312 EST1
[ ESTI [έσ π ], ΕΙΝΑΙ [είναι]
En g l ish th e r e is, th e r e ex ists, it is p o s s ib le that, it is th e ca se that,
it is, e x ists, is; to b e, to exist, to b e identical to, to b e the
case
► ft Y A res GIBT, HA, SEIN, TO BE], and ANALOGY. CATEGORY, DASEIN, ESSENCE,
HOMONYM, NATURE, NEGATION, NOTHING, OBJECT, PREDICABLE, PREDICATION.
REALITY. SPECIES, SUBJECT, THING [RES1,TOTI ΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ,TRUTH
Even the verb "to be," which Schleiermacher calls "the original verb,”
is "illuminated and colored by language' ("Ober die verschiedenen
Methoden des Obersetzens"). The Greek einoi [είναι] has or may
have a number of semantic and and syntactic characteristics capable
of giving rise to philosophy as the thought of being, in particular,
the collusion among the function of the copula, the existential
meaning, and the veridical meaning. It is thus, Heidegger empha­
sizes, that the Greek language "is philosophical, i.e. not that Greek
is loaded with philosophical terminology, but that It philosophizes
in its basic structure and formation (Sprachgestaltong)" (Essence of
Human Freedom, §7). Yet, this dictionary's project is in part to at­
tem pt to make distinctions among linguistic realities, the idiomatic
impact of fundamental philosophical works, and what Jean-Pierre
Lefebvre calls "ontological nationalism’— in this case, the projection
of a sort of Germany onto a sort of Greece.
Parmenides's Poem is fundamental both for Greek thought and
for the Greek language. The form esti [έσπ], "is,"third-person singu­
lar indicative present, which is the name of the route of investiga­
tion of the Poem, is even more remarkable since at the beginning
of a sentence it can mean not only 'there is' (see ES GIBT, HA), but
also *it is possible.' Finally, a series of key words and expressions for
ontology arise over the course of the works of Parmenides, Plato,
and Aristotle simply as derivatives of einar. toon [τό 6v], "what is’;
to ontds on [τό όντως 6v],*what really is, that is, true, authentic
being'; ousia [ουσία], 'being-hood,"essence,"substance'; to on
h fi on [τό όv p όv], 'being insofar as it is being'; to ti en einai [τό
rf ην είναι], the 'w hat it was to be,"'quiddity,' the 'essential of the
essence."
Finally, the question of the "is n ot'and of'what* is not is related
to the question of being from Parmenides on. It requires taking ac­
count o f two possible expressions of negation, prohibitive and sub­
jective (particle m i), or factual and objective (particle ou), mirroring
the difference between 'negation* in the strict sense (Gr. mi; to m i
on, 'w h at cannot be,"nothingness") and "privation" (Gr. ou; to ouk
on, 'th a t which as ft happens is not [such]"), as well as the various
combinations of the negations, which can complement or reinforce
each other. These peculiarities of Greek, which Sophists and philoso­
phers take advantage of, in turn shed light on the specific features
of the vernaculars th at are used to translate them.
I. Greek, th e L an g u age o f Being?
“T o u t ce q u ’o n veut m o n tre r i d est q u e la stru c tu re lln-
g u istiq u e d u G rec p rd d isp o sa ft la n o tio n ‘d ’l t r e ’ a u n e vo­
ca tio n p h ilo so p h lq u e " (all we w ish to show h e re is th a t
th e lin g u istic s tr u c tu r e o f G reek p red isp o sed th e n o tio n o f
“b e in g ” to a p h ilo so p h ic v ocation) (B enveniste, Problems in
General Linguistics), “T h e fact th a t th e d e v elo p m en t o f W est­
e rn g ram m ar b egan w ith G reek m e d ita tio n o n th e Greek
language gives th is p rocess its w hole m eaning. For alo n g
w ith th e G erm an language, Greek (in reg ard to th e possi­
bilities of th inking) is a t once th e m ost pow erful an d th e
m ost spiritual o f languages” (H eidegger, Introduction to Meta­
physics, 143). The no rm ally c o n tra ry view s o f Heidegger the
philosopher and B enveniste th e lin g u ist are in agreement
for once, in describing th e p riv ileg e o f einai [είναι], “to be,"
in Greek, w hich is o th e rw ise reck o n ed to be the source of
m eaning (H eidegger) o r o f c o n fu sio n s a n d mistakes (Ben­
veniste), w h eth er in ev itab le o r accid en tal. Like any verb,
"to be” has a “sy n tactic fu n c tio n ” (B enveniste) related to Its
“gram m ar” (H eidegger) a n d a "lex ical se n se” (Benveniste)
related to its “etym ology” (H eidegger). Jacques Derrida
analyzes this p ecu liarity o f G reek in te rm s o f the function
betw een th e g ram m atical a n d lexical functions of the verb
“to be”: “A lthough alw ays u n e a sy a n d w orked upon from
w ithin, th e fusion o f th e g ra m m a tic a l an d th e lexical func­
tions o f 't o b e’ su rely h as a n e sse n tia l link w ith the history
o f m etaphysics an d e v e ry th in g th a t is coordinated with it in
th e West” (“T he S u p p lem en t o f C opula”).
A. Lexical function: The semantics of einai
Benveniste, in o rd e r to m easu re th e sem antic peculiarity of
the verb “to be” in Greek an d in o u r “philosophical” languages,
takes as th e counter-exam ple th e Ewe language, where, except
for th e strict id en tity o f subject a n d predicate marked by nye,
w hich is “curiously” tran sitiv e, w h a t w e indicate by “to be”is
expressed on th e on e h a n d by le (God exists, he is here) or no
(he rem ains th ere), o n th e o th e r h a n d by wo (it is sandy), du
(he is king), o r di (he is th in ), w ith verbs w hose only relations
to one an o th er are th e o n es th a t we, starting from our own
m other tongues, p roject o n to th e m (Benveniste, Problems in
General Linguistics). H eidegger suggests som ething analogous
in an etym ological m ode, w h en h e brings up the three Indo-
European and G erm anic ro o ts a t w ork in th e uses of the verb
“to be”: es, in Sanskrit asus, “life, th e living” (which yields the
Gr. esti [έσπ], Fr. est, Ger. ist, Eng. “is”); bhu, bheu, “to grow, to
flourish,” perhaps “to a p p e a r” like phusis [φόσις], “nature,”in
Greek, and perhaps th e Gr. phaineshtai [φαίνεσθαι], “to seem,”
w hich yields th e Lat. fui, Fr. il fu t, Ger. bin); finally wes, Sanskrit
wasami, “to live, to reside, to re m a in ” (like th e Gr. astu [aaru],
"th e city,” and Vesta, vestibule, w hich yields th e Ger. war, wesen,
o r Eng. “was” an d “w ere”). “From th e th ree stems we derive
th ree initial and vividly definite m eanings: living, emerging,
abiding,” m eanings th a t we place a t th e level of the “existen­
tial” sense o f “to b e” (H eidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics;
Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics) (see NATURE, Boxi
for phusiy, LIGHT, Box i for phainesthei).
B. Grammatical function: The syntax of einai
Alongside this exceptionally sy n c retic semantics, the verb
einai possesses a gram m atical fu n ctio n th a t is no less peculiar,
1. Cohesive function and copula
E very verb has a co h esiv e fu n c tio n , allow ing it to struc­
tu re th e re la tio n b e tw e e n m e m b e rs o f a proposition
(“S ocrates d rin k s th e h em lo ck "), B ut “to be" has this func­
tio n p re-e m in en tly , It h a s It firs t as th e copula, guaran­
te e in g th e link b e tw e e n su b je c t a n d p red icate, whether·5
a m a tte r o f id e n tity (“S o c ra te s is S ocrates") or inclusion
(“ S ocrates is m o rta l”). It h a s It a se c o n d tim e—whence it*
p re -e m in e n c e —sin ce th is c o p u la tiv e liaison may be sub­
s titu te d fo r an y o th e r o n e: th e c o p u la , as long as we use**1

appropriate predicate, can rep lace any verb (“S ocrates is
drlnking-the-hem lock” is eq u iv alent to "S ocrates d rin k s
the hemlock”). From A ristotle to P ort-R oyal, th is analysis
structures predicate logic (see PREDICATION, WORD):
[The verb, including even to be and not to be] is n o th in g
by itself (ouden esti [ούδέν έστι]), b u t signifies in an ad­
ditional way a putting into relation (prossimainei, w hich
the medievals translate by “co-signify,” sunthesin tina
[προσσημαίνει σόνθεσίν τινα]), w hich can n o t be con­
ceived without its com ponents.
(De interpretatione, 4.16b23-25)
The verb itself should no t have uses o th e r th a n to m ark
the link which we make in our m inds betw een th e two
terms of a proposition; bu t only th e verb to be, w hich we
call a substantive, kept this simplicity.
(Grammar)
2. Assertive function and veridical sense
“A la relation grammaticale qui u n it les m em bres de l’enoncd
s’ajoute implicitement un 'cela est’ qui relie l’agencem ent
linguistique au systlm e de la realite” (to th e gram m atical
relation that links th e m em bers o f th e u tte ra n c e an im plicit
“that is” is added th at connects th e linguistic arra n g em en t
to the system of reality) (Problems in General Linguistics).
A “that is” would accom pany all o f o u r sentences, a t least
the declarative ones, ju st as a K antian “I th in k ” w ould ac­
company all of our representations. Once again, “to b e” has
this function pre-eminently. For on th e one hand, “Socrates
is mortal" asserts th at Socrates is m ortal, ju s t as “S ocrates
drinks” asserts th at Socrates drinks. But on th e o th e r han d ,
“is," as attested by the “th at is” w ritte n by B enveniste, o r th e
English “isn’t it?”—th e French n ’est-ce pas? b u t th e G erm an
nicht mhr?—is equivalent to a declaration o f th is declarative
force, a doubling-up or a second degree, w hile it also func­
tions as a substitute for any affirm ation, h en ce a general
equivalent that is as universal w ith regard to assertio n as th e
copula is with regard to cohesion.
