CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
In Marbury v. Madison (1803) the Supreme Court announced for the first time the principle that
JUDICIAL REVIEW
As early as 1936, the Philippine Supreme Court had unequivocally asserted its constitutional
authority to engage in judicial review. This power was affirmed in the Supreme Court decision in
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court would, in
the next several decades, often decline to exercise judicial review by invoking the political
question doctrine. In 1987, the constitutional convention formed to draft a new charter decided to
provide for a definition of "judicial power" as a means of inhibiting the Supreme Court from
frequently resorting to the political question doctrine. Hence, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution states in part that:Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803)
Facts of the case
In the last days of President John Adams’ presidency, he nominated a number of people to serve
as justices of the peace for the District of Columbia. The Senate confirmed the nominations, and
the commissions were prepared. President Adams’ Secretary of State, John Marshall, did not
deliver all of the commissions before President Thomas Jefferson took office. President Jefferson
then ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions. The
plaintiffs, men whose commissions were not delivered, sued Madison in the Supreme Court and
argued that, in refusing to deliver the commissions, the Secretary of State was neglecting his
Constitutional duty.
Question
(1) Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?
(2) Can they sue for their commissions in court?
(3) Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their commissions?
Conclusion: U N A N I M O U S D E C I S I O N F O R M A R B U R Y
MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN MARSHALL
Though Marbury was entitled to it, the Court was unable to grant it because Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with Article III Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and was
therefore null and void.
Yes, yes, no. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the unanimous opinion. (1) The Supreme
Court held that the Constitution grants the president the power to appoint and commission
officers of the United States. Because the only evidence of the appointment is the commission,
the two actions are tied together. Without the commission, the appointment is not complete, and
so the president’s signature on the commission is the final step in the appointment process. (2)
The Court also held that, upon appointment, the officers have acquired rights to their positions
under the law. If those rights are denied, then they may seek redress in the courts. (3) Marbury
and others sought an original action for their commissions in the Supreme Court. But the
congressional act conferring that authority conflicts with Article III Section 2 of the Constitution.
The judicial power in the United States extends to all cases under the Constitution and the
Supreme Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather than the law when
the two conflict. So if a law is found to be in conflict with the Constitution, then the law is invalid.
In this case, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act ran counter to the Constitution and is therefore void.
Thus, lacking authority, the Supreme Court canceled Marbury's claim.
a court may declare an act of Congress void if it is inconsistent with the Constitution. William
Marbury had been appointed a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia in the final hours
of the Adams administration. When James Madison, Thomas Jefferson’s secretary of state,
refused to deliver Marbury’s commission, Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated
appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling delivery of the commissions.
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, denied the petition and refused to
issue the writ. Although he found that the petitioners were entitled to their commissions, he held
that the Constitution did not give the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that such writs might be issued, but that section
of the act was inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid. Although the immediate
effect of the decision was to deny power to the Court, its long-run effect has been to increase
the Court’s power by establishing the rule that ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.’ Since Marbury v. Madison the Supreme Court has
been the final arbiter of the constitutionality of congressional legislation.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936
FACTS: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov
15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of
Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20,
Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy; Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest
filed by Ynsua.
Article 8
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Political Question Doctrine
A doctrine which prevents a court of law from determining issues which are essentially political;
within the purview of the executive branch of government. ...Questions, in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court."
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in law enforcement.
ISSUE: 1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
is subject to judicial review; 2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING: 1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to
wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it
amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that
decided that redistricting (attempts to change the way voting districts are delineated) issues
present justiciable questions, thus enabling federal courts to intervene in and to decide
redistricting cases.
Facts of the case
Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion
the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how
Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts
within the state.
Question
Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment?
Conclusion
In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court
action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and
that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his opinion, Justice Brennan provided
past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters
pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted.
Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and
others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.
Brief Fact Summary. The General Assembly had failed to reapportion the states voting districts
since 1901, despite changes in population. Tennessee voters sought an injunction against further
elections and a reapportionment of voting districts.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The political question doctrine requires courts to refuse to adjudicate
certain issues that do not lend themselves to judicial standards or remedies.
Facts. Tennessee voters claimed their equal protection rights were being violated due to a
debasement of their votes. This claim was based on the fact that voting districts had not been
