SPS LITA DE LEON and FELIX TARROS v.

ANITA, DANILO and VILMA DE LEON

July 23, 2009 *extra lang I found it but we have this na

What constitutes CPG – if property bought by installments

*A property bought in installment, if not proven to be bought solely by exclusive funds, is not
exclusive property if ownership was vested during marriage. The sale of one half of the conjugal
property without liquidation of partnership is void as the interest during marriage is merely
inchoate and will only be realized upon liquidation.

FACTS
 July 20, 1965 - Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a lot in QC
 April 24, 1968 - Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in civil rites ; they had two children –
Danilo and Vilma
 June 22, 1970 - At the full payment of the cost price, PHHC executed a final deed of sale
in favor of Bonifacio; a transfer certificate of title was issued in Bonifacio’s name, where
it was stated therein that he was "single"
 January 12, 1974 - He sold the lot to petitioners - her sister Lita and her husband Rio
Tarrosa; however, Anita De Leon was not a signatory to the Deed of Sal eexecuted
 May 23, 1977 - Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding
 Feb. 29, 1996 - Bonifacio died
 May 8, 1996 - Sps. Tarrosa registered their Deed of Sale and had the first TCT canceled.
Another TCT was issued in their names
 May 19, 2003 - Daniel and Vilma De Leon then filed a Notice of Adverse Claim to protect
their rights over the property
 Subsequently, Anita, Danilo and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC and
alleged that fraud attended the execution of Deed of Sale to the Tarrosas and that
Bonifacio was still the owner of the property by his subsequent acts, i.e. Bonifacio also
executed a real estate mortgage over the same property in favor of another spouse, which
had already been nullified by the CFI
 The Tarrosas answered that the property was Bonifacio's exclusive property as he was
single when he acquired it from the PHHC and that they were not aware of the supposed
marriage at the time of the execution of Deed of Sale
 RTC ruled that lot was conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita and declared the
subsequent deed of sale and TCT void ab initio and awarded damages to Anita and her
children
 CA affirmed RTC; held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow legal presumption that the
parcel of land was conjugal; that ½ of the conjugal assets does not vest to Bonifacio
because of the absence of liquidation. It deleted the grant of damages.

ISSUES
1. Whether the property purchased on installment by Boni before marriage although some
installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property
(YES)
2. Whether 1/2 of the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio because of the absence of
liquidation (YES)
HELD
1. The full payment of the conditional contract was during marriage, thus ownership was
transferred only during the marriage.
 NCC 160, the governing provision at the time of Boni and Anita’s marriage, provides
that properties acquired during marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.
It is not even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with the funds of the
partnership, for only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. Even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will apply.
 Here, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita. Conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent to a contract to sell - ownership
is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price,
unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. The
efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is conditioned
upon full payment; if the condition has not been fulfilled, the conditional obligation
would stand as it had never existed.
 Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully
paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than two
(2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is,
by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
 It is not exclusive just because it was registered solely in his name. The mere
registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. Thus, they were
not able to overthrow the presumption of the conjugal nature of the property as no
evidence was brought forth to prove that the source of funding solely came from
Bonifacio.
 The deed of sale is also void ab initio for not having marital consent from Anita as
provided by NCC 166. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife
before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory
provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity.

2. Sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void.
 Prior to liquidation, right of the husband or wife in the conjugal assets is inchoate
(mere expectancy) and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets
in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. Their interest is limited
to the net remainder (remanente liquido) resulting from the liquidation after
dissolution. Thus, their right will only be determined by the net assets left after
settlement of obligations which can be divided by the spouses or their heirs.
 Nevertheless, because the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration for the property in
question. As a matter of fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the
liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by the
Tarrosas (ground: unjust enrichment).
I. Property regime of unions without marriage

Review: FC 6, 35 (2), 35 (3), 35 (5), 36, 38, 53; FC 41, 44; FC 45 (Void and voidable marriages)

1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53, cf. NCC 144

Valdes v. QC RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.

Petition on a pure question of law

Facts:
1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5
kids.
2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Art. 36 of the FC.
3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and void
under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply
with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50,
51 and 52 of the FC
4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC did not
have provisions for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”
5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the family
home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined
efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and
partition of property would be governed by the regime of co-ownership
6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the procedure for
liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not apply because it refers
to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community of property
7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.

