npredicta
Russia and the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-71
Mike Wells argues that Russian decisions in July 1870 were of major significance
for the history of Europe.
There are some turning points in
history which never quite get their due
consideration. A good example is the
decision by Hitler to declare war on
the USA in 1941. Obviously this is
mentioned in alt the standard books,
but the explanations seem rather
patchy for an event v^hich changed
the whole war and then had huge
effects on the postwar period.
Another of these neglected turning
points may be the Russian diplomacy
A reception given to the victorious Prussian army on 2V^ September 1866 in Berlin,
after victory in war against Austria. Would Bismarck's forces have triumphed against
France in 1870-71 if the Russians had not deterred Austria from intervening?
at the time of the Franco-Prussian
War. For example, in Pftanze's
magisterial survey of Bismarck and
unification (see Further Reading),
Russian diplomatic actions in July
1870 get a few lines out of 600 pages.
W.E. Mosse, while dealing in a
penetrating and original way with
relations between Russia and
Germany in the period after
Unification, has little directly on the
4 0 Histoiy Review Decanbcr2006
importance of Russian diplomacy in
1870, simply telling us that 'Russia
was preoccupied with the neutrality of
Austria and Denmark'.
Bismarck's Diplomacy and Wars
Professor Tim Blanning has rightly
pointed out the importance of Russian
non-intervention in key periods of
German history. Had Russia
intervened during the wars that
Bismarck fought against Denmark and
Austria in 1864 and 1866, then the
results might have been very different.
As it was, Prussia defeated Austria and
established the North German
Confederation in 1867 without
foreign interference. Neither of
Prussia's powerful neighbours, France
or Russia, stepped in to prevent the
emergence of a new central European
power.
The balance of power in central
Europe, however, had been radically
altered, and Napoleon III was anxious
to gain compensation and maintain
France's role as a great power, able to
influence European affairs. Yet
Bismarck gave him little, and the
growing economic and military power
of Prussia presented France with a
potential rival. Soon the issue of the
Hohenzoltern candidature, in which a
Prussian Prince was considered as a
possible King of Spain, threatened
France with encirclement and was
viewed as provocation by Napoleon III
and the French public.
The independent South German
states seemed increasingly hostile to
Prussia, despite the military alliance
which they had entered into with
Prussia after the war with Austria in
1866. A war to resolve the hostility
between France and Prussia and to
force South Germany into joining the
North German Confederation seemed
highly likely by 1869.
Prussia and the War of 1870
What would be the likely dangers for
Prussia in case of such a war? Modern
historians tend to stress the risks.
Prussia's needle gun was not the war-
winning weapon that it was made out
to be; the French chassepot was aiso
effective. Prussian artillery had
deveioped a lot since 1866, but France
had effective field artillery and the
mitrailleuse, a sort of early machine
gun. In addition, France's railways
were better than the Austrian railways
of 1866 and were plentiful on the
border area. An invasion by Prussia
therefore would meet resistance from
an army fighting on interior lines of
communication and, moreover, likely
to arouse the sort of patriotic
nationalism seen in France in 1792
and 1793, when there were French
victories over superior foreign forces.
 The North German Confederation was a recent creation and might
well collapse should Prussian armies meet with decisive defeat.
Prussian military planning only
envisaged a short war; but Europe
expected a long one, and saw France
as the major military power. A
prolonged struggle might bring in
Austria, in search for revenge for the
defeat of 1866. A Prussian defeat
might even bring Denmark to act,
taking back the lands lost in 1864.
There was undoubtedly hostility to
Prussia within Germany, for example
in Hanover. The North German
Confederation was a recent creation
and might well collapse should
Prussian armies meet with decisive
defeat.
With its vulnerable geographical
and military position, a war was only
possible for Prussia because of the
possibility that the major powers
would not intervene on France's side.
Thus Russia's role was cruciai,
especially if the conflict with France
was not over quickly. In the event of a
longer struggle, Russia would become
a key player. Bismarck, then, had to
consider very carefully the possible
reactions of the major European
