Public Lands

Nancy T. Lorzano v. Ju An Tabayag, Jr., GR No 189647, February 6, 2012

Facts:

The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan Tabayag who
died on June 2, 1992. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the
burial of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be
allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject property
until after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioner’s siblings acceded to
the said request.

After the petitioner’s eldest son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them
the possession of the subject property so that they could partition it among themselves.
However, the petitioner refused to relinquish her possession of the subject property
claiming that she purchased the subject property from their father as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Property4 executed by the latter on May 25, 1992.

Tabayag Jr. Argument: The respondent claimed that their father did not execute the said
deed of sale. He pointed out that the signature of their father appearing in the said deed of
sale was a forgery as the same is markedly different from the real signature of Tabayag.

Same: Forged Signature in the Deed of Sale: The respondent alleged that the petitioner
purposely forged the signature of Tabayag in the said deed of sale to deprive him and their
other siblings of their share in the subject property.

Lorzano Contention: The petitioner maintained she is the owner of the subject parcel of
land having purchased the same from Tabayag as evidenced by the May 25, 1992 deed of
sale. Further, the petitioner asserted that the respondent failed to establish that the
signature of Tabayag appearing on the said deed of sale was a forgery considering that it
was not submitted for examination by a handwriting expert.

RTC Ruling: Ruled in Favor of Tabayag Jr.: a cursory comparison between the signature
of Tabayag appearing on the said deed of sale and his signatures appearing on other
documents would clearly yield a conclusion that the former was indeed a forgery.

CA Ruling: Affirmed the Decision of RTC: The CA held that the testimony of a
handwriting expert in this case is not indispensable as the similarity and dissimilarity
between the questioned signature of Tabayag as compared to other signatures of the latter
in other documents could be determined by a visual comparison.

Lorzano’s Argument: the petitioner points out that the subject property, being acquired
by her through a grant of free patent from the government, originally belonged to the
public domain. As such, the lower courts could not order the reconveyance of the subject
property to the heirs of Tabayag as the latter are not the original owners thereof. If at all,
the subject property could only be ordered reverted to the public domain.
Same: Indefeasibility of the Title: The petitioner asserts that the amended complaint for
annulment of document, reconveyance and damages that was filed by the respondent with
the RTC is a collateral attack on her title over the subject property. She avers that, when the
said amended complaint was filed, more than a year had already lapsed since OCT No. 1786
over the subject property was issued under her name. Thus, the petitioner maintains that
her title over the subject property is already indefeasible and, hence, could not be attacked
collaterally.

Issue:

Is the opinion of a handwriting expert necessary in the examination of forged documents?

Considering that the subject property was registered under the petitioner’s name pursuant
to a free patent, can an action for reconveyance prosper since only the Government could
assail her title thereto in an action for reversion?

Ruling:

First Issue

No, the opinion of a handwriting expert is not indispensable in the examination of forged
documents.

While, it is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon
the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court
can form its own opinion. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of
forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the
comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to
its authenticity.

Second Issue

Yes, action for reconveyance is proper on the case.

True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title [is] issued, the
land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after
the issuance of the latter. However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of
a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrant’s already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.

Rule: Discussion for an Action for Reversion: A fraudulently acquired free patent may
only be assailed by the government in an action for reversion. A free patent that was
fraudulently acquired, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the same, may only be
assailed by the government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public
Land Act.

Same: Same: Reason why Government may bring Action: the reason for the rule that
only the government, through the OSG, upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands,
may bring an action assailing a certificate of title issued pursuant to a fraudulently acquired
free patent: Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the corresponding free
patents in their favor in his capacity as administrator of the disposable lands of the public
domain, the action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.

Exception: Action for Reconveyance: An action for reconveyance is proper in this case.
However, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. A recognized exception is that
situation where plaintiff claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant public land
unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a
constructive trust.

Same: Same: Private Individual may bring an action for Reconveyance: A private
individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof
was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner
thereof.

Same: Same: Action is one based on Fraud: Institution within 4 years from the
discovery: It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the
granting of the patent or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is
not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were
made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor
knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the property.
The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years
from the discovery of the fraud. It is to be noted that as the patent here has already been
issued, the land has the character of registered property in accordance with the provisions
of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party
who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance.

On the Case: The respondent, in filing the amended complaint for annulment of
documents, reconveyance and damages, was not seeking a reconsideration of the granting
of the patent or the decree issued in the registration proceedings. What the respondent
sought was the reconveyance of the subject property to the heirs of the late Tabayag on
account of the fraud committed by the petitioner. Thus, the lower courts did not err in
upholding the respondent’s right to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. To
hold otherwise would be to make the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud.

Heirs of Sps Teofilo M. Reterta et al. v. Sps Lorenzo Mores, GR No 159941, August 17,
2011
Facts:

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of
land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters,
having inherited the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late
father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that
their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999
an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he
had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit,
Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the
then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.

On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case due to the land being friar land,
and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence the Civil Case.

RTC Ruling: The land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain,
consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director
of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. The determination
whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests
to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has
no jurisdiction over the nature of this action.

CA Ruling: Dismissed the Petition.

Issue:

Was the petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?

Ruling:

Yes, an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed
₱20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive
original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the
allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief
thereby sought.

LMB has no Jurisdiction: The authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the
administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners’ action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of
a private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name.
Petitioners’ cause of action for Reconveyance: The petitioners’ cause of action for
reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish
a right in a piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya, in order that a transfer of the
rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary
that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of
transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words,
where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon,
such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law. Under Director of Lands v.
Rizal, the purchaser in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law
as the actual owner of the lot purchased even before the payment of the full payment price
and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in
full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that of a mere lien
holder or mortgagee.

Same: Concept of Action for Reconveyance: An action for reconveyance respects the
incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks the transfer of the property to its
rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly
registered in another person’s name. There is no special ground for an action for
reconveyance, for it is enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property
superior to the claim of the registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. On this score, it is also worthy to stress that
the title of a piece of a friar land obtained by a grantee from the Government without
conforming with the requirements set by the law may be assailed and nullified.