This second function, called th e “veridical usage,” w as
recently foregrounded by Charles Kahn as ch aracteristic
par excellence o f th e Greek einai: thus, legein ta onta [λέγειν
τά δντα] standardly m eans “to call th in g s as th ey are “ “to
say the truth" (cf. Thucydides, 7.8.2, cited by K ahn, Logic of
Being). As such, it was able to provide th e g roundw ork for
the Parmenidean starting point all by itself. T hus, fo r P ierre
Aubenque, Parmenides “confuses” th e veridical, u n iv e r­
sal function (“to be” m eans “it is th e case, it is true,” an d is
contrasted with opinion) and th e lexical, p articu lar m ean­
ing (“to be" means "to be p erm an en t” an d is co n trasted
with becoming). With th e "paralogism " th a t consists in
universalizing the lexical particu lar m eaning in th e nam e
of the universality of th e syntactic function, th u s m aking
the two opposites, “becom ing" and “seem ing," coincide, we
arrive at the proton pseudos (first lie /first error), "founda­
tional to metaphysics” (“Syntaxe et sem antique de l’ltre " ;
cf. “Onto-logique").
This assertorlc function, w hich leads to th e veridical
meaning, is surely intertw ined w ith th e existential m eaning
ESTI 31
(to name ta onta is to name existent reality, W irkhrhkrit),
as well as the copulative function (“Socrates is mortal”
claims that Socrates is indeed mortal). It is in fact nothing
other than a symptom of the “pretension of being outside
of language” (the expression is Derrida’s, ”Le supplement
de copule”), or, in other terms, the specifically ontological
transference o i logos. The grammatical characteristic o f emu,
so rightly called a substantive, is th u s to be able to take rite
place of all the others to link them and to declare, in lan­
guage, in the world or toward the world, and in our thought.
“To be” is, alone, the matrix or grammatical projection o f
this “trinitary unity” be-think-speak o f which Parmenides's
Poem is the first manifestation (Hoffmann, Die Sprache and die
archaische Logik).
To evaluate this fusion or confusion between the function
and characteristic meaning of einai, we o f course have two
possibilities: we may declare it an accidental homonymy and
a linguistic obstacle to rational intelligibility, or a historic feat
and a mark of “the Greek conception of the essence of being
[Wesen des Seins, the being-hood of being]” (Heidegger, Intro­
duction to Metaphysics, trans. <170) as opening. Either way, no
one denies that it is a fact of language. (See ESSENCE. I. where
Mill’s comparatist position may be, m utatis m utandis, placed
alongside Benveniste’s, and Hintikka’s historicizing, or even
“historializing,” position alongside that of Heidegger.)
■ See Box i.
II. Esti: The Third-Person Singular
A. The route 'que esti'
Parmenides’s Poem. On Nature or on Being, is always referred
to as a foundational text of ontology. “These few words
stand there like archaic Greek statues. What we still possess
of Parmenides’ didactic poem fits into one slim volume, one
that discredits the presumed necessity of entire libraries of
philosophical literature. Anyone today who is acquainted
with the standards of such a thinking discourse must lose all
desire to write books" (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics,
<174). It is the paradigmatic text where this fusion may be
deciphered.
This is what the divinity says to the young man:
Ei δ’ άγ’ έγών έρεω , κόμισαι δέ σύ μ ύθον άκ οΰοα ς, α ϊπ ερ
όδο» μούναι διζήσιός είσι νοήσαι- ή μ έ ν δ π ω ς ί σ τ ι ν τ ε
κ α ι ώ ς ούη Ι σ η μή είναι, π ειθ ο ΰ ςεσ τι κ έλ ευ θ ο ς, ά λ η θ ειη
γαρ όπηδεΐ, [5] ή δ ’ ώ ς οοκ Ι σ η ν τε κ αι ώ ς χρ ε ώ ν έστι
μή είναι, τή ν δή τοι φ ράζω π α να κ ευθέα εμ μ εν ά τ α ρ π ό ν
ούτε γάρ 3 ν γνο ίη ς τό γ ε μή Ιό ν , ο ύ γα ρ ά ν υ σ τό ν, ο ΰ τε
φράσαις.
(Come now, and I will tell you (and you must carry my
account away with you when you have heard it) the only
ways of enquiry that are to be thought of. The one, that
[it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be, is the
path of Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth); [5] the
other, that [it] is not and that it is needful th a t [it] no t
be, that I declare to you is an altogether indiscernible
track: for you could not know what is no t—th a t cannot
be done—nor Indicate it.)
(U .l-8 ; Presocratic Philosophers, § 2 9 l)
314 ESTI

The status of the Aristotelian distinctions

> ANALOGY. CATtGORY. HOMONYM, SOPHISM

Aristotle uses, like any Greek speaker, the
verb einai in th e full range of its meanings.
As a philosopher, however, in the Metaphys­
ics. he discusses the variety of senses of being
and stigmatizes, in the Sophistical Refuta­
tions, for example, the errors of reasoning
and th e sophisms th at can be attributed to
confusion with regard to them. Whether or
not he is aware, as Benveniste is, of the rela­
tions between categories of thought and of
language (Problems in General Linguistics),
Aristotle proposes ontologically founda­
tional distinctions and constantly makes use
of m odern distinctions, sometimes 'uncon­
sciously,' including those that constitute, by
way of th e 'ontologies' of computer science,
th e structure of th e semantic web.
Being (to einai), or reality (to on [τό
δν]), is pollachds legomenon [πολλαχώς
λεγόμενον]: it is said in many ways, very
precisely differentiated from homonymy
(the multiplicity of senses is stated several
times in the Metaphysics, Δ 7; E2; Θ 10). In
one sense, which covers and even defines
the copulative function, it is said 'according
to accident' (to kata sumbebikos [τό κατά
συμβεβηκός]): "when one says 'this Is that,’
it means that 'that is an accident of this"
(Δ 7.1017812- 13). In a second sense, which
covers the veridical sense, being is said 'as
true (/ids altthes [ώς αληθές]), and non-be­
ing as false' (E2.i026a34-35). Further, there
are the 'figures of the categories' or “heads
of predication' (schemata tis katGgorias
[σχήματα τής κατηγορίας], 36; see WORD,
Box 2), a finite and practically invariant list
of angles of attack, of Imputations (what is
may be: 'essence, quantity, quality, relative,
in a place, at a time'; it may 'b e in a posi­
tion, having, acting, suffering,' to take the
canonical list of chap. 4 of the Categories).
The first category, however, ousia [ουσία],
a noun derived from the participle on and
translated by 'essence' or 'substance' (see
ESSENCE and SUBJECT, I), is the one that
determines the consistency and the sub­
sistence of the subject of predication: It
thus picks out the existential sense of einai,
and unifies the other categories that are
only said with regard to the ‘unique prin­
ciple* that it constitutes (Γ 2.ioo3bs-io; see
HOMONYM, II). There remains a final sense:
that o f'in potentiality and in actuality' (du-
namei kai energeiai [δυνάμει καί ένεςγείφ]}
(E 2.io26b i- 2), which modern linguistics has
not taken advantage of (see ASPECT), unlike
modern ontology (see ACT). This is the most
enigmatic one for us, as we do not really
distinguish physics (see FORCE, Box 1), praxis
(see PRAXIS), and semantics.

Betw een th e tw o routes o f inquiry capable of being con­
ceived, th e only one th a t we may know and express, th at
o f th e persuasion th a t accom panies tru th , is called: esti, “it
is,” th ird -p erso n singular o f th e p resent o f th e verb “to be”
(he men [hodos] liopds estin, th e first [route], th a t it is, 2.3,
rep eated in 8.1, muthos odoio. . . hos estin [μΰθος όδοΐο . . .
ώ ς a m v ] ,“th e w ord o f th e p a th /th e account of th e route,
th a t it is”).
If ein a i is n o t ju s t any verb, esti is not ju s t any form of it.
“The definite and particular verb form ‘is,’ the third person
sin g u la r o f th e p re sen t indicative, has a priority here. We do not
understand ‘Being’ w ith regard to th e ‘thou art,’ ‘you are,’ ‘I
a m ,’ o r ‘th ey w ould be’ ” (Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphys­
ics). E sti im plies its own m ode (the “indicative”: it is there, it
is th e c a s e , it is tru e—o r always already there), a tim e (the
“p re s e n t”: it is now, sim ultaneous with th e utterance—or
outside o f tim e), a n um b er (a “singular”: it is one, unique—or
w ith o u t num ber), and a person (the “th ird ”: it is the other,
ex terio rity —o r im personal, open).
Of course, as fn Latin and unlike in French o r English, the
indication o f a person (third-person singular) is sufficient
in Creek for th e expression o f th e subject: “is” ju s t means
“is,” b u t esti, w ith o u t a pronoun, m ay be “is,” b u t also “he (or
"sh e” in th e fem inine, o r “it ” in th e n euter) is.” Normally, o f
course, w hen th e subject is n o t expressed, this is because it
ju s t was o r it is easy to deduce ("Socrates arrives; [he, not
expressed in Creek] is ugly").