Issues:
WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar
WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED

Ratio:
1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation period is
governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148
2. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their
marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage
Notes:
 Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147
 Trial court’s decision
o The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations;
o The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario
shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
o "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
o "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children
who are in the custody of the other.
o The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation
of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
 Alleged Errors:
o "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
o "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
o "Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab
initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
read consistently with Article 129.
o "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children
wish to stay."

Carino vs. Carino, GR 132539, February 3, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted 2 marriages during his lifetime. The first
was on June 20, 1969 with Susan Nicdao-Carino, the petitioner of the case at bar with
whom he had 2 children and the second was on November 10, 1992 with Susan Yee-
Carino, the respondent, with whom he had no children. Santiago has been cohabiting
with Susan Yee since 1983 but became bedridden in 1988 and died 13 days after the
second wedding. Both Susans filed for monetary benefits and financial assistance.
Nicdao was able to collect 146K while Yee was able to collect 21K. On December 14,
1993, Yee filed an instant case for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. Yee
wanted at least half of the 146K. Nicdao failed to file her answer and was declared in
default. Yee admitted that her marriage to Santiago took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which summarily stated that
there was no record of a marriage license The trial court ruled in favor of Susan Yee.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court

ISSUE: WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to settle claims to death
benefits

HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

Presumed validity of Nicdao’s marriage w/ the deceased cannot stand as there is no

marriage license, burden of proof of validity was w/ her. It does not follow however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
“death benefits” would now be awarded to Yee. As stated earlier, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void. Considering then that the marriage of Yee
and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid, the application of
Article 148 is therefore in order. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs as they were both
legally capacitated. The difference bet 147 and 148 is that wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation period will be split equally between them
even if only one party contributed in 147, whereas in 148 wages and salaries earned
by each party belong to him or her exclusively. So under Art 147, Susan Nicdao is
entitled to half of the remunerations and the other half belong to the legal heirs of
Santiago, who are in this case, the children of Susan Nicdao

The petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in
the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED.

San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007

Two consolidated cases: Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis, Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad
San Luis
Background:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his
lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first marriage contracted in 1942
he had six children, two of whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963
and his second marriage to an American citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971.
In 1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, the respondent in this case, in the USA. They had no
children but lived together for 18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.
After Felicisimo’s death, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and filed a petition for letters of administration. The children of Felicisimo from his
first marriage opposed this on the grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second
marriage to the American wife subsisting. The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph
2 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate the bigamous marriage
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children (Article 256 of
the Family Code).

Issue/Held/Ratio:
Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration? YES.

Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code, there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis in the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. [oo nalang kung di niyo maalala
ito, guys] where it was held that a Filipino spouse should no longer be considered married if
the alien spouse validly obtains a divorce outside of the Philippines. [Remember that in Van
Dorn the Court applied the nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code] Indeed, in
cases like Quita v. Dandan and Republic v. Orbecido III [again, kung di niyo maalala, oo
nalang, haha] it was pointed out that Par. 2, Article 26 of the Family Code traces its origins to
the ruling in Van Dorn. However, since Felicidad failed to present the necessary evidence to
prove the divorce decree (recall Garcia v. Recio: copy of the law, final decree of absolute
divorce) as well as her marriage solemnized in California, the case is remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad, Felicidad
still has legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides (in part) that a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. Felicidad qualifies as an interested
person with direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their 18-year cohabitation.
If she proves the validity of the divorce but fails to prove her marriage, she may be
considered a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. If she fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, Article 148 of the Family Code would apply. Article 148
states that couples who are incapacitated to marry but still live together as husband and wife
have co-ownership over properties acquired during their cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions.
*Note: There is another issue raised here, but I don’t think Ma’am will care about it. Felicidad
filed the petition for letters of administration in Makati. Petitioners claimed it should have
been filed in Laguna, where the deceased was governor, interpreting “residence” as
“domicile.” The SC did not uphold this, interpreting “resides” in Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court to mean “actual or physical habitation of a person, not legal residence or domicile.”