Republic v. Heirs of Agustin L. Angeles et al, GR No 141296, October 7, 2002

Facts:

On July 30, 1963, the late Agustin L. Angeles filed his Free Patent Application covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2744, Cad. 241, Orion Cadastre, situated in Capunitan,
Orion, Bataan, and with an area of 3,578 square meters.

By virtue of the said free patent application, Free Patent No. 265340 was issued in favor of
the late Agustin L. Angeles on February 24, 1964. On the basis of said free patent, Original
Certificate of Title No. 194 was issued and registered in the name of the late Agustin L.
Angeles.

It appears, however, that the late Agustin L. Angeles, prior to his death, was able to transfer
and convey in favor of his sister, Emilia L. Angeles (now deceased) the 1/2 northern
portion of Lot No. 2744, by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale that was postdated January 5,
1970, when Agustin L. Angeles was already dead.

The postdating of the Deed of Absolute Sale to January 5, 1970, was obviously done to
evade the prohibition of any alienation or encumbrance of the free patent within a period
of 5 years. Then again, the late Emilia L. Angeles was able to transfer and convey, by way of
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 27, 1973, the same 1/2 northern portion in favor of
her daughter, Luz Gancayco Alvarez.

On November 19, 1976, the Samahang Nayon members and Barangay members of
Capuntan, Orion, Bataan, represented by Elvira E. Manabat filed a Protest before the then
Bureau of Lands.

DENR Findings: the later Agustin L. Angeles or his predecessors-in-interest, have never
occupied nor cultivated Lot No. 2744 prior to and after the issuance of the Free Patent in
his name, the same having been in the actual and continuous occupation by the members of
the Samahang Nayon since the prewar days; Lot No. 2744 is not an agricultural land but a
residential land bordering the shoreline of Manila Bay; and that the late Agustin L. Angeles
conveyed the 1/2 northern portion of Lot No. 2744 during the prohibitory period of 5 years
or prior to his death in favor of the late Emilia L. Angeles.

RTC Ruling: The State’s cause of action had prescribed, because the Complaint had been
filed beyond the prescriptive period of four years from the issuance of the OCT. The RTC
further ruled that Respondent Alvarez was an innocent purchaser for value; her title, being
already indefeasible, could therefore no longer be revoked or cancelled.

Issue:

Does prescription runs against the State?

Ruling:

No, it is an elementary rule that prescription does not run against the State and its
subdivisions. When the government is the real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly
to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can as a rule be no defense
grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section
101 of the Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred
by prescription.

Indefeasibility of a Title does not bar the Investigation of the State: While it is true that
a title issued on the basis of a free patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured,
however, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how such
title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether or not
fraud has been committed in securing the title. One who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring
title to public land should not be allowed to benefit from it.

Esconde Case: Reconveyance based of Fraud 4 years Prescription: The court a quo
relied on Esconde v. Barlongay, which held that an action for reconveyance based on fraud
must be filed within four years from the discovery of its cause. Such discovery shall be
deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the OCT.

The Court holds that Esconde is inapplicable to the present appeal. That case involved an
action for reconveyance, a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land
that has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. The purpose of
reconveyance is to compel a person, under whose name the property was wrongfully
registered, to transfer or reconvey it to the rightful owner. Note that in Esconde, the
Complaint for Reconveyance was filed by a private individual. Furthermore, the property
therein had long been the subject of ordinary land registration and did not involve public
land.

Reversion by the State: The instant case involves a reversion sought by the State through
the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner’s Complaint for Reversion primarily seeks the
cancellation of the illegally obtained free patent and certificate of title, as well as the
consequent reversion of the subject land which was originally public in character. In a
reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.
Clearly then, the facts and the issues in Esconde differ from those obtaining in the present
case.

Melchor Caro v. Susana Sucaldito, GR No 157536, May 16, 2005

Facts:

Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160 from Ruperto
Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953. The said lot was situated
in Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares.

Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting
of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of
Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale3 dated January
31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.

On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands
covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The application
was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional
Director rendered a Decision canceling the said application.

Melchor Caro Contention: Respondent claims preferential rights over the land as he
acquired it through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had likewise bought the land
from Ruperto Cepellano in 1953.

Protestant De la Cruz Claims: Protestant De la Cruz testified that the land in controversy
was bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied, possessed
and improved the land by planting coconut trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly driven
out by Gregorio Caro from the land in question.

Regional Director’s Findings: The records disclosed that the land which was actually sold
to Gregorio Caro by Ruperto Gepellano is Assessor’s Lot No. 160. The description and
physical identity of Lot No. 160 is basically different and distinct from Lot No. 4512, the
land in question. Ruperto Cepellano in his affidavit testified that what he sold to Gregorio
Caro is a land distinct and different from the land in question.
Same: Ruling: Applicant respondent Melchor Caro is cancelled. Protestant Deogracias de la
Cruz if qualified, is given 120 days from the finality of this decision to file an appropriate
public land application otherwise he shall lose his preferential right thereto.

Sucaldito Free Patent Application: On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer
of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was issued
Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued OCT No F-
27162 in her favor.

Caro’s Contention against Sucaldito: On February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint
against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of
Ownership and/or Possession with Damages" before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an
amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had been in
possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept of owner,
adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged that the said lot had
been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and
that the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor.

Same: Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in
favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the
subject lot. Hence, as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same
to him as the lawful owner.

RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petition and ruled in favor of Sucaldito.

Same: Ratio: Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent
issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held
that "an applicant for a free patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an
action in court to recover the land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through
administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act," or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a rival-applicant for a free
patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not judicial, because even
if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does not thereby
become the owner of the land in dispute.

CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Does Caro have the personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property?

Ruling:

No, the petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property.

Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this
case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a
free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an
action for reconveyance.

To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that
would result in the reversion of the land to the government. The petitioner has no
personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.

Concept of Person in interest: Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,31 every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one
"who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal
standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest
means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Concept of Reconveyance: The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC
prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering
that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to "return" the subject property to him,
it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that "the essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right." Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by
a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.

Concept of Reversion: Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine.
Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government,
its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

Edgardo Dolar v. Brgy Lublub et al, GR No 152663, November 18, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6
hectares (Lot No. 1). Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the Dumangas
Cadastre.