T here are thus tw o types o f tran slatio n fo r esti:
a. Those th a t presuppose a subject (“to suppose” and
“subject" would be expressed by th e sam e w ord if we
took up th a t them e, h upokeisthal [ύποκεΐσθαι], h u -
pokeim enon [ υ π ο κ ε ίμ ε ν ο ν ] ; see SUBJECT). The subjects
envisioned have been eith er th e closest noun, namely,
t h e r o u te itse lf, o r a n a m e o r p r o n o u n contained in the
G reek (“b ein g ,” “reality ,” “ s o m e th in g ,” “he,” “it”), which
w as t h e n lo a d e d w ith a m o r e o r less heavy metaphysi­
cal, p h y sic a l, o r e p is te m o lo g ic a l se n s e (reality, the true,
t h e o b je c t o f k n o w le d g e ). T h u s , J. B arnes translates
lin e s 3 a n d 5 b y b o t h “ t h a t i t is ” a n d “th a t it is not”-
“ i t ” b e in g t h e o b je c t o f i n q u ir y (Presocratic Philosophers;
“L et u s ta k e a s tu d e n t, a, a n d a n o b je c t o f study, 0; and
su p p o s e t h a t a is s tu d y in g O”). G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and
M. S ch o field d o t h e s a m e , a n d c o m m e n t: “What is the
‘[it]’ w h ic h o u r t r a n s l a t i o n h a s s u p p lie d as grammati­
cal s u b je c t to P a r m e n id e s ’ v e r b estin? Presumably, any
s u b je c t o f e n q u ir y w h a t e v e r —in a n y en q u iry you must
a s su m e e i t h e r t h a t y o u r s u b je c t is o r th a t it is not”
(Presocratic Philosophers).
b. T h o se t h a t u n d e r s t a n d in t h e v e r b o n ly th e verb. It is
h e r e t h a t t h e p o s s ib ility o f esti's b e in g a n “impersonal”
a ris e s (see o n t h i s p o i n t t h e d if fe r e n t classifications in
RT: Dictionnaire grec frangaise a n d LSJ). In Greek, the rela­
tio n b e tw e e n so -c a lle d p e r s o n a l a n d im personal forms
is all t h e m o re n o tic e a b le s in c e esti (o r th e pi. eisi [είσί])
a t t h e b e g in n in g o f a s e n te n c e c o m m o n ly means “there
is.” I t c a n e v e n ta k e a m o d a l s e n s e w h e n followed by an
in fin itiv e , “ it is p o s s ib le t h a t ” : th u s , in verse 3 of frag·
m e n t 2, “kai hds o u k esti m i einai" m a y be translated "and
t h a t it is n o t p o ss ib le n o t to b e ” (cf. 6.1, esti gar emai[futj
γ ά ζ ε ίν α ι], “ It is p o s s ib le to b e ”). W e m u st note that all
o f o u r la n g u a g e s , u n lik e G reek , r e q u ire a n apparent or
g ra m m a tic a l s u b je c t, w h e r e a s esti in Greek, or the pin· j
r a l eisi, a t th e b e g in n in g o f a s e n te n c e , is often follow"
b y th e “r e a l” s u b je c t ( n o t, a s in t h e poem by Rimbaud,
w h ic h H e id e g g e r lik e d t o c ite to explicate the giving
o f es gibt: “a u b o ls, II y a u n n ld d e bdtes blanches [in
th e w o o d s, t h e r e Is a n e s t o f w h ite anim als], but
 u n n id d e b i t e s b la n c h e s " ) . F u rth e r, n e i t h e r F re n c h n o r
G erm an is as f o r t u n a t e a s E n g lish in t h i s m a t t e r s in c e
th e y ("ll y a," “e s g ib t") c a n n o t r e p r o d u c e t h e s a m e a s
th e sa m e ( " th e r e is" in E n g lish ) (se e ES GIBT, HA).
To u n d e r s ta n d a n d t r a n s l a t e t h e e sti o f t h i s r o u t e , w e
m ust s t a r t w ith t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f u s io n in G re e k o f a s ­
se rtio n , c o p u la , e x is te n c e , g iv e n n e s s , a n d n o t r e s t r i c t i t to
one p a r t o r d im e n s io n o f its e lf, a n d h e n c e r e j e c t a n y p a r tia l
tra n sla tio n s, e s p e c ia lly t h o s e t h a t p r e s u p p o s e o r in v e n t a
subject, th u s b lo c k in g a w h o le s e r ie s o f p o s s ib le m e a n in g s .
They h av e all, h o w e v e r, b e e n p r o p o s e d o r e m b r a c e d , t h e i r
p ro p o n e n ts s o m e tim e s v e n t u r i n g t h a t t h e i r c h o ic e c o n ­
tains all th e o th e r s : b e s id e s “ i t is ” (B a rn e s ; K irk , R a v e n , a n d
Schofield), we find “it is th e case” (K ahn's veridical use), —
is— (A. M ourelatos’s provisional copula), i l y a (M . C onche’s
givenness). But no one offers th e com plete freedom o f
tran slatio n by e s t (is), w hich w ould allow th e poem to take
advantage of th e com bined “is," an d to th u s estab lish p h i­
losophy as a fact o f language.
■ See Box 2.
B. From esti (is) to to eon (reality)
The reason we should n o t assum e a subject fo r th is first esti
is th at, in a way, th e w hole poem consists in a n effort to con­
stru c t it. And th e reason it is essential to tran slate esti by “is”
is th a t we m ust be able to perform th e nom inal developm ent

! 2
The accentuation of esti
The Greek texts are initially given to us in the
form of scriptio continue, in uncial script (let­
ters resembling uppercase), w ithout separa-
( tions between words, without punctuation,
| without accents. Their progression to the
|&· form in which we publish them , which re­
quires among other things expanding a va-
I riety of abbreviations and knowing different
I forms of ligatures between letters, is obvi­
ously a source of mistakes. To ''em end' a text,
• to judge the plausibility of a confusion and
hence a correction, we m ust always pay a t­
tention to the conditions of th e transmission
of manuscripts.
Accentuation was codified not only late,
but according to different criteria. As regards
esti, accents distinguish th e type of use being
| made of the verb: most m odern authors
j. write enclitic esti as (έστι) to indicate the
copulative, predicative, or identity uses, and
orthotonic esti (eon) to indicate existential
and potential uses. This rule com pletes the
oldest rule of simple position, with esti (έστι)
accentuated when it is at the beginning (or
after words like alia, ei, kai, hop6s, ouk, Ms)—
actually the two rules overlap each other
j; since an esti at the beginning of th e sentence
or verse is likely to b e a strong, 'accentuated*
esti, with the sense of “there is,*“there exists,*
*lt Is possible*
This late codification, which governs
the distinction betw een th e existential
and copulative senses, nevertheless is In
danger of im peding th e free play o f th e
breadth of esti, Irredudbly sem antic an d
functional, a com plete fact of language,
and of requiring o verdeterm ined choices
with regard to a sta te of th e language,
and the work on th e lan g u ag e th a t is
being done. This is th e case especially in
Parm enides's Poem and Gorgias's Trea­
tise on Non-being. In any case, it marks
choices in th e Greek o f th e interpreters.
Thus, in Parm enides, 7.34, w ith th e sam e
accentuation, we m ay u n d erstan d esti as
a verb of existence (Simplicius, Beaufret),
or as autonym ous (A ubenque, O'Brien,
Conche, or Cassin; se e A ubenque, 'S yntaxe
e t sem antique d e I'itre ”). But depending
on how we accent verse 35. w e will un­
d erstan d it as autonym ous or as a sim ple
copula. There are th u s tw o possible accen­
tuations. a n d th re e ty p es o f translation:
τ ο ύ τ ο ν δ’ έ σ τ ι ν ο ε ΐ ν τ ε καί
ουνεκ εν έ σ η νόημα
ο ύ γ ά ρ ά ν ε υ τ ο υ έ ό ν τ ο ς , ε ν «μ
π ε φ α τ ισ μ έ ν ο ν έ σ τ ίν
ε ύ ρ ή σ ε ις t o ν ο ε ΐν -
(Or c'est le m im e, penser e t ce a des-
sein d e quoi il y a pensee [Yet think­
ing and th at about which there is
thought are th e same].)
(Car sans l i t r e oCi il est devenu pa­
role, tu ne trouveras le penser (For
w ithout th e being in which it has
becom e word, you will not find th e
th o u g h t])
(Beaufret, Rarmenide)
τ α ύ τ ό ν δ ’ έστι ν ο ε ΐν τ ε κ α ί
ουνεκ εν έ σ η νόημα
ο ύ γ α ρ ά ν ε υ τ ο υ έ ό ν τ ο ς , ε ν <μ
π ε φ α τ ισ μ έ ν ο ν έ σ τ ίν
εύρήσεις τά νοεΐν
(C ist une m im e chose q u e penser et
la p e n s ie < affirmant > : « e s t », car
tu ne trouveras pas le penser sans
litre , dans lequel < le penser > est
exprim i (Thinking and th e
<affirming> thought are th e
sam e thing: "is." for you will not
find th e thinking w ithout th e
being, in which < th e thinking> is
expressed])
(O'Brien. Le P oim e de Parmenide)
τ α ύ τ ό ν δ ’ έ σ τ ί ν ο ε ΐν τ ε κ α ί
ο υ ν εκ ε ν έστι νό η μ α
ού γάρ ά ν ευ το υ έόντος, έ ν φ
π ε φ α τ ισ μ έ ν ο ν έ σ τ ίν ,
ε ύ ρ ή σ ε ις τ ό ν ο ε ΐ ν
(C'est la m im e chose penser e t la pen­
s i e que « e s t » [Thinking and the
thought that *is*are th e sam e thing]
car sans lita n t dans leq u el« est * se
trouve formule, tu ne trouveras pas
le penser [for without th e being in
w hich‘is* is formulated, you will not
find th e thinking])
(Cassin, Parm inide)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aubenque. P ien e. “Syntaxe e t sem a n tiq u e d e litre.*
In Etudes sur Parmimde.Vol 2. Paris: Vrin.
1987-
Beaufret, Jean, Parmenide. Le P o im e . Paris: P resses
Universitalres d e France. 1955,
Cassirv Barbara. Borminide.Sur fci nature ousur
W ant La kmgut de flftre? Paris: Editions du
SeuiL 1998,
0'8rien, Q, and J. Frire. Le Poime de Parminide.
Paris: Vrin. 1987.
316 ESTI
of to eon [ τ ό & v ], “being,” from or on the basis of this "is"—to
create the first subject from the first verb.
The different stages all correspond to grammatical forms:
from esti, “is," comes the participle eon, “being,” in its verbal
form, that is, without an article. This is made possible by a
prior transformation, whose priority is indicated by an “in­
deed”: from “is,” we first see the infinitive “to be" come to
the fore:
Χρή τό λέγειν τε νοεΐν τ ’ έόν έμμεναι· ίσ η γάρ είναι (Chri
to legein te noein t' eon emmenai; esti gar einai).»
(It is necessary to say this and think this: [it is] in being
[that] is; is in effect to be.)
(6. 1)
(Regarding the variety of constructions and possible
translations of this sentence, see Cassin, Parmenides; to get
an idea of the breadth of the variations, consider: “What is
for saying and for thinking of must be; for it is for being”
[Barnes, Presocratic Philosophers]; “What is there to be said
and thought must needs be: for it is there for being”[Kirk,
Raven, and Schofield, Presocratic Philosophers].)