reapportioned since 1901, despite population growth and redistribution since then. Additionally,
they claimed redress through changes in state law was impossible due to the election of the
present legislature under the malapportioned voting districts. They sought an injunction against
further elections and reapportionment. The lower court denied relief, finding the claim to be a
nonjusticiable political question.
Issue. Was the lower court correct in determining that a state’s voter apportionment scheme was
a political question, and therefore nonjusticiable?
The effects of a decision of unconstitutionality
A decision by the High Court or Supreme Court that either a post- 1937 law is repugnant to the
Constitution (Article 15.4) or a pre- 1937 law is inconsistent with the Constitution give rise to two
separate issues
1 the date from which the impugned law itself is invalid
2 the consequences for acts done in reliance upon that law prior to the date of the judgment.
Both these issues were addressed by the Supreme Court in Murphy v The Attorney General
[1982] IR 241. In that case the plaintiffs, a married couple, challenged the validity of certain
provisions of the Income Tax Act 1967 which imposed a higher tax on their joint income than on
the same aggregate income of two single people. They were successful and sections 192-197 of
the Income Tax Act 1967 were declared repugnant to the Constitution and invalid. Subsequently
there was further argument before the Supreme Court as to the date from which the declaration
should operate and as to whether and in respect of what period the plaintiffs could claim a refund
of tax paid in accordance with the impugned sections.
1 date of invalidity of Act
On the first issue a majority of the court (O'Higgins CJ dissenting) held that on a proper
construction of Article 15.4 of the Constitution and supported by previous decisions that the
invalidity of a post- 1937 law must date from the time of purported enactment. As Mr Justice
Henchy at p 309 stated
The Constitution, therefore, as part of its in-built checks and balances, has made it abundantly
clear that the delegated power of legislation given to the Oireachtas ... is a power which,
regardless of any interim presumption of constitutionality that it may attach to its enactments
cannot be exercised save within the constitutionally designated limitations of that power; and
once it has lost the presumption of constitutionality as a result of a judicial condemnation on the
ground of unconstitutionality, it must, in accordance with Article 15, subsection 2, be held to be
'be invalid' - not, be it observed have 'become invalid'. It is to be deemed null and void from the
moment of its purported enactment no less than if it had emanated from a person or body with no
power of legislation. In my judgment, the constitutional disposition of the powers of the State in
this respect falls into line with the general principle that, when a Constitution or a constitutional
statute gives a specifically confined power of legislation to a legislature; laws found to have been
enacted in excess of that delegation are ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. This is a principle
which is inherent in the nature of such limited powers, but it is unequivocally spelled out in some
constitutions and constitutional statutes.
Whilst the date from which a pre- 1937 law found to be inconsistent with the Constitution should
be held invalid was obiter in Murphy v The Attorney General. There are a number of subsequent
decisions of both the Supreme Court and the High Court which have held post- 1937 laws invalid
from the date of their enactment and pre- 1937 laws to be invalid from the date the Constitution
came into operation.
There is one situation to which the foregoing principle would probably not apply. If the courts
were to declare unconstitutional an Act which, at the date of its passing, was not repugnant to the
Constitution but, by reason of efflux of time, became unconstitutional, then it appears unlikely that
such an Act would be declared void ab initio. As such an Act was not repugnant to the
Constitution at the date of its passing it was not prohibited by Article 15.4. It has become
unconstitutional by reason of the fact that the Oireachtas, by failing to repeal or amend the Act
has failed to vindicate the rights of the person prejudiced contrary to Article 40.3. It would thus
seem probable that in those circumstances the courts would declare the Act to be
unconstitutional from a date later that the date of its enactment. There has been no decision by
the courts on this point though the possibility of such an argument has been adverted to: see
Browne v Attorney General [1991] 2 IR 58.
2 consequences for Acts done in reliance on invalid law
This issue was also addressed in Murphy v The Attorney General. The general principle was
stated by Mr Justice Henchy at p 313:
Once it has been judicially established that a statutory provision enacted by the Oireachtas is
repugnant to the Constitution, and that it therefore incurred invalidity from the date of its
enactment, the condemned provision will normally provide no legal justification for any acts done
or left undone, or for transactions undertaken in pursuance of it; and the person damnified by the
operation of the invalid provision would normally be accorded by the courts all permitted and
necessary redress.
However Mr Justice Henchy recognised in his judgment that the primary rule is subject to
exceptions and that it is not a universal rule that something which has been done in pursuance of
a law is subsequently held to be invalid will give rise to a good cause of action. At p 314 he
stated:
Over the centuries the law has come to recognise in one degree or another, that factors such as
prescription (negative or positive), waiver, estoppel, laches, a Statute of Limitation, res judicata or
other matters (most of which may be grouped under the heading of public policy) may debar a
person from obtaining redress in the courts for injury, pecuniary or otherwise which would be
justiciable and redressable if such considerations had not intervened ...

For a variety of reasons, the law recognises that in certain circumstances, no matter how
unfounded in law certain conduct may have been, no matter how unwarranted its operations in a
particular case, what has happened has happened and cannot and should not be undone.

On the particular facts of the Murphy case the plaintiffs were only entitled to recover the
excessive tax from the date of institution of the proceedings. The court relied upon the change of
position by the State in the absence of a challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation to
debar the plaintiffs from recovering tax prior to the date of the institution of proceedings and to
debar any other persons who had not commenced proceedings from so recovering.

It thus appears that the respective legal positions of persons who have been prejudicially affected
by acts done in reliance upon invalid laws and of persons who may have acted on reliance upon
invalid laws and the ability of such persons to obtain redress before the courts or defend
themselves from actions taken against them will depend in each case upon the application by the
courts to the particular facts of that case of the above principles as stated by Henchy J.