On September 16, 1981, petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent Barangay
Lublub, subject to the following conditions:

 That the area donated shall be for the purpose of constructing building and/or
establishing public plaza, sports complex, public market, health centers and the like
for the use of the Barangay of Lublub which area shall be hereinafter be known as
DON VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA and shall be so designated in a proper landmark;
 That the construction and development of the area above-described shall be
initiated and completed within 5 years from the execution of this Deed of Donation
 and should the same be not made or completed then this Deed of Donation shall
have no force and effect whatsoever and the ownership of the above-described
property will revert back to the DONORS including all or any unfinished
improvement the DONEE might have placed or constructed; and
 That should the use of the area be converted to uses other than herein stipulated,
then this DEED OF DONATION shall be deemed revoked and the ownership shall
revert back to the DONORS.

Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed5 donating to Brgy. Lublub
represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla
had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the
same conditions expressly set forth in the first.

Petitioner: Dolar’s Claim: On May 6, 1998, petitioner filed against Brgy Lublub a
complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages involving the
donated property. Petitioner claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be
effective, the donee barangay having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.

Same: Same: Failure of Brgy Lublub to fulfill the conditions of the Donation: Brgy
Lublub failed to build or establish within the period therein stipulated, a public plaza,
sports complex and like structures for the use of Barangay Lublub and neither had it
designated in a proper landmark that the area donated is known as the ‘Don Venancio
Dolar Plaza’.

Defense: Brgy Lublub’s Counterclaim: Within 5 years from the execution of the deed of
donation several structures/buildings were constructed thereon for the use and benefit of
Brgy Lublub. PLDT building, Dumangas Water District, PNP Mobile Force Office and Branch
68 of the RTC of Iloilo was established for the benefit and use of the residents.

Same: Same: The deed of donation was executed in September 16, 1981. Even if the donee
failed to comply with the conditions of the deed within 5 years or until 1986, plaintiff
should have sought revocation of the donation within 4 years from 1986 or until 1990 only.

Same: Same: The deed of donation having been executed in 1981 yet, the donee took
possession of the same in concept of an owner, with just title, adverse, open, peaceful and
continuously up to the present. Hence, even if the donation is void or conditions were not
complied with, the property is now owned by the donee, as it can be considered that it has
been acquired by prescription.

Same: Complaint for cancellation of Title: Brgy Lublub filed a motion to dismiss against
the petition of the Sps Dolar for quieting of Title and filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Title, Reconveyance/Issuance of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Delinquency in the
Payment of Real Property Tax.

Petitioner: Herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss against the complaint for
cancellation of title filed by the Brgy on the grounds of forum shopping.
RTC Ruling: petitioner’s action was already barred by extinctive prescription under Article
764,11 in relation to Articles 73312 and 1144 (1)13 of the Civil Code, granted the
Barangay’s motion to dismiss and denied petitioner’s similar motion.

Issue:

Can the deed of donation be automatically reversed as stipulated?

Was the quieting of title prescribed?

Did the barangay acquire the property in question by acquisitive prescription?

Ruling:

First Issue

Yes, however, judicial declaration rescinding a contract is necessary to determine whether

the rescission is proper.

Judicial Intervention to determine whether or not the rescission was proper: The
rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.

Rules on Contract under the NCC when stipulations are not contrary to law: When a
deed of donation . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply,
and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties
to a contract to establish such stipulations . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public
policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of
the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.

Second Issue

The Court can grant that the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donations, as here, are governed by the general rules on prescription,26 which, in context,
is Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing that actions upon a written contract shall be
brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September
1986 – the date when petitioner’s right to revoke accrued - would be September 1996.
Here, however, what partakes as petitioner’s suit to revoke was filed only in May 1998.

In all, petitioner’s right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed,
regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article
1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent
barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his
right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the construction and development
conditions of the donation. From the records, it would appear that respondent barangay’s
boast of compliance is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated
area of telephone service, a water service, a police mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the
benefits of the barangay residents, substantially satisfies the terms and conditions of the
subject donation.

Third Issue

Admittedly, standing alone, adverse, continuous and long possession of a piece of real
property cannot defeat the title of a registered owner. But, then, this postulate presupposes
a Torrens title lawfully acquired and issued. As may be recalled, however, respondent
barangay instituted Civil Case No. 00-140, supra, for Cancellation of Title,
Reconveyance/Issuance of Title precisely because of the dubious manner by which
petitioner allegedly acquired his TCT No. T-129837 over a lot he admits donating.

Maria Alvarez Vda. De Delgado v. CA, GR No 125728, August 28, 2001

Facts:

During his lifetime, Carlos Delgado was the absolute owner of a parcel of land with an area
of 692,549 sq. m. On October 5, 1936, said Carlos Delgado granted and conveyed, by way of
donation or gift with quitclaim, all his rights, title, interest, claim and demand over a
portion of said land consisting of 165,000 square meters in favor of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines or its successors. Acceptance was made by then President Manuel L.
Quezon in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army.

Condition of the Donation: the parcel of land above described shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be used as military reservation for
training cadres or for such other uses of the Philippine Army as the Commander-in-Chief or
Chief of Staff thereof may determine, provided that when the Commonwealth of the
Philippines no longer needs this parcel of land for any military purposes, then said land
shall automatically revert to the donor or its heirs or assigns.

Improvements by the Donee and Registration under Torrens System: The donee
promptly occupied the donated land and constructed buildings thereon for military
purposes, such as a military training campsite. The Donee thereafter caused the
registration of the same under the Torrens System.

OCT in favor of Commonwealth and Annotations Infavor of Delgado: On February 6,

1939, the CFI of Samar decreed that on the basis of more than forty years of quiet, peaceful
and continuous possession by the donors and their donee the aforesaid parcels of land as
well as the improvements thereon, were to be registered in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines as absolute owner thereof. The OCT contained an
annotation of the express condition attached to the land donated by Carlos Delgado.
Subsequently, said OCT was later cancelled and replaced with TCT. It appears, however,
that said TCT did not contain an annotation of the condition originally found in the Deed of
Donation.

