TOTAL EXTINCTION

REPUBLIC V. COJUANGCO

Republic vs Cojuangco

Facts:

On April 25, 1977, respondents Teodoro Regala et al incorporated UNICOM with an authorized capital
stock of P100M divided into 1M shares with a par value of 100 pesos per share. The said incorporators
sunscribed to 200,000 shares worth P20M and paid P5M pesos. On Sept 26, 1978 UNICOM increased its
autorized capital stock to 3M shares without par value and converted the original subscription of
200,000 to 1M shares without par value.

On Aug 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of UCPB, Cojuangco et al, approved resolution 247-79
authorizing UCPB to invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the
benefit of the coconut farmers. On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to
10 million shares without par value. On Sept 18, 1979, the new set of directors of UNICOM composed of
Cojuangco et al amended again its capitalization increasing its authorized capital stock to 1B divided into
500 million Class A voting common shares, 400 million Class B voting common shares, and 100 million
Class C non-voting common shares, all with a par value of P1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5
million shares without par value (consisting of one million shares for the incorporators and 4 million
shares for UCPB) were then converted to 500 million Class A voting common shares at the ratio of 100
Class A voting common shares for every one without par value share. Respondents again amended its
capitalization on Sept 18, 1979 increasing the incorporators share to 100 million shares without cost to
them giving them unwarranted benefits.

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 OSG filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) 3019 against respondents before PCGG. The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM
was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of
only P5 million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common
shares, the governments P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was credited to
UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810. About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum stating that the action had already prescribed. the
Ombudsman approved the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. OSG filed a MR but
was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the respondents alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed

Ruling:

Petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents was for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and cronies (respondent Cojuangco is an alleged Marcos
crony). Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.

But the Court has already settled said section of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents. Thus, the
prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated
in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.

Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in
15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. Since the acts
complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is
10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.

Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in accordance
with Section 2 of Act 3326, which provides:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription, the same began to
run only from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge
could be filed as late as 1996.

The petitioner’s contention is not tenable. The investment does not appear to have been withheld from
the curious or from those who were minded to know like banks or competing businesses. The
transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC
to accommodate UCPBs investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the General Information
Sheets that corporations have been mandated to submit annually to the SEC. These are available to
anyone upon request. And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the
UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element that the action could not have
been instituted during the 10-year period because of martial law does not apply to this case. The last
day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended.
Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four
years of the remaining period of prescription run its course before bringing the proper action.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May 14, 1999 of the
Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of prescription the subject charge of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against respondents.

PRES AD HOC
FACTS:

• President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee).

• A behest loan may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery and may likewise entail
criminal liability.

• Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan
transactions between now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).

• After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors,
and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI.

• After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Memorandum, finding that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the instant case in
court.

• To start with, the cause of action has prescribed and the aforesaid Administrative and
Memorandum Orders both issued by the President in 1992, may not be retroactively applied to the
questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because to do so would be tantamount to an ex post
facto law.

• Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal complaint had prescribed; (ii)
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws; and (iii) there is no
probable cause to indict private respondents for violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019

ISSUES:

• Whether the prescriptive period begins to run on the date of the commission of the offense.

• Whether the Supreme Court can review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint before it.

• Whether the Ombudsman acted with GAD in dismissing the case against the respondents.

RULING:

• No. According to Act 3326, the prescriptive period begins to run either at the time of the
commission of the offense or the discovery of its commission. According to the Ombudsman’s decision,
the period of prescription began at the time of the commission of the offense. However, the Supreme
Court held that it would have been impossible for the State to know about the violations of RA 3019 on
the date of its commission since the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
‘beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive period begins to run from the discovery of the
commission of the offense. Accordingly, prescription has not yet set in.
• No. In Alba v. Nitorreda, the Supreme Court held that “it is beyond the ambit of this Court to
review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service”. It would also be
impractical for the Supreme Court to do so since the court would be swamped by petitions assailing the
Ombudsman’s dismissal of their complaints.

• No. The Ombudsman’s dismissal of the case was based on substantial evidence.