Finally, in 8.32, the nominalization of the participle yields
its definitive fullness of a subject to eon, “being.” We must
emphasize the role of the article, ho, he, to, descended from
the Homeric demonstrative, which confers the consistency
of a proper noun (in Greek: ho SdkratSs [ό Σωκράτης], “the
Socrates”; see WORD, ΙΙΛ), of a subject-substance (the differ­
ence between subject and predicate is marked in Greek not
by the order of the words but by the presence or absence of
the article). The deictic article enters thus into the formation
of the third-person personal pronoun, autos [αυτός], “him­
self,” ipse, which becomes Platonic terminology for the status
of the idea kath'auto [καθ’ αυτό], “in itself." Preceded by the
article, ho autos, it means idem and marks in the Poem the ex­
pression of the self-identity of being (see l/ME/MYSELF, Box 2):
Ταύτόν τ ’ έ ν ταύτώ τε μένον καθ’ έαυτό τε κεϊται χοϋτως
έμπεον αυθι μένετκρατερή γάρ’ Ανάγκη πείρατος
έν δεσμοΐσιν έχει, τό μιν άμφίς έέργει, οϋνεκεν οΰκ
άτελεότητον τό έόν θέμις είναι.
(Remaining the same and in the same place it lies on its
own and thus fixed it will remain. For strong Necessity
holds it within the bonds of a limit, which keeps it in on
every side. Therefore it is right that what is should not
be imperfect)
(8.29-32)
Thus, at the end of the route of esti lies the sphere of to
eon, with the very words used to name Ulysses in his heroic
identity when he is sung to by the Sirens (Homer, Odyssey,
12.158-64; see Cassin, Parminide).
III. Greek Ontological Terminology;
to ontds on, ousla, to on h i on, to ti i n einal
“We may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which
we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their
Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words
but, above all, the ‘grammar.’ If we may allude to some ear­
lier researches on the analysis of Being, incomparable on
their own level, we may compare the ontological sections
of Plato’s Parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh
book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics with a narrative section from
Thucydides; we can then see the altogether unprecedented
character of those formulations that were imposed upon the
Greeks by their philosophers” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 57),
As it happens, philosophers have never stopped creating
technical terms, ever more expressions to express more and
more intimately the par excellence nature of to on as it arises
here, exploiting the semantic resources offered by the most
common Greek, thus revealing the play of these resources as
a possibility for thought.
Thus, the adverb ontds [όντως] (made from the participle
on), which means “really, truly, authentically,” confirming
the link between the existential and veridical senses. It is
used in this sense by Euripides (H in d is , 610: “Did you truly
[ontds] go to Hades?" and Aristophanes (The Clouds, 86: “lfyou
really [ontds] love me"). Plato uses it in turn like everyone
else, correlated with alethos [αληθώς], for example, despite
emphasizing its literalness in context (“then it definitely
seems that false speech really and truly arises from that kind
of putting together of verbs and names”; ontds te kai alethos
gignesthai logos pseudes [όντως τε καί αληθώς γίγνεσθαι λόγος |
ψευδής]; Sophist, 263d). The Stranger can then play with So­
phistical panache on the fact that non-being, as an image
or seeming (eidolon [εϊδωλον]), is not “really/authentically”
(see REALITY) non-being.
STRANGER: Meaning by true, really being (ontds on [όντως
όν])?
THEAETETUS: —Yes___
S.: So you're saying that that which is like is not really
that which is, if you speak of it as not true (ouk ontds
ouk on [οΰκ όντως οΰκ όν]).
Τ.: But it is, in a way (esti pos [έστι πως]).
S. : But not truly (oukoun alethos [ουκουν αληθώς]), you
say.
T. : No, except that it really is a likeness (eikon ontds
[είκών όντως]).
S.: So it’s not really what is, but it really is what we call a
likeness (ouk on ara ouk ontos estin ontds hen legomenei-
kona [οΰκ όν δρα οΰκ όντως έστΐν όντως ήν λέγομεν
εικόνα])?
(Sophist, 240b3-13; see MIMESIS, I)
Simply put, an image is not really non-being, but the
reader is supposed to lose his footing in these matters, and
cannot count on the translator (thus Cordero: “That which
we say is really a copy does not really exist").
In any case, it is clear that Plato makes the adverb ontds
into a technical term by nominalizing the phrase to ontds
on [τό όντως όν], which is often translated as “authentic
being.” For the “friends of the forms" (tous tdn eldon plite
[44]), ontds on and ontds ousla [όντως ούσ(α] refer to real
being and real, unchanging, existence, which is the prov­
ince of reasoning and the soul, in contrast with becoming,
which is the province of perception and the body; it refers 10
the eidi themselves (Sophist, 248all; cf. Phaedrus, 247c7,e3:
cf. also Republic, 10.597dl-2, where the god, unlike the car­
penter and the painter, wishes "to be really the creator of

the bed which really is"; etnai onion kltnis poletis ontds ousts
[είναι όντως κλίνης ποιητής όντως οΰσης],” that is, the idea,
to tides [τό είδος], of “what bed Is”; ho esti klinS [δ εστι κλίνη]
[597al]).
These constructions become even more and differently
complex, with Neoplatonism, which intermingles the ex­
pressions of the Sophist and Parmenides with Aristotelian and
especially Stoic distinctions to yield, by way of ont6s onta and
miontis m i onta, “truly/really existents” and “not-truly/not-
really non-existents” a me on huper to on [μή όν όπέρ τό δν], a
“non-being above being," which contrasts with an "absolute
non-being,” “pure and simple,” haplds m i on [άπλώς μή δν],
and allows us to solve the problem of the definition of God
(Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus).
The same philosophical investment of common lan­
guage is found at the purely semantic level. We know
that ousia has its standard meaning, coming from the
law, of “property, fortune,” which implies belonging and
possession as well as actual and visible presence (we
thus read in Euripides’s Helen the following dialogue:
“Theoclymenus: Tell me, how do you bury those who
have been drowned at sea? —Menelaus: As lavishly
as a man’s substance lets him do (hos an parouses ou-
sias [ώς αν παζοόσης ουσίας]),” 11. 1252-53, Eng. trans.
R. Lattimore; see ESSENCE, III). This is the word, however,
that Aristotle subsequently uses to refer “chiefly and pri­
marily and almost exclusively” to his object of inquiry:
“And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has
always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt,
viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance?"
(ti to on, touto esti tis he ousia [τι τό δν, τοΰτο έστΐ τίς ή
ούσία]) (Metaphysics Z.1.1028bl-7). Later, with Epicurus
and Plotinus, we find ousiotes [ούσιότης] to mean “substan­
tiality” (Corpus hermeticum, 12.1), and the adjective ousiddes
[ουσιώδης] to indicate an aggregate (Epicurus, De rerum
natura, 14.1).
The nominalization linked to repetition remains the key
for philosophical technique. It is thus with to on hei on [τό δν
Πόν], “being insofar as it is being,” or “being qua being,” “and
not qua numbers, lines or fire,” of which the beginning of
book Gamma of the Metaphysics claims there is a science, the
inquiry into which is the work of the philosopher (l,10O3a21;
2.1003bl5-19 and 1004b5-6). Similarly for the enigmatic
to ti in einai [τό τί ήν είναι], which duplicates the question,
also nomlnalized, of to ti esti [το τί εστι] (the “what it is,” the
“essence,” as it is translated), to refer to something like the
heart of the heart of being—“the essential of the essence”
(see TOTI (N EINAI).
IV. Ouk Esti: Non-Being, Void, Nothing
A. The two kinds of negation, ou and me
1. £stl, oukesti and to on, to ouk on, to m£ on
Parmenides's Poem offers two routes of inquiry; which, since
they are contradictory, are apparently symmetrical: esti and
ouk esti, “is" and “is not" (2,3 and 5). The complexity of the
meaning of esti indeed goes both for its use in affirmation
as well as negatton: “is," “it is,” “there exists," “it is possible
that," "It Is the case’7"is not,” “it Is not,” “there is no,” “it is
not possible that, it is not the case” (see above, I and ll.A).
EST1 317
But the expression of negation adds another kind of prob­
lem since Greek has two ways of negating. One is by ou (ouk,
ouch) [ού]: it is a factual, “objective" negation, which is ap­
plied to a real fact or one that is presented as such. The other
is by me [μή]: this covers both “subjective” and “prohibitive”
negation, which implies a will and a supposition of the mind
(see, e.g., Meillet and Mendryes, Traite de grammaire compare
des langues classiques, §882-83). We find the latter mainly in
modes other than the indicative, related in fact to “modal­
ity” (subjunctive, optative), to express all the nuances of
prohibition, deliberation, wish and regret, eventuality, or
virtuality. Similarly, one may distinguish ouk on [οΰκ δν] and
me on [μή δν], “not being,” distributing all the nuances that
can come with a participle, whether more factual and causal
ones (ouk on [x], “insofar as, because, it is not [x]”) or more
adversative, concessive, hypothetical (m i on [y], “although,
given that, even though, it is not [y]”).
The contrast is maintained, of course, when the participle
is nominalized. Thus, ho ouk on, hoi ouk ontes, in the mascu­
line, is Thucydides’s way of referring to the dead (2.44 and
45). Similarly, to ouk on is used to refer to a possible passage
between being and non-being; for example, Melissus, a stu­
dent of Parmenides, denies becoming in these terms: “for it
would be in pain in virtue of something’s passing from it or
being added to it, and it would no longer be alike. Nor could
what is healthy be in pain, for then what is (to eon) would
perish and what is not (to de ouk eon) would come into being”
(30 B 7, §533). In contrast, to me on is what is not, not because
it is not, but because it cannot or must not be. To ouk on and
to me on are thus two distinctive ways of signifying “non-be­
ing," contrasting with the unitary to on.
In the Poem, however, once we advance along the route
of “is not,” ouk esti, we come upon the me rather than the
ouk, so much so that on this route, unlike that of “is,” the
verb does not give rise to any subject. To me on, a nominal­
ized participle, refers to non-being insofar as it is not sim­
ply non-existent, but prohibited, impossible (2.6-7: “for you
could not know what is not—that cannot be done [to ge me
on, literally, “the in any case non-being”]—nor indicate it”).
The choice of this negation implies that there is neither pas­
sage nor commensurability between being and non-being,
and that the route of “is not” is a dead end.