Transition from Commonwealth to Republic: Upon declaration of independence on July

4, 1946, the Commonwealth of the Philippines passed out of existence. It was replaced by
the existing Republic of the Philippines. The subject land and turned portions of it over to
the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), later renamed Bureau of Air
Transportation Office (ATO). Said government agency has since utilized the land in
question, or portions of it as a domestic national airport, with some portions rented to the
Philippine Airlines, and some to the provincial government for a capitol site and a hospital
site, and for some other uses which clearly are not military in nature.

Petition for Reconveyance: A petition for reconveyance was filed on December 25, 1970,
alleging as ground therefor the violation of the express condition imposed by the donor. It
was also during this time that Jose Delgado, brother and lone heir of the donor, Carlos,
obtained a court order dated March 15, 1971, directing the insertion of the automatic
reversion clause as an annotation in the TCT.

Defense Contention: Republic of the Philippines contends that the heirs have no cause of
action and even denied knowledge of such donation, having no record thereof in its
possession. The action for reconveyance is already barred by laches, waiver and/or
prescription.

RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of petitioner ordering the Republic to transfer ownership in
favor of petitioners.

CA Ruling: Reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Did the action for reconveyance already barred by prescription?

Ruling:

Yes, the action for reconveyance has already barred by prescription. Extinctive prescription
has set in in favor of the Republic, and it cannot now be sued based on the same causes of
action.

10 years Prescription under the NCC: Applying Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code on
prescription of actions based on a written contract, the petitioners herein should have
instituted the action for reconveyance within 10 years from the time the condition in the
Deed of Donation was violated. The earliest date the petitioners knew of the said violation
of said condition was on July 4, 1946, when the Republic, as successor of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, took over the properties and diverted the property to
uses other than that imposed by the donor. As found by the Court of Appeals, the cause of
action of the petitioners has clearly prescribed, having instituted the action for
reconveyance only on December 29, 1970, or 24 years after the condition was violated.
Said action was dismissed by the trial court on September 26, 1983 for failure of
petitioners to prosecute the case. The institution of a new action for reconveyance made on
September 28, 1989, does not alter respondent court's conclusion but in fact bolsters it, for
by then, a total of 43 long years were allowed by petitioners to lapse before instituting the
case at bar.

Excess Portion: With regard to the alleged excess of 33,607 square meters mistakenly
included in the OCT, we also find in order the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the action
for its reconveyance has likewise prescribed.

Article 1456 of the Civil code states, "If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

Registration of property by one person in his name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real
owner being another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the character of a
constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for reconveyance.
However, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance of registered land based on
an implied trust prescribes in ten years and it is from the date of issuance of such title that
the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted.

The said excess portion of petitioners' land was mistakenly registered in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines on September 9, 1939, still petitioners were admittedly
aware of this fact. The issuance of the OCT on said date stating the total area included
should have apprised them, even constructively, that a portion of their land was mistakenly
claimed by the donee, respondent Republic's predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners should
have taken appropriate legal action seasonably, within the ten years prescriptive period.
Since petitioners filed their action belatedly, we find that they have also lost any right to the
aforesaid portion of land consisting of 33,607 square meters.

Rule on Automatic Reversion in a contract: The rules governing onerous donations are
applicable to donations with a resolutory condition. Although automatic reversion
immediately happens upon a violation of the condition and therefore no judicial action is
necessary for such purpose, still judicial intervention must be sought by the aggrieved
party if only for the purpose of determining the propriety of the rescission made.

Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Sps Gregorio J. Lumocso, GR No 158121, December

12, 2007

Facts:

Petitioners claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195, a one-hectare portion of Lot No.
6196-A and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso, Cristita Lumocso Vda de Daan and Jacinto
Lumocso, are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots.
On August 6, 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of
Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought
to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding OCT No. P-22556 issued in the
name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. On September 3, 1999, two separate
complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners.

Petitioners Claim:

a) On May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of

land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City;
b) Since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare
land, including the excess 4 hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern
portion;
c) They possessed this excess 4 hectares of land "continuously, publicly, notoriously,
adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the owner.

Respondents Counter Claim: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the compliant and
Petitioners failed to state causes of action for reconveyance and they are barred by
prescription; and waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel. Hence, they filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint.

RTC Ruling: Denied the motion to dismiss.

CA Ruling: CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even
assuming that the complaints state a cause of action; the same have been barred by the
statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud
prescribes in ten 10 years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve
titles issued for at least 22 years prior to the filing of the complaints.

Issue

Does the RTC have Jurisdiction over the complaints of the petitioners?

Ruling

No, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint. The cases are considered as
actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an
instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex
them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title,
the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691. Under this law, the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20, 000.00…

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City
and their assessed values are less than P20, 000.00. Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction
over the instant cases.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of
title45 to or to quiet title46 over real property are actions that fall under the classification
of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein."

Concept of Jurisdiction of Courts: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to
hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.
It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the
parties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it
is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.

Concept of Action for Reconveyance: An action for reconveyance respects the decree of
registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal
owners, or to those who claim to have a better right. There is no special ground for an
action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the
property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed
to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

Vicente Cawis et al v. Hon. Antonio Cerilles, GR No 170207, April 19, 2010

Facts:

Petitioners questioned the sales patent approved by the DENR in favor of Jose Andrada.

The Deputy Public Land Inspector, in his final report of investigation, found that neither
Andrada nor Peralta had constructed a residential house on the lot, which was required in
the Order of Award and set as a condition precedent for the issuance of the sales patent.
Apparently, it was Vicente Cawis, one of the petitioners, who had built a house.

Hence, the Sales Patent was nonetheless transferred to Peralta.

Petitioners Claim: On 8 September 1998, petitioners filed a complaint15 before the trial
court alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent.

Issue:

Do the actual occupants of parcels of land covered by R.A. No. 6099 have standing to
question the validity of the sales patent?

Ruling:

No, petitioners’ complaint questioning the validity of the sales patent and the original
certificate of title is a reversion suit. The objective of an action for reversion of public land
is the cancellation of the certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered
by the title to the State. This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated as an
annulment suit or a cancellation suit.

Public Land Act: Actions for Reversion: Section 101 of the Public Land Act clearly states
that “all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title in bad faith, only the State can
institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act and our
ruling in Alvarico v. Sola. Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will
again form part of the public domain. Only the OSG or the officer acting in his stead may do
so. Since the title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.

