dismissal case) with the NLRC. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-04705-95, and
raffled to Labor Arbiter (LA) Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.

On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute, and ordered all the striking employees (except those who were handed termination papers
on June 26, 1995) to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the order. The Secretary
ordered PHIMCO to accept the striking employees, under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to the strike.[4] On the same day, PILA ended its strike.

On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with
the NLRC, with a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly participated in the
illegal strike. PHIMCO claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress from the PHIMCO
compound, thereby paralyzing PHIMCOs operations. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-08-06031-95, and raffled to LA Jovencio Ll. Mayor.

On March 14, 1996, the respondents filed their Position Paper in the illegal strike case. They
countered that they complied with all the legal requirements for the staging of the strike, they put up no
barricade, and conducted their strike peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without incident.

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 Page 10 of 49

LA Mayor decided the case on February 4, 1998,[5] and found the strike illegal; the respondents
committed prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs
premises and preventing the non-striking employees from reporting for work. He observed that it was not
enough that the picket of the strikers was a moving picket, since the strikers should allow the free
passage to the entrance and exit points of the company premises. Thus, LA Mayor declared that the
respondent employees, PILA officers and members, have lost their employment status.

On March 5, 1998, PILA and its officers and members appealed LA Mayors decision to the
NLRC.

THE NLRC RULING

The NLRC decided the appeal on December 29, 1998, and set aside LA Mayors decision. [6] The
NLRC did not give weight to PHIMCOs evidence, and relied instead on the respondents evidence
showing that the union conducted a peaceful moving picket.

On January 28, 1999, PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case. [7]

In a parallel development, LA Espiritu decided the unions illegal dismissal case on March 2,
1999. He ruled the respondents dismissal as illegal, and ordered their reinstatement with payment of
backwages. PHIMCO appealed LA Espiritus decision to the NLRC.

Pending the resolution of PHIMCOs motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case and the
appeal of the illegal dismissal case, PHIMCO moved for the consolidation of the two (2) cases. The NLRC
acted favorably on the motion and consolidated the two (2) cases in its Order dated August 5, 1999.

On February 20, 2002, the NLRC rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, ruling totally in
the unions favor.[8] It dismissed the appeal of the illegal dismissal case, and denied PHIMCOs motion for
reconsideration in the illegal strike case. The NLRC found that the picket conducted by the striking
employees was not an illegal blockade and did not obstruct the points of entry to and exit from the
companys premises; the pictures submitted by the respondents revealed that the picket was moving, not
stationary. With respect to the illegal dismissal charge, the NLRC observed that the striking employees
were not given ample opportunity to explain their side after receipt of the June 23, 1995 letter. Thus, the
NLRC affirmed the Decision of LA Espiritu with respect to the payment of backwages until the
promulgation of the decision, plus separation pay at one (1) month salary per year of service in lieu of
reinstatement, and 10% of the monetary award as attorneys fees. It ruled out reinstatement because of
the damages sustained by the company brought about by the strike.

On March 14, 2002, PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision.

On April 26, 2002, without waiting for the result of its motion for reconsideration, PHIMCO
elevated its case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[9]

THE CA RULING

In a Decision[10] promulgated on February 10, 2004, the CA dismissed PHIMCOs petition

for certiorari. The CA noted that the NLRC findings, that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCOs
evidence failed to show that the picket constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the points of
entry to and exit from the company premises, were supported by substantial evidence.

PHIMCO came to us through the present petition after the CA denied [11] PHIMCOs motion for
reconsideration.[12]

THE PETITION

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 Page 11 of 49

The petitioner argues that the strike was illegal because the respondents committed the
prohibited acts under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, such as blocking the ingress and egress of the
company premises, threat, coercion, and intimidation, as established by the evidence on record.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the issues raised in this case are factual in
nature that we cannot generally touch in a petition for review, unless compelling reasons exist; the
company has not shown any such compelling reason as the picket was peaceful and uneventful, and no
human barricade blocked the company premises.

THE ISSUE

In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,[13] we laid down the basic approach that should be followed
in the review of CA decisions in labor cases, thus:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast
with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore,
Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis
of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we
have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal,
of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a
Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did
the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling on the case?

In this light, the core issue in the present case is whether the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the unions strike was legal.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly meritorious.

Requisites of a valid strike

A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course
of setting their terms and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic
war between labor and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union
and its members, and one that must also necessarily affect management and its members. [14]

In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must
always rest on rational basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot
heads; it must focus on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to
public welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social
justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.[15]
Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management but also the general
peace and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally,
for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 263[16] of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a
notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the
intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a
meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike.

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These requirements are mandatory, and the unions failure to comply renders the strike
illegal.[17] The 15 to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably
resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban
is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the
imprimatur of the majority of the union members.[18]
In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements; a strike
notice was filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike
vote was filed with the DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April 25,
1995.

Strike may be illegal for commission of

prohibited acts

Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a
strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal.[19]The means become illegal when
they come within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:

No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or

intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC
and the CA, we find the PILA strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and factual
issues of this case as both the NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence, leading them to
inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably had not been
marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA officers and
members undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from
PHIMCOs premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering the
PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.

The Evidence

We gather from the case record the following pieces of relevant evidence adduced in the compulsory
arbitration proceedings.[20]

For the Company

1. Pictures taken during the strike, showing that the respondents prevented
free ingress to and egress from the company premises;[21]
2. Affidavit of PHIMCO Human Resources Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco, stating that
he was one of the employees prevented by the strikers from entering the PHIMCO premises;[22]
3. Affidavit of Cinco, identifying Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida
Catalan, Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela R. Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo
Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis as PILA officers; [23]
4. Affidavit of Cinco identifying other members of PILA;[24]
5. Folder 1, containing pictures taken during the strike identifying and showing Leonida
Catalan, Renato Ramos, Arsenio Zamora, Reynaldo Ganitano, Amelia Zamora, Angelito Dejan, Teresa
Permocillo, and Francisco Dalisay as the persons preventing Cinco and his group from entering the
company premises;[25]
6. Folder 2, with pictures taken on May 30, 1995, showing Cinco, together with non-
striking PHIMCO employees, reporting for work but being refused entry by strikers Teofilo Manalili,

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 Page 13 of 49

Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Bernando Cuadra, Maximo Pedro, Nicanor Ilagan, Julian Tuguin, Nemesio
Mamonong, Abraham Caday, Ernesto Rio, Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gerardo Feliciano,
Alberto Basconcillo, Rodolfo Sanidad, Mariano Rosales, Roger Caber, Angelito de Guzman, Angelito
Balosa and Philip Garces who blocked the company gate;[26]
7. Folder 3, with pictures taken on May 30, 1995, showing the respondents denying
free ingress to and egress from the company premises;[27]
8. Folder 4, with pictures taken during the strike, showing that non-striking employees
failed to enter the company premises as a result of the respondents refusal to let them in; [28]
9. Affidavit of Joaquin Aguilar stating that the pictures presented by Cinco were taken
during the strike;[29]
10. Pictures taken by Aguilar during the strike, showing non-striking employees being
refused entry by the respondents;[30]
11. Joint affidavit of Orlando Marfil and Rodolfo Digo, identifying the pictures they
took during the strike, showing that the respondents blocked ingress to and egress from the company
premises;[31] and,
12. Testimonies of PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva, Aguilar and Cinco, as well as those
of PILA officers Maximo Pedro and Leonida Catalan.