powers to a war between the North
German Confederation and France.
Bismarck's Strategy
Bismarck relied on long-standing
tensions between Britain and France
to ensure that Britain would not
intervene. As for Italy, she owed her
acquisition of Venetia to Prussia's
victory over Austria in 1866, and was
ready to take advantage of French
distraction to occupy Rome. Russia
had been cultivated by Prussia ever
since 1863 when Bismarck had agreed
to cooperate against Polish rebels. Its
hostility to Austria in the Balkans
made cooperation unlikely against
Prussia. However, Russian ruling circles
were divided in their attitude to
Prussia and France. There was no
certainty about Russian reactions to
war.
A Possible Franco-Austrian
Agreement
The most worrying possibility was an
alliance between France and Austria.
Not all the Austrian leaders had
accepted the defeat of 1866. The view
that Bismarck's lenient Peace of
Prague had somehow ended the
danger of an Austrian intervention is
questionable. A possible Franco-
Austrian alliance was talked of in 1869
and 1870. The Emperor Franz Josef of
Austria stated in 1869: 'We consider
France's cause our own and shall
contribute to the success of French
arms'. The Austrian minister-president
Beusst pressed hard to join with
France. The Archduke Albrecht had
visited Paris to discuss joint military
pianning and in 1870 General Le Brun
visited Vienna. Had the war gone in
France's favour, then it is by no means
unlikely that Austria would have
intervened.
Austrian participation was made
considerably less likely by Russian
diplomatic decisions. Bismarck, like all
German leaders after him, was
concerned with the possibilities of war
on two fronts. Russian support for
Prussia in July 1871 made this less
likely. There were, of course, other
factors working against a Franco-
Austrian alliance. First, Austrian
military capability had been severely
hit by the defeats of 1859 and 1866.
Secondly, the influence of Hungary in
the Dual Monarchy, as represented by
Andrassy, joint minister-president, was
against further action in Germany.
Thirdly, nationalism among German-
speakers in the Austrian Empire had
risen to considerable heights and
military intervention on behalf of
France would have been met with
political opposition.
However, all this may have been
more apparent after the event than it
was in July 1870. In 1868 there had
been discussions between the Russian
government and Bismarck via the
Prussian ambassador to Russia, Reust,
about mutual action to prevent what
was seen as a likely alliance between
Austria and France. The Russian
government had promised to move
100,000 troops into Austria if Austria
joined France in a war against Prussia.
In return, the Russians would have
liked a formal agreement for German
military action in support of Russia in
the event of a war against Austria.
Realistically, this seemed to Bismarck
more likely and he resisted a formal
commitment. Instead there was simply
an understanding about recognising
mutual interests. Bismarck was well
aware of the possibility of using this
understanding in July 1870.
The Meeting at Ems, June 1870
Bismarck had gone out of his way to
cultivate the Tsar when he had come
to Ems to take the waters in June
1870. Wilhelm 1 had met the Tsar at
Ems, too. Though not naturally pro-
German, the Tsar had told his mistress.
Princess Catherine Dologuruky, that
he had come to see Napoleon HI as 'an
adventurer'.
Bismarck was encouraged by this
meeting and by his conversations at
Ems with the Russian foreign minister,
Gorchakov, which went on at the
same time, in those important four
days in June 1870. When Prussia and
France mobilised on 15 July 1871,
following the furore at the famous
Ems telegram, it was natural for
Bismarck to make approaches to the
Russians and ask if the understanding
of 1868 was still current.
The Crucial Decision, July 1870
It is at this point that there came about
what might be considered one of the
most significant developments of 19'**-
century diplomacy. The Russians
assured Bismarck on 14 July that the
agreement held and that, in the event
of an Austrian mobilisation, 300,000
Russian troops would be sent to
Galicia, preventing an Austrian
invasion of Germany and allowing
Bismarck to fight a one-front war. As a
bonus, Russian pressure was appiied
to Denmark, whose king had married
a Russian princess, to remain neutral.
Contemporaries saw this as being of
the utmost importance. In a French
history published in 1879 (Alfred
Rambaud's History of Russia. 1879)
the following interesting passage
occurs:
Histoiy Review Do:anber2006 4 1
 The French certainly expected Austrian help and
telegrammed to enquire when it was coming during
the early stages of the war.