Any subsequent action questioning the validity of the award of sales patent on the ground
of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation should thus be initiated by the State. The State has
not done so and thus, we have to uphold the validity and regularity of the sales patent as
well as the corresponding original certificate of title issued based on the patent.

Clearly then, fraud cannot be imputed to Andrada. His supposed failure to introduce
improvements is simply due to petitioners’ refusal to vacate the lot. It appears from the
factual finding of the Director of Lands that petitioners are the ones in bad faith. Contrary
to petitioners’ claim, R.A. No. 6099 did not automatically confer on them ownership of the
public land within Holy Ghost Hill Subdivision. The law itself, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6099,
provides that the occupants must first apply for a sales patent in order to avail of the
benefits of the law.

Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No 152570, September 27, 2006

Re: Application of Free Patent over parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares by
Socorro Orcullo which was subsequently sold to petitioner.

Republic opposed and contended that the subject land is covered by a timberland and
forest reserve.

Issue:

Was the subject lot part of a timberland or forest reserve?

Ruling:

No, the Republic failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it
adverted to. It was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the free patent and original
title were truly erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to
do so.

Republic relied on the provisions of P.D. No. 705 which was promulgated only on 19 May
1975, or four (4) years after the free patent and title were awarded to Orcullo. Thus, it finds
no application in the instant case.
When Right of private Individual concurs over the Right of the Government: While
the Government has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a
private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such
classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could
not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in the first instance
may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.

Concept of Regalian Doctrine: Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this
doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. In instances where a parcel of land considered to be
inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is
allowed by law to file an action for reversion, which is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering
that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

Concept of Action for Reversion: It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves
a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed
against the government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public
domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original
certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest
because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, the State,
as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the
free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being
adequate.

Heirs of Marciano Nagaño v. CA, GR No 123231, November 17, 1997

Re: Declaration of nullity of the OCT issued pursuant to a Free Patent in the name of
petitioners.

Private Respondents alleged that the issuance of the said title was on account of the fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation committed by defendant Marcario Valerio.

Issue:

Was the private respondents' cause of action barred by the statute of limitations since the
action was filed more than one year after issuance of the title?

Ruling:
Prescription is unavailing against private respondent's action. It is settled that a Free
Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal affects whatsoever.
Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Moreover, private respondent's claim of open,
public, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion
since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original
certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible. The complaint of private respondents may thus likewise be considered
and action for quieting of title.

Private respondents claim ownership to the 2,250 square meter portion for having
possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and
adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even
assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired
imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942.

Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the
public domain, because the beneficiary is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter."

East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic, GR No 152947, July 7, 2004

Solicitor General: the Solicitor General asserts that the State, in an action for reversion of
inalienable land of the public domain, is not bound by prescription or laches for public
policy requires an unimpeded exercise of its sovereign function. Petitioner's defense of
indefeasibility of a certificate of title is not tenable considering that TCT No. 38609 issued
in its name is void ab initio and does not form part of the Torrens system. The Solicitor
General, citing Section 118 in relation to Section 124 of the Public Land Act, further asserts
that the sale of the subject lot within the 5-year prohibited period, being unlawful, nullifies
the patent originally issued and justifies the reversion of the property to the State.

Issue:

Does Prescription run against the government?

Ruling:

No, in so far as the timeliness of the action of the Government is concerned, it is basic that
prescription does not run against the State. When the government is the real party in
interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and recover its own property,
there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation.

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or

reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription
does not lie against the State in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run
against the State. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by
prescription.

Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, GR No 168661, October 26, 2007
Issues:

Is a reversion suit proper in this case?

Is the present petition estopped by laches?

Ruling:

First Issue

An action for reversion seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of
to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.17 This remedy is
provided under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 (Public Land Act) which became effective
on December 1, 1936. Said law recognized the power of the state to recover lands of public
domain.

An action for reversion to cancel titles derived from homestead patents or free patents
based on transfers and conveyances in violation of CA No. 141 is filed by the OSG pursuant
to its authority under the Administrative Code with the RTC. It is clear therefore that
reversion suits were originally utilized to annul titles or patents administratively issued by
the Director of the Land Management Bureau or the Secretary of the DENR.

Second Issue

Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot
was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake
any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.

They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be
invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in
those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and
must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against
private individuals.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser for value who relied
on the clean certificates of the title was sought to be cancelled and the excess land to be
reverted to the Government, we ruled that "it is only fair and reasonable to apply the
equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to
innocent purchasers for value.
 Homestead

Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank v. CA, GR No 97872, Mar 1, 1994

Re: Right to Repurchase: Redemption Period

Issue: Did the Sps. Gonzales exercise their right to redeem within the
redemption period?

Ruling: Yes. The Court has ruled in a number of cases that said Section 119
prevails over statutes which provide for a shorter period of redemption in
extrajudicial foreclosure sales. We thus have consistent pronouncement
in Paras vs. Court of Appeals, Oliva vs. Lamadrid, Belisario vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court and Philippine National Bank vs. De los Reyes. These cases, with
the exception of Oliva, involved the question of which between the 5 years
repurchase period provided in Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 or the 1 year
redemption period under Act No. 3135 should prevail.

While Oliva is the only case, among those cited, that involves the Rural Banks'
Act, the other cases reveal the clear intent of the law on redemption in
foreclosure sales of properties acquired under the free patent or homestead
statutes which have been mortgaged to banks or b anking institutions — i.e., to
resolutely and unqualifiedly apply the 5 -year period provided for in Section
119 of C.A. No. 141 and, as categorically stated in Paras and Belisario, to
reckon the commencement of the said period from the expiration of the on e-
year period of redemption allowed in extrajudicial foreclosure.

Following the doctrine enunciated in the Rural Bank of Davao City case, it is
clear from a perusal of the factual antecedents at bar that the plea for
repurchase was not time-barred at the time it was made. When the certificate
of sale in favor of petitioner was registered with the Register of Deeds on
November 5, 1981, private respondents had two years, reckoned from said
date, within which to redeem the property from petitioner, and another five
years, under Commonwealth Act No. 141, counted from the expiration of the
redemption period, to effect repurchase which private respondents precisely
did when the suit below was initiated on March 20, 1986.