For the Respondents

1. Affidavit of Leonida Catalan, stating that the PILA strike complied with all the legal
requirements, and the strike/picket was conducted peacefully with no incident of any illegality; [32]
2. Affidavit of Maximo Pedro, stating that the strike/picket was conducted peacefully;
the picket was always moving with no acts of illegality having been committed during the strike; [33]
3. Certification of Police Station Commander Bienvenido de los Reyes that during the
strike there was no report of any untoward incident;[34]
4. Certification of Rev. Father Erick Adeviso of Dambanang Bayan Parish Church that
the strike was peaceful and without any untoward incident;[35]
5. Certification of Priest-In-Charge Angelito Fausto of the Philippine Independent
Church in Punta, Santa Ana, that the strike complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike, and the
strikers conducted themselves in a peaceful manner;[36]
6. Clearance issued by Punong Barangay Mario O. dela Rosa and Barangay Secretary
Pascual Gesmundo, Jr. that the strike from April 21 to July 7, 1995 was conducted in an orderly manner
with no complaints filed;[37] and,
7. Testimonies at the compulsory arbitration proceedings.

In its resolution of December 29, 1998,[38] the NLRC declared that the string of proofs the
company presented was overwhelmingly counterbalanced by the numerous pieces of evidence adduced
by respondents x x x all depicting a common story that respondents put up a peaceful moving picket, and
did not commit any illegal acts x x xspecifically obstructing the ingress to and egress from the company
premises[.][39]

We disagree with this finding as the purported peaceful moving picket upon which the NLRC
resolution was anchored was not an innocuous picket, contrary to what the NLRC said it was; the picket,
under the evidence presented, did effectively obstruct the entry and exit points of the company premises
on various occasions.

To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an

industrial or labor dispute.[40] The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking
employees outside of the company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing
focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the
company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from the employers premises, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor
dispute.[41] It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual stoppage of work.

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While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of
expression[42] and the right to peaceably assemble to air grievances, [43]these rights are by no means
absolute. Protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises.[44] That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not
free it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.

In this regard, PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva and Joaquin Aguilar, and the companys Human
Resources Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco testified during the compulsory arbitration hearings:

ATTY. REYES: this incident on May 22, 1995, when a coaster or bus attempted to enter
PHIMCO compound, you mentioned that it was refused entry. Why was this (sic)
it refused entry?

WITNESS: Because at that time, there was a moving picket at the gate that is why the
bus was not able to enter.[45]

xxxx

Q: Despite this TRO, which was issued by the NLRC, were you allowed entry by the
strikers?

A: We made several attempts to enter the compound, I remember on May 7, 1995, we

tried to enter the PHIMCO compound but we were not allowed entry.

Q: Aside from May 27, 1995, were there any other instances wherein you were not
allowed entry at PHIMCO compound?

A: On May 29, I recall I was riding with our Production Manager with the Pick-up. We
tried to enter but we were not allowed by the strikers.[46]

xxxx

ARBITER MAYOR: How did the strikers block the ingress of the company?

A: They hold around, joining hands, moving picket.[47]

xxxx

ARBITER MAYOR: Reform the question, and because of that moving picket conducted
by the strikers, no employees or vehicles can come in or go out of the premises?

A: None, sir.[48]

These accounts were confirmed by the admissions of respondent PILA officers Maximo Pedro
and Leonida Catalan that the strikers prevented non-striking employees from entering the company
premises. According to these union officers:

ATTY. CHUA: Mr. witness, do you recall an incident when a group of managers of
PHIMCO, with several of the monthly paid employees who tried to enter the
PHIMCO compound during the strike?

MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.

ATTY. CHUA: Can you tell us if these (sic) group of managers headed by Francis Cinco
entered the compound of PHIMCO on that day, when they tried to enter?

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 Page 15 of 49

MR. PEDRO: No, sir. They were not able to enter.[49]

xxxx

ATTY. CHUA: Despite having been escorted by police Delos Reyes, you still did not give
way, and instead proceeded with your moving picket?

MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.

ATTY. CHUA: In short, these people were not able to enter the premises of PHIMCO,
Yes or No.

MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir. [50]

xxxx

ATTY. CHUA: Madam witness, even if Major Delos Reyes instructed you to give way so
as to allow the employees and managers to enter the premises, you and your co-
employees did not give way?

MS. CATALAN: No sir.

ATTY. CHUA: the managers and the employees were not able to enter the premises?

MS. CATALAN: Yes, sir.[51]

The NLRC resolution itself noted the above testimonial evidence, all building up a scenario that
the moving picket put up by [the] respondents obstructed the ingress to and egress from the company
premises[,][52] yet it ignored the clear import of the testimonies as to the true nature of the picket. Contrary
to the NLRC characterization that it was a peaceful moving picket, it stood, in fact, as an obstruction to
the companys points of ingress and egress.

Significantly, the testimonies adduced were validated by the photographs taken of the strike area,
capturing the strike in its various stages and showing how the strikers actually conducted the
picket. While the picket was moving, it was maintained so close to the company gates that it virtually
constituted an obstruction, especially when the strikers joined hands, as described by Aguilar, or were
moving in circles, hand-to-shoulder, as shown by the photographs, that, for all intents and purposes,
blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. In fact, on closer examination, it
could be seen that the respondents were conducting the picket right at the company gates.[53]

The obstructive nature of the picket was aggravated by the placement of benches, with strikers
standing on top, directly in front of the open wing of the company gates, clearly obstructing the entry and
exit points of the company compound.[54]

With a virtual human blockade and real physical obstructions (benches and makeshift structures
both outside and inside the gates),[55] it was pure conjecture on the part of the NLRC to say that [t]he non-
strikers and their vehicles were x x x free to get in and out of the company compound undisturbed by the
picket line.[56] Notably, aside from non-strikers who wished to report for work, company vehicles likewise
could not enter and get out of the factory because of the picket and the physical obstructions the
respondents installed. The blockade went to the point of causing the build up of traffic in the immediate
vicinity of the strike area, as shown by photographs. [57] This, by itself, renders the picket a prohibited
activity. Pickets may not aggressively interfere with the right of peaceful ingress to and egress from the
employers shop or obstruct public thoroughfares; picketing is not peaceful where the sidewalk or entrance
to a place of business is obstructed by picketers parading around in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.[58]

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What the records reveal belies the NLRC observation that the evidence x x x tends to show that
what respondents actually did was walking or patrolling to and fro within the company vicinity and by word
of mouth, banner or placard, informing the public concerning the dispute.[59]

The peaceful moving picket that the NLRC noted, influenced apparently by the certifications
(Mayor delos Reyes, Fr. Adeviso, Fr. Fausto and Barangay Secretary Gesmundo presented in evidence
by the respondents, was peaceful only because of the absence of violence during the strike, but the
obstruction of the entry and exit points of the company premises caused by the respondents picket was
by no means a petty blocking act or an insignificant obstructive act. [60]

As we have stated, while the picket was moving, the movement was in circles, very close to the
gates, with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder formation without a break in their ranks, thus preventing
non-striking workers and vehicles from coming in and getting out. Supported by actual blocking benches
and obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly intimidating strategy
whose chief aim was to paralyze the operations of the company, not solely by the work stoppage of the
participating workers, but by excluding the company officials and non-striking employees from access to
and exit from the company premises. No doubt, the strike caused the company operations considerable
damage, as the NLRC itself recognized when it ruled out the reinstatement of the dismissed strikers. [61]

Intimidation

Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence, coercion or intimidation is
unlawful.[62] According to American jurisprudence, what constitutes unlawful intimidation depends on the
totality of the circumstances.[63] Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised. There may be
unlawful intimidation without direct threats or overt acts of violence. Words or acts which are calculated
and intended to cause an ordinary person to fear an injury to his person, business or property are
equivalent to threats.[64]

The manner in which the respondent union officers and members conducted the picket in the present
case had created such an intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and even company
vehicles did not dare cross the picket line, even with police intervention. Those who dared cross the
picket line were stopped. The compulsory arbitration hearings bear this out.

Maximo Pedro, a PILA officer, testified, on July 30, 1997, that a group of PHIMCO managers led
by Cinco, together with several monthly-paid employees, tried to enter the company premises on May 27,
1995 with police escort; even then, the picketers did not allow them to enter. [65]Leonida Catalan, another
union officer, testified that she and the other picketers did not give way despite the instruction of Police
Major de los Reyes to the picketers to allow the group to enter the company premises.[66] (To be sure,
police intervention and participation are, as a rule, prohibited acts in a strike, but we note this intervention
solely as indicators of how far the union and its members have gone to block ingress to and egress from
the company premises.)

