Neoclassical Realism. Challengers and Bridging Identities - Michiel Foulon

International Studies Review (2015) 17, 635–661
Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and

Bridging Identities1
Michiel Foulon
University of Warwick
This article anchors neoclassical realism (NCR) as a solid theoretical

framework which departs from Wendtian constructivism, Moravcsik’s
liberal theory, and Putnam’s two-level game liberalism. NCR moves
away from these other approaches by bridging three divides: the spa-
tial (domestic–international), the cognitive (matter-ideas), and the
temporal (present–future). What matters is not what states have to do
because the structure compels them so (as Waltz and Wendt would
want us to believe). Looking at what domestic interest groups want
states to do (as Moravcsik and Putnam suggest) is also unsatisfactory.
Rather, what can states do to represent domestic economic interests
within the predefined geopolitical context? The argument here is that
a version of geopolitical structure is external to the state and binds.
However, a perceptual layer at the level of state policymaker affects
the operationalization of that structure. Domestic economic forces
make themselves felt through state-level policymakers, but only within
the predefined context of binding structural factors that constrain.
The findings from this study are vastly different from previous studies,
suggesting that NCR’s triple bridging identity distinguishes it from
other IR theories.
Neoclassical realism (NCR)2 is said to be the “logical next step” in the realist tra-
dition (Rathbun 2008)3: it bridges the domestic–international divide and
1
Author’s note: Michiel Foulon (m.w.b.foulon@warwick.ac.uk) is a researcher in International Relations at the
University of Warwick. He is grateful for comments on earlier drafts from Shaun Breslin, Chris Hughes, and Anil
Awesti. He would also like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers of International Studies Review for
their elaborate and constructive comments.
2
Other terms have been used in the literature. Schweller (2003:316) refers to NCR as neotraditional realism.
Brooks (1997:445) and Schuett (2010:17) discuss “postclassical realism” as an alternative to neorealism; in reference to
this, Rose (1998:146, footnote 4) coins the term “neoclassical realism.” Yet others such as Feng and Ruizhuang
(2006:112–113) criticize “postclassical realism” for its lack of clarity. This article will henceforth adopt the term NCR.
3
Although, with the end of the Cold War, some thought that the realist tradition had become a controversial
approach—some even calling for “new thinking” in IR—it should not be disregarded as some outdated theory (see
Gaddis 1992/93; Voss and Dorsey 1992; Lebow 1994; Rose 1998:156–157; Shambaugh 1998:165–166; Hopmann
2003:101; Carlsnaes 2013:307). For Gaddis (1992/93), IR theory needs to be improved by combining insights from
different schools; while for Hopf and Gaddis (1993), the problem was more epistemological: the question of how the
Cold War could end and the USSR collapse was not raised in research programs. Legro and Moravcsik (1999) argue
that contemporary realist scholars fail to differentiate from earlier schools and degenerate the tradition to “minimal
realism” (see also Rathbun 2008). Buzan (1996), Frankel (1996:xxiii), Johnson (1996), Little (1996), and Legro and
Moravcsik (1999) stress that the end of the Cold War does not mean that realism became obsolete as an IR theory.
For Frankel (1996:xxiii) and Wohlforth (1994/95) this means that a novel realist school explains much of the story;
and in his neoclassical realist analysis, Layne (2009:133) concludes that “Far from being dead, realism remains as com-
pelling and relevant as ever.” Sterling-Folker (2009:215) extends this point and argues that the end of the Cold War,
like any other major historical event in the twentieth century, will shape realist theory rather than bring an end of it.
Gilpin (1984), Frankel (1996:ix), Schweller (1997:927), Legro and Moravcsik (1999:9), and Wohlforth (2008a:139)
argue that the “richness” or “genie of realism’s rich diversity” cannot be put back into the bottle to falsify its different
schools all at once and stress that realist schools assign different weight to different variables.
Foulon, Michiel. (2015) Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1111/
misr.12255
© 2015 International Studies Association
636 Neoclassical Realism
includes cognitive factors. Liberal theorists such as Moravcsik (Legro and Mor-
avcsik 1999), however, question NCR’s contributions; while Freyberg-Inan, Har-
rison, and James (2009a:259) argue that in fact, it is “realist-inspired
constructivism.” Work that analyzes how NCR is distinct from its close chal-
lengers and its contribution to IR theories is hard to locate—which only leads to
continual ambiguity in its depiction within scholarship.
This study departs from the literature in three main ways. First, it goes beyond
conventional debates that juxtapose NCR with Waltzian neorealism. Few have
conducted in-depth research about how NCR differs from other approaches,
such as Wendtian constructivism. NCR’s cognitive variable distinguishes it here:
a point also made by constructivists.
Second, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has analyzed NCR vis-
a-vis two-level game liberalism (TLG) and Moravcsik’s liberal theory. TLG is a
principal approach which addresses the question of combining international and
domestic factors (Alons 2010:6–8), while Moravcsik’s work is often overlooked.
Does Moravcsik’s focus on domestic politics provide the final blow to structural
theories? How is Putnam’s TLG liberalism’s contribution in bridging the domes-
tic–international divide different from NCR? How is constructivism’s cognitive
variable different from NCR’s perceptual factor? All this controversy revolves
around a central question raised by Hopf (1994:171–172), Schweller (1997:927),
Legro and Moravcsik (1999:55), Rathbun (2008:297–299, 316), and Tang
(2009:802): how can NCR be justified against its main liberal and constructivist
challengers?
Third, the article transcends the mainstream claim that NCR’s contribution
lies in spatial dimensions—bridging the domestic international divide—by eluci-
dating its cognitive and temporal dimensions. Once we understand that states
operate in different perceived geopolitical structures, we can judge their foreign
policies—such as those of France in the late 1950s, or contemporary American
rebalancing to East Asia—more accurately. These foreign policies were imple-
mented within a predefined geopolitical structure.
The argument here, therefore, is that some version of geopolitical structure is
external to the state and binds itself to it. Yet a perceptual layer at policymaker
level also affects the operationalization of that structure. Domestic economic
forces make themselves felt through state policymakers, but only within the con-
text of binding geopolitical factors that constrain. NCR thereby not only bridges
the spatial divide (domestic–international), as conventionally argued in the liter-
ature,4 but also the cognitive (matter-ideas) and temporal divide (present–fu-
ture).
This article denotes NCR as a foreign policy theory. To demonstrate this, it
begins by distinguishing NCR from its close constructivist and liberal challengers,
before advancing the triple bridging identity of NCR.
Neoclassical Realism vis-