Mejia v. Gabayan, GR No 149756, Apr 12, 200 5

Re: Land Reform vis a vis homestead patent

Issue: Are subject properties covered by homestead patents exempt from the
operation of land reform?

Ruling: No, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation
Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, "applies to all
tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a
system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or
not." The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its cov erage. Nowhere
therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt
from its operation.

The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2,

Series of 1978, which states: "Tenanted private agricultural lands primari ly
devoted to rice and/or corn which have been acquired under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land
Transfer." Unquestionably, petitioner’s parcels of land, through obtained by
homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform
under PD 27.

Kings Properties v. Galido, GR No 170023, Nov 27, 2009

Re: A homesteader is prohibited from alienating to a private individual a land

grant within five years.

Issue: Was the sale of the property to Galido valid?

Ruling: Yes. No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five

years and before twenty-five years after the issuance of title shall be valid
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and
legal grounds.

In Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras, the Court explained the implications of

Section 118 of CA 141. Thus:

A grantee or homesteader is prohibited from alienating to a private individ ual

a land grant within five years from the time that the patent or grant is issued.
A violation of this prohibition renders a sale void. This, however, expires on
the fifth year. From then on until the next 20 years, the land grant may be
alienated provided the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
approves the alienation. The Secretary is required to approve the alienation
unless there are "constitutional and legal grounds" to deny the approval. In
this case, there are no apparent or legal ground s for the Secretary to
disapprove the sale of the Subject Land.

The failure to secure the approval of the Secretary does not ipso facto make a
sale void. The absence of approval by the Secretary does not a sale made after
the expiration of the 5-year period, for in such event the requirement of
Section 118 of the Public Land Act becomes merely directory or a
formality. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect of ratifying
and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authori zed.

Republic v. CA, GR No 100709, Nov 14, 1997

Re: A homesteader is prohibited from alienating to a private individual a land

grant within five years; a foreshore land cannot be subjected to private
ownership.

Issue: May a patent granted and certificate of title be cancelled and annulled
since the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after one year from the
issuance of the title?

Ruling: Yes. By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141

and in conformity with the policy of the law, any transfer or alienation of a
free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent is
proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for
the reversion of the property to the State.

The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a

proviso attached to the approval of every application. Prior to the fulfillment
of the requirements of law, Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to
the property; such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore,
not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely, when a
"homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled
him to a patent for [a] particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested
interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof." However,
for Respondent Morato's title of ownership over the patented land to be
perfected, she should have complied with the requirements of the law, one of
which was to keep the property for h erself and her family within the
prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements
of the law, Respondent Morato's title over the property was incomplete.
Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the
grantor could petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of
the title.

Issue: Is the subject land a foreshore land and therefore should be reverted
back to the public domain?

Ruling: Yes, when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it,
the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the
public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis annulled the
registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel
subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction
to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in
this case, being foreshore land, should the refore be returned to the public
domain.

Lopez v. CA, GR No 127827, Mar 5, 2003

Issue: Are the petitioners co-owners of the subject property through

succession?

Ruling: No. Homestead settlement is one of the modes by which public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes are disposed of. Its object is to provide a
home for each citizen of the state, where his family may shelter and live
beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate i n individuals those
feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free
institutions.

It bears emphasis that Act No. 2874 requires that for an application to be valid,
it must be approved by the Director of Lands. This is expressly mand ated by
Section 13 of the law, viz:

"Sec. 13. Upon filing of an application for a homestead, the Director of Lands, if
he finds that the application should be approved, shall do so and authorize
the applicant to take possession of the land upon the payment of ten pesos,
Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after the date of
the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the
homestead; otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land."

This provision gives the Director of Lands discretion to approve or deny an

application. He is not a mere automaton who must perfunctorily approve an
application upon its filing. He is tasked to satisfy himself that, among others,
the application papers meet the requirements of th e law, the land is a
disposable public land, and the land is not subject of a previous valid
application. Only when he finds the application sufficient in form and
substance should he favorably act on it. Otherwise, he should deny it.

The application of Fermin unfortunately remained unacted upon up to the time

of his death. It was neither approved nor denied by the Director, as the Bureau
failed to process it. Hence, he could not have acquired any vested rights as
a homestead applicant over the property bec ause his application was
never acted upon.

Fontanilla v. CA, GR No 119341, Nov 29, 1999

Re: only the vendor has the right to repurchase

Issue: Does a homestead applicant, his widow or his legal heirs have the right
to repurchase the homestead every time the same is conveyed to a third party
or sold to persons outside the family circle?

Ruling: Yes. Our pronouncement in Madarcos that "only the vendor has the
right to repurchase" was taken out of context by petitioners. Said
pronouncement may not be sweepin gly applied in this case because of a
significant factual difference between the 2 cases. In Madarcos, we ruled that
Cantain (petition herein) cannot repurchase the share of Francisca, his co -heir,
because the homestead had already been partitioned and dis tributed among
them as heirs. In other words, in that case, we held that Catain could not avail
himself of the right granted under Section 119 because he was not entitled to
repurchase the share of his co -heir in the homestead. Upon the other hand, in
this case, private respondent is precisely seeking to repurchase from
petitioners his own share in the homestead that he inherited from his parents.

Indeed, there is nothing in Section 119 which provides that the "applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs" must be the conveyor of the homestead before any of
them can exercise the right to repurchase. Rather, what said law plainly
provides is that the "applicant, his widow, or legal heirs" shall be entitled
to repurchase the homestead within 5 years from the date of c onveyance.
In this case, there is no dispute that private respondent is the legal heir of
spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman, the homesteaders.

The foregoing construction is merely in keeping with the purpose of Section

119 — "to enable the family of the applicant or grantee to keep their
homestead" — for it is well settled that the law must be construed liberally in
order to carry out that purpose.

The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law
offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop
with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the
deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The
policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to
venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured
that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short.
This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a
Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as pragmatic
considerations thus call for continued adherence t o the policy that not the
individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are
entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law
confers.