Bismarck orchestrating the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Despite Russian support in 1870, he failed to repay his debt, preferring
instead to secure compromises favourable to Austria-Hungary and Britain.

The menacing attitude of
Russia forced Austria to
maintain her neutrality. This
carried with it Italy. Russian
diplomacy weighed in the same
manner on Denmark, linked to
the Romanovs by marriage
between a Danish Princess and
the Tzarevitch. Russia
prevented the formation of a
possible League of Neutrals and
discouraged the collective
intervention of Europe. The
American ambassador thought
that the officers of the Russian
army were unanimous in their
desire for a war against Prussia;
but the general public thought
otherwise and there were
subscriptions everywhere for
the benefit of wounded French.
This forgotten contemporary
history, written just a few years after
the events, gives much greater
prominence to Russian decisions than
have many more recent works
The Austrian government knew
about the Russian military threat and
discussed it in an important meeting
of the Austrian Crown Council held on
18 July. The Russian reply to Bismarck
had been reported by Austrian agents
in Berlin. It may not have been a
deciding factor, but it certainly
strengthened Andrassy's arguments
for neutrality, especially as the
meeting heard reports from the war
ministers about Austrian's military
unpreparedness; Austrian forces could
not have dealt with a large-scale
Russian invasion.
C.A. McCartney, in hisstudy of the
Habsburg Empire, described this
meeting in Vienna as a major turning
point. Indeed it was. By declaring
neutrality, Austria-Hungary had made
a Prussian victory more likely. She had
indicated that she would not be a
major player in German affairs, and
signalled that her future interests
would be in the Balkans. The
possibility of revenge for 1866 had
receded; the way was open for
alliance with Germany, which would
come about in 1879. Though Beusst,
the Austrian minister-president, told
the French in confidence that in the
event of a French victory, the neutrality
might well end and Austria would
probably join with France, the very
fact of Austrian neutrality made that
French victory less likely.
As Russian diplomacy had
contributed to these major changes, it
must be seen as highly significant. In
fact, Alexander H's position changed
quite quickly. The Prussian victory at
Sedan and the capture of Napoleon III
led the Russian government to seek to
avoid a complete French defeat in
order to maintain a balance of power.
The way was thus set for a future
Franco-Russian alliance. But as such
rapid Prussian conquests were not
foreseen, it is the diplomacy of 14 July
that must be seen as most influential.
It seemed that Bismarck's wooing
of Russia of 1863 had come to a
magnificent fruition - it ensured
French isolation and gave Moltke the
best possible chance to concentrate

4 2 History Review Dftrniher 2006

 In the event of an Austrian mobilisation, 300,000 Russian troops
would be sent to Galicia, preventing an Austrian invasion of
Germany and allowing Bismarck to fight a one-front war.

his forces in the west, using his
railways to take advantage of huge
French strategic and tactical errors.
There was more than just Russian
inaction at the key juncture - the
threat of intervention, even if not
made directly to Austria, was the
clearest possible indication of Russian
support at a key time in the
development of a new Germany.
the Biack Sea Clauses of the Treaty of
Paris, he made it clear that he would
have preferred an internationai
conference. This is a pre-echo of the
situation in 1878. If the Russians
expected huge gratitude for their
really quite remarkable offer of
military assistance at a crucial time.
they were to be sadly disappointed at
the Congress of Berlin.
In 1878, after a war with Turkey on
behalf of the Christians in the Balkans
who had been slaughtered in
massacres in Bulgaria, Russia hoped to
create an enlarged client state in
Bulgaria and dominate the region.

The Consequences of Russian

Policy
The effects of Russia's policy were
huge, and not necessanly foreseen by
Alexander II and Gorchakov, his
foreign minister. These two focused
on the immediate advantage that
Russia could extract from Prussian
support and European preoccupation
with more changes in central Europe.
They sought to end the restrictions
imposed on Russian warships entering
the Black Sea and issued a unilateral
rejection of those clauses from the
1856 Treaty of Paris. Bismarck had let
it be known that he would not object.
France was preoccupied; Austria was
indifferent. That left only Britain. The
Gladstone government, intent on
European concert diplomacy and on
domestic changes, would not be likely
to restage the Crimean War
Thus, from a mixture of friendship
and support to Prussia and by raising
the possibility of armed intervention in
Austna, Russia had gained
considerabie advantage from the
events in the Franco-Prussian War by
October 1870 and had rejected the
hated restrictions which she had had
to accept in 1856, after defeat in the
Crimea.