a -vis Its Close Challengers
Neoclassical Realism as an Extension of Neorealism

Neoclassical realism’s starting point is an acceptance that the incentives posited
by a Waltzian conception of structure exist, but sometimes, states do not abide
by them. Systemic incentives shape but do not dictate state behavior. Waltz
(1986:343) points out: “Structures condition behaviors and outcomes (. . .). They
do not determine them”; while Layne (2009:113) explains that structural incen-
4
See Christensen (1996), Taliaferro (2006b), Brawley (2010), Carlsnaes (2013:309), and Dunne and Schmidt
(2014:106).
Michiel Foulon 637
tives “only tell half of the story.” As a starting point, neoclassical realists share
neorealism’s core assumptions about the state, relative power, and the primacy
of the anarchical material structure. Yet they are skeptical that these suffice when
seeking to explain state behavior. NCR therefore extends the analysis by includ-
ing state-level variables such as the ideas that state leaders hold about other
states.
Some scholars, however, argue that NCR is an alternative, contradiction, com-
petitor, or rejection of neorealism.5 Others purport that neo- and neoclassical
realism are complementary. Quinn (2013) wonders whether NCR seeks to
explain state behavior within a neorealist paradigm, or instead, to question the
primacy of Waltz’ structural constraints. Freyberg-Inan et al. (2009a:256–258)
view contemporary realism as an extension of neorealism and distinguish
between elaborated structural realism and NCR.
Elaborated structural realism, such as Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism,
develops the microfoundations of neorealism. Waltz and Mearsheimer move
away from unit-level factors of individual state leaders (the first image) and
domestic political factors at the state level (the second image), toward the sys-
temic level (third image), which is anarchical in the absence of an overarching
authority; and thereby necessitates states relying on themselves for power and
security (Waltz 1979:16–186).6
Neoclassical realism does not move further away from Waltz’s first and second
image or elaborate on its microfoundations. Instead, it provides a two-level theo-
rization of foreign policy by emphasizing the roles of state-level factors, such as
domestic politics, and perceptions held by state policymakers.7 For example,
Walt (1987) improves Waltz’s balance of power theory by incorporating percep-
tions about intentions, while Schweller (1998) develops a structural informed
understanding with regard to the interests of different states. NCR prioritizes the
structure and includes state-level factors as secondary variables in explaining for-
eign policy.
Neoclassical realists posit a state-level-mediating variable between system and
foreign policy action and bridge the spatial divide: domestic politics affect how
the government devises foreign policy in response to binding structural incen-
tives. State behavior might otherwise appear suboptimal from a neorealist per-
spective. NCR thus explains why a state’s foreign policy diverges from the
structural incentives. Therefore, a key difference between neorealism and neo-
classical realism is not the presence of ideas in the explanation of state behavior
per se, but the reality of the incentive structure which Waltz advocates, and the
extent to which this structure binds states.
Thus, NCR ipso facto exchanges a degree of neorealism’s parsimony for a mul-
tilevel analysis. Wohlforth (1993:15) summarizes this as the “cruel but familiar
5
See Telhami (2003), Wohlforth (2008b:46), Elman (2009:65), Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2009), and
Carlsnaes (2013:308–309).
6
Neorealists who followed Waltz disagree whether states aim to increase their security (defensive realism) or
power (offensive realism). The terms aggressive and defensive realism were coined by Snyder (1991:12), and later
adopted as “offensive realism” by Schweller (1996:115) and Mearsheimer (2001). Aggressive or offensive neorealism,
associated most heavily with Mearsheimer (2001), holds that “offensive action often contributes to security” and that
states are likely to develop expansionary foreign policies (Snyder 1991:12; Mearsheimer 2001). Defensive neorealists
such as Grieco (1990) and Jervis (1999) present a more benign view of international politics and see conflict as
unavoidable only under certain circumstances (Lake 1991; Zakaria 1998:9; Taliaferro 2000/01:129). Yet even
though differences between variants of neorealism exist, they converge in their roots: They hold a view of anarchy
about the international system, view states as the central actor, and believe that the international anarchical struc-
ture shapes state behavior (Elman 2009; James 2009; Layne 2009:107–112; M€ uller 2013:609). A more in-depth dis-
cussion on the similarities and differences of the aggressive/offensive and defensive realist schools would go
beyond the scope of this article. For an overview, see Jervis (1978:48–50), Taliaferro (2000/01), and Snyder (2002).
7
Freyberg-Inan et al. (2009a:260) distinguish between two “versions” as ways forward for neoclassical realism,
respectively, focusing on the role of leaders, ideas and beliefs (version 1), and domestic politics (version 2).
trade-off of rigor and parsimony in favor of richness and detail.” Many instead
argue that NCR “sacrifices” much of neorealism’s parsimony (Legro and Moravc-
sik 1999:35; Layne 2006:11). NCR wants to do something different. Waltz
explains broad questions, such as balancing behavior in international politics, at
an abstract level. Neoclassical realists explain individual state behavior at the con-
crete level of foreign policy and grand strategy (Schweller 1993:73–75). From a
NCR viewpoint, parsimony is not a proper measure of value. NCR does not sacri-
fice parsimony, but exchanges this measure of value for one which provides rele-
vant variables at the state level, and is fertile when explaining concrete empirical
foreign policy questions. In fact, NCR improves explanatory accuracy through a
multilevel framework (Schweller 1993:75, 1998:16). As neoclassical realists
develop their unit-level variables, however, other theoretical developments also
aim to buy into critiques of neorealism.
A Structural-Level Challenger: Wendtian Constructivism

Adler (2013:118) notes that “in the beginning there was Onuf (1989), who
coined the concept of constructivism in IR; then there was Wendt (1992b)—and
the rest is history.”8 Wendt’s work explicitly attacks Waltz’s neorealism and devel-
oped simultaneously with the emergence of NCR. Therefore, this section will be
limited to an analysis of moderate or “thin” constructivism that is mainly associ-
ated with the work of Wendt (Cederman and Daase 2006:118; Suganami
2006:70).9
Wendtian Constructivism as a Criticism of Neorealism

Wendt criticizes the material structure which neorealists argue exists and
exerts pressure on states. He devises a structural approach by drawing on Gid-
dens’s argument that “structure” is not an external factor that affects agents.10
As structure was not defined “in a fashion best suited to the demands of
social theory,” Giddens conceptualized “the duality of structure”: the agent
shapes the structure that the agent is in turn constrained (Giddens 1984:xx–
xxxi, 16; Wendt 1999:1, 143–178). Agents do not exist prior to the structure
but transform and reproduce the structure within which they operate (Wendt
1987:338). In this sense, the structure has no existence independent of the
agent and is therefore also internal to the actions of individuals (Giddens
1984:16–35; Wendt 1999:171–178). Thus, according to Wendt, the state creates
the social structure and thereby contradicts Waltz’s assertions that structure
exists independently and exerts binding constraints on the agent.
Standard realism starts from a material understanding of structure. Waltz
argues that within an anarchical structure, the distribution of material power
capabilities provides a set of incentives that assert themselves on the conduct of
IR. Yet the incentives of Waltz’s model are not inherent to anarchy, and the
material distribution of capabilities has no inevitable results. Neorealism’s over-
statement of the exogenous distribution of material capabilities made it a theory
which is too limited, materialist, and restrictive. More precisely, Wendt rebuts
Waltz’s core argument and argues it is not “material forces per se [that] deter-
mine international life.”11 Both neorealism and constructivism assert that anar-
8
The references “1989” and “1992b” in this citation refer to Adler (2013:118).
9
Other constructivist branches such as critical constructivism (Cox 2002), linguistic constructivism (Onuf 1989),
and radical constructivism (Doty 1996) argue that moderate constructivism does not go far enough in its insistence
on the social construction instead of material objects.
10
Wendt (1987:336, 1999:246–312, especially 251) is clear: his constructivist theory is a structural approach that
draws on structuration theory.
11
See Wendt (1992:396, 1994:384, 1995:81, 1999:140, 189), Checkel (1998:324), Alker (2000:141), Copeland
(2000:187), Smith (2000:151), Guzzini and Leander (2006:76), and Hurd (2009).
Michiel Foulon 657
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consider it to refer to the way in which those actually existing humans who make
state policy perceive the world. Similarly, NCR is not unique in being equipped
to engage with forward-looking perceptions of actors. Prominent structural real-
ists such as Mearsheimer also discuss perceptions about the material structure.
States cheat and cannot trust in the stability over time of others’ intentions, so
they must instead predict future concentrations of capability and respond
accordingly. Yet Mearsheimer only treats this perceptual variable in the margin
of his offensive realist framework. He notes:
some scholars (such as Wohlforth) maintain that (. . .) what really matters for
understanding international politics is the picture of the balance [of power] that
policymakers have in their heads. I disagree (. . .) policymakers usually have a
good sense of the actual balance of power (. . .). Therefore, one need not focus
on perception of power to explain how states behave. (Mearsheimer 2001:422n2)
Furthermore, neorealists did not address the link between state leaders and
society and how leadership at state level is exercised. Neorealism underplays for-
ward-looking perceptions on the part of actors. Waltz acknowledges that first
image state leaders could act as free agents within the constraints of the struc-
ture of the system. The system punishes through a systemic response if the agent
exceeds the systemic limitations (Little 2009:28). I extend the analysis by empha-
sizing the state level’s active role in creating the perceived structural contours
within which foreign policies operate.
Wendtian constructivism, even though it represents an outright criticism of
Waltz’s neorealism, did not clarify these state-level processes. In fact, Wendt pro-
vides yet another structural approach over the constraining force of the interna-
tional structure—”this time from an ideational perspective”—and ignores the
effects sourcing from ideas on the geopolitical context and domestic politics.13
Such a structural approach—Wendtian or Waltzian—ignores the observation that
states have different foreign policies under similar structural constraints. Threat
assessments shape the geopolitical contours within which states deploy their for-
eign policy, in part triggered by domestic pressures.
A Two-level Challenger: Putnam’s TLG Liberalism