Further, PHIMCO employee Rodolfo Eva testified that on May 22, 1995, a company coaster or bus
attempted to enter the PHIMCO compound but it was refused entry by the moving picket.[67] Cinco, the
company personnel manager, also testified that on May 27, 1995, when the NLRC TRO was in force, he
and other employees tried to enter the PHIMCO compound, but they were not allowed entry; on May 29,
1995, Cinco was with the PHIMCO production manager in a pick-up and they tried to enter the company
compound but, again, they were not allowed by the strikers.[68] Another employee, Joaquin Aguilar, when
asked how the strikers blocked the ingress of the company, replied that the strikers hold around, joining
hands, moving picket and, because of the moving picket, no employee or vehicle could come in and go
out of the premises.[69]

The evidence adduced in the present case cannot be ignored. On balance, it supports the
companys submission that the respondent PILA officers and members committed acts during the strike
prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. The testimonies of non-striking employees, who were

Page 16 of 49
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prevented from gaining entry into the company premises, and confirmed no less by two officers of the
union, are on record.

The photographs of the strike scene, also on record, depict the true character of the picket; while
moving, it, in fact, constituted a human blockade, obstructing free ingress to and egress from the
company premises, reinforced by benches planted directly in front of the company gates. The
photographs do not lie these photographs clearly show that the picketers were going in circles, without
any break in their ranks or closely bunched together, right in front of the gates. Thus, company vehicles
were unable to enter the company compound, and were backed up several meters into the street leading
to the company gates.

Despite all these clear pieces of evidence of illegal obstruction, the NLRC looked the other way
and chose not to see the unmistakable violations of the law on strikes by the union and its respondent
officers and members. Needless to say, while the law protects the rights of the laborer, it authorizes
neither the oppression nor the destruction of the employer. [70] For grossly ignoring the evidence before it,
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion; for supporting these gross NLRC errors, the CA
committed its own reversible error.

Liabilities of union
officers and members

In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x

xxxx

Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.

We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines,

Inc.[71] that the effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction
between participating workers and union officers. The services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that he or she
committed illegal acts during the strike. The services of a participating union officer, on the other hand,
may be terminated, not only when he actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike.[72]

In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required;
substantial evidence, available under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal on participating workers and union officers as above described. [73]

In the present case, respondents Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan, Maximo
Pedro, Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto
Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis stand to be dismissed as participating union officers, pursuant to Article
264(a), paragraph 3, of the Labor Code.This provision imposes the penalty of dismissal on any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring
a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. [74]

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PHIMCO was able to individually identify the participating union members thru the affidavits of
PHIMCO employees Martimer Panis[75] and Rodrigo A. Ortiz,[76] and Personnel Manager Francis
Ferdinand Cinco,[77] and the photographs[78] of Joaquin Aguilar. Identified were respondents Angelita
Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday, Alfonso Claudio, Francisco Dalisay, Angelito Dejan, Philip
Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon, Nemesio Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo Pearson,
Mario Perea, Renato Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento, Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal,
Arsenio Zamora, Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin, Bernardo Cuadra, Angelito de
Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez, Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul
Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio, Rodolfo Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin
and Amelia Zamora as the union members who actively participated in the strike by blocking the ingress
to and egress from the company premises and preventing the passage of non-striking employees. For
participating in illegally blocking ingress to and egress from company premises, these union members
stand to be dismissed for their illegal acts in the conduct of the unions strike.

PHIMCO failed to observe due process

We find, however, that PHIMCO violated the requirements of due process of the Labor Code
when it dismissed the respondents.

Under Article 277(b)[79] of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee, who is about to
be terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

We explained in Suico v. National Labor Relations Commission,[80] that Article 277(b), in relation
to Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without
distinction as to the cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed involvement in strike-
related violence prohibited under Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code.

To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must
furnish him or her with two (2) written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination
and giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice
indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the
employer's decision to dismiss the employee.[81]

In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter, on June 23, 1995, to thirty-six (36) union members,
generally directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the
illegal acts they committed during the strike; three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union
members were informed of their dismissal from employment.

We do not find this company procedure to be sufficient compliance with the due process
requirements that the law guards zealously. It does not appear from the evidence that the union officers
were specifically informed of the charges against them and given the chance to explain and present their
side. Without the specifications they had to respond to, they were arbitrarily separated from work in total
disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure.

As to the union members, only thirty-six (36) of the thirty-seven (37) union members included in
this case were notified of the charges against them thru the letters dated June 23, 1995, but they were
not given an ample opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves; the notice of termination came on
June 26, 1995, only three (3) days from the first notice - a perfunctory and superficial attempt to comply
with the notice requirement under the Labor Code. The short interval of time between the first and second
notice speaks for itself under the circumstances of this case; mere token recognition of the due process
requirements was made, indicating the companys intent to dismiss the union members involved, without
any meaningful resort to the guarantees accorded them by law.

Under the circumstances, where evidence sufficient to justify the penalty of dismissal has been
adduced but the workers concerned were not accorded their essential due process rights, our ruling

Page 18 of 49
 Page 19 of 49

in Agabon v. NLRC[82] finds full application; the employer, despite the just cause for dismissal, must pay
the dismissed workers nominal damages as indemnity for the violation of the workers right to statutory
due process. Prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of nominal damages at P30,000.00, which same
amount we find sufficient and appropriate in the present case.[83]

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
dated February 10, 2004 and the resolution dated December 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 70336, upholding the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission.

The Decision, dated February 4, 1998, of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor should prevail and is
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan,
Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano,
Alberto Basconcillo, Ramon Falcis, Angelita Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday, Alfonso Claudio,
Francisco Dalisay, Angelito Dejan, Philip Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon, Nemesio
Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo Pearson, Mario Perea, Renato Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo
Sarmiento, Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal, Arsenio Zamora, Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo
Camarin, Bernardo Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez, Benjamin Juan, Sr.,
Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio, Rodolfo
Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin, and Amelia Zamora are each awarded nominal damages in the
amount of P30,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

 Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Employees Union vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. GR nos.
164302-03, Jan. 24, 2007

THIRD DIVISION

SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA G.R. Nos. 164302-03

PLANT EMPLOYEES
UNION, Donrico V. Sebastian,
Eulogio G. Batino, Samuel A. Present:
Atanque, Manolo C.
Zabaljauregui, Dionisio Tenorio,
Edwin P. Rellores, Luis B. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Natividad, Myrna Petingco, Chairperson,
Feliciano Tolentino, Rodolfo A. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Amante, Jr., Cipriano C. Bello, CALLEJO, SR., and
Ronaldo T. Espino, Efren Galan, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
and Jun Carmelito Santos,
Petitioners,

Promulgated:

- versus -

January 24, 2007

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS

PHILS., INC.,

Page 19 of 49
 Page 20 of 49

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 74174 and 74860, which affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 030424-02, and the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-10-
11579-99-L.

The Antecedents

The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees
of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The individual
petitioners are Union officers, directors, and shop stewards.