However, if we stick to the logic of prohibitive negation,
as the Stranger emphasizes in Plato’s Sophist, there can be no
“right speaking about non-being” (239b): to utter to me on is
already, from the fact of uttering it, to confer a kind of exis­
tence on non-being (the non-being); in addition, it grants it,
by way of the form of the utterance, a kind of unity (the non-
being)—two ways of going against the proper meaning of the
prohibitive expression whether we like it or not (237a-239b).
Whence the philosophical choice of reinterpreting this nega­
tion and making it only the mark of otherness, a distinction,
a difference, rather than of a contradiction or a prohibition.
“Each time we say to mi on, it seems, we say not the opposite
of on, but simply another" (ouk emnticm ti... all’heteron monon,
257b). In this case, against the background of the participation
of ideas in each other, the negation mi is brought back to the
negation ou, and both are brought back to affirmation—n ot
that every determination is negation, as Spinoza would say,
but every negation is determination:
3T8 E5TI

So w e w o n ’t ag ree w ith som ebody w ho says th a t denial
signifies a co n trary . We’ll o n ly ad m it th is m uch: w hen
“n o t" (me) a n d “n o n -” (ou) are p refix ed to n am es th a t fol­
low th e m , th e y in d icate so m e th in g other th a n th e nam es,
o r ra th e r, o th e r th a n th e th in g s to w hich th e nam es fol­
lo w in g th e n e g a tio n are applied.
(Sophist, 257b—c)
P lato , fo llo w in g G orgias, c an c a tc h P arm en id es in his ow n
tr a p b y s ta tin g t h a t to u t t e r n o n -b e in g is alread y to m ake it
be. T h e P a rm e n id e a n orth o d o x y , o n th e o th e r hand, w ould
b e ju s tif ie d in re d u c in g th e m ove in th e Sophist, assim ilating
n o n -b e in g a n d o th e rn e s s , to a p u re a n d sim ple en g ag em en t
in t h e w ay o f doxa, th is to o h u m a n w ay o f m o rta ls w ho do n o t
k n o w h o w to d istin g u is h “is” a n d “is n o t” (“race w hich does
n o t d istin g u is h , fo r w h ic h to e x is t a n d n o t to be (to pelein—
a rc h a ic fo rm o f einai—te kai ouk einai [τό π έλ ε ιν τε κ αί ούκ
ε ίν α ι]) a re re c k o n e d sa m e a n d n o t-sa m e ”; 6.9-10; see DOXA).
■ See Box 3-
2. Negation and privation
T h e d iffe re n c e b etw e e n “th e s e tw o p articles o f n eg atio n
w h ic h th e G reek lan g u ag e likely u n d e rsto o d befo re all th e
o th e rs" (Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction) subtly re.
aligns th e differen ce b e tw e e n n e g a tio n a n d privation.
A ristotle d iscu sses th is d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n “negation” and
“privation.” T hey a re tw o o f t h e fo u r w ay s o f “being oppo­
site ” (antikeisthai [ά ντικ εΐσ θ α ι]):
T hings a re sa id to b e o p p o s e d t o o n e a n o th e r in four
ways: as re la tiv e s [ta pros ti] o r a s c o n tr a rie s [ta enan-
tia] o r as p riv a tio n a n d p o ss e s sio n [steresis kai hexis] or
as affirm a tio n a n d n e g a tio n [kataphasis kai apophasis1
E xam ples o f th in g s th u s o p p o s e d (to give a rough idea)
are: as relativ es, t h e d o u b le a n d t h e half; as contrar­
ies, th e g ood a n d t h e b ad ; a s p r iv a tio n a n d possession,
b lin d n ess a n d sig h t [tuph/otes kai opsis]; as affirmation
a n d n e g a tio n , h e is s ittin g —h e is n o t s ittin g [kathetai-ou
kathita<]!
(Categories, 1 0 .1 lb l7 -2 3 ; tran s. Barnes)
Two k in d s o f p h e n o m e n o n , o f te n b ad ly distinguished,
arise h e re . N e g a tio n (apophasis [ά π ό φ α σ ις], from apo-, “far
from ,” a n d phaino, “t o s h o w ”), lik e a ffirm a tio n (kataphasis
[κα τά φ α σ ις], w h e re kata, “on,” “a b o u t,” re fe rs to “saying,”
i.e., p re d ic a tio n ), is in t h e f ir s t in s ta n c e a fact of syntax
(see SUBJECT, I). A ffirm a tio n a n d n e g a tio n a re contradictory

3
The "Treatises on non-beingrn or how non-being is non-being
| There is no correct expression of non-being.
} That means that to utter non-being, to m i
t ’ on, contradicts its existence, once we sup-
{ pose with Parmenides that being, thinking,
f and saying all belong to one another. The
j statement contradicts the proposition (see
jgf SPEECHACT).
This also implies that any proposition
I about it, first and foremost the one assert-
[ ing its identity, 'non-being is non-being,' is
self-contradictory. As for 'to be,' semantics
is inseparable from syntax. This is Gorgias's
I position in any case, and it initiates a long
j series— Perl tou m i ontos [Περί roO μή
δ ν το ς ΐ De nlhllo, Eloglo del nulla, and Glorie
del niente (see Ossola, Le antlche Memorie
i del Nulla), showing for the first time how non-
l being in a language, Greek In this case, is an
\ exception analogous to that of being—but
* much more interesting as only it can reveal
I the exceptional surreptitiousness o f being
and the proposition asserting the identity
I of being, without which there would be no
ontology.
I El μέν γάρ τό μή είναι έστι μή είναι,
ούδέν δν ήττον τό μή δν τοΰ δντος εΐη,
Τό τε γάρ μή δν έστι μή δν, καί τό δν
1 δν, ώστε ούδέν μάλλον ή είναι ή ούκ
ί είναι τά πράγματα. Εί δ’ όμως τό μή
• είναι έστι, τό είναι, φησίν, ούκ ion, τό
ί άντικείμενον, El γάρ τό μή είναί έστι»
τό είναι μή είναι προσηκει. Ώστε ούκ
δν ούτω ς. . . ούδέν αν είη, εί μή ταύτόν
έστιν είναι τε καί μή είναι. Εί δέ ταύτό,
καί ούτως ούκ αν είη ούδέν* τό τε γάρ
μή δν ούκ έστι καί τό δν, έπείπερ γε
ταύτό τ φ μή δντι.
(For if not to be is not to be, non-being
would be no less than being: indeed,
non-being is non-being just as being is
being; such that these things are no less
than they are not. But if, however, not to
be is, it follows that to be is n o t Such that
in this case... nothing would be, as long
as to be and not to be are not the same
thing. But if they are the same thing, in
this case nothing would be: indeed non-
being is not, just as being, if indeed it is
the same thing as non-being.)
(Gorgias, On Mellssus, Xenophanes,
and Gorgias, 979925- 34)
if we follow the argument, what is genu­
inely impossible is to make a distinction (the
krlsis o f Parmenides's Poem) between the
series 'n o t to be, non-being, non-existence'
(to m i elnal, m i elnal, to m i on, m i on) and
'to be, being, existence' (to elnal, elnal, to on,
on). As Hegel notes at the beginning of the
Theorle Werkausgabe, 'Those who Insist on
the difference between being and nothing­
ness must say what that difference consists
in ' Indeed, in order to make a distinction we
must be able to identify, and that is precisely
what does not work with non-being. In the
identity statement "non-being is non-being'
(to me einai esti m£ einai), non-being is not
self-identical since everything has changed
from one occurrence to the next ("it is as
though there were two beings"; Gorgias, On
Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 979339).
This is especially true in Greek: since the order
of the words is not rule-bound, the predicate
is only known by the absence of an article. The
required article before the subject is the mark
of its consistency or substantiality. It indicates
that any assertion of a subject in an identity
statement presupposes existence, or again
that to say thSt "non-being is non-being'we
must already have admitted that "non-being
is" (see I and Box 2, and cf. WORD ORDER).
Far from refusing to distinguish between
the different meanings of the pollachis It
gomenon "to be," as Aristotle asserts, Gorgias
in fact makes it clear that the problem, the
equivodty, in a word the sophism are the phi*
losopher's fault, since they cleave to Is”and
its ontological understanding. With 'being is 1
being' the difference between subject and |
predicate remains Imperceptible since the |
two sequences "being is' and "being is being’ j
confirm one another and even become Intel* j
twined, just like the existential and copula* j
tlve meanings of "Is| The traditional identity j
 statement exploits and hides the equivotfty
of “is" and turns It Into a rule. Only the case
of non-being makes it possible to become
aware of the difference usually written Into
the statement of Identity: the "is not" must
become the rule of"Is." And it is speech all by
itself that, in its constitutive linearity related
to its temporality, cannot help producing this
catastrophe, which the Sophist aims to make
heard.
These statements about the identity of
non-being are of course difficult to translate
and sources of error. In every treatise on non-
being, whether Sophistical and/or apologetic
In its alms, pure and simple non-being or
non-being beyond being, the difficulties are
idiomatic and inventive, related to the syntax
of negation, to the grammatical possibilities
of moving from a verb to a noun and the
other way around [II niente annientato is, for
example, the name of a treatise by Raimondo
Vidal [1634]) and to the names of non-being.
A good example is Charles de Bovelles's De
nihilo (1509), which attempts to deal with
the problems of the Creator, the creature,
and creation. It begins with the statement of
identity "Nihil nihil est,"*Le N£ant n'est rien*
(Nothingness is nothing), and then extracts
two lessons from it:
hujusque orationis que insit nichil esse
nichil, gemina sit intelligentia, negative
una, altera assertiva et positiva.
(from this proposition "Nothingness
is nothing" there are two readings,
one negative and one affirmative and z w a r n ic h t einerlei, a b e r d a s S e l b e im
positive.) S in n e d e s s e n , w a s im W e s e n d e n d e s S e n s
d e s S e ie n d e n z u s a m m e n g e h o r t
(Le livre d u η έα η ί)
(T h at n ih ila tiv e "not" o f t h e n o t h i n g a n d
One cannot help but notice the distance
t h is n ih ila tiv e “not" o f th e difference a r e
between the indpit "Nihil nihil est" and its
in d e e d n o t id e n tic a l, y e t t h e y a r e t h e
translation 'Le n^ant n'est rien," which, be­
S a m e in t h e s e n s e o f b e l o n g i n g t o g e t h e r
sides the inevitable word order, makes the
in t h e e s s e n t ia l prevailing o f t h e b e in g o f
statem ent of identity invisible. Perhaps
b e in g s .)