Putnam’s TLG approach makes several overlapping claims to NCR. First, some
identify TLG as one of the principal approaches that combines international
and domestic factors (see Wendt 1995:81; Rathbun 2008; Alons 2010:6–8). TLG
and NCR explicitly include international and domestic levels of analysis in their
analytical framework, so the closeness between the two approaches lies in the
analytical realm. This does not mean ideological closeness, which would be coun-
terintuitive: The TLG approach is of liberal pedigree, whereas NCR is realist.
Second, various case studies adopt TLG where NCR could provide better
insights.14 Finally, even though both constructivism and NCR claim to provide
the “logical next step” to shortcomings identified with structural theories (see
Rathbun 2008; Wendt 1995:81) fairly little scholarly attention has been paid to
the liberal alternative of a TLG.
Connecting Domestic and International Affairs

Two-level game bridges the spatial divide between international and domestic
levels of analysis and attempts to offer an “Integrative Approach” (Evans
13
See Adler (1997:325), Checkel (1998:325), Copeland (2000:192), Kratochwil (2006:30) and Lugosi (2012:123).
14
See Jayakar’s (1997) study of the US-China copyright dispute, and Li’s (1994) application of TLG for US-Tai-
wan trade negotiations.
Michiel Foulon 641
1993:397–430). TLG responds to earlier approaches that ignore the domestic

level15 and are therefore “misleading and inadequate” (Pastor 1993:327). Put-
nam argues that instead of understanding IR as a chess or billiard game, interna-
tional economic policy coordination is a TLG. He asserts:
“Each political leader appears at both game boards. Across the international table
sit his foreign counterparts (. . .) And around the domestic table behind him sit
party and parliamentary figures, spokesmen for the great domestic ministries,
representatives of key domestic interest groups, and the leaders’ own political
advisers” (Putnam and Henning 1989:110–111).16
Yet the overlap between TLG and NCR is limited. First, the theoretical link
between the domestic and international level in the TLG is not established.17
The role of the negotiator is the sole theoretical link between the two levels. Put-
nam is clear about this: “the chief negotiator is the only formal link between
Level I and Level II” (Putnam 1988:456; Odell 2013:388). TLG thus explains
behavior of individual negotiators on behalf of the state.
Next, TLG liberalism of the original Putnam variety does not prioritize one
level of analysis over the other. It is unclear which level is more important in
addressing concrete puzzles. Putnam argues for an interaction between domestic
and international levels of analysis via the negotiator. Stein (1993:79), Snyder
(1993:105), and others describe the two levels of TLG as “additive” instead.18 So,
Putnam does not prioritize one level of analysis over the other; negotiators
would disagree over which level or game is dominant.
Third, the absence of a cognitive variable in Putnam’s model precludes the
social mutability of the international environment. The areas that call for further
analysis include how does NCR deal with the connection of domestic and inter-
national affairs and the perceptual layer of the international context in a way
superior to TLG?
Finally, Putnam assumes that negotiations are bilateral and leaves multilateral
negotiations unaddressed (Raymond 1994:347; Jayakar 1997:529; Onder 2011:8).
Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam (1993) and Raymond (1994:347) tested TLG
against a variety of case studies on security, business, political economy, and
human rights. Other work, such as Krauss (1993) and Li (1994) applied TLG to
bilateral trade relationships. Yet these case studies were confined to an analysis
concerning how domestic and international factors affect bilateral or multilateral
negotiation processes. They do not cover international negotiations, foreign pol-
icy, or international politics,19 nor do they include the role of perceptions on
the part of state leaders.
All of this limits the applicability of TLG for concrete empirical questions.
NCR’s view of the state-level offers more insights than “Janus faces” negotiators,
who have to balance international and domestic interests in the TLG approach
(Moravcsik 1993b:15, 135). The neoclassical realist emphasizes state leader per-
ceptions: state leaders are active participants that act as the nexus between the
two levels of analysis.
15
See Moravcsik (1993a:160), Wendt (1999), Alons (2010), Chakma (2012:6), and Schultz (2013:491).
16
Schelling (1960) already adopted game theory for IR, but nevertheless remained focused on the study of war,
threats of war, extortion, and criminal deterrence. Putnam developed this into a two-level understanding of interna-
tional negotiations.
17
See Putnam (1988:436), Moravcsik (1993a:160), Li (1994), Jayakar (1997:554), Rose (1998), Alons (2010),
Miller (2010), Chakma (2012:6), Schultz (2013:491), and Odell (2013:388).
18
See also Putnam (1988:430), Eichengreen and Uzan (1993:199), Evans (1993:402), Moravcsik (1993a:160),
and Boukhars (2001).
19
See Kahler (1993:363), Moravcsik (1993b:16), Odell (1993:261), Li (1994:692–693), and Boyer (2000:185).
Perception in TLG
Two-level game recognizes that cognitive factors on the part of individuals affect
the international context of the game and vice versa in what Putnam (1988:455)
calls a process of “reverberation.” Yet this is limited to the assessment of material
facts in the domestic level (Level II) and the role of the negotiator, not so much
the international context (Level I). Walt (1987:10) similarly criticizes game theo-
retical models for failing to take perceptions into account. TLG only explains
that a negotiator creates the perception of a small set of agreements from inter-
national negotiations (Level I), acceptable to the negotiator’s constituents and
domestic base (Level II). Putnam (1988:437) refers to this as the “Level II win-
set.”20 Consequently, TLG cannot explain differences in a state’s foreign policy
due to changes in the perceived structure of the system ceteris paribus.
An improvement here would be to allow in cognitive factors beyond individ-
ual-level interpretations about the international context (including state-level
interpretations) into realism’s forward-looking approach. NCR allows the incor-
poration of how state policymakers interpret and reassess threats from the distri-
bution of material capabilities in the system at different points in time. Changes
in the assessment of the future international material context cause changes in
the perceived geopolitical setting, within which states operate their foreign poli-
cies. Beijing’s assessments of US military involvement in East Asia as a strategy of
containment over the past decade, although not materially real, nevertheless sets
the geopolitical context for China’s foreign policy.
The inclusion of domestic politics and a state-level perceptual variable in the
NCR framework, however, leaves it vulnerable for criticism. Moravcsik’s liberal
theory best formulated this, asking whether “anybody is still a realist,” and inquir-
ing into what distinguishes NRC from liberal challengers in the IR theory land-
scape.21
A Domestic-level Challenger: Moravcsik’s Liberal Theory