• Elements of a behest loan:

a. it was undercollateralized; b. the borrower corporation was undercapitalized; c. direct or indirect

endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d. stockholders, officers or
agents of the borrower corporation were identified as cronies; e. deviation of use of loan proceeds from
the purpose intended; f. use of corporate layering; g. non-feasibility of the project for which financing
was sought and h. extraordinary speed at which the loan release was made

PEOPLE V. PACIFICADOR

FACTS:

On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile co-accused, Jose
T. Marcelo, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an Information that
reads:

That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo Pacificador, then
Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned
corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine
Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with
other individuals, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith
promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the
reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a
contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that
time was P862,150.00 thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits,
advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the
amount of P777,005.50.

The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998
on the following ground that the court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been
extinguished by prescription.

SANDIGANBAYAN: DENIED.
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27,
1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription of the offense was the ruling
enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of
the complaint with the fiscal's office also interrupts the period of prescription of the offense.

The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The running
of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by
the filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body. In the case at bench, We find in the
record no proof, or even an allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint with the appropriate
investigating body which investigated this case, to enable us to determine with certainty if the offense
charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION: GRANTED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

HELD BY SANDIGANBAYAN: In Our resolution denying accused Pacificador's Motion to Dismiss. We

applied Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA
538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office or investigating body interrupts
the running of the period of prescription. This is where We committed an oversight. Instead of applying
Act No. 3326, as amended, . . ., We utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows that in
computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised Penal
Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. x x x

In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held that the
proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are "judicial proceedings" and do not include
administrative proceedings. x x x

The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976.
The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976.

ISSUE: Whether Act. No. 3326 shall apply in violation of RA 3019 as a special law and not Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Yes. Act No. 3326 shall apply in violation of special law for prescription of offenses.

It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of offenses
defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining the reckoning
period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, we
categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:

SECTION 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis ours)

The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.

This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence
to run on the day it was committed.

It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly committed the
crime charged "on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976." Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under the said
statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for
offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of
fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply
in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private
respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten
(10) years from January 6, 1976.

While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the
registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive notice
thereof to the whole world including the petitioner. Well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that
registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof to the whole world. The
registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Hence, even if the period of
prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the
Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.

PROBATION LAW

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO ABUEG V. CA

FACTS: Sometime on Feb 9, 1988, private respondent Orana, while driving a Yamaha Enduro motorcycle
travelling on the highway within the territorial jurisdiction of Silang, Cavite bumped a bicycle driven by
Francisco Abueg, resulting in his death.
Orana was charged and found guilty with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. He was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of imprisonment and to pay the heirs of his victim
P50k in moral damages, P50k in exemplary damages and P37,700 in actual damages.

On Sept 19, 1989, Orana filed an application for probation alleging that he is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the Probation Law and that he is sincerely remorseful penitent for the offense committed
and, if granted probation, he is willing to undergo supervision under such terms and conditions that may
be imposed.

The private prosecutor representing the heirs of the victim objected to the application of Orana for
probation and was virulent in attacking the psychological aspect or the state of mind of the private
respondent.

The RTC denied the application for probation and so with Orana’s motion for reconsideration.

Orana filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction and restraining order with the
CA. CA granted and ordered the trial court to give due course to Orana’s application for probation.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in giving due course to Orana’s petition for certiorari.

HELD: NO. Under Section 24 of the Rules on Probation, the order of the court granting or denying
probation is not appealable. Since there being no appeal, private respondent has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the denial of his application for probation
except for the special civil action of certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction and restraining
order which he timely filed before the respondent appellate court on March 27, 1990.

Petitioners argue that the challenged temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals issued on May
8, 1990 is unavailing since private respondent was already serving his sentence of imprisonment on said
date. Consequently, there was no pending action in the court below which may be restrained. Citing
Santiago v. Castro,7 moreover, a petition for certiorari is not available when orders sought to be
annulled had already become final and executory, and Manning vs. NLRC,8 that a final judgment cannot
be modified even if the purpose is to correct a perceived erroneous conclusion of facts or law,
regardless of whether the modification is to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land.

Petitioners also argue that the contested decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 cannot
interrupt the regular course of finality and execution of the Regional Trial Court's final and duly
execution orders of January 16, 1990 and March 1, 1990.