French requires som ething like a 'portm an­
teau translation' to retain th e affirmative (P r efa c e t o t h e 3 rd e d . o f V o m W e s e n
character of th e sentence: "le n£ant est d e s G ru n d e s)
n6ant" and th e negative extenuation "le
rien n'est rien'— each an equally acceptable BIBLIOGRAPHY
translation of th e attem pted identification.
Bovefles, Charles d e . Le Dvre d u ηέα η (. Translated b y
The most recent treatise on non-being is
P. M agnard Paris: Vrin, 1963.
no doubt the one written by Heidegger in
Breton, Stanislas. La p en s& d u rien. Kampen:
German, over the course of his work, from
Pharos, 1992.
Was 1st Metaphysik? and Vom Wesen des
Cassm. Barbara. Sv Parmenide. Le traite anonyme
Grundes (1929) where Nothingness appears
De Mefisso, Xenophane e t Gorgia. Presses
as the origin of negation, and not th e re­
Universitaires d e Lille, Editions d e la M atson d e s
verse. No doubt this is the inheritance passed
Sciences d e I'homm e, 19S0.
down along a "me-ontological" tradition,
Hegel, G. W.F. Theorie Werkausgabe. VoL v Frankfurt:
which mixes with mysticism and deploys
V. Ktostermarm, 1965.
the 'annihilating' activity of nothingness,
OssoJa, Carlo. Le anttche memone del nulla. Rome:
the 'nichtende Nicht des Nichts* in which
Edizioni di Storia e t letteratura, 1997-
we hear under the aegis of th e verb, first the
Taubes, Jacob. "Vom Adverb'Nichts' z u m
adverb nicht, then its nominalization Nicht,
Substantiv'das Nichts.' O b eriegungen zu
then the noun das Nichts; see Taubes, "Yon
H eideggers Frage nach d e m Nichts." In Vom
Adverb 'Nichts"). Non-being thus becomes,
K idtzur Kuitur. Fink Veriag, 1996. Translation
as Gorgias wished, though against his criti­
vn: From Cult to Culture: Fragments Toward a
cal intentions, th e measure of being— th at is,
Critique o f Historical Reason (Cultural M em ory
the being of existence:
in th e Present). Edited by C. E. Fonrobert and
Jenes nichtende Nicht des Nichts und A λ Assm ann. Stanford: Stanford University
dieses nichtende Nicht der Differenz sind Press, 2009.

propositions th a t c a n n o t b e sim u lta n e o u s ly t r u e ( s e e PRIN­ T h e d if fe r e n c e b e tw e e n n e g a tio n a n d p r iv a tio n is, i n a n y

CIPLE, I.B). From th is p o in t o f view , ou a n d m e a r e o n t h e s a m e
level: th ey are b o th a d v erb s o f n e g a tio n t h a t m a y a f fe c t t h e
whole proposition, m o st o fte n b y w ay o f t h e v e r b (ouk esti
leukon could b e tra n s la te d “i t is n o t w h ite ,” o r “i t is n o t t r u e
that”- i n co n tem p o rary ja r g o n , “it is n o t t h e c a s e t h a t —it
is white”), even th o u g h th e c h o ic e o f o n e n e g a tio n o r t h e
other, as we have se e n , is n o t in s ig n ific a n t. O n t h e o t h e r
hand, privation (steresis [στεςησις], fro m sterom ai, “t o la c k , t o
lose,” from th e sam e fam ily a s th e G e rm a n stehlen, “t o s te a l”),
which is often ex p ressed b y t h e a p tly n a m e d a lp h a p riv a ­
tive, affects only th e p re d ic a te , a n d is th u s e n tir e ly d if fe r e n t
grammatically. However, in so fa r a s it “d e p r iv e s ” s o m e th in g
of a predicate, it im plies t h a t t h e s u b je c t is c o n c e r n e d w ith
this predicate a t least a s a p o ssib ility , a n d th u s c o n ta in s a
certain so rt o f affirm atio n : akm & on esti m e a n s t h a t so m e­
thing is im m obile, b u t c a p a b le o f m o v e m e n t—th i s is w h y it is
strictly speaking sa id o f m a n , b u t n o t p la n ts (w h ic h b y d efi­
nition grow b u t do n o t move)» H ere, t h e n , t h e a lp h a p r iv a tiv e
and factual n eg atio n b y ou a re o n t h e s a m e s id e w ith r e g a r d
to negation In te rm s o f im p o ssib ility o r p r o h ib itio n a s m l:
what Is aklnSton, In w n o b ile , c a n m o v e (e v e n th o u g h i t is n o t
moving actually, ou kineitai), a n d it is n o t t r u e t o s a y o f it t h e
kiniton eirni, th a t it is " n o n - m o b ile ”
c a s e , a q u e s tio n o f p e rs p e c tiv e . A s to n e , w h ic h h a s n o e y e s ,
is o b v io u sly “ la c k in g s i g h t ” “ n o t s e e in g ” (m e n e g a tio n , a s it
lies o u ts id e t h e s p h e r e o f t h e p re d ic a te ). B u t f o r a m o le , it d e ­
p e n d s : if w e c o n s id e r it a s a n a n im a l w ith e y e s , t h u s b y its k in d ,
it is “ d e p r iv e d o f sig h t,” “b a d ly s e e in g ” (tu p h h s: G re e k h e r e
sa y s a ffirm a tiv e ly w h a t F re n c h sa y s p riv a tiv e ly : a-veugle, ou
n e g a tio n ), s in c e in g e n e r a l a n im a ls s e e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , if
w e c o n s id e r a m o le w ith re g a r d t o t h e m o le s p e c ie s , it is “ n o n -
s e e in g ” j u s t lik e t h e s to n e , s in c e n o m o le s s e e (M etaphysics*
4 ,2 .i0 0 4 a l0 - l6 a n d 5.22; cf. C assin a n d N a r c y s c o m m e n t a r y
in l a decision d u sens).
In a n y c a s e , t h e c h a r a c te r is tic o f p r i v a t io n is t o b e , a c ­
c o r d in g t o t h e p h r a s e o f t h e Physics ( 2 .i .l 9 3 b l 9 - 2 0 ) , eidos p 6s
[ ε ίδ ο ς π ώ ς]: “in a w ay fo rm .” A n d H e id e g g e r c o m m e n t s i n t h e
fo llo w in g w a y o n th i s “n e g a tio n ” t h i s p r i v a t io n (steresis z u r
A nwesung, a b s e n t i n g fo r p r e s e n t i n g ) , w h i c h m a y b e l i n k e d
w ith t h e g r e a t p r iv a tio n t h a t is aletheia ( s e e TRUTH, t.B):
Steresis a s a b s e n e in g is n o t s im p ly a b s e n t n e s s ; r a t h e r , i t
is a presenting* n a m e ly , t h a t k i n d i n w h i c h t h e a b se n e in g
b u t n o t t h e a b s e n t t h i n g ) is p r e s e n t ,
(Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of Physis in
Aristotle’s Physics B, l)
330 ESTI
“Remarks like this may seem subtle," notes Schelling with
regard to negation and privation, “but since they relate to ef­
fective nuances of thought, they cannot be dispensed with."
Different languages, of course, use different marks for them:
The German language has difficulty distinguishing
them and can only rely on the accent—if it refuses to
make do with Latin expressions. Indeed, it is impossible
to be confused as to the difference between est indoctus,
est non-doctus, and non est doctus. We can say of a new­
born neither the first, indoctus, since he has not yet had
the possibility, nor the second, est non-doctus, since he
does not find himself in an altogether impossible condi­
tion, but we will concede the third, non est doctus, in­
deed, since it only denies the actuality, but poses the
possibility.
( Historical-Critical Introduction)
8. The names of non-being:
from miden, "nothing," to den, 'less than nothing"
What does not exist has several names (see NOTHING). We
find, starting with Parmenides’s Poem, two ways of referring
to i t to mi on, negative symmetric of on, “being” (for you will
not be able to know to ge m i on, the [in any case and certainly]
non-being [2.7]), and miden, which is usually translated by
“nothing," rien, nichts, nada (miden d'ouk esti [6.2]: nothing is
n o t see Cassin, Parminide). This second designation, and its
translations, deserve some attention.
Miden [μηδέν] is in the first instance a negative term,
constituted like m i on: a me negation (mide [μηδέ], in this
case, “not at all”) followed by a positive term, hen [£v], “one”
(which would not surprise a Parmenidean, for whom being
and one are one, convertuntur). The etymology is obvious:
the Plato of the Sophist, for example, makes it clear to drive
home the point about performative self-contradiction; when
one says miden, "nothing," one says m i ti [μή τι], “not some­
thing,” that is, hen ge ti [ffv γε τι], "something one” (237el-2
and 237d7); miden thus means m idl·en, “not even one.” How­
ever, unlike to m i on, here we have a single word, and not
a composite expression: miden, like ouden, in a single word,
is the neuter pronoun we find even in Homer. With miden,
negation becomes an affirmed, even a positive entity, like
“nothing" or “no one."
In this regard, the difference between Greek and French
is enlightening: in French, rien, like personne, is positive from
the start. Rien comes indeed from the Latin accusative rem,
“thing,” and Littrd explains that: “l) The etymological and
proper meaning of rien is thing. 2) With the negation ne,
rien by negating any thing is equivalent to the Latin nihil."
From the twelfth century on, as shown by expressions such
as “pour rien,” “de rien,” “mieux que rien," or “moins que
rien" (RT: DHLF), the indefinite pronoun is used In the nega­
tive sense with the ne dropped out. We may then attempt
to taxonomize the names of what does not exist according
to whether they are in the first instance negations (miden,
nihil, niant, niente, “nothing," Niches) or affirmations: the
French rien, but also the Spanish nada (from the Lat. [res]
nata, “[thing] bom"). Above all, we may excuse the waver­
ing mind of a French translator or reader faced with a basic
sentence of Greek physics such as miden ek midenos [μηδέν
έκ μηδενός], source o f th e Latin adage nihil ex nihilo, since the
evolution o f his language allows him to h ear something like
“rien (ne) provient de rien,” th a t is, “everything comes from
som ethlng/nothingness com es from nothingness" (see Boxes
3 and 4). As a side note, we should also forgive translators of
Jean-Paul S artre for n o t finding th e w ords, in German, forex-
ample—even though S artre does w ork “like" Heidegger and
reform ulates his G erm an—to re n d e r th e difference between
rien, or le rien, and infant, o r le niant (Hans Schdneberg and
T raugott Konig are reduced to distinguishing them by low­
ercase nichts and uppercase Nichts [Das Sein und das Nichts},
cf. NOTHING).