Moravcsik is perhaps the liberal scholar most critical of contemporary realists.
While Putnam (1988:427) found that “it is fruitless to debate whether domestic
politics really determine international relations, or the reverse,”22 argues that
domestic factors are sufficient to explain state behavior. States are in full control
of the European integration process—Moravcsik’s main case study—which is not
an inevitable outcome dictated by geopolitical pressures, but a choice based on
what states want, hence “The choice for Europe” (Moravcsik 1998).
Initially, Moravcsik largely confined himself to analyzing the process of Euro-
pean integration, which leads to the question of the European Union’s unique-
ness. Yet his liberal argument can also be applied outside the complex web of
intense interaction that occurs within the European project. After all, Moravcsik
later incorporates his conclusions into his new liberal theory, where he explains
state behavior more generally (Moravcsik 2003, 2008).23
Moravcsik’s earlier work sets out that single-level theoretical approaches are
insufficient to understand foreign policy and world politics,24 and that IR theo-
rists must combine domestic and international explanations (Moravcsik 1993b:9,
20
In this model, a small win-set in Level II would give the negotiator a bargaining tool in Level I.
21
Moravcsik (1997:543, 1998:497–499, 2003:37), Legro and Moravcsik (1999:5), and Feaver et al. (2000:184–185).
22
Moravcsik (1997:518,521, 1998:23, 26, 473–478, 1999:269, 2000a:130, 2000b:6, 24–25, 29, 34–35, 41,
2000c:219–220)
23
Moravcsik (1997:516–521, 524–525, 1998:22–24, 2000c:225–229, 2003:10–19, 2008:240–246) distinguishes three
variants of liberalism, namely ideational, commercial, and republican.
24
Moravcsik (2008) argues that that his liberal approach can account for foreign policy, systemic outcomes, and
world politics more generally.
Michiel Foulon 643
33). However, he later argues that international incentives and geopolitical fac-
tors are redundant in understanding foreign policy: “political economic con-
cerns appear sufficient to explain national motivations” ([emphasis added]25
Thus, Moravcsik’s key argument is not that primarily domestic commercial inter-
ests shape foreign policy, but that to understand state behavior we need to know
what they want, and that what states want can be explained only by looking at
domestic factors at the exclusion of international factors.
Moravcsik thereby turns around the geopolitical explanation for European
integration and state behavior, as best illustrated by his frequent discussions of
former President Charles de Gaulle’s Fouchet Plan. De Gaulle proposed the Fou-
chet Plan in 1961 to create an intergovernmental Union of States, replacing the
supranational European Communities.26 It “was grounded primarily in economic
interests, in particular the search for export markets for French farm surpluses,”
Moravcsik (1998:84) argues. Looking at domestic commercial interests suffices:
“I continue to maintain that commercial concerns are predominant and sufficient
to account for de Gaulle’s actions” ([emphasis added], Moravcsik 2000a:128).
Geopolitics played a negligible role: “De Gaulle pursued his geopolitical goals
within the constraints set by the economic demands of producer groups” (Mo-
ravcsik 1998:477–478).
According to this account, wheat, not nuclear weapons or French grandeur
was the vital interest that fundamentally motivated de Gaulle’s European policy.
The Fouchet Plan was a “smokescreen” and a deliberately deceptive move to
make other states believe that de Gaulle was serious about European integration
and security concerns. The disguised objective was to find export markets for
French farmer surpluses (Moravcsik 1998:84, 177, 186–187, 225). This argument
is in direct opposition to NCR, which emphasizes the structure and treats domes-
tic factors as secondary. What, then, drove France’s foreign policy in the late
1950s and early 1960s through the Fouchet Plan?
Shortcomings in Moravcsik’s Liberal Argument

Moravcsik’s liberal argument is limited in three main ways. First, domestic eco-
nomic incentives did not predominate in de Gaulle’s foreign policy in the late
1950s and early 1960s. According to Moravcsik, the geopolitical rhetoric of the
French leader was only a deceptive tactic designed to mislead his European
peers into thinking that de Gaulle was serious about European integration, for
at least long enough to lock in agricultural reforms to enable French farming
exports through an integrated market that removed tariffs (Moravcsik 1998:84,
177, 186–187, 225, 2000b:34–39). Moravcsik quotes the Peyrefitte memo on at
least four occasions and argues that “de Gaulle’s real ambition was to seduce
pro-European groups into silence while he gained agricultural concessions” (Mo-
ravcsik 1998:84, 177, 186–187, 225). Yet the argument that domestic commercial
incentives superseded geopolitical concerns does not chime with the then
French President’s own words. When de Gaulle was asked about his support for
the European Economic Community (EEC), he replied: “The EEC is not an end
in itself (‘pas un but en soi’). It has to transform into a political community!”
(Peyrefitte 1994:429). Thus, wheat played an important (albeit secondary) role
in French foreign policy in the late 1950s.
Second, Moravcsik assumes that domestic agricultural interests in French eco-
nomic policy also dominated its overall foreign policy and strategy. That, how-
ever, takes a valid insight a step too far. This is illustrated by Moravcsik’s
(2000b:25) argument that “The trade conflict between the United States and
25
Moravcsik (1998:23, 26, 86–158 [especially 157–158], 473–478 [especially 474], 2000a:118–120, 128, 2000b:34,
2000c:219–220), and Trachtenberg (2000:102).
26
For both drafts of the Fouchet Plan, see the Fouchet Committee (1961, 1962).
Europe [in 1961–1964] (. . .) is concerned primarily with agriculture.” Similarly,

Moravcsik (2000b:27) posits that “de Gaulle insisted on the inclusion of agricul-
ture as (the only) “essential” aspect of the Common Market [in 1958].” Agricultural
pressures certainly played an important role in the economic realm; but this
does not mean that commercial interests alone—let alone agriculture surpluses
—explain France’s overall foreign policy.
As an adversary of East Germany, still occupied by Soviet forces and part of
the Warsaw Pact, de Gaulle operated in a Cold War context where geopolitical
security concerns were analytically prioritized and predominated domestic com-
mercial interests. Describing the Common Market as devoid of geopolitical
meaning is unrealistic: It is part of a political construct. For example, East Ger-
many had significant agricultural shortages. However, within the geopolitical dic-
tates of the Cold War, more than 80% of its total imports and nearly 90% of its
total European imports between 1958 and 1963 (right before, during, and after
the drafts of the Fouchet Plan) came from the USSR and Central and Eastern
European communist states.27 French exports to the USSR were marginal (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1960:49; United Nations
Statistics Division 1962:Table XXV-2). Thus, the structure, divided geopolitically
as the Cold War unfolded, limited agricultural export opportunities available to
de Gaulle to such an extent that it rendered domestic economic pressures from
French farmers as secondary variables, which only triggered minor changes in
foreign policy. Elman summarizes: “while structure gives the baseline appropriate
response, second image factors also determine how states frame and respond to
external stimuli” ([emphasis added], 2009:73).
Third, and importantly, if we were to follow Moravcsik’s suggestion and only
look at what domestic interest groups want, then French foreign economic policy
during the late 1950s should reflect a response to shifts in domestic economic
interests (Moravcsik 2000b:21). After all, French farmers pressured the govern-
ment to find export markets. French foreign economic policy should, thus, bear
less relation to the geopolitical context of that time. Yet the predefined geopolit-
ical structure constrained France. What France did was different to what it
wanted based on domestic commercial interest groups. According to Moravcsik,
the Fouchet Plan can be explained by merely looking at what France wanted,
which can be explained by domestic economic interests: in particular, the search
for export markets with French farmer surpluses among “the Six” (France, West
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
One market with significant shortages of the produce which French farmers
had in surplus was that of East Germany. Wheat production in East Germany
dropped 29% and potato production 43% in the year preceding the first draft of
the Fouchet Plan (1960–1961) (Anonymous 1960; Miller 1962; U.S. Department
of Agriculture Economic Research Service 1964:29). French domestic economic
interests also changed significantly: surpluses of starchy wheat, vegetables, and
fruit soared between 1958 and 1961 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations 1960:80). These farmers also constituted an important electoral
constituency, who pressured de Gaulle to find agricultural export markets.
Following Moravcsik’s argument, and ignoring geopolitical considerations, de
Gaulle should have turned to the large East German markets.
On this point, Moravcsik’s liberal theory holds that the structure of prefer-
ences, composed of policy interdependence of domestic state preferences in
France and East Germany, compelled de Gaulle not to turn to the latter for
export opportunities. If East Germany did not need agricultural imports, this
27
The figures in this section are taken from the State Central Administration for Statistics at the Council of Min-
isters of the German Democratic Republic (1963, 1965), Strauss (1969), and the US Department of Agriculture Eco-
nomic Research Service (1964:31).
Michiel Foulon 645
should explain why de Gaulle did not seek more agricultural integration with it.
Yet in the year before the first draft of the Fouchet Plan, farm production in
East Germany lagged to such an extent that it was desperate for cheap agricul-
tural imports. East German Deputy Minister for Trade and Supply, Herbert
Jarowinsky, illustrated this when announcing on July 27, 1960 that “several addi-
tional hundreds of millions of marks had to be spent on non-scheduled imports
of foodstuffs” (Miller 1962). In fact, between 1955 and 1961, East German wheat
imports doubled and potato imports tripled. In other words, East Germany was
very hungry indeed for food imports.28
But those vast imports came mainly from the USSR and Central and Eastern
European communist states, not France (U.S. Department of Agriculture Eco-
nomic Research Service 1964). Moreover, Britain signaled no interest in an
arrangement for further agricultural integration with France in the mid- and late
1950s (Fearne 1997:11–17), and de Gaulle failed to cut agricultural subsidies.
This increased the pressure to find export markets elsewhere (Moravcsik
1998:179–180, 2000b:17). Yet de Gaulle did not turn to the tremendous commer-
cial opportunities in East Germany’s import market. At the very least, this indi-
cates that looking at domestic commercial interest is insufficient to explain
foreign policy.
Borrowing Moravcsik’s qualification that to understand state behavior, one
needs to look at what states want, and that it is sufficient to look at domestic com-
mercial interests to understand what states want, the question is clear: would
France’s foreign economic policy or overall foreign policy have been the same in
the absence of the geopolitical context of the late 1950s and early 1960s? The
answer is very likely no. In fact, in the absence of the East–West divide, France
might have turned to East Germany for more agricultural exports.
It then becomes increasingly difficult to support Moravcsik’s theory. Macroeco-
nomic preferences of ruling economic coalitions pressured government to devise
exporting-seeking foreign policies. Yet arguing that the geopolitical context is
irrelevant to understandings of foreign policy is a step too far. Domestic factors
affect the composition of foreign policy; however, these do not trigger and cre-
ate the baseline and broad contours. De Gaulle pursued policies to satisfy
domestic agricultural interest groups under such significant geopolitical con-
straints that commercial interests were reduced to a secondary explanatory vari-
able. Domestic economic interest groups have less societal input than Moravcsik
assumes.
Domestic pressures (commercial, ideological, and electoral) and foreign eco-
nomic policy can only play a role within predefined geopolitical rules of interna-
tional commerce. Moravcsik wrongly treats domestic interests and the process of
foreign policymaking as analytically more important than geopolitics. So how do
decision makers’ perceptions of structural constraints or opportunities shape
€
future foreign policy choices (Devlen and Ozdamar 2009; Freyberg-Inan, Har-
rison, and James 2009b:7–8)? The geopolitical dimension of the structure
expands or limits the choices and opportunities available to the agent. Percep-
tion of a threat retains primacy over domestic politics (Schweller 2004:169).
Domestic considerations constrain agents within that perceived structure. The
state-level cannot act independently of the structure as a free agent, and the
agent cannot make choices based on domestic commercial pressures alone.
The State-Level between Structural Pressure and Outcome