SC finds the foregoing arguments inapplicable to the case at bar and hence, devoid of merit.

There is no question that the decision of the trial court dated September 6, 1989 finding respondent
guilty as charged has become final but it is incorrect to say that it has become executory. In Palo vs.
Militante,9 this Court held that Section 7, Rule 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that
a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in
accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law of 1976, as
amended, which in part provides that the filing or an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal. In other words, the judgment ipso facto attains finality, although it is not executory
pending resolution of the application for probation.
It is true that the application for probation of private respondent was eventually denied on January 16,
1990 and so with his motion for reconsideration March 1, 1990. Petitioner, however, was of the
erroneous belief that said orders attained finality for failure of private respondent to appeal. Nothing is
further from the truth. Under Section 24 of the Rules on Probation, the order of the court granting or
denying probation is not appealable. Since there being no appeal, private respondent has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the denial of his application for
probation except for the special civil action of certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction and
restraining order which he timely filed before the respondent appellate court on March 27, 1990. With
the filing of the original petition for certiorari, it is clear that the denial of probation has not become
final and executory.

Neither can petitioners' argument that the whole legal controversy has become moot and academic as
the trial court, after denying private respondent's application for probation had already ordered his
commitment to prison on May 4, 1990 well-taken.

Indeed, private respondent's commitment to prison would have rendered his petition before the Court
of Appeals moot and academic if the same is implemented and private respondent started to serve his
sentence of conviction. Precisely, to forestall such an eventuality, the Court of Appeals issued its order
of May 8, 1990 restraining the enforcement and/or continuance of private respondent's sentence of
imprisonment. A restraining order may be utilized not only to enjoin the commission of an act but also
the continuance thereof, if the same has already started. Its essential function is to preserve the status
quo during the pendency of the suit. Accordingly, the timely action of the Court of Appeals precluded
the rendering of the case moot and academic.

Petitioners further contend that the private respondent is not entitled to probation for the simple
reason that in his personal being there is nothing mental, physical, environmental or the likes thereof, to
be corrected, rehabilitated, reformed and given individualized treatment outside of prison; that he has
not shown remorse as he has not asked forgiveness from any of the heirs who were left orphaned and
that he drives around unlicensed and under the influence of liquor. Petitioners also claim that the grant
of probation to private respondent will result in this "eventual release from his civil liabilities to the
unfortunate heirs of the late Francisco Abueg for actual damages of P37,700.00, moral damages of
P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,0000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency . . .
." 10

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in issuing the assailed order. The
system of probation was established as a less costly alternative to the government in the imprisonment
of offenders. It is a disposition under which an offender, after conviction and sentence, is released from
imprisonment only. He is not released from his civil liabilities. The condition usually imposed in the grant
of probation as embodied in the post sentence investigation report is that the offender pays his civil
indemnity which in this case amounts to a total of P137,700.00. 11 Contrary to petitioners' belief, the
granting of probation will allow private respondent to secure a stable job which will enable him to pay
the adjudged civil liabilities.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court, the petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.
FRANCISCO V. CA

Petitioner, President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans Company, failed to control his outburst and
blurted: “You employees in this office are all tanga, sons of bitches, bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . .
Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.” Thus for humiliating his employees, he
was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in 5 separate Information instituted by 5 of his
employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on 4 different days.

The MeTC of Makati found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in 4 of the 5 cases filed against him
sentencing him to a prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional "in
each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)." He was however
acquitted in one case for persistent failure of the offended party to appear and testify. Not satisfied with
the decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to the RTC. The
RTC affirmed his conviction but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion
or obfuscation. Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced “in each case to a straight penalty of 8 months
imprisonment.”

The decision of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC
which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested, petitioner filed an
application for probation which the MeTC denied. Forthwith, he went to the CA on certiorari but his
petition was dismissed. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which
affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed?

HELD:

NO. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. The law expressly requires that an accused must not
have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation.

Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are
not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an
applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for probation. The multiple prison terms are
distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, then
he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is
immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period.
In this case, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Thus, even if petitioner
was supposed to have served his prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision
correccional 16 times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the 4 information, he was charged
with having defamed the 4 private complainants on 4 different, separate days, he was still eligible for
probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable. Consequently, in appealing
the decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.

PADUA V. PP

FACTS:

Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Pasig of violating Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,” for
selling dangerous drugs. Padua entered a plea of not guilty.

During the pre-trial conference, the counsel of Padua of manifested that his client was willing to
withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted under Section
70 of R.A. No. 9165 to first-time offenders. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.

The RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged. After the judgment of conviction, he subsequently
filed a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of
the benefits under P.D. No. 968 (The Probation Law of 1976) and Sec. 70 of R.A. No. 9165. The Chief
Probation and Parole Officer Josefina Pasana recommended Padua to be placed on probation. Judge
Agnes Reyes-Carpio, however, denied the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Sec. 24 of
R.A. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law. The CA denied the Petition for Certiorari filed by Padua.

ISSUE: Whether or not Padua may avail of the privilege of probation

HELD:

No, Padua may not avail of the privilege of probation for it is clear under Section 24 of R.A. No.
9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking or phishing regardless of the penalty imposed cannot
avail of the privilege of probation granted under the P.D. No. 968. Neither can he argue that his right
under R.A. No. 9344 (The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) was violated. Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC (Rule of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) cannot likewise be applied in this case.
Section 68 of R.A. No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of
sentence and not probation. Suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. Act No. 9344 could no
longer be retroactively applied for Padua’s benefit. Section 38 of R.A. Act No. 9344 provides that once a
child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment
of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section
40 of R.A. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Padua
has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes
of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far
as his case is concerned.

Arnel Colinares vs. People

FACTS:

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated
homicide Complainant Rufino testified he and Jesus went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Jesus
took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck
Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as
Jesus fled Ananias testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside.
Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him
out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.

A Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along
the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino
chose to go home after initial treatment.

Arnel claimed self-defense. When he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel
asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,
causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel
but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When
Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the
attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. He voluntarily
surrendered

The RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was
only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision

Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a
new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable.

ISSUE:
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable
penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

HELD:

YES. Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino
out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds
that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide While
Dr. testified that "head injuries are always very serious,"he could not categorically say that Rufino’s
wounds in this case were "fatal." Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication
that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The
wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight
days. there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino
would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for
attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only
to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be
deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such
privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds
that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to
grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial
court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay
for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation.

Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did
not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal,
I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him
that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal
from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply
for that privilege

The Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is
an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done
him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the right
to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The
underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not
served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.

If the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending
him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a
penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.

what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two
years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation.

BALA V. MARTINEZ

FACTS:

The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen
which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in
effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. The trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala
guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document.

The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the lower court's
decision.

After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, the petitioner
applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge. The petitioner was then placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein.

The probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his
residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Piñas. The probation officer verbally granted
the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired one year after the order granting the
same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent
probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.

The respondent filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before the RTC presided over by
the respondent judge.

The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

The petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no longer under probation,
his probation period having terminated. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he
contended.

As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's probation, the
respondent probation officer filed a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time
attaching his progress report on supervision. 6 The same motion, however, became the subject of a
"Manifestation," which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate;
instead, he was submitting a supplemental report 7 which recommended the revocation of probation
"in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation,
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had already
expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the venue of the case from the
RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its
jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Piñas the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D.
No. 968, which provides

Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...

Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control
over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in
such a case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be
furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the
probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by
the court which granted the probation.

As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court.

HELD:

The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which amends section 4 of P.D. 968,
clearly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."

However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990, which went in force on January 15,
1985 cannot be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the motion to dismiss and/or strike
out the motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the issue of the petitioner's transfer of
residence. The motion did not touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation. The respondent
judge has not yet heard and received evidence, much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor
General submits that the present petition is premature.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the
probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.

Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score:

See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report
and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the
probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon
the case is deemed terminated.

Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation.
Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation law.
Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such issuance
can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed the period set in
the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of incarceration, is deemed the
appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review of the records
compels a revocation of the probation without the need of further proceedings in the trial court which,
after all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow the
petitioner to further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible society.
Precisely he was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give
him hope — hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight
and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.