Gonzales vs Gonzales, 478 SCRA 327

FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children
were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties,
and Erlinda managed their pizza business.

In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During
the time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business
and worked hard for its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza
business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their
marriage."

In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its judgment and ordered the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between
Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided,
Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

RULING:
No. SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The
marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was
later affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions
of Article 147 of the Family Code.

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void
marriage.

Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the
parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Diño v Diño, GR 178004, January 19, 2011

DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership.

FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January
1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply
ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision
holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.

RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the
Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to
a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage.
Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
“partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.”
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

Salas, Jr., v Aguilar, G.R. No. 202370, Sept. 23 2013

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., petitioner, vs. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, respondent. [G.R. No.
202370. September 23, 2013.]

Facts
Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married in September 1985. Five months after, Aguila gave
birth to their daughter, Josan Jiselle. Salas left their conjugal dwelling and since then no
longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter. In 2003, Aguila filed a petition for nullity
of marriage, stating that they have “no conjugal properties whatsoever”. In 2007, the RTC
rendered a decision declaring the nullity of marriage. After this declaration, Aguila filed a
manifestation stating that she discovered two properties belonging to Salas. The registered
owner of the Discovered properties is “Juan S. Salas”, married to Rubina C. Salas. Rubina is
Salas’ common-law wife. The RTC granted the petition of the said discovered properties that
are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and
Aguila. However, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that the Discovered
Properties are her paraphernal properties. She claims that she authorized her brother to
purchase the same, but because he was not well- versed with legal documentation, he
registered the properties in the name of “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas”.
The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived
Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which
state that Salas is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held
that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married
as they claimed. The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether Rubina owns the Discovered Properties

Held/Ratio: No
On both Salas and Rubina's contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we
likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is
generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a
strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially
dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It
was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina's statement that she owns
the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered
Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."
In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this
case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-
ownership. 29 In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case
where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the
properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA,
would be governed by co-ownership. 30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered
Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 16 March 2012 and the
Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.

Barrido v Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, Oct. 20, 2014

Facts: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner
Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City,
consisting of a house and lot. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Leonardo filed a complaint for partition over their
property claiming that there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership. Barrido
claimed, by way of affirmative defense,that the subject property had already been sold to
their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo.

MTCC rendered a decision applying Article 129 of the Family Code, ordering the conjugal
property, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain

Nonato appealed before the RTC. The latter reversed the MTCC ruling on the grounds that
the MTCC made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision ruling that MTCC has jurisdiction as the property’s
assessed valuie was only 8,080php and that although the RTC erred in relying on Article
129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision
still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.

Issue: Whether or not Article 129 of the Family Code is applicable in the present case
Held: No. The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations.

This kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1)
must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household is considered
as contribution to the acquisition of the property. All their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
that they owned in common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code
should aptly prevail.

As the spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of
their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. The subject property remains
to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with
the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 reads:

When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.

Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015

OCAMPO et al vs. OCAMPO et al

G.R. No. 150707
April 14, 2004
FACTS:
The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana
Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children. 2 of them, Fidela, and Felicidad are
respondents herein.
‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa
Llander-Ocampo, they acquired 3parcels of land and, upon their death, left the following
properties. Only one of them, lot a is the subject of this case, a parcel of residential/
commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur
‘that the 3 parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses
although the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the
name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by
all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so; that
the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their
co-heirs ;and, that because of their relationship, they undertook earnest efforts to amicably
settle this controversy but because of defendants’ utterly unreasonable and unjustified
actuations, the same failed.
‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the
properties; ordering defendants Fidela and Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any and
all encumbrances which they had caused to be annotated on the TCT; requiring Fidela and
Felicidad to refrain from further encumbering said properties; further ordering Fidela and
Felicidad to indemnify plaintiffs .
‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente
Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the TCT in the name of defendant Fidela and covering the
lot described as parcel (a) was cancelled and, in lieu thereof aTCT was issued to defendant
Belen Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their favor.
That at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when a
TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees were
notoriously aware that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and
that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.
The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful exclusive owners
of the following properties. The CA affirmed with modifications (for damages) the said
ruling. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed
property?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED
Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial
and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence
could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced
by respondents, such as:

1. On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the
property and presented preponderant proof of her claim. she presented a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Residential Land, referring to the subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo
as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The document dated in 1948, was acknowledged before
a notary public. Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his
“exclusive ownership” of the property, “having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having]
been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for more than 50
years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner
without any claim of other persons.”20
2. Respondent Belen proved that in 1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix
Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered the property, actually
occupied it, and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
3. To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also
presented a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had
executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case,
who is now represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a
mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in
question.
4. Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984, between herself as
donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole
ownership of the property
5. In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration indicating
that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of
petitioners.
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Co-ownership cannot be presumed
even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may
dispose only of one’s interest in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-
owned with others. The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion
that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership. In this case,
Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any acknowledgement
of co-ownership.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the
property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement
of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is
the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement — assuming that its
authenticity and due execution were proven — the property had already been donated to
Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the
document (Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied upon by petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to prove
their ownership. Having filed an action involving property, they should have relied on the
strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents’ claim.
Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact that
some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses on the
property. The appellate court correctly found that since the litigants in this case were blood
relatives, fraternal affection could have been a good motive that impelled either Belen or
Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership
among the parties cannot be presumed.
It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling of the subject property
— commencing in 1948 and eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 1984 — it
was only after 1984 that petitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof

NOTES:
1. Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be considered as a
declaration against interest. A statement may be admissible as such a declaration if it
complies with the following requisites:
1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3) at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her
interest; and
4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true
The Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the
declarant Fidela, since her right over the property had already been extinguished by
the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have
acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no more property against which she had an
interest to declare.
2. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right
in favor of another who accepts it. Once perfected, a donation is final; its revocation or
rescission cannot be effected, absent any legal ground therefor. A donation may in fact
comprehend the entire property of the donor. At any rate, the law provides that donors
should reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own support
and that of all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by
law entitled to be supported by them.
3. To be sure, petitioners’ arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the Deed of
Donation itself. The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced to writing, an
agreement must be presumed to contain all the terms agreed upon; and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement

2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50, 37, 38, and 44

Bienvenido v. CA 237 SCRA 676

FACTS:
On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty years after, without
his marriage being dissolved, he contracted another marriage with respondent
Luisita Camacho. In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita Bienvenido, who he lived with from
1968 until at the time of his death in 1989. Sometime in 1982, Aurelio bought a house and
lot which was registered in his name. 2 years after, he executed a deed of sale of the property
in favor of petitioner Nenita, the TCT was issued in her name. After the death of Aurelio,
respondent brought a petition before the RTC seeking the annulment of the sale of the
property of petitioner. Petitioner answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased the
property in question using their joint funds and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.
HELD:
That exception involved by respondent in accordance with Art. 83 of the NCC refers to the
subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting
spouse, after the seven year period has lapsed; That this exception cannot be invoked
because it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting
marriage to Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being
bigamous. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of
the conjugal partnership of Luisita and Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
first place. Until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed.

Agapay vs Agapay, 276 SCRA 340

Case Doctrines:

● Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.

● Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would
turn out to be better than those in legal union.

● Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except
by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in
the marriage settlements.

● Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children
and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in
the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession.

Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after
the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned for good in
1972, he refused to live with Carlina.

In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year
old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A house and lot
was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.

1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement
to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.

In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two
years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house
and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court
dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two
deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel
and Erlinda and the second, in favor of Erlinda alone. (2) The CA erred in not declaring
Kristopher as Miguel’s illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel’s estate. (3)
The CA erred “in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer
should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and
in CA-G.R. No. 24199.

Issues:

1. Who owns the riceland?

2. Who owns the house and lot?

3. Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the nature
of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the termination
of the conjugal partnership?

4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession?

Held:

1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union
was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting
and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang
was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share
in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda
actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to
exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise
date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we
cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living
together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution
would still be essential.

Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina
Palang.

2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this
claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except byjudicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was
not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose
and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of
ownership and possession. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the
case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not
involved in the case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28
1997).

Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000

FACTS:

In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private
respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989,
without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay
P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said
defendants;
"[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the
complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against
her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario
Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
Mario Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they
lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten(10)
years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of
the other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent Mario] deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when [Respondent
Mario] accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].

ISSUE: Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property?

HELD:
Petitioner is not a Co-Owner Under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Even considering the
evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we cannot accept petitioners submission
that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article
148 of the Family Code.
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a
woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of
the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to
adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by
petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as
readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore,
Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
 As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario
Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points
out[26] that "[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage." x-sc chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable because the
cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity -- deserves
scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case, petitioner failed
to show any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues,
we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-
ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in
Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to
a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

WHEREFORE , the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Adriano v CA, 328 SCRA 738

Facts:

On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942 or
prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she
died on June 11, 1968. On November 22, 1968, or ve months after the death of Gliceria,
Lucio married Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament
disposing of all his properties, and assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all
his children by his rst and second marriage as devisees and legatees.

On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was
instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, led a petition for the probate of the will on
February 18, 1981 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City. The RTC allowed
the probate of the will.

On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending
before the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will. In the
complaint plainti s-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother,
Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such,
acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and administration.

Issue:

Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his rst marriage.
Ruling:

Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the bene t of marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while
Lucio's marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it
be proved that

it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and
respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of
conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have also presented su icient
evidence to support their allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with
proceeds of the conjugal fund of his rst marriage.

Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity

would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor
should be allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective e orts, petitioners in
the instant case have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the
acquisition of the property in question.

Malilin vs Castillo, 333 SCRA 628

FACTS:
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted.
During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business
flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered
solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed
a complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages
against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between
them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting
marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved
in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her
own money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated
to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an
adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code
where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married
on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that
he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.

Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of
her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also
prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the award of
attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration, hence the petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent

Held:
- No
- Court affirms the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so
o The Court is disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13,
1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four
(4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the
same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds
basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely
in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was
then already pending against him.
 - Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that
he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee
- The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of
marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is
reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the
very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even
doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that
he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform
the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
- Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant
resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her
child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the
date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City
- Court Dismissed petition for Annulment

Atienza vs.de Castro,G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, Lupo, a married
man cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly
acquired a real property and registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation
turned sour, hence, they parted. He filed an action for partition contending that they owned
it in common under the concept of limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone
was the owner as she acquired it thru her own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC
declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA reversed it as he failed to prove
material contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he contended that he was not
burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property because with or
without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484, NCC, for as
long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be
legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the
contention correct? Explain.
Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other
because Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation
with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a state
of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and
multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. (Cariño v.
Cariño, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required. (Agapay v. Palang,
342 Phil. 302).
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385
Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718;
Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article 148
of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
(Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.).
The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.
The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the
allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced
that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to
acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2)
corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his
submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly written
instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered
into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the
petitioner.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only
did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the
very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the
benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of
bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome
his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that
other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
However, as already stated, petitioner’s evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient
or immaterial to warrant the trial court’s finding that the disputed property falls under the
purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove
his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from earnings, not only
as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money
lending and jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and
bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price
of the subject property.
San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007
SEE ABOVE MENTIONED CASE

Borromeo vs Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009

Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell
in love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was
issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature
remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met Borromeo who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for
a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a
Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when Borromeo sought
to register the deed of assignment he discovered that the properties registered in the name
of respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not Borromeo have the rights over the properties as transferred by
Jambrich, an alien
(2) Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not
transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner

Held: (1) In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that Borromeo had a better right over the
properties. The Court ruled that the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged,
had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen.

Here, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases, that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfer it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.

As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen,
there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

(2) The fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation
does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but
otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was
still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able
to lay claim to any portion of it. Thus, Jambrich has the title to the properties

Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009

Facts: The case stems from a petition filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or
inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of
Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de
Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter,
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);
(3) the illegitimate children of Loreto, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were entitled
only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to
Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should
be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be
satisfied first. In answer, Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate
wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed
their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained
that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the
proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated
beneficiaries; and that it released Odessas share as she was of age, but withheld the release
of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action
insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto
revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy
No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed
nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. Insular further claimed that it
was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as
beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners as legitimate family are entitled to the proceeds of Loreto’s
insurance policies.
Held: No. It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a
favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that
insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of
the Insurance Code states
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of
the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the
policy.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds
are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon
the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form
of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim
from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have
no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva
as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s
insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations
under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the
estate of the insured.