Moravcsik treats state leaders as passive observers in a system, whose sole theoret-
ical and empirical link is that of a “transmission belt” or “manager” between
28
Planning Chief Bruno Leuschner said only in 1962 that no further foodstuff imports were possible (Miller
1962).
international and domestic levels of analysis.29 For Moravcsik, state leaders

merely capture and aggregate preferences of a subset of domestic social groups
through political institutions and represent these through foreign policy initia-
tives at international level. He argues that the state-level “is not an actor but a rep-
resentative institution” ([emphasis added], Moravcsik 2003:5). Therefore, while
Putnam views the negotiator as the sole theoretical link between the two levels
of analysis, Moravcsik regards state leaders as mere representatives of domestic
pressures.
Neoclassical realism conceives state-level actors as active participants. The
“flesh and blood officials” (Rose 1998:158) and “human-constructed institutions”
(Sterling-Folker 2009:210) hold perceptions of future geopolitical structures, and
affect domestic social groups and foreign and economic policies. De Gaulle and
his associates perceived threats from the USSR, which pressured the French gov-
ernment into devising a new security strategy. To this end, the French govern-
ment joined a military alliance with NATO in 1949. De Gaulle formulated more
detailed suggestions for closer political and defense cooperation at a press con-
ference in Paris on September 5, 1960 (de Gaulle 1960; Teasdale 2013:6). This
was subsequently formalized in the first draft of the Fouchet Plan in 1961, with
two main aims: a common foreign and defense policy (Fouchet Committee
1961:Article 2). De Gaulle’s perception of a Soviet threat translated into foreign
policy in the years thereafter that operated within the pre-established structure.
The NCR approach transcends the spatial divide (domestic–international) and
incorporates the cognitive and temporal dimension of how future perceptions at
state-level create a predefined geopolitical setting and limit the range of future
foreign economic policy choices within it.
The Triple Bridging Identity of NCR
Neoclassical realism literature has developed a range of state-level intervening

variables between structure and outcome. Walt (1985, 1987:181–217), Dueck
(2004, 2006), Schweller (2009), and Kitchen (2010) discuss the role of domestic
embedded ideology. Zakaria (1998), Taliaferro (2006b, 2009), and Brawley
(2009, 2010) address the state’s capacity to harness resources, while Walt (1987),
Wohlforth (1993), Schweller (1998:15–38), and Brawley (2009, 2010) extend
research on the perceptual variable. All these scholars add unit-level variables to
extend neorealist theory and enhance its explanatory power regarding foreign
policy. They advance a particular version of NCR, not a universal one.
There is no single neoclassical realist theory (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman
2009:10), but rather, various NCR models. Similarly, state-level variables of per-
ception and domestic political economy outlined in this section are constructed
within a realist framework, but do not represent NCR as a whole. The model
advanced in the remainder of this article transcends the spatial divide (domes-
tic–international), as well as cognitive and temporal divides, through state-level
perceptions.
The Spatial Divide: State Power and Domestic Resources

Standard realism refers to the importance of domestic politics as national power
or the “the power of a nation”; that is, of “individuals who belong to the same
nation” (Morgenthau 1973[1948]:103, 112–149). National power is composed of
different elements of geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military
29
See Moravcsik (1993c:483, 1997:518, 1998:485, 1999:282, 284, 293, 2003:5, 2008:237).
Michiel Foulon 647
preparedness, and population (Mearsheimer 2001:55–137). Yet state govern-

ments, decision makers, top officials, and specific actors and institutions cannot
extract this national power for the formation of foreign policy. For example,
standard realists expect that more Chinese national power in terms of gross
domestic product (GDP), military capabilities, and population will lead to more
power-seeking behavior (offensive realism). Yet this has not happened, even
when international factors set the conditions for conflict (such as the bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1991, or the Hainan Island spy plane inci-
dent in 2001). This highlights that all too often, domestic and international fac-
tors have been considered as an “either–or” issue, and the theoretical and
empirical link between both has not been established: “Any realist discussion of
international change must combine the domestic and international levels”
(Wohlforth 1994/95:107).
Neoclassical realists instead refer to state power (Zakaria 1998:42; Schweller
2004; Taliaferro 2006a:473, 2006b). This entails the resources that the state-level
can extract domestically and deploy through foreign policy at the international
level. NCR criticizes neorealists for assuming that states’ behavior is a direct
response to structural incentives whatever the internal composition of the state:
“structural realism stresses the inescapable impact of anarchy on the relations
among states, to the exclusion of all other influences” (Frankel 1996:xxiii).30
Neorealism thereby fails to pay much attention to states’ internal structure,
domestic factors, and the role of the state level in between the structure and for-
eign policy actions.
Neorealists treat the state as a metaphorical black box and underplay different
internal compositions, which trigger different foreign and economic policy
responses. While subject to the same geopolitical context in the 1950s, with the
USSR the main international threat, de Gaulle dealt with different domestic
pressures than his contemporaries in Britain. Waltz seconds this critique of stan-
dard realist scholarship:
The theory [of neorealism] explains why states similarly placed behave similarly
despite their internal differences. The explanation of states’ behavior is found at
the international, and not at the national level. That is why the theory is called a
theory of international politics. In contrast, a theory of foreign policy would explain
why states similarly placed in a system behave in different ways. Differences in behavior
arise from differences of internal composition. ([emphasis added], 1996:54–55)
In that sense, Waltz (1996:55) helped the development of the NCR school in
the years thereafter, as he wondered: “How can one handle problems posed by
theories that fail to comprehend [state level] factors needed to explain the
behaviors one wants to account for?” The geopolitical context (East Germany on
the other side of the Cold War) and domestic pressures from French farmers
are both required when explaining French foreign policy in the late 1950s. Nei-
ther level by itself is sufficient to explain why de Gaulle sought agricultural
export markets among the Six and not other European states with significant
agricultural shortages, such as East Germany and Britain that were excluded in
the Fouchet Plan. Wendt’s structural explanation and Moravcsik’s domestic-level
approach are inadequate. Putnam’s TLG combines both levels but remains
unclear about which is predominant and what the link is between state leaders
and society.
Neoclassical realism outstrips standard realism’s summary of human nature,
the anthropomorphism of the state (classical realism), and the material balance
30
Guzzini (1993:444), Baldwin (2013:281), Levy (2013:583), Schultz (2013:497), and Simmons (2013:355) treat
neorealism and structural realism as synonyms.
of power that affects states (neorealism). As Schuett (2010:81–82) explains:

“Neoclassical Man is not a one-dimensional creature merely seeking survival in
an anarchical system.” Rather, “Men and states are driven by multiple motiva-
tional forces” (Schuett 2010:81–82). Neoclassical realists can do much to explain
and reduce discrepancies between structural theory and empirical reality. Neore-
alists wrongly assume that states could extract infinite domestic resources. Rose
(1998:146–147), Schweller (2004:164–166), and Taliaferro (2006b:473, 477–478,
485–486) conclude that no immediate or perfect “transmission belt” between
structural pressures and the formation of foreign policy exists, as states cannot
always directly respond to international dictates. International pressures from
the structure are indirect and translate downward through state-specific domestic
intervening variables at state level.
In addition, states require time to reorganize domestic economic and financial
resources, mobilize domestic popular support, and the rate at which these
resources translate into state power varies. As Rathbun (2008:305) puts it: “The
system offers incentives to states, but it does not determine a state’s actions.
(. . .). The system encourages states to do certain things, although they might
not.” And Rose (1998:147) writes: “systemic pressures and incentives may shape
the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy without being strong
or precise enough to determine the specific details of state behavior.” Hence,
rather than an immediate or perfect transmission belt between international and
domestic level, “complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts
that channel, mediate, and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external
forces” (Schweller 1998, 2004:164). States’ different internal compositions
matter.
Zakaria (1998:9) best sets out how NCR takes the next step from standard real-
ism and other theories: “States may be billiard balls, but each is made of a differ-
ent material, affecting its speed, spin, and bounce on the international plane.”
State-level variables such as strategic assessment, domestic political economy, and
decision-making processes intervene as secondary variables which cause minor
changes in foreign policy and grand strategy. Domestic commercial interests in
France during the late 1950s pressured the government to pursue a certain pol-
icy, but only in the predefined geopolitical context within which de Gaulle oper-
ated.
This is a key feature distinguishing NCR from liberal and constructivist
schools. NCR outstrips the spatial divide and bridges the temporal and cognitive
ones. It demonstrates how domestic pressures translate through state power into
foreign policies within the perceived geopolitical setting. State power is then
defined as the “portion of [total] national power the government can extract for
its purposes”; and “the relative ability to extract and mobilize resources from
domestic society” within a certain geopolitical setting.31
This state power operates within the predefined structure. State-level percep-
tions affect what policies leaders devise to satisfy domestic interests in the face of
structural incentives. State-level assessments of future threats set the geopolitical
structure and limit the range of foreign policy choices available to the agent.
This is where NCR brings in the cognitive and temporal dimensions.
The Cognitive and Temporal Divides: Assessments and Time Frames

State-level perceptions about the material distribution of power vary and create
the geopolitical rules of commerce within which foreign policy operates. US state
policymakers and academics already perceived China’s economic growth as a
31
See Christensen (1996:11), Rose (1998:162), Zakaria (1998:9–10, 35–39), Taliaferro (2006a:469–473,
2009:204), Lai (2010:13), and Onder (2011:9).
Michiel Foulon 649
future superpower in the early 1990s. Schweller (1998:200–201) argues that as a

“rising, dissatisfied power,” China will pose the most immediate challenge to the
status quo. Rhetoric in strategic documents as well as empirical evidence, such as
the inception of the National Economic Council, creation of a United States–
China bilateral WTO agreement in 1999,32 and President Clinton’s visit to
Beijing in 1998, illustrate that China was now at the top of the agenda in
Washington’s grand strategy (The White House 1998:43, 2000:I).
With the end of the Cold War, economic disputes have become the primary
source of tensions. Gaddis (1993:4–8) and Schweller (1993:99, 1998:198–201),
two prominent realist scholars, were already arguing during the early 1990s that
military struggles between states had been replaced by economic contests which
would prove harder to resolve: “statesmen (. . .) assess states’ relative power
according to their economic, not military, resources” (Schweller 1993:99). Tense
bilateral relations and perceptions about China’s economic rise no longer
amounted to a secondary foreign policy issue.33 Washington’s assessments
pushed the government to focus on managing emerging trade imbalances with
China. To that end, the US economy became a higher priority in grand strategy.
This led to a rebalancing to East Asia over the early 1990s, even though the
political rhetoric intensified only a decade later. Yet US leaders’ assessments of
China actually failed to correspond with the material reality and might even
never materialize.
Nevertheless, this threat assessment established the geopolitical setting for US
foreign policy whereby China poses a potential danger to Washington’s regional
leadership in East Asia. This could even cause real economic insecurity in the
United States, should Beijing integrate more with other East Asian economies
and away from its bilateral, economically interdependent relationship with the
United States. Any foreign and economic policy on East Asia since the late
1990s, driven by domestic economic pressures in the United States, took place
within this predefined geopolitical context.
US Rebalancing to East Asia