A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because he (probation
officer) is in the best position to report all information relative to the conduct and mental and physical
condition of the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and community resources
that he may avail himself of when necessary. Indeed, it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes
the supervision and reform of the probationer through a personalized, individualized, and community-
based rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On the basis of his final report, the court can
determine whether or not the probationer may be released from probation.

We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had neglected to submit his report and
recommendation. For, as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial court could not issue the order
of final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order of final discharge which would restore the
probationer's suspended civil rights. In the absence of the order of final discharge, the probation would
still subsist, unless otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are going to do. We are
revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be emancipated from the yoke if
not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the conditions of his probation,
among which are:

xxx

4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;

xxx

6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation that will be prescribed by the
Probation Officer. 9

These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-compliance has defeated the
very purposes of the probation law, to wit:

(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized
treatment;

(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he
were to serve a prison sentence; and

(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 10

By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the probation program. Instead of
utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate himself as a productive, law abiding, and
socially responsible member of society, he continued in his wayward ways — falsifying public or official
documents.

Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons, Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and Efren
Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public and/or official documents (U.S. Passports), under Article
172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 29100, 29101, 29102, 29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each of them in all five (5)
cases a prison term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years also of prison
correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the accessory penalties thereof, and to pay the
costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification by granting
restitution of the amounts they collected from the offended private parties. The judgment has since
become final. As a matter of fact, for failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of judgment
despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala on July 10, 1989. A warrant of arrest
against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 and this warrant has not yet been implemented because Bala
absconded. These facts are evident and constitute violations of the conditions of his probation. Thus,
the revocation of his probation is compelling.

At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for
violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall
immediately be brought before the court for a hearing which may be informal and summary, of the
violation charged. ... If the violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and
modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence
originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions
thereof shall not be appealable. 11

(Emphasis supplied.)

The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so that he can
serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is of no
moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can there be a
deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six
months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on "probation"
is not a "sentence," but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final
judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions
are violated." 13

Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred by law on a
person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special enjoyment of a good or exemption
from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law to some persons. 14 Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 15 If the probationer
has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred from revoking
such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if probation is not revoked.

ALMERO V. PP

FACTS: Petitioner is the accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
multiple physical injuries. Trial ensued and the MTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Petitioner filed an Application for Probation, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction only upon
being served the warrant for his arrest. Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his application on the
ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform
the court of his change of address. MTC denied his application.

The RTC sets aside MTC ruling and remands it back to MTC. The CA ruled that the RTC should have
confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for probation.

ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to probation?

HELD: NO. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the
State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation
rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: Probation is a special privilege granted by the state
to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible
convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an
appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on
the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for
probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction.

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically
opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment.
The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led
to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to
put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the sentence is
probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the
accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or
apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an
appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the
filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other defects imputed
by petitioner to the RTC, the SC concur with the findings of the CA:

(x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion. He blames
Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address but Atty.
Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal offer of
evidence since all notices sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this court since
2001. If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with notations
‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’?

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL V. PP

FACTS:

Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law have been initiated by the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites started when the neophytes were met
by some members of the mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They were
consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be happening during the days when they will
be initiated. They were informed that there will be physical beatings and that the neophytes can quit
anytime they want. They were brought to another house to commence their initiation.

The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before they got off the van. Members of the
fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they alighted from the van. Several initiation rites were
experienced by the neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and rounds. They were asked to recite
provisions and principles of the fraternity and were hit everytime they made a mistake.

Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the initiation rites (Victorino) to
reopen the initiation. Fraternity members subjected neophytes to paddling and additional hours of
physical pain. After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that night, he was
feeling cold and his condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on
arrival.

Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with reclusion perpetua.

On January 10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. 19 of the the accused were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found guilty of slight
physical injuries, and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rue 45 on the grounds that the CA
made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death
of Party on 10 August 2011.