Flores v. Bagaoisan, GR No 173365, Apr 15, 2010

Re: the conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the five -year
prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and
void.

Issue: Was the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim void as its contents violate
Section 118 of CA 141 which prohibits the alie nation of lands acquired through
a homestead patent?

Ruling: Yes. The use of the words "confirmation" and "quitclaim" in the title of
the document was an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition imposed
by law. Labeling the deed as a confirmation of n on-ownership or as a quitclaim
of rights would actually make no difference, as the effect would still be the
alienation or conveyance of the property . The act of conveyance would
still fall within the ambit of the prohibition. To validate such an
arrangement would be to throw the door opens to all possible fraudulent
subterfuges and schemes that persons interested in land given to a
homesteader may devise to circumvent and defeat the legal provisions
prohibiting their alienation within five years from the i ssuance of the patent.

It bears stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that
the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it. Its basic objective, as the Court had occasion to
stress, is to promote public policy that is to provide home and decent living for
destitute, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which is
the bulwark of peace and order. Hence, any act which would have the effect of
removing the property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee will be
struck down for being violative of the law.

To repeat, the conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the five -

year prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is
null and void and cannot be enforced, for it is not within the competence of
any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve. There
is, therefore, no doubt that the Deed o f Confirmation and Quitclaim, which was
executed three years after the homestead patent was issued, is void and cannot
be enforced.

In closing, it would be well to mention that the execution of the Deed of

Confirmation and Quitclaim within the five -year prohibitory period also
makes the homestead patent susceptible to cancellation , and the subject
property being reverted to the public domain. It is the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for
reversion. Should the Solicitor General decide to file such an action, it is in that
action that petitioners’ defenses, particularly their alleged lack of knowledge
of the contents of the deed, will have to be resolved.

Sps. Hilaga v. Rural Bank of Isulan, GR No 1 79781, Apr 7, 2010

Re: Rules on Redemption

Issue: Can the petitioners still redeem their foreclosed property?

Ruling: No. In Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , we summarized
the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land
acquired under our free patent or homestead statutes as follows. If the land is
mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act No. 720, as amended, the
mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of
foreclosure or from the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale at
such foreclosure if the property is not covered or is covered, respectively,
by a Torrens title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs
may still repurchase the property within 5 years from the expiration of the 2 -
year redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A.
No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks , the
mortgagor may redeem the property within 1 year from the regi stration of the
certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs
may repurchase the property within 5 years from the expiration of the
redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

In the present case, petitioners admit that when the property was mortgaged,
only the tax declaration was presented. Although a free patent title was
subsequently issued in their favor on August 4, 1976, petitioners failed to
inform the creditor rural bank of such issuan ce. As a result, the certificate of
sale was not registered or annotated on the free patent title. Petitioners are
estopped from redeeming the property based on the free patent title
which was not presented during the foreclosure sale nor delivered to the
Register of Deeds for annotation of the certificate of sale as required under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended. Estoppel in pais arises when
one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts.

For the same reason, petitioners’ assertion that they will have 5 years from the
date of registration of the sale to redeem the foreclosed property under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act has no merit, the reckoning period for the
redemption period being properly from the date of sale.

Heirs of Balanon v. Heirs of Balanon, GR No 160711, Aug 14, 2004

Re: Action for Reconveyance as a remedy for erroneous registration of

property to another person.

Issue: Can respondents no longer question Maximo Labanon’s ownership of the land
after its registration under the principle of indefeasibility of a TCT?

Ruling: They can. While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of
registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an
aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be
impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he does not by
virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. It is evident
from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question and therefore the area
should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages.

Panaligan v. CA, GR No 112611, July 31, 1996

Issue: Is the tender of payment of the repurchase price necessary?

Ruling: No. The law is unambiguous. Tender of the payment of the repurchase price is
not among the requisites of the law and is therefore unnecessary, contrary to the
petitioners' claims. In the case of PNB v. CA, 179 SCRA 619, with reference to two parcels
of land acquired under a free patent for which redemption within five years was conceded
by petitioner therein, the Court held that "(it) is not even necessary for the preservation of
such a right of redemption to make an offer redeem or tender of payment of purchase price
within five years. The filing of an action to redeem within that period is equivalent to a
formal offer to redeem. There is not even a need for consignation of the redemption price."
It is thus immaterial that private respondents did not readily deposit the repurchase
price with the Clerk of Court.

Morla v. Belmonte, GR No 171146, Dec 7, 2011

Issue: May parties to a deed of sale of a land covered by a homestead patent extend or
prolong the 5-year period of repurchase under Section 119 of Act 141, under a private
writing subsequently executed by them?

Ruling: Yes. Nowhere in Commonwealth Act No. 141 does it say that the right to
repurchase under Section 119 thereof could not be extended by mutual agreement of
the parties involved. Neither would extending the period in Section 119 be against public
policy as "the evident purpose of the Public Land Act, especially the provisions thereof in
relation to homesteads, is to conserve ownership of lands acquired as homesteads in the
homesteader or his heirs." "What cannot be bartered away is the homesteader’s right to
repurchase the homestead within five years from its conveyance, as this is what public
policy by law seeks to preserve." "This, in our opinion, is the only logical meaning to be
given to the law, which must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose."

The 1988 contract neither shortens the period provided under Section 119 nor does away
with it. Instead, it gives the Nisperos spouses more time to reacquire the land that the State
gratuitously gave them. The 1988 contract therefore is not contrary to law; instead it is
merely in keeping with the purpose of the homestead law. Since the 1988 contract is valid,
it should be given full force and effect.

It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.

Paris v. Alfeche, GR No 139083, Aug 30, 2011

Issue: Are properties covered by homestead patents exempt from the operation of land
reform? And if they are, may the tenants be ejected from the premises?

Ruling: No. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation Patents sought
to be canceled here were issued to respondents, applies to all tenanted private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy,
whether classified as landed estate or not." The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in
its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead
patents are exempt from its operation.

The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1978, which states: "Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or
corn which have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land Transfer." Unquestionably, petitioner's
parcels of land, though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are
covered by land reform under PD 27.