Lacbayan v Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011 (see J. Brion’s Separate Opinion)

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 165427 : March 21, 2011.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978.
Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed. During their illicit
relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able
to establish a manpower services company .Five parcels of land were also acquired during
the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as
husband and wife.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime
in 1991.In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to
petitioners’ proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned
to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.
However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition
agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial
partition of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.

On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indivisoowner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts
decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack
contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh
out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. Her appeal was denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on ownership;
2. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in
the action for partition
3. Whether respondent is estopped from contesting the Partition Agreement
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.

Ratio:

CIVIL LAW: Existence of co-ownership in an action for partition.

First issue: In Municipality of Bin v. Garcia, the Court explained that the determination as to
the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. While
it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a
co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably,
therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the
complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subject properties.

Second issue: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked
is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law
means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.

REMEDIAL LAW: Admissions.

Third issue: An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged
by him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b)
be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners’ argument would be to
allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent
is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties.

SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
This case stemmed from a complaint for judicial partition of several properties based on the
petitioner’s assertion of co-ownership. As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests on
the party (the petitioner in this case) who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts the affirmative in the issue presented.1
Subject to my observations below, I find that the petitioner failed to discharge by clear
preponderant evidence her co-ownership of the subject properties to warrant their judicial
partition. I confine myself to this conclusion, however, as the issue before us is solely on
whether a judicial partition should be made. Specifically and as articulated in my
observations below, I cannot join the ponencia’s other rulings.
Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to the property relationship in a cohabitation
situation, is clear on the conditions it imposes. The first sentence of this article states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
[underscoring supplied]
Thus, any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered common
property if two (2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence showing that the
properties were acquired by the parties during their cohabitation; and second, there must
be evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry. Stated plainly, co-ownership only arises when there is clear
proof showing the acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties, and the
actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These two (2) conditions must
concur.
On the contribution aspect of these elements, mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the
Family Code, without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof of actual
contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the party either used his or
her own money or that he or she actually contributed his or her own money to purchase the
property.2 Jurisprudence holds that this fact may be proven by evidence in the form of bank
account statements and bank transactions as well as testimonial evidence proving the
financial capacity of the party to purchase the property or contribute to the purchase of a
property.3
In this case, the presumption of co-ownership over the subject properties between the
petitioner and the respondent did not arise. While the first condition was duly proven by
evidence, the second condition was not.
The records sufficiently establish the first condition showing the acquisition of the subject
properties from 1978 to 1991 or during the cohabitation of the petitioner and the
respondent. The second condition is not similarly established since no evidence was adduced
showing the petitioner’s actual contributions in the acquisition of the subject properties.
Since the petition asserts an affirmative allegation (i.e., her co-ownership of the subject
properties to which she bases her action for judicial partition) she carries the burden of
substantiating her claim. She failed in this regard. The records show that she did not present
any evidence showing that the funds or a portion of the funds used to purchase the subject
properties came from her own earnings. On the contrary, the petitioner presented
contradictory evidence when she admitted that the funds used to purchase the subject
properties did not come from her own earnings but from the income of the manpower