ISSUE:

Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is extinguished by death

RULING:

Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took note of counsel for
petitioner’s Notice of Death when it has been received while the petition was pending resolution.
Personal penalties refer to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while pecuniary penalties
refer to fines, costs, civil liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code states that the criminal liability of
a convict for personal penalties is totally extinguished by death of the convict. His pecuniary penalty has
been extinguished since the death of the accused happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the
death of the petitioner for both personal and pecuniary penalties including his civil liability has ended.
His petition has also been dismissed and the criminal case against him has been closed and terminated.

CIVIL LIABILITY

PP V. IRENEO JUGUETA

n Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad
Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber .22 firearm, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the
following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus,
directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."

and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 V% years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was
charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of
Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts,
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina,
his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and
who are minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings,
one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a
certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a
firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that
Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the
Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.4 Thus,
upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.5

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto,
namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of
the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not
tell what kind of ammunitions were used.6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6,
2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of
their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the
covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly
saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto
identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then
uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon" Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa
kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea
for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in
an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the
direction where his family huddled together in their hut.7

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young
daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and
his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died
on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive
her.8

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied
that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a
case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's
testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre,
was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living
for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses
admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10

Finding appellant's defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the
trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants,
conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to
indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the
death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the
sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in
the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs,

SO ORDERED.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G,
reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correctional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.13

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court
issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs.
Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively
discussed their positions before the CA.15

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony,
such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically
identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto's children.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual
findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-
examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.16

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that
appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and
simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all
of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house
that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have
light in your house?

A: Yes., sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.

xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm? A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were having one firearm each?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?

A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?

A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?

A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line
(sic) down face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?

A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to
them?

A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

x x x17

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters
because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is
not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such
case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to
the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to
identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which
is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.19
The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to
qualify a killing as murder.20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because
treachery attended the killing of Norberto's two children, thus:

xxx Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was
stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilbcrto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores].
They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at
them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his
children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13
years old and 3 lA years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly
overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the
attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend
themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the
night, xxx21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People
v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim
without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years,
cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court
held:

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner
the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted
by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown
by the use of firearms, the words uttered24 during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the
crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court's finding that appellant is liable for attempted
murder, viz.:

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by
suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when
Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming
their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would
surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina
but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the
crime committed.25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the
very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant's
firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's
credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to
speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to
trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrators of the crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid
and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not
conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People28 that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the
trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or
revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its
first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility
and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.29

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or
exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent
reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of
Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution
evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the
crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify
the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of
the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing
penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate
counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show
that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the
victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply
with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must
charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st
Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused
the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his
defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in
his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a
motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of
Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.31 Appellant can
therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during
trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in
Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in
the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There
are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the
first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in
firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms,
intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case,
indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several
individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed
cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each
gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."36

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as
an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for
the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

xxx the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of
Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts,
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere."
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party
provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor.40 The testimony of Norberto established
the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his
entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have
appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of
murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2)
counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder,
the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any
of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to
impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for
each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards
criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of
criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral,
and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some
instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages,
which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.42

This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable."

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by
the Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant,
had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused,
which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a
person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also
ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the
law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing
the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it.44

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable
of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,
the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1)
injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
cases expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047 of the Civil Code, x x x.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded
for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."48 They may also be considered
and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the
plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the
reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and]
mental distress."49

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs ofRey Castillon: "[T]he
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."50

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or
the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms
are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity
and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted,53 the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant

ANITA TAN V. STANDARD VACUUM AND RURAL TRANSIT

Facts:

Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials based in the City of Manila, Philippines. On May
3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery to the Rural Transit Company at its
garage at Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, of 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck
trailer. The truck was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline
was being discharged to the underground tank, it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the
truck across the Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street he abandoned the
truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first street causing the buildings on that side to
be burned and destroyed. The house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she
spent P12,000.Julito Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico were charged with arson through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of Manila but were acquitted because their negligence was not proven and the
fire was due to an unfortunate accident.

