1. Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v.

City of Zamboanga, et al

L-24440, March 28, 1968

FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur),
Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of
Zamboanga."

Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it
deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site
and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:

Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?

Should the city pay for said properties?

HELD:

If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use since it is
the only one that is available to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they
are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations,
as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.

If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law
would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just
compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of
public dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal
Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they
should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State,
otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself
says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

2. Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles

L-40474, August 29, 1975

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, the terminal portion of one
of its streets. Later it authorized the sale through public bidding of the property. The Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of
the land. The petition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still
part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be registered.
ISSUE: May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer?

HELD: Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because the street in question has
already been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become patrimonial property. The sale of
the lot was therefore valid.

FACTS: In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the city’s
development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently
opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder at
P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the land’s registration before CFI Cebu but the
provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the court later through Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was
ruled that the road is part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city council “may close any city road,
street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging
to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that portion of the city street subject of
Cebu Oxygen’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows
that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.”

3. LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon Lanzar filed an application for registration of title to a parcel of land, alleging that he is
the owner in fee simple of the lad in question and asking that the title thereto be registered in his name.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition on the ground that the land is a foreshore which forms a part
of public domain. RTC decided in favor of Lanzar holding that the property in question has been
possessed by the applicant publicly, continuously and adversely for more that 30 years. CA reversed,
holding that the land, being an accretion formed by the action of sea, is property of public domain and
not susceptible of appropriation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title to the land may be registered on the basis of adverse possession for over 30
years?
HELD:

No. The shores and lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and
no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain part of the public
domain and are of public uses, and, until they are converted to patrimonial property of the State, such
lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of
prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among
men, in accordance with the provisions of article 1936 of the civil code.

Furthermore, lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea, form part of the public domain; it cannot be appropriated nor can it be acquired by prescription.
When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard services, then the Government
shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof.

4. Director of Forestry v. Villareal

[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part.Facts:Ruperto Villareal
applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps
located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons,including the Director
of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the applicationwas approved by the
CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the
Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari.ISSUE:Whether or not the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation?HELD:The Supreme Court set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application forregistration of title of Villareal,

5. Laurel vs. Garcia

Salvador H. Laurel vs. Ramon Garcia, et. Al.

G. R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.

Gutierrez, J.

Doctrine: A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being
such.

Facts: The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots
being the Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property
(Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential
Property (a vacant residential lot).
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and
property and their suffering during World War II.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in 20
years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement).

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule
and listed under the heading “Government Sector”, through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June
1958. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building “for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy.” As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that
time.

During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to
Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange
of the construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the
Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but instead,
on 11 August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3, and AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987,
the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital
goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first “Whereas” clause. Amidst opposition by various
sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell
the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.

Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restaining order of which was
granted by the court on 20 February 1990. In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to
compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with
the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings
which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.
Issues: Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?

Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?

Held: No. The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was
specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy. It is of public dominion
unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed
to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to
the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State
as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be
the object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesn’t
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.

6. Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:

In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with
the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing
and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of
the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement
that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by
the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered
the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda
assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
“mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction
and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA
and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

Issue:

w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution

w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:

On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state,
the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer
of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.