The Union and the Company had entered into a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) effective July 1, 1996 to expire on June 30, 1999. Upon the expiration of the CBA,
the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced
on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations.
The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit
down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages
be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of
the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees
of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus,
an impasse ensued.[2]

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Office in Southern Tagalog,
Imus, Cavite. The petitioners relied on two grounds: (a) deadlock on CBA ground rules; and (b) unfair
labor practice arising from the companys refusal to bargain. The case was docketed as NCMB-RBIV-NS-
08-046-99.[3]

The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] alleging that the reasons cited by the Union were not
valid grounds for a strike. The Union then filed an Amended Notice of Strike on September 17, 1999 on
the following grounds: (a) unfair labor practice for the companys refusal to bargain in good faith; and (b)
interference with the exercise of their right to self-organization.[5]

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 Page 21 of 49

Meanwhile, on September 15, 1999, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized
by the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola in front of the Companys premises set for September 21,
1999. 106 Union members, officers and members of the Board of Directors, and shop stewards,
individually filed applications for leave of absence for September 21, 1999. Certain that its operations in
the plant would come to a complete stop since there were no sufficient trained contractual employees
who would take over, the Company disapproved all leave applications and notified the applicants
accordingly.[6] A day before the mass action, some Union members wore gears, red tag cloths stating
YES KAMI SA STRIKE as headgears and on the different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.

The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it to conduct a mass protest action
within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.[7] Thus,
the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21,
1999. All of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71
production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during
the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5)
hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day
was short by 60,000 physical case[s] versus budget.[8]

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal [9] alleging, inter
alia, the following: there was a deadlock in the CBA negotiations between the Union and Company, as a
result of which a Notice of Strike was filed by the Union; pending resolution of the Notice of Strike, the
Union members filed applications for leave on September 21, 1999 which were disapproved because
operations in the plant may be disrupted; on September 20, 1999, one day prior to the mass leave, the
Union staged a protest action by wearing red arm bands denouncing the alleged anti-labor practices of
the company; on September 21, 1999, without observing the requirements mandated by law, the Union
picketed the premises of the Company in clear violation of Article 262 of the Labor Code; because of the
slowdown in the work, the Company suffered losses amounting to P2,733,366.29; the mass/protest action
conducted on September 21, 1999 was clearly a strike; since the Union did not observe the requirements
mandated by law, i.e., strike vote, cooling-off period and reporting requirements, the strike was therefore
illegal; the Union also violated the provision of the CBA on the grievance machinery; there being a direct
violation of the CBA, the Unions action constituted an unfair labor practice; and the officers who
knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike should be declared to have lost
their employment status. The Company prayed that judgment be rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the strike illegal;

2. Declaring the officers of respondent Union or the individual respondents to

have lost their employment status;

3. Declaring respondent Union, its officers and members guilty of unfair labor
practice for violation of the CBA; and

4. Ordering the respondents to pay petitioner the following claims for damages:

a. Actual Damages in the amount of P 4,733,366.29

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 Page 22 of 49

b. Moral Damages in the amount of Five (5) Million Pesos; and

c. Exemplary Damages in the amount of Two (2) Million Pesos.[10]

The Union filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Suspend

Proceedings[11] alleging therein that the mass action conducted by its officers and members on
September 21, 1999 was not a strike but just a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of
the right of free expression as guaranteed by the Constitution; several thousands of workers
nationwide had launched similar mass protest actions to demonstrate their continuing indignation
over the ill effects of martial rule in the Philippines. [12] It pointed out that even the officers and
members of the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola had similarly organized mass protest
actions. The Union insisted that officers and members filed their applications for leave for September
21, 1999 knowing fully well that there were no bottling operations scheduled on September 21 and
22, 1999; they even secured a Mayors permit for the purpose. The workers, including the petitioners,
merely marched to and fro at the side of the highway near one of the gates of the Sta. Rosa Plant, the
loading bay for public vehicles. After 3 hours, everyone returned to work according to their respective
shifting schedules. The Union averred that the petition filed by the Company was designed to harass
and its officers and members in order to weaken the Unions position in the on-going collective
bargaining negotiations.

In a letter to the Union President dated October 26, 1999, the NCMB stated that based on
their allegations, the real issue between the parties was not the proper subject of a strike, and should
be the subject of peaceful and reasonable dialogue. The NCMB recommended that the Notice of
Strike of the Union be converted into a preventive mediation case. After conciliation proceedings
failed, the parties were required to submit their respective position papers. [13] In the meantime, the
officers and directors of the Unionremained absent without the requisite approved leaves. On October
11, 1999, they were required to submit their explanations why they should not be declared AWOL. [14]

On November 26, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision [15] granting the petition of the
Company. He declared that the September 21, 1999 mass leave was actually a strike under Article 212 of
the Labor Code for the following reasons: based on the reports submitted by the Production and
Engineering Department of the Company, there was a temporary work stoppage/slowdown in the
company;[16] out of the usual three (3) lines for production for the day shift, only one line operated by
probationary employees was functional and there was a cumulative downtime of five (5) hours attributed
to the lack of manning complement and skills requirement. The Labor Arbiter further declared:

x x x [T]he September 21, 1999 activity of the union and the individual
respondents herein fell within the foregoing definition of a strike. Firstly, the union itself
had admitted the fact that on the date in question, respondent officers, together with their
union members and supporters from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola, did not
report for their usual work. Instead, they all assembled in front of the Sta. Rosa Plant and
picketed the premises. Very clearly, there was a concerted action here on the part of the
respondents brought about a temporary stoppage of work at two out of three bottling lines
at the Sta. Rosa Plant. According to Edwin Jaranilla, the Engineering Superintendent
(Annex H, petition), all of his departments 14 engineering personnel did not report for
work on September 21, 1999, and that only Line 2 operated on the day shift. Honorio
Tacla, the Production Superintendent, testified (Annex H-1), that 71 production personnel
were likewise absent from their respective work stations on September 21, 1999, and that
only Line 2 operated on the day shift. Similarly, Federico Borja, Physical Distribution
Superintendent, stated under oath (Annex H-2) that 12 personnel from his department did
not report for work on September 21, 1999, and that no forklift servicing was done on
Lines 1 and 3. From the foregoing testimonies, it is evident that respondents concerted

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 Page 23 of 49

activity resulted in a temporary stoppage of work at the Sta. Rosa Plant of the company.
Thirdly, such concerted activity by respondents was by reason of a labor dispute. Earlier,
the union had filed a Notice of Strike against the company on account of a disagreement
with the latter regarding CBA ground rules, i.e., the demand of the Union for Alyansa
members from other plants to attend as observers during the CBA negotiation, and for
the members of the negotiating panel to be paid their wages based on their work shift
rate. Moreover, on September 20, 1999, one day before respondents mass leave from
work and concerted action, they had worn red tag cloth materials on different parts of
their uniform which contained the words, YES kami sa strike; Protesta kami; Sahod,
karapatan, manggagawa ipaglaban; and Union busting itigil. (Annexes G, G-1, G-2 & G-
3). These indicated that the concerted action taken by respondents against CCBPI was a
result of or on account of a labor dispute.[17]

According to the Labor Arbiter, the strike conducted by the Union was illegal since there was no
showing that the Union conducted a strike vote, observed the prescribed cooling-off period, much less,
submitted a strike vote to the DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly participating in
the illegal strike, the individual petitioners were considered to have lost their employment status. [18]

The Union appealed the decision to the NLRC. On July 31, 2002, the NLRC affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter with the modification that Union Treasurer Charlita M. Abrigo, who was on
bereavement leave at the time, should be excluded from the list of those who participated in the illegal
strike. She was thus ordered reinstated to her former position with full backwages and benefits. [19]

The Union and its officers, directors and the shop stewards, filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74174. Another petition was filed by Ricky G. Ganarial
and Almira Romo, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74860. The two cases were consolidated in the 6th
Division of the CA.