■ See Box 4.
Let us take up again th e difference betw een m i on/miden.
Two consequences o f very d ifferen t kinds follow.
1. A syntactic blurring:
Miden is a com posite n egation, unlike simple negations
such as m i (similarly, ouden differs from ou). We then face
th e question of th e m eaning o f th e successive negations.
We cannot say th a t in Greek tw o negations are simply worth
one affirm ation. Indeed, ev ery th in g changes depending on
w hether we are dealing w ith sim ple o r com posite negations,
and according to th e ir o rd e r in th e sentence. The grammati­
cal rule is all th e m ore te n ta tiv e as it m ust take account of
th e subject o f th e negation, w h e th e r it is a whole phrase or
a word, w hich can n o t be precisely determ ined by applying
a rule. Here is how a w ell-know n gram m ar book treats the
question:
Greek had a t its disposal, besides sim ple negations (ou
and m i), com posite form s (oute/mete, oude/mede, oudeis/
medeis, etc.): follow ing th e o rd e r according to which
they are placed, th e negative value of th e phrase is
eith er reinforced o r destroyed. We gladly teach that a
sim ple negation, follow ed by one o r m ore composite ne­
gations, yields a negative reinforcement, whereas a com­
posite negation, follow ed by a sim ple negation yields
th e unreserved destruction o f the negation, th a t is, a total af­
firmation. This rule w orks only v ery broadly: in particu­
lar, it takes no account o f th e follow ing consideration: is
th e first negation, w h e th e r sim ple o r composite, applied
really to th e whole sentence, o r only to a word7
(Hum bert, Syntaxe grecque; th e bold and italics are in
the text)
We m ay understand th e Greek vacillation with regard to
such simple successions as: m iden ouk esti (composite I simple)
and ouk esti miden (sim ple 1 com posite), which would mean
things as different as “th ere is certainly being” and “certainly
there is absolutely no th in g a t all." On its own authority, It
would rath er m ean in both cases: "nothing is," “no, nothing
is,” th a t is, som ething analogous to th e simple propositions
miden esti and ouk esti, “n o th in g is," which only a Gorgias,
com ing after Parm enides, could varyingly decipher as "no
subject for is" and "n o t even th e verb Is,"
2. A new sem antic adventure:
Miden is, we have seen, a negative characterization
by design. But It becom es a positive entity capable of
I 4
Tht French n o expletive, a vestige o f m e
► METIS, Box 1, VERNEINUNG

Unlike Old French, which used simple nega­
tion with nr, modern French uses compound
negation. With few exceptions, (Je nr puls,..,
Je nr samurais..,) , the absence of 'forelu-
slfs" [pas, rnh, goutte, point, plus, rlen, which
originally denoted positive entitles—
Including rltn, from the Latin accusative rent,
something) gives the sentence a positive
value. Thus, In the statement *Je cralns que
Pierre ne vlenne," the omission of nr does not
change the meaning of the sentence, which
expresses fear at the Idea that Pierre should
come. This statement Is distinguished from
the statement 'Je cralns que Pierre ne vlenne
pas' which expresses the idea that Pierre
might not come. In the first, the ne has no
negating force. Whence the use of the term
“expletive," which, according to LlttrA (RT:
Dlctlonnalre de la longue frangalse), describes
a word 'which does not contribute to the
meaning of the sentence and Is not required
by syntax'The expletive ne would thus be an
empty sign. Grdvlsse (RT: Le bon usage. Gram-
malre frangalse) looks forward to the Immi­
nent disappearance of this 'parasitic particle*
(ed. 1969, S877b), also called 'redundant* or
"abusive^ (ed. 1993, $983)·
However, the use of the expletive ne Is gov­
erned by strict grammatical rules. In subordi­
nate phrases. It appears after verbs of fearing,
prevention, or doubt or after conjunctions
like d molns que (unless), avant que (before),
and sons que (without) and in comparisons
of Inequality. French usage is thus continu­
ous with the Latin usage 'timeo ne, timeo ne
non,' and the Greek 'dedoika me, dedoika m#
o u k " f e cralns q u e . . . n e ." je crams q u e . . . n e
. . . p a s,'w h er e , to b orrow a n expression from
H u m b e r t'th e r e is a n o b s ta c le in t h e principal
phrase w h ich s o t o sp e a k s e n d s o u t its n e g a ­
tive reflection" o n t o t h e su b o r d in a te p h r a se
(RT: Syntaxe grecque. §654)· In o c h e r w o rd s, t h e
ex p letiv e n e in t h e c o m p le tiv e retake or a c ­
c e n tu a te s t h e n e g a tiv e id e a e x p r e s s e d b y t h e
m ain verb (je c r a k e q u it n e vienne) a n d t h e
p o sitiv e co n ten t o f t h e su b o r d in a te p h r a se (>e
p e n s e qu'il viendraY. th is is p r e c ise ly w h a t t h e
inventive D a m o u rette a n d Pichon, la ter ta k e n
u p b y Jacques Lacan, call t h e ‘d b c a r d a n c e T
(RT: Oes m o ts d la p e n s e e , voL VI. c h a p . 4). a n u ­
a n c e that only French c a n still ex p ress.
M arco B asachera
B arbara C assin

normalization, “th e meden, th e nothing.” Meden as a positive
term (and no doubt also as a w ord o r signifier) is involved in
a different history th an me on. D em ocritus indeed creates on
its basis a word th a t does n o t exist, den [δέν] an d w hich th e
RT: LSJ describes as “abstracted from oudeis" (we fin d it o n ce in
Alcaeus, 320 L. P “in a doubtful an d obscure text,” C h an train e
clarifies, “where we tran slate denos by ‘n o th in g ’ o r r a th e r by
‘something’ (sic), and th ere is “n o relatio n sh ip to th e m o d e m
Greek den, ‘nothing’ RT: Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue
grecque). Democritus affirm s, according to P lutarch, th a t:
μή άλλον τό δέν ή t o μηδέν είναι.
(den is nothing o th er th a n meden.)
(F ragm ent 68 B 156 DK)
The doxographers w ho tra n sm itte d t h e p h ra se all offer
an intra-linguistic tran slatio n . For P lu tarch , th e so u rce o f
the fragment, den n am es th e “body” (Galen say s specifi­
cally the “atom s”; A 49 DK; see also S im plicius, A 37 DK,
tangled up with th e A ristotelian tra n sla tio n s), a n d m iden,
the “void.” We can u n d erstan d th e in te n t: D em ocritus n e e d s
something th at is not an on, a “being,” w h ich is n o t ev en
a ti, a “something” (a te rm th e Stoics fall back o n to avoid
Platonlc-Aristotelian ousia): a “less th a n n o thing,” th e r e ­
fore, to define this body conceived o f as n o t resem b lin g any
body in nature, conceived ev en to escap e th e physical, t h a t
is, atoms, indivisible. Den is a p u re signifier, c re a te d fro m a
mistaken cut (a m anifestatio n o f indivisibility?) o n m&ten
or ouden, m istaken since th e etym ology, w hich c a n still b e
heard (med’hen or oud’hen, n o t ev en one), im p lies th a t w e
cut at hen, “one.” Den suits th e ato m s since like th e m it is
a pure artifact, it is n o t even a w ord in th e language, it is
an ad hoc Invention, a m eaningful play, Lacan sees th is very
clearly, and retu rn s several tim es to th is jo k e by D em ocri­
tus, “who somehow req u ired a cllnam en,” and w ho th u s
in v e n te d th e w ord den to say n e i t h e r m eden (a g a in s t a “ p u r e
fu n c tio n o f n e g a tiv ity ”), n o r hen (“t o a v o id s p e a k in g o f
t h e one” [Le semmaireD. “G iven w h ic h , den w a s in d e e d t h e
c la n d e s tin e p a s se n g e r w h o s e s ile n c e is n o w o u r d e s tin y . In
th is h e is n o m o re m a te ria lis t t h a n a n y r e a s o n a b le p e r s o n ”
(“L’E to u rd it”).
N o th in g is h a r d e r th a n to tr a n s la te a w ittic ism . D u m o n t
(RT: Les Presocratiques) suggests: “Den [b ein g ] is n o th in g m o re
th a n Meden [th e void],” a n d t h e m e a n in g o f th e in v e n tio n is
im m ed iately lost. Diels a n d K ranz a re lucky e n o u g h to b e a b le
to rely o n a sim ilar in v e n tio n , a m is-cu t o n N ickts m a d e by
M eister E ck h art, w h e re w e h e a r t h e iht, invented to be op­
p o se d t o niht (serm o n s 57 a n d 58), a n d thus translate: “Das
N ich ts e x is tie rt eb e n so s e h r wie d a s Ichts.”
It is not unfitting that the paths of “Is” and “Is not” leave
us with this kind of impasse, alternative, and invention.
Barbara Cassin
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et rarsonnee. Introduction by M. Foucault RepuMcaticAS Paulet, 19S9. Fast pub­
lished in <600. Translation. A General and Rational Grammar. Mansion: Scalar
Press 196S. First published in 1 7 »
Auhenque. Pierre. “Onto-togique·· In fncyctapedtr pAdnmphiqiif un rverseOt, v o l 1,
ttkWers phJosoptuque, edited by Andre Jacob 5-16. Paris Presses Unlversttalres
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Bamei, Jonathan. ThefVesooofkPMosapbm. and tested. London: Routledge 1983.
Beaufret, Jean. P a m in k k . Le Palme. Parts: Presses Untvecsltaires de Fiance, 195s,
Benveniste. Emile. "Categoric de penske et categorie de langue,* *Etre‘ e t ‘Avoir,’
dans lews functions lingutstiques.· and T a phrase nominate.' In Probttmes de
Ingotsngue gtnM e, 63-74,187-107, and 151-57. Paris: GaRlmard / la PWlade,
1966. Translation by Μ. E. Meek: Problems in General Linguistics. Coral Gables, FU
University of Miami Press, 197V
Cassin, Barbara. PwmMde, Sur la noturn ou sur Hetant la langue de line? Paris:
Editions du Seoll. 1998.