Anita Tan filed an action against the Standard Vacuum Oil Company and the Rural Transit Company;,
including the two employees, seeking to recover the damages she has suffered for the destruction of her
house. On the other hand, defendants filed separate motions to dismiss alleging in substance that (a)
plaintiff's action is barred by prior judgment and (b) plaintiff's complaint states no cause of action; and
this motion having been sustained.

The lower court dismissed this case in view of the acquittal of the two employees of defendant Standard
Vacuum Oil Company who were charged with arson through reckless imprudence and ruled that
accused were not guilty of the acts charged because of the fire was accidental. It ruled further that "the
accused Imigidio Rico cannot in any manner be held responsible for the fire to the three houses and
goods therein because he was not the cause of it, and he took all the necessary precautions against such
contingency as he was confronted with. The evidence throws no light on the cause of fire.

However, Anita Tan did not make any reservation of her right to file a separate civil action against the
accused as required by the Rules of Court Rule 107, section 1-(a). As Anita Tan failed to make
reservation, and the accused were acquitted, the lower court ruled that she is now barred from filing
this action against the defendants.

Issue:

Whether the avoidance of greater evil makes one still civilly liable.

Ruling:

Yes. As a rule, "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from the declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist" (Rule 107, section 1-d, Rules of Court). This means that the acquittal of the accused
from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise and did not exist. Julito Sto. Domingo and
Igmidio Rico were acquitted since they were not responsible for the fire that destroyed the house of the
plaintiff,—which as a rule will not necessarily extinguish their civil liability,—but the court went further
by stating that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident
for which the accused cannot be held responsible. The court ruled that such declaration fits well into the
exception of the rule which exempts the two accused from civil liability. When the court acquitted the
accused because the fire was due to an unfortunate accident it actually said that the fire was due to a
fortuitous event for which the accused are not to blame. It actually exonerated them from civil liability.

On the other hand, the principle of res judicata cannot apply to Standard Vacuum and Rural Transit for
the reason that they were not included as co-accused in the criminal case. Not having been included in
the criminal case they cannot enjoy the benefit resulting from the acquittal of the accused. This benefit
can only be claimed by the accused if a subsequent action is later taken against them under the Revised
Penal Code. And this action can only be maintained if proper reservation is made and there is no express
declaration that the basis of the civil action has not existed. It is, therefore, an error for the lower court
to dismiss the case against these two defendants more so when their civil liability is predicated or facts
other than those attributed to the two employees in the criminal case.

The company failed to take the necessary precautions or measures to insure safety and avoid harm to
person and damage to property as well as to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demanded, thereby causing the gasoline they were unloading to catch
fire. There is no need for the plaintiff to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action, for
as this court already held in a number of cases, such reservation is not necessary when the civil action
contemplated is not derived from the criminal liability but one based on culpa aquiliana under the Old
Civil Code (articles 1902 to 1910).

On Rural Transit Co., it is predicated on a special provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, article 101,
Rule 2, of said Code provides:
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they have received.

3. After the trial, said defendants were acquitted and defendant Julio Sto. Domingo was acquitted, on
the ground that he so acted causing damage to another in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, under
article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as shown in the decision of this Honorable Court in
said case, dated October 28, 1949, which reads as follows:

Under the foregoing facts, there can be no doubt that had the accused Julito Sto. Domingo not taken the
gasoline tank-truck trailer out in the street, a bigger conflagration would have occurred in Rizal Avenue
Extension, and, perhaps, there might have been several deaths and bearing in mind the provisions of
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code the accused Julito Sto. Domingo incurred no criminal
liability.

4. That the defendant Rural Transit Co., from whose premises the burning gasoline tank-truck trailer was
driven out by defendant Julito Sto. Domingo in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented under article 101, second subsection of the Revised Penal Code.

So, the cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it appearing that the
damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of driver Julito Sto.
Domingo to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-
truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the explosion of the
gasoline deposit of the company which would have resulted in a conflagration of much greater
proportion and consequences to the houses nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this
company is one of those for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes
within the purview of said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be deemed a
bar to a civil action against this company because its civil liability is completely divorced from the
criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a separate civil action
does not apply to it.

The ruling for defendants Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico; but it is reserved with regard to
defendants Standard Vacuum Oil Company and Rural Transit Company, with costs.