Petitioners alleged the following in their respective petitions:

THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR HAVING DECLARED PETITIONERS TO HAVE LOST
THEIR EMPLOYMENT WHEN FACTS WOULD SHOW PETITIONERS WERE NOT
AFFORDED DUE PROCESS

II

THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING THE PEACEFUL PICKETING CONDUCTED
BY THE UNION AS ILLEGAL STRIKE DESPITE ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE ON THE INTENT TO CREATE TEMPORARY WORK STOPPAGE

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 Page 24 of 49

III

THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE LOST THEIR
EMPLOYMENT FOR KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATING IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT ELECTED OFFICERS OF THE UNION AND
ARE MERE SHOP STEWARDS AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
PROOF THAT THEY COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS.[20]

The petitioners, likewise, raised the following, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC HAS GRAVELY ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO WHO COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACTS WHEN HE DECLARED THAT THE
STRIKE CONDUCTED BY THE RESPONDENTS ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1999 IS
ILLEGAL.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC HAS GRAVELY ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO WHO COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACTS WHEN HE DECLARED THAT
INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS (NOW PETITIONERS), INCLUDING SIX (6) UNION
SHOP STEWARDS, ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT
STATUS (EXCEPT CHARLITA ABRIGO) FOR KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATING IN SAID
ILLEGAL STRIKE.[21]

On September 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It
also declared that petitioners, in CA-G.R. SP No. 74860, were guilty of forum shopping.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied; hence, the
instant petition was filed based on the following grounds:
(1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BEFORE IT FOR LACK OF MERIT
WHEN IT IS CLEAR FROM THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE SUBJECT MASS
ACTION WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE WORKERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
PICKET WHICH IS PART OF THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION.

(2) THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT

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 Page 25 of 49

AS ACONSEQUENCE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STRIKE, THE DISMISSAL OF

THE OFFICERS OF THE UNION IS JUSTIFIED AND VALID, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

(3) EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROTEST MASS ACTION

STAGED BY PETITIONERS ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1999 CONSTITUTES A STRIKE,
THE NLRC SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE LABOR ARBITERS
DECISION DECLARING THE FORFEITURE OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF UNION
OFFICERS AND SHOP STEWARDS (WHO HAVE NOT COMMITTED ANY ILLEGAL
ACT DURING THE CONDUCT OF THE SAID MASS ACTION) FOR HAVING
KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.[22]

The threshold issues in these cases are: (a) whether the September 21, 1999 mass action
staged by the Union was a strike; (b) if, in the affirmative, whether it was legal; and (c) whether the
individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union should be dismissed from their employment.

On the first and second issues, petitioners maintain that the September 21, 1999 mass
protest action was not a strike but a picket, a valid exercise of their constitutional right to free
expression and assembly.[23] It was a peaceful mass protest action to dramatize their legitimate
grievances against respondent. They did not intend to have a work stoppage since they knew
beforehand that no bottling operations were scheduled on September 21, 1999 pursuant to the
Logistics Planning Services Mega Manila Production Plan dated September 15, 1999.[24] Thus, they
applied for leaves of absences for September 21, 1999 which, however, were not approved. They
also obtained a mayors permit to hold the picket near the highway, and they faithfully complied with
the conditions set therein. The protesting workers were merely marching to and fro at the side of the
highway or the loading bay near one of the gates of the Company plant, certainly not blocking in any
way the ingress or egress from the Companys premises. Their request to hold their activity was for
four (4) hours, which was reduced to three (3) hours. Thereafter, they all went back to work. The
bottling operations of the Company was not stopped, even temporarily. Since petitioner Union did not
intend to go on strike, there was no need to observe the mandatory legal requirements for the
conduct of a strike.

Petitioners also point out that members belonging to the IBM-KMU at the San Fernando
Coca-Cola bottling plant staged simultaneous walkout from their work assignments for two
consecutive days, on October 7 and 8, 1999. However, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE) declared that the walkout was considered a mass action, not a strike, and the officers of the
IBM-KMU were only meted a three-day suspension. Respondent accepted the decision of the SOLE
and no longer appealed the decision. Petitioners insist that this should, likewise, apply in the
resolution of the issue of whether petitioners staged a strike or not, and whether the penalty of
dismissal from the employment with the respondent is just and equitable.

Petitioners also insist that they were denied the right to due process because the decision of
the Labor Arbiter was implemented even while their appeal was pending in the NLRC. The decision of
the Labor Arbiter against them was to become final and executory only until after the NLRC shall
have resolved their appeal with finality.

On the third issue, petitioners aver that even assuming that they had indeed staged a strike,
the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. They insist that they acted in good faith.Besides, under Article
264 of the Labor Code, the dismissal of the Union officers who participated in an illegal strike is
discretionary on the employer. Moreover, six (6) of the petitioners were shop stewards who were
mere members of the Union and not officers thereof.

In its comment on the petition, respondent avers that the issues raised by petitioners are
factual; hence, inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, the findings of the Labor
Arbiter had been affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, and are, thus, conclusive on this Court.

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 Page 26 of 49

Respondent further avers that the law offers no discretion as to the proper penalty that should
be imposed against a Union official participating in an illegal strike. Contrary to the contention of
petitioners, shop stewards are also Union officers. To support its claim, respondent cited Samahan ng
Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[25] International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v.
Hoffa;[26] and Coleman v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, etc.[27]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The ruling of the CA that petitioners staged a strike on September 21, 1999, and not merely a
picket is correct.

It bears stressing that this is a finding made by the Labor Arbiter which was affirmed by the
NLRC[28] and the CA.[29] The settled rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of tribunals, as long
as they are based on substantial evidence, are conclusive on this Court. [30] The raison detre is that quasi-
judicial agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise since their
jurisdictions are confined to specific matters. Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the factual
issues raised by the petitioner are inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari. Whether petitioners
staged a strike or not is a factual issue.

Petitioners failed to establish that the NLRC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioners had indeed
staged a strike.

Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,[31] the
Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not
its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.[32] The term strike encompasses not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant
equipment and facilities, and similar activities.[33]

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor
dispute.[34] As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to
observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable
persuasion.[35]

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A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment
or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.[36]

That there was a labor dispute between the parties, in this case, is not an issue. Petitioners
notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket. Petitioners insistence
to stage a strike is
evident in the fact that an amended notice to strike was filed even as respondent moved to dismiss the
first notice. The basic elements of a strike are present in this case: 106 members of petitioner Union,
whose respective applications for leave of absence on September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not
to report for work on said date, and gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass protest
action. Petitioners deliberately absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons, carried placards with
slogans such as: YES KAMI SA STRIKE, PROTESTA KAMI, SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG
MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN, CBA-WAG BABOYIN, STOP UNION BUSTING. They marched to and fro
in front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity
which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.

The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayors permit is not conclusive evidence that their
action/activity did not amount to a strike. The Mayors description of what activities petitioners were
allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of whether the action staged by
petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation.

A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force
management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. It is a weapon that
can either breathe life to or destroy the Union and its members in their struggle with management for a
more equitable due to their labors.[37] The decision to declare a strike must therefore rest on a rational
basis, free from emotionalism, envisaged by the tempers and tantrums of a few hot heads, and finally
focused on the legitimate interests of the Union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public
welfare, and, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of
attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. [38]

Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and management
but also on the general peace and progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the right to
strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code
must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or
15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike
illegal.[39] It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on
their illegal strike. We quote, with approval, the ruling of the CA which affirmed the decisions of the NLRC
and of the Labor Arbiter:

Since it becomes undisputed that the mass action was indeed a strike,
the next issue is to determine whether the same was legal or not. Records
reveal that the said strike did not comply with the requirements of Article 263 (F)
in relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code, which specifically provides, thus:

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 Page 28 of 49

ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS

xxx xxx xxx xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the

total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret
ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a
lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the
corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for
the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may at its
own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct
of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish
the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout

without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this
Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding article or
without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by

the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute
to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence

or an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Applying the aforecited mandatory requirements to the case at bench,

the Labor Arbiter found, thus:

In the present case, there is no evidence on record to show that

respondents had complied with the above mandatory requirements of law for a
valid strike. Particularly, there is no showing that respondents had observed
the prescribed cooling-off period, conducted a strike vote, much less submitted
a strike vote report to the Department of Labor within the required time. This
being the case, respondents strike on September 21, 1999 is illegal. In the
recent case of CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, 2999 (sic) SCRA
410, the Supreme Court had said: It bears stressing that the strike
requirements under Article 264 and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory
requisites, without which, the strike will be considered illegal. The evidence
(sic) intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report as
mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right to strike which is

Page 28 of 49
 Page 29 of 49

essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.