American rebalancing is perhaps best exemplified through its commitment to
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) since 2009. The TPP, although established
in 2002, today operates within Washington’s predefined geopolitical rules of
commerce. Wendt’s constructivist approach emphasizes that historical processes
changed Washington’s image of China into that of an adversary, but underplays
realism’s future-oriented perceptions. Mearsheimer’s neorealism predicts that a
forward military strategy to strive for hegemony is counterproductive (as it trig-
gers counterbalancing and hegemonic decline). Neorealism simply falls short of
explaining heavy American military engagement in East Asia. Layne (2009:108–
109) therefore points to limitations of structural theories and wonders why Wash-
ington does not opt for an off-shore balancing strategy that prevents it from “de-
scending down the counterproductive and self-destructive path of seeking
hegemony.”
Neoclassical realism incorporates domestic politics to explain this conundrum.
Domestic commercial incentives led Washington to expand trade with East Asian
economies, but only within the predefined geopolitical context. Sluggish eco-
nomic growth, worsened by the 2007 economic crisis, required the United States
to revive its economy. According to Barfield and Levy (2009), this directly led to
32
A summary of this agreement is available via http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/factsheets/
fs-004.html.
33
Strategic documents from the time are overloaded with rhetoric about US-China economic relations. For
example, The White House (1996).
the start of American negotiations to join the TPP which is expected to add bil-
lions of dollars to the US economy and create thousands of jobs (Gordon 2012).
Yet this trade initiative only occurred within the geopolitical structure of the
time, and did not include China; whereas Japan was included. Japan’s vast GDP
—more than the other TPP negotiation partners combined—offered significant
trade opportunities (Gordon 2012:18). China’s GDP, however, exceeds Japan’s
by over 40% today (World Bank 2012).
In light of Moravcsik’s qualification, we could wonder why the TPP negotia-
tions do not yet include China, still the United States’ most important trading
partner. The US-led TPP does welcome new members—however: (i) China has
already gained access to the markets of most TPP partners through alternative
bilateral agreements and is therefore unlikely to join the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship if required to make great concessions, (ii) Beijing regards the RCEP as a
more attractive (China led) alternative for regional economic integration—and
it excludes the United States, (iii) Chinese economic benefits of joining the TPP
are purely speculative, (iv) Beijing hesitantly seeks ad hoc bilateral trade agree-
ments with the United States, such as ongoing negotiations for an investment
treaty (The White House 2014), and (v) high labor and environmental stan-
dards, as well as intellectual property rights advanced by the United States, de
facto preclude China from joining (Devadason 2014; Ye 2014).
Instead, Beijing responded to the TPP by launching alternative trade initiatives
such as the RCEP, which excludes the United States. The East Asian parties in
the TPP negotiation process include states such as Japan, South Korea, Singa-
pore, Vietnam, and Brunei, but not China. China remains the largest trading
partner for imports in the United States (United States Census Bureau 2014a),
but is also perceived as a competitor for leadership in East Asia, and a potential
threat to American allies in the region.
Structural theories underplay domestic economic factors, and would be hard
pressed to explain why, in spite of the geopolitical context surrounding China’s
exclusion, American demand for cheap Chinese imports persistently fuels the
“China threat” economically and militarily at a time when Washington suppos-
edly aims to contain this. A containment strategy toward China would have
involved a drastic change in US trade policy, reducing economic dependence on
its potential adversary. Instead, while the trade deficit with China was $13 billion
in 1991 and less than $40 billion in 1996, it had risen to $83 billion by 2001 and
exploded to almost $319 billion by 2013 (United States Census Bureau 2014b).
Moreover, relaxing export controls for commercial satellites in 1996 (overturned
in 1998) advanced China’s economic, military, and technological rise, actually
harming American security (Kan 2001).
The offensive neorealist view—that it makes sense for a state to help another
to grow if they fight the same adversary—is flawed in two main ways. First, bor-
rowing Jervis’s discussion of Rousseau’s Stag Hunt example, the United States
would need other East Asian states to hunt the “Stag” (China) (Jervis 1978). Sec-
ond, China does not pose a direct security threat to the United States in a neore-
alist sense. It is too far-fetched to state that the United States aims to contain
China through cooperation with other East Asian states. Layne (2009:128–129)
summarizes this shortcoming of (offensive) neorealism: “The United States (. . .)
is sui generis grand strategically, because as an insular power and a regional
hegemon, it is not constrained by systemic imperatives to expand into distant
regions to gain security.” Neorealism supports the idea that the Pacific Ocean
serves as a buffer zone and that the United States can therefore reduce military
investment and forgo its forward military presence in East Asia.
In his work on threat assessment, Jervis (1978:195) notes, “If all states were
self-sufficient islands, anarchy would be much less of a problem. A small invest-
ment in shore defenses and a small army would be sufficient to repel invasion.”
Michiel Foulon 651
If US strategy is only triggered by neorealist structural incentives—such as the

balance of power, geographical proximity of rival states, and the military-techni-
cal capabilities of a potential adversary—China does not pose a threat. Walt
(1987) and Schweller (1998:63–64) provide vital steps extending this analysis:
states not only assess threats based on aggregate power and geographical proxim-
ity, but also on their perceptions of other states’ offensive intentions. Beijing
lacks the material power, aggressive intentions, and is separated from the United
States by the Pacific Ocean. This precludes China from being a threat to the
United States in the neorealist sense (Walt 1985).
A number of questions then emerge. What are the other causal variables for
US foreign policy in East Asia today? If Washington seeks leadership through a
forward military presence vis-a-vis Beijing, why is it fueling China’s economic and
military rise? Moravcsik’s liberal commercial approach helps explain: import-
and export-oriented commercial interest groups in the United States pressured
Washington to maintain an open international trading regime with China. With
advanced regional integration in East Asia, American leaders fear the prospect
of becoming an outsider in a more integrated East Asian economy (Barfield
2010). Yet, this is where liberal commercial analysis stops: it suffices to look at
domestic commercial pressures. Thus, the question is not a Moravcsikian liberal
one, which looks only at domestic commercial pressures in the United States,
nor a neorealist one of an American response to a geographical and military
threat. Rather, it is how Washington responds to domestic economic pressures
within the predefined geopolitical rules of commerce in East Asia.
For states, the material distribution of power remains analytically and tem-
porarily more important than domestic economic interests. Anarchy is the start-
ing point in the realist tradition, but does not directly affect state behavior. The
state level plays an important role here, as with the examples of de Gaulle in the
late 1950s and state-level perceptions in the United States in the 1990s. The per-
ceived threats are translated to the domestic political community and set the
geopolitical context for foreign and economic policies in the years thereafter.
The TPP and RCEP reflect two competing processes of an American-led Trans-
Pacific leadership and Chinese-led intra-Asian leadership (Barfield and Levy
2009; Barfield 2010; Devadason 2014:477). For China, the RCEP represents a
politically attractive route which excludes the United States from economic inte-
gration and competition for East Asian leadership.
Neoclassical realism therefore requires more than a synthesis about security,
survival, anthropomorphism, international anarchy, and the metaphor of the bil-
liard ball game. Schweller (1997:929) notes that standard realism falls short
when survival is secured, and he shifts the focus toward the question of “how
unthreatened states respond to opportunities in their environment.” In the
absence of a direct geographical or military threat from China to US survival,
how can we best explain Washington’s current strategy toward East Asia? Kirsh-
ner (2012:61) wonders: “Will the US not ‘survive’ if it fails to reach across the
Pacific in an effort to strangle the Confucian baby in its cradle?” Standard real-
ism simply fails to address these important questions.
Developing a Predefined Geopolitical Structure

Neoclassical realism not only bridges the divide between domestic and interna-
tional variables, but also incorporates different points in time: short-term assess-
ments at state-level about the potential long-term material capabilities of
adversaries. The imagined future superpower of China might never materialize,
but already affects the formation of US foreign policy. Christensen (1996:28)
and Brawley (2010), explain that here, NCR brings in the variable of the “time
frame.” Decision makers at state level assess whether international pressures will
occur in the short term or the long term.
Not all perceptions, however, affect foreign policy significantly. For example,
even if China’s future growth pattern is assessed differently, the United States
may also rebalance toward East Asia based on domestic commercial interests. In
this scenario, the predefined geopolitical context would have been different and
China might already have been included as a leading negotiation partner in the
TPP. Therefore, at least to an extent, American perceptions of a rising Chinese
threat created the geopolitical context within which economically induced rebal-
ancing is taking place today. Thus, the question is not whether but how threat
assessments about adversaries create a predefined geopolitical context within
which foreign policy and grand strategy is deployed.
The material incentive of a Chinese threat is not real. Rather, the beholder
treats the other state as if it will inevitably become a future material threat. This
in turn makes the perceived international environment real today by implement-
ing foreign policy in the perceived geopolitical context. Breslin (2010:10,
2011:14–15), Barr (2011:119–135), Lieber (2011:515–516), and Liru (2012) have
therefore questioned the discourse over China. Breslin (2010:10, 2011:14–15)
referred to it as “imaginary China,” while Jervis (1976:372–377, especially 373)
and Schweller (1998:59–92) had already developed this idea: “decision makers
often see imaginary dangers. They are sensitive to threats to their security that
critical observers regard as minuscule” (see also Jervis 1988:675–676,
2006:653,659).
States devise foreign policies based on constraints from their perceived inter-
national environment or “psychological milieu” and implement foreign policy in
the real world or “operational milieu” (Jervis 1976:145). Here, Walt and Jervis
draw on Merton’s work: the thesis about a hostile state becomes self-fulfilling.
The belief of a potential divide between the United States and China is suddenly
no longer illusory. The actual course of events—that China did not join the TPP
and instead launched the alternative RCEP—is taken as proof that Washington’s
initial thesis about a revisionist or even offensive China was correct.34
Governments are relatively unable to consider alternative views once they have
established an image about another actor. Jervis (2005:117, 121) refers to this as
“cognitive bias” and “cherry-picking”: governments adopt data that supports the
pre-established image at the expense of more valid data that would undermine
it. They will discredit the source of discrepant information or disregard it, or
interpret new information and find new data which fits with their established
image.35
Therefore, even if the environment is not “murky” to read, decision makers
start from “predispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and to
neglect others” and governments therefore merely absorb a selection of the
material world.36 State leaders and decision makers also interpret feedback from
the system differently (Taliaferro et al. 2009:28–31). For example, with discourse
over the Chinese threat inflated over the past 20 years, even when US decision
makers receive information which contradicts this thesis, it is likely to be inter-
preted as compatible with the pre-established image. Thus if the Chinese annual
military spending growth rate slows, this is not interpreted as evidence of a more
peaceable grand strategy, but a consequence of economic growth slowing
down.37 Chinese military budgets and economic growth figures are more likely
34
See Merton (1957:422–423), Jervis (1976:76–77, 2006:651–657, 2012:398–399), and Walt (1985:26).
35
See Jervis (1976:10, 45–46, 291–294, 410–413, 1988:680–692, 2006:646–653), and Wohlforth (1993:298–299).
36
See Jervis (1976:198–199), Christensen (1997), Rose (1998:152), and Van Evera (1999).
37
This example is inspired by Jervis’ case study of the Soviet Union (Jervis 1976:143–144, 410).
Michiel Foulon 653
to be read in support of the threat discourse rather than as any substantiation of