No, they may not be ejected. The current provision on retention removes the necessity,
present under PD 27, of ejecting actual tillers. Under the current law, landowners who do
not personally cultivate their lands are no longer required to do so in order to qualify for
the retention of an area not exceeding five hectares. Instead, they are now required to
maintain the actual tiller of the area retained, should the latter choose to remain therein.

Abelgas v. Comia, GR No 163125, Apr 18, 2012

Issue: Are the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of Rights and Quitclaim and the
mortgages in favor of mortgagee banks, null and void for being contrary to the provisions
of CA 141 and its amendatory laws?

Ruling: No. Section 118 of CA 141 requires that before the 5 year prohibition applies,
there should be an alienation or encumbrance of the land acquired under free patent
or homestead.
In this case, Comia did not transfer, convey or cede the property; but rather, he
relinquished, renounced and "quitclaimed" the property considering that the property
already belonged to the spouses. The voluntary renunciation by Comia of that portion was
not an act of alienation, but an act of correcting the inclusion of the property in his free
patent.

The evidence on record reveals that prior the grant of the free patent, the spouses already
owned the property.

Seeing that there is no alienation to begin with, this Court finds that the prohibition is not
applicable. Thus, the Deed of Relinquishment, Renunciation of Rights and Quitclaim is not
null and void for being contrary to the Public Land Act.

Rabaja v. AFP Retirement, GR No 177181, Jul 7, 2009

Issue: Is the AFP's title which originated from an alleged fake and spurious homestead
patent, superior to Rabaja’s title which originated from a valid and existing free patent?

Ruling: Yes. Respondent is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value. Thus, as
far as respondent is concerned, TCT No. 18529, shown to it by JMC, was free from any flaw
or defect that could give rise to any iota of doubt that it was fake and spurious, or that it
was derived from a fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise, respondent was not
under any obligation to make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself when, significantly, a
foreclosure sale was conducted and respondent emerged as the highest bidder.

It bears stressing that a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land
Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title.

Respondent's transfer certificate of title, having been derived from the Homestead Patent
which was registered under the Torrens system on May 27, 1966, was thus vested with the
habiliments of indefeasibility.
 Sale of Public Agricultural Land

Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration Inc., GR No 141019, Nov 23, 2011

Controversy: The present controversy generated a prolonged litigation on the issue of

ownership.

1. On the one hand is the dispute between Mercado and VMMEI as to who had validly
acquired rights over Lot 4867 in the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City
Government of Tagaytay; and
2. On the other, is the persistent albeit unsubstantiated claim of the Olimpiada Heirs-
Fabella Group that they are co-owners of the auctioned property as descendants of
the alleged brothers of Narciso Olimpiada, Juan and Sergio Olimpiada.

Ruling:
It should be stressed that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must
prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence, and is duty bound to identify sufficiently
and satisfactorily the property. Otherwise stated, all facts must indicate that no other
person, including the government, will be prejudiced by the adjudication of the land to the
applicant.

Indeed, a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land
already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree
for the same land would be null and void.

The applicant for registration under Section 14, paragraph (1) of P.D. No. 1529 must
specifically prove: (1) possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (2) the classification of the land as an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration.
The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
 Leas of Public Agricultural Lands

Republic v. CA, GR No 100709, November 14, 1997

Re: Cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a
free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land
and was mortgaged and leased within the 5 year prohibitory period.

RTC Ruling: The lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5 year period ban
against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not
alienated. It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only
the improvement and not the land itself.

Issue:

Did the certificate of title become indefeasible after one year from the issuance of the title?

Is the questioned land part of a disposable public land and not a foreshore land?

Ruling:

First Issue

The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial
proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public
domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the
patent.

Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General, from
filing an action for reversion. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in
obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the
proper remedy.

Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar
the state from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her
clearly stipulated that its award was "subject to the conditions provided for in Sections
118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141." Because she violated
Section 118, the reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily follows,
pursuant to Section 124.

Proscription for encumbrances within 5 years: Relevant sections of Commonwealth Act

No. 141 provides that lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not
be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant.

CA 141 clearly proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent
or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such
encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the
public domain. Encumbrance has been defined as "anything that impairs the use or transfer
of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon
property; a claim or lien upon property."

The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso
attached to the approval of every application. Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of
law, Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the property; such property
remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or
encumbrance. Conversely, when a "homesteader has complied with all the terms and
conditions which entitled him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a
vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof." However, for
Respondent Morato's title of ownership over the patented land to be perfected, she should
have complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property for
herself and her family within the prescribed period of 5 years. Prior to the fulfillment of all
requirements of the law, Respondent Morato's title over the property was incomplete.
Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the grantor could
petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the title.

Second Issue

When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in
Government vs. Cabangis annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings
when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award
foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being
foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.

Lu Do and Lu Ym Corporation v. Aznar Brothers Realty Co., GR No 143307, April 26,

2006

Facts: An 8,485 square meter land was the subject of both an award of Foreshore Lease in
favor of herein respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company, a partnership engaged in
buying and selling real properties and in livestock and agriculture business; and of the
subsequent Miscellaneous Sales Application filed by petitioner, a manufacturer and
exporter of coconut oil products.

Issue: Whether Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, a partnership, became extinct by reason of

the death of all the partners, making the heirs of the deceased partners without legal
personality to pursue the Sales Application previously filed by the said deceased partners
before the Bureau of Lands.

Ruling: The death of the partners did not automatically forfeit the rights they acquired
over the land and that their heirs and the new association established by them should be
considered subrogated in the place of the original partners.
If in Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, where all the partners died, the Court did not
forfeit the acquired rights of the heirs over the controverted land, with more reason that
we should not forfeit the award in favor of respondent which was survived by seven
partners who continued the operations of the partnership, pursued their lease application
and defended their right against petitioner.

Forfeiture of Improvements upon the expiration of the Lease: Under Section 38 of the
Public Land Act, at the expiration of the lease, all buildings and other permanent
improvements made by the lessee shall become the property of the government. Leases of
public lands run for a period of 25 years, renewable once for another period of not to
exceed 25 years.

Temporary Permit: And even granting that petitioner is a legitimate holder of a

temporary permit to occupy the land, said permit will not vest him legal personality to seek
the revocation of respondent’s award. Being merely temporary, its permit may be revoked
at any time by the Secretary of the DENR.