Cassin, B., and M. Narcy. La dM sion du sens. Paris: Vrin, 1989.
Conche, Marcel. Parmenide. Le Prime: Fragments. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
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gins o f Philosophy, 175-206. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
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Euripides. Helen. In The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 3, Euripides, translated by R.
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Heidegger, Martin. DiePhysis bei Aristoteles. Frankfurt Klostermann, 1967. First pub­
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Rowohit Vertag*. Retnbek, 1993.
I ETERNITY
E ternity is g e n e ra lly d e fin e d as w h a t escapes becoming
an d tim e, w h e th e r it is a m a tte r o f in d efin ite duration or
o f b eing e n tire ly o u tsid e o f tim e . However, th e very word
“e te rn ity ” in d icates th a t it is firs t a q u estio n of the dura­
tio n o f a life (Lat. aevum , Gr. αίδη [αιώ ν]). Between these two
poles, across lan g u ag es a n d d o c trin e s, th e modulations can
be c onsiderable.
I. Eternity: D uration/Tim e
“E ternity” com es fro m th e L atin aetem itas, and was perhaps
created by Cicero to re fe r to a d u ra tio n w ith neither begin­
ning n o r end. T he te rm g o es b ack to aevum, αίδη in Greek,
w hich refers, like aetas (cf. age), to th e duration of a life, and
im plies a n "a n im a te d ” c o n c e p tio n o f duration (RT: Ernout
and M eillet, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue latine).
This g ro u p in g is d istin c t fro m a n o th e r way of thinking I
and speaking a b o u t tim e , tem pus in Latin, chronas [χρόνος] in
Greek, th a t co n sid ers it as d e te rm in e d (a cut, a fraction, a pe­
riod—th e L atin tempus h a s b e e n c o m p ared to the Greek temnS
[τέμνω ], “to c u t”), a n d th u s cap ab le o f being quantified, in
particular, as “th e n u m b e r o f m o tio n according to before and
after” (Aquinas).
See ΑΙ0Ν fo r th e m a in difficulties derived from this dis­
tin ctio n , th e h isto ry o f w h ich n o ta b ly intersects with that of
th e tra n sla tio n s o f th e Bible (saeculum, n o t aevum, is used to I
re n d e r αιοη, w h ich y ield s v ery su b tle distinctions and termi­
nological in v en tio n s).
On th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n tim e an d lifetime, cf. DASEIN,
ERLEBEN, LIFE. For th e re la tio n b etw e e n tim e and movement,
see FORCE; cf. FORCE, Box i, o n th e A ristotelian definition of
m ovem ent, a n d NATURE, WORLD.
T he linguistic a n d g ra m m a tic a l expression of duration, in
its relatio n to th e a s p e c t o f v erb s a n d th e ir tenses, is exam­
in ed u n d e r ASPECT.
M ore generally, see PRESENT a n d TIME.
II. Eternity an d In stan t
E ternity o u tsid e o f tim e is re la te d to th e instant (from the
L atin instans, “p re se n t,” a n d “pressing, menacing”), con­
ceived n o t as a u n it o f tim e b u t, o n th e contrary, as an excep­
tio n to th e c o u n tin g , so m e th in g im possible to measure. The
Greeks te rm e d it kairos [κα ιρός], th e possibility of an occa­
sion d istin c t from d u ra tio n a n d tim e: see MOMENT (esp. II),as
well as ΑΙ0Ν. C hristian th eo lo g y uses th e instant as iota sit*
“ev ery th in g a t once,” to co n ceiv e o f divine eternity: seeAlON
II an d GOD.
For th e rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n divine eternity and ethical
subjectivity, an d its e x p ressio n in Kierkegaard's Danish, set
EVIGHED; cf. CONTINUITET, PLUDSELIGHED.
M ore generally, see INSTANT.
III. Procedures of Eternity
R egarding th e w ay in w h ich peo p le attem pt to escape
from th e o rd e r o f tim e a n d e n te r th a t of eternity, [g
BOGOCELOVECESTVO, HISTORY, JETZTZEIT, MEMORY: cf. W®*1
LIGHT, Box 1, SVET, WISDOM.
> DESTINY, GLOCK, NOSTALGIA, PROGRESS
 EUROPE
The Languages and Traditions
That Constitute Philosophy
> ESSENCE, GERMAN, GREEK, LOGOS, SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED, TO TRANSLATE,
WISDOM
Philosophy came from Greece, as both Its partisans and detractors
remind us. Among the former, the Muslim philosopher al-Farabi
reminds us that true philosophy came from Plato and Aristotle [At­
tainment of Happiness). And the rabbi, who Is one of the characters
In the Kuzarl by Judah ha-Levi, explains that since the philosophers
were Greeks, they were not able to benefit from any divine illumi­
nation: "There Is an excuse for the Philosophers. Being Grecians,
science and religion did not come to them as inheritances. They
belong to the descendants of Japheth, who Inhabited the north,
whilst that knowledge coming from Adam, and supported by the
divine influence, Is only to be found among the progeny of Shem,
who represented the successors of Noah and constituted, as it were,
his essence. This knowledge has always been connected with this
essence, and will always remain so. The Greeks only received it when
they became powerful, from Persia. The Persians had it from the
Chaldaeans. It was only then that the famous [Greek] Philosophers
arose, but as soon as Rome assumed political leadership they pro­
duced no philosopher worthy of the nam e' (Kuzari, pt. 1, question/
response 63).
I. Translations
Everyone inherited something from the Greeks, but not ev­
eryone inherited the same thing, and not everyone inherited
it in the same way. The legacy was transmitted differently ac­
cording to the geographical region of inheritance: the Arab
world embraced almost all of the “philosophy" (including
science), but not the “literature.” The Byzantine Christians
of Syria did not translate Greek literature either. In Arabic,
Homer is to be found in only a few anthologies of moral say­
ings. The Greek tragedies were unknown, which helps explain
the absence of the drama in classical Arabic literature.
Europe alone inherited works in Latin, and in particular its
poetry (Virgil, Ovid, etc.). Nothing was translated from Latin
into Arabic, with the exception of Paulus Orosius's history.
Roman law continued to be studied in Latin for a long time
in the Christian Middle East, before giving way to the legal
traditions of the “barbarians," and then it resurfaced in the
eleventh century, notably in Bologna. It was long believed
that some part of Roman law passed into Muslim law (fiqh);
in fact, it now seems that this was only a provincial (foreign)
version of Muslim law.
Medieval Europe, on th e o th e r h an d , w as acq u ain ted w ith
only a few texts o f Greek philosophy: fo r exam ple, th e s ta rt
of Plato’s Timaeus, tran slated by Cicero, an d th e s ta rt o f Aris­
totle’s Organon, tran slated by B oethius. T he A rab w orld k new
almost all of Aristotle's w ork by th e n in th century, a n d knew
Plato through sum m aries, b u t Europe h a d to w ait u n til th e
thirteenth century to have th e com plete w orks o f Aristotle
available. Plato's Meno an d Phaedo w ere tra n sla te d in to Latin
in the thirteenth century b u t n o t w idely dissem inated. Europe
had to wait for th e o th e r dialogues u n til M arsillo Ficino in th e
fifteenth century.
The transmission o f knowledge was often understood as a
translatio studiorum, a purely local displacement, rath er like
moving house. In reality it never happened th a t way. Figura­
tively speaking, as if in accordance w ith a sort o f hydraulic
law of connecting vessels, culture tended to level itself out
through the transmission o f the most advanced civilization
toward others that were less well-off culturally. Translations
presume a potential public, and th a t public dem and precedes
its satisfaction. In Europe, the movement o f translations re­
sponded to a growing need for a set o f intellectual tools set in
train by the Papal Revolution a t th e end of th e eleventh cen­
tury, following the Investiture Controversy, and the revival
of juridical studies th at accompanied it.
However, works that could not really be used were eith er
not translated at all or were translated but not widely dis­
seminated. So the Arab world knew all o f Aristotle, except
the Politics, which indeed seemed like a set of instructions
for an elite political machine. Likewise, Aristotle’s Poetics was
translated but remained almost incomprehensible during
the Arab Middle Ages, ju st as it did during the Latin Middle
Ages.
The problem posed by the different linguistic levels was
not formulated in the same way in the no rth ern and in th e
southern Mediterranean. The Arab world did n o t have the
problem of the transition from a scholarly language to a vul­
gar tongue, as was the case in Europe. This transition sim­
ply did not happen, or if it did, it was unconscious: classical
Arabic, supposedly the language of the Book o f God, was set
in an immutable form. In practice, Christians and Jews w rote
a form of Arabic freed from its Q uranic constraints, known
as Middle Arabic, which contained certain simplifications of
morphology of syntax. In Europe, Latin was th e language of
the Roman Empire and of the Vulgate. In the Middle Ages, it
remained th e language of liturgy and the means of communi­
cation between intellectuals, but it was not a holy language,
a “language of God.”
II. Europe
Europe was conscious of having received its share o f the
inheritance from people who spoke in o ther languages. So
the Franciscan Roger Bacon appealed to the pope in 1265
to support his plan to set up schools o f Greek and Oriental
language: ”[T]he wisdom of the Latins is drawn from foreign
languages: in fact, the entire sacred text and all o f philoso­
phy come from outside languages" (Letter to Clement IV). The
Bible is really itself only in Hebrew (the hebntica veritas of
Saint Jerome, and before him, Origen): Aristotle’s philosophy
is really itself only in Greek. Translation involves the sense
of a loss with respect to the original. Bacon lam ented this
situation and compared a text read through several levels of
translation to a wine decanted several times losing its flavor
|Moralis philosophia, 6.4). Translation is necessary, and there
is a lot of it. But it is only a last resort in relation to reading
the original.
So this is how the problem o f tran slatio n is posed. In th e
West it was made necessary by th e alm ost to ta l erad icatio n
of knowledge of Greek after Boethius. Greek was fo rg o tte n
fairly quickly, except in Ireland, w hose geographical dis­
tance had protected it from b a rb arian invasions. Am ong