Verily, substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice. Strict
adherence to the mandate of the law is required.

Aside from the above infirmity, the strike staged by respondents was,
further, in violation of the CBA which stipulated under Section 1, Article VI,
thereof that,

SECTION 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strike,

walkout, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycott, secondary boycott,
refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sitdown strikes of any kind,
sympathetic or general strike, or any other interference with any of the
operations of the COMPANY during the term of this Agreement, so long
as the grievance procedure for which provision is made herein is
followed by the COMPANY.

Here, it is not disputed that respondents had not referred their issues to
the grievance machinery as a prior step. Instead, they chose to go on strike
right away, thereby bypassing the required grievance procedure dictated by the
CBA.[40]

On the second and third issues, the ruling of the CA affirming the decisions of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter ordering the dismissal of the petitioners-officers, directors and shop stewards of
petitioner Union is correct.

It bears stressing, however, that the law makes a distinction between union members and union
officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is
only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment
status.[41] For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. [42] The law
grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having
lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. [43]

We quote, with approval, the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:

As to the imposition of the penalty provided for should an illegal strike be

declared as such, We find no legal or factual reason to digress from the following
disquisition of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:

No doubt, the strike conducted by respondents on September 21, 1999 is illegal.

Under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code, it is stated that, Any union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status. xxx. In the present case, CCBPI had already promptly notified
respondents and their members of the disapproval of their leave. In fact, in the company
notice (of the disapproval of their leave), CCBPI emphasized that operations will come to

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 Page 30 of 49

a complete stop on September 21, 1999 if all the applications are approved. They were
further informed that, there are no sufficiently trained contractual employees who can
take over as replacements on that day (Annexes C, C-1 to C-18). In other words,
respondents had known beforehand that their planned mass leave would definitely result
in a stoppage of the operations of the company for September 21, 1999.Still, respondents
knowingly and deliberately proceeded with their mass action, unmindful of the ill effects
thereof on the business operations of the company. In the case of Association of
Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219, the Supreme Court had
ruled that,

Union officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect

the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate
the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the
service is just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers
responsibility is greater than that of the members.

Here, the law required respondents to follow a set of mandatory procedures

before they could go on with their strike. But obviously, rather than call on their members
to comply therewith, respondents were the first ones to violate the same. [44]

Petitioners cannot find solace in the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) in
OS-A-J-0033-99, NCMB-RB 111-NS-10-44-99 and 11-51-99 involving the labor dispute between the
Company and the Union therein (the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa Local No. 1, representing the daily
paid rank and file members of the respondent, as well as the plant-based route helpers and drivers at its
San Fernando Plant). In said case, the SOLE found that the simultaneous walkout staged on October 7
and 8, 1999 was indeed a mass action, initiated by the Union leaders. The acts of the Union leaders
were, however, found to be illegal which warranted their dismissal, were it not for the presence of
mitigating factors,

i.e., the walkout was staged in support of their leaders in the course of the CBA negotiation which was
pending for more than nine (9) months; the Plant was not fully disrupted as the Company was able to
operate despite the severe action of the Union members, with the employment of casual and contractual
workers; the Union had complied with the requirements of a strike and refrained from staging an actual
strike.[45]

Neither can the petitioners find refuge in the rulings of this Court in Panay Electric Company v.
NLRC[46] or in Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC.[47] In the Panay case, the Court meted the suspension
of the union officers, instead of terminating their employment status since the NLRC found no sufficient
proof of bad faith on the part of the union officers who took part in the strike to protest the dismissal of
their fellow worker, Enrique Huyan which was found to be illegal. In Lapanday, the Court actually affirmed
the dismissal of the union officers who could not claim good faith to exculpate themselves. The officers, in
fact, admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure in conducting the same. The Court
held that the officers cannot violate the law which was designed to promote their interests.

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Finally, the contention of petitioners Elenette Moises, Almira Romo, Louie Labayani, Ricky Ganarial,
Efren Galan and Jun Carmelito Santos who were appointed as shop stewards of the Union that they were
mere members and not the officers of petitioner Union is barren of merit.

We agree with the observation of respondent that under Section 501(a) and (b) of the Landrum
Griffin Act of 1959,[48] shop stewards are officers of the Union:

Sec. 501 (a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a
labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its
members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account
the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property
solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and
expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of
the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization
as an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring
any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interest of such organization,
and to account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in
connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the
organization. A general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve
any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall be void
as against public policy.

(b) When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor
organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this
section and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or
recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable
time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization, such
member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court
of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor
organization.[49]

Under said Act, Section 3(q) thereof provides, as follows:

(q) Officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative, when used with respect to a
labor organization, includes elected officials and key administrative personnel, whether
elected or appointed (such as business agents, heads of departments or major units, and
organizers who exercise substantial independent authority), but does not include salaried
non-supervisory professional staff, stenographic, and service personnel. [50]

Admittedly, there is no similar provision in the Labor Code of the Philippines; nonetheless,
petitioners who are shop stewards are considered union officers.

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 Page 32 of 49

Officers normally mean those who hold defined offices. An officer is any person occupying a position
identified as an office. An office may be provided in the constitution of a labor union or by the union itself
in its CBA with the employer. An office is a word of familiar usage and should be construed according to
the sense of the thing.[51]

Irrefragably, under its Constitution and By-Laws, petitioner Union has principal officers and subordinate
officers, who are either elected by its members, or appointed by its president, including the standing
committees each to be headed by a member of the Board of Directors. Thus, under Section 1, Article VI
of petitioner Unions Constitution and By-Laws, the principal officers and other officers, as well as their
functions/duties and terms of office, are as follows:

ARTICLE VI

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS

SECTION 1. The governing body of the UNION shall be the following officers
who shall be elected through secret ballot by the general membership:

President Auditor

Vice-President two (2) Public Relations Officer

Secretary Sergeant-at-Arms

Treasurer Board of Directors nine (9)

SECTION 2. The above officers shall administer Unions affairs, formulate

policies and implement programs to effectively carry out the objectives of the UNION and
the Labor Code of the Philippines and manage all the monies and property of the UNION.

SECTION 3. The officers of the UNION and the members of the Board of
Directors shall hold office for a period of five (5) years from the date of their election until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified; provided that they remain
members of the UNION in good standing.[52]

Section 6, Article II of the CBA of petitioner Union and respondent defines the position of shop
steward, thus:

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 Page 33 of 49

SECTION 6. Shop Stewards. The UNION shall certify a total of eight (8) shop
stewards and shall inform management of the distribution of these stewards among the
departments concerned.

Shop Stewards, union officers and members or employees shall not lose pay for
attending Union-Management Labor dialogues, investigations and grievance meetings
with management.[53]

Section 6, Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code mentions the functions and
duties of shop stewards, as follows:

Section 2. Procedures in handling grievances. In the absence of a specific provision in

the collective bargaining agreement prescribing for the procedures in handling grievance,
the following shall apply:

(a) An employee shall present this grievance or complaint orally or in writing to the shop
steward. Upon receipt thereof, the shop steward shall verify the facts and determine
whether or not the grievance is valid.

(b) If the grievance is valid, the shop steward shall immediately bring the complaint to the
employees immediate supervisor. The shop steward, the employee and his immediate
supervisor shall exert efforts to settle the grievance at their level.

(c) If no settlement is reached, the grievance shall be referred to the grievance

committee which shall have ten (10) days to decide the case.

Where the issue involves or arises from the interpretation or implementation of a

provision in the collective bargaining agreement, or from any order, memorandum,
circular or assignment issued by the appropriate authority in the establishment, and such
issue cannot be resolved at the level of the shop steward or the supervisor, the same
may be referred immediately to the grievance committee.