more peaceful behavior.
The American and Chinese governments operated their policies in different
predefined geopolitical structures. Walt’s (1985, 1987) main contribution is that
states devise foreign policies in response to leaders’ perceived offensive capabili-
ties and threatening intentions: later theorized as the “balance of threat.” Sch-
weller argues that states do not operate in a one and the same material
structure, but in different perceived environments. During World War II—his
main case study—Stalin and Hitler, although subject to the same material struc-
ture, operated in different perceived geopolitical contexts. Stalin operated in a
tripolar European system and overestimated the strength of France and Britain
in 1939–1940, while Hitler operated his grand strategy in a bipolar European sys-
tem (Schweller 1998:167–169). Similarly, Wohlforth (1993:7–13), developing his
case that power is elusive rather than easily measurable in material terms, argues
that “One analyst’s unipolarity can be another’s bipolarity.” Thus, state leaders
operate their strategies in different perceived geopolitical structures.
We can then clarify a missing link between state leaders’ perceptions and soci-
ety. Leaders create different predefined geopolitical settings, within which for-
eign policies represent domestic interest groups. A change in decision makers’
perceived structural environment alters the dimensions of the foreign policy-
making process. It triggers changes in foreign policies deployed within this envi-
ronment, even though the material environment has not altered. States do
respond to domestic commercial pressures—but perceptions of the structure
lead them to pursue policies within the structure of the system (Little 2009:28–
30). Agents are subject to pressure from domestic commercial interest groups
within the predefined geopolitical structure in which they operate. If this is
shaped at least in part by the perceptions of decision makers, and states operate
in different predefined geopolitical contexts, then it is important to incorporate
these state-level variables in any explanation of state behavior and foreign policy.
Thus NCR not only bridges the spatial divide between domestic and interna-
tional levels, but also the cognitive and temporal divide: state-level assessments
and imaginations about future material capabilities create the geopolitical con-
tours for the formation of foreign policy.38 NCR demonstrates how and why for-
eign policies and state behavior are not always in line with structural incentives
or domestic interests. It accounts for the foreign policy which we observe in the
real world.
Conclusion
This article has dealt with NCR as a theoretical framework through which to
explain foreign policy in light of its liberal and constructivist rivals. The Wend-
tian constructivist approach offers yet another structural explanation—albeit a
“socially constructed” one—and fails to meet the expectations of the multilevel
analysis at the center of this article. The TLG approach, apparently suitable at
first glance, is limited: the sole theoretical link between the domestic and inter-
national level is that of the negotiator, and the structure of the “negotiation
game” is taken as given. Moravcsik’s liberalism helps bring the domestic level
back to the center of the study of foreign policy and world politics. Yet this also
fell short: by ignoring geopolitical factors as a necessary variable with which to
explain state behavior and treating state leaders as passive observers of structural
incentives.
38
Overlap between Jervis’s earlier work and NCR exists in the levels of analysis. Yet Jervis does not prioritize
either, and argues that this is an empirically driven question (Jervis 1976:15–41, 2012:396–397).
The objective of NCR is to better explain foreign policy than alternative

schools. This article considered the examples of France’s foreign policy in the
late 1950s and the United States’ recent rebalancing to East Asia. Theoretical
approaches that focus on either structural or domestic factors cannot account
for these examples. Neither a Waltzian nor Wendtian structural approach can
explain the American forward military strategy in East Asia; and according to
Moravcsik’s premise, the TPP negotiations should already include China.
The question was therefore not whether international or domestic pressures
compel states, but rather: what can states do after domestic political concerns are
incorporated in a structural approach? By bridging the spatial, cognitive, and
temporal divide, a number of events can be explained. De Gaulle’s foreign pol-
icy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and American foreign policy in East Asia
today, demonstrate that answering this question requires analyses of both the
anarchical international structure and domestic commercial interests. What mat-
ters is not what states have to do because the structure compels them so (as
Waltz and Wendt would want us to believe). Looking at what domestic interest
groups want states to do (as Moravcsik suggests) is also unsatisfactory.
Rather, what can states do within the predefined geopolitical context? How
did the French and American governments respectively respond to domestic
commercial pressures within their predefined geopolitical contexts? NCR
explains why states may adopt certain foreign policies, which would otherwise
appear suboptimal, despite clear shifts in domestic economic interests. The struc-
tural context of foreign policy is predominant and enjoys analytical supremacy
over domestic interests.
Structural incentives shape the contours of state behavior—but other factors
are also important. First, state-level perceptions of the temporal proximity of
international threats set the geopolitical setting within which any foreign and
economic policy decision is deployed. Second, NCR allows for state-level assess-
ment of the timeframe of international pressures: whether a threat in the inter-
national system is forecast in the near or more distant future affects the
domestic political economy and formation of foreign policy.
NCR bridges three divides: spatial (domestic–international), cognitive (mate-
rial–ideational), and temporal (present–future). By focusing solely on structural
pressures, we expect certain foreign policy decisions. Similarly, domestic factors
alone cannot account for trends that diverge from shifts in the domestic political
economy. Structural incentives shape the broad contours of foreign policy; but
the variation between states’ foreign policies under similar structural pressures is
explained by incorporating the perceptual variable and pressure of domestic
commercial interest groups on leaders and decision makers.
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International Studies Review (2015) 17, 635–661

Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and

This article anchors neoclassical realism (NCR) as a solid theoretical

Neoclassical Realism vis-

Neoclassical Realism as an Extension of Neorealism

A Structural-Level Challenger: Wendtian Constructivism

Wendtian Constructivism as a Criticism of Neorealism

James, Patrick. (2009) Elaborating on Offensive Realism. In Rethinking Realism in International

A Two-level Challenger: Putnam’s TLG Liberalism

Connecting Domestic and International Affairs

1993:397–430). TLG responds to earlier approaches that ignore the domestic

A Domestic-level Challenger: Moravcsik’s Liberal Theory

Shortcomings in Moravcsik’s Liberal Argument

Europe [in 1961–1964] (. . .) is concerned primarily with agriculture.” Similarly,

The State-Level between Structural Pressure and Outcome

international and domestic levels of analysis.29 For Moravcsik, state leaders

The Triple Bridging Identity of NCR

Neoclassical realism literature has developed a range of state-level intervening

The Spatial Divide: State Power and Domestic Resources

preparedness, and population (Mearsheimer 2001:55–137). Yet state govern-

of power that affects states (neorealism). As Schuett (2010:81–82) explains:

The Cognitive and Temporal Divides: Assessments and Time Frames

future superpower in the early 1990s. Schweller (1998:200–201) argues that as a

US Rebalancing to East Asia

If US strategy is only triggered by neorealist structural incentives—such as the

Developing a Predefined Geopolitical Structure

to be read in support of the threat discourse rather than as any substantiation of

The objective of NCR is to better explain foreign policy than alternative

James, Patrick. (2009) Elaborating on Offensive Realism. In Rethinking Realism in International

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