business which she managed. The Regional Trial Court found that she only owned 3.33% of
share in this corporation.
Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot automatically
be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income the petitioner
referred to is corporate income. The petitioner should have presented evidence showing that
the income she referred to actually accrued to her in the form of salaries, bonuses,
commissions and/or dividends from the manpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding
the corporation’s distinct legal personality from its officers, stockholders and members
applies.4 Unless otherwise shown, the source of the earnings would be the corporation’s, not
the petitioner’s.
I additionally observe that except for one, all the subject properties name the respondent as
the exclusive registered owner. Although the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real properties covered
thereby may be under co-ownership with the petitioner and vice-versa, the fact remains that
the subject properties are registered in the respondent’s name. The rebuttable presumption
is that these properties belong to the respondent or to the conjugal partnership of the
respondent, in line with Article 116 of the Family Code and Article 160 of the Civil Code.5
In sum, the petitioner’s case for judicial partition of the subject properties has no legal basis
in the absence of a clear evidence of co-ownership proven under the circumstances.
Consequently, we must deny the petition for lack of merit without.
As final observations, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion declaring the respondent as
the sole owner of all the properties sought to be partitioned. Records show that the
petitioner is a registered co-owner of one of the five (5) properties cited in this case, i.e., the
real estate under TCT No. 23301 registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and
Betty Lacbayan." By the tenor of its decision, the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily)
introduced a cloud over the petitioner’s interests in this commonly-owned property. I note,
too, that the complaint underlying this petition is an action for partition; the adjudication of
this case should necessarily be limited to resolving the propriety of the partition sought.
Notably, the Majority itself recognizes that registration in one’s name is without prejudice to
an action seeking to establish co-ownership.
In light of the undisputed joint ownership of the property commonly registered under the
parties’ names, this Decision should be without prejudice to an action for partition to divide
up this property – a remedy we cannot now provide in the absence of any factual basis on
how the parties contributed in acquiring this property. Alternatively, the actual partition of
this commonly-owned property should be remanded to the trial court for determination of
how partition should be made.
The phrase, "without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against
him" in the last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is similarly objectionable. For
one, no issue exists in this case between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the
properties they commonly or individually hold. Additionally, the phrase creates the
impression that the Court is giving legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course
of action to take against her husband. This statement is beyond what this Court should
properly state in its Decision given the facts and issues posed, and is plainly uncalled for.
Subject to these observations, I concur with the opinion of the Majority.

Go- Bangayan v Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Facts
 Benjamin Bangayan married Azucena Alegre on Sept 10, 1973 and had three children
 In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan, a
customer in his family’s business. In 1981, Azucena left for the US.
 In Feb 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together. Sally’s father was against their love,
so in order to appease the latter, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig,
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Knowing Benjamin’s marital
status, Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
 During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired 7 real properties
o 1 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses
o 2 were registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally
o 2 were registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin
o 2 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual
 In 1994, their relationship ended when Sally left for Canada, bringing the children,
and subsequently filing criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of documents.
 Benjamin, in turn, filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage/non-existent marriage
for bigamy and lack of formal requisites to a valid marriage, and asked for the
partition of the properties in accordance with Art. 148 of the Family Code; aside from
the 7 properties acquired during their cohabitation, Sally named 37 more properties
she purports is to be partitioned.
 With regards to the partition, the RTC ruled that the 37 properties Sally named were
owned by Benjamin’s parents given to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. As to the 7 properties, Sally failed to prove any actual contribution to the
purchase of 5 of those properties; and the court ruled that because Sally acted in bad
faith, knowing Benjamin was married to Azucena, she forfeited her share in the
remaining two properties to the children, while Benjamin’s share reverted to his
conjugal partnership with Azucena.
 CA modified the ruling on the 7 properties acquired during cohabitation, saying that
only two properties belong to Benjamin exclusively because he was able to establish
that he acquired them solely. 4 of the properties belonged to Sally, in the absence of
proof of Benjamin’s contribution, and 1 property was owned by them in common, of
which Benjamin’s share will accrue to his conjugal partnership with Azucena, and
Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of bad faith.

Issue: WoN Art. 148 was applied correctly

Held: Yes.

Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage; thus, they shall own only
properties acquired by them through actual joint contribution in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In this case, the 37 properties Sally claims should be excluded,
and as to the remaining 7 properties acquired during cohabitation, the ruling of the CA was
correct; they owned only 1 property in common.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Facts:
 ATTY. LUNA,
o a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the law firm Sycip Law Offices
o at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the
Peace of Parañaque and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan.
o they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna,
Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna,
Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
o After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other and agreed to separation of property, to which end,
they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
 ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of
Dominican Republic.
o on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD.
o Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.
 ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.
 LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Makati City. Said condominium unit was to
be used as law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed which was registered bearing the following names:
o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to
Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x"
 Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
o "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
 LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but
the same was still registered in common.
o The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share.
o ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato
G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
 After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
 o Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law
firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
 The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC.
o The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint
efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share
consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate
of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament;
and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD
from her share in the subject properties.
 The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts ruling that the
24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry; that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under
any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad
L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
 Both parties appealed to the CA.
 The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling EUGENIA, the first wife, was the
legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his
prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15.
Held:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.
Ratio:
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow
the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even
under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed,
the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been
limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards
it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially
among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw.
For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree
dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
Other Issue:
whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled
the latter to any rights in property.
Held:
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval
Ratio:
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior
to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime
of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or
at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as
well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or
the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear
at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and
other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall
apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to
501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only
as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the
action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine
law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently,
the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.
Other Issue:
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?
Held:
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during
their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership
Ratio:
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article
71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by
virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm
such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the
petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties
to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate
their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also
in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-
ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved
by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where,
as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant
some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favourable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by
the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it
and a mere allegation is not evidence.26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the
purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00,
consisting in direct contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totalling P146,825.30;27 and that such
aggregate contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty.
Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the unit’s
purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the law books were
paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank
you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and
that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagreness of the
income derived from his law practice.

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015

Facts:
 Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom – Tambuyat were married on
September 16, 1965.
 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq.
m. parcel of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was
bought on November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as
vendee.
 One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis – Tambuyat, who
signed therein as “Rosario Tambuyat”. All this time petitioner Banguis remained
married to Eduardo Nolasco.
 When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of
Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.
 When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for
Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she was the surviving spouse of
Adriano. That the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name of
“Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.” That per annexed marriage
contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be
cancelled. That a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as
the spouse indicated, and that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.
 On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2,
1988, and thereafter lived together as married couple; that their union produced a
son; and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation,
which is merely a summary proceeding – considering that a thorough determination
will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal or exclusive property,
and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights will be adversely affected by
any judgment in the case.
 The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and directed the RD of Meycauayan to cancel
the TCT of Banguis and in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of title in the name
of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda “Winnie” Balcom Tambuyat. RTC
justified its decision by using Sec. 108 of PD 1529 which states: “court authorization
is required for any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of the title.
 The CA sustained the trial court’s decision, noting that Banguis’ name was included
in the TCT by error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that
Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is the lawful wife of Adriano; that there is a valid and
subsisting marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to such
fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial court; and that Banguis’s
opposition to Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT is not real and genuine as
to place the latter’s title to the subject property in doubt.

Issue: Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.
Held: YES
 Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or
amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances, included
are (1) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or
any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate and (2) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. The present case falls
under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan committed and error in issuing
the disputed TCT, in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is
Adriano’s lawful spouse. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the
preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse
of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife
to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common law relationship at all.
 Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that our laws
do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society,
and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed
by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse”
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.

4) Leonardo A. Villalon and Erlinda Talde-Villalon v. Amelia Chan

G.R. No. 196508

Leonardo A. Villalon and Erlinda Talde-Villalon v. Amelia Chan

G.R. No. 196508, 24 September 2014

Facts:
 On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a civil
ceremony solemnized by then Judge Cancio C. Garcia. The respondent claimed that
her husband and the present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same
person.
 During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, allegedly
contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde, under the name, Leonardo A.
Villalon. The marriage took place on June 2, 1993, and was solemnized by Judge
Ruth C. Santos of MTC Antipolo.
 Amelia, who was then living in the United States could not personally filea case for
bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence
the criminal proceedings for the commission of the crime of bigamy against the
petitioners.
 On his defense, Leonardo filed before the RTC an omnibus motion seeking to
disqualify Amelia’s lawyer. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the
 bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the
complaint-affidavit.
 The RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. However, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being public in nature,
can be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting
authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to
intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the action or
reserve the right to institute one. No waiver was made by Amelia in this case.

Issue: Whether the disqualification of the respondent’s lawyer violated the rights to
intervene and be heard in the bigamy case.

Held: YES
 Sec. 16 of the Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows
an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution o f the offense for the
recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil
action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
 The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the
services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to
participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from
the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have
disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent,
being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel
in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.