All grievance unsettled or unresolved within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its
submission to the last step in the grievance machinery shall automatically be referred to a
voluntary arbitrator chosen in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, or in the absence of such provisions, by mutual agreement of the parties. [54]

Thus, a shop steward is appointed by the Union in a shop, department, or plant serves as
representative of the Union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the
supervisor of the employer.[55] He is the representative of the Union members in a building or other

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workplace. Blacks Law Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official who represents members in
a particular department. His duties include the conduct of initial negotiations for settlement of
grievances.[56] He

is to help other members when they have concerns with the employer or other work-related issues. He is
the first person that workers turn to for assistance or information. If someone has a problem at work, the
steward will help them sort it out or, if necessary, help them file a complaint. [57] In the performance of his
duties, he has to take cognizance of and resolve, in the first instance, the grievances of the members of
the Union. He is empowered to decide for himself whether the grievance or complaint of a member of the
petitioner Union is valid, and if valid, to resolve the same with the supervisor failing which, the matter
would be elevated to the Grievance Committee.

It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the
determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a provision of the
CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the appropriate authority in
the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution
designed to preserve and maintain peace among the employees and their employer. They occupy
positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities.

In this case, instead of playing the role of peacemakers and grievance solvers, the
petitioners-shop stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and directors of
petitioner Union who joined the strike, petitioners-shop stewards also deserve the penalty of dismissal
from their employment.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

 Capitol Medical Center Inc. vs. Trajano, GR Nos. 155690, June 2005

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155690. June 30, 2005]

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and CAPITOL
MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, respondents.

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 Page 35 of 49

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated September 20, 2001 and the
Resolution[2] dated October 18, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479,
entitled Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-AFW.
The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records are:
Capitol Medical Center, Inc., petitioner, is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout
Magbanua Street, Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-
Alliance of Filipino Workers, respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as the certified collective
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital.
On October 2, 1997, respondent union, through its president Jaime N. Ibabao, sent petitioner a letter
requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
In its reply dated October 10, 1997, petitioner, challenging the unions legitimacy, refused to bargain
with respondent. Subsequently or on October 15, 1997, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of
registration, docketed as NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD.[3]
For its part, on October 29, 1997, respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-453-97.
Respondent alleged that petitioners refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice. Despite several
conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement.
On November 28, 1997, respondent staged a strike.
On December 4, 1997, former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, now Associate Justice of
this Court, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all striking workers
to return to work and the management to resume normal operations, thus:

WHEREFORE, this Office assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center
pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are
directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management
to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that
may exacerbate the situation.

Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and
counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement in compliance with
aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 27, 1998.
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Labor
Secretarys Orders. Pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home vs.The National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.,[4] we referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for its appropriate action and
disposition.

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 Page 36 of 49

Meantime, on October 1, 1998, the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order

denying the petition for cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration. [5]
On September 20, 2001, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the
Secretary of Labor. The Court of Appeals held:

Anent the first issue raised by the petitioner, We find the same untenable. The public respondent acted
well within his duty to order the petitioner hospital to bargain collectively, for it was the surest way to end
the dispute. In LMG Chemicals Corporation vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
the Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Chemical Workers Union (G.R. No. 127422, April 17, 2001), the
Supreme Court made the following pronouncement, to wit:

It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national
interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary
and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.

xxxxxx

Indeed, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Secretary of Labor whose power
is plenary and includes the resolution of all controversies arising from the labor dispute. In fact, he was
merely following the directive laid down by the Supreme Court (Decision dated February 4, 1997) in the
case of Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers (CMC-
ACE-UFSW) vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers and Capitol
Medical Center Incorporated and Dra. Thelma Clemente, President, ordering petitioner hospital to
collectively bargain with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers
(private respondent herein) the certified bargaining agent.

As earlier mentioned, the petition for cancellation was dismissed by the regional director in a decision
dated September 30, 1998. x x x.

xxxxxx

Said decision by the regional director was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations in a
resolution dated December 29, 1998, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner hospital from the said DOLE-
NCRs decision.

Finally, the petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52736) entitled Capitol Medical Center,
Inc. vs. Hon. Benedictor R. Bitonio, Jr., in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor and Employment; Hon. Maximo B. Lim in his capacity as Regional Director, National
Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center Employees
Association (CMCEA-AFW), was dismissed in a decision dated January 11, 2001. The motion for
reconsideration which was subsequently filed was denied on March 23, 2001.

xxxxxx

In order to allow an employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for
certification election. The mere filing of a petition does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation
by the employer (Colegio de San Juan de Letran vs. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran and
Eleanor Ambas, G.R. No. 141471, September 18, 2000). If pending a petition for certification, the
collective bargaining is allowed by the Supreme Court to proceed, with more reason should the collective
bargaining (in this case) continue since the High Court had recognized the respondent as the certified
bargaining agent in spite of several petitions for cancellation filed against it.

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 Page 37 of 49

xxxxxx

Secondly, We are inclined to agree with the public respondents statement that the primary assumption of
jurisdiction may be exercised by this Office even without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to
any of the parties disputants. (page 56 of the Rollo).

xxxxxx

We are also not convinced by the arguments raised by the petitioner with respect to its third assigned
error. This Court fails to see any supervening event that would render the execution of the decision of
public respondent impossible. The petitioner asserts that the respondent union has lost its legitimacy, but
at every turn it has been ruled by the various labor administrative officials that the respondent union is
legitimate. It has failed to convince the labor administrative officials, We are likewise not persuaded.
Unless and until the Certificate of Registration of the union is cancelled, it (union) remains the certified
bargaining agent and the Hospital has the duty to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with it.

xxxxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED, hereby AFFIRMING the two
assailed orders, dated December 4, 1997 and April 27, 1998, of the public respondent in OS-AJ-0024-97
(NCMB-NCR-NS-10-453-97).

SO ORDERED.

On October 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that its petition for the cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration
involves a prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of Labor could order the
parties to bargain collectively.
We are not persuaded.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition, the Secretary of Labor
correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude
collective bargaining, thus:

That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the respondent Union is not a bar to set in
motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the
pendency of a petition to cancel the unions registration certificate (National Union of Bank Employees vs.
Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274), more so should the collective bargaining process continue despite its
pendency. We must emphasize that the majority status of the respondent Union is not affected by the
pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it. Unless its certificate of registration and its
status as the certified bargaining agent are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty
bound to collectively bargain with the Union. Indeed, no less than the Supreme Court already ordered the
Hospital to collectively bargain with the Union when it affirmed the resolution of this Office dated
November 18, 1994 directing the management of the Hospital to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement with the Union. That was the categorical directive of the High Court in its Resolution dated
February 4, 1997 in Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Service
Worker vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al., G.R. No. L-118915.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, during the pendency of this case before the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order on October 1, 1998 denying the petition

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 Page 38 of 49

for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration. This Order became final and executory and
recorded in the BLRs Book of Entries of Judgments on June 3, 1999.
Petitioner also maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article 263
(g) of the Labor Code without observing the requirements of due process.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts.

xxxxxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such
orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

x x x. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical
institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an
effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall
be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the
life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In
such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately
assume, within twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or
lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For
this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or
injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of
immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-
out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against
either or both of them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining
the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any
time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

x x x x x x.
In Magnolia Poultry Employees Union vs. Sanchez,[6] we held that the discretion to assume
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior
notice or hearing given to any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can
justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interests.
In sum, petitioners submissions are bereft of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 20, 2001 and the
Resolution dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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 Page 39 of 49

 Steel Corporation of the Phils., vs. SCP Employees Union-NAFLU, GR now. 169829-30,
April 16, 2008

FIRST DIVISION

ST E EL CO R PO R AT IO N G .R . No s. 1 6 98 2 9 - 3 0

O F T H E PH IL I P PI NE S ,

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,*

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

SC P EM PLO Y E E S UN I O N -

N AT IO N AL F ED E R AT I O N

O F L AB O R UN IO NS ,

Respondent. Promulgated:

April 16, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition is seeking to set aside the Decision[1] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28,
2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in

Page 39 of 49
 Page 40 of 49

CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the
Resolution[2] dated September 22, 2005 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials,
supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. [3] On August 17, 1998, SCP-
Federated Union of the Energy Leaders General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for
Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.[4] Respondent
SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to
participate and be voted for in such election[5] but the same was denied for having been filed out of time.[6]

On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as
choices. Said election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file
employees cast their votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election
was characterized by and replete with irregularities. [7] On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother
federation of respondent, filed a petition for Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking
to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner.[8] The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of
FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the

conduct of the election with NAFLU and NO UNION as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed
to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated. [9]

On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a
consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with FUEL-GAS, respondent and NO
UNION as choices.[10] Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18,
1999.[11] Unsatisfied, petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.[12]

On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS
participated without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent
emerged as winner; hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.[13]

On July 12, 2000, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721, rendered a Decision[14] which annulled and set aside
the August 27, 1999 decision and October 18, 1999 resolution of the Undersecretary. The CA further
directed the holding of a certification election with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices, to the
exclusion of respondent.[15]

On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS election protest but deferred the request
of respondent to be declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending
petitions with the CA.[16] Not satisfied with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent
appealed to the Labor Secretary.[17] It further filed a Manifestation before the CA pointing out that in
the April 14, 2000 certification election, it emerged as winner, and thus, the election should be considered
as an intervening event sufficient to bar another certification election.[18] The CA, however, dismissed said
manifestation on December 28, 2000.[19]

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Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision [20] certifying respondent as the
exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.[21]

As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to

petitioner CBA proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its
pending motion for reconsideration.[22]

Finding no justification in petitioners refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of
unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latters refusal to bargain with it. [23]

On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the
CA decision.[24] On February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision.[25]

On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
for compulsory arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.[26] Again, on April 2,
2001, another Notice of Strike[27] was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal
to bargain; discrimination against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal
dismissal, which was later consolidated with the certified case.

On December 13, 2001, acting on the January 19, 2001 petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter
recommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent and FUEL-GAS as
contenders.[28] The decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed
the motion to conduct certification election in a Resolution dated October 17, 2002.[29]

Meanwhile, in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated April 17, 2002, declaring
petitioner as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing
the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss
of employment of the officers of the union.[30] Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[31] of the
resolution praying that additional employees be dismissed. For its part, respondent also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.[32]

On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioners
refusal to bargain and union busting.[33] The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined
from holding a strike.[34]

On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and
union busting.[35] Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the
Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work. [36] The
second certified case was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC
rendered a Decision[37] ordering petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified
bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in
connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of seniority rights and diminution of

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salary.[38] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution [39] dated January
26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
82314.

Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a
Decision[40] dated February 12, 2003 opted to resolve the parties respective motions for reconsideration
collectively. In said decision, the NLRC modified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the
union officers whom it previously ordered terminated, which in effect denied petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration.[41] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution
dated June 30, 2003.[42]These decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.

The petitions before the CA were later consolidated. In CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, herein petitioner argued
that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS CONCLUSION THAT
[PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.[43]

In the other case, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, petitioner herein argued that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DIRECTING PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OF THIS COURT DIRECTING THE
HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE
SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

III

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 Page 43 of 49

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED
BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF LABOR.[44]

On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[45] denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446
while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314. The decretal portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is

DENIED while the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED,
decreeing herein contending parties to comply with the directives of this Tribunal in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55721.

SO ORDERED.

In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the
assailed decision of the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioners claims
are based on pure allegations and not supported by any substantial evidence. [46]

In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect,
nullified and set aside. It is to be noted that FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without
prejudice to the petition it filed in court.The CA added that since it did not recognize the second
certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was voted as the duly-elected bargaining
agent of petitioners rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its claim and it has no right to
demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.[47]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[48] which was denied in the

Resolution[49] dated September 22, 2005.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

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 Page 44 of 49

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE REINSTATEMENT
OF OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.

II

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

FAILED TO DECLARE AS ILLEGAL THE STRIKE HELD BY
THE UNION ON FEBRUARY 4, 2003.

III

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

FAILED TO INVALIDATE THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION DIRECTING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE STRIKERS WHO DEFIED
THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE LABOR SECRETARY.

IV

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR

WHEN IT RULED THAT THE NLRC HAS RECONSIDERED ITS CONCLUSION ON THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE MARCH 2001 STRIKE.

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR

WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
MAY RECONSIDER IN THE SECOND CERTIFIED CASE ITS DECISION ON THE
FIRST CERTIFIED CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.[50]

Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim,
petitioner argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to

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recognize respondent as the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that
respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over
the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-strike, it is illegal.[51]

Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor
Code, particularly Art. 264,[52] which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is
pending arbitration between the parties.[53] Since the labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case
No. 000200-01, was still pending compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and
since the said strike was based substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to
recognize the union, the strike is illegal by express provision of the law.

Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already
resolved by the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor
dispute, namely, the alleged refusal of petitioner to recognize respondent. As such, the NLRCs decision
in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 constitutes res judicata in the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No.
00253-03.[54]

Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed
to have lost their employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the
employer prove that they committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike
warrants their termination from employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the
termination from employment of the union officers was warranted. [55]

Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC
decision[56] ordering the reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with
the February 4, 2003 strike. It argues that since the termination of the employees was due to their refusal
to comply with the return-to-work order issued by the Labor Secretary, not to their alleged participation in
an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the decision. [57]

Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it
concluded that the NLRC may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No.
00253-03.[58]

The petition is meritorious.

Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved
in the negative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain
with it. Thus, the only issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the
officers of the respondent union; and the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such
participation.

The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as
the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions

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of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a
means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law
provides limits for its exercise.[59]

In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the
following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was
undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the
Secretarys return-to-work order.

Respondents notices of strike were founded on petitioners continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus
staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-
recognition-strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer
to recognize ones union and not other contending groups, as the employees bargaining representative to
work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking unions doubtful majority status to merit
voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining
unit.[60]

The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having
been recognized as valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus,
it could not ask

petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had
been settled by the court with finality, [61] petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to
bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondents imputation of unfair labor practice and union
busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on
such basis.

Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondents purpose or objective in staging a
strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the
Secretarys return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory
arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent,
these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds petitioners continued refusal to recognize
it as the collective bargaining representative.

Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:

When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately

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return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such
orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.[62]

The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been
characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When
the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted great breadth of discretion to find a solution to a
labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or
lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.[63]

The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order
directing a return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor
automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly
stated in the assumption order.[64]

A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that
may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their
relationship with their employer.[65]

Says the Labor Code:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.

xxx

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the

President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the strike or lockout.

Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker
must return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed
and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the
Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without
jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this
authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot,

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for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to
justify their action.[66]

Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously
contrary to the provisions of labor laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted
in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had
respondent respected the CAs decision. That way, the collective bargaining agent would have been
determined and petitioner could have been compelled to bargain. Respondent, through its officers,
instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent. The
strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-
work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.

Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but
also on the general peace and progress of

society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to
or destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their
labors. Hence, the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from
emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate
interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged
by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved. [67]

Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper
penalty to be imposed on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.

Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. x x x

Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an

unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer
who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status:Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful
strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.

It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A
worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment

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status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants
the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service.[68] Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the
company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management
from filling up their positions.[69]

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated
September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to
reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

On our next meeting right after the Sinulog, there will be a quiz on the subject matter Strikes, Lock-outs
and Picketing and DOLE Sec. Assumption on Strikes etc. as well as the doctrines held in the above-
mentioned cases.

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