The Long-term Effects

Yet the promise of 14 July must have
had wider ramifications. Even in 1870
Bismarck was not offering Tsar Alexander II (1818-81). How far was he led astray by Bismarck's diplomacy?
unconditional reciprocation of good Under his successor, Russia signed an alliance with France.
will. Though he accepted the end of

History Review December 2006 4 3

If the Russians expected huge gratitude for their
really quite remarkable offer of military
assistance at a crucial time, they were to be sadly
disappointed at the Congress of Berlin.
However, before a general European
conference in Berlin, she had to
reduce her aims and accept a much
smaller Bulgaria. German support was
not forthcoming. Bismarck preferred
to mediate and support a compromise
acceptable to Britain and Austria.
Though standard histories correctly
link this disappointment with the
subsequent ili-feeling between Russia
and Germany, to the closer links
between Germany and Austria and
the build-up to the war, they fail to
give due emphasis to Russia's
guarantee of 1870. This unusual
commitment by Russia must have
made the failure of Bismarck to offer
support at the Congress of Berlin all
the more galling to the Russians.
Without this Russian support, the
German Reich might not have come
into being, and yet Bismarck, the so-
called 'Honest Broker' of 1878,
seemed to forget that his state owed a
huge amount to Russian diplomacy at
a crucial time in 1870. It would be
hard to overstate the importance of
the subsequent rift between Germany
and Russia. It was a major contributory
factor to the First World War; it
amounted to a huge part of World
War II; and itwas still of significance in
the Cold war era. Similarly, the closer
links between Austria and Germany
that developed after 1879 were of
huge significance. These
developments were deeply affected by
decisions taken between 14 and 18
July 1870.
Had Austria offered greater
support to France, her subsequent
alliance with Germany would not have
developed. Had Russia not offered
such important support in 1870, then
her subsequent disappointment at the
4 4 History Review Decemher 2006
lack of German support might not
have led her into alliance with France.
A Neglected Turning Point
The 'Blank Cheque' offer of military
support from Germany to Austria in
1914 was a key step to world conflict
and has received due attention by
historians. A rather similar, if less wide-
ranging, commitment by Russia to
Germany in 1870 is more of a
footnote to history, but its
consequences are considerable
enough to make it a candidate for a
fuller study and more consideration by
students of German Unification and
Russo-German relations after 1870.
For students of Bismarck, the issue is a
fascinating one. On one hand, it was a
tribute to his concern for Russian
relations that, despite divisions of
opinion among the Russian people,
government and court, an
undertaking of this sort could be
obtained. His analysis of the need to
avoid a war on two fronts has been
seen as the vital element in his
diplomacy; the neglect of the principle
after 1890 has been seen as the key to
the tragedies of the 20**^ century when
Germany was 'encircled' by Russia and
France and felt the need to resolve the
dangers this posed by war.
However, the undertaking of 14
July 1870 set up obligations as well.
There really is 'no such thing as a free
lunch' in diplomacy: Bismarck's
success engendered huge problems of
how to repay the debt to Russia while
avoiding alienating Austria and
Britain. From the decision of July came
disappointment for the Russians and
distrust of Germany, emotions that
were becoming unmanageable by the
later part of Bismarck's period of
office. This festering resentment
would probably have led to a Franco-
Russian alliance even had Bismarck
not been dismissed by the new Kaiser,
Wilhelm II, in 1890.
Further Reading
Erich Eyck, Bismarci< and the German
Empire (Norton, 1954)
George Kennan, The Decline of
Bismarck's European Order (Princeton,
1979)
Edgar Feuchtwanger, Bismarcl<
(Routledge, 2002)
Lothar Gall, Bismarck, White
fiei/o/uf/onary (HarperCollins, 1986)
Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign
Policy 1871-1914 {Routledge. 1976)
C.A. McCartney, The Habsburg
Fmpire, ?790-/9;S(Longman, 1968)
W.E. Mosse, The Rise and Faii of the
Crimean System 1855-7] (Macmillan,
1963)
O. Pflanze, Bismarck and the
Development of Germany (Princeton,
1963)
LM. Schneerson, The Franco-Prussian
War and Russia {\^oscow, 1976)
A.J.R Taylor, Bismarck, Man and
Statesman (1958, reprinted by
Sutton, 2003)
Mike Wells, Bismarck {Collins History
Makers, 2003)
D.G. Williamson, Bismarck and
Germany 1862-1890 {Longman, 1998
edition)
Mike Wells is an experienced A
level examiner and author of a
study of Bismarck in the
HarperCollins History Makers
series. A former Deputy Head at
St. Mary's Hall Brighton, he
currently teaches at Roedean
School.